Intelligence-Led Operations: Business as Usual or Paradigm Shift?

[Jobu]

Greetings, SWC. I am currently working on a related SAW thesis and have hit a snag on nailing down what “intelligence-led operations” really are. My hope is to generate a discussion that can tap into the conventional wisdom on the concept, as well get some thoughts on my ideas for expanding it. Anyway, on to my points…

The term “intelligence-led operations” is frequently used to describe our activities in Iraq and Afghanistan, yet one would be hard-pressed to find a single, overarching definition or theory behind it. A few sources on “intelligence-led policing” and the FM 3-24 discussions on “intelligence-driven operations” are the closest thing I’ve found to a theory. The following points are my best attempt to paraphrase the theory from these sources.

Intelligence-led operations…
- Are operations driven by intelligence, rather than vice versa.
- Subsequently produce the intelligence that drives further operations.
- Require intelligence personnel to take a pro-active, rather than passive, role in collecting intelligence.
- Requires operators to be intelligence collectors.

As I read the verbiage behind these points, I kept asking myself if there’s really anything new or different here from the typical intelligence-operations relationship. Using the first two points, one could argue that “reconnaissance pull” and the targeting process are forms of intelligence-led operations. The last two points should be standard operating procedure for any type of operation/environment.

If there’s nothing new here, has the term become a euphemism for tactical-level operations based on something other than a developed course of action with well-defined decision points and supporting intelligence requirements? Are these operations with no clear linkage to the campaign objectives and endstate? Although there may be an element of truth to these questions, I don’t believe they or the points above accurately describe the concept as we know and practice it.

Here’s my shot at a better definition/theory: intelligence-led operations are purposeful interactions with adversary systems for the purpose of gaining understanding and leverage. They are therefore applicable to any type of campaign and should be incorporated into the operational design, not simply left to the tactical level. Now here’s what I think is the most important part…to fully incorporate intelligence-LED (vs. intelligence-DRIVEN) operations into a campaign design, intelligence must be its own logical line of operations. Thus, classic fire and maneuver operations must sometimes be designed to support intelligence, instead of vice versa.

These last two points have been admittedly borrowed from LG William Boykin and Shimon Naveh, respectively. This ops/intel paradigm shift they’re describing, I believe, is necessary to conduct “systems thinking” at the operational level.

That's where I'm at so far. Hopefully I've made sense. I'm looking forward to the discussion.

V/R,

Jason Brown

[Tom Odom]

Hi Jason, I sure dig that Eddie Murphy-Albert Einstein look on your avatar:wry:

Major League is it not? :wry:

Anyway big topic and one I hope yuou will get some insights from...

My take as a long term analyst here is best described in the CALL Special Study Transfroming the Staff for the 21st Century. You can download that on the CALL gateway. I put it as a doctrinal mark we have yet to hit because of the way MI (in the Army) is structured, manned, and promoted. WM has some views on this as well.

We have made some adjustments in the past 5 years--notably the realization driven by operations and the CTCs (JRTC in particular) that we have to have an intel capability at company level in this kind of fight. It took several years but Benning and Huachuca finally got on board--with prodding from AWG. Look at the Tactical Intelligence Newsletter on the CALL Gateway and all of the Company-level SOS series (especially VOLS 1 and 3 as well as 6 which should be out soon) SWJ contributed to that effort.

Best

Tom

[Stan]

Hey Jason and welcome !
Please take a few minutes and introduce yourself here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1441&page=20).


Greetings, SWC. I am currently working on a related SAW thesis and have hit a snag on nailing down what “intelligence-led operations” really are.

Intelligence-led operations…
- Are operations driven by intelligence, rather than vice versa.

Operations are supported by intel and later modified by same. Driven doesn't seem to fit...guided works better for me having had to do both simultaneously as a member of a two-man team.




- Subsequently produce the intelligence that drives further operations.

Again, I don't think 'drives it' is quite on the mark.



- Require intelligence personnel to take a pro-active, rather than passive, role in collecting intelligence.

Not sure what you want to say here. For example, DIA specifically directs collection and targets. Passive sounds rather lame or lazy.



- Requires operators to be intelligence collectors.

I need a little more definition of operator. Requires exactly 'who'? Trained collectors or the average, everyday soldier ?

To You and Yours a Safe and Happy Holiday, Stan

[Jobu]

Thanks for the inputs, gents. Tom, I'm not familiar with the CALL Gateway...how do I access?

Stan, all good questions. The passive vs. active question is something I've been working on specifically. This is really a matter of perspective. DIA and other 3-letter agencies would argue they are active rather than passive. Doctrinally mil intel collects what the PIRs tell them to collect (somewhat passive, wouldn't you say?). Another interpretation is that the method of collection is passive (taking pictures, listening to comms, and most forms of human intelligence). This last point is really gets to the point of intel-led operations in my opinion.

Modern adversaries "maneuver below our discrimination threshold" as the Aussies have said in "Adaptive Campaigning". Passive sensors just aren't going to distinguish these targets...unless you find a way to get the adversary to operate above the threshold. I don't think this is a new idea...exposing adversaries with decoys is a similar if not the same concept. I just don't think it is intuitive among intelligence professionals or typical operators (average aircrew or combat arms types) in Small Wars as of yet...at least not above the tactical level.

[Ken White]

. . .
Modern adversaries "maneuver below our discrimination threshold" as the Aussies have said in "Adaptive Campaigning". Passive sensors just aren't going to distinguish these targets...unless you find a way to get the adversary to operate above the threshold. I don't think this is a new idea...exposing adversaries with decoys is a similar if not the same concept...the intel aspects -- but I'll address them first. Just one quick thought there; getting a competent adversary (and fortunately, most are not that competent in my observation) to operate above that discrimination threshold is all too frequently a matter of luck or the adversary's incompetence -- which is not a matter of solace as the good ones least likely to rise above the threshold are the most dangerous. Thus the more sensible option IMO is to actively pursue indicators.

Active pursuit of information or, the transcending part, active efforts of operation will typically entail risk. Sometimes personal, sometimes to the innocent, frequently to own forces or assets and even more frequently to he or she who direct initiation of those active measures. The former three risk aspects are physical and can result in deaths or casualties; the latter may be physical but more often, the perceived risk is to reputation and job security.

We are today a risk averse society. We are also encumbered by a DoD and service culture that has effectively not really been at war for 62 years (though elements of the services most certainly have been to a number of wars in that time) and that has been increasingly bureaucratized to the point where protection of the institutions takes precedence in too many cases over what needs to be done. We have an intensely -- perhaps too intensely -- competitive selection and promotion system that discourages radicals and, frequently, innovative thinking. We have a budget process that encourages parochialism and finger pointing for fiscal advantage.

The point of all that is that I agree with the rest of your comment:

"...I just don't think it is intuitive among intelligence professionals or typical operators (average aircrew or combat arms types) in Small Wars as of yet...at least not above the tactical level.(emphasis added / kw)
The guys who have to get it done generally do, one way or another -- but they do so at some risk to themselves. For echelons above Battalion / Squadron (all types), I sense strong aversion to risk not universally but all too frequently. I think it is intuitively grasped at upper level -- but is also instinctively rejected for the reasons I cited above.

That raises in my mind two questions. First, back to the Intel piece. Consider that if we remain in the reactive mode and are reluctant to encourage risk taking; if our opponents are smart enough to stay off the radar screen; if being 'right,' 'staying in our lane' and doing things 'correctly' is more important than getting a 75% solution to the folks who need it BEFORE they need it -- or even know they need it (and IMO, that is the goal of Intel led operations) -- are we doing what we should be doing?

The second question is operational; with basically the same considerations except that getting a 75% probability of mission success is adequate to launch -- but we don't because we want a 90% probability -- are we not doing what we should be doing?

[Rifleman]

I don't know what it means strategically, but tactically I think it could be summed up as "recon pull" not "command push."

[Ken White]

I don't know what it means strategically, but tactically I think it could be summed up as "recon pull" not "command push."

Lost me......:confused:

Well, I'd like to stay and chat but we're outa here at O-dark-30 for points north; be out of the net for a week.

The issue in my mind is not pull or push -- I'm with Wilf on that, don't agree with either 'concept.' I'm trying to raise the issue of willingness to take risks, not methodology. Command climate and techniques.

In any event gotta go. Merry Christmas to all.

Danny, only question I have is what, exactly, is hanging from Chucky's lip -- is that a cigarette or... :)

[Jobu]

Fellas,

Obviously you have not seen "Major League" which is perhaps the most significant film produced in America in the last 20 years. :D
This will enlighten you...
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AkFbqp8llzU
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cj88wMKWHzU

Ok, seriously...Ken, I think you make some outstanding points. If I understand you correctly, Intel-led ops require taking a (relatively) significant risk to expose the adversary...which subsequently may or may not occur. Because of our risk-averse mindset, we may not be willing to do what it takes to put energy in to a system to gain understanding...e.g., we are not culturally prepared for "the paradigm shift." Fascinating. I'll have to ponder this over the Holidays with some rum.

[Tom Odom]

Thanks for the inputs, gents. Tom, I'm not familiar with the CALL Gateway...how do I access?

go to CALL.army.mil (http://call.army.mil/)

I believe you still have to submit a request as a non-Army type but permission comes relatively quickly. Click on DOD users log-in and that takes you to here: (https://call2.army.mil/login.asp)

CALL Supplied Login For Contractors or any other users not covered by the groups above (to include the sister services [USMC, USAF, USN, USCG, and Govt Service]). Click here to request a CALL Supplied Login.

[wm]

Fellas,

Obviously you have not seen "Major League" which is perhaps the most significant film produced in America in the last 20 years. :D

Great film but it falls a distant third to Pulp Fiction and Fargo.
I am personally partial to Wild Thing's zig zag haircut and Willy Mays Hayes' basestealing style. Welcome aboard.

On a serious note, as Tom noted, I do have some thoughts on the issue of intel-led ops but have not yet had time to peruse everyon'e post. Work is keeping me a little busy today. I'll post back soon though after I've had a chance to digest what folks have said.

[Penta]

My take as a long term analyst here is best described in the CALL Special Study Transfroming the Staff for the 21st Century. You can download that on the CALL gateway. I put it as a doctrinal mark we have yet to hit because of the way MI (in the Army) is structured, manned, and promoted. WM has some views on this as well.

The docs you mention - are they available to the general public? I'd love to read them, if I could find them...

[wm]

As a quick response, I think that intel-led operations is a lot like "actionable intelligence." Each may well be a catch phrase used to cover up operators' unhappiness with the quality of intelligence that they receive. Intelligence is provided as a result of a request for information from an operator. So, if the stuff an operator gets isn't good enough, then I submit the first place to look is at the questions that the operator asks.

I acknowledge that sometimes the operators are unsure or unaware of what they need to know and therefore do not know what kind of questions to ask their intel folks (or that they even need to ask their intel guys any questions at all.) When one is in such a situation, then an enterprising intel staff guy should be albe to belly up to the bar and help the Cdr and 3 out with some "gentle" prompting and hinting. This might be the best description of intel-led operations

If we view Intel as broadly divided into I &W and long term studies, then each piece has a part to play in intel-led operations. I & W products give the entire force a heads up that it may need to take or to avoid certain actions now or in the near future--this is like reacting to an air raid siren. Studies provide a commander and staff with some parameters about the bad guy. These parameters suggest likely efficacy or probable ineffectiveness of certain actions by friendly forces against the opponent . These pieces, like many other things--the NORs/NORM rates that come from the loggies and the personnel strength report that comes from the S1/G1 staff for instance--help inform the plan that ultimately results from effective use of the the entire staff. But, we don't have "materiel-led operations" or "morning report-led" operations do we?

[Rifleman]

Lost me......:confused:

Unfortunately, in struggling to articulate my thought by saying "recon pull, not command push," I chose a phrase from a source that comes under much scrutiny from board members here. Bear with me, I'll see if I can explain myself a little better.

It seems to me that at a tactical level sometimes an operation needs to be conducted based on recent information. This might need to happen even if the operation does not contribute to a strategic objective.

For example, a drug strategy might center around prevention and treatment, not interdiction. Still, at a local level, you may get a tip about a meth lab in your jurisdiction. Taking down the lab is a tactical operation that will probably contribute little to the strategy. You need to take it down anyway.

So intelligence pulled you to a tactical course of action different than the strategic course of action that the policy makers were pushing.

Am I making sense or just rambling away?

It seems like this would relevant to small wars because a constabulary force may have to act on information for security or peacekeeping purposes even if it does nothing toward achieving strategic goals.

Am I wrong on that?

[Ron Humphrey]

Unfortunately, in struggling to articulate my thought I chose a phrase from a source that comes under much scrutiny from board members here. Bear with me, I'll see if I can explain myself a little better.

It seems to me that at a tactical level sometimes an operation needs to be conducted based on recent information. This might need to happen even if the operation does not contribute to a strategic objective.

For example, a drug strategy might center around prevention and treatment, not interdiction. Still, at a local level, you may get a tip about a meth lab in your jurisdiction. Taking down the lab is a tactical operation that will probably contribute little to the strategy. You need to take it down anyway.

So intelligence pulled you to a tactical course of action different than the strategic course of action that the policy makers were pushing.

Am I making sense or just rambling away? It seems like this would relevant to small wars. Am I wrong on that?

I think what your referring to ties in very much to what the overall Intelligence led Operations attempts to accomplish, at least in my understanding. If tactical awareness and experience become drivers for WM's which question's to ask, then the long term result might be a better awarenes at all levels of what the big and small pictures are and when shifts take place therein.

It's sort of like having a beat cop who had thirty five on the force most of which were on the streets with the people but some of which were in the jailhouses, and then some in the more political management arena.

The greatest part of what that person can accomplish as the police chief would be their ability to know which questions to ask in order to understand whats happening. Then they are at the same time mentoring both their law enforcement side partners and their political side partners. The ultimate end one would hope would equal a much more effective and reliable path to success, much of which would have been determined through good application and understanding of intelligence from all levels and sides.

I don't know if that made sense or just added to the confusion but I gave it a shot:confused:

[Jobu]

Thanks for the inputs everyone. I'm not surprised by the law enforcement analogies...intel-led ops came from intel-led policing...specifically the Brit experience in N. Ireland.

Much like a L.E. scenario, I understand that a lot of this is based on tips and reactions to "hot" info. I'm wrestling with whether or not this has a broader applicability than counterinsurgency/L.E. (i.e. this is in fact a subset of recon-pull). I'll get back to you on that one.

I will say WM brings up a good point on "actionable intelligence"...a term I've come to loathe.

A retired SOF officer told me recently, "Who determines whether intelligence is 'actionable'? It's the one who has to make the decision to take action...which means the definition varies from decisionmaker to decsionmaker. If you want intelligence, take action!"

Thanks for the info Tom...I'll definitely check it out.

[William F. Owen]

The issue in my mind is not pull or push -- I'm with Wilf on that, don't agree with either 'concept.' I'm trying to raise the issue of willingness to take risks, not methodology. Command climate and techniques.


That's an excellent way to put it! Many many thanks. Hand me another and we should be able to bury MW!! :)

[William F. Owen]

Gentleman,

When were well run operations ever not intelligence lead?

I think the concept of intelligence lead operations is meaningless for than reason.

When I worked in the G2/intelligence business, we had folks swapping back and forth from Bosnia, Germany, Belize and Northern Ireland. The Commanders requirements for Intelligence always remain basically the same.

If an IO anywhere in the world, in any conflict is seeking to equip his commander with who the enemy are, what they are doing and where they are in time and space, he is not doing much wrong. If you break all Intelligence requirements down to Intention and Location, you can do pretty good.

[Tom Odom]

The docs you mention - are they available to the general public? I'd love to read them, if I could find them...

Penta,

Sorry they are not,

Tom

[Tom Odom]

When were well run operations ever not intelligence lead?

Depending on how you define "well run" quite often as a matter of fact. That is the point: That well run ops must be intel driven. In many cases they are not even close.

Tom

[William F. Owen]

.

Intelligence-led operations…
- Are operations driven by intelligence, rather than vice versa.
- Subsequently produce the intelligence that drives further operations.
- Require intelligence personnel to take a pro-active, rather than passive, role in collecting intelligence.
- Requires operators to be intelligence collectors.


I can't see anything new here. These are what UK officers would call "SOBO" - Statements Of the Bl**dy Obvious.


Depending on how you define "well run" quite often as a matter of fact. That is the point: That well run ops must be intel driven. In many cases they are not even close.


So how would an operation to secure a refugee camp be "Intel Driven?" The orders paragraph "situation hostile/enemy forces" tells me the threat, so I plan on that basis. I am being given the mission as a result of an intelligence estimate that resources need to be allocated to protecting these folks.

If someone tells me to conduct operations to gain intelligence then that's as old as the hills.

Even in a WW1 UK Infantry Battalion, you had Sniper Intelligence Sections. In fact a huge amount of activity was focussed on collecting information about who was opposite them and what they were doing.

From the US perspective look at MACV-SOG - the vast majority of that organisations efforts were operations aimed at securing intelligence and a great many, if not nearly all, operations were launched as a result of intelligence gained from other operations.

[wm]

I can't see anything new here. These are what UK officers would call "SOBO" - Statements Of the Bl**dy Obvious.



So how would an operation to secure a refugee camp be "Intel Driven?" The orders paragraph "situation hostile/enemy forces" tells me the threat, so I plan on that basis. I am being given the mission as a result of an intelligence estimate that resources need to be allocated to protecting these folks.



While it may be SOBO, it is as often missing as present in the mission planning cycle, IMHO. The second paragraph is so laden wuth assumptions as to be scary. For starters, it presumes that the "situation" paragraph and intel estimate are read and understood by the operators. It also presumes that these two items have meaningful content instead of just wishful thinking and that that content instead of, again, wishful thinking motivates the mission assignment by higher HQ.

Your assertions remind me of the scenes from "The Magnificant Seven" when the villagers are asked by Harry Luck (played by Brad Dexter) about where they hide their gold and when he rifds back into town to his death, simply becuae he cannot believe that tthere is no gold in town,.

[Stan]

Hey Wilf !




So how would an operation to secure a refugee camp be "Intel Driven?" The orders paragraph "situation hostile/enemy forces" tells me the threat, so I plan on that basis. I am being given the mission as a result of an intelligence estimate that resources need to be allocated to protecting these folks.

If someone tells me to conduct operations to gain intelligence then that's as old as the hills.

Sounds a little off the beaten path with those orders. How ‘bout no general orders (read no idea whatsoever), but an initial assessment that you perform yourself (we could call that intel). Planning on a refugee crisis is anything but easy, and the situation changes with such frequency, that ‘driven by whatever’ will never work; each and every single day is a new one.

Tom can certainly tell you in grave detail, that there was no intelligence estimate for our refugee crisis, because we were sent there to perform said, conclude our assessment, drive the proverbial support train, and support those coming.

Yes, it was indeed Intel Driven.

Regards, Stan

[Jobu]

Gents,

Part of the problem here is that we believe the initial assessment will guide us through planning and well into execution. We plan, launch, and sustain operations based on the a priori knowledge from these initial assessments. Subsequent ISR efforts doctrinally shift to “direct support of current and future operations,” meaning collection efforts to support ongoing analysis of the adversary system fall behind that of targeting and other operational requirements. In other words, we place a high level of accuracy in an initial assessment and any new evidence during the course of operations tends to be viewed deductively, resulting in slow adaptation to the flaws in logic that are ultimately exposed.

I guess my point is we should admit that we don't have it right from the beginning and design specific operations to purposefully gain intelligence.

Running these operations off of the traditional "priority intelligence requirements" I believe is infeasible. Rather than trying to give collectors (and the operators supporting them) nebulous questions to answer, why don't we give them intelligence [I]objectives[I]....something like a mission statement (task and purpose)? Instead of defeat, neutralize, destroy, we'd use action verbs such as locate, determine, verify, etc.

I've been very frustrated by the PIR process. I think we need to accept that centering our collection efforts entirely around the commander's decisionmaking needs isn't enough to gain understanding of modern adversaries.

[slapout9]

Greetings, SWC. I am currently working on a related SAW thesis and have hit a snag on nailing down what “intelligence-led operations” really are. My hope is to generate a discussion that can tap into the conventional wisdom on the concept, as well get some thoughts on my ideas for expanding it. Anyway, on to my points…

The term “intelligence-led operations” is frequently used to describe our activities in Iraq and Afghanistan, yet one would be hard-pressed to find a single, overarching definition or theory behind it. A few sources on “intelligence-led policing” and the FM 3-24 discussions on “intelligence-driven operations” are the closest thing I’ve found to a theory. The following points are my best attempt to paraphrase the theory from these sources.

Intelligence-led operations…
- Are operations driven by intelligence, rather than vice versa.
- Subsequently produce the intelligence that drives further operations.
- Require intelligence personnel to take a pro-active, rather than passive, role in collecting intelligence.
- Requires operators to be intelligence collectors.

As I read the verbiage behind these points, I kept asking myself if there’s really anything new or different here from the typical intelligence-operations relationship. Using the first two points, one could argue that “reconnaissance pull” and the targeting process are forms of intelligence-led operations. The last two points should be standard operating procedure for any type of operation/environment.

If there’s nothing new here, has the term become a euphemism for tactical-level operations based on something other than a developed course of action with well-defined decision points and supporting intelligence requirements? Are these operations with no clear linkage to the campaign objectives and endstate? Although there may be an element of truth to these questions, I don’t believe they or the points above accurately describe the concept as we know and practice it.

Here’s my shot at a better definition/theory: intelligence-led operations are purposeful interactions with adversary systems for the purpose of gaining understanding and leverage. They are therefore applicable to any type of campaign and should be incorporated into the operational design, not simply left to the tactical level. Now here’s what I think is the most important part…to fully incorporate intelligence-LED (vs. intelligence-DRIVEN) operations into a campaign design, intelligence must be its own logical line of operations. Thus, classic fire and maneuver operations must sometimes be designed to support intelligence, instead of vice versa.

These last two points have been admittedly borrowed from LG William Boykin and Shimon Naveh, respectively. This ops/intel paradigm shift they’re describing, I believe, is necessary to conduct “systems thinking” at the operational level.

That's where I'm at so far. Hopefully I've made sense. I'm looking forward to the discussion.

V/R,

Jason Brown

Hi Jabu, I don't know if this will help but from a "Slapout Systems Thinking" point of view this paper may interest you.

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/grieco2.html

[Ron Humphrey]

Hi Jabu, I don't know if this will help but from a "Slapout Systems Thinking" point of view this paper may interest you.

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/grieco2.html

Gonna read the whole thing but I like this first part a lot


Thought is the basis of theory. Theory is the basis for doctrine. Doctrine is the basis for operational practice. Operational practice refines our thought. Today we’ll continue our journey through thought and theory by looking at system control points.

[wm]

Gents,

Part of the problem here is that we believe the initial assessment will guide us through planning and well into execution. We plan, launch, and sustain operations based on the a priori knowledge from these initial assessments. Subsequent ISR efforts doctrinally shift to “direct support of current and future operations,” meaning collection efforts to support ongoing analysis of the adversary system fall behind that of targeting and other operational requirements. In other words, we place a high level of accuracy in an initial assessment and any new evidence during the course of operations tends to be viewed deductively, resulting in slow adaptation to the flaws in logic that are ultimately exposed.

I guess my point is we should admit that we don't have it right from the beginning and design specific operations to purposefully gain intelligence.

Running these operations off of the traditional "priority intelligence requirements" I believe is infeasible. Rather than trying to give collectors (and the operators supporting them) nebulous questions to answer, why don't we give them intelligence [I]objectives[I]....something like a mission statement (task and purpose)? Instead of defeat, neutralize, destroy, we'd use action verbs such as locate, determine, verify, etc.

I've been very frustrated by the PIR process. I think we need to accept that centering our collection efforts entirely around the commander's decisionmaking needs isn't enough to gain understanding of modern adversaries.

If the PIR are nebulous questions, then you can bet the operation is not being adequately supported by intelligence. A PIR ought to be narrowly focussed, designed to tell a commander whether, at a given place and time the enemy is reacting as expected or not. If the answer is "not," then the commander and staff should have some alternatives ready to FRAGO to the unit based on what answer comes in to a given PIR.

As I posted earlier, a good intel shop does both Current Intel and studies. CuRIN (what I earlier called I & W) work answers those PIRs. The Studies cell provides the effort to gain understanding of one's current or future adversaries. Work done by the studies shop is what allows the commander and staff to identify what kinds of enemy actions to expect at those critical points in space and time which ar ethe focci of the PIR. If the enemy does not respond as expected, it is the Studies Section's responsibility to figure out why and readjust what we know as true aout the adversary. This may require additional collection taskings. It is likely that the level at which this additional work must be completed will be above that at which the current operation is being planned and executed, if for no other reason than a lack of analytic and dedicated collection resources.

Part of the in-fighting over who will have procurement responsibility for UAVs manifests the problem with control of collection reources.

[Erick]

... that we have to have an intel capability at company level in this kind of fight. It took several years but Benning and Huachuca finally got on board--with prodding from AWG. Look at the Tactical Intelligence Newsletter on the CALL Gateway and all of the Company-level SOS series (especially VOLS 1 and 3 as well as 6 which should be out soon) SWJ contributed to that effort.


Interesting observation. My co started doing this about half way through our deployment. We did not do this when we patrolled a heavily populated urban area; our CO initiated it only after we moved to a rural area bordering on a urban area.

Being that we were a NG infantry unit, we had cops in the unit with investigations experience. Two of the three who ended up working the Co -2 position had previously worked gang enforcement / investigations on the L/E side of things.

It was a lot of incident / location analysis and matching who was with who, plus trying to match that with information coming down from above.

Pushing the intel issue down to the Co level can only help - in so many ways.

[S. Robb Col USMC (Ret)]

Jason,
You've hit on an interesting and often debated question especially between intelligence analysts and operators. During OEF and OIF intelligence and operations were "mutually supporting." I use this because intelligence provided the targets for operations...after conduct of the operation, intelligence was gathered which would lead to addtional targets. Once we were weaned off conventional order of battle targets and started full-fledged man hunting operations, intelligence again provided the information required for ops to capture or kill the individual. At other times, the ops themselves yielded "enablers" on the spot which could be exploited immediately to lead to another larger or more lucrative target.
I was the JIC commander during OEF and OIF (2001-2004). I may be able to assist you in your paper with some better concrete examples. My email is robb_stephen@bah.com.
Semper Fi,
Steve