Optimizing the Marine Corps for small wars

[Granite_State]

I'm sure this idea has been floated by folks both smarter and much more experienced than me, but I can't remember an SWC thread on it. With the ongoing debate about how to prepare the ground forces for both the full spectrum of small wars and the threat of major conventional war, how about letting the Marines focus on small wars, with maybe amphibious/forced entry as a secondary field? I'm in the Van Creveld camp, that nuclear weapons have virtually ended the threat of great power war, but I think it's a small camp, and even if he's right there are plenty of other possibilities for conventional war (Korea). The Army could maintain it's greatly enhanced small wars knowledge, but make that a secondary mission, in the background but not forgotten.

Letting the Marines focus on small wars would also seem to do away with the need for an Army Advisory Corps, the Marines could carry out that function, maybe dispersed more widely throughout Marine ground combat arms. If we're not listening to Steve Metz and we get caught in another big small war like Iraq, the Marines would be there first and serve as mentors of sorts to Army troops joining the fight.

Thoughts, negatives?

[MattC86]

I remember reading a historian describe the Marine Corps as the ultimate force for fighting "non-Western enemies." Basically saying that both in the Corps' history and their current organization, they were optimized for light-infantry war against non-mechanized enemies in difficult or urban terrain. To a degree, this is true - even with the Abrams tank and the AAV or EFV "maneuver element" a MarDiv still does not and will not have the TO&E designed to fight an enemy mechanized division. It probably could do so within the MAGTF concept, but that's not what it's optimized for.

This is an interesting idea, but I don't think it's going anywhere, because of (as Ken White would say) parochialism and turf wars. That Vietnam attitude of "it ain't much of a war, but it's the only one we got" means that everyone will want to get their piece of the pie, even if a service isn't optimized for it (see the AF and COIN operations). The Army wouldn't stand on the sidelines if a pair of MEUs conducted ops in Somalia, say, and the Marine Corps wouldn't allow itself to stand on the sidelines if the Army had to fight the North Koreans. No service will willingly relinquish a particular mission, particularly one so currently important as IW/COIN because it means loss of pride/prestige and loss of funds.

Nonetheless, the advantages are numerous:

-minimizes capability and mission redundancy between USA and USMC
-takes advantage of MAGTF concept and MEU deployability
-would institutionalize small wars within an entire service, and perhaps shape training, equipment procurement, and doctrine towards those missions
among others. . .

The disadvantages I see include massive increased strain on Marine Corps deployment schedules (as such crises requiring intervention could be a constant fixture of the geopolitical landscape), encouraging the Army to ignore COIN and prepare for the "big war," and potentially weakening the Marine Corps ability to prepare for high-intensity conflicts like a forced entry or Korea-style conflict.

The main concern I have is that I think the US has too many interests and too many potential conflict scenarios to afford the luxury of optimizing a 200,000 man force specifically for IW/COIN. We must keep shaping and molding our GP forces, allowing them to be jacks-of-all-trades (and masters of none) rather than risk being caught flat-footed and unprepared for a particular threat.

The Army and Marine Corps will forever complement each other's capabilities, and that isn't a bad thing.

Matt

[tequila]

Not the thinking of the current CMC. Most of what we are hearing out of that office tends towards the "forget Iraq and COIN, let's get back to our kinetic, expeditionary, amphibious warfare role."

Also the USMC is the smallest service and frankly is unable to provide the number of "boots on the ground" required to take the lead role in any major counterinsurgency campaign involving a nation of any size.

[MattC86]

Not the thinking of the current CMC. Most of what we are hearing out of that office tends towards the "forget Iraq and COIN, let's get back to our kinetic, expeditionary, amphibious warfare role."

Also the USMC is the smallest service and frankly is unable to provide the number of "boots on the ground" required to take the lead role in any major counterinsurgency campaign involving a nation of any size.

Question for you. Do you think that Gen. Conway's nixed proposal to take the Corps to Afghanistan and play whack-a-mole (to appropriate Eden's term) with the Taliban is rooted in an aversion to COIN and an affinity for "kinetic, expeditionary" operations?

Because while fighting Taliban guerillas may be more kinetic than patrolling the streets of al-Anbar and collecting garbage, I think it's still very much a COIN operation. . .

Matt

[TT]

Granite State posted: With the ongoing debate about how to prepare the ground forces for both the full spectrum of small wars and the threat of major conventional war, how about letting the Marines focus on small wars, with maybe amphibious/forced entry as a secondary field?

Steve Metz and Frank Hoffman wrote a piece that laid out a number of options re the roles and missions of the Army and the MC. This was one of the options. One of the others was they divide up R&M regionally (I think the suggestion was the Corps take the Pacific). Again, my memory fails me as to where they published this and a very quick troll through my files did not locate it (but I have it somewhere, probably in electronic form) - Steve will be able to help on this piece.

I think MattC86 is right when he says that such a suggestion will not get very far, to quote him, 'because of (as Ken White would say) parochialism and turf wars'. I find it difficult to conceive of the Corps giving up its high end conflict capability (as a light infrantry) to focus solely on COIN, or perhaps more to the point, irregular warfare (but they have established a Center for Irregular Warfare, info about which you can find if you check the SW Blogs).


Tequila posted: Not the thinking of the current CMC. Most of what we are hearing out of that office tends towards the "forget Iraq and COIN, let's get back to our kinetic, expeditionary, amphibious warfare role."

Tequila, I had not considered this as a 'reason' for what Conway said in those several public speeches a couple of months back. His point was that the Corps was getting 'too heavy' (Conway reportedly specifically pointed to the growing number of MRAPs) and needed to return to its expeditionary, amphibious roots (not sure about the 'kinetic' part - see http://newsblaze.com/story/20071016162517tsop.nb/newsblaze/TOPSTORY/Top-Stories.html
a link which I hope still works.)

Conway's speeches did make me smile quietly to myself (SQTM - see, even academics can come up with acronyms :wry:) as what he was saying sounded pretty much like what the Corps was saying when it started to pull out of Vietnam in 1969. Though I suspect that the attitude Conway expressed, while undoubtedly shared by many within the USMC, was more a default (ie organizational culture) response than it was a hard and fast, well thought through, 'this is the future of the Corps' observation. In the least, Conway's articulation of these issues may be seen as a way to forestall the Corps being pressured into being solely a COIN/irregular war force. At bottom, the Corps would, and will always, fight tooth and nail to retain its expeditionary, amphibious character, lest it become seen as a second army, whatever its missions and roles.

The future of the Corps, I would suggest, is more likely - but not necessarily - to lay in preparing for what they term 'Hybrid Wars'. Hybrid Wars are a mix of conventional and irregular warfare, so yes, their future will be to work on being a light, expeditionary force that has the capability to fight across the 'Three Block War'. [On hybrid war, see Mattis and Hoffman, Proceedings, Nov 2005 and Hoffman, Preparing the Marine Corps for Hybrid War, at http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/story.php?F=1445694_0306
There may also, possibly, be an emphasis on urban ops within this, given the Corps past emphasis on urban warfare that goes back to 1995 under Gen. Krulak (Krulak, Operational Maneuver from the Sea, Proceedings, Nov 97 - I think this is right). Though I expect an urban emphasis may be a hard sell within the Corps (this emphasis lapsed for a number of years after Krulak retired in '99), even though we can likely expect conflict to occur in towns, cities and megacities (which is what OMFTS suggested would be the case in the 21st Century).


MattC86 posted: Do you think that Gen. Conway's nixed proposal to take the Corps to Afghanistan and play whack-a-mole (to appropriate Eden's term) with the Taliban is rooted in an aversion to COIN and an affinity for "kinetic, expeditionary" operations?



Hmm. I have heard other reasons, such as it makes rotations and logistics easier, planning easier, predeployment training and exercising easier (I do not mean 'easy' easy, just easier than dealing with two different wars). Being a bit of a cynic (okay, more than 'a bit' of a cynic), I personally wondered whether there was an element of 'lets get out of Iraq while we can, before it all goes pear-shaped and we get blamed, and let's instead go where the possibilities of success are greater'. They were the first out of Vietnam, and seemed to not be tarred by what happened there in the same way the Army was. But I do not really think this was a reason - my default position is 'cynicism'.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

The Corps’ raison d'être pretty much since the Spanish-American War has been to be a service of the “kick down the door and lay waste to all we see” variety. Not that Marines haven’t performed well in COIN (witness the CAP program in Vietnam). Yet, while the “Small Wars Manual” has gotten a lot of attention as of late, it was written based on the experience in very different era of the United State’s overseas force projection (the use of Marines in the “Banana Wars” was seen as an alternative to the cost of deploying and sustaining “heavy” Army units on what was essentially “colonial” duty).

The Corps often touts the “lean mean fighting machine” image and inculcates in Marines an offensive esprit de corps that is not always conducive to the more subtle application of force required by COIN.

[Nomad]

I'm sure this idea has been floated by folks both smarter and much more experienced than me, but I can't remember an SWC thread on it. With the ongoing debate about how to prepare the ground forces for both the full spectrum of small wars and the threat of major conventional war, how about letting the Marines focus on small wars, with maybe amphibious/forced entry as a secondary field? I'm in the Van Creveld camp, that nuclear weapons have virtually ended the threat of great power war, but I think it's a small camp, and even if he's right there are plenty of other possibilities for conventional war (Korea). The Army could maintain it's greatly enhanced small wars knowledge, but make that a secondary mission, in the background but not forgotten.

Letting the Marines focus on small wars would also seem to do away with the need for an Army Advisory Corps, the Marines could carry out that function, maybe dispersed more widely throughout Marine ground combat arms. If we're not listening to Steve Metz and we get caught in another big small war like Iraq, the Marines would be there first and serve as mentors of sorts to Army troops joining the fight.

Thoughts, negatives?


Ah… the debate regarding the role of the Marine Corps; a debate since 1775! Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak (USMC ret.) wrote an excellent book titled First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps, which has become a must read for every Marine and highly recommended for all others! For reasons outlined in this book and others, the Marine Corps will never allow itself to be relegated to focusing on a specific type of war or battlefield. History has shown us that no war is alike. The Marine Corps must focus on the full spectrum of warfare in order “To be ready when the nation is least ready.” It is just as important for the Marine Corps to focus on amphibious operations, as mandated by law, as those “such other duties as the President may direct”, i.e. small wars. Just because we are currently engaged in a COIN environment, we can not lose sight of the fact that the next war may be on the opposite end of the spectrum. Can the Marine Corps do better at small wars? Is it likely that in the foreseeable future we will find ourselves engaged in COIN/small war operations globally? Absolutely to both questions. I do believe the Marine Corps “sensitive paranoia”, as General Krulak wrote in his book as a distinguishing characteristic; will drive a new generation of “thinkers” to better prepare the Corps for future small wars.

Personally, I believe the Corps knows how to forge our nation’s sons and daughters into warriors on the battlefield and into respectable citizens in OUR society. Herein lies the challenge. How do we better prepare the Marine for small wars, where too much force may equate to lost ground, where cultural beliefs and practices may not mirror ours? Where the enemy hides amongst the populace? How do we prepare the iPod and internet generations to operate in an environment where there the people know no such technological luxuries? How do we develop Marines to understand, operate, and positively influence what Robert Tomes writes in Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare; as the “central tenant of counterinsurgency warfare: winning the allegiance of the indigenous population”?

Our current training methods of developing Mission Essential Tasks and instruction through Enabling and Terminal Learning Objectives are great for instructing a Marine how to operate a piece of equipment, handle ordnance, assault a fortified position, etc. This type of instruction can be taught in a classroom and then applied in a field setting. We have excellent Professional Military Education (PME) that teach general military and/or service specific doctrine to our Staff Non-Commissioned Officers and Officers. Our junior Non-Commissioned Officers learn topics such as drill, military customs and courtesies, and may get some basic field skills training such as land navigation or patrolling. This education and training is all very relevant to winning in a small war, but what is lacking in our development revolves around what Tomes cites Lieutenant Colonel Roger Trinquier as concluding in Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency; “that the guerrilla’s greatest advantages are his perfect knowledge of an area…and the support given him by the inhabitants…this total dependence upon terrain and population is also the guerilla’s weak point.” It is the ‘terrain and populations’ Marines must master in order to succeed in future small wars.

I will argue that we learn best through exposure. Can we ‘expose’ our Marines to environments where they will gain understanding of both terrain and people? Our military has units that can deploy and ‘train’ both developed and underdeveloped nations. How about we establish a special PME program, a study-abroad, where we send small ‘learning’ cadres to various regions around the globe to learn and at least come close to mastering both people and terrain of a specific region or area. These cadres would consist of Marines from all rank and file. They would eat what the locals eat, shop where the locals shop, and basically live as the locals live. Cadre members would consist of Marines from various occupational specialties. The cadre would learn terrain, not just from a geographical perspective, but from an infrastructure point of view. How does this society move around? How do they get electricity? Water? Who enforces laws and how? Who are the influential members of the society? How do they communicate? This is a very small snap shot of what a cadre would seek to learn. Then what? Cadres would be the nucleus to any larger organization should the need ever arise whether it be a conventional, small war, or humanitarian mission. Cadre members could come from specific standing units or handpicked from across the Marine Corps. These Marines would need to spend at least 6 months in this capacity and potentially return periodically as a refresher. Our goal would be to have most Marines, not just a select few, knowledgeable in one or several regions. Their experiences would be collected, their acquired skills and knowledge retrievable in a crisis. The objective being; the establishment and accumulation of knowledge and understanding of people and terrain on a global scale that will allow us to exploit the social and environmental conditions to our advantage across the spectrum of conflict.

Will geo-political and sovereignty issues become obstacles in addition to a mountain of other challenges? Sure. Expensive? Possibly. Easier said than done? Maybe. But I’m sure that the same was said to Earl “Pete” Ellis in 1920 when he first envisioned amphibious means in the Pacific against Japan that would come to fruition some twenty-one years later. But then again, I am no Pete Ellis.

Thoughts?

[William F. Owen]

@ How do we develop Marines to understand, operate, and positively influence what Robert Tomes writes in Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare; as the “central tenant of counterinsurgency warfare: winning the allegiance of the indigenous population”?

@ This education and training is all very relevant to winning in a small war, but what is lacking in our development revolves around what Tomes cites Lieutenant Colonel Roger Trinquier as concluding in Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency; “that the guerrilla’s greatest advantages are his perfect knowledge of an area…and the support given him by the inhabitants…this total dependence upon terrain and population is also the guerilla’s weak point.” It is the ‘terrain and populations’ Marines must master in order to succeed in future small wars.


@ I would suggest that this is view is at best simplistic and confuses means with aims. It's WHY the allegiance is necessary, not that gaining it is a pre-requisite. 7% of Thailand's population is Muslim and a minute part of that is effectively sustaining a very bloody insurgency. It could be argued that US and Southern Irish support for the IRA, in the 1970's, was way more effective than that of the local Republicans.

@ If that's a direct quote, could you cite it for me. It might just save me a bunch of work! :)

[Nomad]

William,

Here's the citation.

Tomes, Robert R. "Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare". Proceedings. 34-1(2004):16-28.

You might be able to find the article on the internet as well. Enjoy. I would be interested to hear your views on Granite States post.

[William F. Owen]

I would be interested to hear your views on Granite States post.

...that you are interested, humbles me to a crippling degree.

In all honesty, I have no view on the matter, other than to suggest that the idea of Small Wars is not an accurate enough criteria, on which to base force development.

In some ways the USMC already is and was a security force/colonial police, in terms of it fleet protection, Evacuation, and Embassy security functions.

Get the description of the mission right and that may be some use, but you'll still end up defining things that you don't want the USMC to do, and that may not be useful.

[Granite_State]

Abu Muqawama has a couple of posts on this and the current commandant, whose attitudes have been mentioned here:

http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com/2007/10/does-gen-conway-really-not-get-it.html

http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com/2007/12/cmc.html

[Distiller]

What about that: Disband both Marines and Army and resurrect them as "Ground Forces", operating under Unified Theatre Commands. And MCAir goes to a unified "Tactical Aviation Corps". I feel that the old services structure is coming to an end (for various reasons) - with the UCCs it's already halfway dead, anyway.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

There is periodic talk of dismembering the USMC under the rational that it's redundant. But it will not happen for a number of reasons:

Tradition: The USMC dates back to 1775, as does the Army and Navy.

Patronage: The Marines seem to have friends in high places (i.e. Congress). :D

Money: Typically Marine operations are cheaper. :p

Patience: Who else would sit on a boat (okay ship) for weeks upon weeks off shore just waiting to see if it's going to be an amphibious landing or just another NEO. :eek:

Heritage: Marines suck it up (dumbest thing IMO the Army ever did was to get rid of the regimental system).

Esprit-d'corps: Marines love being Marines, and they have the best uniforms! ;)

[Geoff]

I tend to shudder when I hear phrases like optimise, mission specific function and other generalities. Armed Forces are just that, they are designed to protect and project force, to do so they need to be capable of functioning in a wide variety of environments.

Specialisation is necessary to promote mastery of a skill, but it tends to lead to an inward focus of that specialism - let's not share our knowledge etc, this then becomes a bargaining chip in the ever increasing race for resouces (money) and creates a friction that does not need to exist.

Each part of the Armed Forces has a function, they must be mutually supporting and complementary. What we need is to re-think the whole budget system so that we do not have bureaucrats and people removed from the actual business of conducting war, being in total control of the process, they must be part of it, but not all of it.

Using Mission Command as an analogy, the politicians should state clearly what they expect of their Armed Forces, a Mission Analysis is conducted and the bill is presented, the politicians either pay or explain to the country why they did not & let the public decide if they agree.

[Norfolk]

Hi Geoff, welcome to SWC. So what are you doing living in Detroit? The beer (http://www.detroitbeerco.com/) must be pretty good there, unless you're living out in Bloomfield or Grosse Pointe, and the beer may just be a secondary consideration. Good to see another Commonwealth soldier here, and a man from Transport - someone who knows about the pitfalls of a thankless but vital job. If you haven't already done so, Introduce yourself formally to the SWC on this thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=38369#post38369), and tell us about yourself.

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Other than providing the time and resources to bring all USMC infantry battalions up to standards approaching those of the Battalions selected and trained as SOC MEU's, I would imagine that the Corps probably doesn't need to do terribly much to match itself to the demands of Small Wars. I mean, they wrote the book on it, literally, and while other Armies certainly have encountered lessons that the Marines have or can take heed of, the Marines are fairly solid compared to a lot of Armies, and have their own fair share of lessons to teach to others. Other than improving individual and sub-unit training a little bit (and to a lesser extent Unit-level training as well), the Marines don't really need to do too much probably.

Disbanding the USMC is not just politically impractical, it's militarily unsound. Not only is the USMC a potent fighting force, fit and able to fight just about anywhere (well, maybe not so much in Arctic areas if they have to rent heavy equipment from the locals;)) in just about any kind of war or conflict, but chopping them to the Army would effectively deprive the Navy of its ability to establish and secure overseas naval bases and provide boarding parties for naval vessels - something the Army isn't in much of a position to do properly, even if it absorbed the Marines. And the Marine Air Wings would probably be absorbed by the Air Force!:eek:(say good-bye to Marine CAS then - everyone loves Marine Air:cool:)...

Sure, Amphibious Operations at the Operational-Level can and should (if necessary) be performed by the Army, like in North Africa and Europe in WWII. But the Marines are ideally placed to handle this, given their Maritime role, and they largely wrote the book on it anyway. Why fix somethin' that ain't broke - and it relieves much of the pressure on the Army to come up with a few more Divisions for major Amphibious Ops when they're already down to just 10 active Divs themselves.

Besides, those Dress Blues (the old No. 2 Dress Uniform in the Commonwealth) sure do look good.:D

[Ken White]

. . .
Using Mission Command as an analogy, the politicians should state clearly what they expect of their Armed Forces, a Mission Analysis is conducted and the bill is presented, the politicians either pay or explain to the country why they did not & let the public decide if they agree.

Pity they don't...

Channeling Norfolk, I've heard that the Marines are headed towards an MEU-SOC like effort for the BLTs; each destined for a small war or COIN locale will get specialized training and a certification of some sort.

Sounds like a good plan to me...

A guy -- or a unit that can fight a big war can fight a small one, a simple shifting of gears is all that's needed.

[Norfolk]

Channeling Norfolk, I've heard that the Marines are headed towards an MEU-SOC like effort for the BLTs; each destined for a small war or COIN locale will get specialized training and a certification of some sort.

Sounds like a good plan to me...

You know, with all this "channeling" goin' on here lately at the SWC, it sounds to me like I'm surrounded by psychics or somethin'...I think it's high time for me to invest some coin in a high-quality Tin-Foil Hat (http://zapatopi.net/afdb/), or somein'.

[RJ]

Nomad posted - "But I’m sure that the same was said to Earl “Pete” Ellis in 1920 when he first envisioned amphibious means in the Pacific against Japan that would come to fruition some twenty-one years later. But then again, I am no Pete Ellis."

"Thoughts?"

The Corps has that "Prior Planning Prevents Piss Poor Performance Parameters" as a genitic pattern in its long view planners.

Vertical Envleopment for instance was not an Air Force or Army vision in the 60's, but a Marine one that was developing in the 50's. As a Ronnie Recon type in 1960 my unit was tasked to develop ambush tactics to lure and trap choppers into landing kill zones.

Captured me a Battalion Lt. Col. one time!:eek: Brute Krulak was the ADC of the 2nd MarDiv at the time. He thought it was very funny!

The "Anabar Awakening" seems a product of the Marine Forces in Anabar developing a friendly assist attitude and going along with Sheiks who thought that some of the sunni insurgents who were hand and glove with al Qaeda could be brought in and turned against the enemy.

In the Pacific War the Corps had 6 Divisions and 4 Air Wings and did the bulk of the Island hopping conquests.

The bulk of the Army was focused on North Africa, the Med and Europe.

The Pacific was by its nature an amphibous war stretched out over vast distances and fell to the naval service to take the lead.

Given the money and logistical support the Corps could bulk up for the multi small wars that will more than likely be the near future mode of modern warfare.

I guess the question still is , Does it wan't to belarger than 3 Divisions and Air Wings again?

[Geoff]

RJ you make an excellent point.

However if we optimise forces for a specific function, rather than train them for the wide spectrum of operations which the modern day soldier has to undertake? What happens when the COIN war is sucking up all the trained personnel? What about spreading the love (& knowledge)

Would it not be better to have specialists embedded within units, by actually incorporating different operations as part of the education and development process. Not saying that every unit must have a mountain warfare specialist, an OBUA specialist etc, but a ready pool of people who can be used in preparation for these operations and deploy to cement those lessons learnt. These individuals could then form a conduit for passing lessons learnt on the ground back to the widerarmed forces, rather than waiting for an armchair general like me to pontificate, CNN to advise and the inertial mass of bureaucracy to get in gear?

I must confess I do have a bias against too much specialisation, yes we need experts, but we should use them to spread knowledge, not hold them close and subject them to internal political wrangles - which would happen.

I feel that we need to ensure greater clarity from the political masters, not likely in my lifetime, but also the military hierarchy needs to be more forthright in its capabilities and endurance. It has been known for ages that warfighting has an increased wear and tear on men and materiel - why don't we seem to factor that in our plans? Off point but still pertinent.

Cheers

Geoff

[RJ]

Check out the article in the Marine Corps Times entitled

Marine Corps to get back to its expeditionary roots

[I've included the lead in paragraphs but this is a long article and y'all should down load it. It addresses some of the items and concerns discussed in this thread.] RJ


By Kimberly Johnson - Staff writer
Posted : Friday Feb 8, 2008 18:12:13 EST



The Corps is creating a new pre-emptive strike force unit that will put more Marines back aboard ships.

The plan, which includes creating new Security Cooperation Marine Air-Ground Task Forces, is a road map for how the service plans to fight future irregular wars and was reportedly signed off on by Commandant Gen. James Conway the week of Jan. 28.

For Marines, it means new advisory missions on top of existing requirements. And for sailors, it will mean a steady reliance on the amphibious fleet.

In recent years, with Marines committed to a long-term presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Navy’s gator force has, at times, deployed without Marines on unique missions, such as chasing pirates off Africa or using a big-deck amphib as a floating health clinic in Asia.

But that may soon be adjusted under the new operational concept, known informally as “The Long War” brief.
The emerging “long war” will put new demands on the Corps, Conway said in the report.

“Paramount among these demands will be the requirement for Marines to train and mentor the security forces of partner nations in a manner that empowers their governments to secure their own countries,” he said.
Based on threat assessments projected through 2015, Marines face a spectrum of operations, the report said: stability and support; small wars and counterinsurgency; humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and nation-building; peacekeeping operations; combating terrorism; counterproliferation and nonproliferation; combating drug trafficking and crime; and non-combatant evacuation operations.

“There will be fewer high-spectrum combat operations that require our Marines to bring the full force of our combined arms capabilities to bear,” according to the report.
Under the “Long War” plan, Marine expeditionary units will continue to be the “vanguard” first responders of the Corps. The Corps also will forward-deploy more Marines in the Western Pacific through a combination of permanently forward-based forces and forces sourced through the re-establishment of the Unit Deployment Program.

Central to Conway’s plan is the creation of the new units — the SC MAGTFs — to handle the building of partner-nation capacity, including requirements for civil-military operations and training less-developed military forces, the plan said. The unit will be “‘eyes forward’ in areas not previously accessible to U.S. military forces,” and will be used as an operational reconnaissance asset capable of taking on some special-operations missions.

[William F. Owen]

“Paramount among these demands will be the requirement for Marines to train and mentor the security forces of partner nations in a manner that empowers their governments to secure their own countries,” he said.
Why would that be a Marine mission? It doesn't have anything to do with what Marines do. OK, they may have done it in the past, but isn't the army far better resourced to handle this?


Based on threat assessments projected through 2015, Marines face a spectrum of operations, the report said: stability and support; small wars and counterinsurgency; humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and nation-building; peacekeeping operations; combating terrorism; counterproliferation and nonproliferation; combating drug trafficking and crime; and non-combatant evacuation operations.

So if this was a threat assessment, why are they talking about "types" or "styles" of operation and not talking about the threats? I understand the article is written for folks with no military understanding, but this must be dumbing the idea down to it's bare bones.

[RJ]

I suspect someone who has read the 52 page document will share it with us and either answer your questions or someone else will.

I suspect the Ambhib Navy will support the shift and all those admirals digging up gator navy missions to keep the boats afloat and tuned up.

[TT]

Quote:
Originally Posted by RJ View Post
“Paramount among these demands will be the requirement for Marines to train and mentor the security forces of partner nations in a manner that empowers their governments to secure their own countries,” he said.

Wilf posted:
Why would that be a Marine mission? It doesn't have anything to do with what Marines do. OK, they may have done it in the past, but isn't the army far better resourced to handle this?

I am not speaking on the basis of any ‘insider’ knowledge, for I have no such info. So these are just some thoughts:

This mission does fit from what I heard articulated at conference a couple of weeks back about the new Cooperative Maritime Strategy -- which was that the USMC was very keen in developing the Strategy that conflict prevention be elevated to be of equal importance with warfighting. It ‘may’ also be that this mission is attached to, or related to, the USNs move to work with other naval forces to develop better partnerships with them as part of its increasing focus on Phase 0 operations (conflict prevention).

Beyond that, the article suggests that the USMC does not see being involved, or would prefer not to be involved, in any long term, ground wars in the future (if it can avoid this). Another thought is that if the era of big footprint operations will pass once the US draws down in Iraq, then this mission provides a persistent role in the Long War, which seemingly is the working title of the briefing.



Quote:
Originally Posted by RJ
Based on threat assessments projected through 2015, Marines face a spectrum of operations, the report said: stability and support; small wars and counterinsurgency; humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and nation-building; peacekeeping operations; combating terrorism; counterproliferation and nonproliferation; combating drug trafficking and crime; and non-combatant evacuation operations.

Wilf posted: So if this was a threat assessment, why are they talking about "types" or "styles" of operation and not talking about the threats? I understand the article is written for folks with no military understanding, but this must be dumbing the idea down to it's bare bones.

I the take point that this list is a list of ‘capabilities’. But has not the US shifted, or tried to shift, to capabilities based planning on the premise that this is the best means to be as prepared as possible for futurer risks, dangers and threats that are uncertain? ‘Bout the only thing missing in the list is conventional force-on-force, and that was mentioned elsewhere as not being a likely prospect in the short to mid term.

[Granite_State]

Good to see this thread still kicking. What I meant in my original post, and I probably wasn't clear enough, was an issue of prioritizing threats and future missions. This isn't to say the Marine Corps can wash its hands of a role in large-scale conventional conflict, or amphibious landing/forced entry, just that it seems to me that small wars, "hybrid wars", and the advisory role should be number 1. Amphibious operations may well be 1A. Obviously a combined-arms force of 175,000 cannot be confined to a couple of roles, but it seems like a waste of money and (more importantly) time to be preparing just as much for a peer competitor as for the next small war in the Middle East or elsewhere.

This would also seem to be in accord with General Conway's worries about the Corps getting too heavy.

But if someone on here who's been through OCS, TBS, or SOI recently could tell me I'm way off base, and the Marines have swung too far in the other direction, I'd love to hear that.

[jcustis]

Why would that be a Marine mission? It doesn't have anything to do with what Marines do. OK, they may have done it in the past, but isn't the army far better resourced to handle this?



So if this was a threat assessment, why are they talking about "types" or "styles" of operation and not talking about the threats? I understand the article is written for folks with no military understanding, but this must be dumbing the idea down to it's bare bones.

The Marine Corps has conducted theater engagement for a long time. There is even a Security Cooperation Center aboard Quantico that serves as the hub of sorts.

In its capacity as an amphibious-capable force, the Corps has provided a lot of bilateral training and support with many other nations facing littoral threats, like the Philippines. And since the PI has its own Marine Corps, I don't think utilizing the Army to be the lead makes sense.

Even though it may simply be a hallmark of the past, I think the Corps is just as effectively resourced to provide security training/assistance to other nations. True, we would serve as better enablers of SFers working the FID mission in the backwaters of the world, but if the Groups are going to continue to be hard-pressed as part of the Long War rotations, the gaps have to be filled somehow.

I think that there is a definite and clear distinction between a team catching a helo in to train the indigenous security forces of a state that cannot muster armor formations or air forces, and tasking a MAGTF to focus (instead of conduct as a sideline event) on bilateral exercises and security cooperation engagement that aims at maintaining professional standards within the HN military and making the country as a whole more effective a defeating forces opposed to our national interests. Back as far as 2005, the Corps has been looking at ways to leverage off its unique abilities and skill sets to help the overall fight, not to be the new game in town and break rice bowls that have belonged (and rightly so) to snake eaters with the USA.

[RJ]

jcustis is correct in the role of the Marine Corps is assisting training other nations forces is correct.

In March of 1960 my Battalion along with most of the 3rdMarDiv. conducted a large amphibious landing at Formosa. We, 3/5 went ashore via the "Peter" and "Mike" Boat route by climbing down nets in to the assualt craft. Made a classic amphib landing near Kao-Hsiung, Formosa. Once ashore we linked up with a Nat. Chinese Infantry Co. and boarded helicopters and did a vertical envelopment shift inland about 20 miles.

When the whole Bn. finished the airlift we moved out ot that air head and maneuvered back towards the City of Kao-Hsiung. The name of the training exercise was "Operation Blue Star" .

M-3/5 spent two days at the Chinese Marine Corps home base and worked with them on tactics.

They were primarily a Raider Style Unit and I rembeber their 9 man squads had two Thomson Sub-machine guns for every M-1 Garand rifle.

Lt. Col. Houghton was forever finding us new faces to work with. Chinese Marines, PI Army, Royal Warwicks near Hong Kong, etc.

We were not uncomfortable in mixing with those units and comparing our tactics to theirs.

I just finished Hog Pilots and Blue Water Grunts and there were a couple of small Marine training units in out of the way places, in that interesting read.

It could be a culture deal that dates back to the Banana Wars where Marines traind "Native Constablary Units" to fight "bandits".

[Rex Brynen]

Army, Marines give waivers to more felons (http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/04/21/military.waivers/index.html), CNN, 21 April 2008.


WASHINGTON (CNN) -- The Army and Marine Corps are allowing convicted felons to serve in increasing numbers, newly released Department of Defense statistics show.

...

It also allowed two people convicted of making terrorist or bomb threats to enlist in 2007, up from one the year before.

The Marines did not immediately respond to request for comment.

Well, that's one way of optimizing for the GWoT... :D

[Ken White]

weren't crimes are today 'felonies.' The bomb threats were probably made when they were High School students. Few years ago there was a lot of that down here, got 'em out of classes for half a day sometimes while the Bomb Squad and the dogs swept the building. Got too expensive, so all the states started prosecuting for it. The kids generally get costs, restitution and probation.

You left out the fact that they aren't waiving drug sale offenses; they'll waive burglary and even manslaughter as they should, IMO but not pushing.

Be great to not need waivers, we could do that in an ideal world. It's not an ideal world; never has been and is unlikely to ever be one...

That's another article that's much ado about nothing. The NCOs and Officers will gripe because it makes their jobs slightly harder but by and large it'll make little difference. We've been there before and it doesn't break anything.

[ODB]

Not to hijack the thread but wanted to add to the waivers. 16 year enlisted career and still going. Had a DUI in high school, was a high school dropout (did summer course to get my diploma), I was an overall hell raising teen. Let's see, 16 years later, SFC in SF, a few credits shy of my MBA, wonderful daughter, been married 10 years, the list goes on. Personally I'll take a kid with a chip on his shoulder who messed up as a teenager, certain attitudes cannot be trained. Many of these kids are the same ones who don't know how to quit. They get their immaturity out at an early age and learn their lessons while they are young. Honestly how many people out there have not made mistakes? Some are unlucky and get caught. Finally over the years I have seen and lead many soldiers who grew to become productive members of society.

Don't be too quick to judge the waivers!

[Surferbeetle]

The military provides a chance to realize one's potential. Throughout the years the majority of folks that I have seen coming in the door want to do well and are trainable, and I am for the most part still impressed with the new folks coming in. I was worried about attrition rates among LT's in the late '80's :rolleyes: and how it seemed that many good folks were taking the money and running during when the Berlin Wall came down, however the US military hung tough during those turbulent times and I suspect that we will continue to do so...

As a general note to try and get back to the thread, I have enjoyed working with the CAG in particular, as well as the Marines in general...their planning methods are different that what I am used to as a soldier, but they certainly take care of business.

[RJ]

This was the end of an article on the Waiver Issue about a week ago.

The stats in the article showed the waiver troops were making Sgt. an average of 4 months faster than the troops who entered from High School with out a spot on thier file.

The waiver troops also reinlested at a higher percentage rate.

"Army officials say getting a waiver is a long and difficult process, particularly for those who have been convicted of a serious offense. Serious offenders have their records reviewed and must get approval from as many as nine different analysts and officers — up to the rank of general.

Gen. William Wallace, commander of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command at Fort Monroe, Va., dismisses the notion that waivers are creating more disciplinary problems in today’s Army.

Instead, he said, when the Army brings in a young person who made a mistake and got past it, most likely “they will be a better person for having made that mistake and learned from it, than perhaps somebody who didn’t make the mistake and didn’t have the opportunity to learn.”

Wallace speaks from experience.

As a teen he was taken into custody in his hometown of Louisville, Ky., when — as he put it — “I took an expensive baseball and put it in a not-so-expensive baseball box, and tried to check out with it.”

He remembers the black and white police car pulling up, loading his and his friend’s bicycles in the back and taking him downtown to the station where his father had to pick him up.

He laid out the sobering experience on his application for West Point several years later and, he recalled this week, “somebody looked at that application and said ‘he apparently learned something from the experience and we’ll give him an opportunity.”’

Wallace, a four-star general whose chest full of awards now includes two Distinguished Service medals, five Legion of Merit awards and an Army Commendation Medal for valor, said the Army has an obligation to give young people a second chance to make something of themselves.

“I am less concerned about the raw material that we receive than I am about the product that we produce,” he said.

[Nomad]

Ahhhh.... here we are in 2010... we are making progress...

Title: Corps to have mandatory cultural training

Marines to be assigned area of specialization
By James K. Sanborn - Staff writer
Posted : Monday Sep 13, 2010 16:44:27 EDT

http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2010/09/marine-new-mandatory-cultural-training-091310w/

Fighting in any clime or place means Marines often come into close contact with people of all nationalities and cultures. An intimate understanding of those cultures can make the difference between mission success and mission failure. That’s why the Marine Corps is now rolling out mandatory cultural training that will assign most Marine a specific region of specialization that they will study for the duration of their career.

The program, which will include reservists, will begin in late August with first and second lieutenants, but eventually be expanded to all enlisted Marines ranked sergeant and above, and all officers up to colonel.

The Regional, Culture, and Language Familiarization Program was created by the Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational and Cultural Learning at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Va. Eventually, officers and enlisted Marines will be assigned to one of 17 global regions of study, which they will focus on for the duration of their careers, according to Marine Administrative Message 468/10.

“When you get turned to the south or diverted to the west, you need to have people that are organic to your staff that understand the region,” said retired Col. George Dallas, the center’s director.

For example: the recent humanitarian relief efforts in Haiti in response to January’s earthquake. Marines who spoke Creole or French and understood Haiti’s culture were indispensable during those relief efforts, Dallas said.

The hope is to have at least one or two Marines in every unit who have a solid understanding of any region to which Marines could be called.

The program was prompted by goals set forth in the Commandant’s Planning Guidance, a 2006 report issued by Commandant Gen. James T. Conway, and the Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan for 2009-2015. Both emphasized the need to bolster the Corps’ expeditionary mission. In response, plans were made to carve up the globe into spheres of responsibility for each Marine Expeditionary Force, under the assumption that regionally focused forces are better at forging lasting partnerships with locals. The new training helps meet that mission.

Captains can expect to begin taking courses by November. Sergeants will follow in the spring. Dallas said he hopes all Marines will be studying their regions within a year and a half

“We are not trying to add a lot of new requirements,” Dallas said. “We are trying to take existing things [Marines] have done, or will do, during their career and amplify the cultural, regional lessons tied to it.”

That means Marines will be encouraged to adjust training and education to their geographic assignments. For example, analyzing books on the Commandant’s Reading List through a cultural lens.

Marines still will be required to take additional lessons online through MarineNet. They will complete short quizzes throughout their course of study and a 100-question final exam at the end of each study block.

There will be several blocks over a Marine’s career, each completed every few years, coinciding with career progression. Failure to complete a block could adversely affect a Marine’s career, although it is not a prerequisite for promotion.

When assigning regions, a Marine’s history will be taken into account. That includes prior education, native culture or birthplace. The number of available slots for each region will be determined by three variables: requests from combatant commanders, requests from unit commanders and Corps threat assessments. More Marines will be assigned to volatile regions, as it is where they are most likely to deploy.

Officers at The Basic School submit a wish list of their top three regions. Platoon commanders then work with them to find the right fit.

Once the program is in full swing, enlisted Marines will be assigned regions at random, based on demand, but they will be able to appeal their assignment.

Not everybody will get their first choice, but leaders will give prior knowledge strong consideration, for both officers and enlisted.

The program was made to span a Marine’s career to allow time to develop an in-depth understanding of an assigned region, Dallas said.

“Understanding the culture, the region, the language to a limited degree, allows a commander to better and more effectively shape his battle space,” Dallas said. “It helps him understand the human dimension, anticipate human reactions. If you can do that, you can influence friends and manipulate enemies.”

REGIONS OF STUDY
The 17 global regions Marines will be assigned to study under a new cultural education program, with examples of what each region includes:

• Central Africa: Republic of the Congo, Angola, Cameroon.

• Eastern Africa: Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia.

• North Africa: Egypt, Libya, Morocco.

• Sahel: A narrow band stretching across Africa, where the tropics meet the deserts.

• Southern Africa: Botswana, Namibia, South Africa.

• West Africa: Senegal, Nigeria, Liberia.

• West South Africa: Namibia.

• Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.

• Northeast Asia: Japan, South Korea, North Korea.

• South Asia: Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh.

• Southeast Asia: Vietnam, the Philippines, Cambodia.

• Arabian Gulf: Iran, Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates.

• Levant: Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Israel.

• Balkans: Albania, Boznia and Herzegovina, Serbia.

• Mexico, Caribbean, Central America.

• South America: Peru, Columbia, Brazil, Venezuela.

• Transcaucuses: Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan.

— Source: Marine Corps.