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Ratzel
12-22-2007, 10:53 PM
Hello, this is my first post. I'll give a little background so you know where I'm coming from. I was in the Army from 1999-2003. I served in 3rd ID and did one rotation in Kosovo and took part in the invasion of Iraq. I got out an E-5 and and served as a team leader during both deployments. I'm now finishing up my Bachelors degree and will be either seeking government work or may do a Masters first. Now my proposal:

As we all seen during OIF, Armour certainly has a place in the GWOT. I can still remember one of the 1st Sgt's in my Battalion claiming we were "going to war in our coffins" while conducting MOUT training with the Bradley's. Thank God, he ended up being wrong, as the Brad's and tanks preformed well on our rush up to Baghdad and beyond.

So, my idea is the creation of a Ranger-type-Special-Operations-Capable-PanzerGrendier-unit. While the desert is obvious, the winds seem to be blowing towards Sub-Saharan Africa as the battle space of the future. This is why the creation of such a unit would seem to be appropriate.

I'm not exactly sure how the unit would be assembled? I'm thinking 3 companies of Infantry, one tank company, one recon (with snipers), company, one mortar company, HQ company. Either way, it must be capable of being airlifted to wherever it must go. This may mean that Abrams and Bradley's would have to be replaced with something smaller?

The soldiers would have to go through something like RIP. Every Infantry, Cav-Scout, and Medic NCO would be required to have a Ranger tab. The tankers and other NCO's would be encouraged as well. Just like the Ranger Batt's, the PT standards would high, and the unit would be well equipped. The Tankers would be chosen for their ability shoot gunnery in a superior fashion. I'd also like to see the people who man the Bradly's or other APC's be full time tack people but this may not be possible?

Training would be just as intense as a Ranger Batt. The unit would also train along side other Special operations units, just like Rangers or Marine SOC units' do. While being airborne qualified would be nice too, I'm not sure this would matter besides the psychological understanding that everyone in the unit is willing to jump out of an airplane?

The unit would mainly be used for situations where Special operations forces are needed, but require armour. During the resent operations in Somalia, Ethiopian Armour forces were used, this unit would be used when such forces are unavailable or unable to accomplish the mission.

During OIF I, a unit like this was used in Northern Iraq. It obviously wasn't Ranger-like, but did get inserted by air after the 173rd secured the airfield. It took something like 5 days however, to get a company's worth of gear and personal on the ground. The unit I'm describing would need to get their whole battalion/UOA on the ground in 24-36 hours. This in itself, would require lots of coordination.

Rifleman
12-23-2007, 12:12 AM
Isn't what you described supposed to be the mission of an Armored Cavalry Regiment for their parent corps - to scout, screen, raid, and parade, with all the tradition and 'elan of the historic cavalry?

If our ACRs can't do that.....train them to. If they aren't optimally organized for that role; for instance, not enough dismounts or something, then reorganize them.

Your idea sounds sensible but how about we just make better use of existing assets, to include their proud cavalry lineages?

Maybe the question should be "Should SOCOM have an ACR assigned to it?"

William F. Owen
12-23-2007, 02:02 AM
So, my idea is the creation of a Ranger-type-Special-Operations-Capable-PanzerGrendier-unit. While the desert is obvious, the winds seem to be blowing towards Sub-Saharan Africa as the battle space of the future. This is why the creation of such a unit would seem to be appropriate.
.

Go look at the Royal Marines. This is exactly what they now are and doing well in Helmand. UK Para is even thinking of equipping with the same BvS-10 Armoured Vehicle, as are SF.

Now, do not underestimate the resistance SF/Rangers/Commandos have to armour. There is an incredible amount of emotional resistance, based on ignoring the facts and it is to the eternal credit of the Royal Marines that they adopted light armour, before someone died.

Uboat509
12-23-2007, 05:07 AM
Now, do not underestimate the resistance SF/Rangers/Commandos have to armor. There is an incredible amount of emotional resistance, based on ignoring the facts and it is to the eternal credit of the Royal Marines that they adopted light armor, before someone died.

Which facts are those? SF/Rangers do use uparmor HMMWVs some MRAPs but we really don't need more than that. If a SOCOM element needs more armor or firepower for a specific mission then we borrow it. SOCOM units typically rely on surprise, speed and agility rather than overwhelming fire. Targets that require that kind of force will probably be passed to the units that have those assets rather than trying to make a SOCOM unit into cav or armor unit.

SFC W

William F. Owen
12-23-2007, 06:50 AM
Which facts are those? SF/Rangers do use uparmor HMMWVs some MRAPs but we really don't need more than that. If a SOCOM element needs more armor or firepower for a specific mission then we borrow it. SOCOM units typically rely on surprise, speed and agility rather than overwhelming fire. Targets that require that kind of force will probably be passed to the units that have those assets rather than trying to make a SOCOM unit into cav or armor unit.

SFC W

The facts are my experience of doing presentations to 4-star and 1-star HQs advocating the employment of light armour to vehicles, regardless of the units preferred method of operations. UK Para initially deployed to Helmand with no organic armoured vehicles. Now everyone gets armour. The threat has not changed.

Yes, Ranger and SF units do have Armoured Hummers and MRAPs - today. How many did they have on establishment in 2003? If SF can afford dedicated Helicopter support, as they have in both the US and UK, why not dedicated protected mobility?

No threat currently seen in Iraq is new. Even EFPs have been around for years. They are all threats that folks chose to ignore. Why? I can never work it out.

http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Owen_0207_RDS.pdf

The above link may be of interest. It has some bearing on this discussion.

Uboat509
12-23-2007, 07:25 AM
Yes, Ranger and SF units do have Armoured Hummers and MRAPs - today. How many did they have on establishment in 2003? If SF can afford dedicated Helicopter support, as they have in both the US and UK, why not dedicated protected mobility?

We had and have the what we needed for the threat we face. Outside of Iraq (and to some extent Afghanistan) there is not a significant need for the type of armor that we use in Iraq. in those cases the drawbacks to the extra armor (increased fuel usage, slower speed, maintenance issues, air transportability, etc) outweigh the benefits. As I stated before, if a target requires tanks and heavy armor to take it down then it is not a SOF target and the mission will be given to a unit that already has tanks and heavy armor.


No threat currently seen in Iraq is new. Even EFPs have been around for years. They are all threats that folks chose to ignore. Why? I can never work it out.

The types of threats may not be new but the scale of these threats is new. No one has ignored these threats but there is more to consider than simple armor protection. That type of thinking is why I keep getting issued more and more body armor to the point where, if I were to wear it all, I would be fairly well protected and nearly immobile.

SFC W

William F. Owen
12-23-2007, 08:36 AM
@ We had and have the what we needed for the threat we face. Outside of Iraq (and to some extent Afghanistan) there is not a significant need for the type of armor that we use in Iraq.

@ in those cases the drawbacks to the extra armor (increased fuel usage, slower speed, maintenance issues, air transportability, etc) outweigh the benefits. As I stated before, if a target requires tanks and heavy armor to take it down then it is not a SOF target and the mission will be given to a unit that already has tanks and heavy armor.

@ The types of threats may not be new but the scale of these threats is new. No one has ignored these threats but there is more to consider than simple armor protection.
S

@ Well the threat down here in Southern Thailand means the RTA want's more armoured vehicles. We deployed a lot of armoured vehicles to Northern Ireland, and used them in large numbers for all but the last 10 years. IRA IEDs meant there was no significant Army road movement in South Armagh for nearly 8 years.

@ Agreed, that is why the Royal Marines - and soon Para - are going for BvS-10, not Warrior or Bradley.

@ Well I think the PKM and RPG-7 were very likely to be encountered in great numbers anywhere on the planet, but yes, sensible TTPs are vital, and logistic and operational judgements and compromises have to be made - that is no excuse to base line a units equipment around something that has all the protection of a family car.

My point being, none of this is new. The sensible application of Armour saves lives. A key lesson of the Falklands war was the need to equip light infantry formations with more armoured fire support and mobility - something we, the UK chose to ignore until 1999/2000.

Ratzel
12-23-2007, 08:37 AM
We had and have the what we needed for the threat we face. Outside of Iraq (and to some extent Afghanistan) there is not a significant need for the type of armor that we use in Iraq. in those cases the drawbacks to the extra armor (increased fuel usage, slower speed, maintenance issues, air transportability, etc) outweigh the benefits. As I stated before, if a target requires tanks and heavy armor to take it down then it is not a SOF target and the mission will be given to a unit that already has tanks and heavy armor.
SFC W

Try not to think about this in terms of what you understand Mechanized forces to be today. I'm talking about a new concept here. Your unit, or for that matter, any Special Operations unit would not be transformed into one of these units. Instead, this unit would be formed from, or reflagged from the regular Army.

The idea is not to turn SO into the a mech unit, the idea is turn a mech unit into a SO unit. You bring up the point about a target not being an SF target if tanks and APC's are needed. What I I'm wondering is if there's something in between?

Is there a need for an highly trained mechanized unit that can get on the ground fully in 24 hours and operate for a for a week or so in an intense environment? Mechanized units can sustain themselves longer than a regular Ranger unit. If re-supply by air is imposable due to weather or something unforeseen, this type of unit would be especially useful.

Of course, anyone who entered the military after Somalia learned the lessons of that experience. Most people now admit that armour could have saved a lot of lives there. You bring up the point about a target not being SF if tanks and APC's are needed. But in this situation, this is far from the truth. So now the question is, if we did use armour in that situation, would you rather it be from the regular Army or from the new Panzer-Grenadier-Mech-SO capable Unit? Please answer this question?

William F. Owen
12-23-2007, 11:45 AM
Of course, anyone who entered the military after Somalia learned the lessons of that experience. Most people now admit that armour could have saved a lot of lives there.

As an side, I went back to my light armour presentation notes and found a figure of 6 dead and over 40 wounded from travelling in un-armoured vehicles during the Blackhawk down thing. Can't remember where I got those figures, but they are telling in themselves.

Ski
12-23-2007, 01:56 PM
SF and the Rangers also have Stryker (Rangers) and Pandurs (SF - I think that's what they ended up procuring). I think the capability exists to an extent already.

Uboat509
12-23-2007, 04:56 PM
The idea is not to turn SO into the a mech unit, the idea is turn a mech unit into a SO unit. You bring up the point about a target not being an SF target if tanks and APC's are needed. What I I'm wondering is if there's something in between?

Is there a need for an highly trained mechanized unit that can get on the ground fully in 24 hours and operate for a for a week or so in an intense environment? Mechanized units can sustain themselves longer than a regular Ranger unit. If re-supply by air is imposable due to weather or something unforeseen, this type of unit would be especially useful.

That is the genesis of the light cav concept. I was with 2 ACR when it was first formed as a light cav regiment. Back then our prime mission was "expand the lodgement." The Rangers or 82nd or whoever would seize an airfield and then we would land on that airfield, push out and hold the terrain around the airfield until heavier forces could be landed and pushed into the fight. The original intent of the Stryker battalions was similar. They were designed to be carried on a C130 and then roll off into the fight and as far as I know that is still the intent. Everyone is focused on Iraq right now and not really thinking about forced entry into another country but that is what Stryker is supposed to be for.


Of course, anyone who entered the military after Somalia learned the lessons of that experience. Most people now admit that armour could have saved a lot of lives there. You bring up the point about a target not being SF if tanks and APC's are needed. But in this situation, this is far from the truth.

No one ever denied that armor would have been nice to have for that raid in Somalia but it was not was up to SOF. The armor had been removed as a result of a decision by the NCA not SOF. Had the armor been available in sector then SOF would have used it. That does not mean that they need organic armor capability. In any case, even if SOF did have its own armor it would likely have been pulled out with the rest of the armor.


So now the question is, if we did use armour in that situation, would you rather it be from the regular Army or from the new Panzer-Grenadier-Mech-SO capable Unit? Please answer this question?

I have no problem at all with getting armor support from big Army on those rare occasions when it is needed. What I do have a problem with is a mech unit eating up SOF resources and budget.

SFC W

Norfolk
12-23-2007, 07:31 PM
Uboat509 has an important point about funding being an issue for SOF; simply creating more Units is just spreading existing resources even more thinly.

But Wilf is on to something when he raises the example of the Royal Marines. One of the major differences between the US Army Rangers and the British Commandos is that the latter are trained, organized, and equipped for sustained as well as brief operations. The 75th Ranger Regiment is almost entirely composed of Infantry Battalions, and also a dedicated SF-Support Company or Group; no Armour, no Artillery, no Engineers, no ADA, etc, and as such, can normally only perform operations of very short duration. 3 Commando Brigade has organic Artillery, Engineers, ADA, etc., and Armour attached or on-call. Moreover, within the Infantry Commandos, there are Heavy Support Weapons and Troops; in the Ranger Battalions, the Rifle Companies are mainly left to their own devices, although that appears to be possibly changing or about to change.

When 2 Para fought at Goose Green, the presence of a few Light Tanks may have made quite a difference; I do not mean to say that Light Armour will always or even often be required in many operations by Airborne or Commando Forces, but it should be organic to Airborne and Commando Forces Formations, and therefore available if needed. Even a situation not unlike Mogadishu in '93 may have turned out rather better if a Unit akin to the Rangers found themselves in a similar situation (political factors eliminating that option for the Rangers themselves in '93).

In sum, adding a Light Tank Squadron (Company) or even a Regiment (Battalion) to a Formation such as 3 Commando Brigade would give it tactical and even operational capabilities and options that may prove very useful under certain circumstances. Even a Commando Tank Regiment (Battalion) with a few Squadrons (Companies) plus a Rifle Company or two, and with the usual attached Artillery, Engineers, ADA, etc., might make for a very potent striking force for certain roles and in certain environments.

As for the 75th Ranger Regiment, personally I would rather see it augmented into something at least comparable to 3 Commando Brigade, with sustained operations being added to its roles. That said, I am speaking from a Commonwealth perspective where having fewer troops means having to train them in a greater range of skills and for a greater range of roles. Large Armies may have the luxury of not doing this, though I do not agree with it at all.

Light tracked vehicles are the way to go where possible; the LAV-III Stryker has not turned out well in cross-country operations in Afghanistan; it works best when there is a reasonable road network to use most of the time, and it does not fare well under attack by volleys of RPGs and the like.

Schuld
12-23-2007, 08:46 PM
SOF have used armor: if I'm not mistaken, the Australian SAS used the Wiesel with 20mm gun for fire support on patrol in Afghanistan -- one answer to the beyond .50 BMG range engagement issue on the DM thread. If a small vehicle like the Wiesel 2 could be fitted with something like the Warrior 40mm CTW gun in the remote turret configuration, and powered by hybrid electric drive such as that demo'd in the RA 93-23 program, would it be useful to the Rangers? It would essentially be reprising the role of the M24 Chaffee but in a much smaller, airmobile and LAPSE-able package. This would fill the niche between the GMV-R and the Stryker 105mm MGS, if such a niche needed to be filled. There is also a Wiesel 2 with 120mm self-loading mortar whose 14-rds/minute burst-mode ROF and fire-control might be superior to the current towed 120mm mortar used by the Rangers. If only money were no object.

I think the light infantry fear, which I recollect a NZ Army infantryman expressing as he transitioned to Stryker-type wheeled armor, is that equipment changes mindset and mission focus (in this case, the fears expressed were that suddenly the concept was patrol-from-the-vehicle and COIN skills like tracking were dying out).

Surferbeetle
12-24-2007, 06:03 AM
All,

It's been my observation that SF has moved to a more kinetic focus over the past few years. No doubt this is in part a necessary response to our current operational requirements in Afghanistan & Iraq, however despite this change a standing SOC Armor unit seems to violate some of the basic tenets of SOF.

It has been my observation as a CA-Bubba (OIF 1 & New Horizons) that 'lighter is righter'. Psychologically I am not looking for walls/armor to separate me from the locals. Instead I am looking to develop a network of relationships with key power brokers, SME's on various subjects, and your average local. Often-times my SF brothers have helped me out by fleshing out local networks before I arrive. With this network I can, if I speak the language and understand the culture, identify friction points and leverage points where I can help the commander to influence his AO. I am also situationally aware of how to keep me and mine alive (always a good thing). Over time I can figure out who might need a kinetic visit and make a recommendation. More importantly I can also make short and long term recommendations on how to get to a point in time where kinetic relationships are minimized. To produce this I need to spend alot of time with the locals.

From my vantage point Armor is geared more for highly kinetic operations where one needs a barrier between oneself and something very unpleasant than for working closely with the populace to influence the battle.

Steve

William F. Owen
12-24-2007, 08:05 AM
All,

I think all that is being proposed is the creation of an armoured unit for SOCOM, in the same way as they have dedicated Helicopter support, or small boat support, why not give them dedicated protected mobility. This does not change SF or SOCOM in any way. It augments it.

In the Royal Marines, they have a separate Armoured Support Group. This provides Commando Battle Groups with protected mobility as and when required. Marines still have to learn to Ski, climb and do all the Commando stuff. Nothing changes except you have more capability.

bismark17
12-24-2007, 08:36 AM
The "lightfigher" culture would be very adamant against this for a whole host of reasons. I was in a light unit that got converted into a Bradley unit and just about every tabbed and or scrolled participant bailed at the first chance. The comment, "I didn't sign up to be a treadhead" was uttered numerous times. We lost a lot of highly experienced people.

Beyond that, TO&E and budget issues would be a major problem. It seems like the Stryker units seem or at least are trying to fill that void already. The Panzer Grenadiers were just well trained infantry to be used in a role they were trained for and it seems kind of insulting that you think you need tabbed or people with wings to be competent in that role. Jumping out of airplanes scared the crap out of me but it didn't make me a better Bradley commander. Doing the Darby Queen smoked me but I am not sure it made me a better leader. From what I am hearing from the guys on the ground there is a major blurring in SOF and the regular joes in mission taskings and operational procedures these days, anyway.

More decisions are being made by ever smaller element leaders and the operational tempo is rapidly increasing. It's starting to sound like some of our 11bs are becoming more like cops by stuffing doors and immediately following up on leads instead of forwarding info up the chain and awaiting further orders. These are good things and I sure wouldn't look down upon anyone doing these things in a real world environment who doesn't wear various tabs or badges on their BDU, oops I mean DCU.

bismark17
12-24-2007, 08:46 AM
After re-reading the original post I am not sure if we don't already have that capability through the armor element of the 82nd or the Stryker Brigades. I assume we still have the RDF? Even if not, the bats have anti-armor capabilites and are deployable in 72 hours if I remember correctly.

William F. Owen
12-24-2007, 09:05 AM
@ The "lightfigher" culture would be very adamant against this for a whole host of reasons.

@ Beyond that, TO&E and budget issues would be a major problem. It seems like the Stryker units seem or at least are trying to fill that void already.


@ Well there's the problem. Culture.

@ TO&E is merely how. The critical question is why. Once you have the why, the budget and the TO&E usually follows.

The Israelis don't understand the idea of light infantry as they don't have any. They have an infantry brigade they can drop by parachute, and an infantry brigade that can do amphibious operations, but they are all just infantry. They use armoured vehicles as and when they need them. When they need to get out and infiltrate on foot, they do just that.

Ratzel
12-24-2007, 09:50 AM
All,

I think all that is being proposed is the creation of an armoured unit for SOCOM, in the same way as they have dedicated Helicopter support, or small boat support, why not give them dedicated protected mobility. This does not change SF or SOCOM in any way. It augments it.


Thank you for stating this. I didn't intend to start discussing unit finance or budgets. Lets just assume that no ones budget will be touched. The idea isn't to re-flag the Ranger units or to force a Special Forces A-Team "behind walls." The idea is to form a new unit, that is Mechanized, which has the same standard of fitness, leadership, discipline, and training as a Ranger Battalion. No one who is currently in a Ranger or SF unit would be forced into it. All were doing here is having a brainstorming session.

I meant no offense towards the regular Army, As I was in the regular Army myself. And like I said, I happened to be in a Mech unit. Sticking Rangers into some APC's is not the same as a unit who specializes in it. We want Airborne Rangers to do what they do. We want this unit to do what it does. Think specialization, think comparative advantage. When I said Panzer Grenadier, what I should of said was SS Panzer Grenadier. The SS was a highly trained unit, at the same time, they weren't airborne. We have an image of SOC units as always being Airborne, this unit wouldn't need that. So there would be no changes for anyone else, this unit would be created from the regular Army and from new recruits.

I've been thinking about this since I was in the Army. I often thought about what a mech unit would look like made from the guys who always had high PT scores, got the school slots, never got in trouble, were always motivated for the field, never dropped out of ruck-marches, and who were highly disciplined? This unit would be just another tool for the military to use. A mech unit that could go further, and fight harder than a regular mech unit.

I think we can all agree that the military is going to be very busy for next 20-30 years? I foresee situations that will call for variety of mixed units. If Rangers are the best of the best for light infantry, then why not have the same for a mechanized unit? There may be times when fast-roping into a town and bringing in the little birds will be too dangerous. Instead, what may be needed is a unit to drive into the town that has tanks, 120MM mortars, and maybe even some light artillery?

Don't think about this affecting you. Just let your creative minds operate. Think outside the box.

SWJED
12-24-2007, 10:28 AM
... let your creative minds operate. Think outside the box.

... you are in the right place for that!

Uboat509
12-24-2007, 10:33 AM
I think we can all agree that the military is going to be very busy for next 20-30 years? I foresee situations that will call for variety of mixed units. If Rangers are the best of the best for light infantry, then why not have the same for a mechanized unit? There may be times when fast-roping into a town and bringing in the little birds will be too dangerous. Instead, what may be needed is a unit to drive into the town that has tanks, 120MM mortars, and maybe even some light artillery?


As I stated before, there is no need to create a SOF armor unit. On those occasions when something heavier than upamored HMMWVs or MRAPs is needed then we can get those assets from big Army. The Rangers were not formed simply to be a better light infantry unit. They perform a series of missions that the regular infantry is not trained or equiped to perform. I cannot think of what specialized mission a SOF armor unit would perform that a regular armor unit could not.


SFC W

jonSlack
12-24-2007, 12:29 PM
Thank you for stating this. I didn't intend to start discussing unit finance or budgets. Lets just assume that no ones budget will be touched. The idea isn't to re-flag the Ranger units or to force a Special Forces A-Team "behind walls." The idea is to form a new unit, that is Mechanized, which has the same standard of fitness, leadership, discipline, and training as a Ranger Battalion. No one who is currently in a Ranger or SF unit would be forced into it. All were doing here is having a brainstorming session.

...

I've been thinking about this since I was in the Army. I often thought about what a mech unit would look like made from the guys who always had high PT scores, got the school slots, never got in trouble, were always motivated for the field, never dropped out of ruck-marches, and who were highly disciplined? This unit would be just another tool for the military to use. A mech unit that could go further, and fight harder than a regular mech unit.

Based on the quote from Ratzel, I think SOF/SOC is the wrong term to be using to describe this hypothetical unit. A better term is "elite."

All SOF (the Ranger Regiment, Army Special Forces, and their equivalents from other branches of service) are normally considered to be "elite." On the flipside, all "elite" units need not be SOF and "elite" forces can, and do, exist in "big Army."

SOF means that the units are designed, capable, and expected to undertake missions defined as "Special Operations." This hypothetical mechanized element would not be conducting any "Special Operations." Rather, it would merely be a rapidly deployable conventional heavy element with a high quality personnel at all levels, a high state of readiness, and no constraints when it comes to equipment and training resources.

The high PT scores, rucking ability, good behavior, and other positive traits being sought can be, and are, acheived by having good leaders at all levels willing to devote the time and energy to train and mentor every Soldier under their leadership to exceed the standard in physical fitness, professionalism, maturity, and all other areas.

Uboat509
12-24-2007, 04:58 PM
Big Army does not like the elite concept for the simple reason that if you take all the high quality personnel and put them into one elite unit, what does that leave for the rest of the units? As it is big Army only tolerates "elite units" because they perform different mission sets from big Army. Even still, big Army has taken is toll on elite forces where it could. The Rangers in particular have had to contend with this. Ten years ago, if you did not start in Batt as a private then you simply did not go to Batt. Some time in the recent past someone decided that there was too much talent and experience concentrated in the Batts and so began rotating the NCOs out out of the Batts and rotating NCOs in who had not come up in the Batts. The idea was to "share the wealth" so to speak but the concept is flawed. There are simply not enough NCOs in Batt to make a significant impact on the rest of the Army but the influx of new NCOs, who did not grow up in Batt has watered down the quality of the Batts. I have heard many an old Batt boy bemoan this fact.

SFC W

Rifleman
12-24-2007, 06:24 PM
There are simply not enough NCOs in Batt to make a significant impact on the rest of the Army but the influx of new NCOs, who did not grow up in Batt has watered down the quality of the Batts. I have heard many an old Batt boy bemoan this fact.

I don't doubt there's truth in that but I have to wonder if at least part of it is sour grapes; since, there will always be some "bemoaning" if anyone perceives that someone else hasn't paid their dues. But for people "born and raised" in the 75th dues paying often simply means that you experienced the "Spec. 4 Mafia" hazing culture as a private.

When the battalions were formed in 1974 nobody had grown up in them. I know some people who served in SF or Ranger/LRRP companies were active in the formation of the battalions but I don't think that was excusively the case. Am I wrong about that?

I've never spent "day one" in a Ranger Battalion nor have I been to RIP, but two of the most impressive NCOs I encountred in the Army "grew up" in the battalions. One was a 2nd Battalion Ranger from the mid '70s and the other was a 1st Battalion Ranger from the early '80s. Then again, two of the biggest screw ups that it was my displeasure to serve with had been 1st Battalion Rangers "born and raised" in the battalion.

Jones_RE
12-24-2007, 06:53 PM
I think the resistance to this idea comes from the fact that Special Operations units are different in kind from regular units and not just in quality.

A regular army sergeant who is the strongest man in the world, a crackshot and can run laps around marathon winners might not make it as a Ranger because he lacks the mindset and discipline to operate behind enemy lines. Whereas a Ranger isn't necessarily any better of a fighter than the regular army guys in a stand up fight just because he can parachute and so forth.

An elite mechanized unit, one better only in quality, is a non-starter due to army (probably American military) culture.

A mechanized unit designed to support the unique missions of SOC is viable (because it's been done before).

Raids and surprise attacks well behind enemy lines have been done with armor in the past. Such a capability would probably be useful for current Ranger formations. Might also be useful for certain other units as well. This unit would have to be different in kind from a regular army unit because it would operate by stealth and far from logistical support.

Surferbeetle
12-24-2007, 06:55 PM
Big Army does not like the elite concept for the simple reason that if you take all the high quality personnel and put them into one elite unit, what does that leave for the rest of the units?

There are simply not enough NCOs in Batt to make a significant impact on the rest of the Army but the influx of new NCOs, who did not grow up in Batt has watered down the quality of the Batts. I have heard many an old Batt boy bemoan this fact.

SFC W

Big Army often doesn't like things that are different and that do not fit the mold. Unfortunately it takes some time for things to change.

With regard to quality NCO's I can't speak for the Ranger Battalions but I do know that in general Ranger and SF NCO's are a good thing. I spent a few years in Vicenza, some Guard time, some USAR time, and some time with the 101st. In each of these organizations a group of solid NCO's are largely responsible for the successes of the organization. More times than not they are tabbed, have 'grown up' in a more rigorous culture, and have alot of real world experience. As a result they are able to influence and train up some 'mini-me's' which are vital to improving things. Weak NCO's lead to weak organizations.

To paraphrase a 'SOF truth' quality is better than quantity and it cannot be mass produced in response to an emergency. Our current efforts at recruiting and retention fail to account for this truth, instead we are rapidly moving towards future personnel problems:

http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2007/0712.tilghman.html

http://www.goarmy.com/benefits/money_bonuses.jsp

Steve

Jones_RE
12-24-2007, 06:56 PM
Does anyone here think that providing an armored capability to current units would result in their being used as elite infantry?

This happened to US Ranger forces during WWII as I recall. The battalions acquired heavier weapons that made it harder to raid behind the lines and more likely that they'd be used in conventional combat. The high casualties of conventional combat thinned the ranks of skilled Rangers making it less likely that they could succeed in their original mission. This vicious cycle was compounded by the fact that the Ranger battalions had no regular source of trained replacements.

I could see a decision to send an armor augmented Ranger unit to storm Fallujah, for example. Whereas with their current equipment using Rangers in that environment was simply not an option.

Granite_State
12-24-2007, 07:19 PM
Based on the quote from Ratzel, I think SOF/SOC is the wrong term to be using to describe this hypothetical unit. A better term is "elite."


Was thinking the exact same thing, and the Army's hostility to elite units makes basic sense to me. Aren't the Marines much the same way, viewing Force Recon with suspicion? Cultivating esprit de corps, along the lines of the British regimental system (which has its faults) seems like a better solution to me.

As for the SS, I'm not an expert on WWII German forces, but weren't their roles basically the same as those of the Wehrmacht? You can get divisions of elite, indoctrinated troops when you have conscription and a decade of fascist rule...

ROKMAN
12-24-2007, 07:33 PM
I read a book called Breaking the Phalanx and its update Transformation Under Fire, both by a retired colonel named Douglas Macgregor.

In his book we should concentrate on Combat Groups instead of the division as the all arms formation. The Combat Group according to him is smaller than a division but larger than a brigade. The current modularity going on in the Army right now is kinda based on it but rather a bastardization of the original concept. His approach to TANK/MECH is this.

1 Recon Battalion (Ground and Air (UAV) recon)
3 Combined Arms Heavy Battalions each with
--- 2 Tank Companies
--- 2 Mech Companies
--- 1 Engineer Company
--- 1 HHC
1 Strike Battalion (Artillery and UAVs with missiles)
1 Support Battalion (with improved support capability)
1 C4I Battalion (HQ, Staff, and other support like MP, ADA, etc.)

Total troops is about 5,000 to 5,500 and under the command of a Brigadier General.

As I mentioned before these are not part of a division but rather semi-independent. This semi-independent nature can be used to build a Task Force enabling a wider span of control.

This systems has it all, in my opinion. What do you think?

Uboat509
12-24-2007, 07:37 PM
The SS were not necessarily more elite than the regular Wehrmact troops but they were more fanatical and loyal to the party and therefore got the best equipment first. This has, in fact, been an accusation that has been leveled against the SOF community by some in big Army.

SFC W

selil
12-24-2007, 10:43 PM
There was a genearl back in the 1980's I can't remember exactly what or when or any of that, but I internalized the message. It was something like, "Double the pay, triple the requirements, and I'll give you an army four times more capable", later it was added "and recruits will bust down the door", but I don't believe that was in the original article.

The theme of course was that elitism in the military is counterproductive, and that an elite military is highly productive. What could you do with 350K soldiers trained like every special operator?

jcustis
12-25-2007, 07:52 PM
Was thinking the exact same thing, and the Army's hostility to elite units makes basic sense to me. Aren't the Marines much the same way, viewing Force Recon with suspicion? Cultivating esprit de corps, along the lines of the British regimental system (which has its faults) seems like a better solution to me.

I would say it is less a matter of suspicion and more one of, "Yeah, there go those primadonnas again." Still, I believe there is a fair amount of awe within the junior ranks of the infantry when the term Recon comes up. It all starts with the paperbacks in the Vietnam section of the Military History shelves.

bismark17
12-25-2007, 08:31 PM
I still remember my grandfather talking about his worst battle in WW2 was with a SS unit and he couldn't believe how fanatical they were even as borderline kids. He kept saying how many of them looked like they were 14.

They were fanatical fighters no doubt but there is a lot of controversy concerning how effective they were based on their priority of supply and equipment. Many Wermacht officers have been critical about their preventable losses the units frequently sustained and that was even before the absolute buzz saw of the Eastern Front. The SS were soldiers of the state and very highly indoctrinated. While the myth still persists that the Waffen SS were totally seperate from the Allgemeine SS, the Phd dissertation that was later put into a book called, Soldiers of Destruction goes to great lengths to prove how great their interactions. They did produce some amazing soldiers such as Michael Wittman but not sure how spectacular they were as an overall organization on the battlefield. There was a series of books concerning the various SS Corps that starts with a book called, The Devil's Adjutant concerning Jochen Peiper and the LAH during the Battle of the Bulge that does shed much light.

William F. Owen
12-26-2007, 01:30 AM
Gentleman,

With respect, I suspect we are getting a tad confused on this issue.

I think what the thread was suggesting, was that in the same way that SOCOM has Dedicated Helicopter and Boat units to facilitate air and sea/river support, that the same think is being suggested for protected mobility.

I would suggest that such a unit be Joint, and have armoured vehicles that can be air-dropped, and/or under-slung from CH-47. Unit personnel should be capable of rigging the vehicles for helicopter ops, as well as knowing all the tips and trick associated with long range vehicles operations. What ever levels of qualification exist for air and boat units should be adapted and made relevant to an armoured unit.

Uboat509
12-26-2007, 05:00 AM
Gentleman,I would suggest that such a unit be Joint, and have armoured vehicles that can be air-dropped, and/or under-slung from CH-47. Unit personnel should be capable of rigging the vehicles for helicopter ops, as well as knowing all the tips and trick associated with long range vehicles operations. What ever levels of qualification exist for air and boat units should be adapted and made relevant to an armoured unit.

We have this already. The vehicles we have now are airtransportable in a c130 and can be slung under an MH 47. We don't really do airdrops anymore but I suppose we could if we needed to.


SFC W

Ratzel
12-26-2007, 10:02 AM
I think what the thread was suggesting, was that in the same way that SOCOM has Dedicated Helicopter and Boat units to facilitate air and sea/river support, that the same think is being suggested for protected mobility.



No, I was actually talking about a whole Ranger like Mechanized Unit. What you're talking is sort of like the SAS has, where each team is trained for a speacial task (e.i. Small boats, Mountains, etc). I'm talking about having tanks and artillery pieces here. I would never want to see a Special Forces person being forced to drive a tank. This unit would be nothing more than an elite mechanized regiment. It would be used when SF or Delta (I don't know what they call themselves these days?) needed a highly trained armour unit to support them. Sort of like how Rangers pull security for Operators to come in and take down a target building, this would be the same thing.

I do thank all of you for giving your input. This idea would be hated by the whole Army if it ever became reality. The SOF people would fear a change in SF culture and the regular Army would fear loosing its best people.

We can also think about how this would relate to Tom Barnett's ideas. The Leviathan force would be smaller and better trained than today's force. Tomorrow's Leviathan force may be half the size of today's Army. To make up the loss in numbers, we'd want an extremely well trained and finely selected force. What do you folks think?

Uboat509
12-26-2007, 11:06 AM
The SOF people would fear a change in SF culture an

What are you basing that statement on?

SFC W

jonSlack
12-26-2007, 12:05 PM
...I'm talking about having tanks and artillery pieces here. I would never want to see a Special Forces person being forced to drive a tank. This unit would be nothing more than an elite mechanized regiment. It would be used when SF or Delta (I don't know what they call themselves these days?) needed a highly trained armour unit to support them. Sort of like how Rangers pull security for Operators to come in and take down a target building, this would be the same thing...

In my opinion, you are proposing a solution for a problem that does not exist.

Steve Blair
12-26-2007, 01:58 PM
Actually I kicked around a concept somewhat similar to this in a paper I did for a class (slapout's seen it...and I may expand it as a more serious article). It was more of an updated version of the division cavalry squadron circa Vietnam (except with two ground combat troops, two air troops, and a boosted H&S troop), but I'd actually call the concept more medium cavalry than I would any sort of Spec Ops unit. It's optimized to serve as a reaction force for COIN efforts, but would also function pretty well in a medium to high level conflict as recon and/or security (as well as a reaction force for the Somalia-type situations...it's intended to have a reasonable deployment footprint).

I don't know that you really need to take an armored unit and slap it into SOC to do this, but you do need to hark back a bit to the more traditional roles of cavalry in the US: those being as a reaction force and dragoons.

MattC86
12-26-2007, 05:39 PM
Essentially this concept sounds like a TF Baum/Hammelburg Raid type unit. Entirely self-contained armored task force.

I agree essentially with what SFC W has said; if the mission requires such a unit, it's not a mission for SOF. DA or recon missions seem to me to require an element of speed and stealth that are incompatible with a couple of M1 tanks clanking around. If armor or heavy air/arty support is needed for potential extraction, SOF should be able to call upon those regular forces if needed; that doesn't warrant a brand-new unit.

As far as the self-contained armored TF, for raids or other "special" missions; I think the armored cav concept, and the ability to pare down an ACR into smaller packages depending on the mission, is sufficient; though I don't know enough to say for sure.

To expand upon JonSlack, this unit would be a redundant raid-type capability (covered by ACRs) and much too heavy for SOF-type missions. It would indeed be a unit without a true niche mission.

Perhaps you could expand upon the type of role such a TF would fulfill?

Matt

Rifleman
12-26-2007, 05:43 PM
I don't know that you really need to take an armored unit and slap it into SOC to do this, but you do need to hark back a bit to the more traditional roles of cavalry in the US: those being as a reaction force and dragoons.

That's what I was thinking and trying to say with my first post on this thread, although I thought maybe it should be done by attaching an ACR to SOCOM. Maybe not?

Perhaps an ACR attached to SOCOM wouldn't need to be as robust as the ACR of an armored corps but shouldn't it have at least some tanks and Bradleys? We don't have a light tank since the M8 was canceled so what would be the alternative? Perhaps an ACR with an armored squadron, stryker squadron, and air squadron? I don't have any experience with armor so maybe this isn't a good mix. I'm just tossing out thoughts.

Steve Blair
12-26-2007, 05:50 PM
That's what I was thinking and trying to say with my first post on this thread, although I thought maybe it should be done by attaching an ACR to SOCOM. Maybe not?

Perhaps an ACR attached to SOCOM wouldn't need to be as robust as the ACR of an armored corps but shouldn't it have at least some tanks and Bradleys? We don't have a light tank since the M8 was canceled so what would be the alternative? Perhaps an ACR with an armored squadron, stryker squadron, and air squadron? I don't have any experience with armor so maybe this isn't a good mix. I'm just tossing out thoughts.

My concept had a Vietnam-era mix, with tanks down at the Troop level along with either wheeled or tracked (I tend to prefer the M-113 family for UW/LIC stuff) vehicles to move a dismount element. For operations you could have a ground Troop with an attached air Troop working route security, quick reactions, and even some population security. One of the forgotten lessons of Vietnam was that cav tended to work better when it had its organic air cav along for the ride and not close-held by Division (or higher). The Vietnam-era air cav troop also had a platoon of infantry (the Blues or ARPs) that could be used as either a ground recon force or dismounts/QRF elements to support movements made by the ground Troop.

Ratzel
12-27-2007, 12:54 AM
What are you basing that statement on?

SFC W


When I was in the Army, there was a general disdain for Mechanized forces within light infantry units and especially SOF units. I was stationed at Ft. Benning, and before we deployed to the Middle East-in preparation for the invasion of Iraq-I attended a CQB shooting class/seminar at the Ranger Batt. The class was lead by an ex-Delta guy whose name I totally forgot. Anyway, I was talking to the Ranger Platoon Sgt. about his deployment to Afghanistan and told me that I "can keep that vehicle maintenance crap."

But it goes far beyond that as well. Mechanized Infantry was always looked down upon. Even in Basic Training, I remember the Drill Sgts speaking of the inferior mech units. The general stereotype was that Mech units were lazy, out of shape, and brought grills and coolers out to the field. I also attended several Army schools where I met soldiers and NCO's from light units who held the same attitudes.

Of course, every stereotype holds a little truth and we did have our share of fat bodies and those who used the Bradly as their own personal Winnebago's. Before they merged 11B and 11M, I also noticed some differences in knowledge of tactics between the two. This comes from time in the motor pool. I always served in a rifle squad but still had to spend time in the motor pool. Light Infantry people can spend all their time doing light infantry training, so its a scarcity of time issue.

I look at SF units as being very human capital intensive. What makes Special Forces "Special" is the quality of personal. These men depend on their minds and bodies, with the a little help from technology. Adding in million dollar vehicles, can possibly threaten the emphasis on human capital and divert it to physical capital.

Schuld
12-27-2007, 04:13 AM
The Israelis don't understand the idea of light infantry as they don't have any. They have an infantry brigade they can drop by parachute, and an infantry brigade that can do amphibious operations, but they are all just infantry. They use armoured vehicles as and when they need them. When they need to get out and infiltrate on foot, they do just that.

RE IDF infantry, certainly they've shown their flexibility (paratroopers performing amphibious landings in the first war in Lebanon, etc.), but I thought that there was criticism that the mechanized infantry role has been effectively lost in the IDF -- that during the last war in Lebanon on several occasions tanks were sent forward without infantry support?

Also, I'm under the impression that the Airborne aspect of the IDF's Airborne brigades is a genuflection to the doctrine of elan as developed by Orde Wingate and Mickey Marcus among others, and does not reflect any actual current operational offensive capability outside of attached special forces units. It would take a little time for the IDF to regenerate the TTPs and logistical infrastructure to support mass tactical operations. Current actual practice is airmobile when it's air-anything, or so I've heard, and for many paratroopers the only jumps they make are in basic airborne school?

Couple this with the odd nature of the IDF -- the "regular forces" are a quasi-draft army, and so they are capable of quickly learning much, but also quickly forgetting much. Reputedly, much of the strength of the IDF is in the reserve battalions which have soldiers that have been fighting together in the same unit for decades. Those infantry formations are so capable because they comprise men in their 30s and 40s who've been in the game so long. One of the great criticisms of the last war was that the reserves weren't mobilized soon enough and that their equipment stores were empty when they did deploy because the gov't had failed to keep the stockpiles up and what had been there had often been previously "liberated" by black marketeers.


No, I was actually talking about a whole Ranger like Mechanized Unit... ....To make up the loss in numbers, we'd want an extremely well trained and finely selected force. What do you folks think?

If your desire is for generically "elite armor" don't the armored battalions of the USMC Regimental Combat Teams fill that role? Are we talking about the elimination of the Army, the expansion of the Marine Corps, and SOCOM taking the final step to being recognized as a new Uniformed Service? Jeez, chaos in the streets, cats and dogs living together, the end times are here...



I think what the thread was suggesting, was that in the same way that SOCOM has Dedicated Helicopter and Boat units to facilitate air and sea/river support, that the same think is being suggested for protected mobility.



The Rangers were not formed simply to be a better light infantry unit. They perform a series of missions that the regular infantry is not trained or equiped to perform. I cannot think of what specialized mission a SOF armor unit would perform that a regular armor unit could not.


If we're talking about some sort of light armor unit for SOCOM, some work in the US has been done on the classical European "Mechanized Airborne" concept -- see BG Grange on Airmechanization:

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JulAug01/JulAug01/grange.pdf

See also Air-Mech-Strike, 2ed, from Turner Publishing:

http://www.turnerpublishing.com/detail.aspx?ID=724

What you'd be looking at would be some sort of airborne light armor unit of a sort that exists in European armies but does not currently exist in the US Armed Forces. This would be a small unit that would be able to provide airborne and airmobile mechanized forces in support of Delta in the manner that the Rangers provide infantry support, with the emphasis on a mech footprint MUCH smaller than the Strykers:

Wiesel 1
http://www.military-today.com/apc/wiesel_1.htm

Wiesel 2
http://www.rheinmetall-detec.de/index.php?lang=3&fid=3825

BV series
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/doublejointed-popular-the-bv-family-of-infantry-support-vehicles-updated-02656/

My criticism would be that there hasn't been a second Black Hawk Down, so you must demonstrate that Delta is currently operationally limited by this lack and that current TTPs using airborne firepower (Apaches, A-10s, Specter gunships) are inadequate.

RJ
11-17-2008, 10:07 PM
Ratzel,

You might be attempting to reinvent the wheel. A Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) seems to have all the elements you listed plus air assets too.

Marine Expeditionary Unit
The smallest type of MAGTF is the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) (Special Operations Capable) (SOC). The command element is the standing headquarters for the MEU, usually headed by a colonel. The ground combat element is a battalion landing team (BLT), which is composed of an infantry battalion reinforced with tanks, artillery, engineers, amphibious vehicles, light armored vehicles, and other ground combat assets. The air combat element is composed of a composite squadron of fixed and rotary-wing aircraft and an Air Traffic Control (ATC) and command and control detachment. The combat service support element consists of a Combat Logistics Battalion (CLB) which handles the logistics and administration needs of the MEU. The specific makeup of the MEU can be customized based upon the task at hand; additional artillery, armor, or air units can be attached, including squadrons of F/A-18 Hornet and Harrier jets.

There are usually three MEUs assigned to each of the U.S. Navy Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, with another MEU based on Okinawa. While one MEU is on deployment, one MEU is training to deploy and one is standing down, resting its Marines, and refitting. Each MEU is rated as capable of performing special operations.

11th Marine Expeditionary Unit
13th Marine Expeditionary Unit
15th Marine Expeditionary Unit
22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit
24th Marine Expeditionary Unit
26th Marine Expeditionary Unit
31st Marine Expeditionary Unit

This post comes late to the discussion, but considering the activities of a MEU over the past year in Afganistan and the
results in Helmand Prov. the combined arms force seems to fit the basic description minus airborne and ranger school.

It is half the size of the unit envisioned by you, but covers a lot more options with less troops. The Marines have been fleshing out Battalion Landing Teams with assets needs for specific missions since the mid 1950's.

Todays MEU's grew out of that mix and into what is operational today.

dogtown
11-18-2008, 09:37 PM
If I may jump into the SOF Armor debate: what do SOF units have in common? Core airborne rapid deployment capability. SOF units by their very definition are light units so I have a hard time seeing any major armor asset being adopted by SOF units as a core asset beyond GMVs and armored LMTVs. That being said, in a longer term conflict (think OIF vs Just Cause) it's reasonable to see more powerful armor assets being considered as a large conventional pressence would be expected.

Still, there have been numerous occasions where larger scale armor assets have been scooped into action by SOF units, but across the spectrum of their capabilities I think this is very limited.

Bullmoose Bailey
12-11-2008, 02:53 PM
Great post. Your thinking really shows experience & reason.

This format is the basis of a school of though which has been strong in our Army since WWII; based on mobility horizontally & vertically, force protection in the atomic age & maneuverability over diverse terrains. There's a great book out on it now called Air-Mech Strike.

Luckily we have the equipment on hand to make this happen, such as thousands of M113s and more.

Bob's World
12-11-2008, 04:21 PM
Just a couple of quick thoughts:

1. SOCOM does not want to own any armored units. However, this is simply one of many "service-common" capabilities that the services are tasked to man, train, organize and equip. What we do need are much more effective mechanisms for putting such conventional capabilities under the C2 of the SOF Commander. Central to this is the major paradigm shift that sometimes conventional needs to work for SOF.

2. When SOF rides in armor, it belongs to an ally. I rode to war in an Egyptian APC. Limited US CAS, no US Arty, no US medevac, etc.

3. The party line is "Development of SOF enablers." Not to create conventional capabilities in SOF, nor to create SOF capabilities in the conventional force; but to create the capabilities and policies that allows the conventional commander to more readily provide the SOF force with whatever (log, air, armor, infantry, fires, etc) it might need for an operation, without having to provide it in the one size fits all BCT construct.

ODB
12-18-2008, 04:05 AM
I played catch up on this one and in the process went through multiple WTFs and just pure madness. Coming from an infantry back ground prior to going SF this was wrong to me on multiple fronts. The number one issue being why would I be doing something as an ODA that would require armor? That is not my mission. One of the biggest problems we face in todays Army culture is everyone wants to be everyone else. SF guys want to do kinetic operations only, conventional forces want to be SF guys conducting FID, gathering intel, working with the local populace. When one cog of the whole mechanism is successful everyone wants to be that cog. All the cogs are in place already, we just need to utilize them properly. Entirely too many capabilities are under utilized or misused today. Everyone is looking for the lastest and greatest capability and what do you know, it already exists. Why Cav Scouts in infantry battalions is a prime example of this......I'll hand it to the Cav branch they sure stole one there. If I sound a bit harsh I apologize.

As far as having our own aviation unit, yes SOF does, but ask any SF guy when the last time they were flown by that unit. Us lowly SF guys are not sexy enough for them, we get much better support from conventional aviation and other services aviation units. When talking an infil platform it is just that a means to move from point A to point B, not a lot of special/elite training needed to do that. So in essence if I was to be moved by bus I would need an elite bus driver to drive me because he/she is so much better at driving.....sorry does not pass the common sense factor.

With the political infighting for budget money the way it is good luck, hence we now have MARSOF, why? Why must we keep creating organizations with capabilities that all ready exist in existing organizations.

Honestly I'm torn on the whole who should work for who. Should conventional forces work under SF or SF under conventional. IMO it depends on the situation. Really what a lot of this comes down to is education/knowledge of each others capabilities and personalities.

Spud
12-18-2008, 05:28 AM
[QUOTE=Schuld;35888]SOF have used armor: if I'm not mistaken, the Australian SAS used the Wiesel with 20mm gun for fire support on patrol in Afghanistan -- one answer to the beyond .50 BMG range engagement issue on the DM thread. [QUOTE]

I think you've got the wrong 'Australians' -- no Wiesel in this part of the world.

reed11b
12-18-2008, 05:36 AM
IAs far as having our own aviation unit, yes SOF does, but ask any SF guy when the last time they were flown by that unit. Us lowly SF guys are not sexy enough for them, we get much better support from conventional aviation and other services aviation units. When talking an infil platform it is just that a means to move from point A to point B, not a lot of special/elite training needed to do that. So in essence if I was to be moved by bus I would need an elite bus driver to drive me because he/she is so much better at driving.....sorry does not pass the common sense factor.


I agree with most of what you said, but not this. Look into the history of WHY the SOF aviation unit was created aka "Operation Eagle Claw". There are requirments for flying SF missions that differ from GPF missions. I just can not think of armor asset missions that SF would do with eneough frequency to justify the creation of a mechanized SF unit. Perhaps a Ranger asset?
Reed

ODB
12-18-2008, 06:00 AM
Just stating the fact that "said" aviation unit rarely supports SF, therefore most of our support comes from conventional and other services. That would also factor into the decision as to why SF is currently fighting for their own aviation assets at the Group level, because SOF aviation in it's current form is not big enough to support all of SOF.

Bullmoose Bailey
01-21-2009, 07:24 AM
Our DIV CAV Squadrons were very close to the intent here, albeit with a different METL.

Likely light tanks & tracks will facilitate more agility, maneuverability & force protection....

That being said, should the units be mechanised or motorised ?

I feell mechanised woud be better. What say you ?

William F. Owen
01-21-2009, 07:55 AM
Likely light tanks & tracks will facilitate more agility, maneuverability & force protection....

That being said, should the units be mechanised or motorised ?

I feell mechanised woud be better. What say you ?

The statement that "light tanks & tracks will facilitate more agility, maneuverability & force protection" is pretty context free. When, where and why might be useful to progress this as a discussion.

Ratzel
01-25-2009, 08:00 PM
Ratzel,

You might be attempting to reinvent the wheel. A Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) seems to have all the elements you listed plus air assets too.

Marine Expeditionary Unit
The smallest type of MAGTF is the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) (Special Operations Capable) (SOC). The command element is the standing headquarters for the MEU, usually headed by a colonel. The ground combat element is a battalion landing team (BLT), which is composed of an infantry battalion reinforced with tanks, artillery, engineers, amphibious vehicles, light armored vehicles, and other ground combat assets. The air combat element is composed of a composite squadron of fixed and rotary-wing aircraft and an Air Traffic Control (ATC) and command and control detachment. The combat service support element consists of a Combat Logistics Battalion (CLB) which handles the logistics and administration needs of the MEU. The specific makeup of the MEU can be customized based upon the task at hand; additional artillery, armor, or air units can be attached, including squadrons of F/A-18 Hornet and Harrier jets.

There are usually three MEUs assigned to each of the U.S. Navy Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, with another MEU based on Okinawa. While one MEU is on deployment, one MEU is training to deploy and one is standing down, resting its Marines, and refitting. Each MEU is rated as capable of performing special operations.

11th Marine Expeditionary Unit
13th Marine Expeditionary Unit
15th Marine Expeditionary Unit
22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit
24th Marine Expeditionary Unit
26th Marine Expeditionary Unit
31st Marine Expeditionary Unit

This post comes late to the discussion, but considering the activities of a MEU over the past year in Afganistan and the
results in Helmand Prov. the combined arms force seems to fit the basic description minus airborne and ranger school.

It is half the size of the unit envisioned by you, but covers a lot more options with less troops. The Marines have been fleshing out Battalion Landing Teams with assets needs for specific missions since the mid 1950's.

Todays MEU's grew out of that mix and into what is operational today.

What makes these units "Special Operations Capable?" Is there a selection process and/or advanced training they go through?

Ratzel
01-25-2009, 08:17 PM
IOne of the biggest problems we face in todays Army culture is everyone wants to be everyone else. SF guys want to do kinetic operations only, conventional forces want to be SF guys conducting FID, gathering intel, working with the local populace.

This may be your experience, but in mine, no one wanted to do FID or COIN? Frankly, If the Army ever develops an "Advisor Division" or such, I would not envy the people serving in it in any way. I, in no way wanted EVER to be working with the local population and hated every minute of it when I did. If the Army had units that ONLY did HIC type missions, I probably would have never left?

jmm99
01-25-2009, 08:37 PM
You might want to check out this (http://www.specialoperations.com/USMC/default.html) and this (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special_Operations_Capable) and this (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Marine_Corps_Special_Operations_Capa ble_Forces) and this (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marine_Expeditionary_Unit) - and also reference the USMC MCDP/WP series here at SWJ (http://smallwarsjournal.com/reference/doctrine.php) for general context.

Ken White
01-25-2009, 09:14 PM
...If the Army had units that ONLY did HIC type missions, I probably would have never left?Doesn't get to pick what type of war it may have to fight. Fortunately, most in the Army adapt and do what needs to done.

Ratzel
01-26-2009, 10:16 AM
Fortunately, most in the Army adapt and do what needs to done.

Indeed...

Bullmoose Bailey
01-27-2009, 03:49 PM
The statement that "light tanks & tracks will facilitate more agility, maneuverability & force protection" is pretty context free. When, where and why might be useful to progress this as a discussion.

A context free statement it is.

Thanks you for your question. In response; I've found myself dangerously canalised within the confines of semi- & improved surface roads which comprise our GWOT enemies' primary EA.

In certain of these experiences both pre & post 9-11 I was having great success with wheeled vehicles.....on roadways.

The ability to move off the roadways at a high rate of speed would enable certain bypassing of contacts, envelopments, spoiling attacks, and attacks in depth which would much behoove our efforts in various zones & theatres of operation.

Given the multitudinous terrains over which we should be prepared "engage & destroy the enemies of the United States" (from the latest Soldier's Creed, GEN Schoomaker) to include, but not limited to, urban, agrarian, water, mud, mountain, hill, desert, jungle and the such, I find versatility essential.

So perhaps, having said that, you can understand my frustration that our lightest tank is presently greater than sixty tons & we are a de facto "motorised" army. These are two essential issues which need to be addressed and I expect that good R&D, suggestions from The Forces & innovative leadership will create both useful stop-gaps, such as the MRAP which I think is great in that particular role, & long term solutions.

RJ
01-27-2009, 04:47 PM
Ratzel,

It is advanced training and qualification that makes MEU units special operations Capable.

Special Operations Training Group trains two Marine Expeditionary Units and the security element from the 31st MEU every year to certify the MEUs as Special Operations Capable. Their courses range from specialized demolitions and close-quarters battle to vehicle assault and assault climbing.

In a recent SOC training schedule:

Objectives the Marines were evaluated on included, but were not limited to, a Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), a mechanized raid, a boat raid, and an airfield seizure. In addition, SOTG presented on-call challenges, including, but not limited to, Tactical Recoveries of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP), mass casualty drills, recovery of displaced American citizens, floating mines, and hostile water and aircraft. The Marines performed these missions in only a five-day period.

Though the Marine Corps' other six MEUs re-qualify as SOC every 18 months.

Ratzel
02-01-2009, 10:56 PM
Ratzel, It is advanced training and qualification that makes MEU units special operations Capable.


So there's no selection, but the unit trains for missions usually thought of as being SO? Can any Marine be sent to one of these units, or is there some sort of selection process?

RJ
02-02-2009, 06:56 PM
Ratzel,

Any qualified MOS 0300 Infantry Marine can be assigned duty with these units.

Remember there are 12 MEU's operating in the world. Three Deployed (SOC) MEU's, Three Refitting and Resting after Deployment MEU's, and Three In Training for Deployment MEU's.

The rotation allows for recent graduate recruits who have passed the advanced infantry course run by Infantry Training Regiments (ITR) to be mixed in to the Rest and Refit Infantry Battalions. Marine ITR includes what the US Army defines as Air Assualt training. ITR training puts them in the pipeline and mixes them with SOC qualified Marines with one or more deployments under their belt.

Those combat veterans are the heart of the MEU's Combat Infantry units. SOC is a unit designation not a badge qualification course like Ariborne, Ranger or Air Assualt.

When the R&R battalion's rotation moves into the Deployment Training cycle the newbies have been settled into Company, Platoon, Squads and Fireteams with experienced Marines who have been part of one or more SOC units.

The MEU system has been operating as SOC deployed units well before Gulf War One. Remember it was a Marine SOC unit that extracted that Air Force pilot who was shot down in Bosnia.

Looking back on you initial propsal, why do you need to to create a SPECIAL FORCES Armored Unit?

Who would staff this SOF unit?

What training would the have to have to be assigned to your armoured SOF Battalion?

What are the advantages of a SF unit that is Armor designated vs. a regular US Army Mechanized Infantry unit.

Special Forces "A" and "B" team missions are different and their special training does not allow for them to be thrown into a straight infantry or mechanized infantry environment.

Delta Squadrons, are even more highly refined and their individual skill levels would be wasted in a straight infantry or mechanized infantry environment.

Army Airborne units have light armor and artillery units in their T/O. And Army Divisions have transport, armor and artillery units in their unit mix.

After 7 years of Combat deployments there are very few if any Army or Marine infantry, Mech Infantry, Stryker Brigades that do not have a lot of skill working with the other combat arms units. And skill working with Marine, Navy and Air Force assets.

I doubt any US Army Unit is deployed without a high percentage of combat experienced officers and NCO's who have been deployed at least once.

With that in mind, what is the advantage of a SF Armor unit?

Bob's World
02-02-2009, 08:57 PM
This entire thread is interesting conversation, but entirely moot.

While SOF may certainly require armor support at times, or even work with coalition armored forces ( I personally worked with the Egyptian 3rd MECH Divsion during the first Gulf War, and rode into Kuwait in an Egyptian APC with Egyptian crew during the ground offensive), but none of this translates to a requirement to create Armored or Mechanized SOF; certainly not at the Company level or higher.

Could you see an ODA in a theater near you roll by in a couple of Brads and an M1? Sure. But you might want to check your motorpool to see if you just went short that same number of vehicles...

Cavguy
02-02-2009, 11:16 PM
I guess I just can't see the reason for Armored SOF - it's not like TT VIII changes or something.

Having an "elite" ranger-like unit with high funding, rigorous selection, and that did little else except practice gunnery and maneuver would be a fun tank/cav unit.

However, I just don't see a need or that the mission can't be done with a reasonably competent tank company when needed.

Ratzel
02-13-2009, 06:45 AM
Ratzel,
What are the advantages of a SF unit that is Armor designated vs. a regular US Army Mechanized Infantry unit.


The unit would be a Ranger unit but mechanized. And the purpose would the same as why we have airborne Ranger units. The 82nd can seize airfields and pretty much do anything a Ranger unit can do, but we have Ranger units for missions which require a more highly trained unit. The advantage of this unit would be the same advantages of why we have airborne Ranger units.

It would have a mix of light tanks, APC's, Weasels, and other assault vehicles. All of the vehicles would be small enough to be transported by aircraft. The troops would have better training and better equipment than the regular army. Troops would go to this unit after RIP just like ABR units and E-4 and above would be required to have a Ranger tab.

A mission scenario would be a small invasion into Pakistan. Lets say we wanted to capture and hold some nuclear storage facilities but required the mobility of a battalion of "Mech-Rangers." Part of the unit's capabilities would be to have a whole battalion on the ground in 12 hours or so. An ABR unit would size the airfield and the "Mech-Rangers" would follow on.

I guess the bottom line is:

Is there a need for a highly trained Ranger type unit that trained with, thought about, and fought with vehicles? We could be creative with how this unit used its assets as well? Why not a company with 4 weasels, four light tanks, four APCs (w/2 squads) , 2 mortar vehicles, 1 medic and 1 mechanic track?

Bob's World
02-13-2009, 12:25 PM
While I believe that the authors drew the absolute wrong conclusion due to their predisposition to prove their thesis; the recent article on the failure of mechanized forces in COIN operations fits well here:

Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars
Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson
International Organization , Volume 63, Issue 01,

http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayIssue?jid=INO&volumeId=63&issueId=01&iid=3291884

Some great research, and I really like the "Alternative Explanations" that were raised, briefly discussed, then by-passed to get on to the armor objective (Fond memories of roaring across West Germany as Team Mech attached over to one of the two armor battalions in our brigade during the Cold War...but I digress). I need to take some time with it, but a combination of 3-4 of these alternatives is closer to the truth.

They set out to prove that as armies became more mechanized, they became less effective at COIN, and that that is the cause of a corresponding decline in effectiveness. I buy the part of the argument completely that mounted forces are less capapble that dismounted forces in this type of populace-based engagement. I just think that it is far more due to advances in communications among the populace/insurgent than mechanization among the government/counterinsurgent that truly drives the trends described.

Worthwhile read for those who have not seen.

tankersteve
02-13-2009, 06:36 PM
I have to agree that while light forces are better suited for dismounted patrolling, that is because that is what they were initially designed to do. The study is a bit of a blinding flash of the obvious in that a light unit, especially at a time when we didn't have a great deal of docrine on how to handle an insurgency, will revert to what it knows - patrolling, primarily on foot. A heavy unit, built to survive on a high-intensity battlefield, will revert to what it knows - using its mobility and firepower to patrol. While it is obvious that one method will be drastically more effective than the other in counterinsurgency, the authors never delve into the greatest viariable in any military operation, from the squad patrol to the division campaign plan: Leadership. This is hard to quantify in a statistical analysis.

The methods and effectiveness of the 2 divisions is well known. Yet, while heavy units do not inherently have the same numbers to conduct dismounted patrolling, the idea that they can't be effective is untrue. One has to look at what 3ACR (with 2 heavy squadrons and 1 light battalion) or 1/1AD (3 tank battalions, 1 marine battalion, 1 light infantry battalion) accomplished on their second tours in Iraq.

Using a heavy formation in COIN is ususally not optimal - however, with an effort to focus on good task organization and some equipment changes (more wheeled vehicles), along with Leadership that understands the fight, any heavy unit can be effective in a COIN environment.

Tankersteve

JOgershok
02-14-2009, 08:12 AM
The idea is not to turn SO into the a mech unit, the idea is turn a mech unit into a SO unit. You bring up the point about a target not being an SF target if tanks and APC's are needed. What I I'm wondering is if there's something in between?


My read was that this would be a Mech/RANGER unit. The RANGER mission is direct action. If you specialize too much, you have no one to do the regular infantry work.

RJ
02-16-2009, 04:37 AM
Ratzel posted - "A mission scenario would be a small invasion into Pakistan. Lets say we wanted to capture and hold some nuclear storage facilities but required the mobility of a battalion of "Mech-Rangers." Part of the unit's capabilities would be to have a whole battalion on the ground in 12 hours or so. An ABR unit would size the airfield and the "Mech-Rangers" would follow on. "

Not to pick your scenario apart, but 12 hours is a very long time to put all your assets on the ground. What part of the security would the very small and light armor provide.

I would suspect that the target of your scenario could be secured in under 6 hours by an Airborne, Ranger or Marine Battalion. Holding it would be the test. And injection would probably be by Helos or Osprey's. More focus LZ's and no form up wasted time.

When was the last airborne assualt of an objective conducted by a Ranger Battalion? Grenada? How many battalion or larger airborne assualts have been made since the end of WWII.

One in Korea if I remember correctly. 187th RCT?

None in Vietnam that I can remember?

The secure an air field in Grenada?

And to secure an airfield in Panama?

None in Iraq. Perhaps one in Afganistan in 2002??

The 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisons are fully capable of investing and holding the target you described. And to be reinforced by airborne light armor and artillery units almost immediately. That is what they train to do.

A Mech-Ranger unit is unsupportable for a host of reasons.

Too exotic and too limited in its ability. It would be an Orphan! And a waste of talent.

82redleg
02-16-2009, 01:20 PM
Ratzel posted - "
When was the last airborne assualt of an objective conducted by a Ranger Battalion? Granada? How many battalion or larger airborne assualts have been made since the end of WWII.


By the US?

187th twice in Korea (20&21 OCT 50, 23 MAR 51).

TF 2-503(+) in OPN Junction City (Vietnam)

1st & 2d RGR Bns in OPN Urgent Fury (Grenada)

75th RGR RGT & 1st BDE/82d ABN in OPN Just Cause (Panama)- 5 BNs jumped, IIRC.

173d ABN BDE in OPN Iraqi Freedom.

Uboat509
02-16-2009, 02:05 PM
173d ABN BDE in OPN Iraqi Freedom.

That one really doesn't count. 10th Group had already secured the DZ for them. Not exaxtly forced entry.

SFC W

RJ
02-16-2009, 05:54 PM
I stand Corrected on the Bn. size airborne operations.

I was surprized to see the 503rd Airborne (The Rock) on the list. They were kind enough to let me hitch rides with them to maintain my jump status in Okniawa in 1959-60.

It was the first time I handled an M-14 and the M-60 MG.

82redleg
02-16-2009, 08:32 PM
That one really doesn't count. 10th Group had already secured the DZ for them. Not exaxtly forced entry.

SFC W

You can argue that if you want. I'll argue that we couldn't drive there (Turkey wasn't letting us), and if 10th Group had the capability to execute the 173d's follow on tasks, they would have- WITHOUT the airborne operation.

173d jumped into enemy held territory (ok, 10th Group and some Pesh had the DZ secured), expanded the lodgement, brought in follow-on airlands (2-63 AR, and some 10th MTN, IIRC?) and executed a tactical mission.

To be a valid airborne operation doesn't mean you have to jump onto an enemy armored formation- in fact, we actively try to avoid that.

Bob's World
02-16-2009, 08:45 PM
You can argue that if you want. I'll argue that we couldn't drive there (Turkey wasn't letting us), and if 10th Group had the capability to execute the 173d's follow on tasks, they would have- WITHOUT the airborne operation.

173d jumped into enemy held territory (ok, 10th Group and some Pesh had the DZ secured), expanded the lodgement, brought in follow-on airlands (2-63 AR, and some 10th MTN, IIRC?) and executed a tactical mission.

To be a valid airborne operation doesn't mean you have to jump onto an enemy armored formation- in fact, we actively try to avoid that.

Not only did the 173rd knowingly jump onto an airfield already secured and held by SF and Kurdish Iraqis; but they then essentially fortified themselves into it denying it for use to support the guys who'd actually taken it.

The real sad part of this whole sordid chapter is that in a novel approach that placed the 173rd subordinate to the 1oth SFG, the CDR of the 173rd from all accounts that I have heard essentially refused to follow that order as he would not submit to being under an SF command.

Some silly #### really, but the guy should have been fired; because he could have gotten a lot of good men killed with his attitude and actions.

tankersteve
02-16-2009, 08:53 PM
Is it a combat jump when the aircraft could have landed as easily as the troopers could have jumped? Or with a similar amount of risk? I am not an expert, or even airborne-qualified, but I am curious about this.

No one is doubting that the forces were needed or that they brought capability that the SF in the area didn't have. However, I don't actually know the precise definition of a combat jump. If there hadn't been an airfield at the location, meaning planes couldn't land, but the closest enemy is, say over 100 miles away, is it a combat jump? Is it any jump over enemy territory, as defined by a map? Even if there isn't any enemy where you landed?

I don't think jumping into a locally secured location fits that definition. If you already have friendlies on the ground, beyond a very covert pathfinder element and in this case, more than one ODA and a LOT of friendly Peshmerga, it doesn't sound like combat yet.

I suspect the troopers had to jump because there wasn't a good lounge for the pilots to relax in while the plane was offloading, if they had landed.:D

Tankersteve

Ken White
02-16-2009, 09:48 PM
Lot of myths about that drop. Broadly irrelevant. One can criticize several aspects of it including the necessity and the C and C issues -- which none of us can really comment on with any accuracy because even if we have access to SOME of the AARs, they only tell what the writer wanted told. If one was not there, one cannot know what transpired.

It was also apparently a bad drop, the AF inadvertently extended a one click DZ to 10KM and it took almost 15 hours for the Bn TF to assemble and get functional. If that's correct, it's a situation that is likely to have played in the alleged decision of the Bde Cdr to reject 10th Gps efforts to direct him and the unit (as he had no effective unit at the time); that and the rank of the 10th Gp person on the ground AND what that person directed. None of which we know...

As for the necessity of a jump -- may or may not have been such a need at Drop time on 26 Mar 03. That's not really germane. The issue is what was the perceived requirement and situation on the ground at the time the planning commenced almost certainly five or quite likely more days prior to the drop...

In any event they get credit for a combat drop -- and it was about as much combat as all the others after WW II saw...

The Ranger drop in Grenada, incidentally was not 1st and 2d Bn but a 'select' bunch (I use the word 'bunch' advisedly -- it was not a unit) of senior SPC, NCOs and Officers from both Bns. Bad way to do business. In the 1/504 Jump into Panama, a somewhat similar shuffle took place; a few troops from the Bn were left behind so some senior folks from other Bns could make the jump. Unit integrity and Integrity at their finest...

davidbfpo
02-16-2009, 10:57 PM
To be a valid airborne operation doesn't mean you have to jump onto an enemy armored formation- in fact, we actively try to avoid that.

Correct point and I know the UK Airborne Division did drop at Arnhem (1944) onto an armoured formation, which soured the operation somewhat. It is not implausible given the "fog of war" for airborne troops to land in the wrong place, even amidst armour.

davidbfpo

Ron Humphrey
02-16-2009, 11:14 PM
Correct point and I know the UK Airborne Division did drop at Arnhem (1944) onto an armoured formation, which soured the operation somewhat. It is not implausible given the "fog of war" for airborne troops to land in the wrong place, even amidst armour.

davidbfpo

At least if you land in the middle of tanks theres less likelihood that someone somewhere is about to open the flood gates and make ability to swim a life or death matter

Just a side note/question.

Exactly how likely is it in todays world that you drop without requiring at least a requisite number of Heavier items quite quickly otherwise your gonna be in trouble. This in reference to large group drops,

tankersteve
02-16-2009, 11:36 PM
Interesting info about the drop zone and the 10th Group relationship.

And Ken, you are right, in the greater scheme of things, this whole 'combat jump' issue is irrelevant.

I am curious about experiences with SOF and heavy versus light relationships. While it may be solely based on the attitudes and previous experiences of the senior leadership involved, I wonder if there are common, underlying themes to when a SOF/GPF relationship, either direction, works well.

I would have liked to argue that an armor officer is less likely to have a problem being subordinate to a senior SOF commander because they are more likely to be impressed with the people in SOF. An infantry commander (especially a light infantryman) likely had this guy as a peer or knows his reputation and is less enamored with his 'special-ness'. However, I think it really comes down to competence and a willingness to work together.

CAVGUY mentioned it in another thread that the SF we had in Tal Afar were about as helpful as a missing HEMMT fueler - its not good and a bit of a worry, but in the long run, you have other systems that can do the job and bigger problems to worry about. Meanwhile, in Ramadi, the SEALS and OGA were incredibly involved in being integrated and coordinating actions. If we had turned the relationship around to SOF being the supported HQ, I think it would have worked just as well in Ramadi, and likely would have been pretty ugly in TA.

So I guess the real answer is do your part and be a team player and hope the other guy does his.

So back to the point of this thread - RANGER MECH. While it would be great to be in a heavy unit with incredible training levels and super motivation, Ranger school probably won't make it a SOF-type unit. Most Army light infantry battalions have tons of Ranger school grads within their leadership but the bulk of the troops are just young, bright, fit Soldiers. They get to train a lot on fieldcraft and weapons, compared to most heavy units, but they are far from being a SOF. And I still can't think of missions that require an established special heavy unit.

Once you introduce the dynamic of having to maintain lots of vehicles, and remove the notion of absolute self-reliance as the number one priority in combat, I think you take away much of the special motivation that drives a Soldier to feel 'special'. However, the Rangers are playing with some of their vehicle mixes, using everything from Land Rovers to Strykers to increase their capability. The focus is still on the individual Ranger though.

Tankersteve

Cavguy
02-17-2009, 02:40 AM
CAVGUY mentioned it in another thread that the SF we had in Tal Afar were about as helpful as a missing HEMMT fueler

Steve - pure gold. I may use this statement. I really never figured out what the SF in our sector actually did except use the granary as a launchpoint for missions they wouldn't tell me about. :D

On topic - let's think what makes Ranger BNs special other than attending a hard course.

At heart, they are highly resourced and trained light infantry. They have selective entry standards, and can drop any non-performer for any reason.

They receive copious amounts of training time and little in the way of red cycle BS the GPF endures.

Now, create a cav sqdn/armor BN, give it the same advantages. Might be a worthwhile capability, even if it isn't SOF in nature.

Niel

Ken White
02-17-2009, 03:37 AM
...Ranger BNs special...At heart, they are highly resourced and trained light infantry. They have selective entry standards, and can drop any non-performer for any reason...They receive copious amounts of training time and little in the way of red cycle BS the GPF endures.True. Some day most will realize that 'SOF' has become a misused term. Because regular infantry training from 1975 until quite recently was severely lacking in rudimentary skills that were once taught all Infantrymen, so-called SOF missions became the province of a select few.

I will guarantee you that will not last in a real MIC / HIC war. It cannot..

Fortunately, the Army (I think) has learned that many units can do the old so-called 'Ranger' missions while the Rangers do other things. As Field Marshall Sir W. Slim, arguably one of the best WW II Commanders if not the best, said, any infantry battalion, properly resourced and trained can do all the so-called special operations mission except Strategic reconnaissance (for which we use the wrong people... :rolleyes: ). Long way of getting to the point:
Now, create a cav sqdn/armor BN, give it the same advantages. Might be a worthwhile capability, even if it isn't SOF in nature.Absolutely!!! Been a dream of mine for almost fifty years. It is achievable and could have great utility. Such units could do some great things with the right equipment and training. Think of strategic raids...

Yes, I'm serious. We need -- have long needed, since before Viet Nam -- the capability to smack lightly, destroy surgically take relatively few casualties and withdraw the force. Our last few attempts at trying to wage full scale war using a less than full throttle approach haven't been nearly as successful as we'd have liked, have they...

Cavguy
02-17-2009, 04:11 AM
Been a dream of mine for almost fifty years. It is achievable and could have great utility. Such units could do some great things with the right equipment and training. Think of strategic raids...

Yes, I'm serious. We need -- have long needed, since before Viet Nam -- the capability to smack lightly, destroy surgically take relatively few casualties and withdraw the force. Our last few attempts at trying to wage full scale war using a less than full throttle approach haven't been nearly as successful as we'd have liked, have they...

I'm thinking more along the lines of a rigorous conventional unit, for argument's sake, call it an ACR. It would consist of highly trained crews on M1A2 SEPs, M3A3 Bradleys, Strykers, etc. (would have to brainstorm MTOE)

It would be manned/trained like a Ranger BN, with due emphasis shift to mounted vice light infantry skills.

While not necessairly supporting SOF, it could fill an armor niche:

* "First Responder" unit, nation's armored response force, rapidly deployable, lethal
* Mobile Reserve/Counterattack force in large conventional battle
* Deep armored penetration (no jokes here) force, for raids
* Support SOF/SF or HN militaries as required
* ???

Pros:
* Like Ranger BN, NCO's and Officers would "rotate" in and out of conventional units, spreading the skills/knowledge acquired infuse force with its spirit
* Build a higher skill level among unit members than possible in a GPF unit - truly "master gunners" and "master maintainers"
* Could readily appropriate cavalry history and identity for esprit

Cons:
* Takes "best and brightest" out of conventional units
* Creates "have/have not" promotion ticket/selection bias
* Potential drain on other unit resources/range time.

Just daydreaming here, but thoughts?

ODB
02-17-2009, 04:28 AM
Would have been very useful in let's say Somalia?

An additional con. Would get misused like the rest of us. Not sure why, not at my levels to determine why we consistently get misused, just know we do. Don't forget the "We can't employ them we may need them for this later", mentaality. It's a fine line between proper utilization, under utilization, and flat out misutilization.

selil
02-17-2009, 04:33 AM
I was hoping you'd start talking about light weight, high speed, hover tanks, with the ability to cover any field anywhere, but due to light loads wouldn't be considered for HIC. With recoilless, high fire rate, auto-loading, main guns, on a high speed hover chassis, small enough to be air dropped, but packing enough wallop to take on other armor forces. Hey I can day dream too.

Ken White
02-17-2009, 04:38 AM
I just used shorthand and the most (now) impractical. ;)
* "First Responder" unit, nation's armored response force, rapidly deployable, lethal
* Mobile Reserve/Counterattack force in large conventional battle
* Deep armored penetration (no jokes here) force, for raids
* Support SOF/SF or HN militaries as requiredAgree, one per CoCom responding to the Army component Cdr. There should be also, I think, a light version with wheels (though nothing we have today is, IMO, suitable).

I agree with all your '"Pros" and while your Cons are all valid, I suggest, in order:

* Raise the entry standards across the board to make the Army a challenge and attract even more high quality troops than we already have -- besides, we can let the slugs go (with suitable remuneration and penalty for contract non-fulfillment). We need to shed the mass, peoples Army myth which has not been true for most of our history. World War II will just not go away (and it's been 63 years. Sixty Three. Three Score and three.)... :rolleyes:

* Fix the personnel system which is still operating in the last century. That, of course, needs to happen regardless.

* Fixable easily, I think. We could use Stimulus money to build more ranges (little current humor there; we can afford more ranges but lets build them where we do not have Woodpecker or tortoise problems and where full scale APFSDS firing is possible). Training area for tracks is sort of finite but we could also go off a five day week (another one of my pet rocks... :wry:) and stagger ranges day and night. Yep, night. Turn some young S3s loose and tell them to work it out -- and tell the Installation they're there to support, not dictate, training. All the old retired guys at Range Control can handle it...

Ratzel
02-17-2009, 04:41 AM
Now, create a cav sqdn/armor BN, give it the same advantages. Might be a worthwhile capability, even if it isn't SOF in nature.


This is what I was talking about from the start. If I wrote "SOF" somewhere in the discussion then I'm sorry for the confusion. Ultimately it would be a cav sqdn or mechanized infantry bn. It would be a Ranger-Mech type idea in which it would have a selection process and lots of resources for training and gear. This could include experimentation in different types of vehicles and in new ways of using them. Every NCO would be required to go to Ranger school and higher standards would be required for gunnery.


This kind of unit could be particularly useful in the flat geographies of the Middle East and much of Africa. Some people are predicting that we'll be spending a lot of time in these regions?

Ratzel
02-17-2009, 04:47 AM
I'm thinking more along the lines of a rigorous conventional unit, for argument's sake, call it an ACR. It would consist of highly trained crews on M1A2 SEPs, M3A3 Bradleys, Strykers, etc. (would have to brainstorm MTOE)

It would be manned/trained like a Ranger BN, with due emphasis shift to mounted vice light infantry skills.

While not necessairly supporting SOF, it could fill an armor niche:

* "First Responder" unit, nation's armored response force, rapidly deployable, lethal
* Mobile Reserve/Counterattack force in large conventional battle
* Deep armored penetration (no jokes here) force, for raids
* Support SOF/SF or HN militaries as required
* ???

Pros:
* Like Ranger BN, NCO's and Officers would "rotate" in and out of conventional units, spreading the skills/knowledge acquired infuse force with its spirit
* Build a higher skill level among unit members than possible in a GPF unit - truly "master gunners" and "master maintainers"
* Could readily appropriate cavalry history and identity for esprit

Cons:
* Takes "best and brightest" out of conventional units
* Creates "have/have not" promotion ticket/selection bias
* Potential drain on other unit resources/range time.

Just daydreaming here, but thoughts?


Yes! This was what I was trying to describe from the start. I guess using "SOC" in the title threw everyone off. It wouldn't do any sort of FID, or humanitarian assistance. It would be for the most challenging missions where mech and tanks are needed. I assume the Ranger Batts were created for the most challenging light infantry missions?

Anyway, you're on the right "track." :)

ODB
02-17-2009, 04:50 AM
* Raise the entry standards across the board to make the Army a challenge and attract even more high quality troops than we already have -- besides, we can let the slugs go (with suitable remuneration and penalty for contract non-fulfillment). We need to shed the mass, peoples Army myth which has not been true for most of our history. World War II will just not go away (and it's been 63 years. Sixty Three. Three Score and three.)... :rolleyes:


If at anytime, now is the time. With the state the economy is in, we could take full advantage of it and only take those desirables. Unfortunately we all have our opinion on who is the most desired.

Speaking of slugs. I remember a time back in 92' and 93' when I had a 1SG who chapter an average of 110 soldiers a year. If you were good in the woods you could just about get away with murder. If you were no good in the woods it was just a matter of time before you were gone. Oh how I long for those days to come back to the Army....

Back on thread

What type of vehicles?
a.) If rapidly deployable what meets this requirement?
b.) Packs enough punch without huge logistical tail?

Deployed by?

Been light my whole life, just seeking knowledge here, initial thoughts....

Ken White
02-17-2009, 04:50 AM
An additional con. Would get misused like the rest of us. Not sure why, not at my levels to determine why we consistently get misused, just know we do. Don't forget the "We can't employ them we may need them for this later", mentaality. It's a fine line between proper utilization, under utilization, and flat out misutilization.True dat. 'Nother one of my pet rocks. Let's talk about Strategic Recon and who really ought to be doing it. Then there's the DA mission and who should not be doing that. And the FID mission and who ought to be leading it.

On the GPF side, the units who are really aimed at a type of mission -- and then are given one completely out of character. I'm not talking about re-roleing Tankers or Arty to patrol infantry, that's bad but understandable and supportable -- and as David points out above, other Armies have also done that. We've done it before. There are plenty of cases of severe misuse in all parts of the Armed Forces.

Anyway -- you're right, misuse is a potential. An easy trick to preclude misuse is to design the TOE, training plans, stationing and personnel requirements to preclude it. That is quite possible but you'd have to break a rice bowl or two to do it.

That would work for SOCOM and the Army...

ODB
02-17-2009, 04:56 AM
This may be your experience, but in mine, no one wanted to do FID or COIN? Frankly, If the Army ever develops an "Advisor Division" or such, I would not envy the people serving in it in any way. I, in no way wanted EVER to be working with the local population and hated every minute of it when I did. If the Army had units that ONLY did HIC type missions, I probably would have never left?

When making that statement didn't mean down to the individual. Unfortunately the nature of the beast is about funding. Therefore you end up with those much higher than us fighting over who can do what and forcing units to be misutilized to try to gain more funding at least, if not try and get rid of an entire branch.

ODB
02-17-2009, 04:59 AM
True dat. 'Nother one of my pet rocks. Let's talk about Strategic Recon and who really ought to be doing it. Then there's the DA mission and who should not be doing that. And the FID mission and who ought to be leading it.

On the GPF side, the units who are really aimed at a type of mission -- and then are given one completely out of character. I'm not talking about re-roleing Tankers or Arty to patrol infantry, that's bad but understandable and supportable -- and as David points out above, other Armies have also done that. We've done it before. There are plenty of cases of severe misuse in all parts of the Armed Forces.

Anyway -- you're right, misuse is a potential. An easy trick to preclude misuse is to design the TOE, training plans, stationing and personnel requirements to preclude it. That is quite possible but you'd have to break a rice bowl or two to do it.

That would work for SOCOM and the Army...

Who will shine those jump boots right back up.......

We are our own worse enemy......

Uboat509
02-17-2009, 11:21 PM
I'm still not sold on the need for a "Ranger-Mech" unit. As it is we have only a total of three battalions of Rangers. That's it. And they still have a huge budget. Imagine the budget for "Ranger-Mech" unit, not to mention the facilities and equipment they would need. Furthermore, unless you are planning to deploy them with nothing larger than say, a Stryker, they really aren't going to much more rapidly deployable than any other armor unit. The ability to strike anywhere in the world on short notice is one of the hallmarks of the Ranger battalions. A key to that is the ability to deploy everything they need in C130s. You can't put anything larger than a Stryker in a C130. From what I understand, you can barely put a Stryker in a C130. I think you might be able to 1 or 2 Brads in a C17 but don't quote me on that I know you can put them in a C5 and I have heard that you can put M1s in a C5 although I don't know that for sure. But even still with C17s and especially C5s you are severely limited in where you can land and even then I don't think that you can just roll off and into the fight. And then, on top of that, you have to deploy a sizeable logistics tail to support this unit. Add to that that the Rangers typically use air assets, whether it be airborne or air assault, something that armor cannot do.
I can certainly see the utility of creating an elite formation within existing Mech or Armor divisions to do some of the missions Cavguy listed but I do not see a need for a "SOF" armored formation.

SFC W

Uboat509
02-17-2009, 11:24 PM
Would have been very useful in let's say Somalia?


I'm not so sure. The reason there was no armor there was that the NCA had ordered all armor out. I'd be willing to bet that that would have included SOF armor had there been such a thing at the time.

SFC W

Sabre
02-17-2009, 11:51 PM
The ability to strike anywhere in the world on short notice is one of the hallmarks of the Ranger battalions. A key to that is the ability to deploy everything they need in C130s. You can't put anything larger than a Stryker in a C130. From what I understand, you can barely put a Stryker in a C130. I think you might be able to 1 or 2 Brads in a C17 but don't quote me on that I know you can put them in a C5 and I have heard that you can put M1s in a C5 although I don't know that for sure. But even still with C17s and especially C5s you are severely limited in where you can land and even then I don't think that you can just roll off and into the fight.
SFC W

Whoa, we (the Army) have paid an shockingly HIGH price for fixating on C-130 "deployability". We've spent what, millions? billions? on trying to shoe-horn the Stryker, and then the FCS, into an airframe that first flew in 1952 (when the JEEP was the most numerous vehicle in the inventory), only to finally figure out that we really can't...

The last thing that we need to hear about is the C-130.
For strategic deployability, I think that the C-17's are much more appropriate for delivering heavy armor. Those were used to deliver the tiny armored task force to northern Iraq, to support the 173rd (One platoon of tanks, and three of infantry - one in Brads, two in M113s, plus engineers, support, etc)

The US continues to pay a high price chasing deployability, that it doesn't always even need. Well, the Army pays the price. IIRC, the USAF insisted that it needed more C-17s, until someone suggested that they could cut back on F-22 procurement to pay for 'em... (Perhaps my memory is rusty, these days, admittedly.)

Uboat509
02-18-2009, 12:01 AM
The last thing that we need to hear about is the C-130. For strategic deployability, I think that the C-17's are much more appropriate for delivering heavy armor.

Except that a C17 cannot land many of the places that a C130 can. The C130 may be old but until we find a platform that can land in all the places that it can land to replace it, it is the best we have for SOF missions.

SFC W

Ken White
02-18-2009, 12:26 AM
a C-130 can't do. The C-17 may not be the perfect replacement but it can haul vehicles better and it can land enough places. Not to mention the C-130 is also too big for some things since AFSOC is buying PZL M-28s, Pilatus PC-12s and C-27Js...

Just to clarify a point, I don't think Cav Guy or I were talking about a "Ranger-Mech" unit or "SOF Mech" unit. I know I was not. I am not a Ranger fan.

We were talking about an Armored Cavalry unit that was PROPERLY trained instead of marginally trained. The only Ranger involvement was to allocate more money for training, better support, the ability to fire anyone who looked crosseyed for not breathing properly and better access to intel among other things. IOW, give the rest of the Army the bennies the Ranger Regiment has. Yes, I'm aware of the costs involved -- and aware they're microscopic in terms of the net DoD budget. It's affordable -- it's just not wanted and rice bowls play a bigger part in that than does affordability. Sadly.

There's an old civilian saying that's appropriate: "You get what you pay for."

All that said, it's not going to happen because the upper echelons of the Army and SOCOM cannot and / or will not tolerate sweeping changes to the status quo and their uneasy relationship.

Uboat509
02-18-2009, 12:42 AM
Oh, don't get me wrong, I know that it is technically affordable but SOCOM has no use for a Mech unit and Big Army tends to be allergic to the whole concept of elite formations. If someone is elite that means that everyone else is less than that and they don't like that. I don't see them pouring the lion's share of budget into such a unit.

Getting back to the subject of the C17. I'm not so sure that it can land enough places to make it a viable replacement for the C130. I think both are great at their respective roles but I don't see the need for the C130 going away for a while.

SFC W

Cavguy
02-18-2009, 01:40 AM
Oh, don't get me wrong, I know that it is technically affordable but SOCOM has no use for a Mech unit and Big Army tends to be allergic to the whole concept of elite formations. If someone is elite that means that everyone else is less than that and they don't like that. I don't see them pouring the lion's share of budget into such a unit.

Getting back to the subject of the C17. I'm not so sure that it can land enough places to make it a viable replacement for the C130. I think both are great at their respective roles but I don't see the need for the C130 going away for a while.

SFC W

Uboat,

Please read my proposal again. I don't intend for such a unit to go to SOCOM or do any SOCOM missions (unless requested/tasked). I am talking about a highly trained and lethal armored formation capable of expertly doing the tasks outlined above in a conventional or near conventional setting. The ranger analogy was used only in my reference to it being highly trained and resourced light infantry. Kind of like the WWII rangers, who were used in the most "daring" and no fail missions, rather than today's SOF centric force.

As far as deployability, we have long demonstrated the ability to deploy a company (+) of armor in less than 24h using either C5 or C-17 capability, and sustain them. Sustaining up to a BN by air is possible.

I think a highly trained, selective armored formation would do good as a capability and good for the armored corps.

Uboat509
02-18-2009, 02:28 AM
Sorry about that, I know you weren't but that was the original concept of the thread and I was adressing that. I do agree that having an elite formation organic to the divison would be a good thing, although apparently I did not articlulate that very well. I just don't think you could sell Big Army on the idea.

SFC W

Ken White
02-18-2009, 03:05 AM
Sorry about that, I know you weren't but that was the original concept of the thread and I was adressing that. I do agree that having an elite formation organic to the divison would be a good thing, although apparently I did not articlulate that very well. I just don't think you could sell Big Army on the idea.I do tend to wander off thread now and then -- I olde...:D

The prob, of course is in the one world you used. Elite. I didn't and I don't think Cav Guy meant for that Cav sqn to be that, elite, I mean -- just that it be well trained and equipped, no more. Almost all our current equipment is designed to be multipurpose, thus the designs are compromised significantly to try to make everybody happy.

However, seen as 'elite' it would be an for whatever reason and a lot of people just flat hate anyone or anything that even smells a little different. Dumb.

Can't see it myself; lot of folks smarter than I am, a lot with more money, better character -- but while I applaud their gains on me, I don't think they're one bit more elite than I happen to be. Jealousy is stupid. :cool:

Sabre
02-18-2009, 03:28 AM
Viewed in a certain light, it is almost comical (and at the risk of not putting enough thought into it):

The US Army uses the word "deployability", in roughly the same way a panic-stricken student says that he/she needs to "study" the night before a big exam. Plenty of talk, and disjointed, but all too brief, spurts of action.

The C-17 is outstanding, and the Stryker (and Stryker brigade design) is decent, good even - heck, excellent considering the alternative was previously foot-mobile infantry with some Up-armored Humvees.

So I'm a little surprised that we don't have more airlift, or a replacement for the Herc (SFC W is right, the C-130 can land in an amazingly short distance, on an aircraft carrier even, but the interior dimensions are a bit cramped for serious vehicles). I sat next to a C-17 maintenance officer (either commissioned or NCO - I didn't pry) on a flight one time - he talked about how rapidly those airframes are being worn out - and we really don't have that many.

Most of all, our rapid deployment forces (light infantry and SOF) too often seem to eschew armor to the point of a fetish. Which isn't helped by a few military "experts" both in and out of uniform, who have a seemingly endless stream of excuses for why armor isn't useful or applicable... and who in at least one case managed to be shocked (shocked!) that having a few tanks around in an urban fight, or even in A-stan (a la a company of Canadian Leopards) turns out to be a good idea.

And yet, (after the Sheridan) there was never a US counterpart to the BMD or Wiesel, the more compact French armored cars, or even the Scorpion /Scimitar. Seriously?

Were we serious, we would have come up with something (and actually deployed it). No good reason not to give early-entry commanders another tool in the bag of tricks.
That said, I think that the idea of a QRF company of tanks and Brads isn't as bad a fit as it might first appear.
The M1, with a few improvements (more fuel efficient engine, for example - not too hard to do) could make it less difficult to support - and thus more useful in an austere environment. Usually, we either seem to have the time, or make the time, to get some heavy armor into theater anyway. ...and an M1 can give you a very nice... edge.

We could modify just a battalion, for example. That might be one good mission set for an elite armor unit. Modify vehicles to use less fuel, perhaps add more mechanics and much, much more PLL...
If you can only send one company, one battalion, or one brigade/regiment of armor, then it may as well be a great one.

Besides, from what I've heard, a fair number of tankers have been in Humvees, and not their tanks, for a long, long time. It wouldn't hurt to have armored units that were not subjected to that abuse, and thus ready to go for anything unforeseen. (I always find it suspect, that for a long time it was said that "we always are preparing for the last war", and I haven't heard it in a while; now I hear that insurgencies are the only way wars will ever be fought in the future. Ever. Hmmm... noticeably we still needed to kick down the door in '03...)

A second possibility could be armored units specially trained and equipped to support infantry units in urban combat - since that is also (theoretically) the wave of the future. I'm not entirely sure what that should look like, although the Russians have some ideas about it, and it seems to include some vehicles with multiple auto-cannons and heavy armor.

We also seem to lead with our Cav organizations (both Gulf Wars) and they ended up doing a good bit of fighting. Heh, historically, armored scouts always end up fighting, no matter how often some say they shouldn't.
While the 3rd ACR still has that punch (41/41 Tanks/Brads per squadron, with all 3 Armored Cav Squadrons, the Heavy ACR has twice as many of each vehicle as a Heavy BCT, and it has an Air Cav Squadron, and the other support...), the DivCav Squadrons that were so excellent, have now been dismantled, and the HBCT Cav Squadron certainly couldn't mix it up the way the DivCav could (in spite of the fact that the Heavy BCT's desperately need more combat power). Quite ironic that we nearly dismantled all of the Cav organizations, in the name of "modularity".

This could be a third possible mission set for "special" armor units - the Armored Cav mission (the traditional guard, cover, screen, along with raids), only this time they get some extra resources and other ups. While I was in the 3rd ACR, I saw us get more ammo and training time than my friends in regular units (admittedly not a very scientific study), but I don't think that was institutionalized (I recall that the official ammo allocations were the same as a regular mech or armor battalion, adjusting for the number of vehicles) - so I am just hopelessly biased...

Sabre
02-18-2009, 03:47 AM
I just don't think you could sell Big Army on the idea.

SFC W

Sorry to be a pain, SFC W, but when was the last time that Big Army was sold on ANYTHING?

Big Army has kinda wanted the Stryker /LAV IIIs since 1982, when they were going to maybe equip some parts of the RDF (back when the USMC was getting them). So getting them only took what, two decades? The MRAPs were basically forced on the Army. The need to go to a more integrated, self-contained, brigade-centric organization, the BCT re-org, had been showing in $1 matinees in the theater of the obvious for a long time.

Which is my way of saying that I agree - I'm quite certain that Big Army won't be sold on the idea.

Ken White
02-18-2009, 04:50 AM
The US Army uses the word "deployability", in roughly the same way a panic-stricken student says that he/she needs to "study" the night before a big exam. Plenty of talk, and disjointed, but all too brief, spurts of actionAgreed. However, on this, I'm not so sure:
Most of all, our rapid deployment forces (light infantry and SOF) too often seem to eschew armor to the point of a fetish...Agree on SOF but the Airplane Division -- there's only one and I'm not familiar enough with the 10th and 101st to comment on their attitude -- would love to have an air droppable something. The M8 (which was not a very good vehicle but would have been better than nothing) got sacrificed by the Infantry in order to get Armor to agree to the Bradley (bad trade IMO but they didn't ask me) and Infantry to in turn agree to the M1 so Armor could have the HEMTT (which the AC of USAIS did not want for strange reasons). Equipment buys are so simple...:D

Anyway, what the light guys are not enamored of is Mech Infantry -- it's an attitude thing; Tanks are acceptable and Cav is cool...
And yet, (after the Sheridan) there was never a US counterpart to the BMD or Wiesel, the more compact French armored cars, or even the Scorpion /Scimitar. Seriously?True and a major flaw on our part; as you said,"Were we serious, we would have come up with something (and actually deployed it)."
The M1, with a few improvements (more fuel efficient engine, for example - not too hard to do) could make it less difficult to support - and thus more useful in an austere environment. Usually, we either seem to have the time, or make the time, to get some heavy armor into theater anyway. ...and an M1 can give you a very nice... edge.True. whatever happened to the the LV 100-5? Though I'd opt for an MTU 890 series if it were my call ...
We also seem to lead with our Cav organizations (both Gulf Wars) and they ended up doing a good bit of fighting. Heh, historically, armored scouts always end up fighting, no matter how often some say they shouldn't.Training design flaw, IMO. In NW Europe at the end of WW II, the Recon Sqns and Troops which had been snooping all across Western Europe and doing it well suddenly hit the north German plain and a crumbling German Army -- that led to pressure for speed so they learned to just charge ahead and get into fights. That 'lesson' stuck and as an old Cav Colonel said not long ago, "we don't have the patience to do stealthy recon; so we just go out looking for trouble" lot of truth in that and if you do that, you have to have Armor -- so our Recon unit design defaults to NW Europe. Still. Wrongly. Very wrongly. We haven't done any real recon work there for almost 20 years...

The issue is not that the Scouts don't have the patience to snoop, that can be trained -- the problem is that the Commanders in the rear do not want to give the Scouts time to do that. That's where the impatience is a problem.
...the DivCav Squadrons that were so excellent, have now been dismantled, and the HBCT Cav Squadron certainly couldn't mix it up the way the DivCav could (in spite of the fact that the Heavy BCT's desperately need more combat power). Quite ironic that we nearly dismantled all of the Cav organizations, in the name of "modularity".Very true and very bad mistakes. I'm not a proponent of Scouts mixing it up but acknowledge they may have to and for over 50 years, I've been waiting for a good US Army Scout vehicle. I've seen five attempts but no vehicle...:mad:

ODB
02-18-2009, 04:52 AM
I'm not so sure. The reason there was no armor there was that the NCA had ordered all armor out. I'd be willing to bet that that would have included SOF armor had there been such a thing at the time.

SFC W

Somalia as a prime example in recent history, that such a force would have been perfect for.

Felt the same way as you, SOF does not need an armor unit, but such capabilities outside of SOF makes sense.

SethB
02-18-2009, 04:57 AM
The LV100-5 was running in test form back in 2002, but it fell into the Abrams-Crusader common engine program and when the Crusader was cut it was delayed. Apparently the Army still plans on buying it, but they certainly haven't set a timeline, and I found one news article which described a $327M upgrade program for the AGT 1500 which hasn't been produced since 1992.

COMMAR
02-25-2009, 05:58 AM
What makes these units "Special Operations Capable?" Is there a selection process and/or advanced training they go through?


The MEU(SOC) PTP certifies the MEU, Special Operations Capable, in a 6 mth certification program before each deployment.

Zodiac-borne Company sized Clandestine Raid fr/the sea. A Limited Scale Amphibious Raid designed to Clandestinely Destroy enemy Encampments or Fortifications, or Capture key personnel on foreign soil w/no outside support.

Helo-borne Deep Raid. A Comp sized Raid designed to do the same as the Clandestine Amph Raid out to 400mi fr/the sea on foreign soil w/no outside support.

Deep TRAP. One was performed by the 15th MEU(SOC) to pick up a Delta tm & their downed Black Hawk in the opening days of A'stan in Oct '01.

Non-Combatant Evac Ops on hostile foreign soil
Prisoner Snatch
GOPLAT/VBSS
Special Reconnaissance & Urban Ops
(National Level Asset) Signal Intel Exploitation (RRT)
Advanced Surveillance Target Acquistion (STA)
HumInt Exploitation (HET)

These among others assigned to the MEU are labeled by the DOD as Special Operations.

The MEU(SOC), although capable of conducting these mission is not, purposefully by design, a SOF but is labeled by the DOD as a General Purpose Force (GPF) capable of conducting select Special Operations, hence Special Operations Capable.

RJ
02-26-2009, 12:57 AM
Thanks for the update COMAR.

When I last got my feet wet the Corps was using BLT's as its hammer in the Pacific and the Med. It was pre-LPH Carrier taskforce in the Amphip. Navy. I did a Battalion helo launch from the Hornet in Nov. 1960 near Vietnam, but we never went in-country. A classic show of force, perhaps? The SVN paratroop coup faded away during our training off shore.

Zodiac's? Back inthe Old Corps! :wry:

And our rubber boat contingent paddled ashore with 8 strokers and a SL/Coswain. A Recon Bn. 9 man squad.

Swift, Silent, Deadly, y'all! I taught the small boat course when I was in the 2nd Recon Bn. long, long ago, etc. :D

I'm almost an historical figure.

Ken White
02-26-2009, 01:51 AM
I, OTOH am merely hysterical...:(

RJ
02-26-2009, 04:54 AM
Ken, you might even be historic as well.

If the first three numbers of your original USMC serial number are below 160, you have every right to be hysterical.

Ron Humphrey
02-26-2009, 05:24 AM
Ken, you might even be historic as well.

If the first three numbers of your original USMC serial number are below 160, you have every right to be hysterical.

They weren't even half way through the alphabet yet when he started, let alone into numbers:cool:

As to his hysteria hang around here enough and we'll get you too:D

Cavguy
02-26-2009, 05:26 AM
An SWC recurring issue.

These threads always "jump the shark" when it gets down to making fun of Ken for being old ....

Ken White
02-26-2009, 06:32 AM
I'm not sure what to tell RJ about my Marine serial number starting with a 110, though...

I'll have to think about that.:confused::confused:

RJ
02-26-2009, 02:01 PM
110 - Wow Ken, when you arrived at boot Camp I suspect your 782 gear consisted of a spear, a cudgel, a boiled leather breast plate and greaves for your shins.

When I arrived mine included boondockers, leggens, and herringbone twill utilities that still included a grenade pocket in the blouse. The first General Officer I saw up close at PI was Chesty Puller. He was on the Island to testify for a Courtsmartial. But that's another story.

;)

Rifleman
02-26-2009, 03:58 PM
110 - Wow Ken, when you arrived at boot Camp I suspect your 782 gear consisted of a spear, a cudgel, a boiled leather breast plate and greaves for your shins.

Now, you know that's stretching it a bit. But I suspect that Ken still has his leather throat guard. And he might be "hysterical" because he slipped in the rigging and hit his head on the mizzen when the Consititution hit a swell. At least he didn't drop his fire-lock. Major Henderson would have been pissed.

Ken White
02-26-2009, 06:09 PM
and Lance, fire hardened. :D