Battle Drill

[Norfolk]

Section Leading; A Guide for the Training of Non-Commissioned Officers as Commanders and Rifle Sections, 1928:


"Care must be taken that exercises to teach the combination of fire and movement are not carried out as a drill. When a platoon is attacking, advances must not be made by alternate section rushes, without consideration of the ground and the enemy's fire. Every advance should, if possible, be from fire position to fire position. Training on these lines in peace can only result in heavy and unnecessary casualties in war."

CAMT 7-45, Canadian Army Manual of Training: Infantry Section Leading and Platoon Tactics, 1954:


"Battle drill must be our servant and NOT our master."

"It must be wisely used and applied."

"It must be emphasized that all the drills which follow in this book are the basis on which to work. They are simple guides for the simple soldier. As sections and platoons become expert in these drills, they must learn to modify them and adjust them to the situation and ground. No one drill can suit all circumstances, and variations on those set out in this and other chapters must be encouraged and taught as soon as the "basic stroke" is mastered."

Notes From Theatres of War, No. 16, North Africa November 1942-May 1943; The War Office, October, 1943:


Battle Drill.--The teaching of battle drill undoubtedly proved to be of the greatest value in instilling dash and determination into troops and junior leaders. The best results have been obtained from battle drills on a platoon level, but training in the drills up to company level proved useful.
It is important, however, that junior leaders should not regard battle drill as a universal panacea to be applied in toto in every situation. Battle drill training aims at teaching the basic "strokes," and thus represents only the first rung in the ladder. The drills must be intelligently applied in accordance with the nature of the ground and the particular tactical situation. There were many occasions when unnecessary casualties resulted from poor leadership because junior leaders blindly followed a set drill and failed to apply it with common sense.

Col Arjun Ray, quoted in the RUSI Journal, Autumn 1989:


Fetishism for battle drills has been largely responsible for sanitizing imagination, creativity and mental mobility in infantry ranks. Battle drills are … a set of reactions … Conversely, tactics are a thought out plan to overcome the threat, the two are therefore dissimilar.

All quotes found at:

"The Canadian Infantry Section Attack Part One: Attrition Training in a Manoeuvre Army" by Michael M. O'Leary:

http://regimentalrogue.com/papers/sect_atk.htm#27

and this is its companion piece, Part Two:

http://regimentalrogue.com/papers/sect_atk_part2.htm

[William F. Owen]

Every advance should, if possible, be from fire position to fire position.

Yes, yes and yes. Exactly!! Please send the me the references for this (page number and Pamphlet number etc) . This is excellent!

In a more modern context you can replace or add to fire position with "observation position" or "communication position."

[bismark17]

Yea, I have to agree with that. I know from personal experience going from the Infantry into civilian law enforcement that I had problems going into such a fluid environment without having a Ranger handbook, 7-8, 7-70, the TC on Dismounted Patrolling or the METL manual to help me adjust. In the Army I was able to memorize those TTPs before hand to help create a mental map or model to handle the various situations that may occur. Having specific lane training just reinforced that outlook and I think it does create some issues. I have seen numerous other former military people that seem to have issues with adjusting to the unkown without the benefit of a smart book to assist.

[Norfolk]

Wilf,

Section Leading, 1928, A guide for the Training of Non-Commissioned Officers as Commanders of Rifle and Lewis-Gun Sections, is marked "26 Manuals 355" on the left side of the Title, and the quote is from Chapter VII, Section 22. "Exercises to teach the combination of fire and movement", Item 2; Pages 71-72.

Mike O'Leary Emailed me the Title Page of the Manual, and the whole of Chapter VII in pdf this afternoon. Anyone who wants it can PM me with their Email (the file size is 1.82 mb).

I originally posted this on the Rifle Squad thread some time ago, but it's quite relevant here:


When the British Army introduced Battle Drill early in WWII, the same Field Service Regulations that described them also carried the warning that they were not intended to be a substitute for the tactical judgement of battlefield leaders and soldiers; they were simply intended to be training aids from which soldiers and leaders would have weaned themselves off of towards the end of their basic trade training. Of course, what has in fact occurred in practice is the replacement of tactical judgement by rote drill. The US Army formally adopted Battle Drill in the mid-1950's, and at the same time it formally adopted the Fire Team, with two per Rifle Squad.

Thus all the funny business ever since. The Commonwealth Armies only began to adopt the two-Fire Team Rifle Section starting in the late 1970's, and by the 1980's it was the standard. The German Army has recently adopted the two Fire-Team Rifle Squad as well, with 10 men per squad and 1 MG-4 5.56mm LMG per Fire Team. I haven't heard so far, but I suspect that may adopt Battle Drill now too.

The aforementioned is one of the reasons the offensive tactics of the present-day Rifle Squad are so fixated on the Frontal Attack; it requires a minimum of brainpower and a maximum of firepower to undertake. That said, there are a lot of reasons that the Frontal Attack is more often than not necessary: the ground doesn't provide enough cover and concealment; you're conducting mechanized ops and it's pretty obvious to both you and the enemy that you're coming and they're just waiting for you to pile out of your tracks; there's just not the time to perform a slower but less costly other-than-Frontal attack and you have to attack now, otherwise the enemy will have reinforced his position making it harder to attack a little later; etc.

But in those cases when the Frontal Attack can be foregone, the two-Fire Team Squad and Battle Drill shouldn't be allowed to conspire against alternatives to the Frontal Attack. The German Army in WWII, as I have already mentioned before in this thread, never adopted Battle Drill and never formally adopted Fire Teams; if a Squad at any time split into two balanced teams, it was only because the tactical situation at that place and time made it appropriate to do so. The Squad Leader was free to develop and use his best tactical judgment to fight the Squad as best as he saw fit.

The Fire Team concept and Battle Drill have become crutches with which to prop up weak leaders and weak soldiers who otherwise would be clearly seen to be unable to adapt to the tactical situation at hand; at the same time, by tying capable leader's and soldier's hands with doctrine that has morphed into rigid practice, it serves to obscure those whose tactical judgement is otherwise sound.

[William F. Owen]

Fireteams are nothing to do with Battle Drill. Battle drill was started in 1918 using entire platoons, not sections. If you can find a copy of Maxse's and Liddell-Harts 1919 manual, (SS-148??) it shows this in detail.

What the US adopted in the 1950s is nothing like the UK iteration of Battle Drill.

Battle Drill always talks about attacking from the rear or flank, or even by-passing. The 1942 Instructors hand book is explicit on this. Frontal attacks were used in training because of live ammunition range safety templates. How you train using live fire is still a major consideration on this matter.

[Norfolk]

Fireteams are nothing to do with Battle Drill. Battle drill was started in 1918 using entire platoons, not sections. If you can find a copy of Maxse's and Liddell-Harts 1919 manual, (SS-148??) it shows this in detail.

What the US adopted in the 1950s is nothing like the UK iteration of Battle Drill.

Battle Drill always talks about attacking from the rear or flank, or even by-passing. The 1942 Instructors hand book is explicit on this. Frontal attacks were used in training because of live ammunition range safety templates. How you train using live fire is still a major consideration on this matter.

I had written that post for another thread, where I was discussing the effects of rote application of Battle Drill in lieu of tactical judgement. I was also observing how in the Canadian Army, the adoption of the US Fire Team system coupled to said rote application of Battle Drill made for an almost blind and automatic recourse to the Frontal Attack, even in cases where the traditional Flanking Attack that use to be taught in the CF was possible. At that time, we effectively dispensed with traditional Platoon Battle Drill and settled for an almost US-style approach. Not so good.

[Ken White]

I had written that post for another thread, where I was discussing the effects of rote application of Battle Drill in lieu of tactical judgement. I was also observing how in the Canadian Army, the adoption of the US Fire Team system coupled to said rote application of Battle Drill made for an almost blind and automatic recourse to the Frontal Attack, even in cases where the traditional Flanking Attack that use to be taught in the CF was possible. At that time, we effectively dispensed with traditional Platoon Battle Drill and settled for an almost US-style approach. Not so good.

actually done in units and practiced in combat are more often than not quite different things...

Most manuals are written in the service schools and reflect the thoughts of students at the school, some, called Snowbirds (No, not that kind... :D ) arrive before their Advanced course starts and thus have not absorbed great knowledge.

Others, called Blackbirds, have completed their Advanced Course and are awaiting movement to their next assignment. These have absorbed Great Knowledge -- and therefor are doubly dangerous in the sphere of doctrinal writing... :wry:

They are aided in this by civilian Educational or Training specialists and the occasional Field Grade who has fifty things going on at once. Also by the odd General Officer who has a pet rock he wants introduced to the Army... :rolleyes:

Contrary to what Wilf said Battle Drill as practiced by most infantry units in the US Army in the 50s through the 80s required thinking, a lot of it and it was not rote stuff -- unless they had a poor commander who believed in what the book said; fortunately, a relatively rare thing.

Fire and maneuver at Platoon level and below is movement from wall to wall or tree to rock, is generally uncoordinated and after a few firefights, becomes automatic -- and it is effective (those who cannot adapt perish). Anyone who says squads don't do it hasn't been there.

[Norfolk]

actually done in units and practiced in combat are more often than not quite different things...

Most manuals are written in the service schools and reflect the thoughts of students at the school, some, called Snowbirds (No, not that kind... :D ) arrive before their Advanced course starts and thus have not absorbed great knowledge.

Others, called Blackbirds, have completed their Advanced Course and are awaiting movement to their next assignment. These have absorbed Great Knowledge -- and therefor are doubly dangerous in the sphere of doctrinal writing... :wry:

They are aided in this by civilian Educational or Training specialists and the occasional Field Grade who has fifty things going on at once. Also by the odd General Officer who has a pet rock he wants introduced to the Army... :rolleyes:

Contrary to what Wilf said Battle Drill as practiced by most infantry units in the US Army in the 50s through the 80s required thinking, a lot of it and it was not rote stuff -- unless they had a poor commander who believed in what the book said; fortunately, a relatively rare thing.

Fire and maneuver at Platoon level and below is movement from wall to wall or tree to rock, is generally uncoordinated and after a few firefights, becomes automatic -- and it is effective (those who cannot adapt perish). Anyone who says squads don't do it hasn't been there.

Too true.

I have a few big beefs with the current "synthesis" (I'll use that term for lack of a more sensible one that I just can't think of right now) of Fire Teams and Battle Drill in the Commonwealth (we adopted the Fire System from the US Army in the 1980's). Until the 1980's, we did just fine for the most part with the old 10-man Sections (on paper at least) with the 3-man Gun Group/LAR Group and the 7-man Rifle Group. When F&M has to be performed at Section level, you just did the best with what you had, and it seemed to work, mostly. Plus, you well suited to Flanking Attacks; the Two Fire-Team organization isn't as useful for that, although it certainly makes F&M at Section level easier, until casualities deplete it to the point that the Fire Teams just don't have the manpower to Assault and Fight Through the enemy position. The old Section organization was very good for that.

I remember only performing one Section Flanking Attack in The RCR - and a 4-man Assault Group (assuming no one becomes a casualty), one of whom was carrying an LMG, is in no way as effective at closing with and destroying the enemy in CQB as a 7-man Rifle Group. The idea was that the Platoon Weapons Det would suppress the enemy, and the Sections would pepperpot through, in Frontal Attacks. Just nonsense. You do that when you have no other options; when you have an option, you Flank. Before Fire Teams, the Sections were encouraged to make up their own mind how to attack; after Fire Teams, they were effectively told to just pepperpot their Fire Teams, etc, in a Frontal Attack. That made a lot of Infantrymen very unhappy. Fire Teams and Battle Drill came together not to facilitate tactical judgement and coordination, but to replace it. I like the German system here instead.

This bit came in only after we adopted the Fire Team System; that other English-speaking Regiment introduced it, and my Regiment fought it. DND sided with the PPCLI. A few years later, the Brits went the same way, though they are not as doctrinaire about resorting to Frontal Attacks as we are (but they fought in the Falklands, and we didn't - although we watched Brit Army training films about the subject; I guess those were just shown to the Ranks).

I also get quite upset about the whole Platoon bit; As far as I'm concerned, Platoon is there to direct any Heavy Weapons they may have or receive from Company. Once the Platoon Cdr has made his appreciation and issued his order after Contact, let the Sections do their bit, and the way they see fit.

[William F. Owen]

Contrary to what Wilf said Battle Drill as practiced by most infantry units in the US Army in the 50s through the 80s required thinking, a lot of it and it was not rote stuff -- unless they had a poor commander who believed in what the book said; fortunately, a relatively rare thing.
.

I do not say it didn't. I merely said it was very different from the UK iteration of Battle Drill. Page 10 of J.C. Fry's book gives his definition of battle drill, which makes this very clear. There is an additional definition on Page 66, about the purpose of Platoon Battle Drill, which suggests it Platoon Drills are purely supplementary.

...now it may be that the US did not teach Fry's work, but I understand that they did. As I don't really study US Inf Doctrine, the earliest FM 7-15 I have is 1965, so all and an info would be gratefully accepted.

[William F. Owen]

I also get quite upset about the whole Platoon bit; As far as I'm concerned, Platoon is there to direct any Heavy Weapons they may have or receive from Company. Once the Platoon Cdr has made his appreciation and issued his order after Contact, let the Sections do their bit, and the way they see fit.

Sorry to go off topic here, and back to the old thread, but I don't see what the problem is. Platoons don't just attack things. They do a whole range of activities which the organisation has to account for. The whole problem of this debate is everyone defaults to F&M as being the defining purpose of Squad and Platoon organisation. It is not. The defining purpose should be simple and effective control.

[Norfolk]

Sorry to go off topic here, and back to the old thread, but I don't see what the problem is. Platoons don't just attack things. They do a whole range of activities which the organisation has to account for. The whole problem of this debate is everyone defaults to F&M as being the defining purpose of Squad and Platoon organisation. It is not. The defining purpose should be simple and effective control.

The way I am coming at it is that F&M in particular, and closing with and destroying the enemy in general, constitute the primary and the most demanding tasks of the Infantry. The Defence, Patrolling, and other tasks do not seem to make quite the "manpower" requirements that A-to-C and the Attack do. As such, the "manpower" requirements (et al) of the Firefight, the Assault, and Holding against Counter-Attacks, which expose the Section and Platoon to usually the heaviest losses of any Infantry operation, are some of the chief considerations from that perspective. Smaller units may break down more quickly under sustained battle attrition.

[Rifleman]

I guess I'm between the extremes as far as assault battle drill goes. We certainly did enough of it at squad and platoon levels and I can see how it can do as much harm as good.

Immediate action drills for reacting to contact and breaking contact are another matter, at least according to Vietnam era recon vets. Yes, they sometimes had to be modified under fire but they got everyone started on a correct course of action. Kind of like torpedos and wire guided missiles that adjust course after being fired. They can't do any adjusting until they're fired. You have to take that first step.

Many recon vets of B-52 Project Delta and SOG credit well rehearsed immediate action drills with their survival.

[Norfolk]

I understand your views Rifleman. Battle Drill, especially for Advance/Movement-to-Contact and the Attack bothers me especially in so far as it seems to prop up Infantry leaders who probably shouldn't be leading in the first place. The Germans deliberately avoided Battle Drill, and relied on developing and using the tactical judgement of their Infantrymen in general, and leaders in particular. No-one can claim that that approach didn't work for them, especially against opponents who used Battle Drill (The Commonwealth).

I figure that competent and well-trained infantry and infantry leaders don't need Battle Drill, or if they do, only for very limited purposes. And on the other hand, Battle Drill can serve to disguise the poor tactical judgement of weak infantry and especially their leaders. For those reasons, I think that Battle Drill should be ditched and the German system adopted. It's easier to find out who's got the goods, and who doesn't, in peacetime if they don't have the cover of Battle Drill to hide behind.

That said, I have to agree that on some things, like counter-ambush and the like, certain drills are or may be necessary; tactical circumstances allow no time for anything other than an instantaneous reaction.

[William F. Owen]

Immediate action drills for reacting to contact and breaking contact are another matter, at least according to Vietnam era recon vets.....

Many recon vets of B-52 Project Delta and SOG credit well rehearsed immediate action drills with their survival.

Drill just means common aims and means, so as you say, AI drills are very useful. Battle drill is just an extrapolation of that. Some drills get called SOPs.




@ I figure that competent and well-trained infantry and infantry leaders don't need Battle Drill, or if they do, only for very limited purposes. And on the other hand, Battle Drill can serve to disguise the poor tactical judgement of weak infantry and especially their leaders.

@ For those reasons, I think that Battle Drill should be ditched and the German system adopted. It's easier to find out who's got the goods, and who doesn't, in peacetime if they don't have the cover of Battle Drill to hide behind.

@ I think you are right. I am not a fan of Battle Drill, in terms of the name. IA drills are essential however, as is an objectively based form of infantry training. The real problem is Battle Drill is it is usually taught very badly, because people are confused by the language, so resort to simplistic iterations of what they think is right. That is why you have Section Attacks, and not Section IN the Attack.

@ What is the German System? - and how do you measure tactical skill in peacetime. When I went up to ITC Brecon, back in the UK and suggested that TES kit be used on all tactical courses, everyone fell over in horror! To quote one SI "You can't learn anything once you become a casualty" - and yes he really said that.

...now, forgoing the idea of something called "a German system" I think you are right, and there are some pretty obvious ways to do it.

[Norfolk]

@ What is the German System? - and how do you measure tactical skill in peacetime. When I went up to ITC Brecon, back in the UK and suggested that TES kit be used on all tactical courses, everyone fell over in horror! To quote one SI "You can't learn anything once you become a casualty" - and yes he really said that.

...now, forgoing the idea of something called "a German system" I think you are right, and there are some pretty obvious ways to do it.

Yes, TES puts the fear into the hearts of Slackers and Ruperts alike. MILES became very unpopular very quickly in certain quarters here in the Great White North, particularly after Platoon and Company Attacks made using laser simulation kit revealed the utter tactical incompetence of a distressing number of Infantry Officers and NCOs alike. Attacking Platoons were being reducing to half a dozen men or so, pinned down, against a like number or so of aggressively-handled Enemy Force. Needless to say, MILES is sadly avoided by many Units as much as possible.

The lads on the other hand, love it; although they hate the part where they have to sit out the rest of the fight when they get zapped, and not magically brought back to life by umpires. Every Field EX possible (Live-Fire excepted for obvious reasons) should be run with full TES/MILES support.

The German System:

Well, here's a start (Stan and slapout dug this up for us a little while ago) -

Special Series No. 9, The German Squad in Combat (1943):

http://ahecwebdds.carlisle.army.mil/Data/tmp/linearize_objYAsFmXks3WgmXh9DXXTYBjpHeRrj04STIHw+H aHE8CGo5E3lnZvi8WV+Sih0SjGTtvtfEgO60_sLHep+SQTTvQC FAsLTddoGimPjBj9mK09PAslnIxyQ__.pdf

[slapout9]

Hi Norfolk, I also found a manual on the German Rifle Company but for some reason it was never translated. The whole manual was published in German as part of the US Intell special reports project. Not sure of the reasoning behind that but they did it.:confused:

[jcustis]

The lads on the other hand, love it; although they hate the part where they have to sit out the rest of the fight when they get zapped, and not magically brought back to life by umpires. Every Field EX possible (Live-Fire excepted for obvious reasons) should be run with full TES/MILES support.

Ah, but it is best employed when we actually have the requisite quantities of blank ammunition to replicate a combat load. I've never seen that happen across dozens of MILES exercises. It's usually been a handful of rounds per each man, so the exercise or lane is run as far as it can go until one side runs dry. There was rarely enough ammo to employ sufficient suppressive fires to facilitate an assault, especially in MOUT town.

Come to think of it, there was never any exercise of the battalion-to-company-to-platoon logistics flow during the exercise. No ammo planning, and very little "battlefield calculus" where leaders considered what the rates of fire would be and then factored in planned resupply throughout the fight. We always did a great job of pointing out casualty collection points on the terrain model though...:wry:

Sometimes I sit back and seriously believe we suck, but have just sucked less than our opponents the last few go-arounds.

[Norfolk]

Hi Norfolk, I also found a manual on the German Rifle Company but for some reason it was never translated. The whole manual was published in German as part of the US Intell special reports project. Not sure of the reasoning behind that but they did it.:confused:

Hi slap. Yeah, I found that rather frustrating too. I was even more flustered when I discovered from a specialist source that the traditional German/Prussian script that The German Rifle Company is written in is supposedly almost incomprehensible to most ordinary Germans these days. There is some guy who does translate these things over in Germany or Brit-Land, and he's been swamped by such requests. He tries to get a few manuals translated a year, but it's a really long, tough slog to do so. I've just tried to track him down, but I seem to have lost him.

Here are a few of links to the Evolution of the Section and Battle Drill for whom it may interest:

http://www.canadiansoldiers.com/mediawiki-1.5.5/index.php?title=Infantry_Section

http://www.canadiansoldiers.com/mediawiki-1.5.5/index.php?title=Evolution_of_the_Infantry_Section

Incidently, the following link comes from the Regiment that introduced British Army Battle Drill to the Canadian Army, and it was the Regiment that was commanded by the author of On Infantry, Lt.Col. John English:

http://www.calgaryhighlanders.com/history/battle.htm

jcustis:

Yeah, blank ammo, never mind live ammo, is almost always grudgingly and stingily doled out.:wry: In The RCR, we got around that by loading "Militia Bullets":eek: (shouting "Bang! Bang!" - pathetic isn't it?) when our regular ammo ran out. When we ran out of "Militia Bullets", as the Section Commander would quickly tire of this nonsense, he would issue the order to "Load Insults!":rolleyes:, and thereupon, we would continue the notional firefight with unsocial expressions of ill-will towards the Enemy Force.

We were told that the rear Sections and what not would resupply us with ammo and the like during the Firefight; never saw it done, and I have real doubts that it is practical under many conditions. Didn't somebody say something about the Army that wins is the one that is the least disorganized?

[Ken White]

. . .
Sometimes I sit back and seriously believe we suck, but have just sucked less than our opponents the last few go-arounds.

Been that way for over 200 years I think...

Sad thing is it need not be that way; politics, parochialism and egos are a big part of the problem but our national traits of impatience and unwillingness to think ahead contribute. Those things and our penchant for trying to substitute technology for good training.

The kids generally pull us out of it; bless 'em...

[jcustis]

Been that way for over 200 years I think...

Sad thing is it need not be that way; politics, parochialism and egos are a big part of the problem but our national traits of impatience and unwillingness to think ahead contribute. Those things and our penchant for trying to substitute technology for good training.

The kids generally pull us out of it; bless 'em...


Simple, profound, and so damn true!

[William F. Owen]

Sometimes I sit back and seriously believe we suck, but have just sucked less than our opponents the last few go-arounds.

To paraphrase (no pun intended) an officer from 2 Para said at Goose Green, "We didn't so much win this one as the other side lost it."

[William F. Owen]

Yeah, blank ammo, never mind live ammo, is almost always grudgingly and stingily doled out.:wry: In The RCR, we got around that by loading "Militia Bullets":eek: (shouting "Bang! Bang!" - pathetic isn't it?) when our regular ammo ran out.

I have real issues with blank ammunition on field exercises. Blanks, without TESEX kit, or very good umpiring and role players, provide negative reinforcement, - or bad training, - but there doesn't seem to be any other way to get around it. This one really keeps me thinking.

[Ron Humphrey]

I have real issues with blank ammunition on field exercises. Blanks, without TESEX kit, or very good umpiring and role players, provide negative reinforcement, - or bad training, - but there doesn't seem to be any other way to get around it. This one really keeps me thinking.

but I know the groups of soldiers who go paintballing together become very adept at working together, And the sting kinda gets the point across to.

Get guns close enough to familiar feel and you could get great drilling anytime anywhere with just a quick stop at your local wholesaler.;)

[Penta]

At some point in reading this, I wonder why nobody's ever tried to invent flash suits a la "Ender's Game" for training use - your whole body freezing up when you 'die' would, I think, do much the same as paintball hits, and with less environmental damage.

[Rex Brynen]

but I know the groups of soldiers who go paintballing together become very adept at working together, And the sting kinda gets the point across to.

Get guns close enough to familiar feel and you could get great drilling anytime anywhere with just a quick stop at your local wholesaler.;)

You do have to be careful with paintball as a form of tactical training--it teaches some lessons well--and others very poorly.

To start with, paintballs are sufficiently inaccurate that rapid movement provides far more protection than it does on a real battlefield against an enemy equipped with automatic weapons. Overwatch is harder because its difficult to hit anything out past 30 meters. Indeed, at ranges much beyond that, the paintball is so slow, and the trajectory so arced, that a good player can often simply dodge the incoming round--assuming that you can put it anywhere near them. Even when they hit, they usually won't break, and you may not even feel them.

That doesn't work with either 5.56 or 7.62 :eek:

You can compensate for this somewhat with electronic triggers or fully automatic markers, but then you run into another problem: fire discipline and ammunition supply. I can easily go through a couple of thousand rounds of paintballs in a day with a standard unmodified semi-automatic marker. Similar rates of ammunition expenditure in combat conditions could be fatal.

Third, cover works different. With paintball, leaves and small branches are enough to provide semi-hard cover. That's not a lesson you want your soldiers to learn ;) It would better at training for MOUT, where shorter ranges and snap-to-fire times reduce the differences between real weapons and paintball markers a little.

As for the sting, try playing in the winter up here. Paintballs aren't quite so soft then, and its damn hard to run through several feet of snow ;)

[Ron Humphrey]

If you hadn't had to be a realistic about it somebody might have gotten an idea and before it had the opportunity to be intercepted and corrected ;at least some units might have had a little more fun. :(

Honestly although I understand the limitations with such a thing I gues when I think about what "battle drill" really teaches me as a soldier it would be the teamwork part more so than acurate fires or good concealment practice.

That's why I thought it was worth a try:D

[Norfolk]

Selected Papers of General William E. DePuy (http://comarms.ipac.dynixasp.com/ipac20/ipac.jsp?term=Selected+Papers+of+General+William+E .+DePuy&index=.GW&I1.x=8&I1.y=11#focus), compiled by Richard M. Swain.

General DePuy was instrumental in the formulation of present-day Battle Drill in the US Army (and the USMC adopted soem elements as well). Being practical-minded, DePuy considered that a Infantryman with perhaps as little as three month's training should neverthless be equipped with simple means to make the most of his potential. One of those simple means was Battle Drill, which DePuy described as being practical techniques that could be automatically applied by any soldier without having to spend time thinking for too long about a given tactical situation.

GEN William E. DePuy (Page 25):



Few squad leaders are Doctors of Philosophy-some are more articulate than others, but prudence suggests that we simplify their tasks as much as possible and this is where the battle drill and the team system relieve the squad leader of at least half of his requirement for battlefield explanation. Those who claim that this deprives him of his prerogatives underestimate the size of the problem which remains to confront him. To decide-under fire-where the enemy is-how to approach him-how to use the terrain-how to control his teams-inspire his men-and how to keep the squad's mental picture alive is challenge enough for any man.

Battle Drill provided the soldier with a simple and effective means to react to given situations now, not after the moment for action had passed; DePuy was a firm subscriber to Patton's dictum on this point.

While I certainly do not agree with Battle Drill, let alone giving an Infantryman only a few months training, DePuy's developments and innovations were genius: "11 Men, 1 Mind" (pp.1-24); "Briefing by LtGen DePuy" (pp.59-66); and "One-Up and Two-Back?" (pp.295-302, not quite about Battle Drill, but gives an idea of the tactical setting it was meant to operate in - one of DePuy's best pieces).

[William F. Owen]

The biggest problem with Battle Drill is the words Battle and Drill.

When you call exactly the same thing an "Immediate Action Drill" or "Contact Drills" no one blinks. - and you can't train infantry without such things.

...and strangely, I note from chatting to my friends in the IDF, that the Israelis intuitively refer to training as "Drills." - which bearing in mind the British Army's part in forming the Palmach and thus the IDF may not be surprising.

[Rifleman]

...and strangely, I note from chatting to my friends in the IDF, that the Israelis intuitively refer to training as "Drills." - which bearing in mind the British Army's part in forming the Palmach and thus the IDF may not be surprising.

Legacy of Orde Wingate? Mad man or mad genius?

[William F. Owen]

Legacy of Orde Wingate? Mad man or mad genius?

Definitely a bit of Orde in there somewhere. Mad as a bicycle, but a dam good soldier.

[Norfolk]

The biggest problem with Battle Drill is the words Battle and Drill.

It does tend to conjur up mental images of Battalions forming Squares as an automatic reaction to enemy action.

[MattC86]

Come to think of it, there was never any exercise of the battalion-to-company-to-platoon logistics flow during the exercise. No ammo planning, and very little "battlefield calculus" where leaders considered what the rates of fire would be and then factored in planned resupply throughout the fight. We always did a great job of pointing out casualty collection points on the terrain model though...:wry:


Once the logistics train was complete to battalion level, did they just assume the ammo or supplies would get to each platoon as needed?

Given that since men having been running out of ammo in firefights at the most inopportune moments since gunpowder made its appearance, (and probably archers and other missileers before them), you would have thought they would have realized that ammo expenditure is always going to be higher than predicted, and logistics planning must adjust accordingly. . .

Matt

[Ken White]

... you would have thought they would have realized that ammo expenditure is always going to be higher than predicted, and logistics planning must adjust accordingly. . .
Matt

but that was the time before and all the ammo wasn't used and had to be hauled back and the Ammo guy got chewed out and determined not to make that mistake again. :D

Now, after another chewing; next time he'll make sure they have too much...

And so it goes. People, ya can't trust 'em :wry:

[jcustis]

Once the logistics train was complete to battalion level, did they just assume the ammo or supplies would get to each platoon as needed?

To be frank, yes. There tends to be this presumption that there will be extra ammo back on the track or HMMWV, or that the company gunny will provide it so long as you give him a grid and link-up instructions. Better yet, you'll get your resupply when he stops by to pick up casualties. :wry: Too often the fairy dust wand is waived (at least in the Corps) because we either do not actually have the resource on hand (like a full combat load of blanks), or we have to rely on someone else to get it to us. That's why we've had CH-53 5-tons, 7-tons, and white buses for tactical insert for ages.

It isn't terribly realistic, but the wand gets waved A LOT!

On another note, I sat and browsed through a couple of OIF "playbooks", "battlebooks" and what have you, and started to make several observations. A lot of the guidance and issues for consideration that get pushed out to the troops before each rotation aren't typically in response to actual cognitive learning about the enemy. They are also very unlikely to be new TTPs because we have figured out a better way to go about doing something. Too often, it seems as though the volume of stuff we learn is because we do a poor job of conducting situational based training exercises where much of this should be figured out already. If we have figured it out already, as in a CAX or at the JRTC/NTC rotation, we've allowed the CALL and MCCLL publications lie fallow and failed to incorporate those lessons into the subsequent training. The concepts and tools are often already within our doctrine, but we either don't read our own doctrine, or assume that the unit tacsop is good enough.

Some of these weaknesses become terribly apparent when an entire battalion has to move, especially during periods of limited visibility. I know of too many occasions when I would curse a HQ element for moving in or around the coil with lights on, in total ignorance of the light discipline SOP. Truth be told, someone made a "command decision" because they didn't think it was safe to move into the coil blacked out, but in fact many drivers simply didn't have the training or experience to dive with NVGs. Instead of leaving the exercise with a plan of action to rectify the deficiency, it was back to the shop to conduct maintenance, go on a little libo, and then back to the hum-drum of HQ life. Very rarely did someone take action and say, "Well sir, instead of taking the whole battalion out for the next exercise, we'd like to have the equivalent amount of time to run a HMMWV licensing school and complete more than the baseline hours of night driving." Instead the usual game of musical chairs would happen and cohesion would change.


Sorry for the rant, but I just came back again to the realization that we so often suck...just less than the opponent.

[Norfolk]

jcustis wrote:


To be frank, yes. There tends to be this presumption that there will be extra ammo back on the track or HMMWV, or that the company gunny will provide it so long as you give him a grid and link-up instructions. Better yet, you'll get your resupply when he stops by to pick up casualties. :wry: Too often the fairy dust wand is waived (at least in the Corps) because we either do not actually have the resource on hand (like a full combat load of blanks), or we have to rely on someone else to get it to us. That's why we've had CH-53 5-tons, 7-tons, and white buses for tactical insert for ages.

It isn't terribly realistic, but the wand gets waved A LOT!

Come to think of it, so little practical attention has been paid to this most basic of all tactical logistical problems that not so much as a single bored staff officer has even published a single Battle Drill for it (AFAIK).:wry:

jcustis has raised over the past few posts the matter of one of the most vital of all battlefield functions, the resupply of troops in the midst of battle. I can't remember who wrote or said this, but someone once said that one of the reasons that many battles are lost is that the ammo simply ran out, but that fact very often doesn't get mentioned in the histories.

I wonder if any us here have ever participated a "battlefield" resupply during a "simulated" firefight - and not just during the consolidation/re-org? Ken may be able to fill us in a little on how said was accomplished in Korea and Vietnam. I certainly have not done so, and even in training I have not seen Squads/Sections or even Platoons and Companies perform any meaningful battlefield ammo resupply whilst in "contact", not until the re-org/consolidation anyway.

Yep, that fairy dust wand sure gets a lot of use in peacetime, and it most certainly is not just used by the Corps. Funny how it magically disappears when it's most needed (fickle, perfidious fairies:mad:).

[William F. Owen]

This has far more impact than many ever suggest. EG: If your company has one vehicle allocated to carrying the F-Echelon Ammo load, you can't have the company bigger and thus carrying more ammo, than can be stored in the vehicle! Average 8kg of ammo per man, and you quickly get 800kg of ammo needing to be re-supplied, plus batteries, rations and water. - so over 1,000kg easy.

[Fred III]

This is an extremely interesting discussion and I have only just now had some time to try to participate. I am a little confused, however, and I have either missed something (sorry!) or am not fully conversant with a more modern-day military lingo. First of all, I am not sure I understand what you all mean when you use the term “Battle Drill.” When I was in the army (1962-1972), we used a term called “small unit tactics” and I am guessing those two are synonymous. If I am correct, then I am even more confused by what I am interpreting as a general disapproval of either or both disciplines.

I am not sure how I should respond or refute the things I question, but I find it rather startling that anyone would want to eliminate a general concept of tactical operations for very small units. Or have I missed the point here, as well? I don’t know what the army teaches “fire teams” or “squads” or “platoons” today, but when I was in the infantry and learned what later proved to be some of the most asinine folderol imaginable, these tactics were the heart and soul of a battle group/battalion. One of the things I remember the most about the Fort Benning small unit tactical doctrine was probably because it proved to be the most embarrassing—for me, personally. I remember we were required—at some point close to the objective—to all rise up and form a skirmish line, marching toward the objective, firing from the shoulder and the hip. We used to call it, "John Wayne" tactics.

When I pulled that stunt on my first field exercise as a brand-spanking new second lieutenant under Bill DePuy and Oren Henderson, my ass was hauled out of that platoon so fast I thought I had to go back and hunt for my head. DePuy explained to me, “We don’t do that here,” and I was given a mimeographed set of 1st Battle Group, 30th Infantry tactical mores that set me back about a month in training. The skirmish line was never used, having been replaced by the practice of fire-and-maneuver, always, always, always! There were things like “Traveling,” the “Traveling Overwatch,” the “Bounding Overwatch,” “Overwatch Fire and Movement,” “The Assault,” all of which, when applied in practice—and then in combat in Vietnam—made eminently more sense than the garbage Benning was pumping out.

Now, I do not want to mislead anyone. I was no longer in the infantry, per se, when I was in Vietnam; I was the C.O. of Company A, 1st Supply and Transport Battalion, and as such, commanded the only truck company in the 1st Infantry Division (once again, working for Bill DePuy). So, while even though I could not employ DePuy’s “battle drill” as an infantryman, I found two occasions to use it when my convoys were ambushed, and I used his moving formations when I ran patrols—which was quite often, since I seemed to have been designated the unit expert in that area. DePuy's movement formations bordered on the brilliant, with a wide fan, wide spacing, and mutual support, rather than the claptrap “column” movement we so often see. A perfect example of this appeared in a photograph in Tuesday’s New York Times. The caption read, “American and Iraqi soldiers patrolled Monday outside of Baquba. A bombing in the area killed militia members aiding the military.” The first four clowns in the picture appear to be Iraqi’s, followed by an American and then some more Iraqis, all in a column of single file. There are quite a few Americans bringing up the rear. I cannot make out the unit insignia, but the column is simply moving along a well-worn path. Quite frankly, I wouldn’t have run an operation that shoddily if I were just out trolling for Broadway tickets. To my way of thinking, a formation-- or mission-- of the sort in the picture falls under the category of “battle drill,” and unless this were an administrative movement, it appeared about as effective and secure as Calhoun’s skirmish line at the Little Big Horn.

As far as the “fire and maneuver” aspect of “battle drill” or “small unit tactics” is concerned, I would tend to agree with critics, if firing and maneuvering were the only ingredients in the sauce. That was never meant to be the case, however. When you worked for and trained under DePuy, you were told you had assets other than your small group of soldiers. Back in 1962, 1963, and 1964, when I was running hills for DePuy, Henderson, and Turner, if we didn’t call in smoke, mortars, artillery, air, or whatever else was available, we couldn’t sit for a month. In Vietnam, if one life was lost because some lieutenant or captain didn’t call up his available assets, the man’s career was soon over. We were taught to think and to employ our tactics with originality and intelligence. Cover, concealment, smoke, noise—anything we could think of to distract, to panic, to hamper, to bother the enemy. “Fire and Maneuver” was a lot more difficult than firing and maneuvering.

The same thoughtfulness employed in small-unit infantry tactics can also be employed in the convoy operations I ran in Vietnam or that someone should be able to run in Iraq. In 1966, I wrote the division SOP on convoy operations, something I am sure is no longer followed in this “professional” army run by so-called professionals—and contractors. (It is no wonder men like Yingling, McMasters, Nagel, et al, are viewed as such rebels and spend so much time pleading their case!) We had rules on how to run a convoy and how not to run a convoy. All those guys—and women—in the back of that truck a year or two ago, would never have been killed had it been one of my trucks. There would have been no “Jessica Lynch incident” had those trucks belonged to the Big Red One in 1966 and 1967. (But then, there would have been no Jessica Lynch, period, in my command… but that’s a whole ’nother issue.)

So, overall, I see a clear need for an intelligent, effective, and functioning set of “rules” we can term “Battle Drill,” or, euphemistically, something else. I am simply not sure what you would replace the “drill” with were it to be eliminated. What is, however, most important, is that we teach our leaders the necessity to think and to use their heads and to improvise rather than follow blindly. In that regard, I completely agree with the WWII German method of training leaders. It is not a lot different from Erich Ludendorff’s “corporate” management style when he was Chief of the Imperial German General Staff. That style fostered leadership, ideas, and discussion that, in turn, led to a number of clever battlefield innovations and changes, and befuddled the Allies. Those German innovations proved brilliant and probably prolonged the war a considerable amount of time, even giving rise to their contention that they were never militarily defeated.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[Ken White]

Agree with all of it and it points out very well that units generally do what works and the foolishness * of the schools and doctrine writers is ignored far more than it is practiced. That's why the theorists have such a hard time with it; they intuitively discern we are not doing what the books says. Or not... :D

Particularly enjoyed your comment on the 'patrol' outside Baquba. Generally a couple of other Dinosaurs and I are appreciative of the competence and professionalism shown by the most of the Troops in the pictures we see from Afghanistan and Iraq but occasionally, we grit our teeth at lapses like the one you mentioned. I do not enjoys saying, to myself "...one ping ball will get you all..." or "how many times have you walked that route, that way?" :mad:

We still don't do the basics well... :confused:

Enjoyable post, thanks.

* Not that the writers or the schools are necessarily foolish; just that hewing to the party line, regurgitating long held shibboleths and avoiding risk are, regrettably, embedded in the processes. Combat entails risk, IMO, the schools go too far in trying to eliminate it....

[Fred III]

Ken--

Thank you. I appreciate your kind words, especially considering your background and after reading so much of what you have posted here.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[Norfolk]

Hi Fred! Good to see you back!:)

That was a great post, and really, really well put. DePuy's Battle Drill (along with his tactical ideas) at least as I understand it, when properly understood and conscientously applied, could make a dramatic difference. After reading your post and how you laid things out, it appears that the problem then isn't so much (US) Battle Drill per se, but some of the people being tasked to carry it out - some of them just don't have the mental agility to use it right. That's a personnel and training issue as you indicate, not so much a doctrinal one.

DePuy's Battle Drill (as opposed to what changes or modifications may have been made over the intervening years) offers certain improvements over aspects of Commonwealth Battle Drill (and associated tactics), at least in so far as it was often practiced when I was in. DePuy taught to find the enemy with no more than a Fire Team if possible, and even so it was covered by friendly support weapons; in the Commonwealth, you sent a whole Section to do that, and cover was provided by the Platoon Weapons Det - presumably things have changed in recent years. And we still used Skirmish Lines:eek:(though the Brits to their credit preferred covered approaches to Skirmish Lines); yep, putting a whole 8-man Section in Arrowhead (Wedge) Formation and just marching straight towards the enemy in full view [Norfolk shakes head, then proceeds to bang it against wall]. I mean, when you saw some of the stuff (okay, a lot of the stuff) that we were doing and the way we were doing it, it just made you feel like an idiot. We were actually intending to fight a war this way? How did we honestly expect to win, then?:confused:

jcustis mentioned something on another thread about how he thinks the USMC is bad, just not as bad as our enemies (usually); I can say, most truthfully (and ruefully) that his sentiments are shared in full in other English-speaking Armies - and I can see why my old Section Commander told us we would take 60% casualties in 24 hours of offensive ops.

All that said, there are certainly elements of both US and Commonwealth Battle Drill that could use some fixin'. Like in some of the uses (or abuses) of Battle Drill 6 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2089) in the US Army, and Battle Drill 5 in the Commonwealth (even though it's an improvement in its current form from when I was in, it still does not even mention moving from fire position to fire position). But the key to avoiding problems with Battle Drill is to have small unit leaders who have good tactical judgement, not just good memorization skills.

Once again Fred, Great Post!( And good to see you back).:D

[Fred III]

Norfolk—

Thank you, as well. I wasn’t aware you were in one of the Commonwealth armies, so your points about this whole discussion are particularly interesting to me. Unfortunately, I am not well versed in either the tactics of “British-born” armies (and I use that term only in the way of Genesis) or current-day American thinking. Obviously, much of what I have to say comes from experience of a long time ago, plus the good fortune of having served under some extremely fine examples of American leadership. I guess I can drop some names with the best of them!

I am in complete agreement with you and Ken White regarding “battle drill” vis-à-vis leadership and I think this is where some people may get tripped up. Nothing works without good leadership to ensure the theories are properly instituted and carried out and I wonder if that is more the problem than the specifics of the drill. As you can imagine, I am particularly sensitive to the areas of military convoys, patrolling, and platoon drill, and whenever I see or hear about these situations in places like Iraq and Afghanistan my ire is drawn to our leadership. I am not fond of contracting out what I consider military operations and I am even less happy about seeing the greatly expanded role of women in the military. To me, contractors should spend their time building facilities the military is not traditionally equipped to handle and that fall more in line with civilian expertise, i.e., port facilities, permanent structures, etc., not convoy driving, not running mess halls, not dishing out supplies; and women should be doing the clerical, the nursing, the doctoring, and more of the administrative duties than humping tires on 5-ton vehicles or trying to out-run a bunch of Iraqis dying of laughter. That doesn’t work, I’ll tell you. My cynicism tells me precisely why these two situations exist, but the horror—to me—is that the individual soldier—and that includes the women who serve—are the ones who pay the price. That ain’t “battle drill,” but it is a matter of leadership and it extends to well beyond the military. What makes it particularly galling is that by now the military leadership is complicit. It’s like the old arguments for and against the volunteer army: you had to drag the generals, kicking and screaming, into it, and now you would have to drag them kicking and screaming out of it. Today, they’d probably get a medal from the politicians just for a public “thumbs-up.” Re-sew the lettuce, boys! And that pink-and-purple one on the far left is for….

The problem with DePuy’s battle drill is that I am not sure it was ever fully accepted or implemented into doctrine. That’s more an I-don’t-know, however, than a statement of fact. One might think as head of TRADOC, he would pretty much get his way, especially with something as menial as platoon-sized drill, but I don’t know. I am very surprised, however, that there is not more discussion of his ideas and methods, especially when I see the quality of person on these boards. That almost leads me to believe he has been superseded by… not the skirmish line, I hope!

His drill worked—at least in theory—and I know his “traveling” formations worked in practice—and in combat. But again, it must always be remembered, there was more than just the “A Team moves; B Team fires,” etc. Cover and concealment were integral parts of the drill, as was reliance on higher assets. The deal was to sow confusion and uncertainty and I’m not sure there is anyone unwilling to accept those principles when it comes to warfare, however small the engagement or units involved.

Another thing about William DePuy that I believe a lot of people are unaware of. The American army has this penchant for attrition warfare. It started with U. S. Grant when Lincoln tapped him for command and it hasn’t changed a whole hell of lot since. What’s so intriguing about DePuy’s strategy, however, is his reversal of the theory. Grant employed his “attritive” tactics sort of like a battering ram. He just kept throwing assets at Lee until he wore the Southern forces out. That has been our way ever since and we’ve been blessed with the ability to do just that (of course, there’s the human element that might not agree too readily about flinging fathers and sons into the cauldron!). In Vietnam, DePuy turned the tables and I don’t really know if he’s been given credit for what he attempted to do. The press grabs a hold of this stuff and screams attrition didn’t work in Vietnam, but with DePuy’s theories—and practices—it was the other guy doing the attrition. Think about that for a moment. Knowing they will keep coming, pound them and pound them and pound them. Make them use their assets. Without the bottomless pit spelled “A-M-E-R-I-C-A,” the NVA would eventually have to fold. Clever, don’t you think?

The problem, however, was that we couldn’t go into their sanctuaries; into Cambodia, into Laos (except for Special Forces); we couldn’t physically control or take out the Ho Chi Minh Trail, so we could never hit them hard enough to force the necessary replacements, thereby draining the swamp. Their “swamp” was always regenerating and so we failed. Military strategy succumbed to civilian vicissitudes. I find distinct parallels with our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Tora Bora is a partial example, exacerbated by what I see as Tommy Franks’ incompetence. If we had a foray or two into Pakistan, what do you think Musharraf might say besides, “Thanks, boys!” As for the militants… what? Piss them off? Seems like we’ve already done that! This ruse of turning over security and military operations to the Iraqis is another. We did that with the ARVN, remember? That’s the old blame-game again. Who, Moi? You lost the war! This sudden enlightenment with the new counter-insurgency manual also fits the shoe. Did anyone read the Special Forces Warfare School’s manuals and study publications of some 42 years ago? They say smell is the most powerful of the senses. Seems like I’ve smelled that rose before.

Anyway, I am delighted to know there are DePuy adherents here and I really do think this so-called “battle drill”—if properly taught—works. Again, as an officer, I wouldn’t know what to do without it, and I would be interested in seeing what those who think it is all worthless would substitute for training and doctrine.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[selil]

Hey Fred!

When you head south on US41 down past Pelican Bay on the right is little hamburger spot called CheBurger CheBurger...... Have one and really enjoy it.... Dang I miss that place.

[Distiller]

@ Fred

I feel that a good deal of what you talk about in your second paragraph comes from the lack of understanding of military affairs by the political leadership. Did it start with McNamara? Now there is a situation where civilian leaders fiddle with operational matters - which is not their business, and on the other hand military leaders fiddling with political and strategic matters - which should be attanded to, but isn't enough, by the political leadership. Or in short, the civil leadership is out of touch and not up to the job.


And regarding DePuy: Isn't that more the answer to the questions of a (rapidly built) conscript army, not so much for professional soldiers?

[Fred III]

Hey Fred!

When you head south on US41 down past Pelican Bay on the right is little hamburger spot called CheBurger CheBurger...... Have one and really enjoy it.... Dang I miss that place.

Sam--

I know it well. My cardiologist, however, keeps telling me to avoid the beef, so rather than the burger, on my next foray to someplace good, I'll hoist a beer and wish you well.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[Fred III]

I feel that a good deal of what you talk about in your second paragraph comes from the lack of understanding of military affairs by the political leadership. Did it start with McNamara? Now there is a situation where civilian leaders fiddle with operational matters - which is not their business, and on the other hand military leaders fiddling with political and strategic matters - which should be attanded to, but isn't enough, by the political leadership. Or in short, the civil leadership is out of touch and not up to the job.


And regarding DePuy: Isn't that more the answer to the questions of a (rapidly built) conscript army, not so much for professional soldiers?

Distiller--

I completely agree with you regarding the "lack of understanding" business. It seems to me we handled this a lot better in WWII than we have done since and I do not know if the breakdown began with McNamara; however, you may be correct with that, as well. What I do know is that it has reached epic proportions with the likes of Rumsfeld, Feith, et al. The Pentagon "intelligence-gathering" operation was the first "hint," but it ran into monstrous proportions-- I feel-- when Rumsfeld caved in to the Turks regarding sending the Ivy Division into Iraq, via that route. The decision to withhold the additional force was a major reason we are in the pickle we're in now. (At least, that is how I see it.) I am a huge believer in the employment of overwhelming force at critical junctures and the elimination of such a major element in one's planning is the utter height of arrogance. And stupidity! We howl about how the Turk's are such great allies, yet we allow something like this to happen. I think if we exercised a lot more diplomacy, we would have been a lot better off.

I do not understand what you mean about your DePuy comment. Are you speaking of the use of "battle drill"? If you are, then please allow me to say this: we all seem to get caught in the web of agree/disagree. Someone puts forth an idea or a policy, implements it, and the criticism follows. Much of that criticism is what I call "destructive." In other words, it tears down the policy, but never puts something else in its place. If "battle drill" is worthless, fine, I can fully accept that; but put something else in there to fill the void. You don't want to teach "fire and maneuver," you don't want to teach "skirmish lines," fine. What do you want to teach? What is the alternative? Don't just criticize and walk away.

That was always one of the big buggaboos I had about Vietnam. We did have a treaty called SEATO; we did have a perceived threat, especially in reference to the times and the so-called "monolithic" debate about communism. (George Kennan's theories were not yet fully accepted in 1964.) So what do we do? Send in troops or not? If not, then what? That is what I seemed to have missed. What do we do if we do not address the problem directly? Or... is there even a problem? This-- to me-- is a similar issue with Iraq and strangely enough, it feeds right back into your original point about civilians not understanding the military. Iraq was jammed down our throats and as far as I am concerned, the decision to go into the country-- some how, some way, in some manner, at some time-- had been made long before the WTC came down. Iraq was a seething blister for any number of years. My only question is, Why?

Best wishes,
Fred.

[Distiller]

What I meant with my comment on DePuy/battle drill was, that it basically provides an answer as how to make a conscript infantry work as fast as possible. DePuy's work at TRADOC was done in an era of conscription, as was his combat service. I freely admit I prefer "Auftragstaktik" - it might offer the better answers for todays's environment. As long - and that is important - as the Army is willing to give more authority to the section level and its leaders. If the Army wants to keep to micromanagment and train troops accordingly, then battle drill is the answer. But I feel that in a professional army that is a waste of ressources and initiative.

[Fred III]

What I meant with my comment on DePuy/battle drill was, that it basically provides an answer as how to make a conscript infantry work as fast as possible. DePuy's work at TRADOC was done in an era of conscription, as was his combat service. I freely admit I prefer "Auftragstaktik" - it might offer the better answers for todays's environment. As long - and that is important - as the Army is willing to give more authority to the section level and its leaders. If the Army wants to keep to micromanagment and train troops accordingly, then battle drill is the answer. But I feel that in a professional army that is a waste of ressources and initiative.

Distiller--

That is extremely interesting. I do, however, want to make a small correction to your post. DePuy's combat service was done in the conscription era, but by the time of TRADOC, the army had been-- or was certainly in the process of-- being converted to all-volunteer. Your point is well-taken, however, in that his thinking was probably all for a conscription army.

I am not familiar with the specifics of "Auftragstaktik." Actually, to be perfectly honest, I have no clue what that is, other than a guess that it refers to the German WWII small unit theory of training, possibly extending into today's era. Is it the same, or is it drawn from what Norfolk posted earlier (German WWII doctrine)? And again, I am not at all familiar with how or what it would replace and why it is so different from a clearly defined method of attacking an enemy position.

I could use that education and would be indebted. Also, does anyone have a clue how to download Norfolk's reference?

We are certainly in agreement about the leadership and authority business. It is very interesting, but there seems to have been considerably more small-unit authority allowed back in the latter 19th century army than there is today. Is that because of the improvement in methods of communication? Another interesting point regarding that, is how do we weight the authority issue in small units versus the authority issue vis-a-vis civilian control? The generals complain about civilian meddling from atop, but then proceed to do the same thing below.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[Norfolk]

Fred, I can't help but suspect that you may have received a little more thorough training in some ways than what some of us did. That has a tendency to occurr however, when you're taught by a Master Tactician.:D

[Distiller]

A quick look at google

http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/99autumn/keithly.htm
http://www.ducimus.com/Archive/auftrags-oleary.htm
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/SepOct02/SepOct02/widder.pdf
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/6-0/chap1.htm

[Fred III]

Fred, I can't help but suspect that you may have received a little more thorough training in some ways than what some of us did. That has a tendency to occurr however, when you're taught by a Master Tactician.:D

You know, Norfolk, that's really interesting. I often wonder about that kind of thing. It was a different era and a different war. From what I am reading on these pages, even the organization charts are vastly different. I guess, to a very large extent, I am operating in a distant time-warp. I have only recently read about these "BCT's", these brigade combat teams, and how the newest "division" structures are set up. Someone-- on another thread-- said that divisions are now more HQ organizations than actual operating units, sort of like how brigades used to be when they re-introduced the concept in the '60's (there you go!) So a lot of this has passed me by.

I keep reading about "the best army in the world," "the world's best training," and all the rest of the stuff we puff up about. It's like, who's better, Mantle or Bonds?

So I don't really know. I do know that the conscription army I was in was highly disciplined... and that may fly in the face of some of you out there... but it's how I remember it. We weren't worried about guys re-upping, there was always someone else in the pipeline. And, of course, to me that's the issue today. That leads into my buggaboo about too many women and the use of contractors. That's how they make the "professional" army work. The system cannot generate enough volunteers, so the standards-- the physical standards, mind you!!!!!-- are lowered, i.e., women; and the jobs that cannot be filled are farmed out to civilians. We had civilians in my day, but this is a whole new level, and I don't care what anyone says, experience or no, once you're out baby, the womb is gone and it's never the same. You give me a 5-year Special Forces guy in the service any day over a 20-year retiree merc.

I do know your equipment is better today, your training facilities are better... I don't know how to measure it. I will say this: there isn't a unit today I would take over the 1st Infantry Division of DePuy. We were good. That may be an old man bragging, it may be ignorance, it may be pride... I don't know.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[RJ]

Gentlemen,

Thank you for a very interesting thread. This is my first post on the Council.

My infantry training dates back to the Marine Corps of the mid 1950's. The basic weapons for a line company 13 man squad were M-1 Garand rifles and the BAR. Three 4 man fire teams built around a BAR and a squad leader.

My first peek and fondle of a M-14 and M-60 LMG were during a welcome aboard three day mixer with my Battalion and the 503rd Airborne on Okinawa in late 1959 or early 1960.

I was a squad leader at that time.

My Battalion was commanded by Lt. Col. Kenneth Houghton and was transplanted to the Third Marine Division during a new Marine Corps "Transplacement Battalion" concept. 3/5 a 1stMarDiv. unit switch bases with 3/3 a 3rdMarDiv unit.

The Corps theory was to begin each transplacemt battalion
by staffing them with platoon commanders who were 1st Lt. and were experienced in that command slot. In our case the Battalion Commander built his staff, including senior NCO's with Officers and NCO's he had served with in the past.

The Rifle Companies were all commanded by Captians who were combat veterans. Three out of the 5 CO's were mustangs with Combat experience in Korea. Co. 1st Sgts and Gunnery Sgts were all combat veterans. As were most Platoon Sgts. Squad leaders for the most part were young corporals and Sgts. who had re-enlisted aftr learning the "grunt trade" in the infantry Battalions of the three Marine Divisions.

The enlisted ranks were filled with fresh meat directly out of the Infantry Training Regts. from both the 1st and 2nd Marine Division. A volunteer and highly motivated group of brand new Marines.

Each Battalion trained for 5 months in the hills of Camp Pendleton. Live fire exercises were often and competive.
All of them included Fire and Maneuver, including flanking and frontal assualts. Clearing trench lines, preping and assualting bunker systems, squad, platoon and company in defensive postions. The last two months intergrated the LMG and 3.5 rocket launcher sections with the platoons and eveyone was cross trained to function as machine gunners and ammo humpers for both the "guns" and the "rockets!"

Fire team leaders and Squad leaders were cross trained up to work with H&S Co.'s 81mm Mortars and Flamethrower Platoons. Squad Leaders were trained to direct fire missions with the 81mm platoons and expected to pass on that knowledge to the fireteam leaders.

When we boarded the USS J.C. Breckinridge (MATS) we were pretty cocky and had a strong sense of unit. Some of us were going to spend 15 months withthe Battalion and the majority would spend a full 30 months.

It was the best unit I serve in during my 14 years in the Corps. I finished my regular Marine Corps stint as a Recon Squad Leader in the 2nd Recon Bn. in Camp Lejune. And my USMCR years a a Rifle Platoon Sgt. in a NY Reserve Unit that became part of the 4th Marine Division when the Corp consolidated the old Rifle Company concept into a mirror image of the Regular Marine Infantry Divisions.

In our overseas tour 3/5 trained in the Philippeans, Formosa, and functioned as the "float" battalion for the 7th Fleeet. We were one of the initial BNs to utilize the new vertical envelopment concept during a major amphibious exercise in Formosa and trained for the new concept on the USS Princeton and the USS Hornet. We participated in regular amphibious landings in Leyte and Luzon. We interacted in training with the Philippean Army and the Nationalist Chinese Marine Corps and shared some patrol sharing with the Royal Warwicks in FanLing, China along the New Terrorities border at Hong Kong. Liberty in Hong Kong, Manila, Tackloban, Subic Bay and Yokohamma.

Most of our "battle drill" for the lackof a better word, centered around the Platoon and interacting with support weapons to prep and prepare our objectives. We taught fire and maneuver and the units facing a assualt line were primarily trained to batter the objective with heavy fire while the assualt force set up a flanking attack.

Todays, communications between the infantry and the supporting assets has got to be light years ahead of the old, tried and true "Follow Me" rule that was till being followed since the late 19th Century.

When the Marines when across the berm from Kuwait and into Iraq, I noticed a Marine Squad leader directing his squad by voice commands thru a head set mike.

That has to be a huge improvement to the screaming at the top of your lungs in a fire fight or an assualt.

Sorry for my long winded intro I just wanted to let y'all know how long it has been since I did the infantry thing.

I think my question is - haven't communications at the squad level made a great difference in combat for todays troops? and hasn't the ability of the average infantryman to multiply the force levels against the enemy grown enormously?


I'm the new guy on this site and I promise to lurk most of the time so as to get a handle on the new and improved concepts and reality since my time.

[Ken White]

to be welcomed here.

And anyone who's almost as old as I am certainly is... :D

Welcome aboard.

[RJ]

Thanks Ken!

"Kenny" was an exceptional infantry leader! He was admired, and more than likly "loved" by the troops.

He was the only Marine Officer In my expericence who qualified to wear Jump Wings and Submariners Dolphins.

We were all glad, but not surprised that he made Maj. General before he retired.

3/5 All the Way!

[William F. Owen]

“Moreover, in a day of rapid technical change, when British soldiers were apt to be employed anywhere in the world under conditions that varied widely and could not be anticipated because the tactics, equipment, and transport requirements differed with the circumstances of each campaign, the British Army could not preserve one uniform pattern…About all that could be done to prepare the army to fight was to retain an elasticity in outlook, simplicity in drill, and adopt a common, simplified…training manuals. When the next war came, the British would feel their way amidst the new conditions, but at least their feet would not be chained to a rigid system of tactics long since outmoded”.

Maj Gen Sir John Maurice. The Advantages of Simple Drill 1888

[oakfox]

Regarding the notion of Auftragstaktik and Battle drills:
IMHO the essence of Auftrakstaktik is constituted of the idea that an order is a description of what to achieve but not how to achieve it - leaving it to the subordinate who has better judgement of the situation he encounters to understand the superior's intentions and how to implement it in a given situation.
This implies that for instance am enlisted man had to be able to take over as a squad leader, a squad leader was also educated as a platoon leader, etc...

Historically, the necessity to introduce such concepts in Germany lies in the unique and unfavorable strategic location of Germany which was "encircled" by other powers. Therefore, German armies throughout the history were often outnumbered and short of supply. So creativity was a necessary ingredient to compensate for the odds. I believe it was first mentioned in the liberation wars against the French occupants under the rule of Napoleon.

However, I also believe that the Wehrmacht did exercise something like battle drills (e.g. ballistic machine gun fire together with advances requires frequent rehearsals) - but they were not to be followed blindly - and flexible tactics were encouraged (although on a strategic level the high command always had to struggle with often insane orders given by Hitler).

Notice, that German armies have been draft based for hundreds of years.

Interestingly, as media becomes omnipresent on the battle field, the army becomes more professionalized, due to the technological improvements in communication technologies, and politicians play General and Generals have to cover their asses, Auftragstaktik slowly starts to erode in the modern German
forces...

[Fuchs]

Regarding the notion of Auftragstaktik and Battle drills:
IMHO the essence of Auftrakstaktik is constituted of the idea that an order is a description of what to achieve but not how to achieve it - leaving it to the subordinate who has better judgement of the situation he encounters to understand the superior's intentions and how to implement it in a given situation.
Yes, but a lot of emphasis was placed on a common idea how to achieve it. That was ingrained in training instead of in orders.

This implies that for instance am enlisted man had to be able to take over as a squad leader, a squad leader was also educated as a platoon leader, etc...

That's a necessity in any army in my opinion and was very well achieved in the Reichswehr of 1919-1932, but it's not really part of Auftragstaktik. Auftragstaktik merely requires that the leader understands his superior's intent and how the battlefield conditions interact with this to solve the challenge independently.

Historically, the necessity to introduce such concepts in Germany lies in the unique and unfavorable strategic location of Germany which was "encircled" by other powers.

I know that we emphasized this fact for a hundred years, but in fact the French and Italians had the same situation. The favourable geography of the UK and USA are exceptions in the world.

Therefore, German armies throughout the history were often outnumbered and short of supply. So creativity was a necessary ingredient to compensate for the odds. I believe it was first mentioned in the liberation wars against the French occupants under the rule of Napoleon.

There's a famous quote from the seven years war, I think. A major got criticised by a prince for following an order straight despite it was inappropriate for the condition. The prince said something like "The king made you major because he believed you would know when NOT to follow orders." That's the first mention of Auftragstaktik principles that I know about.

However, I also believe that the Wehrmacht did exercise something like battle drills (e.g. ballistic machine gun fire together with advances requires frequent rehearsals) - but they were not to be followed blindly - and flexible tactics were encouraged (although on a strategic level the high command always had to struggle with often insane orders given by Hitler).

Notice, that German armies have been draft based for hundreds of years.

Since the napoleonic time basically. The reforms of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau made draft official.

Interestingly, as media becomes omnipresent on the battle field, the army becomes more professionalized, due to the technological improvements in communication technologies, and politicians play General and Generals have to cover their asses, Auftragstaktik slowly starts to erode in the modern German
forces...
That happens since the early 90's and is in part due to a loss of quality among junior NCOs. That in turn came from personnel economics; we didn't pay well, so we offered NCO ranks right from the start. A junior NCO is today planned as tank driver, whereas that was a conscript job in the 80's.
Another problem is the lack of lower ranking soldiers for expeditions. Not all conscripts were available for that, causing very NCO and officer-heavy units being deployed to the balkans.
A platoon-sized checkpoint was operated by a colonel in the late 90's.
The causes for the erosion of Auftragstaktik seem to be much more lack of proper personnel financing than politics or technology. The damage could be repaired in few years if we had a competent SecDef like in the 80's.


I was never exposed to drill training, but drills seem to make sense whenever there's not enough time for thinking and/or communication in a situation.

[LetUsHavePeace]

Fred's comments about the origins of attrition warfare are a bit at odds with the facts. When he writes that "(I)t started with U. S. Grant when Lincoln tapped him for command", he does Grant a considerable injustice. Grant's strategy was to prevent the Army of Northern Virginia from being allowed to disengage. If Lee was unable to reinforce the other Southern armies, then Sherman and Thomas would be free to maneuver, outflank and defeat their opponents in the field. (Grant's frustration with Thomas before the Battle of Franklin was based on his fear that Thomas would have the same "slows" that McClellan and too many others had shown.) Whenever Grant had the option, he chose maneuver warfare (Donelson, the entire Vicksburg campaign, the relief of Chattanooga). When, as it did against Lee, the situation required steady pressure, he made that choice but only as a necessary sacrifice, not as the preferred way of doing things. Even as he was dying, Grant felt it necessary to express public regret in his Memoirs over the third and final attack at Cold Harbor. He hated attrition warfare and thought it was complete folly.

[tankersteve]

From the U.S. Army perspective, at least pre-OEF/OIF, battle drill was something to do again and again, until it was ground into the membrane. Very little variation was accepted or allowed.

COL MacFarland, of 1/1AD and Ramadi fame, went so far as to say in a CALL interview that Battle Drill, or the rote execution of a formatted response, needed to go away. We needed Soldiers thinking, deciding, executing - not executing a set course of action. I think the enemy, after watching us enough times, gets a feel for our Battle Drill and can template our reactions into their scheme of maneuver, thus creating a more dangerous situation for us. This definitely is an issue in an urban environment, where the enemy has the ability to watch us very closely. One thing I took away from Ramadi was how incredibly good the enemy recce was.

The problem, and I think it is going away, was the attempt to make the squad or platoon's execution of battle drill open to subjective analysis and grading. The U.S. Army still loves Task, Condition, Standard. That is how we train. Stealing this from someone else, but we need to be more focused on results or outcomes. I can honestly say that I have seen OCs at the NTC give very little thought to battle drill and are much more focused on what the end result is. Of course, in a COIN environment, there are very few battle drill opportunities to execute against the incredible set of variables, especially in more complex, urban environments.

Perhaps we still have a conscript-focused training system for a supposedly-professional Army. We do tend to focus on bulk number of iterations vice quality training. We still tend to be obsessed with keeping our numbers looking good. It is also a mixing of Armor mentality (gunnery being easy to grade/quantify) into infanty training.

Tankersteve

[William F. Owen]

COL MacFarland, of 1/1AD and Ramadi fame, went so far as to say in a CALL interview that Battle Drill, or the rote execution of a formatted response, needed to go away. We needed Soldiers thinking, deciding, executing - not executing a set course of action.

Battle Drill, never was and never is the rote execution of a formatted response,. This was the same criticism the UK War Office levelled in 1942, and did great damage in doing so. Me thinks I need to write something to explain it! :mad:

[Ken White]

From the U.S. Army perspective, at least pre-OEF/OIF, battle drill was something to do again and again, until it was ground into the membrane. Very little variation was accepted or allowed.That it encourages -- almost demands -- exactly that.
COL MacFarland, of 1/1AD and Ramadi fame, went so far as to say in a CALL interview that Battle Drill, or the rote execution of a formatted response, needed to go away. We needed Soldiers thinking, deciding, executing - not executing a set course of action. I think the enemy, after watching us enough times, gets a feel for our Battle Drill and can template our reactions into their scheme of maneuver, thus creating a more dangerous situation for us. This definitely is an issue in an urban environment, where the enemy has the ability to watch us very closely. One thing I took away from Ramadi was how incredibly good the enemy recce was.All totally valid observations based on the way 'Battle Drill' changed after 1975 and the introduction of the very flawed TCS training process. The process effectively decrees that no one should think, just play automaton -- it has totally screwed up Army training at all levels.

Their recon is good because they're patient --patience can be taught (I spent many an hour under watchful eyes without moving...) and we used to do that but the TCS process eliminated that. Know why? It couldn't be defined as a 'task'...

Think about that.

Our Recon is generally poor because we lack patience and our training tries to break the complex process of stealthy reconnaissance into discrete little blocks that don't seem to make sense. Plus, to 'enable' training, a lot of tasks are not taught but are tabbed to the gaining unit to train -- where many of those tasks are usually not trained. The tasks that are taught are all taught pretty much the same way to 'standardize' the performance of the tasks -- that is a guarantee of uniformity.

It also guarantees predictability -- and tactical defeat.

If COL MacFarland said that, and I have no doubt he did and also suggest that many others believe that as well, my question is why have they tolerated such a flawed process??????????
The problem, and I think it is going away, was the attempt to make the squad or platoon's execution of battle drill open to subjective analysis and grading.Did you mean to say objective grading? I hope so because one of the reasons for the introduction of the TCS process was to remove subjectivity from grading and replace it with objective grading. Since the assessment of training for war without being at war HAS to be subjective; it was a terribly flawed premise. The only way they could make it look like it worked and introduce an appearance of 'objective grading' was to move to a 'Go - No Go' standard and define the 'tasks' down to bare essentials. That does not allow for combining tasks which is a combat essential.
The U.S. Army still loves Task, Condition, Standard. That is how we train.No they don't -- love it, I mean. they accept it but most people instinctively know there is something wrong with it. It's accepted because it treats Soldiers like stupid and ignorant beings. It's a pathetic way to 'train.' The fact that the US Army is as well trained as it is (which is far from great...) is due to the fact that a lot of good Officers and NCOs go beyond the training process and the Troops are about five times as smart as that process assumes.
I can honestly say that I have seen OCs at the NTC give very little thought to battle drill and are much more focused on what the end result is. Of course, in a COIN environment, there are very few battle drill opportunities to execute against the incredible set of variables, especially in more complex, urban environments.Great for the first, true for the second sentence.

[tankersteve]

Ken,

I agree with pretty much everything you said, which you stated rather more eloquently than I did.

And yes, I did confuse objectively and subjectively - thanks for correcting that. I still feel my branch, Armor, added much to the problem. If you can so easily quantify the best tank crews by comparing their speed and accuracy in killing targets (forgetting all about the maneuver side), then why can't you do it with a 'mere' squad of dismounted Soldiers? Don't even get me started on the focus on precision gunnery with the Bradley.

As for the Army loving TCS, what I meant is the greater institution of the Army still thinks that TCS is a sound formula for training. I absolutely agree that Soldiers see the foolishness in it but this is an arguement that has not reached the levels (or noise level) that it needs to within regular Army discussions. I hope to still be serving when we move to results or effects-oriented training.

My biggest beef is the Army likes to spend big money on big training, but isn't willing to put much of any money toward the lower end. Therefore, we end up with lousy training on the big end because we still don't do the lower-level stuff very well. And you can definitely link this problem to the idea that you can use battle drills as simply plays to be called and executed by the team. Again, no real thought process. We want to treat our Soldiers like pro football players with a very thin playbook, but we are playing something more akin to rugby, constantly moving and flowing and requiring direction changes on the fly.

Tankersteve

[Ken White]

My biggest beef is the Army likes to spend big money on big training, but isn't willing to put much of any money toward the lower end. Therefore, we end up with lousy training on the big end because we still don't do the lower-level stuff very well. and I suspect that many -- most -- will agree.

Train the basics well and the high end takes care of itself -- and that doesn't address the fact that much high end training is wasted because by the time people reach that plateau, their ideas are formed and they resist change...

On the vehicle gunnery, true; that and the maintenance picture give good 'metrics' for rating folks. As you say, rifle companies can't compete on that basis. As I'm very fond (too fond, many say ;) ) of telling Armor officers "I've seen a lot of US tanks destroyed by poor tactics on our part; far, far fewer by better enemy gunnery."

[Cavguy]

As I'm very fond (too fond, many say ;) ) of telling Armor officers "I've seen a lot of US tanks destroyed by poor tactics on our part; far, far fewer by better enemy gunnery."

You're on a roll tonight. Might have to borrow that too ...

[tankersteve]

Ken, too true about the maintenance statistics. I definitely understand what you are alluding to about tactics, not gunnery, being deficient. With our expensive digital trainers/simulators, hopefully even in a limited budget environment, we can train junior leaders to effectively employ their Soldiers.

Even as we have created battle drills (really many are just TTPs), we have had to modify them and specifically mention altering them so they were not patternable. Things like where to stop for an IED - troops are told to vary the distance, etc. Unfortunately, battle drill is synonymous with a rote executed play. Like running a route in football, you are supposed to execute it exactly the same, without thinking. What this creates is the greater likelihood that Soldiers will not be thinking as they go through the motions of what they have been told to do.

So my question to the smarter people here is, where was battle drill before 1975? I understand it was dumbed down, but what was it like when it was really good and how did you teach it? How did you move beyond it? If I missed this in an earlier bit, let me know and I'll go read again.

Tankersteve

[Ken White]

and noticed that on the first couple of pages, there are a slew of links on the topic. You can also got to your local library and ask them to obtain on an inter-Library loan, copies of FM 17-1 Aug 1957, Armor Operations, Small Units. Or/ and ask for FM 17-15 (1958 I think???), Tank Units, Platoon, company and Battalion. The Knox Library probably has both. If it's still there...
Basically there were no set drills; each unit made up their own and emphasized what they thought was important (horrors!!! :eek: No standardization??? :D). Since essentially, one can only do so much with a piece of terrain and since initial entry training, Officer and Enlisted was better -- it was an inch wide and a mile deep instead of the reverse as it is now -- everyone was on pretty much the same sheet of music anyway.

The most common favorites were meeting engagements and reaction to ambush because, particularly if you gave the OpFor carte blanche or used opposing force (i.e today 1st plat moves, 2d defends/ambushes (OpFor whatever), 3d spts the tng or does something on their own if no spt needed. Tomorrow, it's 2,3 and 1; then the next day 3,1 and 2.) you could get some really interesting situations. Others were Relief in contact -- always hairy -- and Combat outpost, delaying actions, infiltrating attacks, counter guerrilla hammer and anvil and the ever popular airborne special, breakout from an encirclement.

You told your folks what you thought they needed to know. For example, as a Cav and recon PSG, my law was the lead vehicle taken under fire did not do what the 'doctrine' said; return the fire and develop the situation. His orders were to take retrograde if possible, take cover if not and the next guy was directed to get him extracted while the following squad took the responsibility for developing the situation. Occasionally, someone would see us doing that and ask why we weren't doing it by the book; we'd tell them (including a couple of Division Cdrs) and it was never directed that we change. My sensing is that might not have been true post-1975... :wry:

Limited only by the commanders or Platoon Leaders imagination. In good units, anyway. The others did only the stuff in the Army Subject Schedule; sort of an ARTEP precursor which contained the simple stuff I named but not the Relief in contact or infiltrating attacks or anything exotic.

[tankersteve]

I had the opportunity to do somewhat similar training as a platoon leader where our company actually had some white space (amazing, in retrospect, considering I was at Ft Hood) and did our own training in the local area. We maneuvered platoons against the HQ element, including 2 tanks and 2 PCs. Not much of it resembled good Ft. Knox battle drill, such as React to Contact/Action on Contact because we actually had rolling terrain and trees, not a golf course to move on.

The other thing we did, which really increased my appreciation for terrain, was to demarcate a 'kill box' on our maps. This was usually about a 4-5 km square, with a platoon on either side. The objective was to maneuver to kill the other platoon, using the ground however you could. You had to understand whether the ground supported an offensive or defensive set, and sometimes you had to be fairly audacious, using speed and surprise to maneuver out of a difficult piece of ground. MILES and the FBCB2 (or IVIS as we had back then), made this a pretty good fight. The best fight I ever had was with a single tank in overwatch with the loader well forward in the bushes, acting as a FO, guiding the rest of us onto my 'enemy'. Really drove the point home of 'not a step without recce'.

While MILES isn't perfect, ready access to it does wonders for making training more realistic in the eyes of the troops. Some Rangers pointed out to me how they use Sims for MOUT training and it caused them to reevaluate many of their urban TTPs. Sims hurt so there is no denying if something is working or not. Sims is just that much harder to get ahold of.

I understand the frustration in using MILES with no blank ammo. Luckily, at NTC, if the S4 is doing his job, units end up with nearly a basic load. However, I have seen units get a mag per man. That is truly frustrating.

Ken, I'll have to check out the old AR you mentioned. We want to be so multi-anything capable nowadays, that being an inch wide and a mile deep is not a good idea, but I would like to get deep on at least a few basics (isn't that what METL-focused training was supposed to be about?).

Tankersteve