Assessing Al-Qaeda (merged thread)

[Bill Moore]

A negative development, at least in part due to our approach for targeting ISIL and an al-Nusra element planning to target western interests. Al-Nusra is affiliated with AQ, although there is some debate on how close al-Nusra is to al-Qaeda core in Pakistan. ISIL and al-Nusra have apparently agreed to work together, even if it is an uneasy partnership. This appears to be a balance of power decision for both organizations.

http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/Flash.aspx/308996#.VGVJh5t0zIU


Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS Reach Agreement in Syria

“Islamic State” (ISIS) leaders together with those of the Qaeda-linked Jabhat al-Nusra convened last week at a farmhouse in northern Syria to form an agreement on a plan to stop fighting each other and to join forces against their opponents, according to what a high level Syrian opposition official, together with a rebel commander, told to the Associated Press.

These two groups allegedly will combine to target U.S. backed rebels.

Our response?

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/11/13/rout_of_moderate_rebels_leaves_obama_with_vexing_s yria_options


Rout of Moderate Rebels Leaves Obama With Vexing Syria Options


The Obama administration is edging closer to establishing a safe zone in northern Syria that will allow rebel fighters to remain in the country without being forced out by President Bashar al-Assad's regime and rival militant groups, according to analysts.

Setting up such safe zones inside Syria will also address a key demand by Turkey, which sees the Assad regime as a greater threat than the self-proclaimed Islamic State, and has been pushing the United States to set up such areas as a condition for fuller participation in the coalition against the Sunni militant group that is also known as ISIS and ISIL.

This is probably doable, and should have been done a long time ago IMO. It would have relieved the humanitarian crisis to some extent, and given our forces an achievable objective (not unlike the Southern and Northern no fly zones in between the Iraq wars). Can't recreate history, but if have done this first, and then targeted ISIL it all would have been in accordance with international law. Protecting innocent civilians from being targeted, especially since chemical weapons were used, and then targeting terrorists. Apparently Turkey wanted this, and like them or not, Turkey is key to the solution. It also would have maintained our credibility with the Syrian people who now feel betrayed. I don't know if removing Assad would be legal without some sort of UN mandate, but creating safe havens would have probably led to his fall over time with less blood shed.

It would also be nice if there was at least one other country besides the U.S. that would be willing to step up and take the lead.

[Bill Moore]

http://www.fpri.org/geopoliticus/2015/04/one-year-later-isis-overtakes-al-qaeda-whats-next


Those who assessed that bin Laden’s death would be of no consequence for al-Qaeda have been proven wrong. Bin Laden, along with a select few of his top lieutenants and protégés who’ve been eliminated by drones, provided the last bits of glue that held a declining al-Qaeda network together. As discussed in the 2012 post “What if there is no al-Qaeda?”, al-Qaeda for many years has provided little incentive in money or personnel for its affiliates and little inspiration for its global fan base. Things have gotten so bad that rumors suggest Ayman al-Zawahiri may dissolve al-Qaeda entirely, that’s right, al-Qaeda might QUIT! I’ll address these rumors in a separate post next week. Until then, here is what I see as the good and bad for al-Qaeda and ISIS this year.

A few tables and graphs at the link showing the growth of ISIS influence and the decline of AQ's influence.

Compares good and bad news for both. While we sought to weaken the cohesion of these various groups, it is apparent that these divided loyalties have only contributed to an increase of terrorist activity.

[davidbfpo]

The 2015 Chart
http://selectedwisdom.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Screen-Shot-2015-04-08-at-8.34.57-AM.png


The 2014 Chart
http://selectedwisdom.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Screen-Shot-2015-04-08-at-8.35.13-AM.png

[Bill Moore]

Video of Islamic State capabilities impresses military experts

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2015/04/20/263807/video-of-islamic-state-capabilities.html


But beyond the outcome of the refinery battle, military analysts who’ve viewed the video find it alarming because it shows that the Islamic State retains a surprisingly high level of military skill despite months of daily airstrikes by U.S. aircraft and their coalition allies.

“The overall takeaway from this and several other videos like it, and this opinion is borne out by the facts on the ground, is that Daash remains better trained, more motivated, better led and supported by a logistical infrastructure that the Iraqi government is literally incapable of delivering to their own troops,” said one former British special forces soldier who consults with the Iraqi Kurdish government on military affairs. He spoke only on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitive nature of his role in Iraq. Daash is an Arabic acronym for the Islamic State.

Much more in the report, well worth the read. It is an honest assessment from folks on the ground who are not spinning a narrative. It raises important questions on why ISIS is producing more competent foot soldiers than Iraq. I suspect the answers will make us uncomfortable, which normally results in an organizational state of denial.

[Bob's World]

One strategic lesson for the US should be this:

"Military capacity built in support of a fundamentally illegitimate government by a foreign power cannot stand up to a legitimate foreign challenger, or an illegal domestic challenger perceived as legitimate by it's followers."

Consider the track record of the United States in this regard. Since emerging on the global stage in 1900 the United States implemented a strategy of creating governance we perceived as good for US interests and the development of military capacity to secure those de facto illegitimate governments in the following places:

Philippine Islands, 1900-1941: Defeated by the Japanese in short order (though the subsequent Filipino resistance for far more legitimate rationale proved quite strong)
Vietnam 1955-1975
Iraq 2003 - present
Afghanistan 2001 - present

All with the same result. Helping a sovereign partner with governance perceived by it's population as legitimate is a good investment in regional security. We have a solid track record of this with many nations around the globe. But investing in the security of governance lacking in popular legitimacy as in the four examples above is a proven failure.


As to ISIL vs AQ: AQ conducted a non-state approach to UW, and their great strength was their non-state status. It gave them sanctuary from state action, having no territory or population to defend; and it relieved them of the duties of governance having no territory or population to govern. But to win they had to become tangible, and that would destroy both these strengths, so they remained the champion of a virtual Caliphate.

ISIL, on the other hand, sought purposely to create and emerge as a de facto state, and a tangible nucleus for a physical "Caliphate" (the names scares us, but in effect little more than a state dedicated to the laws and values of Sunni Muslims that is free from excessive external influence). This resonated with the same revolutionary movements and populations engaged by AQ, and many, grown weary of the promise of virtual Caliphate, are embracing the opportunity for something real that ISIL offers. This is the strength of the ISIL state-based approach to UW; but it also saddles them with the burden of governance, and gives them all the liabilities common to small, weak states.

I don't think the West has accurately characterized either organization, and have therefore not handled either particularly well. We exaggerate the dangers, we confuse the rationale for their existence and appeal, and we seek to make them be what we want them to be, rather than to deal with them for what they actually are.

How well ISIL fights is actually a clear metric of the inherent legitimacy they possess. We would do well to ponder on that thought.

[Bill Moore]

How well ISIL fights is actually a clear metric of the inherent legitimacy they possess. We would do well to ponder on that thought.

That uncomfortable thought is certainly part of the reason. I would add that a unifying ideology is critical to bring together civilians (in this case from around the world) and turn them into a disciplined fighting force. And of course, a statement of the obvious, they must have excellent trainers. It also appears they're a learning organization.

A lot of folks we train around the world don't believe in their cause (probably most, thus the value of the legitimacy argument), they have weak and dishonest leaders they don't trust, and they're not learning organizations capable of adapting (based on poor leadership). There are a lot of intangibles involved in unit effectiveness that will undermine our tangible capacity to train and equip.

[tequila]

Video of Islamic State capabilities impresses military experts

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2015/04/20/263807/video-of-islamic-state-capabilities.html



Much more in the report, well worth the read. It is an honest assessment from folks on the ground who are not spinning a narrative. It raises important questions on why ISIS is producing more competent foot soldiers than Iraq. I suspect the answers will make us uncomfortable, which normally results in an organizational state of denial.

After watching the propaganda video in question, I'm not sure what the experts are seeing that I'm not (the video is accessible through a link in the story itself).

All you really see is a couple of ranger files of guys walking towards Bayji carrying bottled water. Proper spacing is hard to figure out, but it's not like these guys are doing a squad assault. Then there's about 2:30 of closeups of jihadis firing full auto. Some are firing from the shoulder, a few are doing controlled bursts. But the vast majority are just doing Rambo-style jihadi-cool full auto at something vague in the distance - a few are firing from the hip and aiming at the clouds. Most of these are likely posed.

I agree that ISIS has shown it can outfight the ISF - but I think that's because the ISF has degenerated from an already parlous state, not because ISIS is any good in a stand-up fight.

[Bill Moore]

Thanks for sharing the link to the video, this is the fourth video I have seen of ISIS in combat, and it only adds to the assessment of the analysts quoted in the article. Again we're assessing relative combat effectiveness, so I disagree with you that they couldn't stand up to a real Arab Army anywhere in the Middle East. The Syrian Army is quite good relatively for the region, and ISIS does moderately well in stand-up battles against them.

0:55 the automated command, control, computers, communications, and intelligence (supported by a drone) is relatively impressive. Probably something we'll see more of around the world due to the availability of this technology.

starting around 1:35 the use of mostly conventional crew served weapons is impressive. Acquiring them in battle is one thing, employing them effectively is another. They have done both. Results starting around 6:40, with numerous IA vehicles destroyed including at least one tank.

I tried to find it, but I suspect it was removed from the internet , there is one video that is impressive showing ISIL storming an occupying building. They took some hits in the way in, but in a disciplined manner persisted with the attack until they were successful.

People much less well trained and equipped made life difficult for our guys in Fallujah, so I wouldn't underestimate the challenge. No doubt we can defeat them, but at times it would be become a slug fest.

[tequila]

Bill - agreed with all your main points. They've showed they can defeat their adversaries, and that's what counts. Short of the fall of Baghdad, a MEU or a US armored division is not coming over the horizon.

I think that one of the main things that requires research is ISIL's ability to maintain C4IR and logistics across a very large battlespace in the face of US airpower. Right now I don't think anyone outside of ISIL's command structure itself and maybe the US Gov really knows just how autonomous the different emirs or regions are, or how ISIL's internal supply network works. That they managed to sustain combat in Kobane as long as they did in the face of crippling strikes was pretty impressive to me, even if they did retreat in the end.

That ISIL shows the sort of internal cohesion and leadership to outmatch the Iraqi government, as feeble as that task may be, shows just how important those two qualities are in the face of billions of dollars in aid and equipment.

I think Iraq is in the process of forming a genuine national identity that can command real loyalty to a nation irrespective of governmental identity. Unfortunately this appears to have an exclusively Shia Arab phenomenon at the moment. Not sure where this goes in the end - probably not towards the sort of Iraq we wanted in 2003.

[Bob's World]

Key phrase being "...what we wanted."

Some day we will learn that we are far better served by what we need (a partner with a government possessed of local popular legitimacy - regardless of the form that government might take), than we are by a government we want that is inherently lacking in popular legitimacy by all but those who have sold out to the US to gain power under our protection.

Every time we have adopted a strategy of building a military to defend such a government it has been an abysmal failure. In order, Philippines pre-WWII, South Vietnam, Iraq and (collapsing as soon as we leave) Afghanistan.

I used to think our approach of not controlling such forces was far superior to the British model of recruiting units from such places to serve Britain, rather than their born homelands. But the British model has a legitimacy all of it's own. Those men join to serve Great Britain. We train units to serve government who are created by us. My apologies to Brits who I have chided in the past on this matter.

Better still are units serving a national government possessed of broad popular legitimacy, but that is not something we can create. We often support such partners and allies, but to attempt to create is to render them fatally flawed from inception.

[Bill Moore]

Key phrase being "...what we wanted."

Some day we will learn that we are far better served by what we need (a partner with a government possessed of local popular legitimacy - regardless of the form that government might take), than we are by a government we want that is inherently lacking in popular legitimacy by all but those who have sold out to the US to gain power under our protection.

Every time we have adopted a strategy of building a military to defend such a government it has been an abysmal failure. In order, Philippines pre-WWII, South Vietnam, Iraq and (collapsing as soon as we leave) Afghanistan.

I used to think our approach of not controlling such forces was far superior to the British model of recruiting units from such places to serve Britain, rather than their born homelands. But the British model has a legitimacy all of it's own. Those men join to serve Great Britain. We train units to serve government who are created by us. My apologies to Brits who I have chided in the past on this matter.

Better still are units serving a national government possessed of broad popular legitimacy, but that is not something we can create. We often support such partners and allies, but to attempt to create is to render them fatally flawed from inception.

A lot of factors need to be aligned for capacity building to work, both tangible and intangible. We focus too much on the tangible things we can count and convince ourselves we're making progress. Heck, we have stats to prove it:o

[Bob's World]

Frame for failure, and failure is inevitable. Frame for success, and success is possible.

We have always been so sure of our rightness, that we tend to assume that will overcome the shades of wrongness we impose upon others to ensure our own interests. It doesn't.

Or said another way, we are too quick to rationalize why it is ok to deny for others the very things we demand for ourselves. 100 years ago one could sort of still get away with that. Today it is an impossibility.

If we swapped our current NSS for Washington's farewell address we would be far better served as a nation. Partners grown overly dependent would quibble, as would the neocon hawks, but it would lead to approaches much better suited for the world we live in today.

[davidbfpo]

A long newspaper article to read in The Guardian, which on the first read covers many points and links on SWC. The key feature appears to be access to two Jihadist clerics, Abu Muhammed al-Maqdisi and Abu Qatada, now both resident in Jordan:http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/10/how-isis-crippled-al-qaida?

Here is a taster:
Now the man US terrorism analysts call “the most influential living jihadi theorist” has turned his ire toward Isis – and emerged, in the last year, as one of the group’s most powerful critics. ..... Maqdisi released a long tract castigating Isis as ignorant and misguided, accusing them of subverting the “Islamic project” that he has long nurtured.

As Qatada poured tea into small glass tumblers, he began reeling off images to better communicate the depth of his loathing for Isis. He likes speaking in metaphors. The group, he said, was “like a bad smell” that has polluted the radical Islamic environment. No, they were better described as a “cancerous growth” within the jihadi movement – or, he continued, like the diseased branch of a fig tree that needs to be pruned before it kills the entire organism.

Violent groups often reject their mentors IIRC. Now whether the two clerics can influence how ISIS develops is a moot point. At a minimum it may restrain those jihadists who have read their tracts not to go to join ISIS.

[omarali50]

Pinker has an article in the Guardian about decline in violence that triggered the following blog post. Tangentially related to this thread

http://brownpundits.blogspot.com/2015/09/decline-in-violence-worldwide-for-now.html?spref=fb

relevant extract:
by the way: I think the US has caused state failure in Iraq and contributed to it in Syria (and now has a supporting role in the attempted state failure in Yemen; in Yemen I think the Saudis are the prime movers of the idiocy. There is no reason to accept the Eurocentric Metropolitan Racist view that only White people have agency. The Subaltern may speak :) )
Why has the US caused these state failures? I dont think it was deliberate. But I do think it shows you that it is not just the SJWs/Postmarxist academics who don't appreciate how important the state is; even the decision makers of the most powerful state in the world don't seem to get it. Or rather, they don't seem to have sufficient grasp of where the asabiya or legitimacy of a state comes from: it comes from genuine fellow feeling, or it comes from colonial structures that happened to be this way and within which the necessary fellow feeling builds over time. EITHER can work. Both together are even better. But remove both, and the #### will hit the fan...
Which is also why groups like the Kurds can fight better than any fake army put together by US advisers alone. US advisers PLUS genuine national feeling (Afghanistan, if the US had not allowed us to mess it up) can work though :)

[SWJ Blog]

A Global Strategy for Combating al Qaeda and the Islamic State (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/a-global-strategy-for-combating-al-qaeda-and-the-islamic-state)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/a-global-strategy-for-combating-al-qaeda-and-the-islamic-state) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to WoTR for this long article:http://warontherocks.com/2016/01/the-islamic-state-vs-al-qaeda-the-war-within-the-jihadist-movement/? (http://warontherocks.com/2016/01/the-islamic-state-vs-al-qaeda-the-war-within-the-jihadist-movement/?utm_source=WOTR+Newsletter&utm_campaign=596cfbd794-WOTR_Newsletter_8_17_158_15_2015&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_8375be81e9-596cfbd794-51431913)

Taster:
The Islamic State’s rise has reshaped the global jihadist landscape, which for nearly two decades was dominated by al-Qaeda. With the Islamic State seizing the world’s attention, the age of unipolarity within the jihadist movement is over, replaced by intense internal conflict. Each group is firm in the belief that its organizational model is superior to that of its opponent.

[Bill Moore]

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/pentagon-given-new-authority-to-target-isis-in-afghanistan/

Pentagon Given New Authority to Target ISIS in Afghanistan


The White House has granted the Pentagon new authority to target ISIS and its affiliates in Afghanistan, a decision that for the first time expands the military’s legal authorization to carry out offensive operations against the group beyond Iraq and Syria.

While this is good news, it also points to the dysfunction of the U.S. approach to strategy. Two brief points, first ISIS (or ISIL) is a transnational movement that has a presence in many locations around the world beyond Iraq and Syria. This is recognized by policy makers, so why did our policy wonks ignore this challenge until it became a crisis in Afghanistan, Libya, and elsewhere? For Afghanistan, it would seem logical that any combatant that challenges the government we're partnering with would be fair game since they're part of the collective challenge to the security and stability we are assisting the Government of Afghanistan pursue. Our repeated efforts to provide support to countries to go after a small part of a larger problem fails us repeatedly.

[Bill Moore]

A so-so article that suggests ISIL is gaining support in SE Asia because Al-Qaeda's support for the region has not been persistent.

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/17790/isis-vs-al-qaida-how-do-affiliates-choose?utm_source=Weekly+Headlines&utm_campaign=a19f5852b8-WPR_Weekly_01292016&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_6e36cc98fd-a19f5852b8-62731673

ISIS vs. Al-Qaida: How Do Affiliates Choose?


The few al-Qaida-affiliated emissaries and financiers active in Southeast Asia since 9/11 and the 2002 Bali bombings have been widely disrupted by counterterrorism efforts. When emissaries and financiers can no longer travel and are prevented from interaction, and when attention, support and financing languishes, the ground for switching allegiances is laid, particularly for those groups that have not developed or retained a strong ideological link to al-Qaida.

[davidbfpo]

Catching up the output from Brookings, three recent articles (two by Will McCants and one is a Q&A with Clint Watts):

http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2016/01/07-future-of-al-qaida-and-isis-mendelsohn-mccants

http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2016/01/28-experts-weigh-in-al-qaida-isis-watts-mccants#.Vq4jpoKpS2M.twitter

http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2016/01/27-islamic-state-challenges-alqaida-lister

(http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2016/01/28-experts-weigh-in-al-qaida-isis-watts-mccants#.Vq4jpoKpS2M.twitter)

[davidbfpo]

Jason Burke, of The Guardian, returns to the fray with an overview 'A more dangerous long-term threat': Al-Qaida grows as Isis retreats':https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/29/a-more-dangerous-long-term-threat-al-qaida-grows-as-isis-retreats

[SWJ Blog]

Panel to HASC: Fighting Islamic State, Al Qaeda Could Take 15 More Years (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/panel-to-hasc-fighting-islamic-state-al-qaeda-could-take-15-more-years)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/panel-to-hasc-fighting-islamic-state-al-qaeda-could-take-15-more-years) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[SWJ Blog]

Bin Laden’s Son Steps Into Father’s Shoes as al-Qaeda Attempts Comeback (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/bin-laden%E2%80%99s-son-steps-into-father%E2%80%99s-shoes-as-al-qaeda-attempts-comeback)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/bin-laden%E2%80%99s-son-steps-into-father%E2%80%99s-shoes-as-al-qaeda-attempts-comeback) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[davidbfpo]

A 124pgs WINEP report 'How Al-Qaeda survived drones, uprisings and the Islamic State', reflecting a one day workshop in March 2017 and with a very strong American content. From the introduction:
The event was organized thematically around four topics: (1) al-Qaeda’s strength from an international and domestic perspective; (2) al-Qaeda’s strongest branch in Syria, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham); (3) al-Qaeda’s major branches outside Syria (AQAP, AQIM, al-Shabab, and AQIS); and (4) al-Qaeda’s financial structure. This provided a rich portrait of al-Qaeda’s current stature and the nature of the threat it poses in the broader Middle East as well as in Western countries, including the United States.Link:http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus153-Zelin.pdf

[davidbfpo]

I have reviewed a number of threads on Al-Qaeda and merged six of them. The title was slightly changed from Assessing AQ's future. All prompted by the next post.

[davidbfpo]

A CFR Expert Brief by Professor Bruce Hoffman, sub-titled:
With the demise of the Islamic State, a revived al-Qaeda and its affiliates should now be considered the world’s top terrorist threat.

(Later) Al-Qaeda has systematically implemented an ambitious strategy designed to protect its remaining senior leadership and discreetly consolidate its influence wherever the movement has a significant presence.
Link:https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/al-qaedas-resurrection? (https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/al-qaedas-resurrection?utm_medium=social_share&utm_source=tw)

Looking for a short read try the last passage?

[davidbfpo]

An article by Ali Soufan that poses this question, although it can be applied to other Islamist groups. A passage that summs up his views (lightly edited):
Today’s al-Qaeda can boast tens of thousands of fighters under its command, and that is not even counting the thousands more who still swear allegiance to al-Qaeda’s wayward progeny, the Islamic State.Why have jihadi groups survived and grown? In short, because their ideology remains strong. That evolution, Fazul predicted, would make al-Qaeda much harder to defeat. Unfortunately, he was right. Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other jihadi groups have become adept at luring disaffected young men with false claims of an epochal war between Islam and the West and fraudulent promises of history-shaping adventure.

He has some thoughts, none startling, on as he concludes:
we must dedicate ourselves to undermining the resource that underpins each of its branches: its store of ideas.
Link:https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/alisoufan/opinion-bin-laden-is-dead-so-why-is-al-qaeda-thriving

Very little seems to be done on the 'store of ideas', even after a succession of events that have undermined the optimism in the 'West' that terrorism is a rare, painful event. Then we look around parts of the world and as the author writes there is little room for optimism where most deaths form Islamist activity happens.

[davidbfpo]

A short article from a UK Business News website, the actual title is: 'There are nearly four times as many jihadist militants today than on 9/11, and the 'war on terror' has been a 'terrifyingly expensive failure'. BLUF:


There are nearly four times as many jihadist militants across the world today as there were on September 11, 2001, according to a new report. (https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-salafi-jihadist-threat)
Foreign policy analysts say it's yet another sign the war on terror has been a colossal failure.
There are approximately 230,000 Salafi jihadist fighters across almost 70 countries, according to the report.


On a quick read it appears to be based on a CSIS report published this week.
Link:http://https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-salafi-jihadist-threat

Link to the website article:http://uk.businessinsider.com/there-are-nearly-4-times-as-many-jihadist-militants-today-as-on-911-2018-11?r=US&IR=T

[Bill Moore]

A short article from a UK Business News website, the actual title is: 'There are nearly four times as many jihadist militants today than on 9/11, and the 'war on terror' has been a 'terrifyingly expensive failure'. BLUF:
On a quick read it appears to be based on a CSIS report published this week.
Link:http://https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-salafi-jihadist-threat

Link to the website article:http://uk.businessinsider.com/there-are-nearly-4-times-as-many-jihadist-militants-today-as-on-911-2018-11?r=US&IR=T

All wars are necessarily politicized, but President Bush took it to a new level when he justified invading Iraq partially on their non-existent support for al-Qaeda. We couldn't reverse course, because any opposition to the war was drown out by the repeated claim (proven false later) that anyone who opposed it was weak on countering terrorism. After the tragedy of 9/11 no politician could afford to be seen as being weak on terror. Onward we marched to pursue the neo-conservative vision of the End of History, based on the belief that if we converted Iraq into a democracy it would gradually spread across the region. In fact, it is now hard to discern the difference between our global counterinsurgency approach and real counterterrorism operations focused on killing terrorists. Our efforts to remake the Middle East and broader Umma globally into stable democracies has been an expensive disaster that has promoted greater instability. Not only is the U.S. spending itself into irrelevance over the long run as the article states, we have let our conventional military capabilities and readiness decline to a dangerous level based on the nauseating COINdista rhetoric that insurgency was existential threat to U.S. interests, and the possibility of state on state war was non-existent.

We confused by, with, and through as a strategy, rather than a means. When the means proved inadequate we thought the answer was to throw more resources at the failed means and ways. The argument that by, with, and through is more cost effective is only true if that approach achieves the desired goals. I suspect a more honest evaluation would present a supportable argument that it would have been more cost effective if we just did it ourselves in some cases. We're not going to effectively address underlying causes in most cases, and spending billions on economic development to solve a problem that isn't economically based is another way we bleed out our resources in pursuit of ends that simply don't matter.

Another argument against over reliance on the by, with, and through approach is the moral hazard associated with it. No problem of accepting risk if they're doing it and we're not. In many cases where we rely on a by, with, and through approach we wouldn't be involved if we had to do it, because we know the threat to our interests doesn't justify the investment. Yet, we can continue by, with, and through indefinitely by arguing the turning point is this year (year after year).

Outlined above is our failures, and they are expensive failures. However, if we narrow the metric to assessing our success in disrupting attacks on the homeland and our allies I think that war or security measures has been relatively successful. That requires sustaining a network of willing partners globally that detect and disrupt terrorists (not insurgents) as needed. That war is largely fought in the shadows, just as it was prior to 9/11 at a sustainable level. It must sustainable, because terrorism will never be defeated. It is a viable tactic for the weak, and even the strong if they want to shape an outcome without committing conventional forces. The USSR supported terrorist groups for decades as an element of their statecraft.

Our new defense strategy tells us to reduce spending on counterterrorism sustainable levels, which is different than quitting because we're tired. We can do this smartly, but the probability of being 100% successful is very low. How we react after the next terrorist attack will determine if we can hold the line on reducing the industrial scale counterterrorism efforts we're engaged in now, or if political rhetoric will convince Americans that the attack was due to reduced efforts in Afghanistan, etc. I have great faith in our military leadership to make rational decisions based on our national interests. I have almost no faith in our political leadership to do the same.

[davidbfpo]

A short article from a UK Business News website, the actual title is: 'There are nearly four times as many jihadist militants today than on 9/11, and the 'war on terror' has been a 'terrifyingly expensive failure'. BLUF:
On a quick read it appears to be based on a CSIS report published this week.
Link:http://https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-salafi-jihadist-threat

Link to the website article:http://uk.businessinsider.com/there-are-nearly-4-times-as-many-jihadist-militants-today-as-on-911-2018-11?r=US&IR=T

A short explanation by Alex Thurston (who has been cited before IIRC) on why CSIS is wrong.
Link:https://sahelblog.wordpress.com/2018/11/26/a-flawed-estimate-of-salafi-jihadis-and-some-of-the-politics-surrounding-it/

[Bill Moore]

A short explanation by Alex Thurston (who has been cited before IIRC) on why CSIS is wrong.
Link:https://sahelblog.wordpress.com/2018/11/26/a-flawed-estimate-of-salafi-jihadis-and-some-of-the-politics-surrounding-it/

More accurately, it is the author's "opinion" on why he thinks the report is wrong. He has his own political agenda that he readily admits to. The take away from the CSIS in my opinion is we won't be able to apply sufficient military force to compel jihadists to cease their jihad or deter them from further attacks. They're true believers in their cause, no matter how hard we try to convince ourselves if just give them a little economic assistance they'll stop. Therefore, an active defense is probably the most sustainable and effective strategy to mitigate risks to our collective interests. An active defense includes offensive operations, but the focus is on disrupting attacks and eliminating known cells to protect our homeland that of our allies, not on conducting industrial scale COIN, which conflates insurgency with transnational terrorists.

Getting back to the fuzzy math, I agree with the author that the Taliban are not transnational terrorists, they are insurgents who use terrorist tactics. All insurgents do, and I doubt there were any successful insurgencies in history that didn't apply terrorism to some level to control certain elements of the population who didn't willingly rally around their cause. Mao sure as heck used a great deal of terrorism to compel compliance, so much for the siren song of legitimacy. However, back to 2018, the Taliban are not seeking to conduct terrorist attacks on our homeland. Looking at it from the perspective of hard core transnational terrorist networks like al-Qaeda members and subsequent groups like ISIS, and comparing their impact now to 9/10/2001 and prior, my gut tells me there are a lot more now than the few hundred of hard AQ operatives that existed then. They are dispersed globally through Syria, Libya, Iraq, UK, mainland Europe, West Africa, East Africa, Southeast Asia, South Asia, etc. Some are transnational terrorists, which are the greatest threat to our security, and others are insurgents.

In defense of the original CSIS report, I think their argument about the expansion of jihadist militants (not necessarily hard core al-Qaeda/ISIS types, but local insurgents) is clearly justifiable. There are many more active jihadists movements around the world now than there were in prior to 9/11. The actual number of militants isn't immaterial, but it is unknowable. What is knowable is the scale of the threat has expanded significantly. Most of these are insurgents seeking to impose their version of Sharia within their country/region.

[Bill Moore]

A short article from a UK Business News website, the actual title is: 'There are nearly four times as many jihadist militants today than on 9/11, and the 'war on terror' has been a 'terrifyingly expensive failure'. BLUF:
On a quick read it appears to be based on a CSIS report published this week.
Link:http://https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-salafi-jihadist-threat

Link to the website article:http://uk.businessinsider.com/there-are-nearly-4-times-as-many-jihadist-militants-today-as-on-911-2018-11?r=US&IR=T

An article from the Director of Strategic Planning for the National Counterterrorism Center.

The Fight So Far (NOV 2018)

https://fortunascorner.com/2018/11/27/the-fight-so-far-by-ltg-mike-nagata/


The purpose of this narrative is to encourage a larger and more effective discussion about these investments, practices, and choices.


Despite our efforts of the past 17 years, terrorists’ ability to raise revenue and resources, sponsor and broadcast extremist ideologies, recruit fighters, and move terrorist operatives from country to country has significantly grown.

Said more simply, the United States is facing an upward strategic trajectory of global terrorism.

The author argues due to an increase in great power competition, and there will be military force available to fight terrorists kinetically as we have been doing for the past 17 years; therefore, we need to dedicate more effort to non-kinetic means. This can be summed up as counter their narrative, contest their use of the internet, target their resources, and prevent terrorist travel. All of these things are being done now, but maybe more is required. I remain less than optimistic in our ability to counter their narrative. We have a built in cultural bias that these terrorists and the populations they operate in want to be like us, despite that flies in the face of the facts. Our proposed cure is to change their culture, push democracy, capitalism, economic development, women's rights, etc. It was never U.S. hard power that was the driver of modern day jihadist terrorism, but our soft power. The prevailing issue is not economic, but ideological, or more accurately incompatible ideologies. The non-kinetic ideas of denying terrorism freedom of movement on the internet, disrupting their resources and travel are proven to have some effect, even if it isn't decisive. We need to rethink the other non-kinetic approaches.

[AdamG]

Al-Qaeda is resurgent and seeking to carry out new terrorist atrocities against airliners and airports, the security minister Ben Wallace warned last night.

The terrorist group behind the 9/11 attacks in 2001 poses a growing threat that is keeping ministers “awake at night”, he told The Sunday Times.

Wallace said intelligence had revealed that al-Qaeda was developing technology to bring down passenger jets. Whitehall officials say that could include miniaturised bombs. Islamists have also plotted to use drones packed with explosives to blow up key targets.

https://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/news/al-qaeda-terror-group-returns-to-target-airliners-mlj3lgf87

[davidbfpo]

Well Mr Wallace, Security Minister @ Home Office, you didn't update Mr Chris Grayling @ Dept Transport, who decided not to push through legislation on drone activity near airports. So saying this is "click bait":
Wallace said intelligence had revealed that al-Qaeda was developing technology to bring down passenger jets. Whitehall officials say that could include miniaturised bombs. Islamists have also plotted to use drones packed with explosives to blow up key targets.

Really? From a BBC report:
His comments come after a report in the Times claimed (https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/grayling-put-drone-law-on-hold-before-gatwick-flight-chaos-9tkqck0tg) Transport Secretary Chris Grayling had delayed plans for further legislation regulating drone use.
Link:https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-46663898

[Bill Moore]

https://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/news/al-qaeda-terror-group-returns-to-target-airliners-mlj3lgf87

You can see the full article here without a subscription.

https://www.timesofisrael.com/uk-says-resurgent-al-qaeda-plans-to-target-planes-and-airports/

Do you wonder if we're gradually slipping back to 9/10? Lack of imagination? Still issues with interagency collaboration and information sharing, etc.?


“The aviation threat is real,” Wallace told British newspaper The Sunday Times. “Al-Qaeda are resurgent. They have reorganized. They are pushing more and more plots towards Europe and have become familiar with new methods and still aspire to aviation attacks.”

There is a lot of they could do this in the article, all realistic options, but still largely conjecture. In response are we focused on what we can do to mitigate these potential threats, or are we simply admiring the problem?

[davidbfpo]

Bill,

Thanks for the link. I still consider his reported statement is "spin"; a distraction from the Gatwick incident - where incidentally the police have reported doubts there ever was a drone! There is nothing new in what he reportedly said.

[Bill Moore]

Bill,

Thanks for the link. I still consider his reported statement is "spin"; a distraction from the Gatwick incident - where incidentally the police have reported doubts there ever was a drone! There is nothing new in what he reportedly said.

David,

I agree with the spin, but at the same time I do think we'll see the emergence of al-Qaeda 3.0 and although ISIS core has been psychologically and physically dislocated, malignant ISIS cancerous cells have metastasized to a number of countries. The threat of Islamist terrorism is far from over, and it will evolve and of course we need to co-evolve so we can continue to disrupt their large scale attacks. I don't think there is any way to decisively defeat this threat and call it a day. Instead we will have to continue counterterrorism operations indefinitely to maintain enough pressure on these groups and individuals to keep them off balance enough to prevent another 9/11 scale attack. At the same time, we have to shift a great deal of effort to great power competition and prepare for a large scale war with peer competitors with the aim of preventing war, but winning it if necessary. Where we need to go in the near future is clearer now, but how we will navigate there remains unclear to me for now.

[davidbfpo]

Jason Burke, a UK journalist whose focus is often AQ and jihadists, has a short column and asks:
how is it that a group that commanded such extraordinary, unprecedented attention across the world from 2001 to 2011 can disappear from public attention so completely?
Link:https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/aug/04/no-longer-does-al-qaida-grab-headlines-that-might-be-plan