Assessing Al-Qaeda (merged thread) [Archive]

Jedburgh

01-23-2006, 01:05 PM

Moderator's Note

Today after a review I have merged ten threads covering the future of AQ and changed the title to 'Assessing AQ's future' (merged thread). This was prompted by my new post (ends).

A Hundred Osamas: Islamist Threats and the Future of Counterinsurgency (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB636.pdf)

If America’s pursuit of a Global War on Terror is strategically and politically well-grounded, then why are Islamist insurgencies and extremist movements continuing to operate, generating parallel cells that terrify the world with violent attacks from Iraq to London?

While analysts debate the intensity and longevity of the latest round of terrorist attacks, we would do well to consider whether U.S. long-term goals in the war on terror—namely diminishing their presence and denying terrorists the ability to operate, while also altering conditions that terrorists exploit—are being met. If we are not pursuing the proper strategy or its implementation is not decreasing support for terrorists, then we should adapt accordingly.

This monograph addresses these questions and examines the efficacy of proposed or operative strategies in light of the evolution of Islamist jihadist leaders, ideas, and foot-soldiers. Jihadist strategy has emerged in a polymorphous pattern over the last 30 years, but many Americans only became aware of the intensity of this problem post-September 11, 2001 (9/11), and through observation of the 2003-insurgency in Iraq.

The author proposes that extremist (jihadist) Islamist groups are not identical to any other terrorist group. Islamist discourse, and extremist discourse within it, must be clearly understood. Given the fiscal challenges of the Global War on Terror, the fact that its coordination may be at odds with great power competition, and certainly contests the interests of other smaller states (like Iran), why are we aiming at eradication, rather than containment, and is eradication possible? Differentiating a “true Islam” from the false and destructive aims of such groups is an important response. Each region-based administration has so crafted its anti-terrorist rhetoric, and Muslims, in general, are not willing to view their religion as a destructive, anachronistic entity, so this unfortunately difficult task of ideological differentiation is an acceptable theme. But it is insufficient as a strategy because Islamist insurgencies have arisen in the context of a much broader, polychromatic religious and political “Islamic awakening” that shows no signs of receding. That broader movement informs Muslim sentiment today from Indonesia to Mauritania, and Nigeria to London. Official statements will not diminish recruitment; deeds, not words, are needed. Finally, eradication may be impossible, but containment is philosophically unattractive. A combination of eradication (denial) and cooptation, as we have seen in the Muslim world thus far, probably makes sense. Certain assumptions that underlie U.S. strategies of denying and diminishing the terrorism of Islamist extremists therefore need to be reconsidered.

Among the recommendations made in this monograph are:
1. Revise strategies that too narrowly or too broadly define extremist networks and their operational modes.
2. Acknowledge the evolution and change of Islamist extremist leadership and develop strategies to contain it. Utilize those who know the extremist bases of operations well and speak the appropriate languages instead of relegating this enormously difficult task to those who have no deep understanding of the area, ideological issues, or delicacy of the issues.
3. Focus on antiterrorist as well as counterterrorist principles.
4. Understand and respond to the increasing sophistication of Islamist tactical and strategic efforts.
5. Carefully consider the impact of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and in other areas of the Muslim world on the stated aims of the Global War on Terror.
6. Continue working with local governments in their counterterrorist and counterinsurgency efforts.
7. Establish centers for international counterterrorist operations to specifically address Islamist extremists (rather than all global forms of terrorism).
8. Avoid the use of physical and psychological torture and extralegal measures.
9. Encourage local governments to normalize relations with Islamist groups, and utilize dialogue programs or amnesty efforts in order to return supporters of jihad to society.
10. Recognize the potential of moderate Islamist groups and actors to participate in political processes. This does not mean that moderate or “progressive” Islamists as defined in urban American settings can serve as mediators or spokespersons for counterparts in the region.
11. Extra-governmental diplomacy should be used to achieve mutual understanding on the relevant issues or obstacles to a more “global” pursuit of the Global War on Terror.
12. Establish a multi-country, full media (Web, television, radio, and print) program to discuss and debate Islamist and other forms of religious extremism.
13. Stay the course in promoting democratization of the Middle East and the Muslim world.
14. Provide advanced training to military, intelligence, and political leaders on the history, evolution, and tactics of Islamist extremists.

Merv Benson

01-23-2006, 05:02 PM

A policy of containment has always had a component of deterrence. The enemy in this war is a death cult made up of religious bigots. They think they are on a mission from God so any compromise means they are going to hell rather than to the 72 white grapes/virgins. The only way to defeat them is to destroy them and their ideology. Containment is a concept that requires a rational enemy. A Nihilist enemy must be destroyed.

BTW, the torture meme has had no apparent effect on the enemy one way or the other. Its principle effect has been in the west where it has impacted the sensitivities of those who do not want to fight the war vigorously. Clearly the NY Times and other leftist media organs have had much more to say about it than Bin Laden or Zarqawi. Since they have shown they would do worse if the situation were reversed it is hard to argue that they care beyond wanting to have their operatives give up less information.

GorTex6

01-23-2006, 06:12 PM

The only way to defeat them is to destroy them and their ideology. Containment is a concept that requires a rational enemy. A Nihilist enemy must be destroyed.

No it isn't. You out mobilize (mobility in the Maoist sense) and out organize while maintaining the moral high ground. In COIN, constant physical destruction of the enemy only proves futile; winning support amongst the population, they leverage your heavy handed overreaction to limited combat against you. You cannot fall into this trap by always responding with sheer violence of action. Eroding their popular support, you must steal their voice; you disenfranchise their ideology. It has nothing to do with being "less vigerous" to fight a war( :mad: ), nor does it have any "leftist" sway but has everything to do with succeeding.

SWJED

02-18-2006, 01:21 PM

Recently posted to the SWJ Threat Page (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/ref/threat.htm) - 14 Feb study by the US Army Combating Terrorism Center - Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting al-Qa’ida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/ctc1.pdf).

Here is the Executive Summary:

This study, conducted by the faculty and research fellows of the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point, serves multiple purposes, the most important of which is contributing to the depth of knowledge about the al-Qa’ida movement. Evidence supporting the conclusions and recommendations provided in this report is drawn from a collection of newly-released al-Qa’ida documents captured during recent operations in support of the Global War on Terror and maintained in the Department of Defense’s Harmony database. In the text of these documents, readers will see how explicit al-Qa’ida has been in its internal discussions covering a range of organizational issues, particularly regarding the internal structure and functioning of the movement as well as with tensions that emerged within the leadership.

In the first part of the report, we provide a theoretical framework, drawing on scholarly approaches including organization and agency theory, to predict where we should expect terrorist groups to face their greatest challenges in conducting operations. The framework is informed as much as possible by the captured documents, and provides a foundation upon which scholars can build as more of these documents are declassified and released to the public.

Our analysis stresses that, by their nature, terrorist organizations such as al-Qa’ida face difficulties in almost any operational environment, particularly in terms of maintaining situational awareness, controlling the use of violence to achieve specified political ends, and of course, preventing local authorities from degrading the group’s capabilities. But they also face problems common to other types of organizations, including private firms, political parties, and traditional insurgencies. For example, political and ideological leaders—the principals—must delegate certain duties to middlemen or low-level operatives, their agents. However, differences in personal preferences between the leadership and their operatives in areas such as finances and tactics make this difficult and give rise to classic agency problems.

Agency problems created by the divergent preferences among terrorist group members present operational challenges for these organizations, challenges which can be exploited as part of a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy. Thus, the theoretical framework described in this report helps us identify where and under what conditions organizations can expect the greatest challenges in pursuing their goals and interests. Understanding a terrorist organization’s internal challenges and vulnerabilities is key to developing effective—and efficient—responses to the threats they pose and to degrade these groups’ ability to kill. The captured al Qa’ida documents contribute significantly to this type of understanding.

The experiences of the “Moslem Brotherhood” and “The Fighting Vanguard” (al-Tali’a al-Muqatila) in Hamah, Syria are examined as a particularly relevant case study. The lessons learned from these groups’ efforts during the 1970s—based on the actual internal assessments of senior jihadi ideologues themselves—are summarized here. Many of the jihadi experiences in Syria have striking parallels to current al-Qa’ida sponsored operations in Iraq, and we highlight several that we believe are especially relevant. This case study not only expands our understanding of the al-Qa’ida network and how it operates under pressure from the government, it also provides a useful model for other researchers to follow in applying a similar theoretical framework to the study of other terrorist organizations and their potential vulnerabilities.

Leveraging our framework and historical context from the Syrian case, we assess al-Qa’ida’s emerging organizational challenges, internal divisions, and places where the network is most likely vulnerable to exploitation. Our analysis emphasizes that effective strategies to combat threats posed by al-Qa’ida will create and exacerbate schisms within its membership. Members have different goals and objectives, and preferred strategies for achieving these ends. Preferences and commitment level vary across specific roles performed within the organization and among sub-group leaders. Defining and exploiting existing fissures within al-Qa’ida as a broadly defined organization must reflect this intra-organizational variation in preferences and commitment in order to efficiently bring all available resources to bear in degrading its potential threat. While capture-kill options may be most effective for certain individuals—e.g., operational commanders—we identify a number of non-lethal prescriptions that take into account differences in al-Qa’ida members’ preferences and commitment to the cause. Many of our prescriptions are intended to induce debilitating agency problems that increase existing organizational dysfunction and reduce al-Qa’ida’s potential for political impact.

To achieve long-term success in degrading the broader movement driving terrorist violence, however, the CTC believes the United States must begin aggressively digesting the body of work that comprises jihadi macro-strategy. We therefore also seek to apply our model to the ideological dimension of al-Qa’ida revealed in numerous instances in these documents, the goal being to identify ways to facilitate the ideational collapse of this body of thought. The included documents provide insights into the points of strategic dissonance and intersection among senior leaders that must be better understood in order to be exploited.

In sum, this theoretically informed analysis, along with assessments of the individual captured documents themselves, contributes to existing bodies of research on al-Qa’ida. It provides several tools for identifying and exacerbating existing fissures as well as locating new insertion points for counterterrorism operations. It presents an analytical model that we hope lays the foundation for a more intellectually informed approach to counterterrorism. And perhaps, most importantly, this assessment demonstrates the integral role that scholars can play in understanding the nature of this movement and in generating smarter, more effective ways to impede its growth and nurture the means for its eventual disintegration.

SWJED

02-18-2006, 01:31 PM

Hat tip to Douglas Farah (http://www.douglasfarah.com/) of The Counterterrorism Blog (http://counterterror.typepad.com/) for the pointer to this study.

Farah's post on this study:

It is encouraging to see new signs that the military intelligence community is actively pursuing new, critical analysis both of al Qaeda's operational structure and ways of improving counterinsurgency stategies, particularly in Iraq. Given the recent British intelligence assessment that al Qaeda has a 50-year plan of attack, these developments are important.

The West Point CTC project called "Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting al Qaeda's Organizational Vulnerabilities"-written about by Andrew Cochran earlier-analyzing documents seized from al Qaeda and declassified from the Harmony database, is particularly enlightening on al Qaeda thinking. It shows the new trend in U.S. intelligence-finding exploitable vulnerabilities in the enemy structure. Prior to 1999 there was no overall assessment of al Qaeda's organizational or financial infrastructure. In the post-9/11 world, survival and insurance against another attack led to little real emphasis being placed on al Qaeda's internal organizations, and even less was known about ways to excert pressure on the organization because vulnerabilities were not clearly identified.

Now it is clear that al Qaeda is a decentralized organization that spends considerable time, perhaps more time than our own intelligence community and armed forces, on studying "lessons learned" from unsuccessful operations, both of itself and others (i.e. the Muslim Brotherhood experience in Syria). It has, or at least has had, a coroporate structure that deals with everything from salaries to vacation schedules. It has internal discrepanies over tactics, targets and resource allocation.

Jedburgh

02-20-2006, 04:32 PM

...another new paper from the same source: Stealing Al-Qa'ida's Playbook (http://www.ctc.usma.edu/Stealing%20Al-Qai%27da%27s%20Playbook%20--%20CTC.pdf)

There's no ExecSum in this one, but I'll quote from the Foreward, which is by GEN (Ret) Wayne Downing:

As the Defense Science Board observed two years ago, an essential element of U.S. combating terrorism efforts must involve strategic communications composed of coordinated public diplomacy, public affairs, open military information operations (which include psychological operations), and classified operations.

The United States government reached a significant stage in the fight against jihadi inspired terrorism this past year when it decided to place a greater emphasis on fighting its ideological roots. Yet despite this appropriate course adjustment, the U.S. government and its Western allies generally do not know the main producers of this ideology and the significant issues that unite and divide the movement—information that is key to defeating it.

Our authors suggest ways to address this significant shortfall. Not only do they attempt to answer the who and what sort of questions in plain language; they also outline a highly original method for discerning the answers to these questions that has, up to now, been ignored or poorly used.

One of the best places to look for information regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the jihadi movement, Brachman and McCants argue, is in texts written by jihadi ideologues. Of course, a number of analysts inside and outside the U.S. government read texts like these for insight into al Qa`ida’s strategic thinking. But it has been my experience that many of the most useful texts have not received attention. And of those that do, there are often useful pieces of information that get overlooked. There are two reasons for this:

• First, there is an overabundance of texts. Since there is no metric yet for determining which works are important within the jihadi movement, text selection tends to be a very subjective process and minor thinkers sometimes receive more attention than they deserve. Moreover, the overabundance of texts and the paucity of analysts mean that the latter must often scan texts rapidly for important information, which is sometimes predetermined by their initial assumptions. Time and resources are not available for looking for information that challenges these assumptions.

• Second, useful pieces of information are overlooked because many analysts who are new to this literature do not know what to look for. As Brachman and McCants observe, jihadi leaders are remarkably open and blunt when discussing who their biggest competition is and what their PR vulnerabilities are. This is precisely the sort of information needed for crafting effective counterterrorism strategies. The authors of this article have given several concrete examples of what type of information to look for, making it easy for others to use their method.

If the jihadis are right in their assessment of geopolitics and the situation in the Middle East, overt U.S. military action or diplomacy can often be more harmful than helpful in the fight against jihadi inspired terrorism. Indeed, the jihadi ideologues surveyed in the article focus most of their attention on psychological operations to exploit our actions rather than on large scale, direct military action.

Understanding the vulnerabilities of the jihadi movement is the necessary prelude to defeating it. In this article, Brachman and McCants give us the tools and some recommendations to do just that.
Note that the authors are using similar methodology to that used by the author of the recent ICG paper I linked to in an earlier thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=517) - that of exploiting the material openly published by the bad guys for insights that could potentially drive the development of effective operational measures against them.

Jedburgh

02-21-2006, 03:22 AM

Testimony presented to the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities on February 16, 2006:

Bruce Hoffman, RAND: Combating Al Qaeda and the Militant Islamic Threat (http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2006/RAND_CT255.pdf)

Four and a half years into the war on terrorism, the United States stands at a crossroads. The sustained successes of the war’s early phases appear to have been stymied by the protracted insurgency in Iraq and our inability either to kill or capture Usama bin Laden and his chief lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri. More consequential, but less apparent perhaps, has been our failure to effectively counter our enemies’ effective use of propaganda and related information operations. Their portrayal of America and the West as an aggressive and predatory force waging war on Islam not only continues to resonate among large segments of the Muslim world but also continues to undermine our own efforts to break the cycle of recruitment and regeneration that sustains al Qaeda and the militant, global jihadi movement it champions. Although many reasons are often cited for the current stasis in America’s war on terrorism—from the diversion of attention from bin Laden and al-Zawahiri caused by Iraq to inchoate U.S. public diplomacy efforts——the real cause is at once as basic as it is prosaic: we still don’t know, much less, understand our enemy...

James Philips, Heritage Foundation: The Evolving Al Qaeda Threat (http://armedservices.house.gov/schedules/2-16-06PhillipsTestimony.pdf)

Al-Qaeda is a transnational Sunni Islamist terrorist network operating in over 60 countries around the world. At the center of the web is the core group, which I will refer to as al-Qaeda Central (AQC), a disciplined, highly-professional cadre of committed revolutionaries, which now probably consists of less than 1,000 dedicated members, and perhaps less than 500. Although it has become the most hunted terrorist group in world history since its September 11, 2001 attacks and has been severely degraded by substantial losses, it remains a resilient and potent threat to the United States...

Zeyno Baran, Nixon Center: Combating al-Qaeda and the Militant Islamic Threat (http://armedservices.house.gov/schedules/2-16-06BaranTestimony.pdf)

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, for the opportunity to appear before you to share with you my views on combating al-Qaeda and the militant Islamic threat. I will focus my remarks on two key issues and then suggest some policy options.

I. The threat posed by militant Islam is neither new nor solely military in nature; instead, the challenge is primarily an ideological one. Unless we understand this ideology that gives rise to extremist violence, we will not succeed in defeating either the terrorists or the “non-violent” Islamists who seek to trigger a clash with the West.

II. Western Europe has become a central battlefield in the war of ideas within Islam between moderates and radicals. For decades, radicals have taken advantage of the legal and societal openness of Western Europe to strengthen their organizations and spread their ideas—and furthermore to export radical ideas and radical activities to Muslim lands. The continuing inability of the West to differentiate between moderates and radicals is resulting in the legitimization of radicals and the isolation of moderates. The failure to effectively integrate its Muslim citizens, coupled with the eventual return from Iraq of European Muslims with experience in armed jihad, will lead to even more serious problems in the future—both for Europe and the U.S....

SWJED

02-24-2006, 07:44 AM

24 Feb. Washington Times commentary - Jihad With All the Medical Benefits (http://www.washtimes.com/commentary/20060223-094059-3234r.htm) by Austin Bay.

Al Qaeda's "bylaws" -- describing the medical and holiday benefits package -- is one of two-dozen recently declassified documents (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/ctc1.pdf) available at West Point's "Combating Terrorism Center".

Most of the documents were translated during 2002, which suggests coalition forces acquired them in Afghanistan. I'm certain the Defense Department would not have released the documents if they had any remaining operational utility. Their instructive value, however, is extraordinary. The documents provide detailed -- if at times jarring -- insight into al Qaeda's goals, its penchant for meticulous planning, its use of propaganda and its intent to use weapons of mass destruction.

Still, the Defense Department needs to declassify more documents like these. If Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld thinks al Qaeda has an "information warfare" advantage -- and he said so last week -- one way to erode that advantage is exposing al Qaeda's vicious ambitions, calculated plans and manipulative intents. These documents do that...

Jedburgh

03-02-2006, 09:20 PM

The Jamestown Foundation, 28 Feb: Al-Qaeda's Insurgency Doctrine: Aiming for a "Long War" (http://www.jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id=166#), by Michael Scheuer.

Conventional national militaries train, think, and fight according to their doctrine. To date, however, America and the West have not sufficiently appreciated that al-Qaeda, too, is fighting the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan according to a doctrine of its own. That doctrine has been developed from the group's experiences during the Afghan war against the Red Army, and has matured through each of the insurgencies in which bin Laden's fighters have since been involved, from Eritrea to Xinjiang to Mindanao. In presenting their doctrine, al-Qaeda's strategists also have tipped their turbans to the significant lessons they have learned from Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Mao, General Giap, and even Ahmed Shah Masood, as well from the training manuals of the U.S. and UK Marines and Special Forces. Ironically, al-Qaeda strategists have discussed all of these matters for years in their Internet journals, but this discussion has garnered little interest in Western essays.

The corpus of al-Qaeda's writings on the development and application of its insurgency doctrine is too diverse and voluminous to discuss in a single article. For present purposes, it will suffice to look at some of the insurgency-related work of five of the group's strategists: the late Abu-Hajer Abd-al-Aziz al-Muqrin, Abu Ubyad al-Qurashi, Abu-Ayman al-Hilali, Abd-al-Hadi, and Sayf-al-Din al-Ansari. These writings discuss the need to conduct the political and military facets of an insurgency in tandem. They are especially worth reviewing now because of the success al-Qaeda is having in using its doctrine against U.S.-led forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, a success that has prompted U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld to rename the Global War on Terror as the "Long War" and to publicly lament that al-Qaeda is beating the U.S. in the political war being fought in the media. The essays used herein to analyze al-Qaeda's insurgency doctrine were published between January 2002 and February 2004 in the al-Qaeda Internet journals al-Ansar, al-Neda, and Mu'askar al-Battar...

Jedburgh

05-24-2006, 11:47 PM

Michael Scheuer, writing for the the Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Focus, 23 May:

Al-Qaeda Doctrine: The Eventual Need for Semi-Conventional Forces (http://www.jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id=181)

...al-Qaeda believes that it and its allies can only defeat the United States in a "long war," one that allows the Islamists to capitalize on their extraordinary patience, as well as on their enemies' lack thereof. Before his death in a firefight with Saudi security forces, the leader of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Abu Hajar Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, wrote extensively about how al-Qaeda believed the military fight against the United States and its allies would unfold. He envisioned a point at which the mujahideen would have to develop semi-conventional forces. He identified this period as the "Decisive Stage".

Al-Muqrin told his insurgent readers that the power of the United States precluded any expectation of a quick victory. He wrote that the war would progress slowly through such phases as initial manpower mobilization, political work among the populace to establish trust and support, the accumulation of weaponry and other supplies, the establishment of bases around the country and especially in the mountains, the initiation of attacks on individuals and then a gradual intensification of the latter until a countrywide insurgency was underway. Each of these steps was essential and none could be skipped, al-Muqrin maintained; the steps would prolong the war, thereby allowing the mujahideen to grow in numbers, experience and combat power. "We should warn against rushing from one stage to the next," he wrote. "Rather, we should be patient and take all factors into consideration. The fraternal brothers in Algeria, for instance, hastily moved from one stage to the other…The outcome was the movement's retreat...from 1995-1997."...

SWJED

06-23-2006, 01:18 AM

23 June London Daily Telegraph - Cameraman Reveals Secrets of al-Qa'eda Propaganda War (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/06/23/walq23.xml&sSheet=/news/2006/06/23/ixnews.html) by Isambard Wilkinson.

An al-Qa'eda propagandist has revealed the inner workings of the terrorist network's media machine, describing how he was summoned to a hideout in Afghanistan to shoot a video of Osama bin Laden's deputy.

Qari Mohammed Yusuf, a cameraman, described in an interview with the Associated Press news agency how a courier brought a summons to him. It read: "The emir wants to send a message."

The emir, meaning prince or commander, was Ayman al-Zawahiri, who wanted to broadcast a message of defiance proclaiming that he had survived an American air strike.

Yusuf, 30, claimed that he followed the courier's directions to one of Zawahiri's hideouts in January. "Everything was ready," said the bearded cameraman. "There was just myself and the emir. I used a small Sony camera. It lasted just half an hour.

"They chose the place. They fix it and then they just say to me to come, and my job is only to record it. These are their rules, and no one asks any questions."...

The speed with which the Taliban and al-Qa'eda manage to respond to events in Afghanistan and churn out propaganda has frustrated commanders. "The Taliban are winning the propaganda war," said one senior British officer in Afghanistan...

SWJED

09-06-2006, 08:35 PM

6 September Voice of America - Experts Say Al-Qaida Has Transformed Itself Since 9/11 (http://www.voanews.com/english/2006-09-06-voa25.cfm) by Andre de Nesnera. Reposted in whole per VOA guidelines - bolded text by SWC.

The attacks of September 11, 2001 launched President Bush's global "war on terror" - a struggle that is still going on five years later.

The first target was Afghanistan, where the Taleban government was harboring al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden. A U.S.-led coalition ousted the Taleban, but Osama bin Laden remains at large, believed to be hiding in the rugged terrain between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

American Enterprise Institute terrorism expert Danielle Pletka says al-Qaida has been significantly weakened since the beginning of the Bush administration's "war on terror."

"They are constantly under assault. Their financial lifelines have dried up. Their weaponry has dried up. Anytime your leader is hiding in a cave, it is hard to say that you are in the same strong position you were in when you were living in a mansion," noted Pletka.

Many experts agree that the "war on terror" has been successful in degrading al-Qaida's operational capabilities.

One of those is Brian Jenkins, a leading authority on terrorism working for the RAND Corporation. But he says the U.S. and its allies have not been successful in denting al-Qaida's determination to continue its "jihad," or holy war, against the West.

"We have not blocked their communications. We have not blunted their message. We have not impeded their recruiting, nor have we prevented them from planning and preparing new terrorist attacks. There have been close to 30 communications from Osama bin Laden himself since 9/11 - a greater number from his lieutenant [Ayman] Al-Zawahiri," said Jenkins. "The fact that they can, despite the security risks involved, still deliver videotapes and audiotapes to television stations, indicates an ability to deliver other things. If they can get a tape to al-Jazeera, they can get a secret message to someone else, and it suggests that it would be premature to write off the center."

Jenkins says since 9/11, al-Qaida has transformed itself into something other than a radical Islamist group.

Al-Qaida has transcended its historic organizational skin to become an ideology, and I think it is probably more correct today to speak of the 'jihadist enterprise' which is inspired by al-Qaida's ideology," he continued. "Now that may include the veterans of the original terrorist organization. It includes a new cohort of fighters who are gaining their experience and skills in Afghanistan and Iraq today. It includes affiliated groups in Indonesia, in Egypt, in Algeria, in Saudi Arabia. And it includes those self-radicalizing entities who may not have any organizational connections with the historic al-Qaida, or any center at all, but who self-radicalize and who, on the appeal of al-Qaida's message, turn themselves into weapons."

Jenkins says since al-Qaida is now an ideology, the removal of Osama bin Laden would have less effect on the whole terrorist enterprise now than it would have had four or five years ago.

"The fact that he has been able to survive, the fact that he has formulated this narrative over the past five years, the fact that this ideology has spread via the internet and other means of communications throughout the globe, does suggest that his departure now, while it would have some impact, psychological impact, would not necessarily lead to the demise of the enterprise itself," explained Jenkins.

Given the international scope of the terrorist threat, Jenkins and others believe the "war on terror" will go on for a long time. Experts say a successful outcome will involve a combination of vigilance at home and increased international cooperation.

Steve Blair

09-07-2006, 01:36 PM

Of course they've transformed. All successful terrorist groups do. What has really helped Al-Qaida in this effort is their linkage to Islam (radical or otherwise), which has a much wider appeal than the Marxist-Lenninist calls of most of the terror groups in the 1980s.

It's worth remembering that most of the terrorist groups that survived for the long haul (over ten years) had links to nationalist/ethnic minority causes (the ETA or PLO) or quasi-religious overtones or links (the IRA and UDA both come to mind). Any terrorist group that can link itself to something with pre-existing social value within a society or community has a much greater chance of surviving and thriving.

CPT Holzbach

09-15-2006, 12:46 PM

How Al-Qaida may evolve, or end (http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2006.31.1.7?cookieSet=1):

The war on terrorism might be perpetual, but the war on al-Qaida will end. Although the al-Qaida network is in many ways distinct from its terrorist predecessors, especially in its protean ability to transform itself from a physical to a virtual organization, it is not completely without precedent. And the challenges of devising an effective response over the long term to a well-established international group are by no means unique. Al-Qaida shares elements of continuity and discontinuity with other terrorist groups, and lessons to be learned from the successes and failures of past and present counterterrorist responses may be applicable to this case. Current research focuses on al-Qaida and its associates, with few serious attempts to analyze them within a broader historical and political context. Yet this context sheds light on crucial assumptions and unanswered questions in the campaign against al-Qaida. What do scholars know about how terrorist movements end? What has worked in previous campaigns? Which of those lessons are relevant to understanding how, and under what circumstances, al-Qaida will end?

Jedburgh

09-25-2006, 01:00 PM

Andrew Black, writing for the the Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor, 21 Sep:

Al-Suri's Adaptation of Fourth Generation Warfare Doctrine (http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370137)

In a highly influential and sizeable treatise posted in January 2005 and titled "The Global Islamic Resistance Call," jihadi ideologue Abu Musab al-Suri (http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00076/_The_Al-Qaida_strate_76568a.pdf) (aka Mustafa Setmariam Nasar) culminated a life of activity by providing his strategic template for the Global Salafi-Jihad. This work, rare for its self-examining and almost scientific approach, provides details for how the jihad should pursue its campaign henceforth. While not outwardly acknowledging it, al-Suri's strategic manifesto carries many of the same tenets of fourth generation warfare (4GW) as outlined by military analyst William Lind. Perhaps the reason he did not cite Lind's writings as motivation is that al-Suri's work demonstrates a significant step in the development of the 4GW doctrine...

Jedburgh

10-27-2006, 03:59 PM

Chris Zambelis, writing for the the Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor, 24 Oct:

Al-Hakaima Positions Himself for Key Role in the Global Salafi-Jihad (http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370173)

As the media spotlight continues to highlight Muhammed Khalil al-Hakaima's "Myth of Delusion," it is important to emphasize that al-Hakaima has authored other detailed works dealing with tactical and operational issues related to intelligence and warfare that warrant closer examination. These documents have been circulating for weeks on radical Islamist forums shortly after al-Qaeda's second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri introduced al-Hakaima as an al-Qaeda partner in a videotaped statement issued on August 5. They are also available on the website of al-Thabeton ala al-Ahad (Those who Stand Firm for the Covenant), al-Hakaima's organization, in sections located on the website's title page labeled "Your Guide to Individual Jihad" and "Statements by Sheikh al-Hakaima." It appears that these documents are part of a collection of publications, including a manual entitled "Towards a Better Strategy to Resist the Occupiers" (http://www.althabeton.co.nr). Similar to "Myth of Delusion," these works are well researched and contain detailed information on practical aspects of intelligence, conventional warfare, special operations, assassinations, insurgency and related topics. The underlying theme in al-Hakaima's publications stresses the importance of individual initiative on the part of aspiring extremists who are called on to hone their skills and take up arms against what he labels the "enemy occupiers."...

Related article in the same issue: Online Jihadi Forums Provide Curriculum for Aspiring Mujahideen (http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370176)

Jedburgh

11-17-2006, 03:46 PM

Beyond Al-Qa'ida Part 1 - The Global Jihadist Movement (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG429.pdf)

Defeating the global jihadist movement—which we define as al-Qaeda and the universe of jihadist groups that are associated with or inspired by al-Qaeda—is the most pressing security challenge facing the United States today. The global jihadist movement can be distinguished from traditional or local jihads, which are armed campaigns conducted by Islamist groups against local adversaries with usually limited aims as well as geographic scope, in that it targets the United States and its allies across the globe and pursues broad geopolitical aims...
http://img135.imageshack.us/img135/6301/theterroristnebulapi6.jpg (http://imageshack.us)

Beyond al-Qaeda Part 2 - The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG430.pdf)

The “al-Qaeda universe” does not incorporate the entirety of the terrorist or extremist threat facing the United States. Clearly, Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders hope that their efforts will persuade other Islamic militant groups to join the global jihad. But what about the terrorist or extremist groups that are not part of the al-Qaeda network and do not adhere to its agenda? The temptation for policymakers is to set aside groups that have not chosen to join al-Qaeda as less dangerous. Yet these Islamist groups, non-Islamist terrorists, and criminal organizations still pose a threat to the United States, its interests, and its allies....
Contents

Chapter One: Introduction

Chapter Two: Hezbollah and Hamas

Chapter Three: Other Islamist Groups Outside the al-Qaeda Network

Chapter Four: The Iraqi Insurgency

Chapter Five: Non-Islamist Groups

Chapter Six: Antiglobalization Movements

Chapter Seven: The Convergence of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Crime

Chapter Eight: Conclusions and Recommendations

Jedburgh

01-20-2007, 02:45 PM

More on Al-Suri from the Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor, 18 Jan 07:

Al-Suri's Doctrines for Decentralized Jihadi Training - Part 1 (http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370236)

The evolution toward smaller, more autonomous and decentralized organizational structures has been identified as a key trend in jihadi terrorism during the past few years. Confronting amorphous structures and networks, which lack clearly identifiable organizational linkages and command structures and in which self-radicalization and self-recruitment are key elements, is a formidable challenge for security services. The jihadi decentralization trend is clearly a result of counter-terrorism successes. These "defeats" have been scrutinized and digested in the writings of key jihadi theoreticians during the past few years. New roadmaps and operational concepts are being explored as the jihadis search for effective ways to operate in the much less permissive security environment of the post-9/11 era....
Edit to add: Part 2 (http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370240), in the Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor, 1 Feb 07:

Training jihadi recruits in the post-9/11 world is increasingly about finding a safe place where training is possible rather than discussing curricula, facilities, selection of recruits, instructors and related tasks. In his voluminous treatise The Call to Global Islamic Resistance, published on the internet in January 2005, the Syrian-born al-Qaeda veteran Mustafa bin Abd al-Qadir Setmariam Nasar, better known as Abu Mus'ab al-Suri and Umar Abd al-Hakim, examines five different methods for jihadi training based on past jihadi practices:

1. Secret training in safe houses.
2. Training in small secret camps in the area of operations.
3. Overt training under the auspices of states providing safe havens.
4. Overt training in the camps of the Open Fronts.
5. Semi-overt training in areas of chaos and no [governmental] control....

slapout9

01-20-2007, 03:33 PM

Jed,this is fantastic stuff. Should be read by all. I know everyone is tired of me saying this but this article explains why the Strategic Framework of Ends,Ways and Means is not going to work. It is Motive,Methods,and Opportunity. The article explains it far better then I can but we had better wake up to this because these guys are not just tough, but smart!

The counter so to speak, at least for the US is in SWJ magazine#7. I can not remember the name of the article but it is about the training philosophy used by Carlson's raiders. Again read the article, it is quite good.

As usual for your listening plasure and cultural enhancement and dedicated to all the AQ assholes in the world. Keep looking behind you!! that is (US) you here coming to take you away.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MmfgrcpRpoo

Jedburgh

02-16-2007, 05:05 PM

The Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor, 15 Feb 07:

The Threat of Grassroots Jihadi Networks: A Case Study from Ceuta, Spain (http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370249)

...The jihadi group in Ceuta was composed of at least 11 individuals and constitutes another good example of the emergence of grassroots jihadi networks in European countries. "Grassroots jihadis" refers to groups that sympathize with and relate to the global jihadi movement, sharing common strategic objectives, but have little or no formal connections to al-Qaeda or any other associated organizations. They could, however, eventually secure relationships with some established operatives....

AdmiralAdama

06-22-2007, 09:43 PM

SWJED

06-22-2007, 10:40 PM

AdmiralAdama

06-23-2007, 03:28 AM

Of course. I certainly don't want to violate any rules here.

Are the opinions of Stephen Emerson (writer for The New Republic and author of the book Warriors: Inside the Covert Military Operations of the Reagan Era (http://www.amazon.com/Secret-Warriors-Inside-Military-Operations/dp/0399133607), Walid Phares who has written (http://counterterrorismblog.org/experts/walid-phares/bio/) for Global Affairs, Middle East Quarterly, and Journal of South Asian and Middle East Studies, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross (who was himself a radical Muslim and wrote a book on the experience (http://www.amazon.com/My-Year-Inside-Radical-Islam/dp/1585425516/ref=sr_1_1/002-1838639-8999203?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1182568955&sr=1-1)) and Bill Roggio (who is a former infantryman doing reporting in Iraq now) not considered sources of plausible analysis? Or am I misunderstanding you?

SteveMetz

06-23-2007, 10:30 AM

Interesting symposium on the state of the Jihad. (http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=28843)

One participant -- Bill Roggio (http://www.billroggio.com/) -- claims Al Queda is shifting focus to the Middle East to form a caliphate (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caliphate), away from attacking the West directly.

I'll give you my opinion. I think AQ and its affiliates would like to rule a state and probably to recreate some sort of Islamic super state. I think they may be capable of seizing a state at some point in time (more likely through means other than terrorism and insurgency). I do not believe they could ever create a "caliphate."

Ultimately Al Qaeda can kill and destroy but cannot create or administer. As salafists, al Qaeda has no executable political plan or strategy. They are not like the Bolsheviks and Nazis who had explicit political plans and strategies even before they seized power. Recent history suggests that even should al Qaeda's allies or affiliates take power somewhere, they stand little chance of unifying the Islamic world, much less creating a super-state which can challenge the United States. It is hard to imagine, for instance, the benighted Afghan Mullah Mohammed Omar, whom Osama bin Laden considered the paragon of an Islamic leader, ruling a modern, powerful state which could challenge the West. It is equally hard to imagine that Indonesia, Bangladeshi, Indians, Afghans, Iranians, Turks, Kurds, Chechen, Uzbeks, and others would accept an Arab-dominated super state, or that Arabs would accept a caliphate ruled by one of these other nationalities.

To the extent that we can glean any sort of political program or plan from the Islamic extremists, it is a recipe for a failed state. The "new caliphate" is, like the medieval European idea of "Christendom," a fantasy, clung to by both some Islamic extremists and some Americans. To build American strategy on the delusions of our opponents rather than their capabilities is a mistake. To distort al Qaeda into the type of enemy we know and understand—a Hitler, Stalin, or Saddam Hussein who can be defeated by war—may be emotionally appealing, but it does not reflect reality. And by pretending that the challenge from Islamic extremists is something it is not, we are less able to deal with the threat that it is.

SWJED

06-23-2007, 11:43 AM

Of course. I certainly don't want to violate any rules here...

Or am I misunderstanding you?

Yes you are and you don't get it. This is our (Council members) living room - farting in it is one thing - a steaming #### is another. No ###-for-tat with you is on my agenda - get with the program here or move on - more of your insights and observations - the writer that you claim to be - rather than full-auto links to any and all items that support 'whatever you are about'.

Side-note - maybe it is me - but your screen name and the Colonial Defense Force (http://www.cdfcommand.com/) 'thingee' conveys that you really do not want to be taken seriously here.

Steve Blair

06-23-2007, 01:40 PM

I'll give you my opinion. I think AQ and its affiliates would like to rule a state and probably to recreate some sort of Islamic super state. I think they may be capable of seizing a state at some point in time (more likely through means other than terrorism and insurgency). I do not believe they could ever create a "caliphate."

Ultimately Al Qaeda can kill and destroy but cannot create or administer. As salafists, al Qaeda has no executable political plan or strategy. They are not like the Bolsheviks and Nazis who had explicit political plans and strategies even before they seized power. Recent history suggests that even should al Qaeda's allies or affiliates take power somewhere, they stand little chance of unifying the Islamic world, much less creating a super-state which can challenge the United States. It is hard to imagine, for instance, the benighted Afghan Mullah Mohammed Omar, whom Osama bin Laden considered the paragon of an Islamic leader, ruling a modern, powerful state which could challenge the West. It is equally hard to imagine that Indonesia, Bangladeshi, Indians, Afghans, Iranians, Turks, Kurds, Chechen, Uzbeks, and others would accept an Arab-dominated super state, or that Arabs would accept a caliphate ruled by one of these other nationalities.

To the extent that we can glean any sort of political program or plan from the Islamic extremists, it is a recipe for a failed state. The "new caliphate" is, like the medieval European idea of "Christendom," a fantasy, clung to by both some Islamic extremists and some Americans. To build American strategy on the delusions of our opponents rather than their capabilities is a mistake. To distort al Qaeda into the type of enemy we know and understand—a Hitler, Stalin, or Saddam Hussein who can be defeated by war—may be emotionally appealing, but it does not reflect reality. And by pretending that the challenge from Islamic extremists is something it is not, we are less able to deal with the threat that it is.

I would also put forward (as one of my pet rocks) that as al Qaeda moves farther down the terrorist spiral of violence they will become less capable of governing anything (assuming that they ever were capable of such activity). They will become more wrapped up in their tactics of violence (and justification for same) and more distant from whatever their founding goals were. This is a common trend with all groups that make the slide from insurgent to terrorist, and I don't really see a TNI like al Qaeda being any different. In al Qaeda's case it could even be worse, as they will run head-on into a number of ethnic and tribal considerations as you mention, Steve.

Steve Blair

06-23-2007, 02:00 PM

AA, I'd suggest you broaden your research a bit to include things you don't agree with. I don't know what your academic background is, but you might want to take the time to do some reading into historical methods and research. Cherry-picking sources isn't research - it's filtering your sources until they agree with your conclusion. I've pointed out before that you paint things with a very broad stroke...which may work well on the editorial page but falls short when it comes to serious research and scholarly writing (in most cases...some of the newer fields seem to like this kind of writing, but I digress).

Your methods seem akin to those of the Fundamentalist Christian who does all her research in Christian bookstores or the Arabist who believes that Al Jazeera is the one source of all that's true in the world, or the dedicated eco-warrior who only believes what he hears from Al Gore or Michael Moore. Every source has some degree of spin, created by the perceptions of the author and aided by what the reader brings to the table. If you want to be taken seriously, take off your blinders, use a wide variety of sources, and present your opinions as opinions, not the One Word of Truth.

Check out the required books for an upper-division history course at your nearest university bookstore. There's usually one class devoted to research methods (although for some idiotic reason some schools don't require this until the graduate level). Find some of the books that deal with research methods. Buy them and read them cover to cover until you understand them. That's your first step to quality research. I wish you well.

Culpeper

06-25-2007, 01:07 AM

AA, I'd suggest you broaden your research a bit to include things you don't agree with. I don't know what your academic background is, but you might want to take the time to do some reading into historical methods and research. Cherry-picking sources isn't research - it's filtering your sources until they agree with your conclusion.

I'll second that suggestion. Also, the Battlestar Galactia stuff is demeaning to the very nature of this council. I mean, people are dying and getting maimed in combat for real. His profile gives the impression that this is fascinating from a combination of comic book and cliff note perspectives. I have agreed and disagreed with AA in the past at the expense of opportunity cost. But, he should take the pain, grow up, and become more diversified as well as learn the "company language" of the forum. Consistently approaching from a preferred tactical perspective is only going to get AA alienated. The SWC has more of a strategic platform that should be immune from "True Conservative" and "Democratic Underground" type of threads. I speak from experience. I have been raked over the coals once during the beginning of my membership. Do we still have that one forum that had pictures of user names on tombstones?

Culpeper

06-25-2007, 03:11 AM

I'll give you my opinion. I think AQ and its affiliates would like to rule a state and probably to recreate some sort of Islamic super state. I think they may be capable of seizing a state at some point in time (more likely through means other than terrorism and insurgency). I do not believe they could ever create a "caliphate."

I'm no monument to the history of Islam but aren't you describing Iran after the 1979 revolution? Irrerversible changes took place almost immediately. Mainly, westernization or progress depending on how you may define that aspect. Even Khomeini was unable to erase it after he used it. Even a large framed photgraph of Khomeini hanging on a wall is a voilation of true Islamic Law. Post Iranian Revolution Iran was unable to keep the institution they envisioned because of the same tools they used to get it started. Al Queda and others will fail as well. They blame - Modernization - that is, the United States, for ruining the ability to convert back to a pure state of Holy Law. In my opinion, it is a pipe dream. A dream that is distorted and has created a nightmare in the Middle East as well as The West, which started in our lifetimes after Great Britain and France couldn't maintain the regions they started long after the Ottomans' ceased any real contribution to Islamic Holy Law. Also, the fact that the USSR fell under its own weight and many of their Islamic satellite states went back to their old borders virtually overnight didn't help matters as well. Today, Islam is fragment upon fragments. And the calamity we are witnessing today is nothing new to its history. It was born out of calamity. And with the exception of the first generation of Islam there has never been an agreement amongst Muslims on what constitutes a true Islamic Order. So, as you suggested, a "Caliphate" hasn't existed in a very long time; not in every essence of the word. Wouldn't it be like France going back to the way things were before the French Revolution? Wouldn't that idea be ridiculous if a group of French terrorists were going around killing in that name? "Let them eat cake"?

SteveMetz

06-25-2007, 09:02 AM

I'm no monument to the history of Islam but aren't you describing Iran after the 1979 revolution? Irrerversible changes took place almost immediately. Mainly, westernization or progress depending on how you may define that aspect. Even Khomeini was unable to erase it after he used it. Even a large framed photgraph of Khomeini hanging on a wall is a voilation of true Islamic Law. Post Iranian Revolution Iran was unable to keep the institution they envisioned because of the same tools they used to get it started. Al Queda and others will fail as well. They blame - Modernization - that is, the United States, for ruining the ability to convert back to a pure state of Holy Law. In my opinion, it is a pipe dream. A dream that is distorted and has created a nightmare in the Middle East as well as The West, which started in our lifetimes after Great Britain and France couldn't maintain the regions they started long after the Ottomans' ceased any real contribution to Islamic Holy Law. Also, the fact that the USSR fell under its own weight and many of their Islamic satellite states went back to their old borders virtually overnight didn't help matters as well. Today, Islam is fragment upon fragments. And the calamity we are witnessing today is nothing new to its history. It was born out of calamity. And with the exception of the first generation of Islam there has never been an agreement amongst Muslims on what constitutes a true Islamic Order. So, as you suggested, a "Caliphate" hasn't existed in a very long time; not in every essence of the word. Wouldn't it be like France going back to the way things were before the French Revolution? Wouldn't that idea be ridiculous if a group of French terrorists were going around killing in that name? "Let them eat cake"?

I believe the extremists MAY be able to take over an existing, functioning nation state and sort of hold it together (if it has oil). That's the Iran model. But that's not the same as a multi national "caliphate" which is what our strategy uses as the bogeyman.

Steve Blair

06-25-2007, 01:12 PM

I believe the extremists MAY be able to take over an existing, functioning nation state and sort of hold it together (if it has oil). That's the Iran model. But that's not the same as a multi national "caliphate" which is what our strategy uses as the bogeyman.
I agree with this. I honestly don't think that AQ or any related movement has the capability to create any sort of multi-national entity. We confuse talk with capability in this case. And as they spin deeper into their tactics and get further away from their strategy, they will become less capable of this sort of thing.

Tom Odom

06-25-2007, 01:22 PM

I agree with this. I honestly don't think that AQ or any related movement has the capability to create any sort of multi-national entity. We confuse talk with capability in this case. And as they spin deeper into their tactics and get further away from their strategy, they will become less capable of this sort of thing.

And I do too. The very history of Islam, the shift of the Calphate between Baghdad and Damsacus and ultimately Istanbul (as the Sultan), the fragmentation of both Sunni and Shia into sects and now the various groupings argue hard against the image or even the idea of a unified Calphate capable of ruling inside a country versus across the borders of many. In many ways the Islamic extremist view represented by AQ is the Sunni extremist version of Pan-Arabist thought, which died a quick death thn 1967. A parallel movement--and one confused by Westterners and Muslims alike--is the strengthening of Shia control in the region, at least temporarily. I add that latter clause because tha strengthening is very tentative. Syria is controlled by a Shia minority; a Sunni backlash is always a threat. Lebanon is always a toss up; Syrian influence there is not a always a given.

This is not to say that AQ is not a threat. It is not however a monolith.

best

Tom

Ken White

06-25-2007, 03:12 PM

status; they might but the hold is shaky. I've always considered Hezbollah more potentially dangerous.

Obviously the loose networking between the various groups of Jihadis etc. has some potential but a Caliphate isn't one of them. My only real concern is that in their pursuit of that unattainable goal they do something really stupid on a massive scale and get Europe aroused.

The mood there may be broadly pacifistic and 'go along - get along' but if the French and Germans really get fired up that will have very significant reverbrations...

P.S.

Enjoy Kansas in late June... :)

SteveMetz

06-25-2007, 03:17 PM

Ken White

06-25-2007, 04:51 PM

concept but history says they are perfectly capable of playing harsh and dirty. :)

Do recall I said a really big and really dumb event. Conversations with serving folks from some of those nations indicate that that almost, not quite, a desire that something like that might occur (as a way of a resurgence and a problem eliminator) is present as a rarely and discretely discussed attitude. We all know Armed forces in Democracies are a little more right leaning than their societal norm -- but not much more...

Hopefully, I'm just mumbling in my dotage. :wry:

An allied topic; is it just me or do the Europeans do a better job of countering the media efforts of the bad guys than we have been able to do thus far? Your warning of the media battle from some years ago didn't click in establishment minds and we're paying a heavy price for that while they seem to be able to deflect or better respond...

Jedburgh

10-03-2007, 12:28 PM

CTC, 2 Oct 07: Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in al-Qa’ida from 1989-2006 (http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/aq3_pdf.asp)

The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point is pleased to present the report, Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in al-Qa’ida from 1989-2006. Based on a collection of al-Qa’ida documents recently released from the Department of Defense's Harmony Database, in addition to the previously released documents utilized in the Combating Terorrism Center’s two prior Harmony reports, this report analyzes the history of al-Qa’ida’s internal and long-running debates over the strategies and larger goals of the jihadi movement. Many of these documents, captured in the course of operations supporting the Global War on Terror, have never before been available to the academic and policy community. Cracks in the Foundation includes a richly sourced account of the ongoing struggle between different factions among al-Qa’ida’s leaders and specific recommendations for effectively exploiting weaknesses arising from these internal struggles. We have provided brief summaries of each of the released documents, and the full texts of the released documents can be accessed via hyperlinks within the report, both in their original Arabic and in English. We hope this report will serve as a useful resource in our collective efforts to better understand and combat al-Qa'ida and its affiliated movements.

goesh

10-03-2007, 04:45 PM

The kill rate in Iraq and Afghan, regardless of how accurate it is or is not, reflects I think the tactical need for AQ and its allies to have blooded operatives/cell leaders. The screw-ups in attempted attacks on the Western front have that element in common and we may be too inclined to chalk off such attempts as being the work of amateurs when in fact it may simply be a lack of nerve due to no combat experience, IMO.

SteveMetz

12-09-2007, 03:10 PM

In a brilliant essay (http://www.the-american-interest.com/ai2/article.cfm?Id=331&MId=16) in the journal The American Interest, Barry Posen of MIT writes,

"Today the most imminent U.S. security problem has to do not with conquest or intimidation but safety...The main discrete threat is al-Qaeda, but if the foregoing analysis is right, there are deeper forces feeding that organization than its interpretation of religious texts. These forces could give rise to other violent organizations. In other words, al-Qaeda is not the problem, but a particularly threatening example of a condition of global disorder and disaffection capable of giving rise to numerous such groups, Islamist and otherwise."

Posen asks what the United States can do to address the conditions that gave rise to al Qaida. This is a vitally important issue. The implication, of course, is that the Bush strategy misdiagnosed the problem by focusing on the absence of liberal democracy.

But there is another question which fewer strategists are grappling with: If in fact, it is systemic conditions which gave rise to al Qaida and if, in fact, the United States cannot ameliorate them, who will arise to replace al Qaida once that organization is destroyed? Are there proto-insurgencies or nascent radical organizations out there now which will rise in power with al Qaida gone? How can we identify them? How can we stop them?

Strategy is not simply dealing with extant threats, but preventing the rise of new ones. Here's hoping that someone is grappling with this issue now.

JeffC

12-09-2007, 03:51 PM

In a brilliant essay (http://www.the-american-interest.com/ai2/article.cfm?Id=331&MId=16)

But there is another question which fewer strategists are grappling with: If in fact, it is systemic conditions which gave rise to al Qaida and if, in fact, the United States cannot ameliorate them, who will arise to replace al Qaida once that organization is destroyed? Are there proto-insurgencies or nascent radical organizations out there now which will rise in power with al Qaida gone? How can we identify them? How can we stop them?

Strategy is not simply dealing with extant threats, but preventing the rise of new ones. Here's hoping that someone is grappling with this issue now.

I've seen similar questions being asked in various BAAs and SBIRs, but its a question (in its most basic form) that's been asked by all ruling powers throughout history. Where will the threats to our power arise from and what can we do to prevent it? There's the biblical example of Pharoah and Herod attempting to intercept the rise of a great threat to their power (Moses and Jesus) by killing all of the first born children in their kingdom. That clearly didn't work, and no similarly motivated strategy has worked for any government since.

Posen wrote:

"The activist U.S. grand strategy currently preferred by the national security establishment in both parties thus has a classically tragic quality about it. Enabled by its great power, and fearful of the negative energies and possibilities engendered by globalization, the United States has tried to get its arms around the problem: It has essentially sought more control. But the very act of seeking more control injects negative energy into global politics as quickly as it finds enemies to vanquish. It prompts states to balance against U.S. power however they can, and it prompts peoples to imagine that the United States is the source of all their troubles."

We need to lighten our touch, and change our global strategy; and part of that change is not pursuing the fool's errand of trying to predict and control every possible factor which may lead to future threats. The chaotic nature of life doesn't permit such control.

At the end of the essay Posen recaps his points with a brief summarizing statement:

"The United States needs now to test a different grand strategy: It should conceive its security interests narrowly, use its military power stingily, pursue its enemies quietly but persistently, share responsibilities and costs more equitably, watch and wait more patiently. Let’s do this for 16 years and see if the outcomes aren’t better."

I wholeheartedly agree.

SteveMetz

12-09-2007, 05:19 PM

I've seen similar questions being asked in various BAAs and SBIRs, but its a question (in its most basic form) that's been asked by all ruling powers throughout history. Where will the threats to our power arise from and what can we do to prevent it? There's the biblical example of Pharoah and Herod attempting to intercept the rise of a great threat to their power (Moses and Jesus) by killing all of the first born children in their kingdom. That clearly didn't work, and no similarly motivated strategy has worked for any government since.

Posen wrote:

"The activist U.S. grand strategy currently preferred by the national security establishment in both parties thus has a classically tragic quality about it. Enabled by its great power, and fearful of the negative energies and possibilities engendered by globalization, the United States has tried to get its arms around the problem: It has essentially sought more control. But the very act of seeking more control injects negative energy into global politics as quickly as it finds enemies to vanquish. It prompts states to balance against U.S. power however they can, and it prompts peoples to imagine that the United States is the source of all their troubles."

We need to lighten our touch, and change our global strategy; and part of that change is not pursuing the fool's errand of trying to predict and control every possible factor which may lead to future threats. The chaotic nature of life doesn't permit such control.

At the end of the essay Posen recaps his points with a brief summarizing statement:

"The United States needs now to test a different grand strategy: It should conceive its security interests narrowly, use its military power stingily, pursue its enemies quietly but persistently, share responsibilities and costs more equitably, watch and wait more patiently. Let’s do this for 16 years and see if the outcomes aren’t better."

I wholeheartedly agree.

If I were king (and I realize I can't be since John Fishel is), I'd create a director for long term/emerging threats on the National Security Council to try to use interagency assets to identify and respond to emerging threats. One of the first things I'd do is commission research on the actual mechanics of strategic threat recognition in the United States.

LawVol

12-09-2007, 08:19 PM

The war which has been imposed upon us and the rest of the West in general is an Islamic war of aggression. Islam is at war with anything and everything that is non-Islamic. Even Muslims who do not tow the ideological pure line are considered apostates and deemed good fodder for immediate, cold-blooded slaughter.

A religion-based ideology can only be addressed or countered in like manner. Apples to apples.

That's my 0.02 worth.

This is an issue that has recently been the topic of much discussion on another site I frequent, so I'll pose the same issue. If Al Qaeda's brand of terrorism is indeed a global insurgency, do we not play into their hands by painting this as a war between religions?

Let me explain. The prize in this "global insurgency" is the people, as it is in all insurgencies. We currently have a vocal (and violently active) subset of the world Muslim population (how large or small is debatable). This vocal subset seeks to harness all of Islam in a war against the West. However, another subset is either opposed to this or at least neutral. If we subscribe the theory that this is indeed a war of religion, as Al Qaeda argues, then we force those Muslims that haven't chosen a side to choose the side antagonistic to us.

I don't believe that Islam, in and of itself, is out to conquer the West or Christianity or anything else. I do believe that some have determined that the use of Islam can provide a valuable tool in their fight against the West. I just don't believe we should take actions, or pursue strategies, that make this tool more effective for Al Qaeda and their ilk.

SteveMetz

12-09-2007, 08:44 PM

This is an issue that has recently been the topic of much discussion on another site I frequent, so I'll pose the same issue. If Al Qaeda's brand of terrorism is indeed a global insurgency, do we not play into their hands by painting this as a war between religions?

Let me explain. The prize in this "global insurgency" is the people, as it is in all insurgencies. We currently have a vocal (and violently active) subset of the world Muslim population (how large or small is debatable). This vocal subset seeks to harness all of Islam in a war against the West. However, another subset is either opposed to this or at least neutral. If we subscribe the theory that this is indeed a war of religion, as Al Qaeda argues, then we force those Muslims that haven't chosen a side to choose the side antagonistic to us.

I don't believe that Islam, in and of itself, is out to conquer the West or Christianity or anything else. I do believe that some have determined that the use of Islam can provide a valuable tool in their fight against the West. I just don't believe we should take actions, or pursue strategies, that make this tool more effective for Al Qaeda and their ilk.

I've been struck in a discussion board I frequent where most of the participants are "red state" non-experts just how many subscribe to a manichean, Islam versus Christianity, end of the world sort of perspective. I guess I didn't think that much about it until I started hearing the same thing from presidential candidates like Giuliani and Huckabee.

I suspect if I looked more closely at the late 1940s and early 1950s, I'd see the same phenomenon. During times of challenge, extremism gains legitimacy and moderation is deprecated, even delegitimized. I compare it to the witch trial in Monty Python and the Holy Grail where the only way to gain attention is to stake out a position even more extreme than the person who went before.

Islam makes a useful "witch" because its violent extremists claim to speak for the religion and many Americans don't know enough about it to recognize what does and does not represent defining characteristics of it.

One of the most bizarre discussions I had in that "other" board came when someone floated out the line from the Koran about slaying non-believers. I pointed out that there are some pretty bloodthirsty and down right genocidal divine instructions in the Bible as well. The other discussants were absolutely shocked that I couldn't see what was to them a perfectly clear distinction: the legitimization of violence in the Bible was God's instruction while that in the Koran was not. I guess I am just too thick to see what to them was an obvious point.

JeffC

12-09-2007, 09:47 PM

I've been struck in a discussion board I frequent where most of the participants are "red state" non-experts just how many subscribe to a manichean, Islam versus Christianity, end of the world sort of perspective. I guess I didn't think that much about it until I started hearing the same thing from presidential candidates like Giuliani and Huckabee.

I see this happen at Blackfive.net, Townhall, and pretty much every Republican-oriented board that I infrequently visit. I still can't get used to hearing it, and, to be honest, I find it a little bit frightening. Religious wars last a very long time because both sides believe that they have a mandate from their respective Higher Powers to kill the nonbeliever.

The other frightening aspect to the "War on Islam" faction is that these are 21st century Americans who are advocating it. Granted that what's said in the Comments section of a political blog is often written in a more exaggerated style due to the anonymity of the medium, but still, this type of fear-mongering should have ended a long time ago.

Ken White

12-09-2007, 09:59 PM

the ideological and religious divides. They bear watching but no support in equal parts.

The rabid right will kill 'em all and let god sort 'em out, the rabid left sees no threat other than said rabid right -- the truth, as always is probably somewhere in between.

JeffC

12-09-2007, 10:13 PM

Ski

12-10-2007, 01:33 PM

Great article and thanks for the link. Agree wholeheardetly. We've burnt the Army to ash over the last 17 years, we need to take a long pause and realize that military actions has definitive limits for countless reasons.

I think there are two counteracting forces at work in the world right now. Globalization and the rise of non-state actors. The patient who gets to feel the brunt of these two forces is the nation-state - both globalization and the rise of non-state actors pull the nation state apart from two different spectrums. Globalization pulls it apart from the economic angle, and the non-state actors pull it apart from the political, religious and cultural angles. Globalization really means homogenization - you see the same stores, brand names and the like everywhere you go. On a personal level, I hate this but you can't stop progress, even if its not progress.

I think Americans like "either/or" scenarios way too much. We reduce everything to this dichotomy, and the world is much, much more complex and grey. I suppose the media could be blamed, but in reality it's a matter of self education and not trusting what is put out in front of you as gospel.

The Moslems are no better and no worse then most of us in the world. There is a small minority of Qtubists who are deluded into thinking they are the new blend of Leninist/Mohammedanian vanguard of religious revolutionaries. They tend to die a lot, mainly by choice. Isolate them through good propaganda (I mean IO), and increase the standards of living in Islamic countries and they will die off.

SteveMetz

12-10-2007, 01:36 PM

JeffC

12-10-2007, 02:47 PM

Ski

12-10-2007, 03:00 PM

We have to label the radical Sunni terrorists as something. I hear Salafist/Wahhabist/Qtubist - I'll be interested to see what her definition of "right" is.

SteveMetz

12-10-2007, 04:13 PM

We have to label the radical Sunni terrorists as something. I hear Salafist/Wahhabist/Qtubist - I'll be interested to see what her definition of "right" is.

They are out of the salafi tradition (although, of course, not all salafis are extremists). Some but not all of them are out of the wahabist tradition. Qtub influenced them but, according to my professor, developed a critique of the West and call for piety, but not an ideology of "war."

Tom Odom

12-10-2007, 04:25 PM

They are out of the salafi tradition (although, of course, not all salafis are extremists). Some but not all of them are out of the wahabist tradition. Qtub influenced them but, according to my professor, developed a critique of the West and call for piety, but not an ideology of "war."

All correct but in the interest of labeling I would recommend irhabists (versus salafis and/or wahabis for the reasons Steve gives or as jihadists because that puts a single meaning on jihad, which is inaccurate and misleading) and continued use of extremists as an effective descriptor of them (versus terrorists as a trite label for their intent).

Tom

SteveMetz

12-10-2007, 04:49 PM

All correct but in the interest of labeling I would recommend irhabists (versus salafis and/or wahabis for the reasons Steve gives or as jihadists because that puts a single meaning on jihad, which is inaccurate and misleading) and continued use of extremists as an effective descriptor of them (versus terrorists as a trite label for their intent).

Tom

I guess we can say what we want but my professor is quite critical of attempts by non Muslims to shape or promote the Arabic words that Muslims use. I myself stick to "extremists" or "militants." Of course, there are problems with that as well since the category would include both Osama bin Laden and Richard Perle.

Steve Blair

12-10-2007, 07:01 PM

I would suggest that folks on this thread take a deep breath, check any urges to thump on sacred books of any sort at the door, and then resume discussion.

That does not involve checking one's deity at the door but rather refraining from invoking him in every post. The original line of this thread was useful. Let's see if we can get back to that without running down too many rabbit holes.

Thanks.

Steve Blair

12-10-2007, 07:26 PM

Now I know these folks all have the PR image of tree-hugging loons with Che t-shirts and an aversion to basic hygiene, but what happens if they become the "next thing?" After all, they developed a great deal of the vaunted "global insurgency" framework (diversified networks and leadership structures, communicating via the internet, and so on). I'm wondering how things might look if more of them buy into the ELF-type mindset.

Sean Osborne

12-10-2007, 07:30 PM

With respect to the thread title "After al-Qaeda?", perhaps this current article by Ali Eteraz (http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/opinion/?id=23445) is germane to the gist of the discussion?

Jedburgh

12-11-2007, 01:37 PM

CTC, 2 Oct 07: Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in al-Qa’ida from 1989-2006 (http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/aq3_pdf.asp)
CTC has now released a report based on the documents provided at the link in my earlier post:

The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point is pleased to present the report, Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in al-Qa’ida from 1989-2006. Based on a collection of al-Qa’ida documents recently released from the Department of Defense's Harmony Database, in addition to the previously released documents utilized in the Combating Terorrism Center’s two prior Harmony reports, this report analyzes the history of al-Qa’ida’s internal and long-running debates over the strategies and larger goals of the jihadi movement. Many of these documents, captured in the course of operations supporting the Global War on Terror, have never before been available to the academic and policy community. Cracks in the Foundation includes a richly sourced account of the ongoing struggle between different factions among al-Qa’ida’s leaders and specific recommendations for effectively exploiting weaknesses arising from these internal struggles. We have provided brief summaries of each of the released documents, and the full texts of the released documents can be accessed via hyperlinks within the report, both in their original Arabic and in English. We hope this report will serve as a useful resource in our collective efforts to better understand and combat al-Qa'ida and its affiliated movements.
Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in al-Qa’ida from 1989-2006 (http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/pdf/Harmony_3_Schism.pdf)

For those who don't feel like slogging through the entire 78 page pdf at once, CTC was thoughtful enough to break it down so you could access it in chunks:

Foreword (http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/aq3_foreword.asp)

Introduction (http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/aq3_intro.asp)

Part I
1990-1996: Al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia (http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/aq3_part1.asp)

Part II
1996-2001: The Taliban Refuge and the War with America (http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/aq3_part2.asp)

Part III
2001-2006: Dispersal, Reconsolidation and Problems in Iraq (http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/aq3_part3.asp)

Conclusion (http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/aq3_conclusion.asp)

Jedburgh

04-15-2008, 01:40 PM

RFE/RL, 4 Feb 08: The Al-Qaeda Media Nexus: The Virtual Network Behind the Global Message (http://docs.rferl.org/en-US/AQ_Media_Nexus.pdf)

Key Findings
- The ”original” Al-Qaeda led by Osama bin Laden accounts for a mere fraction of jihadist media production.

- Virtual media production and distribution entities (MPDEs) link varied groups under the general ideological rubric of the global jihadist movement. The same media entities that “brand” jihadist media also create virtual links between the various armed groups that fall into the general category of Al-Qaeda and affiliated movements.

- Three key entities connect Al-Qaeda and affiliated movements to the outside world through the internet. These three media entities — Fajr, the Global Islamic Media Front, and Sahab — receive materials from more than one armed group and post those materials to the internet.

- Information operations intended to disrupt or undermine the effectiveness of jihadist media can and should target the media entities that brand these media and act as the virtual connective tissue of the global movement.

- While video is an important component of jihadist media, text products comprise the bulk of the daily media flow. Within text products, periodicals focused on specific “fronts” of the jihad are an important genre that deserves more attention from researchers.

- The vast majority of jihadist media products focus on conflict zones: Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia.

- The priorities of the global jihadist movement, as represented by its media arm, are operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, and North Africa.

- Jihadist media are attempting to mimic a “traditional” structure in order to boost credibility and facilitate message control. While conventional wisdom holds that jihadist media have been quick to exploit technological innovations to advance their cause, they are moving toward a more structured approach based on consistent branding and quasi-official media entities. Their reasons for doing so appear to be a desire to boost the credibility of their products and ensure message control.

- In line with this strategy, the daily flow of jihadist media that appears on the internet is consistently and systematically branded.
Complete 28 page paper at the link.

Spud

04-15-2008, 10:59 PM

Thanks Jedburgh

paper is virtually winging its way through my IO mates as I speak

very useful

Jedburgh

07-22-2008, 02:46 AM

The Economist, 19 Jul 08: Winning or Losing? A Special Report on Al-Qaeda (http://www.economist.com/specialreports/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11701218)

A Hydra-Headed Monster: Al-Qaeda may have been cut down in Afghanistan, but it is growing in Pakistan’s border area (http://www.economist.com/specialreports/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11701231)

Hearts and Minds: Al-Qaeda’s star is falling in Iraq but rising in the Maghreb (http://www.economist.com/specialreports/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11701285)

Doing Their Own Thing: Unlike in America, terrorism in Europe is often home-grown (http://www.economist.com/specialreports/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11701276)

Bending the Rules: The high cost of Guantánamo Bay (http://www.economist.com/specialreports/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11701249)

Powers of Persuasion: Saudi Arabia tackles terrorism with a mixture of tough policing and gentle re-education (http://www.economist.com/specialreports/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11701258)

The Self-Destructive Gene: Al-Qaeda’s biggest weakness is its propensity to kill indiscriminately (http://www.economist.com/specialreports/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11701267)

Sources and Acknowledgments (http://www.economist.com/specialreports/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11701242)

davidbfpo

07-22-2008, 05:28 AM

THis is the title for an Adelphi Paper (No.394), published by the London based IISS, Ending Terrorism: Lessons for defeating AQ by Audrey Kurth Cronin, now a few weeks ago, but only reached me a week ago. A fascinating read and recommended.

From their website: Like all other terrorist movements, al-Qaeda will end. While it has traits that exploit and reflect the current international context, it is not utterly without precedent: some aspects of al-Qaeda are unusual, but many are not. Terrorist groups end according to recognisable patterns that have persisted for centuries, and they reflect, among other factors, the counter-terrorist policies taken against them. It makes sense to formulate those policies with a specific image of an end in mind. Understanding how terrorism ends is the best way to avoid being manipulated by the tactic. There is vast historical experience with the decline and ending of terrorist campaigns, yet few policymakers are familiar with it. This paper first explains five typical strategies of terrorism and why Western thinkers fail to grasp them. It then describes historical patterns in ending terrorism to suggest how insights from that history can lay a foundation for more effective counter-strategies. Finally, it extracts policy prescriptions specifically relevant to ending the campaign of al-Qaeda and its associates, moving towards a post al‑Qaeda world.

To order: http://www.iiss.org/publications/adelphi-papers/how-to-order/

Being a highly respectable, nay prestigious international think tank you may find a copy in a good university / military library. The author is currently at the US National War College and previously Oxford University. She has written widely on the nature of war and when we last met was working on the Pakistani Army.

davidbfpo

marct

07-22-2008, 01:57 PM

THis is the title for an Adelphi Paper (No.394), published by the London based IISS, Ending Terrorism: Lessons for defeating AQ by Audrey Kurth Cronin, now a few weeks ago, but only reached me a week ago. A fascinating read and recommended.

Very interesting, David; thanks for posting it. It will take me a while to go through it.

Jedburgh

07-29-2008, 06:20 PM

RAND, 28 Jul 08: How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741.pdf)

By analyzing 648 groups that existed between 1968 and 2006, this monograph examines how terrorist groups end. Its purpose is to inform U.S. counterterrorist efforts by understanding how groups have ended in the past and to assess implications for countering al Qa’ida.....
Chapter One: Introduction

Chapter Two: How Terrorist Groups End

Chapter Three: Policing and Japan's Aum Shinrikyo

Chapter Four: Politics and the FMLN in El Salvador

Chapter Five: Military Force and al Qa'ida in Iraq

Chapter Six: The Limits of America's al Qa'ida Strategy

Chapter Seven: Ending the “War” on Terrorism

Appendix A: End-of-Terror Data Set

Appendix B: Al Qa'ida Attacks, 1994–2007

Appendix C: Regression Analysis

davidbfpo

07-29-2008, 08:16 PM

Jedburgh

07-29-2008, 10:38 PM

I have skimmed this RAND paper, it has many good points - notably Bruce Hoffman's comments and using the statistics gathered advocates a massive change in the US strategy - more police and intelligence, less military.

Audrey Cronin's paper is far shorter. They do compliment each other, but if economy of effort is critical - read her paper.

....but if economy of pocketbook is critical - the RAND piece is a free download and Cronin's paper is $28.95 ;)

However, for all of us cheap bastards, her '06 piece from International Security, which is essentially an earlier version of the same theme, How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups (http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/isec.2006.31.1.7), is available for free download....

Ken White

08-02-2008, 04:32 AM

I'm inclined to agree with most of their findings and conclusions. I differ from them on many minor and three major points:

1. They advocate a change in strategy to emphasize law enforcement and intelligence operations. IOW, they want to change what we are doing to do what we are doing. Many confuse the war in Iraq as a part if not the major activity of the 'War on Terrorism' (in fairness because of really poor messages to that effect from the Administration). It is in a sense but, even though it is the big story in the media, it is only one small part of the counterterror effort involving US intel and LE assets worldwide that is and has been ongoing for several years. So no cigar there...

2. They advocate minimal use of military force and use of local forces rather than US. Agree with the concept -- but as they point out, AQ et.al. are now concentrating on Afghanistan (vs. their previous concentration on Iraq) -- so we are merely, again, doing what they advocate. We are more heavily involved in Afghanistan than we'd like due to lack of local capability; we were more involved in Iraq for the same reason (and the fact that some idiot disbanded the Iraqi Army and Police instead of paying them to get retrained...). So, again, no cigar.

3. They acknowledge they had little data on religious groups, state that AQ is unlikely to win in the long term and advocate infiltration and police work as the best vehicle to contain or eliminate the AQ problem. I don't really disagree with that but must point out that infiltrating AQ will not be easy and you have to have effective police (or counterterror agencies) to complement the effective intel effort. Note the 'effective;' some nations have those and some do not, some have one and not the other. As an international player, AQ requires international intel and LE cooperation; we do not have that at an adequate level and the US cannot do much about that except strive for improvement. Further, the quasi-religious dedication sparked by AQ will not just go away and their heavy reliance on ideological terror activity to buttress their points is, I believe, misguided. So I guess I give the paper an 'A' for a great academic exercise that only merits a 'D' for practical applicability.

All IMO, of course. :wry:

I believe on balance that the paper provided no new insights -- I can recall nothing I read in it that I'd consider groundbreaking; most of their recommendations and findings have been in slightly different form around for some time. I realize that the think tanks and studies such as this have to offer 'new directions' -- if they said keep doing what you're doing, they'd quickly go out of business -- but I truly missed anything new in this one.

jmm99

08-02-2008, 05:56 AM

I ain't buying.

COIN strategy, operations and tactics "ain't my department"; but some conclusions raise policy issues - so, IMO.

Rand
First, policing and intelligence should be the backbone of U.S. efforts. In Europe, North America, North Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, al Qa’ida consists of a network of individuals who need to be tracked and arrested. This would require careful work abroad from such organizations as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as well as their cooperation with foreign police and intelligence agencies.

No argument about co-operation, etc. between CIA, FBI and their external equivalents (subject to standard caveats; e,g., "there are friendly nations, there are no friendly intelligence agencies" - but "we can co-operate, so to speak."). I object to "arrest" as the magic bullet.

With AQ (as with any adversary), there are three basic, non-exclusive paths:

(not a quote - just to set it out)

1. Convert (difficult to do for hard-core AQ)

2. Contain (arrest & prosecution is one aspect of this path - so, within my department as to that)

3. Kill (in other persons' departments).

All three paths should be pursued - based on specific METT-TC, as the military guys say.

Rand
Second, military force, though not necessarily U.S. soldiers, may be a necessary instrument when al Qa’ida is involved in an insurgency. Local military forces frequently have more legitimacy to operate than the United States has, and they have a better understanding of the operating environment, even if they need to develop the capacity to deal with insurgent groups over the long run. This means a light U.S. military footprint or none at all.

No argument, in general, about the first sentence - economy of force is good - except when you get your neck chopped off because there has been too much economy. The issue is the application of the necessary force at the key application point.

The rest of it - Tora Bora; the ISI and the Pakistan border crossings, etc., come to mind as contra examples.

True, that a light or no US military footprint gives us fewer international law problems; but that cannot be the determining factor.

Rand
Religious terrorist groups take longer to eliminate than other groups .... Religious groups rarely achieve their objectives. No religious group that has ended achieved victory since 1968.

Probably some truth there - if the fanatics are not close in beliefs (and practices) to a majority of the target population.

Fanatics are "integral rigidists" (in the sense used in systematic theology) - all their beliefs and practices have to be accepted, or (they believe) their system will fall apart. So, the Taliban became disliked; as also AQ in Anbar (about which others here have written).

Perhaps, that is the basic weakness of the extreme Salafist supremacists. I doubt whether their defeat will occur in my lifetime.

Jedburgh

09-20-2008, 03:44 PM

18 Sep 08 testimony before the HASC Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee on Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida and the Way Ahead:

Seth Jones (http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/TUTC091808/Jones_Testimony091808.pdf), RAND

.....The good news about countering al Qa’ida is that its probability of success in actually overthrowing any governments is close to zero. While bin Laden enjoys some popular support in much of the Muslim world, this support does not translate into the mass support that organizations such as Hezbollah enjoy in Lebanon. But the bad news is that U.S. efforts against al Qa’ida have not been successful. They have now lasted longer than America’s involvement in World War II. Despite some successes against al Qa’ida, the U.S. has not significantly undermined its capabilities. Al Qa’ida has been involved in more attacks in a wider geographical area since September 11, 2001, including in such European capitals as London and Madrid. Its organizational structure has also evolved, making it a dangerous enemy. This means that the U.S. strategy in dealing with al Qa’ida must change. A strategy based on military force has not been effective. Based on al Qa’ida’s organizational structure and modus operandi, only a strategy based on careful police and intelligence work is likely to be effective.
Michael Scheuer (http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/TUTC091808/Scheuer_Testimony091808.pdf), The Jamestown Foundation

.....Finally, it is worth considering whether it might be smarter, cheaper, and less bloody to change the failed foreign policies that brought war with al-Qaeda and its Islamist allies, rather than maintaining those war-motivating policies as divine writ and building an ever-larger military to fight the ever-expanding wars that writ produces. Energy self-sufficiency, a fixed and even obdurate determination to stay out of other peoples’ religious wars, and a much more narrowly defined set of genuine U.S. national interests would require far less frequent resort to war and would be much more consonant with timelessly wise foreign-policy goals of our country’s Founding Fathers.
John Arquilla (http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/TUTC091808/Arquilla_Testimony091808.pdf), NPS

....Indeed, it might serve us best if we completely reconsidered the very problematic notion of waging a war of ideas against an enemy whose core constituency of zealots – numbering in the several tens of millions, if opinion polls across the Muslim world are to be believed – will never be talked down by even the slickest rhetoric. So instead, with the goal in mind of improving our ability to detect, disrupt and destroy terror networks, we should recast our intellectual efforts in favor of conducting “a war of ideas about the idea of war.” If such a debate were fostered and undertaken, there would be a good chance that our military might be able to make the shift, in a more supple manner, from industrial-age interstate warfare – characterized by mass-on-mass maneuvers – to the new age of conflict in which the fundamental dynamic is that of “hider/finder,” and whose key tactical formation is a “swarm (http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/2005/RAND_DB311.pdf)” capable of simultaneous, omni-directional attack.....

MikeF

11-11-2009, 07:07 PM

It's about time. Documentary airs 15 Nov.

New jihad code threatens al Qaeda (http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/11/09/libya.jihadi.code/)
Nic Robertson and Paul Cruickshank, CNN

Tripoli, Libya (CNN) -- From within Libya's most secure jail a new challenge to al Qaeda is emerging.

Leaders of one of the world's most effective jihadist organizations, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), have written a new "code" for jihad. The LIFG says it now views the armed struggle it waged against Col. Moammar Gadhafi's regime for two decades as illegal under Islamic law.

The new code, a 417-page religious document entitled "Corrective Studies" is the result of more than two years of intense and secret talks between the leaders of the LIFG and Libyan security officials.

The code's most direct challenge to al Qaeda is this: "Jihad has ethics and morals because it is for God. That means it is forbidden to kill women, children, elderly people, priests, messengers, traders and the like. Betrayal is prohibited and it is vital to keep promises and treat prisoners of war in a good way. Standing by those ethics is what distinguishes Muslims' jihad from the wars of other nations."

The code has been circulated among some of the most respected religious scholars in the Middle East and has been given widespread backing. It is being debated by politicians in the U.S. and studied by western intelligence agencies.

In essence the new code for jihad is exactly what the West has been waiting for: a credible challenge from within jihadist ranks to al Qaeda's ideology.

While the code states that jihad is permissible if Muslim lands are invaded -- citing the cases of Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine -- the guidelines it sets down for when and how jihad should be fought, and its insistence that civilians should not be targeted are a clear rebuke to the goals and tactics of bin Laden's terrorist network.

davidbfpo

11-30-2009, 11:17 PM

In a rather interesting contrast BBC Radio 4 'Start the Week' programme had Professor Audrey Cronin and Sir Hugh Orde (former RUC/PSNI Chief Constable) discuss their perspectives: http://www.bbc.co.uk/podcasts/series/stw/

Hopefully available to listen tobeyond the UK (unlike some TV items I have posted).

omarali50

12-01-2009, 08:07 PM

It is important to keep in mind that civilian police work and intelligence work are going to work when you have a regime you can work with. Nobody is advocating going to war against Britain in spite of a number of terrorists who were radicalised in Britain or come from Britain. Clearly, Britain is a friendly government and we can take it from there.

The problem is the existence of states that do NOT wish to cooperate (or pretend to cooperate and don't). Military operations are sometimes the only way to change such a govt (Afghanistan) or to force it to change its behavior. Of course, it doesnt have to be a frontal attack. Pakistan may be said to have changed course because of the fear of military action rather than actual action (though there is some confusion about the issue and the army's insane obsession with India makes it resistant to some forms of anti-terror cooperation even now)....

On another note: It may be a mistake to focus too much on the Islamic roots of Salafist terrorism. The idea of Islamic solidarity and the way military supremacy and religion were intertwined in early Islamic history means that classical Islamism (there must be a better term, but i am in a hurry) provides a ready made tool for anyone wishing to organize military resistance (or terrorism, same thing on a different scale), but in the end, populations seem to respond to straightforward "secular" pressures even though the supposed ideology does not change.

EVEN in supposedly fanatical Pathan lands, with decisive military superiority (and ruthlessness), Maharaja Ranjit Singh ruled over several Pakhtun districts with no more trouble than he was getting within Punjab from fellow sikhs and "less fanatical" muslims.

My point is, it may be a distraction to be too hung up on trying to change the supposed ideology of "fundamentalist Muslims". History, not argument, undermined the gods. Ideological change will come from within when it's need is felt strongly enough (and its need IS being felt). Foreign powers may be better off dealing in standard carrots and sticks and not making too much of a fuss about why Achmed insists on believing that infidels should pay Jizya. Unless his army can beat the infidel army, that dream is going nowhere.....

Of course, I am all in favor of USAID supporting arts and literature and CIA front companies employing religious scholars and arranging "courses" in Honolulu for sympathetic intellectuals (because a number of my friends are likely to be beneficiaries of such largesse and because its a worthier cause than paying off rapacious warlords)....I am just saying, that is not the crucial front.

davidbfpo

12-30-2009, 10:39 PM

Marcus Sageman has written in Perspectives on Terrorism a long piece on
'Confronting al-Qaeda: Understanding the Threat in Afghanistan' and on a read last night it is really a lot more strategic than Afghanistan IMHO. Note an earlier version was given in late 2009 to the US Senate. He supplements his analysis with several charts.

The link is:http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine&view=article&id=92&Itemid=54

A good read and I expect it has drawn some academic "fire", which can be left alone on SWC, see an old thread on this: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5334

davidbfpo

01-10-2010, 03:51 PM

Caught on SWJ news summary, Bruce Hoffman on 'Al-Qaeda has a new strategy. Obama needs one, too': http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/08/AR2010010803555.html?hpid=opinionsbox1

SWJ summary:In the wake of the failed Christmas Day airplane bombing and the killing a few days later of seven CIA operatives in Afghanistan, Washington is, as it was after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, obsessed with "dots" - and our inability to connect them. "The U.S. government had sufficient information to have uncovered this plot and potentially disrupt the Christmas Day attack, but our intelligence community failed to connect those dots," the president said Tuesday. But for all the talk, two key dots have yet to be connected: Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the alleged Northwest Airlines Flight 253 attacker, and Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi, the trusted CIA informant turned assassin. Although a 23-year-old Nigerian engineering student and a 36-year-old Jordanian physician would seem to have little in common, they both exemplify a new grand strategy that al-Qaeda has been successfully pursuing for at least a year. Throughout 2008 and 2009, U.S. officials repeatedly trumpeted al-Qaeda's demise. In a May 2008 interview with The Washington Post, then-CIA Director Michael Hayden heralded the group's "near strategic defeat." And the intensified aerial drone attacks that President Obama authorized against al-Qaeda targets in Pakistan last year were widely celebrated for having killed over half of its remaining senior leadership. Yet, oddly enough for a terrorist movement supposedly on its last legs, al-Qaeda late last month launched two separate attacks less than a week apart - one failed and one successful - triggering the most extensive review of U.S. national security policies since 2001.

Well worth reading in full IMHO and following my habit this is the last paragraph:
Remarkably, more than eight years after Sept. 11, we still don't fully understand our dynamic and evolutionary enemy. We claim success when it is regrouping and tally killed leaders while more devious plots are being hatched. Al-Qaeda needs to be utterly destroyed. This will be accomplished not just by killing and capturing terrorists -- as we must continue to do -- but by breaking the cycle of radicalization and recruitment that sustains the movement.

davidbfpo

01-10-2010, 04:13 PM

Two comments on this burgeoning theme in the media and blogsphere. Hat tip to KOW, which set a balancing view: 'Amid the Hysteria, A Look at What al-Qaeda Can't Do' . Read more: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1952315,00.html?xid=rss-topstories&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed:+time/topstories+(TIME:+Top+Stories)&utm_content=Google+UK#ixzz0cE6UE98G

And on KOW:http://kingsofwar.wordpress.com/2010/01/10/the-fragile-republic/

davidbfpo

01-27-2010, 10:29 PM

Steve Coll has appeared giving evidence today before the House Armed Services Committee about Al Qaeda and U.S. policy. My complete testimony follows on the link: http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/stevecoll/2010/01/house-testimony-the-paradoxes-of-al-qaeda.html#entry-more#ixzz0dr2PHFtX

Too long to read fully now.

Entropy

01-27-2010, 10:46 PM

This may be applicable here. Leah Farrell, a former Australian counter-terrorism analyst who's writing her PhD dissertation on Al Qaeda, has struck up a relationship with Abu Walid al Masri who she describes as:

...currently an author for the Taliban’s flagship magazine, and self declared “old friend” of al Qaeda. He has an amazing history. One of the first Arabs to go to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets and the first foreigner to swear allegiance to Mullah Omar.

They're in a dialog and Ms Farrell just posted a translation of al Masri's recent questions and as well as her response (http://allthingsct.wordpress.com/my-dialogue-with-abu-walid-al-masri/abu-walids-questions-and-my-response/). There's much more on her site and it's all well worth the time to read.

davidbfpo

01-31-2010, 12:12 PM

A wide-ranging article, headlined 'Recruits seek out al-Qaeda's deadly embrace across a growing arc of jihadist terror. Just two years ago al-Qaeda was believed to be on the back foot. Now the jihadist group is attracting ever more recruits across a growing arc of terror'.

The Yemen and Somalia appear a lot.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/saudiarabia/7105454/Recruits-seek-out-al-Qaedas-deadly-embrace-across-a-growing-arc-of-jihadist-terror.html

As a contrast a story announcing a WINEP report on those who leave: http://counterterrorismblog.org/PRIVOXY-FORCE/2010/01/terrorist_dropouts_learning_fr.php and the report itself: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus101.pdf

davidbfpo

02-25-2010, 11:14 PM

On Feb. 25, 2010, the Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative and Foreign Policy magazine hosted "Al-Qaeda Central: Capabilities, Allies, and Messages," a conference about the two strikingly different but simultaneously accurate pictures of al-Qaeda have dominated recent discussion of the terrorist group: one, a resilient foe still determined to attack the United States and its interests abroad, and the other, a wounded organization whose leaders are being hunted down and killed.

The New America Foundation also released a series of papers designed to address the current state of the threat from al-Qaeda’s Afghanistan- and Pakistan-based central leadership, its allies, and messaging strategies:

Paul Cruickshank, "The Militant Pipeline Between the Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Region and the West." (Executive summary.)

Barbara Sude, "Al-Qaeda Central: An Assessment of the Threat Posed by the Terrorist Group Headquartered on the Afghanistan-Pakistan Border."

Stephen Tankel, "Lashkar-e-Taiba in Perspective: An Evolving Threat."

Link:http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/events/2010/al_qaeda_central

There is a pod cast for the presentations and I listened earlier to the first, excellent and started the sceond before chores arrived.

davidbfpo

03-24-2010, 10:36 PM

Leah Farrell has written a short article on AQ command; key points:
Key Points

1. Al-Qaeda’s decentralised operating structure has cushioned it from the impact of droneattacks and arrests. A clear hierarchy remains intact, supported by robust and adaptable command and control processes, despite the losses it has suffered since 2001.

2. This modus operandi for external operations plots has remained remarkably constant in recent years, with plot members assigned several points of contact who provide technical and logistical support.

3. Nearly all recent disruptions to Al-Qaeda’s operational activity have occurred outside of its Pakistan-based command structure via the arrest of couriers tasked with facilitating franchise communication or co-ordinating the
activities of operatives in the West planning for attacks.

Full article:http://allthingsct.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/jsas-11-p16-20-command.pdf

One caveat… I wrote this in September/October last year so it is a little dated in terms of drone attacks etc. However, I still stand by the arguments I made in this piece.

davidbfpo

05-07-2010, 02:58 PM

This article was clearly written before the Times Square attack and appears within a Kings of War comment:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/05/complacence/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed:+KingsOfWar+(Kings+of+War)which in itself is of value.

Cracks is by Tomas Rid, he opens with:
Yet it is only growing more difficult to defeat the global jihad. and near the end:
The global jihad is losing what David Galula called a strong cause, and with it its political character. This change is making it increasingly difficult to distinguish jihad from organized crime on the one side and rudderless fanaticism on the other.

Link:http://www.wilsonquarterly.com/article.cfm?AID=1523

davidbfpo

05-01-2011, 10:42 AM

A BBC commentary by Gordon Corera, which opens with:
As uprisings challenge the old order in the Middle East and North Africa, one organisation which for many years claimed it was at the vanguard of toppling authoritarian regimes has so far played almost no part. So is al-Qaeda still relevant? Do the uprisings represent a threat or an opportunity to its role?

Citing Nigel Inkster, a former deputy head of Britain's intelligence service, now with the International Institute for Strategic Studies:
Ayman Al-Zawahiri (al-Qaeda's number two) has been trying to overthrow Egyptian regimes for the last 30 years by violence, and a group of middle-class activists armed with cell phones managed to achieve it in under one month...This is hardly a resounding endorsement for the jihadist business model.

Gordon concludes:
...if al-Qaeda currently appears on the backfoot it may still be able to find new ideological and physical spaces in which to renew itself and continue its struggle.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13003693

Bob's World

05-01-2011, 12:44 PM

Arab Spring is the moment that the west has been waiting for, but most do not recognize that yet.

The tremendous potential energy of these many populaces in varying stages of suppressed insurgency is what AQ has been leveraging for years with they networked UW campaign. Now that many of these are starting to break from from that suppressed state the time is ripe to make aggressive moves to Out-compete AQ for influence with these movements and to provide the much broader populaces behind such movements a far better advocate to help them negotiate new or better governance with their leaders.

They know AQ offers a bad choice, but when a bad choice is your only choice for confronting a worse situation, what do you do?

The other realization the West needs to come to is that while we cannot "contain" AQ in the FATA, neither should we try to defeat them there either. Better to know where their base of ops is than to send them completely into the shadows. Ideology cannot be contained, and these guys do not need some big patch of real estate to run effective operations.

The final move for greater success is to narrow the aperture tremendously in regard to what we consider to be "AQ." We have allowed a legal process and threat-seeking intel mentality lump all manner of movements under broad categories of "terrorist" or "AQ" that may facilitate capture kill operations, but tremendously hinders other forms of engagement to bring these organizations in from the cold and convert to part of the legal solution. Sure, some deserve the title and the relentless hunting, but most do not and it is a problem.

jmm99

05-01-2011, 05:07 PM

I'm not disagreeing with your analysis of AQ and its waging unconventional warfare against the US; nor your BL that "Sure, some deserve the title and the relentless hunting, but most do not and it is a problem."

That said, what does the "West" have to offer the Arab World, or for that matter, the Muslim World ? Those Worlds have already picked at "Western Technology" (they like it and want more of it; but not its ideology as perceived by them). They also have picked at some forms (repeat, forms) of governance.

If you'd asked Maududi, he (IMO) would have said: "Yes, I believe in "justice", "democracy" and "self-determination".

Tell you what, I'll play Maududi and you convert me.

Regards

Mike

Bob's World

05-01-2011, 07:50 PM

Mike,

It is not what we have to offer so much as what it is we have persistently denied through our presence and influence over the governments of the region.

What we have to offer now is as simple as "De Oppresso Liber." These are populaces who have had little option other than to turn to organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, and AQ for support and leadership in challenging outside influences and governments at home that have come to act with a growing impunity to the concerns of the common people.

Currently AQ is the UW force in the region, AQ is the De Oppresso Liber force in the region. When we send US forces to help these governments build "security force capacity" far too often that is capacity to suppress their own populace rather than capacity to protect their populace against external threats or terrorism from non-state actors that we lump as "VEOs."

So what we offer is simple:

1. Stop being an obstacle to good governance (no more enabling of poor governance or capacity building that we can reasonably assume will be used far more to suppress than protect)

2. Start competing AQ IAW our own professed principles as a nation. Not to overly intervene or demand that other act, think, govern or pray as we do, but rather to help establish clear limits for internal disputes to be resolved within; and to focus on repairing the dysfunctional nature of the relationships we have with so many of these governments (and with so many of the non-state actors as well).

For the US we slid with increasing speed down the slippery slope of involvement in this region following WWII. Much of Cold War Containment was waged here. Little of Cold War Containment was rolled back here as it was elsewhere. The local autocrats liked the lives they had developed and the protection to maintain them. We liked the certainty of these relationships as well, with the access to resources and key sea lanes that are critical to our economy. We just need to find a new, less abusive of the people of the region, approach.

jmm99

05-01-2011, 10:03 PM

Bill Moore

05-01-2011, 11:03 PM

I tend to agree with Bob's last post. There are many who rather embrace policies that protect the status quo to protect the interest of big busness and others, but this appears to an ideal time to devise policy that is aligned with our values. Regardless of whoever gets in power, they will continue to sell oil, so we can set that irrational fear aside for the time being.

Why we do embrace political change in our nation through the demoratic process, yet fear it when we see it happening external to our borders? Since there is no means in the Arab Nation-States for the nation to legally change its State their process is illegal, messy, and unpredictable, but not necessarily less democratic than ours.

For the most part I recommend only providing moral support to those trying to change their illegimate governments via mostly peaceful protests. However, once again we learn that peaceful protests don't work when the State decides to suppress with martial force. At that point great nations like the U.S., and organizations like NATO and the UN have to make hard decisions on what policy to pursue. Getting militarily involved in gray situations where the actors are largely unknown is risky, but failing to help the nation that is struggling for freedom is potentially immoral if we truly have a foreign policy that hinges on values blended with interests.

We don't know what tomorrow will bring. Some of these movements may succeed, while others fail, and even the successful revolutions may in the end bring little change. One thing we can predict though is these nations will remember how the U.S. responded, and if our response was aligned with our stated values.

This may be the new era for unconventional warfare as the proliferation of ideas through various forms of media prompt more nations to rise up and demand change. This won't be the UW of our past that was largely focused on guerrilla warfare, that doctrine and its associated TTPs will have to evolve into something that may be more appropriately called political warfare in response to new challenges, but it is a policy option we should be "prepared" to offer our leaders.

Dayuhan

05-02-2011, 02:10 AM

I have some serious doubts about some of the propositions being advanced here.

First, the extent to which nationalist insurgents turn to AQ for support is debatable, and largely unsupported. What support has AQ actually provided to these groups? In many cases AQ is the one receiving recruits and financial support from nations where we assume nationalist insurgency. This relationship is a lot more complex than "AQ rides to the rescue as champion of the populace". While AQ has very successfully exploited regional resentment to western intervention, its efforts to muster revolution against local regimes have fallen pretty flat. There's little to suggest that anyone, anywhere has adopted AQ as their champion against their own government.

Similarly, resentment to despotic governance is not the only or the most effective narrative exploited by AQ. There's a deep-seated generic resentment to the west throughout the region, and not just because the west is perceived as supporting local despots. We should not assume that if Saudi Arabia or Egypt ceases to be governed by despots AQ will lose support in these countries. It's very likely that even if these countries were democracies AQ would still find them ready suppliers of funds and recruits, as long as western powers are engaged in the region.

We should not overestimate our role as "enablers" or "supporters" of despotic governments. Certainly we have to deal with the perception, but if we assume that the perception is the reality we will assume influence that we do not actually have. Saudi Arabia or Kuwait will not become a constitutional monarchy because we press them to. More likely they will tell us to bug off and mind our own business, and there's not much we can do about it if they do. At the moment we need them more than they need us, and they know it.

We cannot assume that pressure on these governments will win us points with the people. Often it won't. Even people who loathe their governments often react very badly to US criticism of those same governments: it's not seen as standing up for the populace, it's seen as intrusive meddling and as disrespect for the nation and the culture. Our motives will always be suspect, no matter what we say. We may intervene chanting "de opreso liber", but that doesn't mean the populace won't be hearing "we want the oil".

I've no objection at all to reducing or eliminating support for and enabling of despotic regimes... though we should not assume that will change much. When we start talking about actively trying to change those regimes, we step into very muddy waters with abundant potential for misinterpretation and unintended consequence. It's tempting to think that the ill effects of past bad meddling can be corrected by compensatory good meddling. We should remember that the meddling that now seems bad seemed quite good at the time, and we're no more omniscient now then we were then. The answer to bad meddling isn't good meddling, it's less meddling.

Sallying forth to liberate the Middle East is likely to leave us in an even bigger mess. That doesn't mean we have to stick with the status quo, but it means that we have to proceed with a great deal of subtlety and restraint - not traditionally our strong points - when it comes to challenging that status quo.

davidbfpo

05-02-2011, 08:17 AM

Please note some posts here have been moved to the 'Osama bin Laden dead (for information & debate)' thread just created:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=13211

Can comments on OBL's death and implications be placed on that thread please.

Bob's World

05-02-2011, 11:14 AM

Robert, if I may address you so,

First, a general question that pervades all: why should I or any other resident of the Islamic World accept principles of governance from the United States ? What do you have to offer that cannot be found within the four walls of the Islamic House ?

Second, yes - "Stop being an obstacle to good governance". And, withdraw your support from governments in the Islamic World - their fates have been ordained. As you know, I wrote of good governance many years ago.

Third, I may not understand this - "Start competing AQ IAW our own professed principles as a nation." However, this seems inconsistent with your other statements. Are you speaking only of diplomatic discussions; or are you speaking of interventions to change our professed principles (albeit, "kinder and more gentle" as one of your presidents said) ?

Fourth - what does ""De Oppresso Liber" translate to (to you) in the modern-day realities of the Islamic World ?

Fifth - if the US "We just need to find a new, less abusive of the people of the region, approach", why not just depart and allow the People of the Islamic World to seek out what we want and do not want from the US ?

Sincerely,

Abul
(last address, Buffalo, NY, 1979)

Point One: (And Dayuhan always twists this one and throws it back at me, so I have apparently never been clear) Our principle is to allow people to live and govern by their principles. When we enable a single strongman to govern such populaces with impunity WE do not live by our principles, and men so corrupted with wealth and power soon do not govern by the principles, ways and means acceptable to the populaces they are supposed to serve.

When I read principles such as "all men are created equal" I realize that the actual value assessed is situational and varies wildly over time and by culture. Even with in the four corners of the US values change. Where we go astray is when we demand anyone, anywhere adhere to our current assessed value.

I have always been adamant that we need to stand for Self-Determination (another principle that we loudly profess, but then tend to subjugate to newer values, such as the specific form of governance found in "Democracy." The fact is that Self-Determination is the ultimate form of democracy, regardless of what form of government adopted, as it implies that these people are being governed as they desire to be governed.

On your second point, I do not ever say we need to withdraw our support, but we do need to stop granting unconditional support to individual leaders and regimes while ignoring how they are not treating their populace within the norms of their own culture. We need to become more attuned to how the people feel about their government and not get into positions were we are reasonably perceived as the obstacle to self-determination and the enabler of impunity.

On my third point, when I say "compete" with AQ, that is a competition for influence with, and the trust of, the people of every nation. Most importantly for this mission are those that are in high levels of suppressed insurgency that AQ is targeting so aggressively to leverage that energy for their own ends. Those people deserve a new champion that is not so committed to extreme versions of their own religion, or extreme tactics for influencing governments.

As I type this the talking heads on "Morning Joe" are already saying "Great on Bin Laden, but the real danger is not AQ base in Pak, but rather is AQ on the AP." That is so WRONG. AQ conducts UW, and yes, they have agents working on the AP with members of the many oppressed populaces that exist on that beating heart at the core of the energy that AQ has leveraged from the very beginning. If we shift to massive CT against these insurgents and AQ operators, coupled with massive security force capacity building to suppress such internal threats, we will have totally and completely blown this opportunity. Now is the time to completely change the tone and focus of GWOT to focus on root causes. Let the SOF community and the CIA worry about finding and disrupting the UW hubs of AQ as a silent, relentless supporting effort. The main effort must be the relationship between the populaces as a whole and their own governments.

Fourth, De Oppresso Liber is to liberate the oppressed. When one is not free or when one is oppressed is an assessment of the individual in question, and of a populace as a collective norm. Many of the most oppressive regimes in the world still exist in the Middle East, and many of those are counted as our allies, and many of those are the primary source of recruits to support AQ operations around the globe. When we merely conduct CT against those who dare to stand up; when we build the capacity of those governments to suppress more effectively (great article on Al Jazerra on this point http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/04/2011429181644559572.html ) we miss the main point. This is politics, this is governance. Yes, it is good go help protect populaces from the insurgent, from the terrorist. But first, me must ask, have we protected them from their own governments as well??

5th. At the end of the day we are still a great and mighty country. A country with interests. Many of those interests have critical nodes in the Middle East. We must engage to promote those interests. What we must learn is that old techniques that were cavalier to the issues of the populaces affected by such engagement are rendered invalid, dangerous and obsolete by the modern information age. Great Britain learned this lesson to a certain degree when they made the decision that the cost of a colonial empire exceeded the benefit. Today, the cost of the accidental, functional "empire without colonies" built largely through the control measures born of 60 years of Containment also exceeds the benefit. We need to find a new, more efficient model for managing such interests.

AdamG

05-02-2011, 01:28 PM

Place your bets, folks.

The mastermind of the 9/11 attacks warned that al-Qaeda has hidden a nuclear bomb in Europe which will unleash a "nuclear hellstorm" if Osama bin Laden is captured, leaked files revealed.
http://news.ninemsn.com.au/world/8241119/capturing-bin-laden-would-unleash-hell

*
May 2, 2011

U.S. intelligence and law enforcement authorities today stepped up patrols near mosques and recalled an elite U.S. marine unit that handles chemical and biological weapons attacks in preparation for the possibility of terrorist reprisals, following President Obama's announcement that Osama bin Laden has been killed.
http://abcnews.go.com/US/death-osama-bin-laden-trigger-terror-supporters-al/story?id=13505844

*

Osama bin Laden’s death, which weakens al-Qaeda by eliminating the leader who recruited members with grainy video messages, won’t end the terror threat as followers morph into smaller groups inspired by him.

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-02/terror-threat-remains-as-bin-laden-likely-to-inspire-attacks-even-in-death.html

davidbfpo

05-02-2011, 04:28 PM

A new thread resurrected at original author's request that the issues are separate from the general commentary on OBL's demise.

carl

05-02-2011, 05:01 PM

I think it reasonable for AQ as it exists in Pakistan and their allies to conclude that the Pak Army/ISI sold OBL to the Americans. If so they might be inclined to focus the bulk of their malign intentions on Pakistan.

davidbfpo

05-02-2011, 09:21 PM

Currently we are awash with analysis, so caveat aside here is one written by a Canadian resident in the UK:http://www.enduringamerica.com/home/2011/5/2/bin-laden-top-10-list-his-death-and-whats-next.html

It ends with;
Terrorism will not end with the death of bin Laden. There will undoubtedly be retaliatory attacks in his name. However, one of the legacies of 9-11 is that the security regime it unleashed makes future attacks on that scale nearly impossible.

Bin Laden will remain an inspirational figure for his efforts, first against the Soviet Union and then against the US, and those motivated by him now remain the greatest threat.

But bin Laden failed to offer any positive political agenda for the future, which is why Al Qa'eada is so absent from the current events in the Middle East.

J Wolfsberger

05-02-2011, 10:41 PM

But bin Laden failed to offer any positive political agenda for the future, which is why Al Qa'eada is so absent from the current events in the Middle East.

I wonder about that. We seem to have assumed from the beginning that AQ was a completely independent entity. Is it possible that they have actually been an instrument of the Muslim Brotherhood?

AdamG

05-03-2011, 01:56 PM

:confused:

Five men are being held under the Terrorism Act after being arrested close to the Sellafield nuclear site in Cumbria, according to police.

The men, who are all from London and aged in their 20s, were arrested on Monday shortly after 1630 BST.

The arrests were made after Civil Nuclear Constabulary officers conducted a stop check on a vehicle close to the Sellafield site, in Cumbria.

The men were held in Carlisle overnight and are being moved to Manchester.

The BBC's Fiona Trott said the men were thought to have been filming and were all Bangladeshi.

The BBC understands the arrests were not the result of a long running investigation.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-13268834

AdamG

05-03-2011, 01:59 PM

Pre-emptive 'spoiling attack' by the Germans?

Security officials in Germany arrested three suspects who may be linked to al-Qaida on Friday. The men could be the first group connected to the international terrorist group to be uncovered in the country since Mohammed Atta's Hamburg-based 9/11 terror cell. One of the men is believed to have had regular contact with al-Qaida.

http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,759852,00.html

Meanwhile, the report in Die Welt claimed that the three Moroccan men, who have German passports, are part of a larger group of terror suspects. Because further arrests and raids could take place, the BKA and German Federal Prosecutor's Office were reserved, the paper reported security officials as saying. The newspaper reported that when the men appear, as expected, before investigative judges at the Federal Court of Justice on Saturday, they will be accused of membership in a foreign terrorist organization.

davidbfpo

05-03-2011, 02:19 PM

I think not, just a realistic decision that arrests had to be made, even if others not under control. See:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13248107

Posted two days ago on another thread.

tequila

05-03-2011, 04:00 PM

I wonder about that. We seem to have assumed from the beginning that AQ was a completely independent entity. Is it possible that they have actually been an instrument of the Muslim Brotherhood?

There is much evidence against this thesis and very little towards it - I would ask if you have any for this argument.

Also I think you overestimate the unity of the MB itself. Are you talking about the Egyptian MB, the Jordanian MB, the Syrian, Hamas?

jmm99

05-03-2011, 05:45 PM

I'd suggest a look at (from pp.14-15 pdf):

Another vulnerability of Zawahiri is his attacks and abject hatred of the Muslim Brotherhood, that found its ultimate expression in a 1994 book “Bitter Harvest.” Zawahiri attacks the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas and Hizballah for working with the government and participating in electoral politics. This only serves to further isolate al-Qaida and Zawahiri from the wider Islamist movement.

Ayman al-Zawahiri, A Mythic Figure or Fringe Leader within the Islamist Political Movement: Highlighting the 2006 Writings of Egyptian Journalist Gamal Abdal-Rahim (http://ctc.usma.edu/publications/ABOUL-ENEIN-ZAWAHIRI.pdf) (by LCDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, MSC, USN 2006) (15 pages pdf).

This is a book review, not a scholarly thesis; but it points up the links and disputes that now-target #1 had with the various factions and affiliated groups of the Egyptian MB.

While collateral to Zawahiri's relationship to EGB, I think this comment by LCDR Aboul-Enein (pp.13-14 pdf) is worth some present thought (emphasis added):

Another disagreement I have with the book is the insistence that the term al-Qaida was derived from the string of five Afghan bases (Farouk, Badr, Jalalabad, al-Siddiq and Jihad), it is most likely the name was derived from Azzam’s many speeches and writings calling for the establishment of al-Qaida al-Sulba (firm foundation). The language of Islamist militants is important, as base and foundation are two different entities, with a foundation connoting flexibility that ranges from base to a transnational world of global logistical support.

The wider "base-foundation" concept is somewhat similar to our (US) concept of a special operations base, which can have more than one geographic location so long as the functional components are networked.

I'd hope that the above is useful for educational, not argumentative, purposes.

Regards

Mike

J Wolfsberger

05-03-2011, 07:15 PM

There is much evidence against this thesis and very little towards it - I would ask if you have any for this argument.

Also I think you overestimate the unity of the MB itself. Are you talking about the Egyptian MB, the Jordanian MB, the Syrian, Hamas?

I wasn't advancing a theory, I was speculating on a possibility. It seems reasonable that MB, having been largely driven underground throughout the Moslem world, would spin off AQ as a pressure group, thereby obtaining the twin benefit of destabilizing the authoritarian regimes and being able to cast themselves as "moderate."

Along with that speculation, I suppose I should raise the question just how much of the perception of the unity of MB (or lack thereof) is due to actual knowledge, and how much is due to any coordination having been driven underground as a result of the suppression of MB by the various authoritarian regimes in the region. (In fact, I can't think of any country where they were allowed to operate completely in the open without fear of suppression - including Egypt.)

Again, just a speculative question for consideration. YMMV.

J Wolfsberger

05-03-2011, 07:53 PM

I'd hope that the above is useful for educational, not argumentative, purposes.

It is.

However, both AG and MB seek dramatic ("revolution arty") change in the Moslem world. Specifically, a return to a pure, Islamic form of ordering society, ala Qutb and Salafism. In revolutionary theory, there is usually an open, political, "peaceful" organization, in this case MB, and a covert, "military," violent organization, in this case AQ. The two are almost always publicly disapproving of each other for disinformation purposes.

Similar to your comments, mine are for discussion, not argumentative, purposes.

jmm99

05-03-2011, 08:40 PM

but maybe someone else has them (with sources), and that is an estimate of adherents to "ala Qutb and Salafism" among Muslims. Also MB adherents among its various branches. Then we could have some fact-based discussion - I know, I'm no fun.

This stuff can get pretty esoteric as in this SWJ publication (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/04/ayman-alzawahiris-citations-of/), Jai Singh and John David Perry, Ayman Al-Zawahiri’s Citations of the Qur’an: A Descriptive Study of Selected Works (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/405-singh.pdf) (2010) (pdf pp.12-14):

The most cited chapters were at Tawba (Surah 9, 39 citations), aal-e-Imran (Surah 3, 32 citations), an Nisa (Surah 4, 31 citations), al Maeda (Surah 5, 26 citations), al Anfal (Surah 8, 23 citations), al Baqara (Surah 2, 16 citations), al Ahzab (Surah 33, 16) and Muhammad (Surah 47, 12 citations). Taken together, these eight chapters provided a substantial portion of all chapters cited (69.1%).
....
The distribution of ayat cited within each surah was then considered (using all 428 ayat). The most cited surahs were all Medinan era with al Baqara (Surah 2, 18 citations), Aal-E-Imran (Surah 3, 58 citations), an Nisa (Surah 4, 42 citations), al Maeda (Surah 5, 43 citations), al Anfal (Surah 8, 31 citations), at Tawba (Surah 9, 58 citations), al Ahzab (Surah 33, 35 citations) and Muhammad (Surah 47, 21 citations). Together, these citations represented 71.5% (306 of 428) of all citations noted. The distribution of ayat cited in each of these surahs is shown in Figures 1.
.....
The three most oft-cited ayat were Surah at Tawba (9:38, 13 citations) and Surah al Maeda (5: 51, 10 citations; 5:52, 9 citations). Neither of the “sword verses,” 9:5 and 9:29, were cited by al Zawahiri.

I found the last sentence interesting - since he has no aversion to the sword.

Regards

Mike

tequila

05-03-2011, 08:50 PM

I agree with one thing: both al-Qaeda and the MB in its various incarnations have the same broad goal - an Islamist state that governs principally by sharia law. AQ probably envisions this state covering all the old domains of the Umayyad caliphate + Central Asia and East Africa, while the MB's mental map doesn't go quite so far, but one should never, ever forget that the MB are Islamists.

I very much doubt, however, that the MB/AQ are like Sinn Fein/PIRA. More like the Communist Party of India (Marxist), which governed West Bengal and Kerala for decades, and the Red Army Faction. Both fly the Communist flag, both probably envision a state governed by Communist principles - but one participates in government more or less peacefully, while the other principally enjoys bombing people and issuing communiques - and neither in communication or control of the other.

Presley Cannady

05-04-2011, 12:43 AM

jmm99

05-04-2011, 01:18 AM

Perhaps, a response to your 5-points in the Fri-Sun period. We in the nether regions have to learn patience ;), as we await The Cleaving Asunder (http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/maududi/mau82.html#S82) (text (http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/k/koran/koran-idx?type=DIV0&byte=940263)) and The Resurrection (http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/maududi/mau75.html#S75) (text (http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/k/koran/koran-idx?type=DIV0&byte=920701)) - perhaps some commonality, perhaps not.

Sincerely,

Abul
(last address, Buffalo, NY, 1979)

AdamG

05-04-2011, 11:12 AM

I'm reading this and hearing one of Sasha Cohen's voices, probably a Borat variant.

In a Youtube video uploaded by the imam he said: "The western dogs are rejoicing after killing one of our Islamic lions. From Al-Aqsa Mosque, where the future caliphate will originate with the help of God, we say to them – the dogs will not rejoice too much for killing the lions. The dogs will remain dogs and the lion, even if he is dead, will remain a lion."

The imam then verbally attacked US President Barack Obama saying: "You personally instructed to kill Muslims. You should know that soon you'll hang together with Bush Junior."

http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4064183,00.html

AdamG

05-04-2011, 11:18 AM

I think not, just a realistic decision that arrests had to be made, even if others not under control. .

You don't think there's a possibility that the Germans, who were working on these guys for awhile, might have gotten a "wink-wink, nudge-nudge, you might want to get them soon" suggestion?

It'd make sense to roll up any easily captured, potential counterattackers before you do something that's going to be their trigger.

davidbfpo

05-04-2011, 06:41 PM

AdamG,

The five men arrested near a UK nuclear site have been released without charge, albeit slipping from the front page:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-13284968

As for the arrests pre-UBL demise I've seen no update. My reading of the German explanation was that the men had passed the danger point in a CT investigation, so no need for any external "nudge". Let's see what happens at court.

AdamG

05-05-2011, 01:17 PM

WRT 'ze Germans', a back-channel hint shouldn't ever come out in a courtroom.

WRT to the five Bangladeshi's, good call on your part : so (predictably), we see post-OBL hypersensitivity on the part of security personnel.

*
New stuff, also related -

The Saudi Interior Ministry said today that a senior al Qaeda member on Riyadh's most-wanted list named Khaled al-Qahtani called from abroad and turned himself in.

"Interior Ministry's spokesman Maj. Gen. Mansour Al-Turki said in a statement Wednesday that Khaled Hathal Abdullah al-Atifi al-Qahtani contacted the security authorities from an undisclosed country and expressed his wish to come home," the Associated Press reports.

http://news.yahoo.com/s/yblog_theenvoy/20110504/ts_yblog_theenvoy/al-qaeda-member-surrenders-saudi-arabia-says

AdamG

05-05-2011, 03:52 PM

ADEN: A leader of al Qaeda’s branch in restive southern Yemen on Wednesday vowed revenge for the US killing of the worldwide network’s founder Osama bin Laden.

“We will take revenge for the death of our Sheikh Osama bin Laden and we will prove this to the enemies of God,” he told AFP, contacted by telephone from Yemen’s southern province of Abyan, an al Qaeda stronghold.

“They will see what they haven’t expected … We are preparing a plan to continue jihad in the coming period,” said the al Qaeda leader, requesting anonymity for “security reasons.”

Uh huh. Ok, tough guys....

ADEN, May 5 (Reuters) - Two mid-level al Qaeda leaders were killed in Yemen on Thursday in a remote province where al Qaeda is active, the news service of the Yemeni defence ministry said, and residents said they saw a drone in the air at the time.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/05/al-qaeda-deaths-two-mid-level-leaders-yemen_n_857888.html?icid=maing-grid7|main5|dl12|sec3_lnk3|60614

davidbfpo

05-07-2011, 10:20 AM

Paul Rogers writes a commentary, summarised as:
The death of the al-Qaida leader is a symbolic moment. But far more important is that the future of his movement - and much else besides - is closely tied to the success or failure of the Arab risings.

Near the end:
The hope within al-Qaida is that the aspirations embodied in the Arab spring are dashed, and that it can benefit from the ensuing deep disillusion..... After the failure of democratic and non-violent protest, they will work strenuously to embed a core idea - that the only path to renewal is Islamist and it must be won by violence.

Clearly there is an overlap here with Bob's World's writings.

Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/al-qaida-and-arab-spring-after-bin-laden

Bob's World

05-07-2011, 12:57 PM

AQ without bin Laden is still AQ. AQ without Western support to the sustainment of oppressive regimes across the Middle East is just noise.

The death of bin Laden does, however, provide a transition point.

1. AQ: We don't know if UBL has been a moderating or radicalizing force on the nature of AQ's operations in recent years. Nor do we know who will step up and take charge and what their focus will be. A ramp up in operations are far less likely to be revenge for the killing of UBL (though I am sure the new boss will paint it as such to motivate the operators he recruits for the missions, and in his PSYOP to the West); but more because that is how the new boss sees the road to success.

2. The West. Perhaps we can finally set the crack pipe down, step back, and form some clear thoughts on what is really challenging us and how to best address those challenges. Organizations like AQ and Hezbollah, etc threaten us, but are not a threat to us. There is a big difference, and we need to define and respond to that difference. I would recommend something along the lines of:

A. Immediate reduction of the priority, and following reduction of effort, in AFPAK. Shift to a ME of championing reconciliation of the revolutionary issues between the Taliban government in exile and the sitting Northern Alliance government to form a new government for ALL Afghans under a new Constitution designed to create trust where none exists, and preserve rights that are largely unprotected at all levels (regional, ethnic, tribal, individual).

B. Elevate a program designed to get in front of the wave of Arab Spring as the new priority. Setting clear limits for governments and populaces in what types of activities will draw interventions and what will not. Conducting a full range of high-level summits, diplomatic engagement, etc aimed at EVOLUTION of government and re-framed relationships between governments that are aimed at preventing revolution and also breaking the linkage of blame that AQ leverages to convince nationalist insurgents to join their team for international operations and terror attacks. (This in turn will greatly reduce the amount of "homegrown" radicalization).

C. Conduct a MAJOR re-think on Capacity Building (are we merely helping the oppressors to oppress even better?) and Development (are we trying to bribe populaces to submit to oppression?). We can do better. Such engagement must be re-purposed and narrowly tailored to build the right type of capacity that deters interstate conflicts; and the right type of development that fosters greater legitimacy, justice, equity and hope of a populace in their OWN government. Budgets for both can be greatly reduced, and troops required as well.

D. Lastly, we really need to move "Containment" to the bench and a supporting role and develop a grand strategy construct better designed for the emerging world. Sustaining the status quo through expensive control measures is not the best way forward. At the same time, open our eyes to emerging state threats. The US window or bubble of relative hegemony over other states may well be over already. Frozen conflicts and issues of geopolitics are melting faster than the Arctic ice cap, and are far more dangerous to our future. These issues will begin to move soon, new alliances will form, and states will clash. Is our military prepared for that?? We need to get that way. Fast.

Fuchs

05-07-2011, 01:51 PM

C. Conduct a MAJOR re-think on Capacity Building (are we merely helping the oppressors to oppress even better?)

This has been my critique on many COIN practices for a while...it's dangerous to us, too!

davidbfpo

05-07-2011, 10:08 PM

I'm sure after the underwear bomber attack and another attack I've posted that we are lucky AQ seem to have preference for attacking aviation.

In a short analysis an open source terrorism analyst, Raffaello Pantucci, refers to:
But for terrorists the optimal target will continue to be aircraft in transit. The problem from a terrorist’s perspective is that a bomb at an airport is very similar to a bomb in any other public place, except the security is tighter ..... Consequently, it can seem easier to simply deposit a device on a public transport system where security will be far less. Furthermore, it lacks the drama of an attack on an international flight.

As Brian Michael Jenkins put it in 1974, “terrorism is theater” and an airplane full of people traveling between two developed economies remains the only sure way to guarantee a large media splash, dramatic economic damage and intense attention for your cause. Given AQAP’s continuing fixation with aviation, security in the air will continue to be a major headache in the years to come.

Link:http://raffaellopantucci.com/2011/05/07/airport-security-aiming-at-aviation/

I do wonder what we would do if AQ or AQAP decided on an alternative target set, which fulfilled:
..a large media splash, dramatic economic damage and intense attention for your cause.

A number of targets come to mind: mass transit, a few parts of critical national infrastructure (CNI) and "theatre" at iconic targets.

Dayuhan

05-10-2011, 08:27 AM

Point One: (And Dayuhan always twists this one and throws it back at me, so I have apparently never been clear) Our principle is to allow people to live and govern by their principles. When we enable a single strongman to govern such populaces with impunity WE do not live by our principles, and men so corrupted with wealth and power soon do not govern by the principles, ways and means acceptable to the populaces they are supposed to serve.

I'm not sure how I "twist" this; it seems to me that I respond to the words I read.

I'm not entirely sure that it's appropriate for the US to be thinking of how to "allow people to live and govern" in any event, assuming the people in question are not Americans.

I'd also have to point out, as many times before, that you're inclined to overstate the extent to which the US "enables" governments to govern as they do. That proposition suggests that these governments depend on us (and thus that we have leverage over them) and that they would not be able to govern as they do without our enabling actions. This is often not the case at all: many of these governments would govern as they do no matter what we say or do, and do not rely on our help to govern as they do. Assuming you have influence that you do not actually have is always dangerous. It's necessary to clearly and realistically assess the extent to which we enable in any given case.

There's also a tendency in your posts to assume a unitary populace with a clear consensus on how it wishes to be governed. I know you always say this is not the case, but witness the following:

men so corrupted with wealth and power soon do not govern by the principles, ways and means acceptable to the populaces they are supposed to serve.

it implies that these people are being governed as they desire to be governed.

we do need to stop granting unconditional support to individual leaders and regimes while ignoring how they are not treating their populace within the norms of their own culture. We need to become more attuned to how the people feel about their government

The main effort must be the relationship between the populaces as a whole and their own governments.

All of these suggest a coherent "the populace" with a consistent view of what sort of governance they desire. In many places at many times no such coherent populace exists. American observers, alas, are likeley to listen to the voices that call for the sort of government Americans like and assume that they speak for "the populace", even when they don't. In many of the places we deal with we have no clear idea of what "the populace" actually wants, and in many cases the populaces in question are in deep and even violent disagreement over what sort of government they want. Insurgencies aren't always about "the people" fighting "the government". Often it's about one part of "the people" fighting another part of "the people". If one part gets control of the government they call the other part "insurgents"; if the "insurgents" win they call the others "insurgents". The assumption of "populace vs government" is simplistic and often simply wrong. We may decide that the part of the populace that opposes the government is "the people" - especially when we find the government distasteful - but there's often a substantial part of "the people" that's not part of what we call "the people".

I have always been adamant that we need to stand for Self-Determination (another principle that we loudly profess, but then tend to subjugate to newer values, such as the specific form of governance found in "Democracy." The fact is that Self-Determination is the ultimate form of democracy, regardless of what form of government adopted, as it implies that these people are being governed as they desire to be governed.

Self determination sounds a lovely thing, but the process by which any given self determines what they want is often contentious and often violent. We shouldn't pretend that self-determination equals peace, because in a society where different groups have different ideas of how governance should be conducted, it's likely to be the opposite. A phenomenon we often see in relatively prosperous societies with totalitarian governments (Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, China) is that people in the middle class often support the government, not because they approve of it but because they fear that trying to change it would unleash a chaos of competing factions that would directly threaten their security. As long as they provide prosperity, security, and stability, these governments are likely to enjoy a lot more support among the quiet bulk of the citizenry than you seem willing to admit.

we do need to stop granting unconditional support to individual leaders and regimes while ignoring how they are not treating their populace within the norms of their own culture. We need to become more attuned to how the people feel about their government and not get into positions were we are reasonably perceived as the obstacle to self-determination and the enabler of impunity.

Are we in fact "granting unconditional support" to any leaders in this position? Where?

How do we go about assessing the norms of other cultures, and how do we assess "how the people feel about their government" in places where different groups of people have very different feelings about their governments? Again, we have to be very wary of the American tendency to assume that those whose opinions of their government align with ours necessarily represent "the people", or the tendency to assume that the people who make the most noise, or blow things up, represent "the people".

On my third point, when I say "compete" with AQ, that is a competition for influence with, and the trust of, the people of every nation. Most importantly for this mission are those that are in high levels of suppressed insurgency that AQ is targeting so aggressively to leverage that energy for their own ends. Those people deserve a new champion that is not so committed to extreme versions of their own religion, or extreme tactics for influencing governments.

I don't know of any populace, anywhere, that has ever considered AQ their champion against their own government. Do we need to supplant AQ in a role that they do not even hold?

I think your estimate of AQ's drivers is dangerously focused on one track. It's not just driven by "suppressed insurgency". That's not by any means the only factor involved.

The main effort must be the relationship between the populaces as a whole and their own governments.

Again, the populace isn't always a whole... and the populace is likely to have no desire at all to see America interfering in the relationships between Middle Eastern populaces and their governments. That kind of interference is going to be perceived as self-interested meddling no matter what the intention, and opposition to foreign meddling is one of AQ's most potent narratives. I think you're proposing an interventionist position in a place that's very tired of intervention, and that it could very easily blow up in our faces despite the best of intentions.

This is politics, this is governance. Yes, it is good go help protect populaces from the insurgent, from the terrorist. But first, me must ask, have we protected them from their own governments as well??

Is it our place to protect other populaces from their governments? Do they want us to protect them from their governments?

[QUOTE=Bob's World;120412]5th. At the end of the day we are still a great and mighty country. A country with interests. Many of those interests have critical nodes in the Middle East. We must engage to promote those interests. What we must learn is that old techniques that were cavalier to the issues of the populaces affected by such engagement are rendered invalid, dangerous and obsolete by the modern information age. Great Britain learned this lesson to a certain degree when they made the decision that the cost of a colonial empire exceeded the benefit. Today, the cost of the accidental, functional "empire without colonies" built largely through the control measures born of 60 years of Containment also exceeds the benefit. We need to find a new, more efficient model for managing such interests.

I agree... but I don't think we can accomplish this by trying to proactively reorder the way other governments relate to their populaces, and I don't think most of the populaces in question want the US participating in their internal politics.

We've meddled in the past, often to bad effect. We shouldn't forget that at the time that meddling was done, we believed ourselves to be on a righteous past. We may now believe that a different sort of meddling will counteract the ill effects of that previous meddling, but we are no more omniscient now than we were then, and the meddling that we now believe to be righteous is likely to come out as badly as what we thought was righteous back in the cold war. he answer to bad meddling isn't good enlightened meddling, it's less meddling.

Any proposal involving the US inserting itself into the domestic politics of another nation needs to be treated with a whole lot of skepticism, and a whole lot of restraint. IMO, of course.

AdamG

05-10-2011, 02:28 PM

SAN FRANCISCO (AP) -- The passengers sat stunned as they watched a man walk quickly toward the front of American Airlines Flight 1561 as it was descending toward San Francisco. He was screaming and then began pounding on the cockpit door.

*

Within moments Sunday, a flight attendant tackled Rageh Almurisi. Authorities do not yet have a motive.

While Almurisi, 28, of Vallejo, Calif., has no clear or known ties to terrorism, authorities say, the incident underscored fears that extremists may try to mount attacks to retaliate for the death of al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden last week.

Federal agents are investigating Almurisi's background. He was carrying a Yemeni passport and a California identification card, authorities said.

http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/US_FLIGHT_DISTURBANCE?SITE=FLTAM&SECTION=US

Bill Moore

05-10-2011, 05:18 PM

While our national defense team is obligated (and should continue) to make educated guesses on AQ and AQ's associated movements next move, in the end (except for specific plans that intelligence manages to find out about) it is still a guess. Terrorism doesn't have a next move, terrorism is a tactic, so those that employ it will base their next move off their strategy and the environment we present (we close off some options, and leave others open).

Individuals who are self radicalized and want to act out (as perhaps the individual on the plane did) will remain unpredictable. The correct response is educated airline employess and an educated public that are aware of their environment and what a potential threat may look like (without unreasonable paranoia), and then a well trained and dispersed security force (local to federal) that can quickly react. As has been stated many times we have to get it right everytime, while those who conduct terrorism only need to get right just once. While not a defeatist, since the the three groups I mentioned above have so far been 100% successful in the States since 9/11, I suspect eventually they'll have a successful attack somewhere in the U.S. again, so we need the capability to respond effectively to a mass casualty situation. For the most part we are doing pretty good on the homefront (what should be most important to us). Our foreign policy is open to debate in regards to GWOT.

To reinforce that war is a series of actions and reactions here is a comment from one of their best tactical leaders,

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KJ15Df04.html

"Our battle cannot be against Muslims and believers. As I have mentioned earlier, what is happening at the moment in the Muslim world is a complexity due to American power games which have resulted into reactions and counter-reactions. This is a totally different debate and might deviate me from the real topic. The real game is the fight against the great Satan and its adherents," Ilyas said.

AdamG

05-12-2011, 12:29 PM

TBO.com > News > AP
May 12, 7:59 AM EDT
Official: 2 men arrested in NYC terror probe
By COLLEEN LONG and TOM HAYS
Associated Press

NEW YORK (AP) -- A law enforcement official tells The Associated Press that two men are in custody in an investigation that may be related to terrorism in New York City. The official would not give further details about the charges the men face.

http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/US_NYC_TERROR_PROBE?SITE=FLTAM&SECTION=US

AdamG

05-13-2011, 11:57 AM

SHABQADAR, Pakistan — A pair of suicide bombers attacked recruits leaving a paramilitary training center in Pakistan on Friday, killing 80 people in a strike that the Pakistani Taliban claimed it carried out to avenge the killing of Osama bin Laden.

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/43017005/ns/world_news-south_and_central_asia/t/suicide-bombing-kills-scores-pakistan/

davidbfpo

05-14-2011, 03:37 PM

A short briefing paper on 'The coming struggle within al-Qaeda' by the UK-based Quilliam Foundation:http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/images/aq10may.pdf

It ends with:
For the international community, this range of competing trends within al-Qaeda, combined with the game-changing developments of the Arab spring, together create a unique opportunity to undermine and divide al-Qaeda at an ideological and practical level. While military force certainly has a role to play against Al-Qaeda (as was demonstrated by the US raid that killed bin Laden), other tools may also become increasingly effective at fragmenting the organisation from within.

What makes this worth reading is one of the two authors is Noman Benotman, an ex-LIFG leader and who was at one time an "insider" within 'AQ Central'.

SWJ Blog

05-17-2011, 08:00 PM

Crisis in Yemen, the Rise of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and U.S. National Security (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/05/crisis-in-yemen-the-rise-of-al/)

Entry Excerpt:

Crisis in Yemen, the Rise of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and U.S. National Security (http://www.aei.org/event/100413) - Highlights from today's American Enterprise Institute event in Washington, D.C., can be found at the link. Participants included Christopher Boucek, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Edmund J. Hull, Former U.S. Ambassador to Yemen; Katheline Zimmerman, AEI; and Frederick W. Kagan, AEI.

Event summary follows: The United States must develop a comprehensive strategy toward Yemen beyond counterterrorism, panelists concluded Tuesday at the American Enterprise Institute. Katherine Zimmerman (http://www.criticalthreats.org/users/kzimmerman), an analyst and the Gulf of Aden Team Lead for AEI's Critical Threats Project (http://www.criticalthreats.org/), outlined the six most likely and dangerous crisis scenarios in Yemen that could result from the current political stalemate, including the collapse of Yemen's economy or a mass-casualty attack on the United States by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

Frederick W. Kagan (http://www.criticalthreats.org/users/fkagan), the director of AEI's Critical Threats Project, argued that the United States, in addition to its regional and international partners, has a vested interest in preventing Yemen from complete state collapse. Christopher Boucek (http://www.aei.org/EMStaticPage/100413?page=SpeakerBio) of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCYQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.carnegieendowment.org%2F&ei=VdHSTdfUDqLg0QGxp8TrCw&usg=AFQjCNECnMGBhSDda91AKxC6uK6VkfT9mQ) pointed out that while current American strategy is focused almost exclusively on counterterrorism, the greatest threat facing Yemenis daily is the looming meltdown of their economy--not al Qaeda.

Ambassador Edmund J. Hull (http://www.aei.org/EMStaticPage/100413?page=SpeakerBio) described the challenges of on-the-ground implementation of a comprehensive strategy, given the limited ability of US officials to operate beyond the capital, San'a, due to security concerns. The panelists advocated drawing on the lessons from the American experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq to fine-tune an appropriate approach to Yemen that links development gains and security gains.

--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/05/crisis-in-yemen-the-rise-of-al/) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
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Polarbear

05-25-2011, 12:32 PM

Marc Sageman was in Switzerland this week, where he held a lecture on the Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich. He also gave an Interview to the online magazine of the University. Keeping the danger of terrorism in perspective, he sees no danger that radical elements could seize power in the arab countries, especially Egypt. Equally, he judges the risk from radicalized groups or individuals for Western societies as negligible.

For those who want to improve their German I link the article from the homepage of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology:

http://www.ethlife.ethz.ch/archive_articles/110525_Interview_Sagemann_sch/index

Regards
PB

AdamG

06-05-2011, 06:42 PM

Tangential -

http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/al-qaeda-video-buy-automatic-weapons-start-shooting/story?id=13704264

The two-part, two hour video appeared on jihadi websites Friday with images of jihadi leaders as well as snapshots of alleged underwear bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab and accused Fort Hood shooter Major Nidal Hasan. Both Hasan and Abdulmutallab are charged with carrying out attacks inside the U.S.

Called "Do Not Rely on Others, Take the Task Upon Yourself" and produced by al Qaeda's media arm, as Sahab, the tape mixes Gadahn's new message with clips from old videos of Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and other al Qaeda leaders praising one-man attacks. They call on jihadis in the West to carry out lone wolf operations.

He (Gadahn) urges Muslims to pursue attacks with whatever is available. "Let's take America as an example. America is absolutely awash with easily obtainable firearms. You can go down to a gun show at the local convention center(1) and come away with a fully automatic assault rifle(2), without a background check(3), and most likely without having to show an identification card(4). So what are you waiting for?"

Four fallacies in a row, no waiting, but you betcha this will fuel some Grade-A wailing and gnashing of teeth.

davidbfpo

06-07-2011, 05:49 PM

Elsewhere SWC are considering leadership, so it appropriate that someone raises this issue:
Slain jihadi leaders like Ilyas Kashmiri and Osama bin Laden aren't so easily replaced....

But does cutting the head off the snake really matter? Can't they just be replaced by the next militant waiting in the wings?

One paragraph:
New leaders tend to either be less strategically seasoned or prove unable to replicate the formula the old leader had. Al Qaeda in Iraq was never the same after Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed, and Yemen's Aden-Abyan Islamic Army never really survived the death of its leader Abu al-Hassan, instead becoming subsumed by regional al Qaeda-linked cells. In both cases, the deaths of leaders with contacts and celebrity deprived the groups of their appeal. This means fewer recruits, less funding, and less capacity to launch audacious plots. Spectacular attacks like May 22's brazen assault on Karachi's naval base, which some have linked to Kashmiri, require great nerve and audacity to pull off, driven by an inspirational figure who can convince fighters to die for the cause.

Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/06/al_qaedas_toughest_task?page=0,0

AdamG

06-12-2011, 04:38 PM

Los Angeles – An eccentric California salvage diver was Sunday preparing a mission to the north Arabian Sea to recover Usama bin Laden's body as proof the al Qaeda leader really is dead the New York Post Reports.

Bill Warren, 59, has vowed to scour the sea bed to find the corpse and deliver photographic evidence that the terror leader was killed, the New York Post reported.

Read more: http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/06/12/california-diver-on-mission-to-find-bin-ladens-body-on-sea-floor/#ixzz1P52lH6MF

AdamG

06-17-2011, 12:56 AM

An al-Qaida-linked website has posted a potential hit list of targets that include names and photos of several U.S. officials and business leaders, calling for terrorists to target these Americans in their own homes, NBC New York has learned.

The FBI has sent out a new intelligence bulletin to law enforcement agencies, warning that this new web-based threat, while not a specific plot, is very detailed. The bulletin said the list includes leaders "in government, industry and media."

The FBI has notified those individuals who are named.

NBC New York will not identify them or their companies. The list includes Wall Street firms, political leaders, leaders with think tanks and contractors who do business with the military.

The websites contain 40 specific names, 26 of them with photos attached, and they call for posting home addresses. One jihadist called for sending package bombs to any listed address as just one possibility.

http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Possible-Al-Qaida-Hit-List-Targets-Specific-Americans.html

AdamG

06-17-2011, 02:10 PM

A man carrying a suspicious package was detained in Arlington National Cemetery this morning after police searched his backpack and found the materials as well as pro-al Qaeda literature, officials told ABC News.

Police believe he was carrying ammonium nitrate and spent ammunition for an automatic weapon. Ammonium nitrate has been used in terrorist bombs.

According to law enforcement sources, the man is a naturalized U.S. citizen. Initially he was thought to be of Ethiopian ethnicity.

http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/suspicious-man-ammonium-nitrate-detained-pentagon/story?id=13865755

WASHINGTON - Authorities are warning hotels in major US cities to be vigilant after intelligence recently obtained in Somalia shows al Qaeda was planning to launch a Mumbai-style attack on an upscale hotel in London, FOX News Channel reported late Thursday.

http://www.myfoxny.com/dpp/news/hotels-warned-of-terror-potential-terror-threats-ncx-20110617

davidbfpo

06-24-2011, 08:00 PM

A good commentary, from a variety of opinions, although I've not watched the pod casts by an ex-AQ insider. The bureaucratic aspects I'd not seen before.

Ends with:
Whatever the future maybe, al-Qaida faces challenges beyond that of getting used to a new leader. Gerges said the group is also grappling with financial issues as well as the existential threat of the Arab Spring, the popular uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa.

Al-Qaida also faces the threat of the U.S.-led war on terrorism, seemingly rejuvenated by the death of bin Laden and the troves of secrets taken from his compound. Still, analyst Bruce Hoffman said al-Qaida's corporate structure will help keep the group in business.

Link:http://www.voanews.com/english/news/Al-Qaidas-Business-Savvy-Sows-Uncertain-Future-124280919.html

davidbfpo

08-17-2011, 12:16 PM

Hat tip to FP Blog for 'Why Is It So Hard to Find a Suicide Bomber These Days?', which is sub-titled 'A decade after 9/11, the mystery is not why so many Muslims turn to terror - but why so few have joined al Qaeda's jihad'.

Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/why_is_it_so_hard_to_find_a_suicide_bomber_these_d ays?page=0,0

The author starts looking at the case of Mohammed Taheri-Azar, who launched a vehicle attack on fellow students at the University of North Carolina in 2006.

For several decades now, Islamist terrorists have called it a duty for Muslims to engage in armed jihad...Tens of thousands have obeyed, perhaps as many as 100,000 over the past quarter-century, according to the U.S. DHS...At the same time, more than a billion Muslims -- well over 99 percent -- ignored the call to action....by my calculations, global Islamist terrorists have managed to recruit fewer than 1 in 15,000 Muslims over the past quarter-century and fewer than 1 in 100,000 Muslims since 9/11. (Moving on)

By the U.S. Justice Department's count, approximately a dozen people in the country were convicted in the five years after 9/11 for having links with al Qaeda. During this period, fewer than 40 Muslim Americans planned or carried out acts of domestic terrorism... None of these attacks was found to be associated with al Qaeda.

(Final sentence) We may not be so lucky in the future. But even if they succeed in killing thousands of us, attacks like these do not threaten our way of life, unless we let them.

I am sure we will see more such commentaries before the 9/11 anniversary. SWC has touched upon this issue before, although on a quick scan I failed to identify other thread(s). Often I cite Bob Jones reference to the difference between those who are angry and those who are motivated to take action.

What FP Blog did not state is the author, Charles Kurzman, has written a book 'The Missing Martyrs: Why There Are So Few Muslim Terrorists' and was reviewed on:http://motherjones.com/mixed-media/2011/08/missing-martyrs-charles-kurzman-jihadists

Amazon link, no reviews:http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_sb_noss?url=search-alias%3Dstripbooks&field-keywords=The+Missing+Martyrs%3A+Why+There+Are+So+F ew+Muslim+Terrorists&x=0&y=0

Umar Al-Mokhtār

08-17-2011, 05:56 PM

the answer lies in that there just are not that many psychopaths per 100,000 people, regardless of theology or culture, and using coercion to engage in suicide bombing only goes so far.

I also cannot fail to notice how the most strident calls for violent jihad come from those exhorting for others to do it. :wry:

CWOT

09-10-2011, 02:08 AM

Ten years ago, I remember sitting with some co-workers discussing how many people were in al Qa’ida. Recently, J.M. Berger from Intelwire (http://www.intelwire.com/) initiated an interesting discussion on “What is al Qa’ida?” (http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=345) which tallied the votes of readers. The findings were quite interesting. Following up on “what is al Qa’ida?”, I ask “How many people are in al Qa’ida?” This question, unlike most of my past survey questions, should be ideally suited for crowdsourcing. Essentially, if enough people vote, we should, on average, be relatively close to the right answer- or at least that is what crowdsourcing advocates say.

"How many people in the entire world are members of al Qa'ida?"
So please cast your vote at this link:
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/AlQaedastrength

I think it will take less than 30 seconds to vote.
Please enter one number and only one number!
If you enter a range I can’t average the collective answers to come up with a single estimate.

Use any definition of “al Qa’ida” you prefer and take a guess. I’ll post the results of the collective estimate in a few days. I also ask for your professional category so we can see how different groups see the size of al Qa’ida. Click on “Done” after the second question and your vote will be submitted.

Thanks for your participation and I'll post the results here at SWJ!

CWOT

09-14-2011, 01:37 AM

Thanks to those that have already casted their vote. I'll leave the voting up for another 48 hours or so. For anyone remaining that would like to make your estimate on the size of AQ at this link:

https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/AlQaedastrength

Thanks.

CWOT

11-20-2011, 02:23 AM

Thanks to all those that voted on this post.
For some reason this post got stuck in OIF section.
So I just posted the results in the GWOT section.
Here is the link to the results here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=128821#post128821).

Bob's World

11-20-2011, 04:40 AM

Come on, while I am the first guy to stand up and say that the Intel community TOTALLY exaggerates AQ by conflating all manner of nationalist insurgents into their count, to ask people to just pull a number out of their 4th point of contact makes our intel guys look like rocket scientists.

This poll is worse than being of no value. It is dangerous and irresponsible.

omarali50

11-21-2011, 01:32 AM

I thought the whole point of such polls was that large numbers of people randomly pulling numbers out of their ass DOES in fact outperform intel professionals to a disturbing degree....

davidbfpo

12-27-2011, 01:16 AM

A review article by Jason Burke that starts with:
We've made progress fighting 'blame al-Qaida syndrome', but the search for new threats creates another dangerous disorder......In the last week there have been two good examples of a very familiar malaise that periodically affects governments around the world. Let's call it "blame al-Qaida syndrome".

Link:http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/dec/25/stop-looking-next-al-qaida

For an example of the 'blame' syndrome:
"Operating largely from northern Mali, [al-Qaida in the Maghreb] presents an increased threat to our security," William Hague, the foreign secretary, recently told parliament.

It's not often that someone based in northern Mali, one of the most remote, poorest and desolate parts of the world, is described as an increased threat to anyone, let alone the UK or Europe, and it is difficult to really see the al-Qaida in the Maghreb organisation as one that should particularly worry the British or other security authorities. It has 1,000 or so active members at most, limited resources and almost no reach into Europe beyond a few scattered sympathisers. Its operations have been largely local and, though some of their antecedent groups in the region launched attacks in Europe, it has yet to do so.

Sounds like David Kilcullen's Accidental Guerilla needs updating IMHO. Who are our enemies?

Bill Moore

12-27-2011, 02:34 AM

Personally I found Jason Burke's article irresponable. I guess the same dismissal arguments could have been made about AQ in Sudan (or perhaps they were), that is until they bombed our Embassies in Keny and Tunsia killing and wounding hundreds. Does it really matter where AQ affiliates are located if their intent is to over throw the government and kill westerners? Should we simply allow them safe haven because they're in Mali? I think if Jason did his homework he would find that AQ in Mali did kidnap and kill some Westerners, to include at least one Brit because the Brits wouldn't release a senior AQ prisoner they were holding in the UK. I guess that doesn't necessarily qualify as a threat if you put Mali off limits to your people, though that would be a weak policy decision. AQ in Mali has been expanding their influence, so to assume that the problem will remain isolated to a small geographical in Mali seems absurd to me.

http://articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/19/nation/la-na-al-qaeda-cocaine19-2009dec19

The three suspects, who were charged in federal court in New York, are believed to be from Mali and were arrested in Ghana during a Drug Enforcement Administration sting. Although U.S. authorities have alleged that Al Qaeda and the Taliban profit from Afghanistan's heroin trade, the case is the first in which suspects linked to Al Qaeda have been charged under severe narco-terrorism laws, federal officials said.

Al Qaeda in the Maghreb -- a North African ally of Osama bin Laden's organization -- has muscled into the lucrative cocaine smuggling routes of the Sahara, according to Western and African officials. It existed for two decades under other names before declaring allegiance to Bin Laden in 2006.

Al Qaeda in the Maghreb finances itself partly by protecting and moving loads along smuggling corridors that run through Morocco into Spain and through Libya and Algeria into Italy, according to the complaint and Western investigators.

http://www.temoust.org/associates-of-al-qaeda-group,12920

The stakes are high because of the potential for al Qaeda in the Magreb to use the cash and firepower of the cocaine trade in its war on the West. A grim harbinger cited by anti-terror investigators: the al Qaeda-connected cell of North Africans who carried out the Madrid train bombings that killed 190 people in 2004 financed the attack by dealing hashish and ecstasy.

Moreover, conversations among undercover informants and suspects suggest that the lawless region around the Gulf of Guinea is a crucible for alliances among groups united by hatred of the United States: Al Qaeda, Mexican gangsters, Colombian guerrillas and Lebanese militant groups.

"For the first time in that part of the world, these guys are operating in the same environment in the same place at the same time," said Michael Braun, a former chief of DEA operations. "They are doing business and cutting deals. What’s most troubling about this is the personal relationships that these guys are making today, between drug organizations and terror organizations, will become operational alliances in the future."

Doesn't take too much imagination to understand the implications of the following, and the 9/11 commission said our gravest shortcoming was a lack of imagination prior to 9/11.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/13/us-drugs-security-aviation-idUSTRE60C3E820100113

The document warned that a growing fleet of rogue jet aircraft was regularly crisscrossing the Atlantic Ocean. On one end of the air route, it said, are cocaine-producing areas in the Andes controlled by the leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. On the other are some of West Africa's most unstable countries.

The clandestine fleet has grown to include twin-engine turboprops, executive jets and retired Boeing 727s that are flying multi-ton loads of cocaine and possibly weapons to an area in Africa where factions of al Qaeda are believed to be facilitating the smuggling of drugs to Europe, the officials say.

To put it bluntly Jason needs to do a lot more research before he publishes another article like the one we're commenting on.

Bob's World

12-27-2011, 02:24 PM

Our focus for AQ must be independent of any physical location it may happen to manifest in at any given time. Sanctuary comes primarily from their status and the support of populaces dissatisfied with their own governance at home, who are also Sunni Muslim and happy to place some blame for their circumstance upon the US. It does not come from the dirt they stand upon, and US efforts aimed at the denial of that dirt are unlikely to achieve the true ends we seek.

For the US to swoop into such locations and reinforce the security apparatus of that troubled regime, and to concurrently conduct excessive unilateral actions against a target list which inartfully conflates nationalist insurgents in with the actual transnational terrorists we seek, is a disastrous policy.

Ultimately AQ must physically be someplace. Those places are not important because AQ is there. If those places are important it is because they were important BEFORE AQ was there. This is an importance based upon traditional assessments of the confluence of vital national interests and geostrategic importance. Even if a place is deemed important on both counts, AQ very likely poses little risk to either one by their presence. Key point is to maintain our perspective and not over-react.

Now is the time to move Black Operations back out of the limelight and into the shadows. Concurrently we must put a much finer point on our intelligence work. There are a handful of individuals who form critical nodes to AQ's network of operations. We must focus on these wherever they might be, and deal with them silently and decisively. If we would assassinate a man in his tent in Mali we should be equally prepared to dispatch that same man on the streets of London or New York. Our discrimination and concern for collateral effects should be equal as well. (Not likely to see a US Reaper fire a missile into a window of the Savoy any time soon...)

Do the governments and populaces of the Maghreb have problems? Certainly. Should Western countries help in appropriate ways both the populaces and governments of that region? No problem. But to do so in the context of defeating AQ? There is little chance that is apt to turn out well.

Bill Moore

12-27-2011, 05:14 PM

Bob,

I definitely agree that a combination of clandestine and covert ops are the preferred unilateral (or even multinational) approach to dealing with AQ in Mali and other places where this cancer exists. We definitely shouldn't over react, but on the other hand we still need to act. If you look at our engagement history prior to 9/11, we did engage with Mali along with other nations in ECOWAS/ECOMIL to help promote regional security, so engaging Mali is nothing new.

I'm not sure about the origins of the troubles in Mali, but I don't suspect poor governance has much to do with AQ creating a safehaven in northern Mali. I suspect it has more to do with people's religious beliefs, and since Islam is a religion that believes in prophetizing by the sword, any government that doesn't practice Shari'a law (as interpreted by AQ) is seen as illegimate. That hardly means the majority of the population feels that way, but you can always found the outliers in any society to leverage as surrogates. We definitely have our share of people engaged in various cults.

The fact that associates of AQ are flying aircraft across the Atlantic Ocean in my view is cause for concern. Aircraft that can be flown into commercial aircraft, ships, and buildings. Aircraft that can be loaded with any type of material. Of course that isn't the purpose of the a/c now, they're just being used to smuggle drugs and potentially other illicit materials and people, but in the hands of an extremist it is a different animal altogether. This gets back to the argument of pre-emptive actions for a potential threat, which admittedly is a sensitive area. However, if it has AQ stink on it we should do something about it.

davidbfpo

01-05-2012, 09:48 PM

A Newsweek article, that appeared on The Daily Beast, which opens with a sub-title:
A young jihadist returns to his former unit on the Afghan border and finds only the desperate remnants of bin Laden’s once-dreaded organization.

Deep among North Waziristan’s mountains, far from any village, Hafiz Hanif finally tracked down the remnants of his old al Qaeda cell last summer. The 17-year-old Afghan had wondered why he hadn’t heard from his former comrades in arms. They didn’t even answer his text messages in May, after the death of the man they all called simply the Sheik: Osama bin Laden. Now Hanif saw why. Only four of the cell’s 15 fighters were left, huddled in a two-room mud-brick house, with little or no money or food. Except for their familiar but haggard faces, they looked nothing like the al Qaeda he once trained with and fought beside. They welcomed him warmly but didn’t encourage him to stay. They said the cell’s commander, a Kuwaiti named Sheik Attiya Ayatullah, had gone into hiding. The others had either run off or died. “Why should we call you back just to get killed in a drone attack?” Hanif’s friends explained.

Link:http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2012/01/01/al-qaeda-on-the-ropes-one-fighter-s-inside-story.html

Worth reading. Some may find it chimes with the stated impact of the drone attacks, the ambivalent stance of the Pakistani Army and more.

davidbfpo

01-30-2012, 06:17 PM

Hat tip to ICSR for providing a link to the London book launch of 'The Al-Qaeda Factor: Plots Against the West' by Mitchell Silber, NYPD's Head of Intelligence Analysis:http://icsr.info/news/al-qaedas-centre-of-gravity-a-discussion-with-nypd-intel-chief

Silber analyses sixteen of the biggest jihadist plots against Western countries in order to determine the precise role, if any, played by the central al-Qaeda organisation.

His findings include the following:

Al-Qaeda Core’s actual role in plots against the West has been overstated, though their importance as an external inspiration endures.

Much more of the “action of the conspiracies” has taken place in the West, by Westerners, independent of Al-Qaeda.

Al-Qaeda has not actively recruited in the West; rather the plots are underpinned by a “bottom-up” process, driven by individuals in the West who radicalise and then take the initiative to go overseas for training or to get into the fight.

Al-Qaeda has been opportunistic, taking advantage of the Westerners who have shown up on its doorstep to utilise them in plots against the West.

Post Bin-Laden, given the combination of Westerners who continue to radicalise/mobilise plus the rise of other important nodes in al Qaeda’s worldwide network of allies and affiliates, the threat from al Qaeda type terrorism has not ended.

On the link is a podcast and the PPT slides used. I've ordered the book and will add a review when read.

Amazon has no reviews yet:http://www.amazon.com/Al-Qaeda-Factor-Plots-Against/dp/0812244028/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1327947515&sr=1-1

davidbfpo

02-02-2012, 12:35 PM

A strange document seized by the Germans from an AQ courier and now in the public arena; hat tip to various sources.

a strategy paper drafted by the al-Qa’ida leadership based in the Pakistani-Afghan border area suggests that a combination of smaller and larger attacks “will drive the enemy to despair.” Other documents describe the taking and subsequent killing of hostages, the use of toxic substances, and how to give cover to fighters smuggled in.

Al-Qa’ida expects that growing fear among the general population and increasing reprisals on the part of the security authorities will marginalize Muslims. As a result of such escalation, Muslims will join the Holy War in ever larger numbers, security sources quote from the papers.

Link, with no more citations alas from the paper:http://gunpowderandlead.wordpress.com/2012/01/24/al-qaedas-strategy-paper-on-its-war-of-attrition/

The author's commentary (in part):
...this strategy paper shows that the group continues to depend on the West’s reactions to advance its objectives, demonstrated by its expectation that “increasing reprisals on the part of the security authorities will marginalize Muslims,” thus causing more Muslims to flock to al Qaeda’s jihad.

Having listened recently to several Muslim community members they would echo the danger of reprisals. Their words were more direct:
What pisses off a jihadi? Think about it. and:
Add Do not provoke to Op Contest (the UK CT strategy).

SWJ Blog

03-02-2012, 01:21 AM

Al Qaeda in its Third Decade (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/al-qaeda-in-its-third-decade)

Entry Excerpt:

--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/al-qaeda-in-its-third-decade) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

davidbfpo

03-02-2012, 07:16 PM

An excellent analysis by Leah Farrell, from Australia, and in summary:
Despite leadership losses, Al-Qaeda has exhibited significant consistency and continuity in its operational focus and planning and training activities, which are driven largely by institutional factors rather than by key individuals.

Al-Qaeda can remain operationally active and viable so long as it can access and deploy a small number of recruits. It has demonstrated in recent years that, even with the loss of its senior leaders, this capacity continues.

Prolonged operational impotence is the greatest threat to Al-Qaeda’s organizational unity and viability

It ends with:
The solution for Al-Qaeda central in maintaining its operational effectiveness and forward focus is likely to be much as it has always been: to continue efforts to successfully carry out mass impact attacks against Western targets, which are an assured means of raising
its profile, attracting support, and quelling any internal dissent and rivalries within the organization.

Thus, despite its current operational impotency, and its inability to carry out a successful external attack, Al-Qaeda’s focus on this approach is unlikely to change over the medium- and long-term, regardless of who assumes the leadership position. Rather, maintaining this focus will be crucial to ensuring organizational unity and longevity as it deals with more generational change. Such a focus would also help ameliorate any issues caused by parochial or local focuses becoming more prominent in Al-Qaeda’s public narrative.

Absent of this success, Al-Qaeda’s longer-term future as a unified and functioning organization is questionable. Nevertheless, as a mode of action, the notion of Al-Qaeda will endure

Link:http://allthingsct.files.wordpress.com/2012/03/janes-article-2012.pdf

davidbfpo

03-19-2012, 08:40 PM

A fascinating analysis by Raffaello Pantucci of ICSR that refers to the documents seized in Germany from an AQ courier (See Post 23); the title is 'The British End of the German al Qaeda documents' and the focus is on the UK and terrorism. Security, strategy and much, much more to absorb.

From the understanding I have, the papers are essentially a post-operation report on the July 7, July 21, and Overt bomb plots (Overt was the codename for the 2006 attempt by Abdulla Ali and a bunch of his mates to bring down about eight planes as they made there way to America) and German intelligence seems pretty convinced that this was written by Rashid Rauf, the infamous British-Pakistani terrorist operator. This is apparently based on the detailed knowledge of the British plots and some biographical details that are mentioned.

Link:http://icsr.info/blog/The-British-End-of-the-German-al-Qaeda-documents

A summary of the original documents, in English is on:http://abususu.blogspot.co.uk/2012/03/alleged-qaida-documents-surface-in.html

Having listened to the author at a conference I can commend his work

Caveat:
..Die ZEIT is only published in German and the article is not online..

There is another German journalist who has commented on his blog:http://ojihad.wordpress.com/2012/03/14/cut-off-the-head-of-the-dead-body-al-qaida-strategy-paper-discovered-in-berlin/

davidbfpo

05-04-2012, 10:44 PM

An updated CNN article on Rashid Rauf's role on Operation Overt, the planned airliners liquid bombs attack:http://edition.cnn.com/2012/04/30/wo...nts/?hpt=hp_t1

Alongside a CNN piece on the German seizures :http://edition.cnn.com/video/?iid=ar...s-combined.cnn

davidbfpo

09-30-2012, 01:30 PM

Leah Farrell's comment:
By my count AQ core has resurrected itself three times--each when it had less than 50 members.

Nothing like an Australian to ask painful questions. For those not familiar with Leah's background:http://allthingscounterterrorism.com/about/

On SWC we have looked a number of aspects about AQ, not its ability to resurrect itself.

My first thoughts are: a) it is the resilience of the message, b) 'small is beautiful' easy to finance, organise etc and c) will it work minus OBL?

ianaj

09-30-2012, 04:00 PM

Even providing for a total kill of Al Qaeda, the organization is likely to reestablish itself given just a few years time. This is primarily due to the first of three points David made above.

Removing ourselves from a specific Islamic extremist group for a minute and taking a step back to look at the larger picture that is developing within the Muslim world, what we see is a religious revival, a reformation of what it means to be "Muslim". The change is not completely dissimilar to the protestant reformation in its scope or implication. A man wakes up in Cairo, he sees poverty all around him, he has a graduate degree but he drives a taxi, his political leaders are corrupt but there is naught to do about any of it. All of this is filtered through the stories he learned as a child of the Golden Age of Islam, the disparity is obvious.

At this point the man could choose to go several different routes in finding a solution to his problem - but a not wholly illogical route would be to state to himself "all of these man-made institutions have failed, it is time to get back to God, because he is infallible". Indeed, such a sentiment is one often shared among Christian conservatives here in the US.

While most on this path will seek to change their political situation through *relatively* peaceful means (Moorsi & Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt) there are many who will see this revival as an opportunity to violently shrug off non-Islamic (Qutb's "jahili") rulers.

AQ's stated purpose is to reestablish the former Islamic Caliphate, but this is only a best case scenario, the realization that this is unachievable is hardly enough to end their campaign. As long as there are rulers in Muslim countries who do not appear to live or govern by Islamic standards, the recruitment pool for AQ will always replenish itself, it will always be capable of funding itself, and now that OBL has set the example, it needs no other charismatic leader to keep it going.

Fuchs

09-30-2012, 04:16 PM

The Bolsheviks were down to about four members in exile afaik, but one of the four was their leader, nobody attempted to assassinate them and they later got decisive foreign assistance.

Today's AQ leaves on me the impression of being what its name says; a base. It may have some chieftains, and his certainly has enough indoctrinated supporters (just as the few dozen RAF terrorists had a supportive base of up to several thousand Germans) as well as some groups who think using the franchise is a good idea, but it appears to lack what makes a terror organisation so dangerous: The active, violent terrorists who are available for imagining, planning, preparing and executing terror attacks.

This may be related to the built-in defect of AQ; almost 0% of their terrorists return from a mission.
In the end, suicide attacks may have been too costly (and too much of a recruiting liability).

jcustis

09-30-2012, 04:37 PM

ianaj makes excellent points David, and to this specific line:

My first thoughts are: a) it is the resilience of the message, b) 'small is beautiful' easy to finance, organise etc and c) will it work minus OBL?

I'd like to offer that once we (or we/Israel) attack Iran, the message will become resurgent. Amid the disarray that comes from trying to resolve the Iran situation, we won't be able to focus quite as clearly on AQ for a brief spell. I may not look like the AQ of 9/11 vintage, and it make lack the charismatic leader it had in OBL, but it absolutely has the ability to rise from the ashes (if it is actually there now).

Bill Moore

09-30-2012, 05:46 PM

Posted by Davidbfpo

On SWC we have looked a number of aspects about AQ, not its ability to resurrect itself.

I disagree David, we have addressed this repeatedly directly and indirectly. A 50 man base is not a small base for a terrorist organization, especially one as creative and capable as AQ after a decade of co-evolving with the various counterterrorism tactics.

jcustis makes an important point

I'd like to offer that once we (or we/Israel) attack Iran, the message will become resurgent.

It doesn't have to be Iran, it can be a Western intervention in any Muslim land. The West will come with the narrative of liberation and AQ and their ilk with come with the narrative the West is oppressing Muslims and that will capture the imaginations of many Muslims who will swell their ranks as cannon fodder. Among that cannon fodder a few will prove to be elite and become prominent leaders in the movement themselves (within or outside the AQ Core). As several have pointed out over the years in SWJ and beyond AQ is a starfish organization.

In the longer run I think history will view AQ as the catalyst for the resurrgent Jihad, or in other words they restarted Jihad in the 21st Century using 21st Century technology to support their historical religious mandate (their narrative), and the Jihad evolved to the point where it can't be decisively defeated at this point. Pandora's box is open and we're not going to put the lid back on it by killing a few HVIs. If previous adminstrations acted decisively before 9/11 then maybe we could have delayed or prevented this global movement, but even that is questionable.

What we can and should do IMO is relentlessly pursue AQ and their followers with intelligence, law enforcement and special operations. It will be long fight, and we need to pursue it in a way that is sustainable and stop pursuing the mythical center of gravities that we incorrectly identified as Afghanistan and Iraq. We have an unsustainable strategy that hinges on the success of nation building and social reform. While we have the best intentions, or actions are seen as offensive to cultures who really don't want to be like us, and thus our actions create anti-bodies that continue to generate more terrorists. This needs to be a shadwo war period. A war/police effort that is sustainable and limits the propaganda value we provide to AQ, since propanda is a key part of what sustains their effort.

I would wager even if we killed the remaining 50 core members (imaginary number), the movement would be severely degraded, but it would still continue . So by all means we should kill the remaining 50, but not fall under the illusion we decisively defeated them. I think they were a base, but now they're an umbrella. Many other movements fall and will fall under their umbrella of ideology and methodology, and that will endure even if the base doesn't.

We need to strap in for a long fight, and simultaneously prepare to deal with other problems related to national security. For a free country we're very reluctant to change course even when we know we're going down the wrong path. I think that is a curse of democracy, in the case of national security it doesn't allow flexibility because strategies come with strong political undercurrents and politicians don't want to admit they were wrong and risk not getting re-elected.

davidbfpo

09-30-2012, 07:33 PM

Bill,

Thanks for this. Posted by Davidbfpo:
On SWC we have looked a number of aspects about AQ, not its ability to resurrect itself.

Bill posted:
I disagree David, we have addressed this repeatedly directly and indirectly. A 50 man base is not a small base for a terrorist organization, especially one as creative and capable as AQ after a decade of co-evolving with the various counterterrorism tactics.

I looked around, in particular this arena and found nothing. Nor did my memory help. So if anyone can point to previous threads please help!:)

OK there is 'Confronting al-Qaeda (Afghanistan to the global level)':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9360 and maybe 'Why so few have joined al Qaeda's jihad':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=13957

Bill Moore

09-30-2012, 11:31 PM

David,

There are posts scattered throughout various forums, so this forum is worthwhile to focus the conversation, some examples of past discussions include:

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=16961&postcount=4 A single post on issue and finance.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5334&highlight=resurgent+Qaeda Hoffman vs. Sageman: Myth of Grassroots Terrorism

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1223&highlight=defeat+terrorism How Al-Queda may evolve, or end.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3840&highlight=starfish Groups: Bin Laden plans video on 9/11

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=14318&highlight=Qaeda+Core The Islamist Terrorist Threat to Europe after bin Laden’s Death

Fuchs

09-30-2012, 11:37 PM

David,

There are posts scattered throughout various forums, so this forum is worthwhile to focus the conversation, some examples of past discussions include:

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=16961&postcount=4

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5334&highlight=resurgent+Qaeda

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1223&highlight=defeat+terrorism

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3840&highlight=starfish

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=14318&highlight=Qaeda+Core

Oh no. What did you do? Why?

Now he's going to bundle them all into one! :D

Dayuhan

09-30-2012, 11:50 PM

c) will it work minus OBL?

I'd submit that a dead charismatic leader is probably the most effective kind: he can be infinitely romanticized without the risk that he'll say or do something inconsistent with the image.

Bill Moore

10-01-2012, 02:47 AM

I'd submit that a dead charismatic leader is probably the most effective kind

Moses, Jesus, Martin L. King, Nathan Hale, Che comes to mind among others. Mythology is very powerful.

Can't forget Eddie would go.

Now he's going to bundle them all into one!

David likes an orderly house, where I'm quite content with somewhat of a mess :-)

Bob's World

10-01-2012, 08:20 AM

AQ was never so much about the man or the ideology, but rather about "the cause."

Little, other than the Arab Spring, has been designed to address the cause of AQ; or to help address the many diverse causes of the many diverse populaces that AQ is reliant upon to operationalize their vision or tactics. Instead we have worked in many ways to reinforce the causes and to validate the unifying message of AQ, while at the same time being overly focused on the group itself, and those groups that turn to them for support.

While people are being biblical, 50 is plenty for a dead martyr; look what Jesus did with 12...

davidbfpo

11-06-2012, 01:29 PM

A lengthy review of two books by Raffaello Pantucci: 'Hunting in the Shadows: The Pursuit of al Qaeda since 9/11' by Seth Jones and 'The Al Qaeda Factor: Plots Against the West' by Mitchell D. Silber:http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/11/05/appraising_al_qaeda_the_practitioners_perspective

A short review comment:
Jones's Hunting in the Shadows could be described as an official history of sorts of al-Qaeda from the U.S. government perspective. This makes it a different beast to Silber's The Al Qaeda Factor, in which a much more coldly analytical process draws a clear conclusion about the ‘al Qaeda factor' in various terrorist plots.

Longer excerpt:
..offer different insights into this question, while reaching largely similar conclusions about what al-Qaeda is and how it has targeted the West.

Both of these books were published over a decade after the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington bloodily thrust al-Qaeda into the public consciousness, meaning they are able to look back at a considerable amount of data. While Jones' is the more narratively satisfying book, telling a story of al Qaeda around the world, there are omissions in the text that reflect its heavy American focus. Silber's, on the other hand, is a case-by-case analysis that lacks a narrative storyline, but the accounts of the plots in question are drawn from primary sources that make them some of the most factually accurate versions yet told of the various plots, and bring new and interesting insights useful to analysts and researchers

Link to Seth Jones's book:http://www.amazon.com/Hunting-Shadows-Pursuit-Qaida-since/dp/0393081451/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1352215573&sr=1-1&keywords=seth+jones

Link to Mitchell Silber's book: http://www.amazon.com/Al-Qaeda-Factor-Plots-Against/dp/0812244028/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1352215718&sr=1-1&keywords=mitchell+silber

davidbfpo

01-09-2013, 11:52 AM

An article from an Arab paper, id'd via Twitter:http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2013/01/history-ansar-al-sharia-arab-spring.html

It opens with:
The emergence of Ansar al-Sharia [Partisans of Islamic Law] in several Arab countries as democratic uprisings sweep across the Arab world represents a new phase of the Salafist-jihadist movement and its strategic goals.

davidbfpo

01-30-2013, 10:40 PM

SWC member Clint Watts has a paper on FPRI:http://www.fpri.org/geopoliticus/2013/01/are-todays-al-qaeda-offshoots-following-bin-ladens-vision

It opens with:
The May 2011 raid killing Osama Bin Laden in his Abbottabad compound not only eliminated the world’s most notorious terrorist but also provided a unique glimpse into the strategic musings of al Qaeda’s leadership. The Abbottabad documents released in May 2012 reveal Bin Laden’s strategic recalibration as he witnessed the demise of his organization in Afghanistan and Pakistan while missing out on an Arab Spring that toppled many of the so-called “apostate dictators” he despised. All of the documents disclosed to the public reveal different aspects of al Qaeda's operations. However, two documents in particular shed light on Bin Laden's last thoughts on the future direction.

OBL made several points on lessons learnt and future options, rightly Clint concludes:
It is too early to assess whether Bin Laden's guidance is the basis for the disaggregated Salafi-Jihadi violence occurring around the world.

davidbfpo

05-09-2013, 10:18 AM

Hat tip to a "lurker":
CSIS (the Canadian one) has done a really rather good foresight paper about the future of AQ

Link:.https://www.csis.gc.ca/pblctns/cdmctrch/20130501_eng.pdf

Just over eighty pages looking forward to 2018, with sections on: AQ core & AQ in Iraq, AQIM, AQ in East Africa and AQAP.

This thread fits in with other strategic threads in this section.

davidbfpo

07-12-2013, 12:46 PM

A CNN commentary 'Terrorism at a moment of transition' by an ex-CIA officer, John McLaughlin, for an Aspen event:http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2013/07/12/terrorism-at-a-moment-of-transition/

Remarkably the only focus is on an evolving AQ, as if it was the only terrorist group. It does have some succinct passages, like:
So this is a highly fluid moment of transition for international terrorism – when we can confidently discern trends but cannot predict end states with any assurance.

This one struck me as odd, read first:
It is no accident that the two most significant terrorist attacks in the last six months occurred here: the assault on the U.S. base in Benghazi, Libya, and the attack on the In Amenas natural gas plant in Algeria.

Emblematic of the freedom that terrorists have here, the leader of the latter attack was able to use networks across the region to gather weapons and recruit fighters from Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Algeria, Nigeria, and Mauritania.

I think it is significant that the In Amenas attack needed such a range of fanatics; we invariably miss that so few Muslims are attracted to the violent Jihad. It is a sign of weakness IMHO.

Maybe a minor point, but why use 'the U.S. base in Benghazi', my emphasis. It was a diplomatic building, although we now know some murky activity was under-way elsewhere.

bourbon

07-12-2013, 01:26 PM

Maybe a minor point, but why use 'the U.S. base in Benghazi', my emphasis. It was a diplomatic building, although we now know some murky activity was under-way elsewhere.
Just as the State Department has an embassy in a capital city and consulates in other cities - CIA has a 'station' in the embassy and 'bases' in other cities.

davidbfpo

07-12-2013, 06:24 PM

Transnational networks are indeed a function of modern Islamist terrorism, as they are of almost every other aspect of modern life. Just as with cross-border fraud or organised crime, they require an enhanced international response. But they have not been unknown in the past. The Fenian bombing campaign in London of the 1880s depended upon its foreign training camp – the Brooklyn Dynamite School – and the propaganda produced under First Amendment freedoms including that notable New York periodical, “Ireland’s Liberator and Dynamite Monthly”. The identification of religiously-inspired plotters with foreign powers and foreign training goes further back than that: several of the Gunpowder plotters of 1605 were educated by foreign Jesuits; while their explosives expert Guy Fawkes was recruited for the task in Flanders, where he had learned his skills as a mercenary, originally for the same King of Spain – Philip II – who had recently launched the Spanish Armada.

From an article 'Shielding the Compass: How to Fight Terrorism Without Defeating the Law' by David Anderson, a UK lawyer and now the Independent Reviewer of Terrorist Legislation - which I am currently reading:http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2292950

The passage cited illustrates that so much of contemporary terrorism is not new and has some odd historical episodes.

davidbfpo

08-14-2013, 02:00 PM

Somewhere there is a thread on the management style of AQ, but on a quick search it has eluded me:(.

Returning to this issue, assessing AQ's future, was prompted by a short article in Foreign Affairs 'The Business Habits of Highly Effective Terrorists Why Terror Masterminds Rely on Micro-Management' by Jacob Shapiro, which has some illuminating insights:http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136827/jacob-n-shapiro/the-business-secrets-of-highly-effective-terrorists?page=show

davidbfpo

08-20-2013, 07:33 PM

I missed in the last post jacob Shapiro had written a book 'The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations' and Clints Watts has done a short review, with my emphasis:
I’m only about 50-60 pages in and it is fantastic....is a must read for those trying to understand how terrorist group’s make decisions and I hope everyone gets a chance to read it. It’s well written and uses a fantastic array of case studies from throughout history and around the globe. And with that, I’m off to read some more.

Link to review:http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=1121

Link to book, with no reviews:http://www.amazon.com/The-Terrorists-Dilemma-Managing-Organizations/dp/0691157219

davidbfpo

10-02-2013, 11:40 PM

Steve Metz (SWC Member) has a short article on WPR, 'Strategic Horizons: Al-Qaida’s Resurgence, Like Its Demise, Is Greatly Exaggerated'
'
I liked this passage:
The threat today comes less from al-Qaida as an organization than from the ideas it popularized by disguising sociopathic violence with a religious veneer to appeal to the world's extensive supply of lost, disillusioned and angry young men. It is extraordinarily difficult to kill ideas. But Americans and the citizens of other nations victimized by terrorism must understand that an occasional attack, however tragic, does not demonstrate that the extremists are undergoing a revival. Violent Islamic extremism, like other forms of barbarism, will eventually fade, but it will continue to kill both Muslims and non-Muslims as it does so. Al-Qaida and its allies can murder, but they cannot manage, produce or govern. And those latter qualities are the benchmarks of a truly dangerous enemy—one that begins small and fractured and, over time, grows more organized and better able to administer and undertake centrally controlled, coordinated political and military efforts.

Al-Qaida and its affiliates are moving in the opposite direction, becoming less organized, more fractured and less able to exercise political power. Thus they are more reliant on terrorism, particularly terrorism in highly populated areas, which is more likely to get the attention the extremists so crave.

Link:http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13264/strategic-horizons-al-qaida-s-resurgence-like-its-demise-is-greatly-exaggerated

In the very long term, yet to be seen Steve is right to say:
Violent Islamic extremism, like other forms of barbarism, will eventually fade.

Historians, one whose name escapes me, trace such violence back to at least the Indian Mutiny. Or does such violence just become part of the landscape, that we fail to notice? Before 9/11 very few of the public in the USA noted this extremism, many others countries, including some in the UK remarked "Ah, now you see what we've fought for years".

There is another article on this theme, but till tomorrow.

davidbfpo

10-11-2013, 10:40 PM

A short CSIS paper, with some pithy comments, for example:
the new jihadi-salafists are undertaking a more strategic, grassroots effort to Islamize society while occasionally using targeted direct action, including violence, to advance their goals.

Link:http://csis.org/files/publication/131011_MalkaLawrence_JihadiSalafism_Web.pdf

davidbfpo

10-22-2013, 10:33 PM

Stephen Tankel on War on The Rocks on the apparent decline of AQ Central, with the removal of Arab leaders becoming more like AQ Pakistan. He concludes:
We should not expect al-Qaeda in Pakistan to give up entirely on transnational attack planning. But given its addition of Pakistanis at senior leader levels and its increasingly limited capabilities, we should expect a continued growing focus on the insurgency in Pakistan and possibly on striking foreign targets in India. Regionally, that has important implications for U.S. counterterrorism practices in South Asia. Globally, it means that AQAP is not simply the most lethal arm of al-Qaeda, but also increasingly its center of gravity in terms of leadership and coordination.

Link:http://warontherocks.com/2013/10/going-native-the-regionalization-of-al-qaeda/

davidbfpo

11-13-2013, 12:37 PM

A short, simple explanation by the British FCO. Fascinating assessment and a public document too; the weblink IMHO suggests a regular publication, although first time I've seen this:https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/256616/Oct_2013_AQ_newsletter.pdf

The summary:
For the first time, AQ’s top leader has appointed a deputy from beyond the Afghanistan/Pakistan based “AQ Core”, from Yemen based AQ in the Arabian Peninsula (AQ-AP). This geographical spread at the top mirrors the spreading threat posed by the wider AQ Movement which has already been underway for four years. It means that we should stop calling Af/Pak based AQ figures “AQ Core” since they do not necessarily have a higher standing than any of the other AQ groups - the top leadership is multi-national and in that sense “AQ Core” is no more.

Bill Moore

12-11-2013, 07:19 AM

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25206462#!

"They are technically adept, they move very fast, they have a core of experienced people, they operate in a country with fragile areas and elude the Yemeni authorities. Plus they have the ability to inspire people to lone acts of terror."

What makes AQAP so dangerous is its Saudi master bomb-maker, Ibrahim al-Asiri, one of the CIA's most wanted targets. He is thought to be the brains behind all three non-metallic devices that got past airport security.

Last year, just weeks before the London Olympics, they handed a new, upgraded device to one of their number who volunteered to be a suicide bomber. But he turned out to be an informant who fled to Saudi Arabia, taking the device with him, which was then passed by the Saudis to the FBI for analysis.

All the more reason we should continue drone strikes. These individuals are striving to kill hundreds of innocent civilians by destroying commercial aircraft and we're worried about the potential blowback from drone strikes? Does anybody really think if we stop they'll stop?

Bill Moore

01-06-2014, 09:20 AM

http://www.eurasiareview.com/26122013-three-versions-al-qaeda-primer/

The Three Versions Of Al Qaeda: A Primer

Al Qaeda today only slightly resembles the al Qaeda of yesteryear. Al Qaeda operatives or “al Qaeda-like” organizations stretch throughout North Africa, across the Middle East and into South Asia. This disparate string of organizations hosts a handful of al Qaeda’s original Afghanistan and Pakistan veterans but mostly consist of newcomers inspired by al Qaeda’s message — disenfranchised young men seeking an adventurous fight in the wake of a tumultuous Arab Spring. Al Qaeda, or more appropriately jihadism pursued under al Qaeda’s banner, has morphed in several waves over the course of more than two decades.
Evaluating al Qaeda through three incarnations may help us fully understand the group’s evolution into the present day and what it may become in the future. Al Qaeda may be examined in three periods: al Qaeda 1.0 (1988 – 2001), al Qaeda 2.0 (2002 – 2011) and al Qaeda 3.0 (2011 – present). Note, these periods are not distinct entities. Al Qaeda has transformed slowly through each phase. Some affiliates carrying al Qaeda’s name have rapidly morphed based on changing local conditions while others have adjusted more pragmatically. However, two significant events, the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the death of Osama Bin Laden on May 1, 2011 provide natural turning points for tracing al Qaeda’s evolution.

JMA

01-22-2014, 07:26 AM

Moderator adds: Post 2 asks for this thread and Post 9 created this thread (ends).

'Encouraging' somebody is not making him/her anybody's proxy. Only direct support does.

It is how it is done.

Too many examples (in the past) of lone or small teams of CIA operatives attempting to direct the opposition forces in exchange for weapons and other support where these CIA individuals are woefully unqualified militarily together with this a near total lack of knowledge of the complexities of the situation on the ground. Sadly pathetic.

The one consistent aim of the US since 9/11 has been to go after Al Qaeda and prevent their expansion. In terms of Syria this has been a spectacular failure.

jmm99

01-22-2014, 04:28 PM

The one consistent aim of the US since 9/11 has been [1] to go after Al Qaeda and [2] prevent their expansion. In terms of Syria this has been a spectacular failure.

The US has been consistent in going after AQ Base - we have killed a lot of them via direct actions and drones.

We should have a discussion somewhere other than in this thread - a SWC thread may already exist - on "preventing AQ expansion". An ounce of prevention now may free a pound of care later.

Moderator adds: a new thread was started 24th January 2014 at:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=19947

But, having said that, US "prevention" efforts generally have been less than "shock and awe"-inspiring. Our "state building" operations in Iraq and Astan were certainly intended to prevent AQ expansion. Now, thousands of lives and just south of $ 2 trillion later, we have basically nada - those two "state building" efforts have been the "spectacular failures".

A subsidiary issue for that separate discussion is how far afield does the US go in preventing the expansion of AQ "franchises" (as opposed to hitting AQ Base). In short, the feasibility and the costs of mounting those operations (whatever they might be) may well be prohibitive with respect to local "AQ" groups.

In retrospect from 9/11, the US has been successful in small direct actions and drone strikes against AQ Base and the leadership of closely-tied franchises on an international scale. The US has also been successful within CONUS in prosecuting hundreds of AQ inspired local terrs - with only one shootout (Detroit MI) that I know of.

Finally, this past situation should not exist today:

Too many examples (in the past) of lone or small teams of CIA operatives attempting to direct the opposition forces in exchange for weapons and other support where these CIA individuals are woefully unqualified militarily together with this a near total lack of knowledge of the complexities of the situation on the ground. Sadly pathetic.

We have the green light for joint Title 50 (CIA and other intel agencies) - Title 10 (DoD) operations. The questions go to the wisdom of when and where to use them - and how much.

Regards

Mike

davidbfpo

01-22-2014, 10:55 PM

Within an article on scaling down the military presence in Kashmir and placing the emphasis on the police are several facts, here are some:
The principal reason to consider scaling back the Army’s counter-insurgency presence in Kashmir is simple: there isn’t an insurgency to be fought. Ever since the 2001-2002 near-war between India and Pakistan, levels of violence in the State have fallen steadily. In 2001, as many as 1,067 civilians, 590 security forces personnel, and 2,850 terrorists were killed in fighting. The numbers fell in 2003 to 658 civilians, 338 security forces and 1,546 terrorists. Last year’s numbers, the authoritative South Asia Terrorism Portal records, were 20 civilians, 61 security forces and 100 terrorists.

In population-adjusted terms, the insurgency in J&K cost 1.51 lives per 100,000 persons of its population, lower than the homicide rate in Delhi or Haryana. The State’s total firearms fatalities were well below those in Uttar Pradesh (1,575 in 2012) or Bihar (681) or even West Bengal (269).

Link:http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article5597916.ece?

JMA

01-23-2014, 08:39 AM

We have the green light for joint Title 50 (CIA and other intel agencies) - Title 10 (DoD) operations. The questions go to the wisdom of when and where to use them - and how much.

Exactly!

When, where, HOW and on what scale.

The how requires more than a little bit of 'skill and cunning' ;)

MoorthyM

01-23-2014, 03:03 PM

jmm99

01-23-2014, 06:22 PM

There are a number of threads here at SWC to which you could contribute.

For the benefit of other members/viewers, I don't know Moorthy (his first name, BTW); but I've just looked up his book, Defeating Political Islam: The New Cold War (http://www.amazon.com/Defeating-Political-Islam-The-Cold/dp/1591027047) (2009). Here's the Amazon pitch:

Al Qaeda and its sympathizers are often viewed as isolated fanatics outside of the mainstream Muslim population—outlaws not only in the West but also in respectable Muslim nations. This book argues just the opposite: that in fact terrorism is the logical outgrowth of an international Islamic political agenda that is endorsed and funded by Islam’s major players—Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan. Author Moorthy S. Muthuswamy labels these nations the "Axis of Jihad". For decades, he says, they have been devoted to extending their spheres of influence in the name of religion.

Utilizing a recent groundbreaking statistical analysis of Islamic doctrines and an analysis based upon the outlook of Muslims, he discusses the possibility that Islam is less a religion and more an ideology of conquest.

Muthuswamy urges US policymakers to rethink the War on Terror along the lines of the successfully waged Cold War against communism. The nuclear physicist-author makes the following main point:

Like the Cold War, this war is more a contest of ideas than armed conflict. Rather than placing the emphasis on military might and costly wars abroad, the West should invest the bulk of its effort in a science-based ideological war, one that is directed at discrediting the simplistic, conquest-oriented theological roots of Islamist indoctrination and jihadist politics.

Muthuswamy also emphasizes the importance of a largely non-Muslim India in the War on Terror, in view of its location and size. The India-born author gives a fascinating description of modern Islamic conquest in South Asia. His insights into the Islamist siege and subversion of Indian democracy should be revealing for the citizens of western democracies.

The author asserts that the West needs India in dealing with the conundrum that is Pakistan, as they both share language, culture, and more with each other.

This fresh perspective on the ongoing threat from Islamist terrorism offers much to ponder about the future course of US foreign policy initiatives.

I also found two reviews. One (by Diana West in the WT), BOOK REVIEW: Reversing U.S. policy in AfPak (http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/27/reversing-us-policy-in-afpak/?page=all), is favorable. The other (by GB Singh in NER), Dangerous Policy (http://www.newenglishreview.org/custpage.cfm/frm/42165/sec_id/42165), is unfavorable. The latter attacks Moorthy's message, but also attacks the messenger (IMO). I did take Mr Singh's advice on one point: I will read the book ! :)

Moorthy, the concept here at SWC is to attack the message (ruthlessly), but not to attack the messenger. In short, an officer and a gentlemen standard works best in preventing flaming and in keeping learnable conversations going. In that context and in my opinion, Mr Singh should have left out the last half of his last paragraph.

I encourage you to post here, not only in this thread but elsewhere.

Regards

Mike

carl

01-23-2014, 09:26 PM

MoorthyM:

If the 'Preventing AQ expansion' thread gets going you gotta get into the discussion. The US needs some ideas beyond Preds shooting Hellfires.

Moderator adds: new thread created, so please post there and so next two posts have been moved (ends)

MoorthyM

01-24-2014, 06:03 AM

MoorthyM:

If the 'Preventing AQ expansion' thread gets going you gotta get into the discussion. The US needs some ideas beyond Preds shooting Hellfires.

Jmm99 & Carl

Thank you for the kind comments.

I want to posit a new paradigm that I believe will help us safely navigate the threat of radical Islam (and beyond): If a social phenomenon has a wide following (such as the Al Qaeda variety) it has to have a simple and well-known construct.

Indeed, I am confident that we know now how radical Islam functions, and consequently, how to neutralize it. In other words, a “Grand Strategy” policy formulation of addressing the engulfing worldwide threat of radical Islam and the associated Muslim socioeconomic stagnation may be feasible. A research article of mine (about 11,000 words long) that identifies the radical Islamic construct is scheduled to be published in a few months.

I don’t see why it would take more than a few years to break the back of the ideological basis and power centers of radical Islam. We should be able to do that without attacking the religion or antagonize the religious majority. In fact, we can get the religious majority to our side, as they are victimized by Islamists as much as anyone else.

Even then, I do admit that we would still need a few Hellfire missiles, not so much as part of any reactive response, but as part of a strategic one.

davidbfpo

01-24-2014, 04:38 PM

JMM99 asked for a new thread we should discuss "preventing AQ expansion". An ounce of prevention now may free a pound of care later.

His initial comment added:
But, having said that, US "prevention" efforts generally have been less than "shock and awe"-inspiring. Our "state building" operations in Iraq and Astan were certainly intended to prevent AQ expansion. Now, thousands of lives and just south of $ 2 trillion later, we have basically nada - those two "state building" efforts have been the "spectacular failures".

A subsidiary issue for that separate discussion is how far afield does the US go in preventing the expansion of AQ "franchises" (as opposed to hitting AQ Base). In short, the feasibility and the costs of mounting those operations (whatever they might be) may well be prohibitive with respect to local "AQ" groups.

In retrospect from 9/11, the US has been successful in small direct actions and drone strikes against AQ Base and the leadership of closely-tied franchises on an international scale. The US has also been successful within CONUS in prosecuting hundreds of AQ inspired local terrs - with only one shootout (Detroit MI) that I know of.

My initial search, using intervention and prevention failed to identify a relevant thread. A skim through this arena found a thread started by Gian Gentile that does fit! It is a 2008 thread 'The Global Counter Insurgency" Some Thoughts' at:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4927

DrTRFurnish

01-24-2014, 05:07 PM

I submit that a possible avenue of de-legitimization of AQ and its (Sunni) literalist exegetical paradigm of the Qur'an, Hadith and Islamic history would be Islamic sects, some of which (Ahmadis, Isma'ili Shi`a, a number of Sufi orders) hold different views of, in particular, jihad; they define it as truly non-violent, unlike the majority Sunni view over the last 1434 years. Jihad is thus not "extremist" or even "radical," as journalists and too many analysts parrot; jihad, and yes violent jihad against non-Muslims, is mainstream in Islam and has been since the examples of Muhammad himself. The only way that legitimate narrative--which gives strength to AQ and the other 38 Muslim groups on the current State Dept. FTO list--can be degraded is by holding up to Muslims that there are those within their own faith tradition that dissent. This will take time, but it may work. I wrote an article on this a few years ago: http://hnn.us/article/83742

carl

01-24-2014, 05:18 PM

MoorthyM:

I ask your opinion on this. One of the vulnerabilities of radical Islam is its bloodthirstiness. People in general don't like that, so much so that radical Islam either comes up with a fairy story denying that radical Islam did it, ie the story that we destroyed the world trade center ourselves; or they twist the theology in order to justify psychopathic murder. Even that only goes so far with the people who have live under them, eventually those people rebel, like in Iraq before and in Syria now. The people who provide the recruits and the money never see the blood so they swallow the fairy stories and the twisted theology and continue to provide recruits and money.

So, I think we should attack this vulnerability. We should highlight all the murders continuously, constantly present the obvious evidence that these guys are so many Jeffrey Dahmers organized. Every time an American diplomat meets a Sauidi or Pakistani diplomat bring up the latest atrocity. We should buy time on Al Jazerra and run shows on the bombings and murders. We should beat them over the head so to speak with the severed limbs of the
victims. The idea is to try and make it that people who give the money have to some extent live with and see the blood. I think it would discourage the money giving.

What do you think?

jmm99

01-24-2014, 05:34 PM

As another fan of Jeremiah Johnson (Amazon (http://www.amazon.com/Jeremiah-Johnson-Robert-Redford/dp/6304696531)), I liked your short comment on your webpage (http://www.mahdiwatch.org/):

Friday, January 3, 2014

Jeremiah Johnson, Islam and CT Analysis.

One of my favorites movies of all time is the 1972 atypical Western "Jeremiah Johnson (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeremiah_Johnson_(film))," starring Robert Redford. Johnson is a mountain man somewhere in the Rocky Mountains of the western US in the mid-19th century, fighting the elements, bears, wolves and of course Indians (no they aren't' "Native Americans," because they too came to the Western hemisphere from elsewhere--they just did so some millennia before the Europeans).

At one point Johnson is asked to guide a US Cavalry unit and a Protestant minister through a sacred Crow Indian burial ground, in order to relieve a band of trapped American settlers. Johnson replies that doing so could be dangerous because the area is "big medicine." Reverend Lindquist sneers "you don't believe that!" To which the mountain man retorts "it doesn't matter; THEY do!"

After being reminded of this insightful scene by my good friend Reverend Chuck Treadwell, it occurred to me that most modern American counter-intelligence, intelligence and area studies analysts could learn something from Jeremiah Johnson. I can't even recall how many times I've read, or been told in person--by members of the Intelligence Community, State Department, media, chaplains or even our military--that "jihadists aren't REALLY motivated by Islam" or "no Muslims REALLY believe in the Mahdi" or (perhaps my favorite) "I don't have to read the Qur'an to know that it's a 'peaceful' book."

http://www.mahdiwatch.org/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderpictures/Jeremiahbiggerjpeg.jpg

US CT policy would be better off heeding this guy than the Mark Sagemans of the world.

This was the point I was making in an interview I did with the "Jerusalem Post" (during my trip to Israel in November 2012), regarding analysis of the Islamic world: "We have to look at the culture, economics, politics and psychology in addition to religion—but it cannot be ignored. In intelligence analysis, much like historical analysis, you put yourself in the others' position. It is very important to understand the others—even when we do not agree with them.”

That way, maybe, the Muslim equivalents of Paints-His-Shirt-Red will eventually call off their jihad against us and raise their hands in peace--as that Crow chief did toward Johnson at the end of the movie. But that only occurred after the bearded and heavily armed white Christian had defeated all the braves sent to kill him.

Reverend Lindquist was an idiot, was he not (arrogance bred from ignorance).

Regards

Mike

PS (off-topic): Vine (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vine_Deloria,_Jr.) would've argued that the moccasin tracks went in the other direction (link (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Earth,_White_Lies)). :)

I've drunk more than a few beers with Indians (woo-woo kind), but not with a Native American (rara avis ?) :D

slapout9

01-25-2014, 05:29 AM

Bill Moore

01-25-2014, 11:23 AM

The author of this article, Praveen Swami, has overlooked the strategic aims of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia backed Islamists in South Asia.

These Islamists, such as Pakistani intelligence backed Lashkar-e-Taiba want to “recapture” India for Islam. Under this vision, a radicalized Kashmir is to be used as a base for escalating radicalization of India’s Muslim minorities and formation of jihadist groups in the Indian heartland. The Islamists have made great strides in this direction. It has just been noted that a group modeled after (Pakistan-based) Tahreek-e-Taliban has now taken root in the central Indian city of Aurangabad.

Strategically, from an Islamist view, there is little to be gained by intensifying jihad in Kashmir at this time as it would invite retaliation by the Indian army, bring hardships to the local (Muslim) population, and make them reluctant to help the Islamist cause. Fundamentally, India (like every other nation) has failed to understand why the locals have been drawn to radical ideologies and how to extricate them. That’s the bottom line.

In my 2009 book, Defeating Political Islam: The New Cold War, an entire section titled, “Siege of India (pp: 81-133)” is devoted to a discussion of the ongoing multi-front jihadist assault on India.

This may be one of those situations where a storm is waiting in the wings of the calm.

We have understood the radicalization for years, even prior to 9/11, but that doesn't mean we understand how to stop it. I think we need to keep a realistic view of our limitations when it comes to both implementing counter-radicalization (prevention) and de-radicalization effective programs. We understand the forces the cause volcanos, but we can't prevent them from happening. Assuming the collective we, to include Muslim allies in this struggle could develop an approach to counter current methods, both state and non-state actors who promote radicalization as a way to obtain their political goals will adjust their radicalization process to overcome our messaging to discredit them. While this will still remain an important effort we're not going to contain Al-Qaeda anytime soon pursuing this.

Fighting will still be required to hold the wave back, but more importantly as Bob's World has pointed out repeatedly governments will have to evolve to limit the appeal of radical Islam. While counter intuitive, if the population desires more fundamentalism then why not encourage it? If they practice Islam in that way, then what is the basis of any argument by Al-Qaeda that they need to change?

davidbfpo

01-25-2014, 11:37 PM

The NYT Sunday Review has a succinct article, with many good quotes, for example Will McCants:
Al Qaeda is kind of a ready-made kit now..It is a portable ideology that is entirely fleshed out, with its own symbols and ways of mobilizing people and money to the cause. In many ways, you don’t have to join the actual organization anymore to get those benefits.

The penultimate sentence:
But while counterterrorism can be effective in stopping specific threats, depriving militant groups of the unstable environments where they flourish and organize is much harder.

The last sentence reflects a focus on the Middle East, when IMHO it ignores the sustenance provided by some within stable, governed territory (KSA, Gulf sheikhdoms etc) for militancy elsewhere. The Yemen has been a nearby "sideshow" for years, then there is the 'sore" of Iraq and now Syria. None of them appear to mobilise beyond a small militant minority, which we all too often overlook in our fear.

What you are seeing in the Middle East is a problem of militancy combined with ungoverned territory,....That is the real problem, not which groups belong to Al Qaeda and how can we get rid of them.

Link:http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/26/sunday-review/the-franchising-of-al-qaeda.html?_r=0

Bill Moore

01-26-2014, 12:20 AM

The NYT Sunday Review has a succinct article, with many good quotes, for example Will McCants:

The penultimate sentence:

The last sentence reflects a focus on the Middle East, when IMHO it ignores the sustenance provided by some within stable, governed territory (KSA, Gulf sheikhdoms etc) for militancy elsewhere. The Yemen has been a nearby "sideshow" for years, then there is the 'sore" of Iraq and now Syria. None of them appear to mobilise beyond a small militant minority, which we all too often overlook in our fear.

Link:http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/26/sunday-review/the-franchising-of-al-qaeda.html?_r=0

David, is it ungoverned territory if Al-Qaeda or affiliated group governs that space? This was addressed in the "Management of Strategy," which is one of the Islamist strategy books. Kilcullen developed a theory to address this for terrorists, criminals, and insurgents, called "the theory of competitive control." I tried to spur a discussion on this topic earlier to no avail, but in my opinion the spread of AQ is all about competitive control.

davidbfpo

01-26-2014, 12:52 AM

David, is it ungoverned territory if Al-Qaeda or affiliated group governs that space? This was addressed in the "Management of Strategy," which is one of the Islamist strategy books. Kilcullen developed a theory to address this for terrorists, criminals, and insurgents, called "the theory of competitive control." I tried to spur a discussion on this topic earlier to no avail, but in my opinion the spread of AQ is all about competitive control.

Bill,

No, in many of the territories AQ are supposedly active they rarely govern. AQIM is a good example. It has gone through a cycle of militancy, retreat, crime (kidnapping & smuggling) and militancy in the Sahel where there are few people and even fewer who accept or need what they offer. Yemen I think is similar, with corruption replacing crime.

There is a big difference in deciding what the strategy should be in places where there are people in large numbers, Indonesia comes to mind.

I am not sure AQ's narrative has much appeal beyond inhospitable places with small populations (Afghanistan) where there is a competent state which can contain them (India), sorry also those that are ruthless (Algeria & Egypt).

I failed to find 'competitive control' instead this old thread Indirect and Direct components to strategy for the Long War (from 2008-2009) appeared and maybe useful:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5070

Bill Moore

01-26-2014, 01:06 AM

Bill,

No, in many of the territories AQ are supposedly active they rarely govern. AQIM is a good example. It has gone through a cycle of militancy, retreat, crime (kidnapping & smuggling) and militancy in the Sahel where there are few people and even fewer who accept or need what they offer. Yemen I think is similar, with corruption replacing crime.

There is a big difference in deciding what the strategy should be in places where there are people in large numbers, Indonesia comes to mind.

I am not sure AQ's narrative has much appeal beyond inhospitable places with small populations (Afghanistan) where there is a competent state which can contain them (India), sorry also those that are ruthless (Algeria & Egypt).

I failed to find 'competitive control' instead this old thread Indirect and Direct components to strategy for the Long War (from 2008-2009) appeared and maybe useful:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5070

David,

I going to disagree, while you have some valid points, they are not true in all cases. They generally can't maintain control, but they can establish it pretty quickly as demonstrated in parts of Iraq, Syria, Mali, etc. where village by village, or town by town they established control (however ephemeral) quickly, implemented their laws, and provided predictability.

If you read Kilcullen's new book Out of the Mountains he discusses his theory at some length, and a little more explanation at the links below:

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/future-of-warfare-in-a-post-coin-conflict-climate

In a 1964 lecture he said that during WW2 “any sound revolutionary warfare operator used small-war tactics [ie guerrilla techniques] -not to destroy the German Army, of which they were thoroughly incapable, but to establish a competitive system of control over the population”. This is the same normative system idea I mentioned earlier: it implies the presence of a system of incentives and disincentives, of a normative system (behavioral rules correlated with a set of consequences) that is used to generate control over population groups.

http://www.oupcanada.com/catalog/9780199737505.html

Kilcullen also offers a unified theory of "competitive control" that shows how non-state armed groups, drug cartels, street gangs, warlords - draw their strength from local populations, providing useful ideas for dealing with these groups and with diffuse social conflicts in general. But for many of the struggles we will face, he notes, there will be no military solution. We will need to involve local people deeply to address problems which neither outsiders nor locals alone can solve.

http://www.nyjournalofbooks.com/book-review/out-mountains-coming-age-urban-guerrilla

a more lengthy discussion on how it applies to AQ at this link.

http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303799404579284450431896952

The foundation of "Out of the Mountains" is Mr. Kilcullen's "theory of competitive control," which zooms in on the insurgent networks that other theories glance at from a bird's-eye perspective. The theory suggests that "populations respond to a predictable, ordered, normative system, which tells them exactly what they need to do, and not do, in order to be safe." Remove that normative system, and chaos could easily ensue.

JMA

01-26-2014, 07:39 AM

Good perspective... and probably correct.

When an area 'goes quiet' you need to have a good look at what is going on below the surface (so to speak).

The author of this article, Praveen Swami, has overlooked the strategic aims of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia backed Islamists in South Asia.

These Islamists, such as Pakistani intelligence backed Lashkar-e-Taiba want to “recapture” India for Islam. Under this vision, a radicalized Kashmir is to be used as a base for escalating radicalization of India’s Muslim minorities and formation of jihadist groups in the Indian heartland. The Islamists have made great strides in this direction. It has just been noted that a group modeled after (Pakistan-based) Tahreek-e-Taliban has now taken root in the central Indian city of Aurangabad.

Strategically, from an Islamist view, there is little to be gained by intensifying jihad in Kashmir at this time as it would invite retaliation by the Indian army, bring hardships to the local (Muslim) population, and make them reluctant to help the Islamist cause. Fundamentally, India (like every other nation) has failed to understand why the locals have been drawn to radical ideologies and how to extricate them. That’s the bottom line.

In my 2009 book, Defeating Political Islam: The New Cold War, an entire section titled, “Siege of India (pp: 81-133)” is devoted to a discussion of the ongoing multi-front jihadist assault on India.

This may be one of those situations where a storm is waiting in the wings of the calm.

slapout9

01-26-2014, 07:29 PM

Bill Moore

01-27-2014, 07:04 AM

I have not read Kilcullen's new book so I am asking if anybody knows what Kilcullen means when he says a "Normative" system. In it's normal usage Normative systems are often the primary cause of Insurgencies and Revolts because the Governing system is refusing to Adapt to the needs of the Governed Population.

There is a decent explanation at this link which was provided above also.

http://www.nyjournalofbooks.com/book-review/out-mountains-coming-age-urban-guerrilla

This range of wide to narrow normative systems of a specific society in question has important implications. It often demonstrates how much control a group (whether it is a government or non-state actor) may or may not have, over that society.

Thus organizations, whether they are state or non-state actors, which successfully provide stability and predictability, have a greater chance of achieving such control while others, of course, may have far less success. Failure to provide stability (as well as fairness), of course, is just one of the reasons why so many governments in the Arab spring have faltered.

Some examples from his book include, page 104: The gang leader in each area, known as a "don," maintained a group of armed followers or "shooters" who acted as enforcers, kept down petty crime, and enforced a strict normative system of punishment and reward upon the population.

p 124:
Nonstate armed groups draw their strength and freedom of action primarily from their ability to manipulate and mobilize populations, and that they do this using a spectrum of methods from coercion to persuasion, by creating a normative system that makes people feel safe through the predictability and order it generates. break
It applies to insurgents, terrorists, drug cartels, street gangs, organized crime syndicates, pirates, and warlords, and it provides useful explanations and insights for law enforcement, civil war, and diffuse civil conflict, --not just insurgency.

p 136:
Simply put, the idea is that populations respond to a predictable, ordered, normative system that tells them exactly what they need to do, and not do, in order to be safe.

We didn't do this in either Iraq or Afghanistan. Rules correlated with consequences (both negative and positive).

p. 142:
the owner of a normative system becomes the dominant actor in a given area (or over a given population) precisely to the extent to which people in that area or population abide by its rules.

Much more in the book, but getting to our point about why insurgencies start is because people reject the normative system, that is the whole point about competitive control. Who can establish the most effective normative system. If people get to the point they believe the normative system puts them at risk, and they believe they have a chance to change it they most likely will. My point is we don't seem to realize this dynamic with our approach to U.S. led COIN operations. When we remove a government and then take our sweet time to establish a government, while failing to take on our responsibility as an occupying power because it is politically correct we allow chaos to emerge, and that presents opportunities for various non-state actors to establish an alternative normative system.

Dayuhan

01-27-2014, 08:01 AM

My point is we don't seem to realize this dynamic with our approach to U.S. led COIN operations. When we remove a government and then take our sweet time to establish a government, while failing to take on our responsibility as an occupying power because it is politically correct we allow chaos to emerge, and that presents opportunities for various non-state actors to establish an alternative normative system.

Isn't it also true that the US is at times inclined to favor "normative systems" that conform to the preferences of the American populace (those we can at least pretend ar democratic) over those that meet the requirements of the populace being governed? We might also consider that a "normative system" perceived as an imposition by an occupying power is going to face an uphill struggle for acceptance purely because it's seen as an imposition by an occupying power?

There is a big difference in deciding what the strategy should be in places where there are people in large numbers, Indonesia comes to mind.

AQ's influence in Indonesia has deteriorated very considerably, but not because of any strategy adopted by the US or "the west". The Government has been fairly successful in cracking down on AQ-associated groups and arresting leaders. JI attacks on civilian targets that have killed Indonesian Muslims have not helped the group. Possibly the most important factor, though, has been a sharp reduction in domestic sectarian conflict. Sectarian fighting between Christians and Muslims in Sulawesi and Maluku kept groups like Laskar Jihad in business; these groups were often not directly linked to AQ, but drew in fundamentalists with an inclination toward violence and provided ideal recruitment and organizing grounds for groups like JI. There is still a radical core in place, but the reduction in local sectarian conflict has deprived them of the immediate local issue that allowed them to tap into the larger populace.

davidbfpo

02-08-2014, 09:42 PM

A fascinating review of AQ by J.M. Berger this week on FP, with several hat tips on Twitter and now The New Yorker's recommendations for weekend reading says:
a thorough and clear overview of the group’s evolution since 9/11. Berger argues that Al Qaeda has changed so much in its hierarchy, goals, and tactics that to call it a terrorist organization might actually be a misnomer: its focus has shifted almost entirely to military campaigns and insurgencies. “The new Al Qaeda is still radical, extremist, and incredibly violent, overwhelming evidence suggests that terrorism is now decidedly secondary in Al Qaeda’s portfolio.” Updating our understanding of the organization, Berger argues, can give us insight into the strength of its leadership, the motivations of its recruits, and the next stages of its development, all of which will be difficult to grasp as long as U.S. policies “remain fixated on the brand name and organization that carried out the 9/11 attacks.”

Link:http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/books/2014/02/weekend-reading-gay-propaganda-the-new-al-qaeda-garrison-keillor.html

The FP article is behind a free, registration wall:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/02/04/war_on_error_al_qaeda_terrorism

jmm99

02-09-2014, 04:52 AM

a Transnational, Violent, Non-State Actor, a nature that existed in 1994, in 2004 and still exists in 2014 - and should be expected to continue in that nature (whether as "AQ", the Base, or under the name of some takfirist affiliate who manages to weather the storms better than its spiritual parent).

One would expect that, since its "conception" ca. 1988, its tactics (and, for that matter, strategies and underlying policies) would have changed to meet changed conditions. And indeed, that has been the case with AQ's embrace of terrorism from 1988 to date - a steadily tightening embrace until ca. 2008 (two decades after its founding as an insurgent group; or probably better, an aider and abettor of insurgent groups).

In other words, what could be seen was The Erosion of Noncombatant Immunity within Al Qaeda (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/67-ciovacco.pdf?q=mag/docs-temp/67-ciovacco.pdf) (by Carl J. Ciovacco, 2008, SWJ) - a somewhat legalistic way of saying that AQ fell more and more in love with whacking innocent civilians and increasing its reliance on the tactic of terrorism.

Ciovacco sees five stages of AQ's embrace of terrorism in its first two decades:

Phase One

The first phase of al Qaeda’s treatment of noncombatant immunity begins with respect for noncombatants in war. When al Qaeda first formed in 1988, it was fully engaged in a battle between armed combatants. While the Soviet Army was better trained and equipped, the Afghan militias and Afghan Arabs were armed nonetheless. Al Qaeda only fought the Soviets with guns and tactics directed against its soldiers. Suicide bombings against Soviet civilians in Moscow were scarcely a figment of bin Laden’s imagination. ...

Phase Two

This phase begins in March, 1997, with a CNN interview of bin Laden in Afghanistan. In a dramatic change to bin Laden’s view of noncombatants, he hints that civilians may not be as shielded as they were in the past. While he does not say that al Qaeda will target civilians, he basically intimates that if noncombatants get in the way, “it is their problem.” ...

Phase Three

In this third phase, bin Laden moved from luke warm approval of noncombatant immunity to overtly declaring that noncombatants were legitimate targets. On February 22, 1998, bin Laden released a signed statement on behalf of the World Islamic Front. The World Islamic Front consisted of al Qaeda, the Jihad Group in Egypt, the Egyptian Islamic Group, Jamiet-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan, and the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh. In this statement, bin Laden, and the rest of the alliance, not only sanctioned the killing of civilians, but also elevated it to level of a holy duty, or fatwa. ...

Phase Four

Phase Four is time-stamped by the 9/11 attacks. In these attacks, nearly 3,000 noncombatants were targeted both on the planes and on the ground. The noncombatants working in the World Trade Towers and those flying on the planes were in no way associated with the American government. Their intentional murder was exacted to draw media attention to al Qaeda’s cause and as retribution for perceived injustices by the American government on the Muslim community. While uniformed combatants were killed in the Pentagon on 9/11, the thrust of the operation was directed against noncombatants. ...

Phase Five

After the 9/11 attacks, it appears that al Qaeda’s move to complete disrespect for noncombatant immunity was complete. This interpretations, however, does not account for the scale-up potential of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Accordingly, the fifth phase demonstrates the final and most disturbing position regarding noncombatants: the use of WMDs to intentionally kill mass numbers of noncombatants. The fact that al Qaeda released a public statement informing the world of this intent, and received religious backing from a prominent Muslim cleric, makes this phase all the more dangerous. This is the current [2008] phase that we find al Qaeda; however, as far as we know, it is only at the rhetorical and preparation stage. ...

But, as AQ was winding up for its pitch at Armageddon, it realized it was as vulnerable to blowback as the USG. Ciovacco saw this in 2008 as a possible Phase Six, where the terrorism pendulum would start to swing back to increased Noncombatant Immunity - a shift which could go on for years (as it took two decades to shift from insurgency to WMD terrorism).

Just as al Qaeda’s targeting of noncombatants progressed in phases, perhaps it is moving into a Phase Six where a limited respect for noncombatant immunity once again exists. In 2005, Zawahiri directed al Qaeda in Iraq to stop killing Shia noncombatants because it was hurting al Qaeda’s greater cause. Furthermore, a top al Qaeda strategist, Abu Yahya al-Libi, has written to al Qaeda in Iraq telling them that its killing of “too many civilians” was undermining al Qaeda’s global strategy. Indeed, one influential ex-jihadist has correctly identified the flawed nature of targeting noncombatants by saying that, “the tactics have taken over the strategy.” While a full prohibition against the targeting of all noncombatants may be years ahead, this development is promising. Although the path to disregard for noncombatant immunity took over a decade to mature, signs are pointing to a reversal as its legitimacy is crumbing under its own weight. ...

So, in the tents of the takfirists, as in the punditry of the infidels, we heard the lament that “the tactics have taken over the strategy.”

The shift from WMD terrorism in 2008 (already then changing) to a more insurgency-focused set of tactics (complete with more formalized base areas - i.e., shadow governments) has been no surprise to those who read Ciovacco's article in 2008, or who arrived at its construct independently.

IMO: J.M.Berger's article (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/02/04/war_on_error_al_qaeda_terrorism) is a typical buzz-word piece of rhetoric - the sky is falling; do something quick:

So what happens next?

The most immediate priority for the United States and its allies is to make sense of the rapid changes al Qaeda is undergoing and then make the necessary policy adjustments.

While there are many different dimensions to the course corrections the United States needs to consider, the most important questions are these:

1. Do we believe jihadist warfighting organizations present a national security threat on a similar order to terrorist groups?

[JMM: Jihadist organizations are jihadist organizations - tactics do shift]

2. What policy tools do we need to deal with such organizations?

[JMM: Realistic decisions in each case about our engagement in the "Management of Savagery" would help - see below and above]

3. If such organizations are a national security threat by their nature, does it matter whether a group calls itself al Qaeda or not?

[JMM: No; names can be changed to protect the guilty - The critical question is whether the organization (jihadist or otherwise) is a TVNSA whose violence is directed against the US]

4. How do we address our concerns about these groups without embroiling ourselves in a series of counterproductive wars all over the globe?

[JMM: See "Management of Savagery" below]

5. What can we do to mitigate the risk that future terrorist organizations might emerge as successors to these fighting groups?

[JMM: Probably nothing realistic without attempting to be the World's policeman - Anna Simons footnote below]

As the points raised herein suggest, these are not simple questions -- but the United States must venture answers. The fundamental nature of al Qaeda has shifted, perhaps temporarily, perhaps permanently. But U.S. policies -- most notably the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) that empowers the so-called war on terrorism -- remain fixated on the brand name and organization that carried out the 9/11 attacks.

Although these policies allow for broad powers -- perhaps overly broad -- they are geared toward fighting a terrorist mission that has become secondary to our adversaries.

In reality, the 2001 AUMF has turned out to be very flexible in dealing with TVNSAs (e.g., the drone strikes) - the key issue has become violence directed against the US. A decent wordsmith (I don't know if that applies to Mr Berger) could draft a broader AUMF, encompassing all TVNSAs whose violence is directed against the US. But, currently and into the next several years, the 2001 AUMF is not the villain.

That is not to say that the USG has had a coherent policy with respect to AQ and its affiliates since 1996. However, what future policy should be is not going to be helped by premising a qualitative change in AQ's nature which is really only a tactical shift.

Progress toward a coherent policy would be helped if the USG would ask - realistically - whether it should become involved directly in the "Management of Savagery", or become involved by proxy, or not become involved at all. And, "Management of Savagery (http://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/abu-bakr-naji-the-management-of-savagery-the-most-critical-stage-through-which-the-umma-will-pass.pdf)" is exactly what is involved.

Anna Simons articles 2011-2013:

Sovereignty – The Ultimate States’ Rights Argument (http://www.fpri.org/telegram/201107.simons.sovereignty.html)

Soft War = Smart War? Think Again (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=146476)

21st Century Cultures of War: Advantage Them (https://www.fpri.org/docs/Simons_21st_Century_Cultures_of_War.pdf)

Regards

Mike

Bill Moore

02-21-2014, 08:33 AM

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-26281231

Al-Qaeda: Younger men take up leadership roles - UN study

"Younger commanders and fighters have a different perspective on international affairs, have the potential to generate propaganda that chimes with their generation more easily, and can also challenge their own leadership on tactics and targets," the UN experts found.

Further points highlighted in the report were:

Shifting locations: Affiliates find new spaces from which to operate when pushed back by government forces

Operational changes: Complex, simultaneous multi-strike attacks demonstrate that local branches are seeking to follow al-Qaeda core guidance for "spectacular" incidents

Potential return to Afghanistan: al-Qaeda is seeking to regroup and rebuild a presence in Afghanistan ahead of Nato's withdrawal of international troops at the end of 2014

Better weapons: Bombs are getting large and more innovative, with at least 90 countries suffering attacks

Now the actual report:

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/41

Fifteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2083 (2012) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities

Summary

1. The present report is the fifteenth to be submitted by the Analytical Support
and Sanctions Monitoring Team, which supports the work of the Security Council and its Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) and now referred to as the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee. The Team finds that Al-Qaida (QE.A.4.01) remains a threat, even though it has not been able to recover its former strength. Meanwhile multiple Al-Qaida affiliates are evolving, often autonomously, with generational, geographical, ethnic, structural and operational changes in evidence. The overarching ideology of international terrorism remains central for all affiliates, but local experiences and preferences generate varying operational trends. This presents a challenge for any analysis of Al-Qaida as a whole. The report also identifies three specific approaches to enhance sanctions implementation:

• First, deterring ransom payments to Al-Qaida and its affiliates to advance the
assets freeze
• Second, using biometrics and changes to national inadmissible passenger
criteria to advance the travel ban against listed individuals
• Third, improving analysis of and measures to limit component availability for
improvised explosive devices used by Al-Qaida and its affiliates

SWJ Blog

03-05-2014, 08:40 PM

One More Thought on Unconventional Approaches to Dealing with al Qaeda (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/one-more-thought-on-unconventional-approaches-to-dealing-with-al-qaeda)

Entry Excerpt:

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This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

SWJ Blog

03-13-2014, 06:19 AM

U.S. Commander in Afghanistan Warns that Full Withdrawal will Allow al-Qaeda to Regroup (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/us-commander-in-afghanistan-warns-that-full-withdrawal-will-allow-al-qaeda-to-regroup)

Entry Excerpt:

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Bill Moore

03-24-2014, 04:16 AM

This article focuses on ISI's support for various militant groups to include Al-Qaeda, which of course is worthy of its own discussion. I'll limit my thoughts on the paragraph where al-Qaeda sees it future in the Indian Ocean Region post Afghanistan, and they see the value in a Naval capability. What would an al-Qaeda naval capability look like? LTTE model? Quds Force model?

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/magazine/what-pakistan-knew-about-bin-laden.html?hp&_r=0

What Pakistan Knew About Bin Laden

At the meeting, Bin Laden rejected Akhtar’s request for help and urged him and other militant groups not to fight Pakistan but to serve the greater cause — the jihad against America. He warned against fighting inside Pakistan because it would destroy their home base: “If you make a hole in the ship, the whole ship will go down,” he said.

He wanted Akhtar and the Taliban to accelerate the recruitment and training of fighters so they could trap United States forces in Afghanistan with a well-organized guerrilla war. Bin Laden said that Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and the Indian Ocean region would be Al Qaeda’s main battlefields in the coming years, and that he needed more fighters from those areas. He even offered naval training for militants, saying that the United States would soon exit Afghanistan and that the next war would be waged on the seas.

davidbfpo

03-24-2014, 03:37 PM

Two analysts review AQ's future, both co-operate so there is some overlap.

First, CWOT aka Clint Watts (SWC member), in Part Four of his review:http://www.fpri.org/geopoliticus/2014/03/isis-rise-after-al-qaedas-house-cards-part-4-smarter-counterterrorism

Rather than punishing ISIS and regaining authority over the global jihad, Zawahiri and al Qaeda may soon become the second largest jihadist organization in the world. Angered by Zawahiri’s betrayal and admiring of ISIS commitment to pursue an Islamic state, what were once thought to be al Qaeda Central affiliates are openly declaring allegiance to ISIS emir Baghdadi.

There is a lot there to take in, so a comment another day.

Second, J.M. Berger of Intelwire.com, has a chart (as below) and a short explanation of how this evolved:http://news.intelwire.com/2014/03/al-qaeda-fractures-update.html

http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-slrRnfQ9TVg/Uy8AkwwsbnI/AAAAAAACy3I/n5t9XOVoNjg/s1600/2014-03-23-aq-fractures.png

Bill Moore

03-30-2014, 07:45 PM

http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2014/03/17/global_terrorism_set_to_reignite.html

Some interesting comments from an Indian and Indonesian CT practitioner. While not stating it directly, their arguments give support to the emergence and spread of Al-Qaedaism.

We see plenty of signs indicating a resurgence of terrorism in SE Asia, and of course India is justifiably concerned about a surge of terrorism in India within two years of our departure from Afghanistan.

Talking to both Ali and Doval gives a kind of stereoscopic depth of view to the re-emerging terror threat. They share key concerns: what is happening in Syria, what will soon happen in Afghanistan, the growing popularity of al-Qa'ida ideology in North Africa and the Middle East and the deep strategic planning of jihadist networks.

"Al-Qa'ida doesn't have to seek them out. Quite the reverse. Sometimes it rejects them.

"But this acceptance by all these groups of al-Qa'ida as the ideological hub is extremely important. Al-Qa'ida doesn't have a local agenda, it only has a local geography. Its agenda is global."

davidbfpo

07-09-2014, 09:33 PM

Bill Moore

07-10-2014, 03:42 AM

A short commentary by Bruce Hoffman on the SITE website 'Perfect Storm: The Arab Spring and the Syrian Civil War':http://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/entry/203-perfect-storm-the-arab-spring-and-the-syrian-civil-war

It reminds us that it is not Jihadist attacks, terrorism or actions that are the primary threat, it is the message and it is spreading (a point that has appeared elsewhere on SWC this week).

Excellent piece by Bruce Hoffman, thanks for sharing.

I'm not sure I follow your commentary though, a message alone doesn't threaten us, it is the actions taken by the Jihadists that threaten us. The message came first, and now the message interacts with the actions in many ways to make it more appealing to those thousands, or perhaps tens of thousands, who are interested in and identify with the message. A lot of people were interested in, and identified with Christianity also, but that message didn't threaten us, because people usually didn't act out violently because of the message (though one can argue that point).

The fact that the message resonates despite a collective "our" best efforts to weaken it should definitely cause concern. As Bruce points out the impact of social media on the ability to get their message out is important.

The advantages of the new social media to terrorists are manifold. Ease, interactivity and networking, reach, frequency, usability, stability, immediacy, publicity, and permanence are benefits reaped by those terrorist groups exploiting and harnessing these new technologies. A new generation of celebrity fighters is also being created, heralded and extolled in a familiar vernacular to Facebook friends and Twitter followers throughout the world.

His comments on their attempt to produce chemical weapons was interesting also. Not surprising since AQ leadership has expressed desire to obtain WMD for many years, but with the assumption that some of the scientists who helped Syria and Iraq develop their chemical weapons joined the jihadist movement the risk is greater that they will succeed in acquiring an actual chemical weapon. How effectively can they employ it? That is still an unanswered question.

in May 2013 Turkish authorities reportedly seized two kilos of sarin nerve gas—the same weapon used in the 1995 attack on the Tokyo subway system—and arrested twelve men linked to al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al Nusra. Only days later, another set of sarin-related arrests was made in Iraq of ISIS operatives overseeing the production at two factories of both sarin and mustard blistering agents.

Favorite quotes from the article:

Wishful thinking

And, the longing for democracy and economic reform across North Africa and the Middle East that the same optimists enthused had decisively trumped repression and violence.

Reality

Despite having suffered the greatest onslaught directed against a terrorist organization in history, al-Qaeda’s ideology and brand has nonetheless prospered.

It is time to rethink this challenge with a clean slate and without the biases of political correctness or Islam phobia.

Bob's World

07-10-2014, 10:38 AM

It's time to recognize that this has always been about coercing political change where change was needed, but where those in power had no inclination to do so, and offered no effective legal means for evolution of governance to the people affected by their governance.

It has been about leveraging the active or latent energy for revolution resident within population groups perceiving themselves oppressed by some blend of formal or informal, foreign or domestic systems of governance.

Syria is not distinct from "Arab Spring"; And Arab Spring is not distinct from the Constitutional Revolutions in Turkey and Iran 100 years ago.

It has never been about religion, that is just what defines the teams of revolution, just as it has defined the teams of the governance and populations leading up to revolution.

Being a shirt or a skin tells you what basketball team you are on - but it isn't why you play basketball. We focus on the wrong factors, draw the wrong conclusions, and expend ourselves supporting the wrong causes and flailing away at the symptoms.

Bob's World

07-10-2014, 10:52 AM

IMO Dr.Hoffman brings a distorted perspective, as he views revolution and UW through the lenses of the ideologies espoused and the tactics applied by the participants. He is clearly an expert on the trees - but I believe he is far off base in his understanding of the ecosystem of the forest. Unable to see the forest for the trees.

carl

07-10-2014, 11:51 AM

Mr. Hoffman produced a fine article. He writes very well and covered three of the main points, money from rich Gulf Arabs, safe haven and sanctuary and social media. The ironic thing about all that to me is all three can be looked at as being the result of Western sufferance.

For example, Twitter knows full well their business is being used to promote and strengthen people who would destroy them and their loved ones but allow it to continue because they don't want to look bad. The rich Gulf Arabs are rich because the West gives them money for oil that could not be produced, and couldn't have been produced, without Western tech and know how. The House of Saud didn't get rich because they were outstanding petroleum engineers. And to cite one example, AQ central has existed because the Pak Army/ISI has allowed them sanctuary for many years and we never moved to stop that. We never even tried.

Historians of the future will puzzle over this. How could we have abided the strengthening and growth of those who would destroy us for so long when so many sources of their strength were...us?

carl

07-10-2014, 11:55 AM

It has never been about religion, that is just what defines the teams of revolution, just as it has defined the teams of the governance and populations leading up to revolution.

No, I think you're very wrong. When you ask a guy why he is doing something and he says Allah commands it, I figure you should take him at his word. It is about religion. When he proclaims to the world as loud as he can and as often as he can that what he has done, is doing and will do is because his religious beliefs command it, it is not wise to disregard what he says.

Bob's World

07-10-2014, 01:38 PM

Carl, you are in good company. But then, so were all of the passengers of the Titanic.

As I said, Dr. Hoffman is clearly an expert on the facts. I have studied his professional work and he is also an expert on the perspectives of historical experts who have studied and written on this topic. I have discussed these things with him personally. You can draw comfort from the fact that he believes I am wrong every bit as much as you do.

But this is 2014, and we now must consider old case studies and perspective in the context of the strategic environment of the day. Some do not think that is an important distinction. I do. I also recognize that there is a tremendous bias written into the works of agents of colonial or containment powers as they discussed how they worked to suppress local, violent challenges to the policies and actions of those powers, and also to the local national governments created or adopted by those powers to advance the interests of the great powers and those local leaders OVER the interests of the people who actually lived in those places. This is my own bias, but I believe it is validated by the facts.

So, Carl, noted, I fully recognize that Dr. Hoffman's article is factually correct and well written. I fully note that you think I am wrong.

Now, (God bless American and our freedoms to debate openly and to hold diverse opinions), let me be clear. I believe that Dr. Hoffman's conclusions are far off the mark as to how he assesses those facts as to why they occur and what they mean.

Our CT efforts have only sniped at the symptoms of the organizations that have emerged to draw upon the energy long resident in the populations they operate among. In most cases, actions that have suppressed symptoms have been done in a manner that actually put MORE energy into they system, rather that working to resolve the problem.

So I stand by my statements without reservation. This is about populations who perceive their situation to be unfair and intolerable under the systems of governance that affect their lives. This is equally about systems of governance that are unable or unwilling to make the small, reasonable changes necessary to bleed the negative energy from the system.

When these conditions exist, leaders will emerge to organize individuals (who join for a host of reasons) for action. Smart leaders pick an ideology and narrative that resonates with their target audience.

Lenin targeted urban populations and used workers reform to topple the Tsars.

Mao, Ho and other in agricultural Asia used land reform to topple the colonial powers and the large land owners.

Neither of those approaches work in the arid, nomadic lands occupied by the Muslim populations of the Middle East. Communism was tried in Saudi Arabia and flopped. But religion works. This is why religion is used to advance challenges to governance. Because it works. Religion defines their lives. It defines who is in power and who is out of power; who does well under a system of governance and who suffers. Therefore it defines the teams when political challenge occurs - both legal and formal; or illegal and informal.

This is the way these types of conflicts have always been. It is human nature. But now human nature plays out in the modern information connected and empowered environment of the modern age. Governance is much harder in general. Imposing highly biased and divisive governance, or governance perceived as lacking legitimacy in the eyes of segments of the population it affects is becoming nearly impossible.

Bill Moore

07-10-2014, 01:49 PM

OUTLAW 09

07-10-2014, 03:43 PM

Please spare us the extremes of the governance model, it applies when it applies and it doesn't apply in all cases. It is a bit extreme to imply that al-Qaeda is pushing for "needed" change, or that religion has nothing to do with it.

Nonsense, if you change the government in most these countries and install what you believe to be legitimate government al-Qaeda will still exist and target that government for not embracing Sharia law, if you take religion away al-Qaeda can't exist. Furthermore, you can't separate governance and Islam, the religion dictates the form of governance one should apply.

In this case you're looking at the wrong forest. This isn't about good versus evil governance, or ineffective versus effective governance, both sides in these conflicts are led by tyrants. In the real world different interest groups compete, often violently, there are few cases in the Middle East and Africa with the current state boundaries that peace is possible without the state using what we would consider excessive coercive power. In time other political arrangements may be possible, but not in the near term.

Bill---tend to disagree---if one looks at religion ie the Sunni/Shia divide there is more ongoing right now that we are not "seeing" in the West and it is all about governance.

The Sunni philosophy has been all about governance over the last 1400 years and the different forms of Sunni global community governance and believe it or not the Shia have philosophically not engaged in the conversation for whatever reasons over the last 1400 thus Iran ends up with their theocratic religious definition of Shia governance.

In some aspect the Sunni governance debate has been opened by none other than al Baghdadi and the IS with their Caliphate declaration and now the internal weakness of Islam is showing itself.

If one looks at the Sunni religious emirs---those learned scholars of the Koran and Scharia and just about any major Sunni religious leader---even down to he local level can have and can voice his opinions thus one can have up to say seven/eight or nine different interpretations of the same Islamic materials---which we are now seeing occurring---say an Jordanian view, a Qatari view, and a KSA view not to exclude the various jihadi group views.

Finally we are getting a healthy discourse on the concept of Caliphate which at it's heart is about what type of governance is to be used for the Islamic global community.

Once that is out of the way just maybe the same senior religious leaders from the above governments will turn to the interpretations of the Koran as voiced by the Salafists and the Takfiri's.

Islam needs a Reformation badly but there is no central religious leader that all Muslim's look toward for guidance.

Bob's World

07-10-2014, 04:12 PM

Bill,

It is not nonsense. You calling someone else's professional, informed and supported position nonsense does not make it nonsense.

I would offer that you are looking more at the surface facts of a particular case whereas I am looking more at the fundamental nature of conflict. That does not make your position "nonsense," it is just a position on a different aspect of the problem.

Religion has always been a powerful tool of governance, equally to the challenge of governance. Why? Because it works. Many would argue that this is why religion was invented to begin with. I suspect that more accurately, political leaders have long recognized the value and have hi-jacked it for their own far more earthly purposes since the very beginning.

So no, I am not "looking at the wrong forest" - I am simply looking beyond the "what" and seeking to appreciate the "why."

But, since there are no governance problems in the places where AQ has been most effective, I will stand down.

Since the governments of those regions do not discriminate against the population groups that AQ has been leveraging, I will stand down.

Since the governments of the region allow open debate of governance and provide effective mechanisms within the context of their respective cultures to allow legal and peaceful evolution of governance I will stand down.

But of course none of those things are true about the governance in this hotly contested region where AQ operates. And as I stated clearly, Islam affects everything in that region and is a cornerstone of all governance.

But this isn't about how people feel about how religion is affecting their lives, it is about how they feel about how governance is affecting their lives.

My last point is that revolution is rarely, if ever, to bring better governance. Revolution is to challenge governance widely perceived as intolerable with no legal means of redress. For this reason revolutionary energy is often hi-jacked by locals with self-serving purposes; and equally by foreigners with self-serving purposes. This is the nature of revolution.

We focus too much on the hi-jackers; the tactics they employ, and the messages they use. We would be better served by focusing on understanding the perspectives of the populations being leveraged, and dealing with the systems of governance fueling those perspectives through their actions.

The problem is that one of the most important systems of governance fueling this is our own.

Most of the other systems of governance fueling this are our allies or partners.

So we do what governments faced with revolution typically do - we set out to put down those who dare to challenge the status quo and hope to get back to business as usual. The people are tired of business as usual, and AQ gets that very well and is tapping into that energy to advance their own agenda.

And I have never said this is about good or evil, or about effective or ineffective. It is about how people feel, and who they blame. And many are not putting up with it any more and they are blaming their governments at home and those who enable those governments to ignore their pleas for reasonable change. When governments are unreasonable, then ultimately the people will become unreasonable as well.

Bill Moore

07-11-2014, 02:22 AM

Bob,

When you write,

It has never been about religion, that is just what defines the teams of revolution, just as it has defined the teams of the governance and populations leading up to revolution.

I think you're off base, especially when you go on to state that religion is what defines the teams! In war you have teams, and the identity the teams form around matters a lot. Without that identity there wouldn't be teams, and possibly no war. Are there other factors, of course, and you aren't the only one looking beyond local context. Clausewitz's trilogy and Thucydides' fear, honor, and interest are concepts about war that still endure. The government is part of the trilogy and it plays a role when it is an actor, but in some conflicts, conflicts between non-state actors the government is not the most relevant actor. In the current fight, whatever we call it, revolution, jihad, terrorism, etc. if you take religion out of the equation AQ, AQism, Jihad, etc. will no longer exist. If people still feel compelled to rise up against the state, and each other, they'll have to find another issue to identify with.

You wrote the following, and while true to some degree, they're also of limited relevance to AQ.

But, since there are no governance problems in the places where AQ has been most effective, I will stand down.

Since the governments of those regions do not discriminate against the population groups that AQ has been leveraging, I will stand down.

Since the governments of the region allow open debate of governance and provide effective mechanisms within the context of their respective cultures to allow legal and peaceful evolution of governance I will stand down.

AQism motivated extremists are not going to impose "better" governance that fix any of these shortfalls you addressed, and they have excessively discriminating tastes. Talk about a high maintenance date, one that I doubt the majority of people are eagerly seeking to go out with, but governments that can't protect them leave little option. That is one part of good governance you seem to avoid. If AQism linked groups ever lose their ability to impose their will through coercion I suspect they'll rapidly be rolled back by a frustrated population.

While the good governance argument certainly has merit, the U.S. is not capable of fixing dysfunctional governments in foreign states, so it doesn't provide with viable strategic options. This isn't necessarily a problem that has a solution, but one that needs to be managed to keep the threat our national interests at a reasonable level.

But this isn't about how people feel about how religion is affecting their lives, it is about how they feel about how governance is affecting their lives.

In some cases yes, in others the government is irrelevant, such as in the sectarian violence. Also foreign fighters rallying to join the jihad in Syria isn't about them acting out against their host governments, instead they are rallying to support their identity group, which by the way is based on religion. They're not identifying with freedom fighters, communism, anarchists, or any other secular group. Is religion relevant? It is not only relevant it is crucial in this fight.

My last point is that revolution is rarely, if ever, to bring better governance. Revolution is to challenge governance widely perceived as intolerable with no legal means of redress. For this reason revolutionary energy is often hi-jacked by locals with self-serving purposes; and equally by foreigners with self-serving purposes. This is the nature of revolution.

Yes, sometimes revolutions are hijacked and other times their joined. This isn't about a freedom movement being hijacked by extremists in Iraq, in Syria maybe it was. The nature of revolution has little to do with good governance once it starts, the winner is whatever side can more skillfully employ coercive power at the end of the day. Not in a decisive way, but in a long drawn out way to wear out the other side's will to resist. Then again, since in some cases like Syria where is no apparent compromise since Assad and Alawites are fighting for their lives, and Iran is fighting for its national interests, there is zero hope "good governance" can be established at this point by any side. The country's false borders need to redrawn, not by us, but by the people.

The problem is that one of the most important systems of governance fueling this is our own.

Most of the other systems of governance fueling this are our allies or partners.

There is some truth to this, again without specifics on what governments can realistically do to reform in a way that would be meaningful it means little.

so we do what governments faced with revolution typically do - we set out to put down those who dare to challenge the status quo and hope to get back to business as usual. The people are tired of business as usual, and AQ gets that very well and is tapping into that energy to advance their own agenda.

So when Saudi and Jordan start to experience increasing levels of violence as the movement spreads should we promote change by supporting the extremists, or help the less than perfect governments stay in power? What are the other options that are realistic?

And I have never said this is about good or evil, or about effective or ineffective. It is about how people feel, and who they blame. And many are not putting up with it any more and they are blaming their governments at home and those who enable those governments to ignore their pleas for reasonable change. When governments are unreasonable, then ultimately the people will become unreasonable as well.

What reasonable change is being proposed? Both sides are beyond reasonable, and it is beyond the point where you can put the conflict in reverse and get back to the opportunity for reasonable change. The pleas now are for protection. We don't have good options, we have options that are less bad than others. Sitting back and telling governments to reform won't work, we have been trying that for decades. Allowing AQ linked groups to be victorious is not in our interest.

I think your arguments are most relevant to the left of bang, but become less relevant after the situation implodes.

Bob's World

07-11-2014, 11:37 AM

Bill Moore

07-11-2014, 12:30 PM

When people define the problem in the context of the religion of the participants, they are not only superficial in their analysis - they create a problem with no solution other than genocide or pure suppression of one party by the other.

But that is not how the wars of Christian Reformation ended (wars to throw off the control of the Holy Roman Empire by Western Europeans, ending at Westphalia).

And that is not how the "Protestant vs Catholic" conflict (resistance insurgency waged by Catholic Irish against their Protestant British occupiers) is resolving either.

Why? Because ultimately these types of conflicts are about governance and power. Those who wish to wield power understand full well that few things work better than religion to motivate those fed up with existing governance to act out illegally for change.

Shirts vs skins. It isn't why we play the game - its how we define the teams.

Get past this impossible framing of the problem, and then maybe we can get past silly ideas that simply killing the leaders (CT) or bribing the people (pop-centric) can lead to a durable acceptance of the status quo of governance. The status quo is the problem. If those who keep that status quo refuse to make wise and reasonable refinements, then those promoting radical change will lead the people to blow that intolerable status quo out.

Only criticism of the current approach, no realistic recommendations for alternative approaches. For one that recommends we stop relying on history, you seem to be clinging to it, and conveniently conflating the Reformation with the current conflict to fit your model. While there are similarities, that doesn't mean there are parallels.

As you once said, anyone can criticize, but it takes a little, or a lot more, to come up with realistic alternative strategies. The call for good governance without a roadmap on how we're supposed to enable that is not an alternative to what we're doing now.

Bob's World

07-11-2014, 02:27 PM

Bill,

I am not criticizing the current approach, I am merely pointing out that it is based more upon our Western interpretation of history, framing governance conflicts in religious terms, rather than appreciating the nature of these conflicts for what they more accurately are.

As to offering solutions, I have published and presented on this routinely. As these are not truly military problems, the solutions are not military solutions. Reframing the problem helps us to begin to reframe solutions. Once this is done the supporting tasks for the military will quickly emerge. We have to get past the idea that one must defeat the threat to the status quo first with the military prior to civilian governance officials tidying up behind. Governance reform must lead.

We actually see a de facto reform of US foreign policy taking place. The changes are largely positive IMO, but because their is no articulated theory for why they are making those changes and no articulated strategy to frame the context of what we are likely to do or not do, it is creating massive uncertainty for US Foe, Ally and Partner alike. The American people as well.

To cling to the approaches of the past, as many draw comfort from and encourage, as they criticize the current administration, can only lead to failure. To simply send out the military to beat down and prop up polices that have expired in the context of the world we live in today is folly.

A new National Security Strategy should be coming out soon. I hope it is dramatically more pragmatic than the family of post Cold War strategies we have attempted to live by in recent years. I hope it is more than vague, fluffy hand waves and platitudes.

But read my published piece on a recommendation for a new Grand Strategy rooted in the concepts that FDR planned to implement had he survived.

Read my published piece on a way ahead for Afghanistan focused on stepping back from attempting to prop up the government we created, and a mix of reconciliation, supporting the development of a replacement of the current destructively failed Afghan constitution with one more in tune with the culture and trust issues of the region; and being more pragmatic about working with whatever government emerges rather than thinking we need to shape who the winners or losers are.

I give too many solutions frankly, and am working more now on simply helping people to step back and think about the problem more clearly and then working out better solutions for themselves.

carl

07-12-2014, 01:14 AM

When people define the problem in the context of the religion of the participants, they are not only superficial in their analysis - they create a problem with no solution other than genocide or pure suppression of one party by the other.

This is a very important view. It recognizes the horror of religious conflict, but that is not why the statement is important. It is important because I think the recognition of the horror that religious conflict results in may affect our ability to realize when the enemy is embarked upon a course that intentionally seeks to start a religious war. Because it is such a horrible thing doesn't mean it can't come and it doesn't mean some people don't desire it and seek to provoke it. AQI intentionally tried to do that once before in Iraq. It can happen and has happened and therefore it is important that we realize this and believe it to be when it comes.

The problem with Bob's World's statement above is it appears to so dread the possibility that somebody wants to kill me or you because of religion that it refuses to recognize that that possibility exists. It seems such a strong fear of a thing that denial of its existence is the only emotionally acceptable recourse. We must accept the reality that the other guy can define the conflict upon the basis of religion so we can see it for what it is when it comes. And it has come. We don't seek to define this as a religious conflict. They do. We do ourselves no favors by denying what is.

Bill Moore

07-12-2014, 01:43 PM

In many locations where there are conflicts a reasonable change in governance would do much to alleviate the hostility. In the deeply divided country of Iraq political changes are a must for any chance of progress. Hopefully I'm wrong, but I see little reason to believe there can be a one Iraq solution, and instead we'll see a formal or informal division of Iraq into at least three ethnic enclaves. Even if that happens it won't appease IS I who desire to impose a caliphate throughout the entire region based on their interpretation of Islam. That problem is very much a military problem unless the majority will peacefully accept their rule, which isn't possible. At this point in our discussion I think there are political aspects for the Iraq problems that need to be addressed, and if they're not any military action will only achieve short term effects, but at the end of the day military action will be needed against the IS I.

Bob's World

07-12-2014, 03:13 PM

Carl,

Who are "They"?

You are right that "they" in charge of ISIS, ISIL, Muslim Brotherhood, AQ, etc. choose to define the conflict in religious terms. As I have often said, this is the smartest and most effective way to recruit citizens to serve as guerrillas, as an underground, and as an auxiliary (in US doctrinal terms) in support of their agenda. But even those three broad groupings of the population only make up a small portion of Sunni populations of the greater Middle East and the entire planet writ large.

I suspect the majority of Sunni believe strongly that the governance they live under must change; but that a much smaller percentage believe they must act out illegally to effect that change; and a much smaller percentage still that believe that the future governance they should replace their current governance with is that extreme Islamist version is espoused by the "they" you seem so concerned about. The much larger "they" simply want fair opportunity, justice under the law, and reasonably evolved rights more in tune with the environment of the current day.

The Sunni revolutionary insurgencies are in full swing and will continue to play out. The most likely (and best, IMO) outcome in Syria and Iraq is a fragmentation into new states defined much more by common culture and heritage than by the desires and interests of Western imperialists.

It looks to me that the leadership of the Gulf States (where the revolution will spread to next if those governments to not stop simply attempting to buy down their populations with oil money), are conducting UW with various Sunni groups in Syria and Iraq to facilitate the formation of a Sunni state (or states) there. It looks like the US either tacitly or covertly supports that play.

No one knows what the future will bring, but most should be able to see that the current framework of governance in the region where the states of Iraq and Syria currently burn is untenable. The US does not need to control this, and any efforts to do so will not only be likely to fail, but will also only validate the #1 rationale employed by AQ and others to motivate their target audience to conducts acts of transnational terrorism against the US and the West.

Mitigate, shape, develop lines of influence - yes to all. But the more we attempt to control the less of all three of those more critical factors we will have.

slapout9

07-12-2014, 03:19 PM

This is a very important view. It recognizes the horror of religious conflict, but that is not why the statement is important. It is important because I think the recognition of the horror that religious conflict results in may affect our ability to realize when the enemy is embarked upon a course that intentionally seeks to start a religious war. Because it is such a horrible thing doesn't mean it can't come and it doesn't mean some people don't desire it and seek to provoke it. AQI intentionally tried to do that once before in Iraq. It can happen and has happened and therefore it is important that we realize this and believe it to be when it comes.

The problem with Bob's World's statement above is it appears to so dread the possibility that somebody wants to kill me or you because of religion that it refuses to recognize that that possibility exists. It seems such a strong fear of a thing that denial of its existence is the only emotionally acceptable recourse. We must accept the reality that the other guy can define the conflict upon the basis of religion so we can see it for what it is when it comes. And it has come. We don't seek to define this as a religious conflict. They do. We do ourselves no favors by denying what is.

I think your right carl,
One has to ask why are we afraid to face this? It is a religious war, the goal is to hurt America anyway possible. I am sure there are other motives to go along with this but it seems to be the primary mover. Political Correctness is going to destroy this country, it prevents the discussion of reality. What a propaganda win for the PC crowd, they have completely destroyed our ability to think as a Nation in order to defend ourselves and never fired a shot. Anything that violates the love boat foreign policy is not even considered no matter obvious it has become.

Bill Moore

07-12-2014, 03:46 PM

I think your right carl,
One has to ask why are we afraid to face this? It is a religious war, the goal is to hurt America anyway possible. I am sure there are other motives to go along with this but it seems to be the primary mover. Political Correctness is going to destroy this country, it prevents the discussion of reality. What a propaganda win for the PC crowd, they have completely destroyed our ability to think as a Nation in order to defend ourselves and never fired a shot. Anything that violates the love boat foreign policy is not even considered no matter obvious it has become.

Actually Carl and Bob are both right. There must be a new political arrangement in the Middle East for any hope of a sustainable peace that will lessen, not erase, the appeal of radicalism. We also need to take the radicals' threat to the wider region and the U.S. very seriously. Foreign fighters are not flocking to Syria for secular reasons, but to support a religious war. Some will continue that fight when they return home. We can do little to influence the political outcome, but we can implement a wide range of security measures, to include military action to reduce the threat. This war is far from over, but we can be smarter about how we conduct ourselves so we don't make the situation worse like we did with our invasion of Iraq. We also can make it worse by not taking action as we failed to do against AQ prior to 9/11.

No easy answers, which is why I think this discussion is valuable.

TheCurmudgeon

07-12-2014, 04:26 PM

I think your right carl,
One has to ask why are we afraid to face this? It is a religious war, the goal is to hurt America anyway possible. I am sure there are other motives to go along with this but it seems to be the primary mover. Political Correctness is going to destroy this country, it prevents the discussion of reality. What a propaganda win for the PC crowd, they have completely destroyed our ability to think as a Nation in order to defend ourselves and never fired a shot. Anything that violates the love boat foreign policy is not even considered no matter obvious it has become.

I did not realize "American" was a religion.

That statement, more than anything else, demonstrates the flaw in your thinking. You confuse religious organizations and political organizations. So you will never be able to define the problem correctly.

Bob is right, religion is NOT the main driver. By using religion to define the problem you include vast numbers of people who are unrelated to the problem. YOUR religious opinions make you see the problem as religious. You have defined the sides, the "us and them", based on your religious views. I wonder is Muslim Americans see the problem the same way.

So what is your solution, genocide?

TheCurmudgeon

07-12-2014, 04:48 PM

Let me offer "a modest proposal" - a way to examine the question of religion in conflict. I will assume that the average American is Christian. Based on that observation alone, I can assume that the American answer to radical Islam is total annihilation of the entire Muslim population.

That is a fair interpretation because of the religious teachings of both Christians and Jews. The bible teaches them that, when confronted with an enemy it is appropriate to kill them all. In 1 Samuel 15 God instructed them to destroy Amalek completely, “man and women, child and infant, oxen and sheep, camel and donkey.” Total genocide.

So clearly the teachings of the bible would direct all Americans to engage in the total extermination of every Muslim in the world.

Think about this for a minute. Based on what I have just said is it fair to impute motivation and desire to every member of a religion based on the religions teachings. Is it really fair to say that, because there are a few passages in the Koran about killing infidels, that every Muslim is now a threat to my existence?

Religion is not the problem. Men interpret religion. They adapt it to their own thinking. It is not the religion that cause acts of terror, it is the motivations of the people and the way they twist the religion to fit their desires. It is those initial motivations that are the problem. They are what has to be addressed to find a solution.

Bill Moore

07-12-2014, 07:47 PM

TheCurmudgeon

07-12-2014, 08:22 PM

Slapout can speak for himself, but i think you just left the ballpark completely with your comment about America not being a religion, so therefore the other side can't wage jihadists. First off the religious conflict is principally between Muslims, we are simply seen as the far enemy viewed as a secular state that is supporting those the jihadists see as undesirable. Al-Qaeda linked movements are most definitely fighting to impose their view of Islam, which is also a political system. Just because we separate church and state doesn't mean that others do this. As we all recognize there are multiple groups fighting and the coalitions constantly shift. Some of those group are seeking political power regardless of religion, so it is complex. It is also wrong in my view to claim ISI isn't motivated by religion. Why we shy away from I don't understand.

The problem is not that we shy away from religion, it is that we use it as the primary evil without looking any further. We make no effort to understand how religion is being used by the extremist. The history being invoked, to try to find the reason why anyone would follow them. We think in shallow terms - they are evil people who are religious, therefore their religion is evil and so is everyone who practices it.

The recent article "The Coming War with the Caliphate" is a prime example. The author had no idea what he was saying by using that term the way he did. He might have well have said "The Coming War with the Ummah."

For some people it is enough to know that they are Muslim extremists. That categorization alone explains their motivations. It is this narrow thinking that causes the problem.

Extremists of all strips use a doctrinal base from which to espouse their message. Be it Muslim, Cristian, Communism, or some ethnic identity myth. Again, it is not the religion that is at issue, it is the base of the extremist view and why that view resonates with a particular segment of the population.

Thinking that way is complicated. Thinking that way is hard. But what we have done up until now is not working. There is no reason to expect that it will in the future.

BTW, it was Slap that compared America to a religion, not me. You can't mix metaphors without revealing a little about how you think.

Explain to me how Islam is a political system. What part of the Koran explains how a government should be established? What part discusses who the executive is? How laws are made? How budgets are determined? The reason there is a Sunni Shia split is because Mohamed failed to leave anything like a plan for future governance. So no, Islam is not a form of government. It lays out some laws, just as the bible does. That is nothing new. It certainly does not make Islam a political system.

Bill Moore

07-12-2014, 10:01 PM

The problem is not that we shy away from religion, it is that we use it as the primary evil without looking any further. We make no effort to understand how religion is being used by the extremist. The history being invoked, to try to find the reason why anyone would follow them. We think in shallow terms - they are evil people who are religious, therefore their religion is evil and so is everyone who practices it.

The recent article "The Coming War with the Caliphate" is a prime example. The author had no idea what he was saying by using that term the way he did. He might have well have said "The Coming War with the Ummah."

For some people it is enough to know that they are Muslim extremists. That categorization alone explains their motivations. It is this narrow thinking that causes the problem.

Extremists of all strips use a doctrinal base from which to espouse their message. Be it Muslim, Cristian, Communism, or some ethnic identity myth. Again, it is not the religion that is at issue, it is the base of the extremist view and why that view resonates with a particular segment of the population.

Thinking that way is complicated. Thinking that way is hard. But what we have done up until now is not working. There is no reason to expect that it will in the future.

BTW, it was Slap that compared America to a religion, not me. You can't mix metaphors without revealing a little about how you think.

Explain to me how Islam is a political system. What part of the Koran explains how a government should be established? What part discusses who the executive is? How laws are made? How budgets are determined? The reason there is a Sunni Shia split is because Mohamed failed to leave anything like a plan for future governance. So no, Islam is not a form of government. It lays out some laws, just as the bible does. That is nothing new. It certainly does not make Islam a political system.

First off I think very few people in uniform default to all Muslims are evil terrorists, and I think more than half have actually read a fair amount of history on the topic. You and Bob can come across as more than a little condescending at times. Our military is full of bright and educated folks who have put their lives on the line to protect Muslims, so keep that in mind.

Second we have always had our share of simpletons, to include rednecks, in the public sector who form opinions based on 15 second sound bytes in the news. Those people don't make policy, but admittedly if stupidity mobilizes voters then it could influence policy.

Islam according to al-Qaeda and I believe the Wahabbists should guide both social and political life. The laws are based on Sharia law, and law is a function of the state. I agree that governments must eventually form institutions, and since Saudi Arabia seems to be a state that follows Islam closely maybe a close look at their institutions would be informative.

http://www.merip.org/mer/mer205/what-political-islam

What is Political Islam

by Charles Hirschkind

Over the last few decades, Islam has become a central point of reference for a wide range of political activities, arguments and opposition movements. The term “political Islam” has been adopted by many scholars in order to identify this seemingly unprecedented irruption of Islamic religion into the secular domain of politics and thus to distinguish these practices from the forms of personal piety, belief and ritual conventionally subsumed in Western scholarship under the unmarked category “Islam.” In the brief comments that follow, I suggest why we might need to rethink this basic framework.

The claim that contemporary Muslim activities are putting Islam to use for political purposes seems, at least in some instances, to be warranted. Political parties such as Hizb al-‘Amal in Egypt or the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria that base their appeal on their Islamic credentials appear to exemplify this instrumental relation to religion. Yet a problem remains, even in such seemingly obvious examples: In what way does the distinction between the political and nonpolitical domains of social life hold today? Many scholars have argued that “political Islam” involves an illegitimate extension of the Islamic tradition outside of the properly religious domain it has historically occupied. Few, however, have explored this trend in relation to the contemporaneous expansion of state power and concern into vast domains of social life previously outside its purview -- including that of religion.

Gets more interesting as you keep reading....

TheCurmudgeon

07-12-2014, 10:20 PM

I think your article makes my point:

Grasping such complexity will require a much more subtle approach than one grounded in a simple distinction between (modern) political goals and (traditional) religious ones. Terms such as “political Islam” are inadequate here as they frame our inquiries around a posited distortion or corruption of properly religious practice.

My issue is that we, as professionals, should not give into the the desires to simplify the problem. If we start using terms like "political Islam" without the necessary clarifications between the terrorist/insurgents' interpretation of Islam and a more pedestrian meaning of the term Islam then how can we hope those who read our writing to understand there is a difference. If we are incapable of understanding and articulating the difference in conversations amongst ourselves, how are we ever going to get the general population to understand.

As professionals, people listen to what we say. We should be clear when we use terms like "political Islam."

BTW, the article you site makes a great point on how Islam is blamed for socioeconomic problems that are larger than Islam.

Bill Moore

07-13-2014, 01:50 AM

I think your article makes my point:

My issue is that we, as professionals, should not give into the the desires to simplify the problem. If we start using terms like "political Islam" without the necessary clarifications between the terrorist/insurgents' interpretation of Islam and a more pedestrian meaning of the term Islam then how can we hope those who read our writing to understand there is a difference. If we are incapable of understanding and articulating the difference in conversations amongst ourselves, how are we ever going to get the general population to understand.

As professionals, people listen to what we say. We should be clear when we use terms like "political Islam."

BTW, the article you site makes a great point on how Islam is blamed for socioeconomic problems that are larger than Islam.

As professionals it probably way past time to explore updating our lexicon.

Obviously Islam isn't a cause for economic problems, since the same economic problems impact other societies and states that are not Islamic. A lot of countries that are primarily Muslim suffer from the same issues of corruption, the resource curse, and borders drawn to facilitate exploitation by western powers as many non-Muslim countries. On the other hand, those that practice fundamental Islam do have an issue with marginalizing approximate 50% of their population by hindering the ability of women to get an education and pursue professions, and I can't help but think that is a factor in some countries for retarded economic growth.

Islam is the underlying reason for the wide ranging jihad we're wrestling with now. That doesn't mean every Muslim embraces it, and most likely a small percentage do, nonetheless a small percentage of 1.3 billion people is still a lot of people. We have to understand our adversary and ourselves, and based on the recent dialogue I fear we understand neither.

Bill Moore

07-13-2014, 03:56 AM

Somewhat dated, but these excerpts from a RAND study are worth considering, and it helps clarify my point that we're looking at this through a Western bias that almost makes it impossible for us to imagine a government without institutions, yet the jihadists admit that they want a government that doesn't stand in between God and man, and they admit they don't know what that will look like, and the transition will be rough. You may also be right, and this could be their downfall.

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG602.pdf

in their own words
Voices of Jihad, by David Aaron
Compilation and commentary

Jihadis can also be categorized as Islamists, political movements that want to bring the practice of Islamic law into government. Here, too, the jihadis are at the extreme end of a spectrum. At the moderate end is the Islamist-oriented government of Turkey, a NATO ally and a nation where secularism is enshrined in the constitution. Further along the spectrum, the Muslim Brotherhood is the largest opposition group in the Egyptian Parliament. And finally, there are the Islamists in Sudan who countenance the genocide in Darfur (of non-Arab Muslims), the Taliban, and the jihadis.

The following statement is indictative of the bias we start with when viewing these challenges, which makes one wonder why they thought that Muslims were going to embrace western civilization in the first place?

“Many writers, thinkers, scholars, and leaders who were advocating conformity with the values of western civilization and adherence to its norms and the complete adoption of its principles began rethinking their ideas and started to change their tone and replace it with a new more cautious and wary approach. The call for the return of Muslim society to the fundamentals and teachings of Islam became more powerful, paving the way for the re-islamisation of all aspects of life.

Below Naji references the competing political systems.

“The interest in understanding the rules of the political game and the political reality of the enemies and their fellow travelers and then mastering g disciplined political action through sharia politics and opposing this reality is not less than the importance of military action.” (Naji, 2004)

You can't more clear than this in a vague sort of way :D

“In other words, any political program will not succeed unless we can defeat the West militarily and culturally, and repel it from Muslim lands. At that time, it will not be difficult for the nation—with its great energies and vast wealth—to re-form its life in accordance with the fundamentals of Islamic Sharia.

This is where I think you and Bob are too quick to draw parallels to the West, even when claim to be above that. Highlights are mine.

The caliphate we are working to establish cannot be compared with
any known man-made political system.” (Ibrahim, 1984)

One of the unfamiliar characteristics of these writings is the way religious sayings and symbols are used to address issues that in the West would not take on such religious aspects. It is reminiscent of the way the communist movement in the 20th century discussed almost every political issue in terms of “class struggle,” and in much of the Christian era, secular problems were debated in the language of church doctrine. Similarly, jihadis address contemporary problems in terms of their religious ideology.

Do they desire to fight the West? Some do,

“Islam is an all-encompassing religion. It is a religion for people and for regimes. . . . Islam is the only alternative for the countries [of the world]. . . .

“Therefore, the crime of the tyrants in infidel [i.e. non-Muslim] countries, who do not rule according to Allah’s law, is an enormous sin . . . and we are obliged to fight them and initiate until they convert to
Islam, or until Muslims rule the country and he who does not convert to Islam pays Jizya.

“That is the religious ruling with regard to infidel countries and all the more so with regard to those who rule Muslim countries by way of the cursed law [i.e. a man-made law].” (al-Najdi, 2003b)

Bob's World

07-13-2014, 04:46 AM

The sad truth is that America's founding principals and the goals of the Sunni populations that AQ targets align far more than either side is comfortable to admit.

slapout9

07-13-2014, 06:18 AM

I did not realize "American" was a religion. I go to work for awhile and you just fall off a cliff....Read it again I did not say American....You said that! I said America!!! referring to the country....based upon a conversation with a Muslim American who asked me directly "Why America doesn't get it?" Allah is everything....All must start with him not Politics according to my friend. But he is right most people don't get it which why we are in the mess we are in.

That statement, more than anything else, demonstrates the flaw in your thinking. You confuse religious organizations and political organizations. So you will never be able to define the problem correctly. I have no flaw in my thinking but you sure do. I am stunned you are such a Cartesian thinker that you really have know clue do you? Here let me help you. Please read "Understanding Islamic Fundamentalism" by William R. Polk

http://consortiumnews.com/2014/06/29/understanding-islamic-fundamentalism/

And finally NO! I do not nor have never recommended genocide!

slapout9

07-13-2014, 06:20 AM

BTW, it was Slap that compared America to a religion, not me. You can't mix metaphors without revealing a little about how you think.

If you are gonna quote me get it right!!!! I never said that read it again.

TheCurmudgeon

07-13-2014, 02:52 PM

Bill Moore

07-13-2014, 03:51 PM

The sad truth is that America's founding principals and the goals of the Sunni populations that AQ targets align far more than either side is comfortable to admit.

It is important to clarify this statement to avoid confusion. Sunni populations is too broad a description to be useful, that is even broader than saying Americans think this or that. If you read the writings of various Sunni revolutionary writers I agree with you statement. This thread specifically is focused on al-Qaeda and al-Qaedaism, which narrows the focus to a small percentage of the Sunni population. I agree AQ targets this broader population, and ultimately needs to win it over through conviction or coercion to be successful.

Specifically al-Qaeda leaders, and the religious leaders they reference, align their thoughts to some degree with our American revolutionary leaders when they talk of freeing their people from tyrannical regimes who oppress their people. Several fundamental and radical Muslims were fond of U.S. Information Service during the Cold War, because they believed we were the only ones effectively telling the truth about the USSR and their oppression of Muslims. However, they (for lack of a better term, the radical leadership that embraces al-Qaedaism) see us as the oppressors due to our perceived desire to impose secular governments elected by the people, which in their view puts the people above God. They agree on removing regimes that oppress the Muslim people, but that is where al-Qaedaism linked groups stop being aligned with our founding fathers. They have no use for democracy, equal rights, etc. The form of governance they plan to implement is equally oppressive, but perhaps more just, than the ones they desire to expel.

They adjust their words over time based on local context and to respond to the adversary's actions, so their religious (same as political in their case) narrative continues to evolve, but the core of establishing a caliphate remains; and some extremists are on record as looking globally, not just re-establishing the caliphate.

The vast majority of Sunni Muslims who are not aligned with al-Qaedaism, still seem to find some aspects of AQ's arguments credible (Islam is under attack, Muslims are being oppressed, etc.), and any military action the West takes can unintentionally give additional legitimacy to AQ linked groups. Dictators in Muslim countries, especially where the majority of Muslims live in poverty also lend legitimacy to AQ's assertions. We agree on this, and it explains why AQ is able to spread its message and help mobilize the local population to act against their government, so yes that aspect is political. However, I think we would be remiss to discount the larger religious context that informs the political. Unlike our nation, religion is superior and informs the political in Islam, especially to al-Qaedism linked groups.

Steve is probably right that once the extremists establish governance they'll probably lose power when coercive power isn't enough to hold it altogether. That still doesn't reduce to the West from the AQ linked members who still desire to strike the West either out of revenge, or to convince the West not to interfere in their countries, or in some cases in a misguided attempt to spread Islam into the West (the global caliphate).

From a security standpoint we need to identify those terrorists (another word that isn't overly helpful) who intend to do "us" harm and find a way to eliminate them without giving AQ additional legitimacy. Ignoring the threat isn't an option, nor is a major ground campaign, nor is nation building in our image. It is absolutely critical we understand the narrative which is based on their interpretation of Islam. Trying to replace this narrative with a narrative based on democracy has failed and will probably continue to fail. Seems that most the appropriate approach to weaken their narrative is other Muslims promoting narratives that weaken AQ's. This is probably happening in some locations, but unfortunately leaders like Maliki further legitimize AQ's narrative.

TheCurmudgeon

07-13-2014, 04:07 PM

The sad truth is that America's founding principals and the goals of the Sunni populations that AQ targets align far more than either side is comfortable to admit.

I believe you are right, which means that a large part of the problem is not them, but us. We don't like to make the comparison between the our history and the current Sunni situation because of uncomfortable parallels and what it reveals about our own national "creation myths".

OUTLAW 09

07-13-2014, 07:05 PM

The exchange between Bob and Bill is interesting for a number of reasons--but having dealt often with really good Islamists (good from their understanding of the Koran and the Sunnah and their speaking a really good Arabic) and even though I was the interrogator and they were the detainees the conversations sometimes got deep.

We in the West never took the time to try to understand what was driving them and often I caught myself actually agreeing with them--example---in 2005 and 2006 we never took the time to fully understand what was driving the Sunni insurgents---was it religious in nature, was it nationalism in nature meaning they did not like their country being invaded by Americans, was it they simply did not like foreigners and the list could go on and on.

Example---we chased someone for over two years---one year from the previous BCT the 1st ID and then we actually stumbled across him.

When I got his folder it was honestly four inches thick with reports over reports. So if one looked at the folder one would think you were dealing with a really major AQI fighter and or cell leader.

When I read through the reports I was stuck by a number of repeated reports saying virtually the same thing so that really the four inches went to about a half inch.

Then I simply said explain the remaining reports to me and just how did you get this massive reputation. He was startled by the direct question.

Here is the story and it goes to the heart of the ME and how we as Americans failed to fully understand what we were seeing.

This individual had a two brothers one a few years younger than himself (he was the oldest) and a really young brother of 12.

Next to the family in a small faming village near Baqubah there was a richer farmer who had a pond and ducks. One day the rich farmers wife came to my insurgents family and accused the youngest brother in front of the mother for stealing four of the ducks---the mother of the accused brother then slapped the rich farmers wife who went home crying.

Two days later the nephew of the rich farmers wife came to the insurgents family waving a pistol and demanding a financial payment for slapping the wife--this led to a gun fight with the nephew who was killed by the second oldest brother.

Now at least under Saddam the police functioned in 2002---the second oldest brother was arrested as was my insurgent who was later released as the investigating judge ruled there was no involvement on his part. The brother got a 20 year jail sentence for the killing and was in Abu Ghraib when we arrived in Baghdad and was released by Saddam just before we arrived thus basically freed of all charges.

So he goes home and there the aggrieved family then with every opportunity would finger the released brother for being in AQ , for being an insurgent, for being a criminal, for smuggling, for building IEDs, etc---and naturally we the Army collected all these reports which ended up in a targeting folder.

True reason for the massive reporting: ---the aggrieved family was simply mad that the murderer was out of jail and free and they wanted him locked back up.

When we did not respond by arresting the second brother the finger pointing towards my insurgent picked up as well with the same acusations ---at this stage in 2005 many BCTs did not fully understand this concept of Iraqi finger pointing which was using the Army by the local Iraqi as a vengeance tool against their alleged and perceived enemies.

Now AQI comes into play---in this town was a alcoholic AQ leader who often would walk down the street shooting his pistol at the locals---my insurgent had two windows shot out by him and one evening he goes down and basically shoots the AQI leader seriously wounding him---so now he is in trouble with the US Army, the AQI and caught between both the fronts.

He was also pushing AK47s that he had stolen from a local military camp because we did not get to Diyala until five weeks after arriving in Baghdad. So AQI upped the pressure and threatened his family if he did not sell them the weapons which he did --so now we have him on the radar as a AQI weapons dealer.

So now I have him sitting in front of me with a four inch folder as a AQI member, an AQI weapons dealer---all because of four allegedly stolen ducks back in 2002.

Or as the BN that captured him stated---he was a really bad dude.

Guess what--- we the US Army until 2010 never got this finger pointing exercise that the Iraqi's used with us to settle their personal disputes.

By the way many Iraqi women learned quickly that by accusing their husbands of being AQI we would arrest them and then they were gone for at least 2 or more years in Abu Ghraib and Bucca---during this period they would then divorce their husbands because the Army had arrested them as "terrorists" ---this was jokingly referred to as the "Iraq divorce".

slapout9

07-13-2014, 07:25 PM

It literally means to submit..... does it not? or more generally to submit to the will of Allah. That means there is nothing to interpret!!!! nothing to analyze!!!! nothing to do but follow and submit!!!!! or be killed as an infidel. In fact only an infidel would try an analyze or interpret Islam which is an abomination in and of itself. This is what we never seem to understand. That is why the only way out is to follow......... The Prime Directive!

carl

07-13-2014, 08:55 PM

The sad truth is that America's founding principals and the goals of the Sunni populations that AQ targets align far more than either side is comfortable to admit.

LOL. I hate to use that but nothing else fits...and it did make me.

Freedom of association. Freedom of religion. Freedom of the press. Representative government. Checks and balances.

carl

07-13-2014, 09:09 PM

Carl,

Who are "They"?

You are right that "they" in charge of ISIS, ISIL, Muslim Brotherhood, AQ, etc. choose to define the conflict in religious terms. As I have often said, this is the smartest and most effective way to recruit citizens to serve as guerrillas, as an underground, and as an auxiliary (in US doctrinal terms) in support of their agenda. But even those three broad groupings of the population only make up a small portion of Sunni populations of the greater Middle East and the entire planet writ large.

I suspect the majority of Sunni believe strongly that the governance they live under must change; but that a much smaller percentage believe they must act out illegally to effect that change; and a much smaller percentage still that believe that the future governance they should replace their current governance with is that extreme Islamist version is espoused by the "they" you seem so concerned about. The much larger "they" simply want fair opportunity, justice under the law, and reasonably evolved rights more in tune with the environment of the current day.

They are, as you said, the ones who are defining this as a religious conflict, as I said. They are the people with the weapons and the organization. So that makes them dangerous. What you believe the majority of Sunnis believe makes no difference at all even if they do believe as you think because the ones who matter are the ones with the weapons and the organization. They have not attended some secret conference somewhere and all agreed to pretend that they are motivated by religion just to recruit and motivate the foot killers. They don't fool themselves. They motivate their rank and file with the same thing that motivates them, religion.

As you said, but seem to refuse to acknowledge, the conflict is religious. They defined it such. We have to believe that they have done so in order to combat it. You gotta know the kind of fight the other guy has put you in even if you didn't want to be put into it.

TheCurmudgeon

07-14-2014, 12:54 AM

They are, as you said, the ones who are defining this as a religious conflict, as I said. They are the people with the weapons and the organization. So that makes them dangerous. What you believe the majority of Sunnis believe makes no difference at all even if they do believe as you think because the ones who matter are the ones with the weapons and the organization. They have not attended some secret conference somewhere and all agreed to pretend that they are motivated by religion just to recruit and motivate the foot killers. They don't fool themselves. They motivate their rank and file with the same thing that motivates them, religion.

As you said, but seem to refuse to acknowledge, the conflict is religious. They defined it such. We have to believe that they have done so in order to combat it. You gotta know the kind of fight the other guy has put you in even if you didn't want to be put into it.

Carl,

What do you think it is about this religion that motivates them?

carl

07-15-2014, 02:40 PM

Carl,

What do you think it is about this religion that motivates them?

I don't know. It is probably more useful to say what is it about religion rather than to speak about "this religion". If you go that track it still doesn't really matter about the details of belief and religion's place in the human heart. It matters that religion can be used as the reason to kill, conquer, rape and steal. It hasn't been widely fashionable lately but it is making a comeback in a big way.

davidbfpo

08-14-2014, 09:30 PM

A short review by Professor Bruce Hoffman:http://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/entry/229-al-qaeda%E2%80%99s-playbook-persistence-toward-the-caliphate

Starts with:
Once again, the conventional wisdom in Washington about al-Qaeda (AQ) and the broader jihadi terrorist threat has been proven wrong. The wishful thinking passing for analysis since the beginning of the year that the split within the movement resulting in the expulsion of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) from the AQ fold would simultaneously weaken both Core AQ and ISIS—now pretentiously re-named the Islamic State (IS)—has been dramatically disproven by the latter's lightning thrust into Iraq and seizure of the northern and western parts of the war-torn country.

Bill Moore

09-04-2014, 06:07 PM

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/09/al_qaeda_opens_branc-print.php

As Sahab, al Qaeda's official media outlet, released a lengthy video promoting the creation of al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent today. The video, which was published on various Internet video sites, including YouTube, features Ayman al Zawahiri as well as Asim Umar, the new emir of al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and Usama Mahmoud, the group's spokesman. The video was translated by the SITE Intelligence group.

"A new branch of al-Qaeda was established and is Qaedat al-Jihad in the Indian Subcontinent, seeking to raise the flag of jihad, return the Islamic rule, and empowering the Shariah of Allah across the Indian subcontinent," Zawahiri says in the opening of the video, according to the translation by SITE.

Business should be good for this franchise since it is focused on of the most densely populated areas in the world with a wide spectrum of social and political issues, and questionable security forces.

Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh will need to cooperate at unprecedented levels to cut out this cancer before it metastasizes.

Bill Moore

11-08-2014, 10:15 PM

I think the AQ's evolving strategy, to include the associated two-arm strategy is showing a level of strategic maturity not seen before. I know there are many who think AQ can't establish a presence in India, but I think that is wishful thinking. India has more people living in abject poverty than all of Africa, and much of its large Muslim population lives in poverty and has a history of being discriminated against. Islamic terrorist events happen in India periodically already, so it is probable AQ will enjoy some success, how much depends on a lot of factors.

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=184986

Al Qaeda's "Resurgence" Focuses on Indian Subcontinent

AQ's new magazine is released, and it principally focuses on South Asia.

The reasons for the delay in its release are not publicly known. At 117 pages, the magazine covers a variety of jihadist topics. But the content of the magazine is heavily focused on recent events, especially al Qaeda's activities in the Indian Subcontinent.

It was produced by As Sahab, al Qaeda's propaganda arm. However, "(Subcontinent)", has been appended to As Sahab's name, suggesting that the media wing has rebranded at least part of its operation to focus on the region.

Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri and other senior jihadists announced the creation of al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), al Qaeda's newest regional branch, in early September. Much of "Resurgence" is devoted to AQIS propaganda.

It also addresses economic targeting, and demonstrates knowledge of the impact of insurance costs on commercial shipping if the perception of the threat rises.

there is an "energy umbilical cord which [sic] sustains western economies" and "stretches across hundreds of miles of pipelines and sea lanes." This "represents the Achilles heel not just of the energy market, but also of western economies dependent on oil from the Muslim world."

Khalid argues that a strategy of "sustained disruption in this supply system would not only increase insurance costs for international shipping, but also affect the price of oil globally, making the theft of our petroleum resources an expensive venture for the West." Khalid then delves into an in-depth assessment of various "choke points," explaining the relative virtues of striking them.

Khalid believes that the time is coming for a sustained campaign of "economic warfare

They have been doing their homework, and for those that study strategy they'll see some familiar themes from the Cold War, but updated for current conditions. I suspect we'll start seeing something along the lines of "unrestricted warfare" from non-state groups who will operate not only in the human domain, but the cyber, maritime, and with UAVs in the air domains.

http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2014/11/05/world/asia/05reuters-india-security-alqaeda.html?ref=world&_r=0

Officials Fear Al Qaeda Grooming Indian Militants for Big Attacks

But Indian security agencies said evidence they had gathered pointed to growing ties between al Qaeda and IM, a home-grown movement hitherto known for low-level attacks on local targets using relatively crude weapons like pressure cooker bombs.

Weeks after al Qaeda announced the formation of a South Asia wing to strike across the subcontinent, agencies said they had discovered IM members were training with al Qaeda and other groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan for major attacks.