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Timothy OConnor
01-02-2008, 07:43 PM
There have been several interesting proposals for squad through battalion-level organizations.

I'm interested in the relationships between organization, span of control, and "effective" weapon ranges relative to these proposals. It seems to me that span of control and effective weapon ranges are core organizational drivers but these are usually either assumed in such discussions or left out all together which can result in significant battlefield friction.

For example, if you look at typical WWII organizations there's a clear correlation between effective weapon range and unit frontage and depth at various levels of command from platoon to battalion. In other words a given unit level is expected to control a given amount of frontage and depth based on its size/number of sub-units and equipment. But there were also huge C3limits in WWII that have been addressed today but which are still not completely solved (see Ambush Alley for an excellent description of the limits of current battlefield communications technology.)

This is nothing new but the acceleration curve for battlefield dispersion driven by the firepower available to light infantry has increased rapidly in the 20th century and continues to do as demonstrated in Afghanistan where U.S. special forces used PGMs as WWII troops used 60mm mortars (well, almost): to place indirect fire on enemy troops with great agility. At the same time it's easy to be lulled into believing that strategic "stand-off" weapons directed by small units of light infantry is sufficient to win modern wars. Such technology can be used to smash conventional forces or even massed irregular forces but it faces severe limitations against dispersed unconventional forces determined to resist.

There is also often difference of opinion on how many sub-units a given level of command can control and their appropriate level of dispersion, especially when one considers that a minimal level of situational awareness is required to excercise command effectively. And there is often disagreement on the unit level at which certain weapons should be organic, attached, or left under the control of higher level leaders.

Books such as Not Mentioned in Despatches, Not a Good Day to Die, Ambush Alley, and No True Glory do an excellent job of describing the friction that occurs when higher level leaders (eg battalion+) try to excercise too much control over lower level tactical situations and how lack of equipment at a given level can impede a lower level unit from accomplishing its tactical mission.

So here are a few questions for this group. My involvement in these topics is limited to development of underlying technologies for reconaissance systems (tactical to strategic) so I'm always fascinated by (and greatly respect) the opinions of those with experience at the sharp end.

1. At a given a leader's level (squad, platoon, company, and battalion) how much space (frontage and depth) should he expect to fight as determined by four broad categories of terrain? (eg open desert, rolling countryside, urban, jungle). Assume a typical modern western battalion with respect to technology (eg Blue Tracker, etc.), differentiating between mech and leg infantry as needed. Assume ongoing combat operations against opposing light infantry (regular or irregular) and/or traditional combined arms opfor as opposed to security and stability operations in (relatively) calm urban centers with dense civilian populations going about their daily business. So, collateral damage is still a concern but it's "open warfare" Fallujah-style rather than doing neighborhood patrols while handing out candy to children in Basra. There are of course lots of fields manuals and conventional wisdom on the subject but I still encounter interesting differences of opinion, often driven by the individual's personal experience.

2. At each of the levels, given the amount of space expected to be fought at that level and available transport, what sort of weapons should be organic? Attached? Left under control of higher level leaders? This is covered by some other threads but here it's explicitly tied to terrain and area of operations at each given level of command and seeks comment on specific ranges (do also consider logistics and transport with respect to sub-unit dispersion, ammo supply/use rate, etc.).

For example in one thread I noticed a difference of opinion with respect to ATGMs and ATRLs and their relative value in urban warfare given assumed engagement ranges. One fellow assumed very short ranges and saw ATGM as overkill while another saw urban terrain as allowing 2,000m+ engagements and ATGMs as valuable. Such assumptions are (should be) key drivers to determine TO&E but these assumptions are often left unspoken.

And if one proposes a given weapon system should exist at a given level, what are the assumptions for its operation? Always concentrated and directed at higher levels? If attached, at what level of dispersion before becoming too ineffective? Given typical engagement ranges, weapon effective range, and unit/sub-unit dispersion who's in the best position to control a given weapon system in light of that individual's typical situational awareness and probable reaction times to battlefield developments? (eg if a system is placed too high it can't exploit tactical opportunities, too low and it becomes a burden or isn't aware of opportunities.)

3. Based on the two items above, what should sub-units look like and what level of independece should be expected of them? How should one balance directive command and restricitve control at various levels as determined by tactical situation, C3I, and troop quality considerations? This last item probably deserves its own thread but here is tied directly to how much area a given level of command is expected to fight as determined by various factors such as terrain, etc.

Rex Brynen
01-02-2008, 10:12 PM
There have been several interesting proposals for squad through battalion-level organizations.

I'm interested in the relationships between organization, span of control, and "effective" weapon ranges relative to these proposals. It seems to me that span of control and effective weapon ranges are core organizational drivers but these are usually either assumed in such discussions or left out all together which can result in significant battlefield friction.

Excellent comment, Timothy. I suppose similar curiosities--but much less well articulated--drove me to want to pull together the various threads that had emerged into a section-to-battalion overview, something that Norfolk and others have now offered.

Did you ever post an introduction here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1441&page=21)?

Norfolk
01-03-2008, 02:57 AM
Well, the traditional tried-and-true span-of-control (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Span_of_control) is one leader or higher HQ for up to five immediate subordinates or lower HQ. Graicunas (for some reason I called him Granicus in another thread, the name of one of Alexander the Great's battles) if I remember correctly, stated a range of 3-6 subordinates for each leader, with 4-5 being optimal; Clausewitz himself reckoned 4-5. But you also have to bear in mind that good-quality, well-trained and well-led troops can take a good deal of the load off of their commander's shoulders because they are willing and able to handle a lot of the coordination details amongst themselves after being given their task - SoC Theorists call this Fayol's Bridge; the military calls it different things like Teamwork and Auftragstaktik.

For ranges, there's an attachment to this post. Tactical Bounds are tied to those ranges however, "One Tactical Bound" being the Effective Range of a unit's longest-range weapon. Usually units prefer to operate within the range of their Heavy Weapons, for obvious reasons, and may resort to moving distances of one-half of a Tactical Bound when in the presence of or in proximity to, the enemy in order to remain under its protection.

As to distances between men, key weapons, unit frontages and the like, that's a little more involved in some ways. Generally, 10m between Infantrymen is preferred in open country in day, 5m at night, and 5m in close country or 3m at night; some Armies are returning to 5m most of the time - which is closer to WWII than present-day practices, but reduces control problems in the field but increases vulnerability to enemy weapons. The point is to try to stay out of the danger space/beaten zones of enemy weapons, or if caught in them, then to reduce the damage done.

Vehicles try to stay about 100 m apart, but in recent years there have again, been some shifts more towards WWII-style 50m or even 25m spacings between vehicles; sometimes this is unavoidable anyway - in GW1 this sometimes happened. And the Russians still use 25m between tanks much of the time. So you get a Rifle Squad/Section attacking on a 50m (close country) to 100 m (open country) front (USMC Squad may attack on a 125m front), and a tank platoon may attack on a 400-500m front. They usually defend a frontage of twice that.

Of course, as you go up the ladder of echelons, Frontages and Depths increase (see especially pages 5-5 and 6-3 to get an idea of what is involved here at angrif.hp.infoseek.co.jp/corseware/st_100-7.pdf - Google it), depending upon the number of sub-units that units put on the line (ie 2 up, 1 back, vice versa, etc.) and spaces between sub-units of units, and units of formations.

William F. Owen
01-03-2008, 03:41 AM
Actually got a deadline to deal with so I cannot give this the attention it deserves right now, but the critical aspect here is not really anything to do with weapons. It's sensors and communications equipment. How far you can disperse a given organisation is pretty much a function of the four critical freedoms of Fires, Observation, Communication and Manoeuvre. Your ability to do those things in time and space will define how far you can disperse and how quickly you can concentrate.

EG- A dismounted Coy with Spike ATGMS and a Man packed UAV can in theory cover a 3.5km x 3.5km area in terms of an anti-armour mission. Reality is somewhat different!

Timothy OConnor
01-03-2008, 04:09 AM
Of course, as you go up the ladder of echelons, frontages (and depths) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/angrif.hp.infoseek.co.jp/corseware/st_100-7.pdf) increase (see especially pages 5-5 and 6-3 to get an idea of what is involved here), depending upon the number of sub-units that units put on the line (ie 2 up, 1 back, vice versa, etc.) and spaces between sub-units of units, and units of formations.

Outstanding info! Love the the way the chart correlates weapon to frontage.

An interesting excercise would be to tag the weapons on the chart at the command level and concentration at which various weapon systems are organized.

This goes to the ATGM vs ATRL in urban warfare. Also goes to systems such as 60mm and 81mm mortars (and now 120mm!). Some American TO&Es show only 2 such weapons concentrated in a weapons platoon or weapons company respectively. Others have 3 or 4 and some have proposed as many as 8! This raises the issue of how many such weapons are required to develop a "critical mass" given their tactical roll. Too few 60mm mortars and do you simlpy have an overweight grenade launcher? Too many 81mm mortars and have you created an overweight maneuver element that ties down the battalion? Too few and are you simlpy engaging in small-scale H&I fire without really bending the enemy to your will through agile, rapid response indirect fires? Keep concentrated or disperse? (Some of my friends assert that the Germans dispersed their battalion-level mortars in 1s and 2s to the companies which makes sense due to poor comm technology in WWII.)


Actually got a deadline to deal with so I cannot give this the attention it deserves right now, but the critical aspect here is not really anything to do with weapons. It's sensors and communications equipment. How far you can disperse a given organisation is pretty much a function of the four critical freedoms of Fires, Observation, Communication and Manoeuvre. Your ability to do those things in time and space will define how far you can disperse and how quickly you can concentrate.

EG- A dismounted Coy with Spike ATGMS and a Man packed UAV can in theory cover a 3.5km x 3.5km area in terms of an anti-armour mission. Reality is somewhat different!

This goes to the heart of my interest. Looking forward to your reply!

Small units of dispersed light infantry can accomplish amazing feats of arms against the right enemy (ie those "more" easily found and engaged by supporting stand-off weapons!) But at what point does such dispersion become a liability when trying to clear and control battle space such as an urban environment? Such a force, a sort of rapier, has the attributes needed for quick, precise, and lethal strikes against the right opponent. But against a "hardened", dispersed opponent determined to stand his ground in higher numbers do you need a warhammer instead? Thus two different types of battalions?

My son and I had a discussion today about an "ideal" weapon system. The target acquisition and designation system would be very small and blend in with the environment so as to be innocuous. The muntitions are dispersed and hidden in hard to ID and hard to reach places, silent until called upon by the "hunter" so even when "fired" their release doesn't draw unwanted attention to a platform that matters any longer or a platform that's reachable by enemy weapons. We've nearly achieved that level of capability in some ways and for certain situations and clearly the trend is in that direction. But for now there are severe limits on such technologies when the trigger-pullers must clear and hold certain types of terrain (and without too many broken buildings resulting!) :-)

William F. Owen
01-03-2008, 09:15 AM
But at what point does such dispersion become a liability when trying to clear and control battle space such as an urban environment?

When you can't defeat the enemy! It's that obvious I'm afraid and there are no clear cut cook book answers. It depends on how well you are trained and lead, and how effective you concept of operations is. If you are too dispersed to effectively perform the tasks and actions you need to achieve your mission the you are dispersed too far.

The biggest factor is usually communications and manoeuvre. Manoeuvre gives you freedom of action, which is why protected mobility is so essential to infantry operations, especially if a competent enemy has it and you don't.

RTK
01-03-2008, 01:32 PM
This obviously is going to depend upon unit types and missions. The frontage for a mechanized brigade in an attack is going to be vastly different of a Cavalry Regiment conducting a cover.

wm
01-03-2008, 02:15 PM
Since we really know nothing about Mr OConnor's interest and background because he has chosen not to introduce himself, excuse me for making some assumptions.

It seems to me that he is seeking a formula for success on the battlefield based on establishing metrics for unit engagement areas. As the posts from both Wilf and RTK point out, it is not quite that simple. Back in the near Dark Ages (I'd have to defer to Ken White for the real Dark Ages), FM 100-5 discussed areas of interest and areas of influence in terms of both time and distance, by level of command. Areas of influence were essential limited by the range of fire support systems. However, these times and distances are best treated as rules of thumb. It ought to be readily apparent that one cannot be expected to defend against a mechanized battalion size force with a dismounted rifle platoon on a frontage of 5 kilometers . However, it is not quite so clear that a dismounted rifle platoon will be more successful in attacking an entrenched infantry force on a 300 meter frontage than on a 500 meter frontage, regardless of terrrain type. There are far too many variables to try to get a simplistic analysis that is as fine-grained as that. Successful tactics are not a matter of applying data into "plug and chug" formulas; there is at least as much art as science to the matter.

Timothy OConnor
01-03-2008, 04:51 PM
It ought to be readily apparent that one cannot be expected to defend against a mechanized battalion size force with a dismounted rifle platoon on a frontage of 5 kilometers . However, it is not quite so clear that a dismounted rifle platoon will be more successful in attacking an entrenched infantry force on a 300 meter frontage than on a 500 meter frontage, regardless of terrrain type. There are far too many variables to try to get a simplistic analysis that is as fine-grained as that. Successful tactics are not a matter of applying data into "plug and chug" formulas; there is at least as much art as science to the matter.

Yes, that's precisely the point of my questions (though not to that absurd extreme!). :)

A lot of bytes have been spilled in related threads about what battalions, companies, platoons, and squads should look like. Many of those posts contained broad (and very, very different) assumptions such as possible engagement ranges in urban combat and the resulting relative value of ATGMs (eg Javelin) and ATRLs (eg SMAW); the value of typical company and battalion-level assets such as mortars; the relative value of various MGs; etc... Yet assertions have been made about what squads and platoons should look like, how many weapons of a given type should be included, etc.

The last 2-3 responses to my question (which range fully from "that's obvious" to "too complicated") demonstrate why the topic is both so difficult and important yet filled with the peril of assertions based on assumptions which may or may not be valid for a given set of circumstances. Such assumptions are of little consequence on an internet forum but they cost lives on the battlefield.

How does one propose a squad, platoon, company, or battalion TO&E without first agreeing upon the unit's operating environment and intended purpose? As the other threads have demonstrated each individual has his own, unique perspective on what that environment looks like which drives his proposals. As Wellington said, "The history of a battle is not unlike the history of a ball." More coarsely, opinions are like you-know-what and everyone has one! :)

As for my background, the relevant bit involves asking questions such as these when business people make assertions based on assumptions which may or may not be true and which may or may not be shared by everyone else with a stake in the decision. From what I've observed the typical result is a lot of talking past one another as assertions are made based on often unspoken assumptions.

It's also been my experience that it's for more valuable to hash out those assumptions/assertions first to expose differences of opinion (which are viewed as "facts" too often) which can then lead to identifying that which is truly fact, that which is opinion, and that which is truly unknown (it's also very common for people to assume facts about which little or nothing it really known!).

The Darwinian battlefield is very good at molding troops into rational TO&Es that work for a given situation. Getting to that point from the paper TO&E typically involves the loss of many lives. There's always that danger of designing a TO&E "to fight the previous war" but based on my experience it's always best to back into a solution by clearly, honestly, and brutally laying out the requirements for that solution first and then considering what that solution should look like.

So, let's start again, and maybe this a better, more direct question. Instead of asking questions about TO&Es and redundancy and designated marksmen, let's ask the first question which should drive all of those answers and which should expose a lot of assumptions for further testing.

Describe your view on the full spectrum of the "small war" operating environment. What does it look like? Opposition? Terrain? Climate? Engagement ranges? Mobility limits and enablers? Factors which limit or liberalize applications of firepower? Access and limits to logistical support? Population density and demographics? Media access issues such as native, hostile foreign, and domestic? NGO aid groups? Language and cultural requirements? Force protection requirements? Security of infrastructure? Phase requirements from initial invasion to reconstruction? What is a society willing to pay when it comes to manning and equiping this force?

As an excercise consider these questions in light of the Iraq experience and you can immediately see where assumptions made on each of these issues had a significant effect on operations. Tiny example: a friend who is deploying (again) to Iraq said that the 7th seat on the Bradley is never used due to manpower (too few) and equipment (too much). The 9-man paper squad is a nice theory but just not a reality that makes sense given his world with respect to what he has available and what he needs to do. Another friend trains units such as arty crew in combat MP duties to escort convoys in Iraq.

Bigger examples: the debate between tracked vs wheeled APCs; debate between HMGs vs autocannons on carriers; vehicle armor levels vs intended mission vs actual mission; rules of engagement during initial invasion; force-space ratio relative to taking down conventional forces vs securing the battlefield; suspected WMDs yet not all troops equiped to survive such an environment; phase requirements; etc.

Asking what a platoon should look like without first clearly identifying knowns, opinions, and unknowns about the operating environment is like asking, "how long is a piece of string?" without first asking "what sort of package is that string (platoon) going to deliver?"

So, first, what's inside that small war package?

Then you'll have a better idea (never, ever perfect!) about whether to bring Javelins or SMAWs and how many 60mm mortars should be in a weapons platoon.

The challenge is balancing needs vs wants relative to cost and the full spectrum of objectives and requirements.

RTK
01-03-2008, 04:59 PM
I need an organization, mission, and endstate to determine my operational limitations. The topic is too broad to be answered in its present form.

Timothy OConnor
01-03-2008, 05:08 PM
Manoeuvre gives you freedom of action, which is why protected mobility is so essential to infantry operations, especially if a competent enemy has it and you don't.

Excellent example of the need to define the operating environment relative to requirements and solution.

Protected mobility is great but protected from what and at what cost?

Another thread proposed an APC with protection nearly as good as an M1 Abrams. The IDF uses obselete MBTs as APCs, But even an Abrams can be disabled by weapons available to the insurgent and the cost would be astronomical.

WWII Shermans were clearly inferior to German tanks but could be transported in sufficient numbers across the Atlantic to win the war (huge debates have been waged there!)

Clearly unarmored humvees are insufficient but what is required and what can is affordable? Resistance to 7.62 rounds? 12.7? 14.5? IED blasts of some significant metric? RPG-7s? (Afghan muj had access to 14.5mm machineguns so it's not unthinkable and protecting against the latest RPGs is nearly impossible at a "reasonable" cost.) It's not only a military issue but also a political one in the US.

In other words, what assumption is one making when speaking of "protected mobility"?

Same trend occured from the early 16th century to the early 18th century as heavily armored cavalry made the evolutionary journey from full plate to breast plate, finally being limited to mounted infantry in the 19th century (inspite of some events during the Franco-Prussian War, WWI, and early WWII!).

Ken White
01-03-2008, 05:16 PM
was that there is no perfect TOE, no perfect piece of equipment, no perfectly trained forces and no way to determine what the effects of Mission, Enemy, Time, Terrain, Troops available and local population and infrastructure will have on ones organization and plans. That's a long way of saying that any attempt to 'study' or rationalize the question(s) at hand is going to fail because the parameters are entirely too many and varied.

So Armies blunder around and sustain some losses and achieve some successes and the key parameter is generally competent leadership and good, smart and intuitive commanders.

As I've grown older, I've watched literally dozens of pseudo scientific approaches to the amelioration of those problems and virtually all have seemed at least somewhat successful in the laboratory, testing ground or conference room while foundering badly when exposed to actual combat.

Penalty of trying to turn an art in to a science, I suspect.

Timothy OConnor
01-03-2008, 05:18 PM
I need an organization, mission, and endstate to determine my operational limitations. The topic is too broad to be answered in its present form.

But the military is required to answer that question every day whether or not they want to.

The usual reply is that Darwinian journey from paper TO&E to survivable solution (if not winnable).

Other threads have proposed squad-battalion TO&Es, but TO&Es to address what?

We have redlegs being tasked with convoy escort duty and Braldey companies which have done everything from engaging enemy vehicles to building schools and organizing local elections.

The topic is broad because reality has imposed broad requirements.

Timothy OConnor
01-03-2008, 05:28 PM
That's a long way of saying that any attempt to 'study' or rationalize the question(s) at hand is going to fail because the parameters are entirely too many and varied.

So Armies blunder around and sustain some losses and achieve some successes and the key parameter is generally competent leadership and good, smart and intuitive commanders.

Great in theory but the harsh reality is that at some point a congressman puts into place an appropriation for a weapon system, etc. and you end up with APCs that can't carry a squad or VTOLs that approach an LZ with the grace of a commerical airliner. All of that blundering from policy and doctrine determination to training and procurement and finally to action on the battlefield results in guys at Walter Reed missing limbs or losing their lives.

Like I wrote, you can never, ever have perfect solutions because the requirements are so varied relative to cost and available resources. And precisely because it's not a science and rather an art teasing out assumptions and opinions is absolutely critical since unchallenged opinions have killed a lot of people.

RTK
01-03-2008, 05:44 PM
All of that blundering from policy and doctrine determination to training and procurement and finally to action on the battlefield results in guys at Walter Reed missing limbs or losing their lives.


But the military is required to answer that question every day whether or not they want to.


The topic is broad because reality has imposed broad requirements.

Timothy,

First, you've been asked to introduce yourself at least twice. Please pay us the courtesy of complying. Most of us, especially those of us who are regular to the site and have contributed to the Journal, have paid others that respect. Please do the same.

We, the military, have answered those questions over the last four years because we have the answers to the three items I asked for. What I dealt with as a cavalry troop commander conducting reconnaissance, security, and surveillance operations in Northern Iraq was placed in context by understanding what our mission was, my task organization, and my Commander's desired endstate. Reality gave me those items. It was up to me, my Soldiers, and my Troop to conduct our mission in accordance to what we were given and still accomplish my Commander's endstate.

What you are asking the council to do is theorize in a box. Ask me what I did as a Regimental Training officer to get Howitzer Batteries and cavalry Troops prepared to conduct reconnaissance patrols and advisor duties and I'll tell you. Ask me to come up with the 90% solution TO&E and I'll tell you that you can't. The armored divisions of WWII made it through hedgerow country due to inginuity at the lower Soldier level. We'll never get away from relying upon that as the silver bullet, even if the proponents of the FCS try to make it so.

Lastly, we're at war. People die and get hurt. Over half of my troop has received the Purple Heart and I've been to more memorials for friends in the last 5 years than I care to remember. I understand the costs at the user end far more than your post gives credit for. The bottom line is that the enemy has a say and if the perfect solution were to come about, chances are the enemy would find a way around the perfect solution and inflict casualties within 2 weeks anyway. Then we'd be back at square one with this little exercise. Wars precipitate evolution and change and there's no getting around that.

Penta
01-03-2008, 06:19 PM
I think it can be said less harshly than RTK did (though I know the harshness was necessary):

Timothy: Combat, war, is not about numbers and math and equations and formulae. I've never experienced it but through games, reading, and history, and I know this.

You are trying to impose math and metrics upon something which is, in its most final analysis, about people. Real, non-integer people.

I've done it myself - it's an easy trap to fall into. It's incredibly seductive to just go "Well, I'll use new whizbang 728 with 23 guys to a squad and..." But it is wrong.

Don't think about the numbers. Throw the technical details out the window.

The people are the key. The people who wear the uniform and man the units, the people who make up the opposing side, the people who decide the context of any particular event.

What RTK is asking for is a question, or set of questions, you really, really need to have answered before you consider anything else:

"Why am I putting 18, 19, 20 year olds on a plane and sending them to a dangerous place? What are they intended to do when they get there? What do we hope to achieve with those people I have sent to a dangerous place, and why do we hope to achieve that?"

If the answer is "I am sending them to Europe to potentially defend against Soviet actions that may be part of a general war that may involve the use of nuclear weapons", you are going to have different parameters than if you're sending them to Afghanistan to fight an insurgency, support a government, and basically make things peaceful and prosperous. If you are sending them to Korea to defend against the KPA as they come across the DMZ, you have yet another set of parameters.

Timothy OConnor
01-03-2008, 06:20 PM
What you are asking the council to do is theorize in a box.

Acutally, I think I'm doing the opposite. A question such as, "what's a good platoon TO&E" leads to comments such as the following from another thread:



I think that your proposed 30-man Platoon is a very useful Raiding organization, but I retain doubts about its ability to go toe-to-toe with an entrenched enemy on the battlefield.


Wow! Look at the vast chasm seperating the two perspectives: small raiding force vs. going toe-to-toe in a set piece battle! What very different assumptions in mission objective and yet both participants were proposing solutions to a problem.

The question, as I raise above, what problem? Answering that question first is a prerequisite to a solution (but proposing solutions before figuring out the problem is human nature).

As for my background, I apologize for not introducing myself formally. In fact, when rex made his comment I immediately PM'd him last night that I had not noticed the intro area and would post there as soon as I had time (he can vouch for that if you're still feeling any hostility or doubt towards me as implied in your comments).

I have not yet posted in the intro, not out of deliberate neglect, but merely out of great enthusiasm for the forum's excellent content. I was not aware that such weight was placed on introductions and had been simply enjoying the exchange of ideas.

And that is the peril of assumptions, both mine and yours! :)

Best Regards,

Tim

PS Quick background: have served in senior leadership positions for various companies supplying defense, civilian agency, and the commercial world with underlying technologies related to reconaissance and information retrieval. These technologies are being used in Iraq, Afghanistan, the broader GWOT, civilian space agencies, and even in commerical entities. Not nearly as exciting as many on this forum thus my interest in your comments. Otherwise I'm just an amateur, armchair historian with a "virtual" doctorate in military history according to my wife who says I buy way too many books (in our last move we had more weight in books than furniture!) :wry:

Timothy OConnor
01-03-2008, 06:25 PM
You are trying to impose math and metrics upon something which is, in its most final analysis, about people. Real, non-integer people.

I've done it myself - it's an easy trap to fall into. It's incredibly seductive to just go "Well, I'll use new whizbang 728 with 23 guys to a squad and..." But it is wrong.

Don't think about the numbers. Throw the technical details out the window.



My question about the operating environment is not quantitative.

In fact, the questions raised in the other threads are quantitative by neccessity: How many people should be in a squad? Platoon? How many mortars should be at platoon and company level? At some point decisions related to these issues must be made.



If the answer is "I am sending them to Europe to potentially defend against Soviet actions that may be part of a general war that may involve the use of nuclear weapons", you are going to have different parameters than if you're sending them to Afghanistan to fight an insurgency, support a government, and basically make things peaceful and prosperous. If you are sending them to Korea to defend against the KPA as they come across the DMZ, you have yet another set of parameters.

Precisely. And thus the disconnects and cross-talk evident in the related threads (raiding force vs set-piece battle?).

I think it's time to go back to discussing how many teeth are in a horse's mouth. :cool:

Ken White
01-03-2008, 07:25 PM
Great in theory but the harsh reality is that at some point a congressman puts into place an appropriation for a weapon system, etc. and you end up with APCs that can't carry a squad or VTOLs that approach an LZ with the grace of a commerical airliner...
actually that the Congress Critter in most cases is merely concerned with any tangible benefit to his or her District. Were that not the case, they'd be willing to double the training budget instead of forcing buys of expensive equipment that too many administrations over the years, too many service chiefs have not wanted.

That APC you mentioned and that VTOL are examples of that. They are also examples of systems effectively desired by the services for specific missions -- missions that got changed by those METT-T factors I cited. The Bradley was not great but was fairly good for its initially designed theater and mission (among other things, it needed to be able to be transported on European railways, thus its size constraint). It is not great for other theaters and missions; thus the flaw is not that no one thought about what was needed. They did and they did a good job -- they just assumed that the world situation would remain static and it does not.

Your efforts will be doomed by the same phenomenon; your product will work for the here and now but is unlikely to be able to cope with the dynamics of change. That's a people thing.

...All of that blundering from policy and doctrine determination to training and procurement and finally to action on the battlefield results in guys at Walter Reed missing limbs or losing their lives.
All of that blundering is from human fallibility. You got a cure for that?

I've been around the world and back in both directions due to policy and doctrinal blunders, seen poor training and flawed equipment and seen a lot of bodies that didn't need to be dead. The majority of those errors were also due to human fallibility -- and a number of the humans involved tried to institute a more 'scientific' approach to policy, equipment design, procurement, doctrine, training and / or a lot of other things. When you come up with a methodology that will correct for the inability of metrics and other such inappropriate considerations to compensate for human flaws, you may be on to something.

All of the questions you raised in your 1651 post are valid -- they can be scientifically sorted and answered today and today's likely scenarios and locales. Will those answers still be appropriate in 15 year or 20 years in an unforeseen scenario in a locale not even dreamed of being a problem location?

As an aside, you also in that post said that wm's theoretical situation was absurd -- it wasn't, I have seen near replicas of those attack and defend situations on more than one occasion.

Back to my 15-20 years hence question; until then, as you said:

Like I wrote, you can never, ever have perfect solutions because the requirements are so varied relative to cost and available resources....
However, you left out the all important "multivaried terms and locales of application," in front of the word 'cost.'

Realize that real cure for your 'problem' is significantly improved training because better trained people will not get tunnel vision, will not fixate on one theater or form of warfare and will design organizations and specify equipment that will better do the job in most places most of the time -- we will never design such that will always do the job everywhere and to waste time and effort attempting to do so is, of course, your prerogative.

...And precisely because it's not a science and rather an art teasing out assumptions and opinions is absolutely critical since unchallenged opinions have killed a lot of people.
No, attempting to convert art in to science sullies and lessens both while unchallenged opinions never killed anyone -- misjudgments, failure or inability to adapt and incompetence have killed millions.

Ken White
01-03-2008, 07:33 PM
Acutally, I think I'm doing the opposite. A question such as, "what's a good platoon TO&E" leads to comments such as the following from another thread:

Wow! Look at the vast chasm seperating the two perspectives: small raiding force vs. going toe-to-toe in a set piece battle! What very different assumptions in mission objective and yet both participants were proposing solutions to a problem.

You may or may not have noticed that almost no one who is now serving or has much combat experience is participating in those sorts of discussions to any real degree. You might want to ponder the why of that...

RTK
01-03-2008, 07:38 PM
I'm still unclear as to your proposal and questions:

- Are you talking infantry, cavalry, armor, engineer platoons?

- Are you taking into consideration combined arms aspects of platoon and troop/company operations? Are you seeking to make the platoon organization capable of combined arms organically?

- Are you looking for a "platoon-in-a-box" that can do everything required in a COIN environment?

- Are we shedding traditional MOS roles and making a "jack of all trades" organization with multiple skills and no specialites?

- What are my enemy's capablilities?

- What is my METL?

Please understand my frustration in my apparent inability to understand your question fully. This is my job and I teach this very thing. Problem is, to quote Bill Parcells, is that I'm asked to make dinner and not being told what the ingredients are....

RTK
01-03-2008, 07:40 PM
You may or may not have noticed that almost no one who is now serving or has much combat experience is participating in those sorts of discussions to any real degree. You might want to ponder the why of that...

Which is another reason I'm fairly reserved on this. The obvious OPSEC issues of telling in open forum what I'm missing right now are potentially fatal. I'd imagine a defense contractor would understand this consternation.

Ken White
01-03-2008, 07:48 PM
Which is another reason I'm fairly reserved on this. The obvious OPSEC issues of telling in open forum what I'm missing right now are potentially fatal. I'd imagine a defense contractor would understand this consternation.

Then again, as I said; "Great in theory but the harsh reality is actually that the Congress Critter in most cases is merely concerned with any tangible benefit to his or her District." Or something on that line...

Timothy OConnor
01-03-2008, 09:09 PM
You may or may not have noticed that almost no one who is now serving or has much combat experience is participating in those sorts of discussions to any real degree. You might want to ponder the why of that...

I defer to your experience since I think that you said it best in a related thread on battle drill:




Been that way for over 200 years I think...

Sad thing is it need not be that way; politics, parochialism and egos are a big part of the problem but our national traits of impatience and unwillingness to think ahead contribute. Those things and our penchant for trying to substitute technology for good training.

The kids generally pull us out of it; bless 'em...

Ken White
01-03-2008, 09:27 PM
And it even bears excessive repetition:


"Been that way for over 200 years I think...

Sad thing is it need not be that way; politics, parochialism and egos are a big part of the problem but our national traits of impatience and unwillingness to think ahead contribute. Those things and our penchant for trying to substitute technology for good training.

The kids generally pull us out of it; bless 'em..."(emphasis added / kw)

Noting that the politics, parochialism and egos are a constant of the human condition and all the superior design in the world will not forestall their impact; that 'technology' includes not only hardware but software and even an approach to 'problem solving;' and the the kids are able to take the flawed products of all the foregoing and make it work in spite of the impediments placed in their way by their nominal superiors (to include in presumed intellectual superiority). :D

Timothy OConnor
01-03-2008, 09:43 PM
I'm still unclear as to your proposal and questions:

- Are you talking infantry, cavalry, armor, engineer platoons?

- Are you taking into consideration combined arms aspects of platoon and troop/company operations? Are you seeking to make the platoon organization capable of combined arms organically?

- Are you looking for a "platoon-in-a-box" that can do everything required in a COIN environment?

- Are we shedding traditional MOS roles and making a "jack of all trades" organization with multiple skills and no specialites?

- What are my enemy's capablilities?

- What is my METL?

Please understand my frustration in my apparent inability to understand your question fully. This is my job and I teach this very thing. Problem is, to quote Bill Parcells, is that I'm asked to make dinner and not being told what the ingredients are....

Good metaphor!

Hmmm...that was the point of my question above. I'm not proposing anything, I'm asking!

So let's try this.

To all individuals who proposed or commented upon TO&Es in related threads: What were your assumptions that guided your comments?

If you proposed a given unit organization, what was your assumed mission? Your operating environment? ROE? etc. Was it to be a jack-of-all trades? Why did you propose what you did? Was your proposal based purely on conventional OpFor, purely counter-insurgency, or a combination? When two individuals with military experience see "small raiding force" and "set-piece battle" in the same train of thought you know they're on the same planet but from different worlds.

From my amateur perspective, here's what I've observed with respect to the bulk of American front-line trigger-pullers. And by that I mean our light infantry such as airborne and rangers, our marine rifle battalions, our mech infantry and cav in Brads, and our new Stryker-mounted units.

They've been tasked with various missions related to the initial invasion and occupation of a third-world country. They've been asked to engage conventional if poorly equiped/trained/led "regular" forces, civilian militias, experienced foreign fighters, terrorists, and reluctant civilians. And they've been asked to provide security like neighborhood police in the midst of warring factions and outright thugs and criminals. They've faced AFVs with autocannons and tank guns (even if in very poor condition and poorly manned), regulars in fixed positions with heavy machine guns and mortars, civilian militia with AKs and RPGs, experienced foreign fighters with sniper rifles, dads being forced by terrorists to plant IEDs because they need the money, and even kids and moms being used as spotters.

So, from initial invasion to conventional combat to counter-insurgenecy to "police-work" the "line troops" who make up the bulk of our front-line forces have been asked to face all of those things with a paper TO&E that's fairly consistent (either 9 or 13-man squads in 4-man fire teams, a couple of platoon-level GPMGs and AT teams, sometimes company-level 60mm mortars, usually battalion-level 81mm mortars, and a battalion-level recon platoon.)

So, if you (as in vous/y'all) proposed or asserted anything in the related threads about TO&E for squad to battalion, what were your assumptions?

In the absence of your assumptions, just look at the varied operating environment and threats faced by our airborne, ranger, mech, cav, and marines in Iraq and test your ideas against those parameters since they're all real-world based.

Ken White
01-03-2008, 11:13 PM
...

... When two individuals with military experience see "small raiding force" and "set-piece battle" in the same train of thought you know they're on the same planet but from different worlds.

... or they may just have differing experience sets...


So, from initial invasion to conventional combat to counter-insurgenecy to "police-work" the "line troops" who make up the bulk of our front-line forces have been asked to face all of those things with a paper TO&E that's fairly consistent (either 9 or 13-man squads in 4-man fire teams, a couple of platoon-level GPMGs and AT teams, sometimes company-level 60mm mortars, usually battalion-level 81mm mortars, and a battalion-level recon platoon.)

... they seem to have made that work out in all those varying scenarios...

William F. Owen
01-04-2008, 02:53 AM
So, from initial invasion to conventional combat to counter-insurgenecy to "police-work" the "line troops" who make up the bulk of our front-line forces have been asked to face all of those things with a paper TO&E that's fairly consistent (either 9 or 13-man squads in 4-man fire teams, a couple of platoon-level GPMGs and AT teams, sometimes company-level 60mm mortars, usually battalion-level 81mm mortars, and a battalion-level recon platoon.)


With respect, you seem to be confusing form with function. Form is defined by opinion, budget and emotional/human needs. Function follows what the form is capable of. Where the form is not capable of the function you see failure, - which how you know its not working.

Norfolk
01-05-2008, 12:48 AM
Which is another reason I'm fairly reserved on this. The obvious OPSEC issues of telling in open forum what I'm missing right now are potentially fatal. I'd imagine a defense contractor would understand this consternation.

With reference to the weapons summary, DND openly states on its site what is in its possession, along with general characteristics of said. And there is no shortage of professional journals (one of the most comprehensive of which that covers the Canadian Forces is located at a university in San Franciso), industry sites and publications, military enthusiast sites, and US Manuals openly available on-line that state quite publicly the specific performance characteristics of such implements.

That said, the insurgents in A-Stan have a much better knowledge of who has what, and what that can do, than most arms manufacturers. And they have long known what we have and don't have, and what we can do with them. No secret there at all, sadly.:wry:

RTK
01-05-2008, 01:28 AM
With reference to the weapons summary, DND openly states on its site what is in its possession, along with general characteristics of said. And there is no shortage of professional journals (one of the most comprehensive of which that covers the Canadian Forces is located at a university in San Franciso), industry sites and publications, military enthusiast sites, and US Manuals openly available on-line that state quite publicly the specific performance characteristics of such implements.

That said, the insurgents in A-Stan have a much better knowledge of who has what, and what that can do, than most arms manufacturers. And they have long known what we have and don't have, and what we can do with them. No secret there at all, sadly.:wry:

That argument would not defend me at a court martial....

Ken White
01-05-2008, 01:48 AM
specifically, we do in fact do -- or don't do -- with the equipment available. Conjecture by theorists is perfectly fine and can be an enjoyable and interesting read. Comments with specifics by those serving are an entirely different thing. They have to be careful, the rest of us do not have that constraint.

Not only the potential actual use of equipment or organizational TTP should be considered but any statements made that may be taken out of context and applied in a propaganda mode should be avoided by those in uniform. The rest of us don't have to heed that; whether we should is another matter...

Recall the first item in the ROE; (LINK) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/faq.php?faq=small_wars_council_faq#faq_forums) "No discussions of current ops that may disadvantage lawful combatants." Disadvantage is a very broad term...

Norfolk
01-05-2008, 02:07 AM
specifically, we do in fact do -- or don't do -- with the equipment available. Conjecture by theorists is perfectly fine and can be an enjoyable and interesting read. Comments with specifics by those serving are an entirely different thing. They have to be careful, the rest of us do not have that constraint.

Not only the potential actual use of equipment or organizational TTP should be considered but any statements made that may be taken out of context and applied in a propaganda mode should be avoided by those in uniform. The rest of us don't have to heed that; whether we should is another matter...

Recall the first item in the ROE; (LINK) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/faq.php?faq=small_wars_council_faq#faq_forums) "No discussions of current ops that may disadvantage lawful combatants." Disadvantage is a very broad term...

Understood. I had deliberately avoided discussing related matters to put information from said attachment into a useable tactical context. The attachment has been deleted forthwith.

I have not been in uniform for some time now.

Ken White
01-05-2008, 02:48 AM
just trying to point out why RTK and some others don't comment on some threads.

That comment of mine wasn't pointed at you, it was just an idle and generic reminder. No need for you to have deleted anything... :)


Understood. I had deliberately avoided discussing related matters to put information from said attachment into a useable tactical context. The attachment has been deleted forthwith.

I have not been in uniform for some time now.

Norfolk
01-05-2008, 02:54 AM
just trying to point out why RTK and some others don't comment on some threads.

That comment of mine wasn't pointed at you, it was just an idle and generic reminder. No need for you to have deleted anything... :)

No, I do not want to even create the appearance of having compromised anything. And if RTK was strong in his point, then clearly there must have been something that I had done for RTK's antenna to pick it up.

Nevertheless Ken, I am somewhat thick at times, and my civvie years may have rubbed a little off my old edges anyway. A gentle reminder it was.

Ken White
01-05-2008, 03:15 AM
they have ESP with a 600km range. :D

JeffC
01-05-2008, 05:15 AM
As for my background, I apologize for not introducing myself formally. In fact, when rex made his comment I immediately PM'd him last night that I had not noticed the intro area and would post there as soon as I had time (he can vouch for that if you're still feeling any hostility or doubt towards me as implied in your comments).

I have not yet posted in the intro, not out of deliberate neglect, but merely out of great enthusiasm for the forum's excellent content. I was not aware that such weight was placed on introductions and had been simply enjoying the exchange of ideas.

And that is the peril of assumptions, both mine and yours! :)

Best Regards,

Tim

PS Quick background: have served in senior leadership positions for various companies supplying defense, civilian agency, and the commercial world with underlying technologies related to reconaissance and information retrieval. These technologies are being used in Iraq, Afghanistan, the broader GWOT, civilian space agencies, and even in commerical entities. Not nearly as exciting as many on this forum thus my interest in your comments. Otherwise I'm just an amateur, armchair historian with a "virtual" doctorate in military history according to my wife who says I buy way too many books (in our last move we had more weight in books than furniture!) :wry:


Tim, I'm sure that in time you'll discover what a unique and valuable resource the SWC is. Much of the credit for that goes to the owners, the moderators, and most of all, the real-world expertise of the membership. Unfortunately, the very thing that makes this a great place to have discussions also makes it a magnet for people who have less than honorable motives or hidden agendas (and they show up like clockwork several times a month). That's partly why we like to see folks introduce themselves and/or fill out the Profile with something more than "n/a".

I see from your post that you have been involved in developing IR technology. That's my professional specialty as well. Are you a member of SIGIR? Do you have any particular areas of interest in the field, such as deception detection or stylometric analysis?

krsna
01-09-2008, 05:44 AM
I have read with great interest your thread and feel you need oriental perspective too. Here is what we think in the Asian region:

Area of Operational Influence(AOPIN) = Reach of Ground Forces (REAGROF) x Target engagement range of
Fire Support Systems (TERFSS)

Hence the frontage and depth is governed by AOPIN. The Organization is built upon smallest subunit capable of limited independent operations. It may be squad (4) or section (8-10). The smallest frontage x depth covered is 50 m2 for the squad. The entire hierarchy is built upon it as triad or quad aggregation for command and control. The dispersion is a factor of communication, surveillance and target acquisition as well as logistics. Hope it solves some of your issues. I would like to be associated with you since I am a researcher too as long as I am cited appropriately.:p

William F. Owen
01-09-2008, 07:39 AM
Area of Operational Influence(AOPIN) = Reach of Ground Forces (REAGROF) x Target engagement range of
Fire Support Systems (TERFSS)

Hence the frontage and depth is governed by AOPIN. The Organization is built upon smallest subunit capable of limited independent operations. It may be squad (4) or section (8-10). The smallest frontage x depth covered is 50 m2 for the squad. The entire hierarchy is built upon it as triad or quad aggregation for command and control. The dispersion is a factor of communication, surveillance and target acquisition as well as logistics.

I'm not sure I understand this well enough to comment, but I would not agree with the idea that:

"The dispersion is a factor of communication, surveillance and target acquisition as well as logistics.".

These are certainly factors, but a squad, as cited in the example, can in theory acquire targets at 3,000m, so I am not sure why a frontage and depth would be specified

As I say, I may not have understood correctly

Distiller
01-10-2008, 02:09 PM
Back at my computer again after three weeks of different amusements ...


A couple of thoughts (all based on the fact that this here is small war's council):

# How much space/width and how many threat vectors can a single squad defend? Well, if every man has a PGM targeting device thousands of yards and dozens of targets.
On the other hand, in urban combat a squad might be happy to "control" a single small courtyard of a building and a single vector, reducing their engagement width to single digit meters.

# The equipment:
Assuming that in combat operating (i) a man is fully busy with a weapon with a single characteristic/ballistic one is more than enough, and that (ii) a squad does not have the overview for employing indirect fire, the squad should be limited to direct fire weapons and such as are always needed, and enable the soldier to concentrate on his single weapon, plus without being too heavy and bulky. Thus rifle and machine gun only.
On the platoon level then the weapons specialists with things like RPGs and AGLs, which have about the same max range and do not require a lot more overview than a squad has, plus give the platoon that desired direct/indirect/anti-armor mix. The arithmetics should be chosen in a way to re-enforce the squads, meaning one RPG and AGL per squad (2-men teams each, one operates the weapon, the other carries reloads and observes).
Since a squad/platoon can be expected to be employed in very rough terrain, keep weight down, keep ammo resupply requirements down.
On company level then you ad range and punch - mortars, guided missiles. Still everything man-portable. And with enough people to carry ammo, esp for the mortar.

# On the numbers of the heavier weapons:
Mortars I'd say three, maybe six - but then ammo has to transported in trolleys or barrows (only in not too rough terrain). If you have to operate in very rough terrain you need six men per mortar to have anything more than a few moments of indirect fire. Same goes for the missile teams (anti-armor, anti-air).
All these mortar and missile teams should be sized and trained that they can revert to a fourth platoon in the company, if their special weapons are not needed. I think that is one critical point - it gives the unit flexibility.
For the battalion level there are only the support elements to ad.
What weapon you don't have on company level, you don't get (again, small wars).

# The numbers of heavier weapons depends on your heavy precision fire support (155mm, UAVs, helicopters, fighterbombers), and how much you trust in their availability. Environment, enemy, C3.

# I think keeping fire support together on higher levels is a good idea, but there should be enough of it to support each individual lower formation. Re only two mortars for a company is not a good idea when you have three platoons (and nine squads) that each can potentially face a threat vector and require fire support.

# All in all over-organization on those low levels is a bad idea. You give the squads what they always need, the platoon what is needed in some situations, and the company what is rarely needed. All the rest is for the CO to figure out.
If you are too static in your approach you equip formations with weapons they don't really need, adding weight, logistics needs and costs.
Effector ranges are not as decisive as overview.

# I think one of the questions unchanged is, how can you equip a formation like a platoon or company without loading it up too much, giving too many special weapons to them that they don't need and how to balance the unit for assault and sustained ops.
The U.S. forces, due to their logistics capabilities, might not be the best place to look for such answers I feel.

Cavguy
01-10-2008, 03:23 PM
they have ESP with a 600km range. :D

I got in some hot water once for claming my "spidey sense" was tingling - my chain of command was pretty dismissive, to say the least. I had just opined that the insurgents in our AO were about to make a move - later that day, a major car bomb went off in a market - and caused huge problems.

Never got anyone to believe I could sense the events coming! ("Sir, time to up the posture, Cavguy has a bad feeling ... or gas from KBR")

About to read : "Blink: The power of Thinking without Thinking" - I think the real reason is that I was very close to the populace in the AO and picked up some subconscous signs that things were amiss .......

selil
01-10-2008, 04:00 PM
I got in some hot water once for claming my "spidey sense" was tingling - my chain of command was pretty dismissive, to say the least. I had just opined that the insurgents in our AO were about to make a move - later that day, a major car bomb went off in a market - and caused huge problems.

Never got anyone to believe I could sense the events coming! ("Sir, time to up the posture, Cavguy has a bad feeling ... or gas from KBR")

About to read : "Blink: The power of Thinking without Thinking" - I think the real reason is that I was very close to the populace in the AO and picked up some subconscous signs that things were amiss .......


We have a lot of anectdotal evidence from law enforcement to suggest something like "ESP".. Unfortunately it isn't as sexy as brains on hyper drive, but is actually closer to our roots. Forms of pattern recognition from our hunter reflexes have been shown to provide flashes of insight that are otherwise not apparent. Examples from a book I read a long time ago include police officers noticing that all the cars in a row had the front tires facing away from the curb (get away ready). The rear license plates on cars that were bug splattered parked in front of "stop and robs" (camouflage).

Tiny signs in the environment provide clues to the mind that may not be part of the conscious dialog. Absence of clues and normal hum can have the same effect. In New York City the sudden absence of noise is usually indicative of something bad. Many people after 9/11 complained of a sudden sense of dread that was only alleviated when jets started flying again (counter intuitive considering the events).

The more observant the individual the more likely that they will pick up on cues they are unaware of in the environment. Few people actually look with their entire eye let alone the rest of their senses. Most people only "see" a tiny cone of what they eye can actually process. Even fewer people "listen" to the totality of the environmental churn of noise. Unlike closing your eyes you can't turn off hearing. So people block noise out fairly well. Further degrading their sensitivity to the environment. Smell, and feeling also get short shrift in most technology cultures yet advertising has used them well. There is a reason the movie theater has fragrant pop corn smell pumped into the waiting area. If you were in Iraq around dinner time would you notice the absence of cooking smells? Though you would likely perceive the smell of gasoline? Danger is processed faster than the absence of normal.

Sensory perception is an interesting phenomenon. My interest was piqued while doing forensic analysis. We seen in investigations that people look for the evidence to convict but rarely look at exculpatory evidence regardless of roles or rules in place. I found lots of stuff on sensory research and less on the mental acuity.

Bottom line listen to your "gut" feeling and more important listen to the silence as much as the noise....

Sabre
01-10-2008, 11:07 PM
At first, I decided to stay out of this thread, since OPSEC concerns were being raised, and at least a few denigrated the very topic as being at best irrelevant and at worst, amateurish.

Yet, how often have all of us heard "train as you fight, and fight as you train"...?
Someone, somehow, must decide what vehicles will be in your motorpool, how many weapons and of what type must be in your armsroom, how many officers, NCO's, and troopies you are supposed to have (and sometimes, those numbers actually do match up with reality).
...and while that obviously doesn't solely determine how you will train, it darn sure has a real impact.

Besides, arguing over organizations is fun, as long as everyone realizes that it is just one detail of the endless multitude of details that determine success or failure on the battlefield... possibly because organization is so easily analyzed, as opposed to concepts like doctrine, leadership, and training, which of course play a much larger role.

So, to cavalierly disregard the "it depends on the situation" argument, and drastically simplify things, I'll just wade in and draw fire…

Beginning with artillery (which some may decry as being totally irrelevant to “small wars”):
If you expect to see a decent amount of combat, then you want artillery, if for nothing else than "just in case".
It can be thought of as a reserve of (near) instantly applicable combat power. A battalion commander can dispatch a reserve platoon to reinforce a unit in contact, and it may take them the better part of an hour to get there, while artillery can affect the fight within minutes, or even seconds.
For this reason, I believe that every commander, from Company level up, should have their own artillery, organic to their organization (so that he will actually *have* it when he needs it).

Artillery must have enough range to sit behind the combat platoons, and reach out to targets beyond those platoons (and any scouts /recon elements the commander has out there, hopefully). Artillery, thus far, must be stationary to fire, and requires at least some time to emplace ("set up"), and thus maneuver units can easily "outrun" their fire support. The other major consideration is how much the ammo weighs, since even with precision munitions, you may need generic suppressive fires, or smoke screens, and those fire missions still require plenty of ammunition...

At the company level, since we generally expect an infantry company to be able to walk places that vehicles can't go, we are limited to mortars. 81mm mortars can be "humped", but it is unpleasant (heh, the TOW missile launcher can theoretically be humped, too, and I knew an 11H sergeant who was in an AT platoon ordered to do it once, he said it was the most pathetic thing that he ever saw...) 60mm mortars are lighter, the ammo is lighter, and with 3 or 4,000m range, have enough range, as long as the company is grouped tightly together. If you are humping the mortar tubes, you probably have to hump the ammo, too (the alternative is a sling load under a helo, or parachute supply). In an attack, even if every grunt in the rifle company carries two rounds, and dumps them off at the firing point, that still isn’t much (60mm mortars have a murderous rate of fire, up to 20 or 30 rounds/minute). So having say, six mortars down at company level wouldn’t do much good, as you would just burn through the ammo supply unnecessarily fast, and then be left with 6 metal tubes doing nothing. The U.S. Army has two tubes at company level, the USMC has three; I’d say three is better – allowing you to pump out rounds fast enough, or alternatively to “chop” one to each of the three rifle platoons. In the mech world, a section of three 120mm mortars is enough to build a useful smoke screen even in unfavorable conditions, and the range is (barely) sufficient to support the platoons.

At battalion level, you need more reach to be able to range in to support the line companies, and (theoretically) it is easier to keep them supplied with ammunition. Most have a platoon of 81mm (if you need to hump the tubes), or 120mm mortars (if you can use vehicles to tow them around), and a battery of howitzers habitually attached. If it were me, instead of a platoon of 4-6 mortars and a battery of 6-8 howitzers, I’d just have one large battery organic to the battalion, with 8 to 12 crews and howitzers, along with perhaps 6-8 120mm or 81mm mortars for when the howitzers can’t be used. It has been shown that artillery crews can rapidly transition from using one type of ordinance to another (with 2-3 weeks of training). On average, howitzers require only one or two additional crewmen, and it is easy to concoct scenarios where the artillery of a battalion must be called on for targets exceeding the 6 or 7km range of most mortars. (I can already hear the howls that will come from this over-simplification…)

Ken White
01-11-2008, 01:02 AM
is the key not only to combat survival but to combat success. Be it ESP, Spidey Sense, intuition or instinct is is critically important in combat. Those that do not have it (and there are some, about 20% or os in my estimation) don't have any business being there. Like any human attribute, it's more pronounced in some than in others but a lack of it is not good. Particularly in a Commander -- and no experienced Commander will ever discount it from a good subordinate.

Saber said:
'...(I can already hear the howls that will come from this over-simplification…)"

AhhhooooooooOOOO...

Aside from equal accuracy within range, a terminally guided projectile (which the 105 howitzer has not...), a far, far higher rate of fire and a much greater bursting radius of the HE (and WP) shell and thus a more lethal hit (not to mention a longer lasting Illum round), no 120 Mortar owning Commandante is going to give up HIS tubes to get two more artillery tubes that belong to someone else. Totally correctly in my view.

In Afghanistan and Iraq, the FArty (is that the correct abbreviation?) is not terribly busy and thus is responsive; in a busy war, they can be terribly unrespsonsive -- centralized control is not all it's cracked up to be; it'll divert your DS tubes to a "higher priority" target set in seconds.

I'd also suggest that anyone concerned with being inside of his own artillery range is being unduly cautious and that should rarely if ever be a consideration. Yeah, I know -- but the guy that wrote that was sitting in an air conditioned building. Things in the real world aren't always that helpful...

I agree with you that each echelon directly supported by artillery should actually own the tubes. That is totally doable technically but not politically, the Artillerists will kill to protect their ownership. I mean, they still insist on LTs for FOs in spite of the waste of Officers on unneeded tasks that most FD NCOs can do as well or better. Does keep the Branch population up, though...

The Javelin is a great weapon, no need to haul the TOW. Humping 81s isn't all that bad and the ammo problem is manageable (ammo problem is solved by fire discipline -- not one of the strong points of the US Army...).

Ken White
01-11-2008, 01:14 AM
is the key not only to combat survival but to combat success. Be it ESP, Spidey Sense, intuition or instinct is is critically important in combat. Those that do not have it (and there are some, about 20-30% or so in my estimation) don't have any business being there. Like any human attribute, it's more pronounced or stronger in some than in others but a lack of it is not good. Particularly in a Commander -- and no experienced Commander will ever discount it from a good subordinate.

Saber said:
'...(I can already hear the howls that will come from this over-simplification…)"AhhhooooooooOOOO...

Aside from equal accuracy within range, a terminally guided projectile (which the 105 howitzer has not...), a far, far higher rate of fire and a much greater bursting radius of the HE (and WP) shell and thus a more lethal hit (not to mention a longer lasting Illum round), no 120 Mortar owning Commandante is going to give up HIS tubes to get two more artillery tubes that belong to someone else. Totally correctly in my view.

In Afghanistan and Iraq, the FArty (is that the correct abbreviation?) is not terribly busy and thus is responsive; in a busy war, they can be terribly unresponsive -- centralized control is not all it's cracked up to be; it'll divert your so-called DS tubes to a "higher priority" target set in seconds.

I'd also suggest that anyone concerned with being inside of his own artillery range is being unduly cautious and that should rarely if ever be a consideration. Yeah, I know -- but the guy that wrote that was sitting in an air conditioned building. Things in the real world aren't always that nice and easy...

I agree with you that each echelon directly supported by artillery should actually own the tubes. That is totally doable technically but not politically, the Artillerists will kill to protect their ownership. I mean, they still insist on LTs for FOs in spite of the waste of Officers on unneeded tasks that most FD NCOs can do as well or better. Does keep the Branch population up, though...

The Javelin is a great weapon, no need to haul the TOW. Humping 81s isn't all that bad -- there was no 60mm Standard A for many years in the 50s and 60s -- and the ammo problem is manageable (the ammo problem is solved by fire discipline -- not one of the strong points of the US Army...).

Timothy OConnor
01-11-2008, 04:14 AM
Besides, arguing over organizations is fun...


That's what I realized about the other threads. They're a bit like an arguement in a bar over sports teams, never mind the whys or reasons.

If one wants 32-man platoons in 4 squads but another wants 36 men in 3 squads and the one is pushing light raiding forces at the same time (and in the same conversation) his boothmate is talking Fulda Gap 1985, well, have another pint and carry on! Since everyone knows my hockey team can beat your baseball team in football any day of the week.

:D

You shouldn't feel odd about joining the fray and expressing an opinion as that is exactly (and merely) what everyone else is doing. Yours is just as valid as any other.

As one forum member mentioned there's a reason the combat vets shy away from such threads and upon further consideration I saw the wisdom of his comments. :cool:

krsna
01-11-2008, 06:27 AM
I'm not sure I understand this well enough to comment, but I would not agree with the idea that:

"The dispersion is a factor of communication, surveillance and target acquisition as well as logistics.".

These are certainly factors, but a squad, as cited in the example, can in theory acquire targets at 3,000m, so I am not sure why a frontage and depth would be specified

As I say, I may not have understood correctly

Dear Owen,
Never mind the niceties. Best debate is frank and forthright. As I said, I shall clarify further. The dispersion as we understand is the geographical area covered by a subunit or unit (let us call it ENTITY for ease of reference) for independent operations whereas frontage and depth is the area covered by the capability (in terms of SATA and Target engagement range) of weapons and equipment organic to it. Dispersion is a product of the the organic capbility as well as the communications (internal permits intra entity dispersion while external permits inter entity dispersion) besides the logistics (mobility and sustenance). Hence the three factors of fire power, mobility and communications play a major role in frontage-depth as well as dispersion. Hope it is a better attempt this time. By the way I am a Colonel from Infantry.

William F. Owen
01-11-2008, 04:18 PM
Dear Owen,
Never mind the niceties. Best debate is frank and forthright. As I said, I shall clarify further. The dispersion as we understand is the geographical area covered by a subunit or unit (let us call it ENTITY for ease of reference) for independent operations whereas frontage and depth is the area covered by the capability (in terms of SATA and Target engagement range) of weapons and equipment organic to it. Dispersion is a product of the the organic capbility as well as the communications (internal permits intra entity dispersion while external permits inter entity dispersion) besides the logistics (mobility and sustenance). Hence the three factors of fire power, mobility and communications play a major role in frontage-depth as well as dispersion. Hope it is a better attempt this time. By the way I am a Colonel from Infantry.

Call me Wilf, everyone does. Interesting explanation. So would weapon's time of flight (ATGM and Mortars) be a planning factor associated with Front and depth and not dispersion?

jcustis
01-11-2008, 04:30 PM
If we are addressing time of flight for things like ATGMs, then I would offer that we must look at mobility from a specific perspective, and that is how terrain affects the X number of engagement windows available. That, as I'm sure folks here know, will have a significant affect on both frontage and depth (especially depth) if the terrain prevents full LOS for the entire range and time of flight for a system.

Because of rolling terrain, I may only have a few engagement windows, thus forcing me to sight ATGM systems further forward in sector because targets moving at X speed will only expose themselves for X time period, and to engage from max effective range, the target would disappear from view before the missile made impact.

I had the good fortune of having this battlefield geometry lesson instilled during a combt readiness evaluation and not actually on the two-way range. I actually knew the answer, but lack of sleep lead me to eyeball the sector of fire and call it "good" when that was the furthest thing from the truth.

Norfolk
01-11-2008, 05:33 PM
That's what I realized about the other threads. They're a bit like an arguement in a bar over sports teams, never mind the whys or reasons.

If one wants 32-man platoons in 4 squads but another wants 36 men in 3 squads and the one is pushing light raiding forces at the same time (and in the same conversation) his boothmate is talking Fulda Gap 1985, well, have another pint and carry on! Since everyone knows my hockey team can beat your baseball team in football any day of the week.:D

Actually, I was referring to Vilseck circa late 1980's, not Fulda Gap 1985 - we were to deal with the Russkies as they tried to exploit the boundary between US VII Corps and German II(?) Corps - but close enough.;):D But now I find myself rather more favourably disposed towards the "light raiding forces".

jcustis raises important points about ATGMs and frontages and depths. Javelin is something that may really change a few things when it comes to siting ATGMs. I had real reservations about TOW, and for a lot of reasons; especially the crew having to track it all the way to the target, which could be a real problem when having to fight in places where the terrain only allows for shots out to about a mile a lot of the time, and the capture range is measured in hundreds of metres to begin with. That just doesn't give TOW and HOT the time to get more than a round or maybe two off, especially when tanks can snap-shoot real easy at those ranges.

Javelin changes some of that, at least in so far as it can actually be man-packed, fired from cover, and then you just haul out macht schnell. Or it can be mounted on a light or armoured vehicle. Except for the range, it's way better than TOW for most Battalion purposes. Makes siting your AT weapons and figuring out your plan much easier, and your plan a little more flexible. But unless you have Javelin Under-Armour like TOW and HOT came to be by the 80's, it's easier for Javelin to be suppressed by enemy fire, and harder to move long distances quickly without having to re-mount. Sill, Javelin may be able to do wonders for Company and even Platoon frontages.

Timothy OConnor
01-11-2008, 08:09 PM
The book Roughneck Nine One provides an excellent description of the Javelin being used under combat conditions for which it was intended (ie anti-tank rather than busting houses). The account describes Javelin's advantage which, as it turns out, can be a liability. Its ability to kill AFVs actually exceeds paper specs with respect to range according to the book (from a security perspective I was surprised to read this in a mass market book). As for flight time the crew first thought there had been a mis-fire since, from their perspective, the missile simply vanished into a low cieling for a very long period only to come down right atop the target. But the operators also had some difficulty achieving lock when an insufficient amount of the target's hull was visible.

So Javelin's long flight time is not as important to the crew since they were able to exploit the missiles homing ability and shoot-n-scoot if desired (they stood, fought, and won in the actual event). But that same human-independent homing ability was clearly less capable than the human eye and judgement.

William F. Owen
01-12-2008, 08:08 AM
If we are addressing time of flight for things like ATGMs, then I would offer that we must look at mobility from a specific perspective, and that is how terrain affects the X number of engagement windows available. That, as I'm sure folks here know, will have a significant affect on both frontage and depth (especially depth) if the terrain prevents full LOS for the entire range and time of flight for a system.
.

High speed stuff! Good observation!



So Javelin's long flight time is not as important to the crew since they were able to exploit the missiles homing ability and shoot-n-scoot if desired (they stood, fought, and won in the actual event). But that same human-independent homing ability was clearly less capable than the human eye and judgement.

Javelin and Spike are two systems that change a lot of the rules. This is why it so important to a have thorough understandings on the limitations, of the systems. Spikes NLOS capability makes sighting of posts and even mobility and resupply, far less critical.

Rifleman
01-13-2008, 05:54 PM
is the key not only to combat survival but to combat success. Be it ESP, Spidey Sense, intuition or instinct is is critically important in combat. Those that do not have it (and there are some, about 20-30% or so in my estimation) don't have any business being there. Like any human attribute, it's more pronounced or stronger in some than in others but a lack of it is not good. Particularly in a Commander -- and no experienced Commander will ever discount it from a good subordinate.

Something's hinky here, Ken, something's hinky! ;)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hinky

Ken White
01-13-2008, 06:36 PM
was also part of the old American Legion song, Mademoiselle from Armentiers; the part in the chorus that is "...hinky, dinky, parlez vous..."

Since hinky is defined at your link, dinky is generally construed as being of poor quality and 'parlez vous' is obviously French, I can only conclude you're indirectly bashing the French and that's not nice... :D

Still, hinky or spidey -- it's really important to have it. And heed it.

slapout9
01-14-2008, 12:36 AM
Ken is this you?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HZNAoYsgSYY&feature=related

Ken White
01-14-2008, 02:19 AM
his nose is too small, he's wearing fruit boots and he's got his hat on in the house. Nope, not me. :D

Not to mention he can carry a tune... ;)

krsna
01-14-2008, 06:06 AM
Call me Wilf, everyone does. Interesting explanation. So would weapon's time of flight (ATGM and Mortars) be a planning factor associated with Front and depth and not dispersion?
Wilf and jcustis,
This is for both of you. The effective interlocked arcs of fire, as defined by range of any weapon system, whether static or mobile, determines the frontage covered. In former case it would be frontage of static defence and that of mobile defence in the latter case. Depth is related to certain factors as capability to absorb the breach of frontage and allow repulse of breach by providing counterattack capability. As regards dispersion and the time of flight factors, I maintain that the dispersion is frontage and depth plus the capability to disperse by means of communication, mobility for maneuvre, protection for sustenance and logistics for sustenance. Time of flight is an attribute of speed, hence it influences the effectiveness in terms of time of decision (it may give more time for Commander to decide). Further it shall influence the maneuvre too by allowing speed of engagement and hence allow move to better position of advantage. Dispersion as we see it is not only a factor of larger frontage needs but also of defensive need to avoid being pinned by enemy massed attack by conventional means or by WMDs.

William F. Owen
01-14-2008, 07:55 AM
Wilf and jcustis,
This is for both of you. The effective interlocked arcs of fire, as defined by range of any weapon system, whether static or mobile, determines the frontage covered. In former case it would be frontage of static defence and that of mobile defence in the latter case. Depth is related to certain factors as capability to absorb the breach of frontage and allow repulse of breach by providing counterattack capability. As regards dispersion and the time of flight factors, I maintain that the dispersion is frontage and depth plus the capability to disperse by means of communication, mobility for maneuvre, protection for sustenance and logistics for sustenance. Time of flight is an attribute of speed, hence it influences the effectiveness in terms of time of decision (it may give more time for Commander to decide). Further it shall influence the maneuvre too by allowing speed of engagement and hence allow move to better position of advantage. Dispersion as we see it is not only a factor of larger frontage needs but also of defensive need to avoid being pinned by enemy massed attack by conventional means or by WMDs.

krsna, excellent doctrinal description and a fascinating one, but it seems to me that frontage and depth, are in fact products of dispersion, and not the other way round. How far you can effectively disperse, (defined by the planning factors you mention) defines your frontage and depth - so the need to differentiate is an interesting point of doctrine.

krsna
01-15-2008, 06:05 AM
krsna, excellent doctrinal description and a fascinating one, but it seems to me that frontage and depth, are in fact products of dispersion, and not the other way round. How far you can effectively disperse, (defined by the planning factors you mention) defines your frontage and depth - so the need to differentiate is an interesting point of doctrine.
Wilf,
Dispersion as an activity is part of frontage and Depth while as a Principle of War it is a factor of offensive manevre in pursuit of tactical advantage as well as defensive posturing to obviate massed attack.

Distiller
01-16-2008, 06:49 PM
Doesn't that sound a little ... WW1?

krsna
01-17-2008, 04:38 AM
Doesn't that sound a little ... WW1?
some things are ageless and timeless. ask the americans who used horse-based laser target designators to direct smart munitions.

Distiller
01-17-2008, 05:19 AM
If you go cross-country in a more-or-less flat landscape it's ok. But how do you apply those principles to a, say, present day cavalry unit in an undulating suburban ops area, that is forced to move in less than optimal tactical formation?

I think the approach is too static, but e.g. doesn't factor in combined weapons and airpower enough. With precision engagement equipment of FACs the potential "arc of fire" even a small unit can controll is quite larger than what the C3 capabilities of such units realisticly allow for.

Even with micro UAVs for situational awareness those C3 limitations dictate your dispersion, not your weapons range, I think.

William F. Owen
01-17-2008, 06:49 AM
Even with micro UAVs for situational awareness those C3 limitations dictate your dispersion, not your weapons range, I think.

You only disperse if it gives you benefit. It's a balance of security and activity. There is no point in expending resources detecting the enemy, unless doing so gains you something by doing it. EG- When you find them, you must be able to tell someone.

In my experience the biggest factor effecting dispersion is the ability to effectively concentrate fires in time and space.

Also don't forget that weather tends to have far greater effect on that than many realise. What looked good at 18:00hrs can be blanked off by mist and cloud at 05:30hrs the next morning.

krsna
01-18-2008, 05:00 AM
You only disperse if it gives you benefit. It's a balance of security and activity. There is no point in expending resources detecting the enemy, unless doing so gains you something by doing it. EG- When you find them, you must be able to tell someone.

In my experience the biggest factor effecting dispersion is the ability to effectively concentrate fires in time and space.

Also don't forget that weather tends to have far greater effect on that than many realise. What looked good at 18:00hrs can be blanked off by mist and cloud at 05:30hrs the next morning.
one is prone to be techno-mesmerised but remember the boots on ground dictates the end result. got to get dirty eventually. technology gives one the edge in area of interest and area of influence but area of control is where organic capability comes in. you got to control the area post C4I advantage by quick closing in, defeating the enemy and then retaining the area wrested for whatever duration necessary. a general in washington can see what a sergeant is looking and can direct fires but he still needs boots on ground. conventional wars turn to uncoventional in no time. days of WW 1 are back sooner than you wish despite your asymmetry in surveillance, communications, firepower and mobility.

krsna
01-18-2008, 05:35 AM
If you go cross-country in a more-or-less flat landscape it's ok. But how do you apply those principles to a, say, present day cavalry unit in an undulating suburban ops area, that is forced to move in less than optimal tactical formation?

I think the approach is too static, but e.g. doesn't factor in combined weapons and air power enough. With precision engagement equipment of FACs the potential "arc of fire" even a small unit can controll is quite larger than what the C3 capabilities of such units realistically allow for.

Even with micro UAVs for situational awareness those C3 limitations dictate your dispersion, not your weapons range, I think.
further to your comment. i read your earlier submissions today. thumbs up for excellent analysis. some of your argument stems from mobility and balance from the C4I capability of mobile forces. in today's environment, none stays mobile forever. the modern technology disperses an entity away from other entities as well as from its control HQ but it has limits on intra-entity dispersion. Americans and Australians gave up the Soldier Modernization Pro gramme (SMP) induced 24x7 SATA capability of a soldier since ultimately human being wants assurance of physical support at a psychological level. thus the dispersion is limited also by human needs to be together unlike rambos who like to work alone. same is for vehicles where limited FOV restricts inter vehicle dispersion despite technology. the buddy system operates at the lowest to highest level.

William F. Owen
01-18-2008, 08:35 AM
Krsna, please go to this (if you haven't already) link and tell us something about yourself.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1441

Geoff
01-23-2008, 09:42 PM
I've read through most of this thread and seen a lot of informed comment, but the salient point should be not about organising around weapon systems, they change - we need to think terms of interoperable teams.

If. as was stated earlier the ideal base team is 4-5 then organise around that, build up your structurre from the base. When it comes to weapon systems, design them around your teams and the tasks that you have them perform. You have to be able to operate in a variety of theatres, but your recognition as to what is required for weaponry is driven by the task that people are expected to perform.

It will never be perfect, because the enemy will not do what you want them to do - it is not in their best interests, so we need to focus on well trained people who can react to a changing situation and sieze the initiative and thus dictate the pace and tempo of the battlefield around them.

krsna
01-25-2008, 03:45 PM
History of war dates to duel between two unsocialised animals called Homo Sapiens. Has the society imposed the 4-5 limit on base as you suggest? Buddy system is the base of organised combat (Synergy of the twins, as against rivalry of twins-Kane and Abel). You can build anything upwards on this. Think about it.

William F. Owen
01-25-2008, 04:08 PM
There are actually two issues at play here.

a.) The optimum team size for a complex and stressful task.
b.) Span of Control - not Command as is commonly expressed.

A lot of discussion assumes they are the same thing. I suggest they are not, thus I view task organisation as being the balance of those two items. Under great stress the span of control shrinks and can shrink down to two! However a team trying to accomplish a task, gets less effective as it gets smaller. This is why I argue so much for flexible and/or modular Platoon and Company groupings.

Timothy OConnor
01-25-2008, 09:20 PM
However a team trying to accomplish a task, gets less effective as it gets smaller.

I think it really depends on the task at hand.

For example, conventional wisdom held that sniper teams should be very small to enhance their ability to avoid detection. But in Iraq American sniper teams have discovered that too small a team is easy pickings once discovered. As a result they've been working with larger teams to enhance security.

But, they've also discovered that if too large their ability to remain undetected truly is compromised such that they become ineffective as the bad guys avoid them. Thus the team is unable to meet its intended purpose if too large.

So, it all depends...

krsna
01-26-2008, 06:35 AM
I think it really depends on the task at hand.

For example, conventional wisdom held that sniper teams should be very small to enhance their ability to avoid detection. But in Iraq American sniper teams have discovered that too small a team is easy pickings once discovered. As a result they've been working with larger teams to enhance security.

But, they've also discovered that if too large their ability to remain undetected truly is compromised such that they become ineffective as the bad guys avoid them. Thus the team is unable to meet its intended purpose if too large.

So, it all depends...

I agree with the concept of span of control as much as the need for innovation to suit ground reality. But consider that span of control stems from research in the management field where the supervisor has average span of control over 7-8 subordinates. Our squad span has brought it down to four. This is to to suit the buddy concept upwards than halve the span of control for greater control. The sniper teams signify this concept that the buddies have limit to independence in their sustenance. They must return to base or base must extend support to sustain them. Most of these concepts need to take Urban Warfare than Jungle or Mountain Warfare in our future deliberations.

Rifleman
01-26-2008, 05:24 PM
For example, conventional wisdom held that sniper teams should be very small to enhance their ability to avoid detection. But in Iraq American sniper teams have discovered that too small a team is easy pickings once discovered. As a result they've been working with larger teams to enhance security.


Variations of this have always been done.

I've read sniper employment SOPs for 3rd Marine Division and 9th Infantry Division sniper operations in Vietnam. Both called for the two man sniper team to be secured by a fire team to squad size element. I don't think it was usually a case of the security element occupying the same hide site, but they would have been close enough to overwatch and provide supporting fire.

kaur
03-06-2008, 07:25 AM
Some time ago, in the beginning of this thread somebody posted one table in pdf format about Candadian small arms shooting distances. Now this attatchement is gone. I do have discussion with my friends in another forum and would like to use this material as good illustration. I'd like to ask this person to post this table one more time. PM is maybe better option.

Eden
03-06-2008, 04:31 PM
I've followed this thread off and on as it has wended its way back and forth over various subjects. Just wanted to comment on one recurring theme that I've seen - the idea that there exists an 'optimum' base or span of control that effects dispersion, dictates organization size, and limits the 'flatness' of a particular organization.

I would just ask that people keep in mind that you can find examples of teams or spans of control that far exceed 4 or 5 or a dozen or whatever.

150 years ago one man routinely controlled, with a fair degree of precision, the movement of a regiment. He could do this because the 'team members' had been rigourously trained in fairly simple tasks, they could all be communicated with simultaneously, they all had organic markers to guide their actions (dressing of ranks, presence of the colors, etc), and the leader could monitor their actions with a glance.

60 years ago, one bombardier in a B-17 could control dozens of bombers during their run over a target. He did this without communicating because all the members of that particular team could perform the enabling tasks (fly the plane, drop the bombs, fend off enemy fighters) without supervision, the conduct of the run itself was a well-rehearsed drill, and because of the simplicity of the control mechanism (follow me in your preassigned relative positions, drop your bombs when I do).

Finally, a quarterback controls ten other men in extremely complex tasks every play, with only a few seconds notice as to what task is required. He can do this because of a well-developed communications system (huddles, audibles, hand signals), a pre-determined way of reacting to opposing countermeasures (pass routes, blocking schemes, option handoffs, etc.), and, of course, practice, practice, practice.

My point is that optimal span of control and organizational size is a function of many factors - training, complexity of the task, weapon systems, willingness to accept risk, and many others. To state that there is an inherently optimal number - probably drawn from 20th Century management theory - and design your weapons, tactics, or organizations from that seems to me bassackwards.

And apologies to my Commonwealth friends for the American football example.

William F. Owen
03-06-2008, 06:37 PM
My point is that optimal span of control and organizational size is a function of many factors - training, complexity of the task, weapon systems, willingness to accept risk, and many others. To state that there is an inherently optimal number - probably drawn from 20th Century management theory - and design your weapons, tactics, or organizations from that seems to me bassackwards.


It's actually military research, done by the DERA in the 1980s that proved the span of control was 4-5 and shrinks under pressure. This assumes that all of the 4-5 elements are doing different tasks.

The Napoleonic Army, B17 formation, football teams tasks are all "self synchronised" actions, that do not require explicit and direct control.

marct
03-06-2008, 06:45 PM
Actually, Eden is right - it comes out of management research, originally with the Bank Wiring Room in the early 1930's, and then formalized again by the Brits with socio-technical systems (STS) theory in the 1940's and 50's. One of the findings of STS was that span of control was directly related to the degree of independence / professional expertise of a subordinant in order to fulfill their work role; the greater the required skills / knowledge, the lower the span of control. Napoleonic and 19th century armies required much less exercise of judgement and skills than 21st century armies do.

Ken White
03-06-2008, 07:08 PM
Eden's examples are all those of mechanistic responses. If one wants to instill the fear of flogging or death that prevailed in most Armies of the Napoleonic era, then one man can still control a Regiment -- on a linear battlefield. Don't think I'd want to try it in the mountains of the 'Stan against the wily Pathan...

On the other hand, if one wants troops with drive and who will use their initiative and do innovative things, then 'iron discipline' is contraindicated. I submit in this day, more rather than less autonomy is needed in combat.

Any Tank Platoon leader that insists on fighting all four of his tracks as a unit instead of in pairs is likely to get in big trouble. A Company commander running squads is a menace. Can't do either of those things in most high intensity combat so why do it in training -- then your Squads or tracks are waiting for divine guidance when they should be acting.

I have controlled over 30 people in a gaggle in combat. I use the term control in its figurative sense because I was nominally in charge but I sure had no idea what the majority of those folks were doing. I have controlled three people, each of whom controlled three others -- and in a bad fight, I had no clue what one or two of the three I was supposed to be 'controlling' were doing. :o

I've in training and combat worked with varying numbers, have read a lot of the studies produced by The US Army Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO), the Marines (and Wilf's UK DERA) which all came up with a combat effective span of 3-5. So a long time ago I came up with White's Control Theorem:

"If you try to control more than three to five subordinates and / or try to do any part of their jobs for them, you are a dangerous micromanager and I do not want to go to war with you."

And yes, circumstances have forced me to go to war with some of those against my 'want.' Proving that my theorem was and is totally correct...:cool:

Eden
03-06-2008, 07:38 PM
The Napoleonic Army, B17 formation, football teams tasks are all "self synchronised" actions, that do not require explicit and direct control.

That was sort of my point. Span of control was increased because the team members exercised a greater degree of self-synchronization than is possible in combat today, due to doctrine, tactics, weapons system, etc.

I wholeheartedly agree that currently 3-5 subordinates is the optimal number, given today's circumstances. For all I know that may continue to be the case well into the future. However, I also believe that improvements in communications, situational awareness, individual and vehicular armor could change that. In other words, both Ken and Wilf are right...given today's conditions. But change those conditions and optimum solutions change.

After all, initiative, for instance, is not in and of itself a good thing. It is a good thing today because of the current state of communications and the complexity of the tasks we face. We want NCOs with initiative who can act within the spirit of issued orders to accomplish a stated goal. But NCOs two hundred years ago were most valued who displayed a brutal willingness to follow orders, set a good example, and enforce discipline. Initiative - at least in the tactical sense - was neither valued nor particularly desired. This was not because leaders back then were stupid, its because the conditions were different.

So, if you are looking for a theoretical approach to optimizing span of control and/or organizational size, you have to free yourself from the prejudices of the moment. Especially if, as most futurists predict, our ability to self-synchronize operations will improve in the near future.

Ken White
03-06-2008, 08:40 PM
...
"... However, I also believe that improvements in communications, situational awareness, individual and vehicular armor could change that. In other words, both Ken and Wilf are right...given today's conditions. But change those conditions and optimum solutions change.No question that conditional changes can adjust the size of the span and are likely to do so. Whether that adjustment is downward or upward remains to be seen. I think the human mind and not any degree of situational awareness is going to be the ultimate arbiter.
After all, initiative, for instance, is not in and of itself a good thing...We can disagree on that :)
... It is a good thing today because of the current state of communications and the complexity of the tasks we face. We want NCOs with initiative who can act within the spirit of issued orders to accomplish a stated goal. But NCOs two hundred years ago were most valued who displayed a brutal willingness to follow orders, set a good example, and enforce discipline. Initiative - at least in the tactical sense - was neither valued nor particularly desired. This was not because leaders back then were stupid, its because the conditions were different.I suggest that innovative leaders of 200 years ago did prize initiative on the part of their subordinates. From Gustavus Adolphus through De Saxe to Sir Henry Clinton and Sir John Moore they not only fostered initiative, they changed warfare.
So, if you are looking for a theoretical approach to optimizing span of control and/or organizational size, you have to free yourself from the prejudices of the moment...Good advice, though I suggest that the theory is not nearly as important as the practice and one should exercise care to avoid introducing replacement prejudices.
... Especially if, as most futurists predict, our ability to self-synchronize operations will improve in the near future.If the Futurists are correct in this instance, that will be a pleasant change from their past performance but I believe that such self synchronization if it (a) appears and (b) is allowed will call for more, not less initiative while significantly reducing any 'benefit' from over control.

krsna
03-14-2008, 09:14 AM
No question that conditional changes can adjust the size of the span and are likely to do so. Whether that adjustment is downward or upward remains to be seen. I think the human mind and not any degree of situational awareness is going to be the ultimate arbiter.We can disagree on that :)I suggest that innovative leaders of 200 years ago did prize initiative on the part of their subordinates. From Gustavus Adolphus through De Saxe to Sir Henry Clinton and Sir John Moore they not only fostered initiative, they changed warfare.Good advice, though I suggest that the theory is not nearly as important as the practice and one should exercise care to avoid introducing replacement prejudices.If the Futurists are correct in this instance, that will be a pleasant change from their past performance but I believe that such self synchronization if it (a) appears and (b) is allowed will call for more, not less initiative while significantly reducing any 'benefit' from over control.
Great to see the thread active again. Just a small incident for you guys. I was in the combat zone engaged with a group of terrorists some years ago. Although at the helm of 1000 or so men, I was left alone with just my own team in the thick of ops and with just my buddy in the face of two of the enemy. I remember my buddy admonishing me for single shot than a burst of fire, which he did of course and we won that round. In combat not just the span but the leadership shifts too, down the chain. All communication fails at the crucial moment except the basic animal instinct ingrained since ages. Hence training to control is less important than training to survive and let the enemy die. Technology may reduce the physical distance but it often fails at the wrong moment. I for one can vouch for it. My advice is to look beyond the span argument and let the sleeping dogs lie.