Insurgency Articles in the New Parameters

[SteveMetz]

By denizens of SWJ:

New Challenges and Old
Concepts: Understanding
21st Century Insurgency (http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/07winter/metz.pdf)

STEVEN METZ

From the 1960s to the 1980s stopping Communist-backed insurgents was an important part of American strategy, so counterinsurgency was an important mission for the US military, particularly the Army. Even when most of the Army turned its attention to large-scale warfighting and the operational art following Vietnam, special operation forces preserved some degree of capability. In the 1980s American involvement in El Salvador and a spate of insurgencies around the world linked to the Soviets and Chinese sparked renewed interest in counterinsurgency operations (as a component of low-intensity conflict). By 1990 what could be called the El Salvador model of counterinsurgency, based on a limited US military footprint in conjunction with the strengthening of local security forces, became codified in strategy and doctrine.

Interest then faded. Policymakers, military leaders, and defense experts assumed that insurgency was a relic of the Cold War, posing little challenge in the “new world order.” With the demise of the Soviet Union and the mellowing of China, insurgency—even though it persisted in the far corners of the world—was not viewed as a strategic challenge to the world’s sole superpower. With American involvement in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Haiti, multinational peacekeeping—a previously unimportant role for the military—moved to the fore. In a burst of energy, the military revamped its peacekeeping doctrine and concepts. Professional military education and training shifted to accommodate these missions. Wargames, conferences, and seminars proliferated. Counterinsurgency was forgotten by all but a tiny handful of scholars.

Then, one clear September morning, the world turned. Al Qaeda and its affiliates adopted a strategy relying heavily on the methods of insurgency— both national insurgency and a transnational one. Insurgency was again viewed as a strategic threat and the fear grew that insurgent success would create regimes willing to support and protect organizations like al Qaeda. The global campaign against violent Islamic extremists forced the United States military to undertake counterinsurgency missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Once again, the Department of Defense was required to respond to a major strategic shift. The military services scrambled to develop new concepts and doctrine. Counterinsurgency reentered the curriculum of the professional military educational system in a big way. It became a centerpiece for Army and Marine Corps training. Classic assessments of the conflicts in Vietnam and Algeria became required reading for military leaders. Like the mythical phoenix, counterinsurgency had emerged from the ashes of its earlier death to become not just a concern of the US military but the central focus...

-------------------------------------------------------

US COIN Doctrine and
Practice: An Ally’s Perspective (http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/07winter/alderson.pdf)

ALEXANDER ALDERSON

Until very recently, the four and a half years of military operations in Iraq appeared to have created an obstacle in people’s minds. Rightly or wrongly, reality has subsumed theory, and because of the media coverage Iraq has received, counterinsurgency is now seen as nothing but an indescribably bloody, draining, protracted, and arduous business which makes tremendous demands on popular support, political resolve, and the resources required to sustain the fight. History shows this has always been the case, but perhaps the initial incidences of rapid, decisive, conventional operations misled the public. The fact remains: The cost of counterinsurgency is high. It always has been, depressingly so, and it is largely unrefundable. There is now more than a glimmer of hope, a detectable, increasingly palpable feeling that something may be changing, that there is now what can be best described as “a reasonable degree of tactical momentum on the ground.”

Leadership, more troops, focused training during preparation for deployment, and the application of hard-learned lessons from four and a half years at war are playing their part. A new factor is present, one that is fundamental to overcoming many of the initial obstacles and a factor that was absent when the insurgencies started to emerge from the shadows to so bedevil the stabilization efforts in Iraq. That factor is doctrine, and the publication of US Army Field Manual 3-24 and US Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 provides American participants with a counterinsurgency doctrine applicable, as the authors intended, to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and for similar operations well into the second decade of this century.

The development of FM 3-24 is notable for at least two reasons.2 First, the writing team canvassed and included a far wider range of opinion and expertise than is normally the case in developing such documents, giving the doctrine a wider applicability than simply how to win in Iraq. Second, and arguably of greater importance, the speed with which both the doctrine was produced, incorporating that wider view, and at the same time the entire education and training systems were revamped was unprecedented. The project underlines the fact that there is much more to the development and implementation of doctrine than the publication of a pamphlet. Outcomes depend on the approach that the doctrine describes being taught, understood, and executed. To be effective, doctrine must be assimilated, absorbed into the military culture, and then sensibly applied to the prevailing conditions...

[J Wolfsberger]

... whetted my appetite for you book.

I agree with you completely on the need for re-engineering countries. How do we do it without falling into the "nation building" trap so beloved of leftists, liberals and neo-cons? I happen to think the US model of representative government is ideal - for us. I don't see it as the best, "one size fits all" model for every place and people on Earth. But that is exactly how the ideologues will understand and implement re-engineering.

For example, we think in term of national representation delineated geographically. It that the best, most appropriate approach? Afghans or Iraqis could elect representatives based on tribal delineations, which would be a culturally organic evolution from their customs of meeting of tribal elders to resolve disputes. Is that the kind of solution our politicians would accept, or even understand?

On the other hand, there is a strong movement that would view re-engineering as an opportunity to keep a region locked in a primitive state of development - for example the Amazon Basin. A large part of the environmental movement views this as ideal, and doesn't care about the mortality rate from malaria.

I think a discussion of just what re-engineering means, what its goals are, and how it's implemented would be valuable.

[SteveMetz]

... whetted my appetite for you book.

I agree with you completely on the need for re-engineering countries. How do we do it without falling into the "nation building" trap so beloved of leftists, liberals and neo-cons? I happen to think the US model of representative government is ideal - for us. I don't see it as the best, "one size fits all" model for every place and people on Earth. But that is exactly how the ideologues will understand and implement re-engineering.

For example, we think in term of national representation delineated geographically. It that the best, most appropriate approach? Afghans or Iraqis could elect representatives based on tribal delineations, which would be a culturally organic evolution from their customs of meeting of tribal elders to resolve disputes. Is that the kind of solution our politicians would accept, or even understand?

On the other hand, there is a strong movement that would view re-engineering as an opportunity to keep a region locked in a primitive state of development - for example the Amazon Basin. A large part of the environmental movement views this as ideal, and doesn't care about the mortality rate from malaria.

I think a discussion of just what re-engineering means, what its goals are, and how it's implemented would be valuable.

Good points. It the very broad sense, there are three options 1) don't attempt to re-engineer foreign nations--just contain, cauterize, and provide humanitarian relief; 2) attempt to re-engineer them according to what *we* think a state should look like (democracy, transparency, national state with a monopoly over organized violence and the provision of security, market economy, etc.); and 3) re-engineer them into something else, perhaps a system where the economy and security system are distributed and locally focused.

[Gian P Gentile]

....Counterinsurgency reentered the curriculum of the professional military educational system in a big way. It became a centerpiece for Army and Marine Corps training. Classic assessments of the conflicts in Vietnam and Algeria became required reading for military leaders. Like the mythical phoenix, counterinsurgency had emerged from the ashes of its earlier death to become not just a concern of the US military but the central focus...

Steve:

Well put and it does highlight the fact that the American Army has become a counterinsurgency-only force; and to our strategic detriment. The dustbin of history is littered with fools who have said that "this kind or that kind of war" will never be fought again. The Irony of current Counterinsurgency thinking is that it is premised on the notion that it is prescient, forward looking, and creative when in fact it has become dogmatically grounded in the past and locked into an operationally dogmatic straightjacket. In my mind your above statement reinforces this notion.

gian

[Eden]

Steve:

The Irony of current Counterinsurgency thinking is that it is premised on the notion that it is prescient, forward looking, and creative when in fact it has become dogmatically grounded in the past and locked into an operationally dogmatic straightjacket.


Absolutely correct. I am convinced that those who think about counterinsurgency need to take an oriental (as opposed to occidental) approach to their philosophizing. Each insurgency is unique, immured in its environment, and an organic outgrowth of history, personalities, and circumstance. This severely limits the utility of 'doctrine' in the sense of being able to reduce COIN to a set of universally applicable principles, which is what our manual writers are striving so manfully to do. At best, I think we can develop generally useful tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Without going all mystical, the eastern approach to understanding through analogy and metaphor, rather than reductive analysis, seems to me the more productive way to think about counterinsurgency. But I find it hard to believe that TRADOC will take me up on that. Its no accident that there is no Clausewitz - hell, there's no Jomini - of counterinsurgency.

[marct]

I agree with you completely on the need for re-engineering countries. How do we do it without falling into the "nation building" trap so beloved of leftists, liberals and neo-cons? I happen to think the US model of representative government is ideal - for us. I don't see it as the best, "one size fits all" model for every place and people on Earth. But that is exactly how the ideologues will understand and implement re-engineering.


Good points. It the very broad sense, there are three options 1) don't attempt to re-engineer foreign nations--just contain, cauterize, and provide humanitarian relief; 2) attempt to re-engineer them according to what *we* think a state should look like (democracy, transparency, national state with a monopoly over organized violence and the provision of security, market economy, etc.); and 3) re-engineer them into something else, perhaps a system where the economy and security system are distributed and locally focused.

It's an area I've been thinking a lot about, recently, and there is another option to the three you listed, Steve, but it is both tricky and unlikely to sell politically. Basically, the idea is the work with a "state" (loosely construed) to achieve certain minimum outcomes that are not based on phenotypic institutions (i.e. forms of government). Analogically, this is closer to a biological manipulation than a mechanical one - and it would have to be done over a fairly longish time period (10-20 years).


For example, we think in term of national representation delineated geographically. It that the best, most appropriate approach? Afghans or Iraqis could elect representatives based on tribal delineations, which would be a culturally organic evolution from their customs of meeting of tribal elders to resolve disputes. Is that the kind of solution our politicians would accept, or even understand?

They probably wouldn't accept or understand it :wry:. Still and all, it's one possible example. Another one would be to variably do away with individual voting and place the "franchise" in the hands of social organizations, be they tribes, professional associations, cities, etc. and let each social organization decide on how their representatives are chosen. If that is couple with a "right of departure" of individuals from that social organization, then it should work in todays climate.


On the other hand, there is a strong movement that would view re-engineering as an opportunity to keep a region locked in a primitive state of development - for example the Amazon Basin. A large part of the environmental movement views this as ideal, and doesn't care about the mortality rate from malaria.

Yup, and there are many other examples as well. I think the real trick to re-engineering is to realize that everyone is engaged in it anyway, whether they realize it or not. In many ways, there is little or no difference between re-engineering a state and re-engineering a corporation or any other social organization. The base requirements are the same, at least in terms of process requirements (sorry, I'm writing a paper on his right now and it is on my brain).


I think a discussion of just what re-engineering means, what its goals are, and how it's implemented would be valuable.

We could certainly start one.

Marc

[J Wolfsberger]

Well put and it does highlight the fact that the American Army has become a counterinsurgency-only force; and to our strategic detriment.

We tend to focus on the current or last war in a crisis mode sort of behavior. A behavior, I would add, not unique to the military or the US.

We do seem to be emphasizing COIN a lot. But I'm not sure we've gone all the way to a contingency only force. We are still developing the Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (HBCT) we'd need in a conventional, force on force war. The BCT structure can support either, if the focus remains on operational combined arms, operational agility, operational tempo, etc.

What seems to be missing is a discussion of what the full spectrum of combat missions is, and what means it takes to address all of them. The detrimental impact on our strategy is in our current impaired ability to fight multiple large scale wars of different types. For example, I think we'd be hard pressed to engage in a conventional war at present.

Steve's article identified three types of insurgency. Each calls for a different mission executed with different means:

- "A functioning and responsible government with some degree of legitimacy in a nation with significant US national interests or traditional ties can be rescued by foreign internal defense (El Salvador model)." The mission is stability and support, executed with Special Forces, USAID, Peace Corps, NGOs, etc. This seems to be our approach today in the Philippines, Mali, etc.

- "There is no functioning or legitimate government but there is a broad international and regional consensus favoring the creation of a neo-trusteeship until systemic reengineering is complete. In such instances, the United States should provide military, economic, and political support as part of a multinational force operating under the auspices of the United Nations." The mission is COIN and stability and support, executed as above with added conventional infantry. Much as we're attempting today in Afghanistan.

- "There is no functioning and legitimate government and no international or regional consensus for the formation of a neo-trusteeship. In such cases, the United States should pursue containment of the conflict through the support of regional states and, in cooperation with friendly states and allies, creating humanitarian “safe zones” within the region of the conflict." The mission is "conquest," in the sense of establishing and maintaining a monopoly on the use of force. The means are conventional forces, civil affairs, etc., at least initially. (I disagree with Steve on this. Establishing a cordon sanitaire would most likely create a breeding place for perpetual and perhaps greater future problems.) An example of where this should have been done is Somalia in the 1990s.

[J Wolfsberger]

We could certainly start one.


If we do, you should lead it.

To be useful, it has to be stripped of ideological cant. It can't be hijacked to justify anybody's utopian ideal. To accomplish that goal, I think we'd have to go back to the Stoic idea of natural law and identify a common set of social laws. Those could be used to define a set of social constructs that could implement them in any state, modified to reflect the local customs and traditions that would guarantee the institutions would last.

For example, I'd propose that any country needs to be organized under rule of law. I'd define that as (something along the lines of) a mechanism that allows for the delegation of resolution of disputes to disinterested third party, with the outcome dependent solely on application of previously agreed rules. How this is achieved depends on local custom. (Much as our concept of trial by jury is descended from Anglo-Saxon moots.)

The need is to identify that common set of natural laws, which should be a product of anthropology.

[J Wolfsberger]

In many ways, there is little or no difference between re-engineering a state and re-engineering a corporation or any other social organization.

I recall one of my B-School professors pointing out that corporations don't get serious about reengineering until they face a near death experience. Until then, it's all buzzword. The same, unfortunately (and in line with Steve's business model approach) is true of nations.

[SteveMetz]

I recall one of my B-School professors pointing out that corporations don't get serious about reengineering until they face a near death experience. Until then, it's all buzzword. The same, unfortunately (and in line with Steve's business model approach) is true of nations.

That was one of the points I was playing with. The conundrum for the United States is that whatever state we are supporting in counterinsurgency won't undertake serious reform unless they have a "near death" experience which means they have to believe we will abandon them. But to sell Congress and the American people on involvement in counterinsurgency, the President has to make a case that supporting the partner state is a vital national interest.

That's the rub--if supporting them is a vital national interest, we're unlikely to abandon them. But if they don't believe we will abandon them, they won't undertake the really deep changes need to ameliorate the source of conflict. As I pointed out in the stuff I've written on this, we're asking the elites in partner states to, in effect, commit political and economic suicide since however bad their system is, it's been good to them personally. The people with the power to change their system don't have the motivation, and the people with the motivation don't have the power.

Personally, I think we disregard these problems because they lead us to the conclusion that we're unlikely to be successful in counterinsurgency, and we don't want to believe that.

[Rank amateur]

That's the rub--if supporting them is a vital national interest, we're unlikely to abandon them. But if they don't believe we will abandon them, they won't undertake the really deep changes need to ameliorate the source of conflict.

I was thinking just the other day that our objective in Iraq seems to be to leave, without ever leaving.

I think we need a little Regan logic. Government isn't the solution, it's the problem. Don't build green zones, help people: Kosovo Liberation Army, certain tribes etc. Others know a lot more about it than me, but I believe that is the thinking in foreign aid; it makes more sense to lend someone $50 to start their dream business than to build damns, roads, power plants etc.

Put more simply, we should partner with people already committed to ameliorating the source of the conflict, instead of trying to force reconciliation on diverse parties.

[Ken White]

...
Put more simply, we should partner with people already committed to ameliorating the source of the conflict, instead of trying to force reconciliation on diverse parties.

Basic problem is those kinds of folks are hard to find and rarely seem to be available in trouble spots. If they aren't trouble spots, we seldom get too heavily involved because Congress historically refuses to fund foreign affairs adequately...

That and our four and eight year political cycle.

[Rank amateur]

Basic problem is those kinds of folks are hard to find and rarely seem to be available in trouble spots. If they aren't trouble spots, we seldom get too heavily involved because Congress historically refuses to fund foreign affairs adequately...

That and our four and eight year political cycle.

I don't know. If there's ethnic cleansing, the people being cleansed will be happy to partner with us to stop it. The Shia would've been happy to help us get rid of Saddam, but we didn't want the Shiites to replace Saddam. It seems to me that we can't admit that if we can't find allies, we're probably wrong.

Instead of asking how can our government can create a country that no one wants, we should be asking why is our government trying to create countries that no one wants?

[Ken White]

I don't know. If there's ethnic cleansing, the people being cleansed will be happy to partner with us to stop it. The Shia would've been happy to help us get rid of Saddam, but we didn't want the Shiites to replace Saddam....

Since the orginal plan was apparently to install a Shia government and that got replaced in fact by an appointed Interim government with a Shia Prime Minister which government in turn was replaced by an elected government with a Shia prime minister (both with Shia majorities in Parliament), I'm unsure why you say that.


... It seems to me that we can't admit that if we can't find allies, we're probably wrong.

We, the US, are rarely going to find 'allies' in the sense I think you mean. We're the big guys that everyone loves to hate; been that way since 1945 blatantly and less overtly since 1787. Certainly not going to find many in any nation that is a racial, ethnic, religious or cultural opposite. Combine any two of those and the probability decreases. What you say is tantamount to saying that if you're stopped on the freeway by a major accident and you can't find anyone in the damaged car to help, you should not offer aid...

OTOH, if you mean allies in the practical sense, we generally do, though we sort of have to bribe them to help -- as we did in Korea, in Viet Nam and oh, yeah -- in WW II. We are not very popular. Haven't been for years; you think it's bad now -- you should've wandered around overseas at the height of Viet Nam -- then we were really unpopular.


Instead of asking how can our government can create a country that no one wants, we should be asking why is our government trying to create countries that no one wants?

I think you are asking the latter question. Those asking the former question are dealing with reality -- and the answer is because that's where we are now.

I also think you're quite wrong on a country no one wants. I believe most Iraqis do want an Iraq; the Saudis would definitely like an Iraq. There are some caveats to that but the basic borders of that country were determined by the Brits almost a century ago, so you should probably talk to them to determine why the country exists.

What countries (plural) our government is trying to create?

If your response to all that is had we not gone to Iraq, this or that wouldn't have happened. True. However we did go there -- and we went not expecting what has happened to happen (that from a combination of poor intelligence, poor planning and several other circumstances that were essentially beyond our control).

War will do that -- throw you for a loop you didn't expect, that is. Ideally there would be no more war. Not likely to happen. This one (Iraq, specifically) we seem to be the instigator but we were not. We emphatically were the agressor going into Iraq --but the Instigation to get there started in 1972 against the west and in 1979 specifically directed at us.

Were there other ways to respond to the instigation and provocations? Yep. Would they have achieved the likely end result of the route chosen? Probably not. Would they have achieved a level of success as quickly. Almost certainly not.

Americans are so impatient...

[Rank amateur]

Since the original plan was apparently to install a Shia government and that got replaced in fact by an appointed Interim government with a Shia Prime Minister which government in turn was replaced by an elected government with a Shia prime minister (both with Shia majorities in Parliament), I'm unsure why you say that.

The original plan of withdrawing after 90 days wasn't implemented, but it was "OK" in my opinion because it was Reganesque: don't let the US government solve the problem.

Also "OK" would've been cooperating with the Shia to create a government with no Sunnis and no Kurds. I have no objective proof of this, but believe that the Shia would've rallied around a Shia dominated non democracy. We would've faced a Sunni insurgency, but we faced one anyway, without Shia assistance. (Instead of asking, "Who can help us get rid of Saddam Hussien and what kind of regime do they want to create instead" we asked, "What do we want to replace Saddam with?")


We, the US, are rarely going to find 'allies' in the sense I think you mean.

We didn't win WWII, the Allies did. We didn't even have the most causalities on the Allied side. We were "Johnie come latelies" in WWI as well. I believe that when you served in Korea you were officially under UN command. We had broad support in Kosovo.

Officially, there's a "coalition of the willing" in Iraq, but realistically it's nowhere near as strong or committed as the first Gulf War. In Vietnam, we were pretty much on our own.

I haven't seen it proven statistically, but I believe that the math would hold; the more allies we have, the more likely we are to win decisively.


We're the big guys that everyone loves to hate. This is the source of our disagreement. No doubt we're big, but I don't think we're hated per se. I think we're generally seen as a good guy, who usually does the right thing, and who smacks people who need it, but who occasionally over reacts. Therefore, people are nervous and particularly nervous when we get worked up over religion.

To finish the analogy, we got unnecessarily worked up over Vietnam and Iraq. The way to tell whether we are beating on people who need it, or overreacting, is to see if Canada, France, Germany etc. are cheering us or booing. It's in our best interest to do so, because the only way to fight against "the big guy" is asymmetrically, asymmetric battles are very expensive for us and people who feel like they are being unfairly picked on don't give up easily, if ever.

Like I said, we just can't get certain people - like the last Sec Def - to admit that if Germany, France and Canada all think we're overreacting, there's isn't going to be anyone greeting us as liberators or throwing flowers at our feet.



I also think you're quite wrong on a country no one wants.

I meant the type of country no one wants. Multiethnic compromise seems to be as popular in Iraq as gay marriage is here. Bad things happen when the US government tries to force either on the population. In my opinion, letting the Iraqis figure out what kind of country, politics, laws and values they want would be Reganesque, more effective, more stable in the long run and much cheaper for us.



What countries (plural) our government is trying to create?

Again, I meant type of country. We're trying to create a multiethnic democracy. We should've either picked a side - a shia or Sunni dominated country, and worked with the people who wanted to create that - or stuck to the original plan and left after 90 days: both would've been Reganesque.

For the record, I do think we're getting better. Letting Sunni tribes basically do whatever they want as long as they are anti AQI and don't attack us is Reganesque. They'll work on their own problems. They will probably stumble on the way, and might even start a Civil War, but in the long run they'll emerge with something much stronger and more stable than any government bureaucrat could've created.



Americans are so impatient... Because we know that free market solutions are better and faster. Does anyone want to wait longer for worse results?

[Ken White]

The original plan of withdrawing after 90 days wasn't implemented, but it was "OK" in my opinion because it was Reganesque: don't let the US government solve the problem.Mine too. We'll find out some day what caused the change. May be when I'm dead and gone given 30 years to declassify. Shoot me an e-mail down there and lemme know how it turns out... :D
... (Instead of asking, "Who can help us get rid of Saddam Hussien and what kind of regime do they want to create instead" we asked, "What do we want to replace Saddam with?")Failure to ask the right questions, the old human bugabear...

We didn't win WWII, the Allies did. We didn't even have the most causalities on the Allied side. We were "Johnie come latelies" in WWI as well. I believe that when you served in Korea you were officially under UN command. We had broad support in Kosovo.Well, yeah on WW II -- and who supplied how much to get said 'Allies' to continue to fight (British empire and the USSR) or fight with us and not against us (France). Not a bribe, you say? Ok-a-a-ay-y-y...

Yep, in Korea, I fit under the UN. Heh, heh. So did Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philipines, Thailand and Turkey. Who paid the transportation and other costs to include aid in kind...

We didn't have broad support in Kosovo -- we were drug, reluctantly, to the party because the EU whined and pleaded for "US leadership." I believe if you check, there was some cost sharing involved in that 'leadership' as well...


Officially, there's a "coalition of the willing" in Iraq, but realistically it's nowhere near as strong or committed as the first Gulf War. In Vietnam, we were pretty much on our own.

Who's paying the freight for much of the current coalition -- same guy who payed a lot of it for the earlier bunch in the same AO? In Viet Nam there were several Korean divisions, an Australian (with New Zealanders) Brigade, a Thai Brigade and a Philipine BCT. Only the Strynes paid their own way.


I haven't seen it proven statistically, but I believe that the math would hold; the more allies we have, the more likely we are to win decisively. Math can prove zero has a value and that four has none. Bottom line is it depends on the situation.


This is the source of our disagreement. No doubt we're big, but I don't think we're hated per se. I think we're generally seen as a good guy, who usually does the right thing, and who smacks people who need it, but who occasionally over reacts. Therefore, people are nervous and particularly nervous when we get worked up over religion.We are not hated by many; we do indeed make a lot of people very nervous but that doesn't necessarily mean dislike; we are widely envied (the source of much dislike); we are arrogant, big, loud, somewhat xenophobic and brash (the source of more dislike). We also, due to our power, tend to act unilaterally too often and on too many matter (a source of more dislike) and thus upset applecarts (yet more...).
To finish the analogy, we got unnecessarily worked up over Vietnam and Iraq. The way to tell whether we are beating on people who need it, or overreacting, is to see if Canada, France, Germany etc. are cheering us or booing... Sorry, got to vehemently disagree with that. All of those nations have particular hangups with us and do not particularly wish us well. They realize we're essentially well meaning but past slights, our size, our culture -- all are anathema to them. They will be polite -- as will the Brits -- but they are far, far from fond of us and do not mind at all if we trip a bit.

As for unnecessarily worked up; depends on what you mean. We misread Viet Nam and thus, in a way got worked up. On Iraq, I'd say there was no '"worked up" to it -- it was a very cold and calculated decision to take a calculated risk in an effort to shorten some adverse trends.
..It's in our best interest to do so, because the only way to fight against "the big guy" is asymmetrically, asymmetric battles are very expensive for us and people who feel like they are being unfairly picked on don't give up easily, if ever. While that statement is generally true, the last clause very much so, that doesn't connect with the first part of the paragraph re: the other nations...
Like I said, we just can't get certain people - like the last Sec Def - to admit that if Germany, France and Canada all think we're overreacting, there's isn't going to be anyone greeting us as liberators or throwing flowers at our feet.Not likely to occur in most cases with or without their support or even agreement. In any event, that can be A determinant on whether we take a given action; it cannot be THE determinant.
I meant the type of country no one wants. Multiethnic compromise seems to be as popular in Iraq as gay marriage is here. Bad things happen when the US government tries to force either on the population. In my opinion, letting the Iraqis figure out what kind of country, politics, laws and values they want would be Reganesque, more effective, more stable in the long run and much cheaper for us. They got along reasonably well before and eventually will again. The schism was used as a lever by several parties in and outside the country to discombobulate us. What you say is desirable is essentially what is now happening.

For the record, I do think we're getting better. Letting Sunni tribes basically do whatever they want as long as they are anti AQI and don't attack us is Reganesque. They'll work on their own problems. They will probably stumble on the way, and might even start a Civil War, but in the long run they'll emerge with something much stronger and more stable than any government bureaucrat could've created.Agreed.
Because we know that free market solutions are better and faster. Does anyone want to wait longer for worse results?Also agreed.

[Rank amateur]

I got you to agree with everything except the most important part;). Not bad.


I've noticed that happens when folks come down South from up North. People in the South can be so doggone oversensitive to the slightest hint of anything even bordering patronization and suffer from their dogged determination to get even... :D

How about this? When we act like unilateral northerners, the war is likely to be asymmetric, nasty, long and costly.

[Ken White]

I got you to agree with everything except the most important part;). Not bad.
important part wrong... :D
How about this? When we act like unilateral northerners, the war is likely to be asymmetric, nasty, long and costly.
True -- but for whom... ;)

[marct]

Quote:
We didn't win WWII, the Allies did. We didn't even have the most causalities on the Allied side. We were "Johnie come latelies" in WWI as well. I believe that when you served in Korea you were officially under UN command. We had broad support in Kosovo.
Well, yeah on WW II -- and who supplied how much to get said 'Allies' to continue to fight (British empire and the USSR) or fight with us and not against us (France). Not a bribe, you say? Ok-a-a-ay-y-y...

I've got to disagree with the "Johnie come latelies" - not true, RA. "Doughboys" is the correct term 'cause, as my grandmother used to say, "they were needed in 1914 but didn't rise 'till 1917" :cool:.

On WW II, things are trickier. Certainly the lend-lease program kept the Empire and USSR fighting. France was already out of the fight by the time you folks decided to come and play - especially the French navy which had been either eliminated or grabbed by the Brits in 1940. Didn't see many US fighter pilots in the UK in the summer of 1940, either ;).

On the other hand, the US Navy was looking at fighting the Japanese as early as 1927, if not earlier. And, if I was being totally cynical about it, I would point out that it was in the US's national interest to see the British Empire smashed in the Far East since it opened the way for US control over shipping in the area and control over Far Eastern sources of crude oil and rubber.

OTOH, Ken, I do agree with you about Korea and Kosovo :D.

Marc

[Ken White]

I've got to disagree with the "Johnie come latelies" - not true, RA. "Doughboys" is the correct term 'cause, as my grandmother used to say, "they were needed in 1914 but didn't rise 'till 1917" :cool:.

Considering that WW I was not in our national interest and that the awkward conduct (polite term) of operations in Europe from 1914 until 1918, it is possible that it was really nice of us to come to the party at all...
On WW II, things are trickier. Certainly the lend-lease program kept the Empire and USSR fighting. France was already out of the fight by the time you folks decided to come and play - especially the French navy which had been either eliminated or grabbed by the Brits in 1940. Didn't see many US fighter pilots in the UK in the summer of 1940, either.Yes, out of it. Thus Operation Torch and the Brits in Syria -- which was not a cake walk...

Nor were many Empire pilots at Midway in 1943. I think it was something about the geography -- and the desire of the respective populations and governments. The UK government took the entire British Empire to war in 1939. FDR wanted to take the US to war in 1940 but public opinion wouldn't buy it. Interesting comment on 'democracy' and government power...
On the other hand, the US Navy was looking at fighting the Japanese as early as 1927, if not earlier. And, if I was being totally cynical about it, I would point out that it was in the US's national interest to see the British Empire smashed in the Far East since it opened the way for US control over shipping in the area and control over Far Eastern sources of crude oil and rubber.You aren't being cynical, just accurate. FDR wanted to run Britain and France out of the Colonial business and he proceeded to make that happen (interesting to speculate had he not died what would have happened in the Far East, it's known that he planned to occupy NW Germany...). Not cricket but as someone said "... have no friends, only interests." or words to that effect. :D


OTOH, Ken, I do agree with you about Korea and Kosovo :D.

Marc

Thank you -- and I agree with you about WW I and WW II. We just have a different perspective. ;)