The Roles and Weapons with the Squad [Archive] - Page 3

Fuchs

01-20-2010, 09:24 AM

This is opinion unsupported by data. The limitation of hitting targets over 200m under operational conditions is entirely human. It's nothing to do with equipment or doctrine. Yes, a magnifying optic sight and a bipod makes hits on the range more likely at longer ranges, but it will make no difference to combat behaviour.

Actually, there is a hardware fix to the problem; periscoped weapons that permit firing from behind cover (minimized influence of fear).

Again, opinion. No evidence and not true. "Ineffective" compared to what?" SS-109 5.56mm punch CRISAT at well over 300m dependant on barrel length! That will kill anyone hit in the head or chest, most of the time.

The penetration of 1.6 mm titanium alloy followed by 20 layers kevlar tells "very little" about killing power.
The primary cavity caused by a 5.56NATO at long range is almost identical to the primary cavity caused by a small calibre pocket pistol at short range (unless bones are being shattered).
Unattended wounds of that type can be deadly, but treatment of such wounds is relatively simple unless heart or bones were hit. It's basically about stopping the (internal) bleeding (relatively simple due to the small wound) and good wound hygiene.

There is a vast amount of casualty data to support this.

Feel free to show it off.

5.56NATO has its limits and is clearly below optimum, just as 7.62NATO is below optimum for vehicle mounts and sniping and above optimum for general dismounted use.

I say let them experiment in an unimportant and low intensity war like Afghanistan. It's better than to stumble into a major war without recent experiences. We should be aware that the infantry's job profile will differ a lot between both types of war.

William F. Owen

01-20-2010, 09:42 AM

5.56NATO has its limits and is clearly below optimum, just as 7.62NATO is below optimum for vehicle mounts and sniping and above optimum for general dismounted use.
I would only dispute that we really do not know what optimum is.
Having said that, I believe the basic need is for the individual weapon, sights and round most likely to produce consistent hits on an A3 sized target at 100m from the standing position, and the same prone supported at 300m.

Hits merely have to have sufficient energy perforate CRISAT 100% of the time.

William F. Owen

01-20-2010, 09:57 AM

The penetration of 1.6 mm titanium alloy followed by 20 layers kevlar tells "very little" about killing power.
Not true. What is "killing power?" What it clearly demonstrates is for comparative purposes (hence the name CRISAT) is the ability to perforate cover and thus the ability to perforate any biological medium. That is relevant.
Infantry rounds need to be better at punching cover than they do fragmenting in the body.

The primary cavity caused by a 5.56NATO at long range is almost identical to the primary cavity caused by a small calibre pocket pistol at short range (unless bones are being shattered).
Bullets kill in the same way arrows and knives do. Are we disputing the severity of a wound cause by 5.5mm Ice-pick strike perforating the head or chest cavity? Most people would die from such an injury.[/QUOTE]

There is a vast amount of casualty data to support this.

Feel free to show it off.
I do not have it to hand, but most armies record it, and it's mostly open source. What the WW2 data generally proves is that it is where you are hit and not by what that makes the difference.

Percentage deaths versus wounds from SAA seems to stay remarkably consistent, regardless of the round concerned. - which is why the Light Weapons Technology folks always want to ignore it!

Fuchs

01-20-2010, 10:46 AM

William F. Owen

01-20-2010, 12:18 PM

Statistics such as this one?
http://history.amedd.army.mil/booksdocs/korea/reister/ch3.html
Sorry, it doesn't seem to back you up that much. Chest (thorax) wounds were very survivable. The KIA percentage is of course higher than for extremities, but very, very far from "Most people would die from such an injury.".
Exactly. I actually have the paper version of this, so thanks. As you will note the highest percentage of fatal wounds occur in the head and thorax. EG: If you get hit there, you are most likely to die. I see no data there to indicate anything contrary to the assertion that hits, by high velocity small arms projectiles, to the head and thorax are usually fatal. Additionally we also multiple hits are disproportionately fatal compared to single hits.

Your overemphasis on CRISAT is completely misplaced.
CRISAT was a hypothetical future Soviet body armour, made up during the Cold War by some analysts or whatever and it later rose to fame because its penetration became a PDW requirement.
Comparative Research Into Small Arms Technology. - OK, show me a better analogue with better data? It's what we can measure, and it has been shown to be consistent.

There's no CRISAT armour in use anywhere, nor does a penetration of CRISAT tell much about wound ballistics.
Show me the NATO Group working paper that says body armour was the model for CRISAT? The Soviet Body Armour myth was a post discussion rationalisation, as far as I can tell. Again, what do you suggest as a better engineering model?

Finally; yes, there is a huge difference between an ice pick / arrow /knife / 5.56NATO long range / old U.S. 7.62NATO long range hit and a hit by a modern 5.56 or 7.62 bullet designed for maximum wound ballistic effect.
Yes there is a huge difference, but bullets kill in exactly the same way as Knives, ice-picks and arrows. The difference is merely velocity and the issue of multiple wound channels.

The one wound is a clean primary cavity channel of less than 2 cm width and a small exit wound. First aid prevents death by loss of blood and a surgeon is almost guaranteed to save the life if he can treat the wound soon. Unless you can stop the internal bleeding and other causes of exsanguination, and nerve path damage, knives and arrows kill as surely as bullets

Oh, by the way; I know someone whose vest was penetrated three times and he survived three chest hits. The triple vest penetration meant little, while first aid and the surgeon team meant everything. As I said, I know someone hit by 30-06 in the chest and survived. That's not data. It's a story.

Hitting the right places is of great importance in wound ballistics, but the calibre, velocity and bullet design decide about the area of the "right places" for a hit.
So the difference to being hit in the exact same spot, in the chest by 6.8mm versus 5.56mm will have a noticeable and decisive effect on infantry operations? Really?

You may have studied external ballistics well enough, but your expression of opinion on wound ballistics appears to be superficial, Wilf. Especially the reference to CRISAT is a very bad idea. That's on the level of FNH or HK marketing efforts.

It may well be superficial because, based on data, it is amazingly unimportant. Additionally it is an area with particularly bad data, bad physics and poor engineering. So I actually went to Royal Army Medical Corps and asked the questions. - The answer was essentially - "any hit by any high velocity round to the head or chest is a nightmare. Hits are hits." - and there is no data that shows otherwise!

EG: Deaths from Small Arms fire rose from 32 and 33% in WW2 and Korea, to 51% in Vietnam. Does that mean 7.62mm x 39 and 5.56mm are more lethal than 7.92mm and .303?
Put simply, Infantry combat has seen no significant change despite using very different bullets!

An ice pick wound has really little relation to what the better bullet designs do. So explain how the causes of death differ between the two, as concerns its medical mechanism? If the wound channels are the same length and diameter through the same parts of the body, what is the actual difference?

Fuchs

01-20-2010, 01:09 PM

"Small arms (bullets) hits to the head resulted in the highest fatality rate (59.9 percent), with bullet hits to the neck (40.3 percent) second"

Note: 40.3 % is less than half, therefore not
"EG: If you get hit there, you are most likely to die."
at all!
It's obvious that death is more likely if hit in those vital parts, but the chance of survival once hit is still large.

"Comparative Research Into Small Arms Technology. - OK, show me a better analogue with better data? It's what we can measure, and it has been shown to be consistent."

CRISAT hardly earns to be mentioned together with "data" in one line.
As I mentioned, that CRISAT target is a made-up laboratory standard with no relation to real-world combat.

A better working model would include a loaded AK magazine vest followed by a flak vest and average weather clothes.
An alternative would be to use a NIJ level II (~ Schutzklasse 2) body armour instead of a thin flak vest. That's the standard for vests with plate inserts options today.

Yes there is a huge difference, but bullets kill in exactly the same way as Knives, ice-picks and arrows. The difference is merely velocity and the issue of multiple wound channels.

No, they don't. Especially not "exactly".
They cause a loss of blood and destroy tissue, that's it with commonality. Inform yourself about wound ballistics.

So the difference to being hit in the exact same spot, in the chest by 6.8mm versus 5.56mm will have a noticeable and decisive effect on infantry operations? Really?

As much as having a rifle with 10-30% jam probability of not. The difference is not overwhelming, but significant. A 5.56NATO near miss of the spine or heart would incapacitate immediately or in seconds with better bullets.

So explain how the causes of death differ between the two, as concerns its medical mechanism? If the wound channels are the same length and diameter through the same parts of the body, what is the actual difference?

The same as the difference between having 1 gram TNT exploding in your hand and 1kg.
One kills you because too much damage while the other damages such a little part of the body that survival is quite likely.

Again: An ice pick or arrow is a completely different league than a good rifle bullet in wound ballistics. Poor bullets and in general small calibre low velocity pistol bullets approximate the arrow/ice pick attack, though.

Ken White

01-20-2010, 02:44 PM

The real problem is that most infantrymen cannot hit targets under-stress and training has very clear absolute limits. You cannot train out the bodies physical reaction to fear,which is what degrades marksmanship at 100m by >90%. Regardless of operational conditions, 99% of the infantry cannot hit anything much over 200m, when using handheld IWs.I have read and heard that but I have difficulty accepting it based on observation (admittedly not scientific) and experience. Acknowledging that the figures are very much nation, service and even unit and to a slight extent equipment dependent (both the Koreans and the Viet Namese had trouble with the big M1 and the .30 cal cartridge and its recoil), I'm firmly convinced that one should cut the overall percentage of degradation to 50-67% and the percentage of those who can get hits at 200m or more to the same 50-67% in good units and no more than half that again for mediocre units perhaps rising to your figures for poor units.

I contend most of that loss is attributable to selection, training and, most importantly, to combat conditioning (which most western forces do not do in training because it is 'dangerous' and expensive. So is combat...). It is only somewhat equipement dependent
This is opinion unsupported by data. The limitation of hitting targets over 200m under operational conditions is entirely human. It's nothing to do with equipment or doctrine. Yes, a magnifying optic sight and a bipod makes hits on the range more likely at longer ranges, but it will make no difference to combat behaviour.I'm aware much 'data' supports your numbers -- I also suggest much of that 'data' was developed by various Armed Forces in support of their position on the topic -- and the proposed weapon purchase (and the costs thereof -- much was also predicated on NW Europe / WW II and flawed 'research' ala S.L.A. Marshall). Said data was also mostly developed on Ranges under controlled conditions...

I do totally agree that almost all the inability to hit at over 200m is due to human and not mechanical factors. I do not agree that doctrine is inapplicable, I believe it is very much a factor -- if your 'doctrine' says the typical combat range is 100-250m due to flawed research and compilation (2% at 500m, 11% 400m, 17% 300m, 21% 200m, 34% 100m, 15% <100m does not necessarily equal a mean of ~188m because of the variance in target presentation, weather and light conditions, terrain, etc. as well as individual shooter training, experience, mental outlook and general capability ) then your training will not attempt to teach people how to shoot properly IN COMBAT -- which requires conditioning by the application of stress, both physical and mental.
True, but only if it done badly by stupid people.Umm, I think that may be the problem... :D
If he means most soldier do not understand infantry weapons or their employment, I would strongly agree! However some simple testing can very simply rectify this. It's been done and been ignored.We can agree on that with a caveat or two. ;)

William F. Owen

01-20-2010, 02:48 PM

"Small arms (bullets) hits to the head resulted in the highest fatality rate (59.9 percent), with bullet hits to the neck (40.3 percent) second"
How many of those were direct hits by high velocity rounds? I do not see anyone seriously disputing the fact that if you are hit in the head, by an HV rifle bullet, you are most likely to die. - even with about 35% of the heads structure, not being essential to life - eyes, nose, jaw, ears etc.

CRISAT hardly earns to be mentioned together with "data" in one line.
As I mentioned, that CRISAT target is a made-up laboratory standard with no relation to real-world combat.
CRISAT was never meant to replicate anything to do with "real world combat!" It's an engineering analogue - for comparison! - and it did generate useful data. It's exactly the same as "Ballistic Gelatine" - which does not replicate how rounds perform in the human body. It's merely a engineering analogue/model/comparative medium!

They cause a loss of blood and destroy tissue, that's it with commonality.
They destroy tissue and/or organs, causing the loss of blood! - and interrupt/destroy nerve functioning - which causes organ failure.

Inform yourself about wound ballistics. Just me, or both of us?
A lot "wound ballistics" is a pseudo-science, populated with poor science and popular opinion.

The difference is not overwhelming, but significant. A 5.56NATO near miss of the spine or heart would incapacitate immediately or in seconds with better bullets.
So basically you are telling me that the percentage difference between possible relative incapacitation between identical hits from 5.56mm and let us say 6.8mm will have a significant operational effect?

Essentially this arguments suggests that equipping 10 men with a X.Ymm rifle (same weapon, same optics) will make them more operationally capable than the same 10 men with a 5.56mm rifle, based on the terminal effects of that round on the body?
Please correct me if I have not articulated the argument correctly.

Again: An ice pick or arrow is a completely different league than a good rifle bullet in wound ballistics. Poor bullets and in general small calibre low velocity pistol bullets approximate the arrow/ice pick attack, though.
OK, different league. Same mechanism. Tell me something bullets do that knives or arrows do not. Point being, all these theories about "Energy dump," and "Temporary cavities" is basically rubbish.

Now, before all the hoplophiles and gun-nuts get too excited, I am not doubting that you can have a better IW round than 5.56mm, but let me ask this. Do you want to put that budget into a new round, or into better training? Which do you think will pay-off better in the long run?

William F. Owen

01-20-2010, 03:02 PM

I do totally agree that almost all the inability to hit at over 200m is due to human and not mechanical factors. I do not agree that doctrine is inapplicable, I believe it is very much a factor -- if your 'doctrine' says the typical combat range is 100-250m due to flawed research and compilation (2% at 500m, 11% 400m, 17% 300m, 21% 200m, 34% 100m, 15% <100m does not necessarily equal a mean of ~188m because of the variance in target presentation, weather and light conditions, terrain, etc. as well as individual shooter training, experience, mental outlook and general capability ) then your training will not attempt to teach people how to shoot properly IN COMBAT -- which requires conditioning by the application of stress, both physical and mental.
I am also very wary of poor doctrine (what is taught). I think attributing a "typical range to combat" is probably a bad idea. However you have to have some place to start from - and very little time and effort is put towards discussing that start point.
My schtick is that folks need to get real about weapons and human performance.
Can we teach folks to shoot better in combat? We probably can. _ and I would rather put money into that than new rounds and weapons..... but human frailty is a considerable restraint on what you can actually get the 80% percentile infantry recruit to do.

Fuchs

01-20-2010, 04:20 PM

Wilf, no strawmanning, please.
I did not even mention temporary cavities or energy.

So you want to know what a bullet does that a knife, ice pick or arrow does not?
- bullets shatter bones
- bullets often change their course in soft tissue
- bullets create a primary cavity that's greatly expanded during its 180° turn (moving its heavier back to the fore) (certain bullet designs >~600m/s only)
- bullets expand in diameter (handgun bullets)
- bullets break up and leave several fragments in different parts of the body, at times even fragments that move with the blood stream into remote organs (typically Spitzer ball at >~700m/s)

The causes of death are the same - loss of blood, damage to central nervous system, inability of heart to keep pumping or wound infection.

The way how it's done is as different as air travel is to riding a bike.

Wound ballistics is an incomplete science under development, but that doesn't excuse to equate the effects of an arrow to the effect of a breaking Spitzer rifle bullet. The difference is obvious enough that it's not in need of any explaining theory.

About the relevance of (better) bullet effects:

- psychological: Seeing comrade get pierced, transported to hospital and coming back after weeks is definitively something different than when the hit prove deadly already during first aid. This is strongly related to the importance of medics to combat troops, and that one is well known. Medics cannot bolster morale much if they're perceived to be helpless against typical wounds.

- strategic relevance: Trickle back to units is smaller if wounds are more
lethal.

- operational relevance:
no obvious one except spillover effects by the strategic and tactical level

- tactical relevance (for the user of the better designed bullets):
slightly quicker incapacitation/neutralisation of enemies
slightly better suppression
slightly better morale
slightly less ammunition to be carried (or more firepower with given ammunition)
...it sums up

SethB

01-20-2010, 05:03 PM

Wilf, the L96 is a great weapon, but it uses specialty ammo to achieve a slightly longer range than a machinegun.

It weighs the same as a SAW. And it takes a lot more training to use correctly.

At the same time, it doesn't have much short range utility.

William F. Owen

01-21-2010, 05:58 AM

.
I did not even mention temporary cavities or energy.
No you did not, but modern wound ballistics theory is built around those two fallacies.

Wounds from sharp weapons can and do shatter bone. Apart from the secondary missiles effect, the same mechanisms apply to whit:

The causes of death are the same - loss of blood, damage to central nervous system, inability of heart to keep pumping or wound infection. - which was ALL I was saying!

Wound ballistics is an incomplete science under development, but that doesn't excuse to equate the effects of an arrow to the effect of a breaking Spitzer rifle bullet. The difference is obvious enough that it's not in need of any explaining theory.
Well we'll have to disagree. Modern Wound Ballistics is a pseudo-science that confuses well understood medical issues with mechanical modelling. How platoon weapons perform against hard cover is far more relevant and measurable.

About the relevance of (better) bullet effects:
- psychological:
- strategic relevance:
- operational relevance:
- tactical relevance :
slightly quicker incapacitation/neutralisation of enemies
slightly better suppression
slightly better morale
slightly less ammunition to be carried
In the last 100 years, no one has ever lost a war for using the wrong bullet.
Fact is, a sensible mix of 5.56mm and 7.62mm is good enough. There is no evidence that we need to change.

William F. Owen

01-21-2010, 06:03 AM

Wilf, the L96 is a great weapon, but it uses specialty ammo to achieve a slightly longer range than a machinegun.
So did the L42, -which I trained on before doing the conversion to the L96. All UK sniper weapons do. GPMG is employable out to the observed fall of shot,

It weighs the same as a SAW. And it takes a lot more training to use correctly. - and what does that tell you?

At the same time, it doesn't have much short range utility. - which is why it has always mattered how you group and move snipers! - that has nothing to do with kit the UK's historic/continuing inability to understand Platoon weapons requirements.

jcustis

01-21-2010, 06:46 AM

Firn

01-21-2010, 07:49 AM

The only thing I want out of a round different from M855 is something that offers a velocity that supports a flatter trajectory, penetrates cover so it can get to those vital hydraulic organs or the spine, and can better withstand wind effects. That's it. A round with a bigger cross section and yawing characteristics does me no good if I can't hit the target because it has terrible velocity, under penetrates, etc.

I'm far from an expert on this topic, but may have as a well read and experienced hunter some insight.

Increased velocity can cause both increased and decreased penetration of hard structures such as bone and light cover. The specific relationship is greatly influenced by the bullet design. "Softer" bullets tend to fragment with great effect at far lower velocity than "harder" bullets, but may not reach the vital animals due to heavy bones, light cover and body armor to cause that devastation, having too little united mass left. On the other hand the harder bullet may penetrate the soft parts of the body while not causing the devastation of a soft ones. The hunter has of course far more leeway when it comes to the selection of bullet designs.

All in all one can never be sure how precisely bullet and animal interact. That's why one should only take secure shots and have a tracking dog handy. Needless to say that this only goes for the hunter. Long story short, to some extent your requirements do conflict.

Firn

Tukhachevskii

04-26-2010, 04:59 PM

...looking at 5.56mm lethality in close quarters battle (http://wstiac.alionscience.com/pdf/WQV8N1_ART01.pdf) originally publiched in the Sept-Oct 2006 edition of Infantry Magazine.

The major problem occurs at the very beginning: What is effectiveness? As it turns out, that simple question requires a very complex
answer. For the Soldier in combat, effectiveness equals death:
the desire to have every round fired result in the death of the
opposing combatant, the so-called “one-shot drop.” However,
death – or lethality – is not always necessary to achieve a military
objective; an enemy combatant who is no longer willing or able
to perform a meaningful military task may be as good as dead
under most circumstances. Some equate effectiveness with “stopping
power,” a nebulous term that can mean anything from physically
knocking the target down to causing the target to immediately stop any threatening action. Others may measure effectiveness as foot-pounds of energy delivered to the target – by
calculating the mass and impact velocity of the round – without
considering what amount of energy is expended in the target or
what specific damage occurs to the target. In the end, “footpounds
of energy” is misleading, “stopping power” is a myth, and
the “oneshot drop” is a rare possibility dependent more on the statistics
of hit placement than weapon and ammunition selection.
Effectiveness ultimately equates to the potential of the weapons
system to eliminate its target as a militarily relevant threat.(p.3)

The projectile must have enough penetration to be able to reach vital organs to cause them damage. At the same time, it must not have so much
penetrating capability that it passes completely through the target
without significant damage – resulting in a so-called “throughand-
through.” Energy expended outside the target is useless (incidentally,
this is why “impact energy” is a poor measure of bullet
comparison, as it does not separate energy expended in damaging
the target from energy lost beyond the target). The ideal bullet
would have enough energy to penetrate through any intervening
barrier to reach vital organs without significantly slowing, then
dump all of its energy into damaging vital organs without exiting
the body. Unfortunately, design of such a bullet is nearly impossible
in a military round, even if all human bodies were uniform
enough to allow for such a thing. A round that reaches the vital
organs of a 5-foot 6-inch 140-pound target without over-penetration
is likely to react differently against a 6-foot 2-inch 220-
pounder, even without considering target posture. To complicate
matters, when hitting a prone firing target the bullet might have
to pass through a forearm, exit, enter the shoulder, then proceed
down the trunk before striking heart or spinal cord. A flanking
hit would engage the same target through or between the ribs to
strike the same vital regions. All these possibilities are encountered
with the same ammunition. Ultimately, bullet design is a
series of tradeoffs complicated by the need to survive launch,
arrive at the target accurately, possibly penetrate armor, glass, or
other barriers, and be producible in large quantities (1+ billion
per year) at costs the military can afford.(p.5)

Joint Services Wound Ballistics (JSWB) Integrated
Product Team (IPT) was eventually able to conclude that: (1)
there were no commercially available 5.56mm solutions that
provided a measurable increase in CQB performance over fielded
military ammunition, (2) the reports from the field could be
explained and supported with sound scientific evidence, and
(3) there are steps that can be taken to immediately impact
performance of small arms at close quarters ranges.(p.3)

kaur

04-27-2010, 05:32 AM

Review of Infantry Magazine 2006 Lethality Article

http://www.m4carbine.net/showthread.php?t=32989

Tukhachevskii

04-27-2010, 03:08 PM

William F. Owen

04-27-2010, 03:29 PM

Now we have rifles capable of true automatic fire (when necessary) why do we have what ammount to heavier versions when true SF GPMG should be organised at Coy level to mass their fires (and in pairs)? Comments and clarification would be much appreciated.
Does this help? (http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Alice_In_Warminster_RDS_Summer_09.pdf)
Yes I've posted this before, but I think it gets the major points you ask across.

GI Zhou

04-27-2010, 07:40 PM

I for one believe the need for suppressive fire means a belt-fed full calibre weapon at the squad level. Suppressive fire can only be provided by a proper machine gun. Unless a suppressive fire weapon can chew through bricks, concrete, wood etc it is a waste of space and weight. You shouldn't need to spray rounds on automatic, as heavy barrelled assault rifles are not heavy or robust to provide effective automatic fire. You should be only using 3-5 round bursts unless they are almsot on top of your position.

William F. Owen

04-28-2010, 04:13 AM

I for one believe the need for suppressive fire means a belt-fed full calibre weapon at the squad level.
Why belt fed? Why at the Squad level?

Suppressive fire can only be provided by a proper machine gun.
Not true. Suppression is created by any weapon the enemy believes can harm him.

Unless a suppressive fire weapon can chew through bricks, concrete, wood etc it is a waste of space and weight.
Chewing through bricks, concrete, and wood is destructive fire, not suppressive fire.

kaur

04-28-2010, 05:11 AM

Dr Storr's definition.

For the purposes of this article we shall use the following
definitions. ‘Suppression’ is the effect of small arms and other
weapons which prevents the enemy firing its weapons or
moving in the open whilst the fire is falling. ‘Neutralisation’
is the effect of weapons that prevents the enemy firing its
weapons or moving in the open for some time after the
fire stops. It is generally associated with indirect or area
fire. ‘Destruction’, in dismounted combat, means death or
incapacitation. For a piece of equipment, such as an armoured

http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/storr_RDS_feb2010.pdf

William F. Owen

04-28-2010, 05:47 AM

Dr Storr's definition.

http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/storr_RDS_feb2010.pdf
Thanks. I do not wholly agree with that definition. I have discussed it with him at some length.
See the bottom of the article
"The author is grateful to Dermot Rooney and William Owen for
their comments on a draft of this article."

Fuchs

04-28-2010, 10:42 AM

Not true. Suppression is created by any weapon the enemy believes can harm him.

This is incorrect. 'No-escape' weapons (usually) don't suppress. You'll only be suppressed if you have some cover that you believe is effective (extreme psychological reactions aside).

Let's use a model: You have a 1x1 m wall of armoured glass in front of you and an AT weapon. 30m to your right is a stone building.
An enemy tank approaches, his turret swings into your direction.
Three options:
(a) fire the AT weapon
(b) run for cover behind the house
(c) cower behind the clear wall (<- be suppressed)
I'm sure that (c) isn't the typical reaction.

- - -

You cannot suppress someone (who fires from behind a wall) with 25mm airburst projectiles, for example. You do rather motivate him to run (not bad either, but completely different).
The same applies to many air-launched munitions.

Firepower can even step beyond suppression into deterrence. German troops didn't march in daylight in the summer of '44 in France. All marches were night marches. The air attack firepower wasn't suppressing; it was deterring on a grand scale.

This 'beyond suppression' thing is relevant in regard to 20, 25 and 40 mm airburst munitions and in regard to weapons with good penetrating power against typical cover (sniper rifles, LAW).

Summary:
Suppression is created by any weapon the enemy believes can harm him
unless he stays behind cover.

Uboat509

04-28-2010, 11:16 AM

... could someone tell me why equipping all rifelmen with an IAR would be a bad idea? I remember reading the James Webb article for Marine Corps Gazette written referenced earlier and he suggested the same thing (as I recall). I understand weight is an issue but surely rifelment would be more than compensated by the capability it would bring in terms of suppressive fire (when needed) and also accuracy. I get flumoxed when I read that fireteams and sections/squads need/do not need SAW/LMG/IAR capabilities for the close fight only to then read that allied forces small arms are/are not capable of supporting the rifleman out to 500m (as per the article by Erhart; sp?). AFAIK the whole reason for equipping infantry sections/squads with rifles capable of automatic fire (Bren/BAR/MG3) was because the standard infantry rifles were bolt action. Now we have rifles capable of true automatic fire (when necessary) why do we have what ammount to heavier versions when true SF GPMG should be organised at Coy level to mass their fires (and in pairs)? Comments and clarification would be much appreciated.

For starters, fully automatic rifles are actually not all that common in the US Army (I don't know about the Marines). Most are issued rifles with a three round burst option instead. This is because, by and large, fully automatic rifle fire leads to a waste of ammo. The SAW and the various GPMGs (M60, M240B etc.) that are belt fed allow for more sustained automatic fire. Basic load for a the M4 is 210 rounds per man by doctrine. That, of course, gets modified based on METT-TC but 210 rounds will not last long in a weapon with a rate of fire, if memory serves, around 700 RPM (don't quote me on that number but I'm sure that it is close). Basic load for the belt fed weapons is, of course, much higher, which allows for more sustained fire. Additionally, most, if not all belt fed guns, have the removable barrels to allow hot barrels to be switched out. I don't know if the IAR has this but it is hardly practical for everyone to have spare barrels for their weapons.
In any case, automatic fire is really unnecessary for most rifle equipped soldiers in most situations anyway. Slow, steady aimed fire (I was always taught around 1 round every two seconds) is far more effective than bursts or fully automatic fire. As I have stated before, the only two drills that I have been taught to use fully automatic fire for in the last few years are near ambush and vehicle drills (where the vehicle is coming at me and I have no where or no time to get out of the way).

William F. Owen

04-28-2010, 12:36 PM

Suppression is created by any weapon the enemy believes can harm him
unless he stays behind cover
Not quite. Suppression is in its most general form, is actually the failure to act through fear of harm. - That is its most coherent meaning and its meaning in most well written doctrine.

Suppression can be as simple as shouting "stop or I shoot!"
UAVs/OPs can provide suppression, because many enemy associate detection with harm. - So likewise "hard targeting" as done on foot patrols also provides suppression.
Snipers and MGs apply suppression in the same general way, using specifically different means. Anything that prevents effective enemy action is applying suppression.

Tukhachevskii

04-28-2010, 02:56 PM

Does this help? (http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Alice_In_Warminster_RDS_Summer_09.pdf)
Yes I've posted this before, but I think it gets the major points you ask across.

Sir,

I think a lot of wht you've written, stirring up a hornet's nest as you go, has helped to carify a lot of the issues for many (including myself). I have read that article and a few others before. Personally I find you're suggestion, in another article, of the merits of issuing PDWs (such as the Magpul PDW) to riflemen to enable the section and platoon to carry more CSW very, well, er, suggestive:o. I read an article in the Marine Corps Gazette by a Cap. P. K. S. Sprincin (I think) entitled "Rethinking the Rifle Platoon" (link broken) which argued along similar lines (in "Rethinking the Rifle Company" he also has a reconnaisance platoon attached to each COY which if allied to a sniper team [+TI sights per team as well as FOOs] would be a potent combination with recce plt finding and fixing with long range fires, the two rifle plts striking and the weapons plt providing SBF, but I digress:o). From the works that I have read regaridng the recent unpleasentness in Iraq and Afghanistan MORE HE projectors, LAWS and MAN-portable Missiles are the answer to the weight problem. An FN MAG with 500rnds wieghs about , what, 25kg? A mini-spike (for example) with 5 rounds gets you the same weight for greater precision and for a larger terminal "effect" (yuk, I get a bad taste in my mouth with that word!:eek:). The CLU (4kg) also has a useful point reconnassance(sp?), surveillance(sp?) and battle-planning/assigning TRP function. The fact that the system can be deployed by two men who can still carry an IW/PDW means you haven't lost two riflemen but gained a vluable capability. But I still the see the need for IW with at least an effective range of 300m+ and just wondered if a true IAR would be better along the lines suggested by webb. Anyway, as a layman I much appreciate the knowledge avaliable here offered ...for free no less!. I can't remember interaction this good since I left Kings College London and the Department of War Studies (I was a student, nothing more important than that):mad:

Tukhachevskii

04-28-2010, 03:02 PM

For starters, fully automatic rifles are actually not all that common in the US Army (I don't know about the Marines). Most are issued rifles with a three round burst option instead. This is because, by and large, fully automatic rifle fire leads to a waste of ammo. The SAW and the various GPMGs (M60, M240B etc.) that are belt fed allow for more sustained automatic fire. Basic load for a the M4 is 210 rounds per man by doctrine. That, of course, gets modified based on METT-TC but 210 rounds will not last long in a weapon with a rate of fire, if memory serves, around 700 RPM (don't quote me on that number but I'm sure that it is close). Basic load for the belt fed weapons is, of course, much higher, which allows for more sustained fire. Additionally, most, if not all belt fed guns, have the removable barrels to allow hot barrels to be switched out. I don't know if the IAR has this but it is hardly practical for everyone to have spare barrels for their weapons.
In any case, automatic fire is really unnecessary for most rifle equipped soldiers in most situations anyway. Slow, steady aimed fire (I was always taught around 1 round every two seconds) is far more effective than bursts or fully automatic fire. As I have stated before, the only two drills that I have been taught to use fully automatic fire for in the last few years are near ambush and vehicle drills (where the vehicle is coming at me and I have no where or no time to get out of the way).

So, essentially, the SAW/LMG offers a greater deal of endurance in the fire-fight viz the IW which, when used properly, deliver point fires against PID targets while the LMG/SAW gets them out into the open or keeps their heads down to enable said shots?

I have also wondered wether or not having a SAW/LMG acts as a psychological crutch/sop for squadies. Would removing them aid in habituating offensive IBT rather than waiting for the SAW to start opening fire. I think I recall another thread or a post on this one that stated that the SAW/LMG/BAR was usually the only effective weapon firing or some such while others kept themselves suitably out of harms way (or did I read that wrong; probably in connexion with SLA Marshall's "work")

Uboat509

04-28-2010, 04:20 PM

So, essentially, the SAW/LMG offers a greater deal of endurance in the fire-fight viz the IW which, when used properly, deliver point fires against PID targets while the LMG/SAW gets them out into the open or keeps their heads down to enable said shots?

Something like that. The machine guns allow us to put a lot of rounds down range quickly which allows us to gain and maintain fire superiority. Now that concept has been drilled into me since I was a private but it is fairly controversial here. There are other issues as well. It is difficult at best to maneuver with a GPMG and even the SAW is not great for moving with under fire. I am not a huge fan of the saw. It lacks the punch of the GPMG and the accuracy and maneuverability of a rifle (anyone who has gotten up to do a short rush with one of these and had the ammo box fly off knows what I am talking about). The only real advantage it has it the ability to put a lot more lead down range. Sometimes that is a great thing to have and sometimes it just means more wasted ammo.

I have also wondered wether or not having a SAW/LMG acts as a psychological crutch/sop for squadies. Would removing them aid in habituating offensive IBT rather than waiting for the SAW to start opening fire. I think I recall another thread or a post on this one that stated that the SAW/LMG/BAR was usually the only effective weapon firing or some such while others kept themselves suitably out of harms way (or did I read that wrong; probably in connexion with SLA Marshall's "work")

I am reading On Infantry at the moment and that sounds like the old French model for infantry developed during the Great war, where the job of the rest of the team/squad was to protect the automatic weapons. That is not a good way to do things and we got away from that a long time ago. There are times when the GPMG might be the only really effective weapon for a specific engagement due to its range and penetration but that is not the rule.

William F. Owen

04-28-2010, 04:36 PM

I am reading On Infantry at the moment and that sounds like the old French model for infantry developed during the Great war, where the job of the rest of the team/squad was to protect the automatic weapons. That is not a good way to do things and we got away from that a long time ago. There are times when the GPMG might be the only really effective weapon for a specific engagement due to its range and penetration but that is not the rule.

I'd be a bit careful of "On Infantry." It gets some stuff plain wrong. Not sure about the French, but a recurring theme in German and to some extent the UK infantry tactical doctrine is the constant movement of the "Guns" (LMG and/or GPMGs) forward, using the squad/section to get them into position, while then seeking out a new fire position, which to move the gun to next.

This was explicit in the 1941 "Battle Craft" manual and very much implicit to the Wigram Grouping of 1943. I would also submit that if you look at the British 1918 Infantry Platoon of 2 x Gun Sections and 2 x Rifle Sections, you see the same idea. BUT - from about 1942/3 onwards, the UK just ignores the idea and reduces everything to the "Section Attack." The rest is a sad history of bad infantry tactics.

Once you have section or squads of 2-3 equally equipped fire teams, this type of "gun manoeuvre" becomes impossible, - which is a pity because it works really well.

Ken White

04-28-2010, 04:43 PM

is far more important in extended combat than rate of fire.

Accurate fire provides better suppression against trained or experienced fighters than a large number of inaccurate rounds or more noise.

Energy at range is more important than velocity; knock down power helps but shot placement is still key.

The M249 and similar weapons fail on all three counts.

The M240 / PKM / MG3 are GPMGs and should be Company weapons, detached to Platoons and Squads only occasionally and as the situation demands (as opposed to habitual...).

The Stoner 63 system offered an automatic rifle with a fast change top fed and thus more reliable magazine. Get that and one of these LINK (http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.mwgco.com/mm5/graphics/00000002/40_Round_AR-15_MAgazine.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.mwgco.com/ar-15_accessories/product/CA-IK520-40.html&usg=__V5UHC4qyDaS4HpRlNW-WC0mFiG8=&h=387&w=300&sz=26&hl=en&start=43&um=1&itbs=1&tbnid=BVzQ74o0Zi44qM:&tbnh=123&tbnw=95&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dmagpul%2B40%2Bround%2Bmagazine%26star t%3D40%26um%3D1%26hl%3Den%26client%3Dfirefox-a%26sa%3DN%26rls%3Dorg.mozilla:en-US:official%26ndsp%3D20%26tbs%3Disch:1). Magpul also allegedly has one LINK (http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.joepennsy.com/mags/magpulcat1.jpg&imgrefurl=http://chaostheoryfilms.blogspot.com/2010/01/magpul-40-round-pmags-and-5-and-10-and.html&usg=__mQy1cIhXwi3hnHvay3UeAbtznuw=&h=476&w=800&sz=123&hl=en&start=1&um=1&itbs=1&tbnid=iOGkeEOzk9_99M:&tbnh=85&tbnw=143&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dmagpul%2B40%2Bround%2Bmagazine%26um%3 D1%26hl%3Den%26client%3Dfirefox-a%26sa%3DN%26rls%3Dorg.mozilla:en-US:official%26tbs%3Disch:1).

It is not desirable or possible to train or equip a vast mobilization Army in accordance with those parameters. It is possible desirable to so equip and train a small professional Army.

William F. Owen

04-28-2010, 04:57 PM

The M240 / PKM / MG3 are GPMGs and should be Company weapons, detached to Platoons and Squads only occasionally and as the situation demands (as opposed to habitual...).

This is intriguing. Why? I would generally want to hold GPMGs in the Platoons.

GI Zhou

04-28-2010, 05:48 PM

The Russians and Chinese in combat, as opposed to exercises, have always emphasisied the pushing forwrad belt fed machine guns, regardless where they were/are held on the TO&E. The Russian Army's experience in the Causasus only reinforced it, and has seen the trend to go away from 5.45 x 39mm back to 7.62 x 39mm and 7.62 x 54mmR weapons by pushing the PKM et al into the squad/section level. Armies on operations will configure their forces with what works, and the need for a belt fed 7.62 x 51mm or equivalent weapon has been proven over time to give the edge in combat. I finish with this example but can provide Russian and Chinese examp[les from combat operations.

The Australian Army in Vietnam emphasised this early, even when the L2A1 heavy barrelled magazine fed version of the SLR (FN-FAL) was available. On page 72 of the April 2010 Australian Infantry Magazine it notes about 1RAR (infantry battalion) in early 1966 that:

'Each standing patrol was made up of usually a small group of men. Ideally it could be up to a section of ten men, but in reality it was more likely to be one NCO and four to five diggers. The equuipment carried would consist of a radio, at least one M60 machine gun (emphasis added), hand grenades, flares and personal weapons. The patrol would travel light with only basic combat webbing. There was no requirement for much else as the patrol would depart the perimeter at last light and would normally return a little after first light. Or earlier if things got exciting.'

William F. Owen

04-28-2010, 06:02 PM

'Each standing patrol was made up of usually a small group of men. Ideally it could be up to a section of ten men, but in reality it was more likely to be one NCO and four to five diggers. The equuipment carried would consist of a radio, at least one M60 machine gun (emphasis added), hand grenades, flares and personal weapons.
Interesting that this is of a Standing Patrol - who normally seek not to fight, so I guess the M60 was just to break contact.

JMA

04-28-2010, 06:51 PM

Interesting that this is of a Standing Patrol - who normally seek not to fight, so I guess the M60 was just to break contact.

Maybe if their position had been compromised and they were attacked they would have to extricate themselves?

GI Zhou

04-28-2010, 07:02 PM

Standing patrols did not generally turn into a major firefight and are still practiced today where appropriate. Generally an enemy and a patrol stumble upon each other and break contact unless one has had time to set up a hasty ambush. The M60 gave an important advantage in case the enemy group turned out to be larger than the patrols. The Vietnamese found the RPG2 to be an effective weapon to break contact too.

The use of CS gas is frowned upon to break contact, as is the use of a similar grenade top the M34 WP.

The purpose of the patrols are to keep an enemy off balance by denying him the ability to stage attacks and close recon of your positions, and early warning of an impending attack. Two M60s/MG3s/GPMGs provide a rather potent problem on an enemy's flank.

Night vision equipment is a bonus as they make it easier to patrol and conversely rreduce the need for as many patrols providing the ground doesn't have too many daed zones, hence the need for standing patrols in close country.

Ken White

04-28-2010, 08:19 PM

Why? I would generally want to hold GPMGs in the Platoons.My observation has been that MGs at Platoon level are misused and overused -- generally not because they're needed or in many cases even make tactical sense but simply because they're available. They are the least reliable Platoon weapon (now that the Dragon is gone :D), misused they can burn up a heavy ammo load, most Rifle Platoon Machine Gunners are not at all well trained (I said most, not all) and more. Placed in Co level MG Plat, they can be farmed to Platoons as required based on METT-TC, the gunners and squads train together and become true specialists instead of being just the guy who got stuck with (or loves...) the gun (neither of those two poles guarantees the best man for the job. Indirect fire. There's more, that's just openers.;)

A proper AR or true LMG, magazine fed for reliability, works more than adequately in most situations, the weapon is less complicated, more reliable easier to learn and fire, lighter and more flexible, uses less ammo and with a single shot capability will not give away the positions of your automatic weapons under a probe or recon by fire....

GI Zhou:

Both the Russians and the Chinese still have mostly conscript armies, thus an emphasis on automatic weapons to compensate for the lack of decent marksmanship training and to counterbalance the inherent inaccuracy of sloppily made weapons. No reason for a professional force to spend that much money on ammunition for combat when they could simply spend a bit more for training purposes and far less for combat.

My observation of 1 and 5 RAR in Viet Nam was that they carried the M60 for the same reason the US Army and Marine Corps did -- it was available and no suitable AR or LMG happened to be. :o

A CS grenade atop an M34? Never tried it. What does REALLY work to break contact is an M8 HC Smoke Grenade taped to an M18 Claymore equipped with a 30 second piece of M700 time fuze and a Fuze Lighter, preferably the M2 or M60 -- the others don't do damp. One usually works, two were virtually guaranteed to do so. They now have this little dude: LINK (http://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/images/pdm1.gif&imgrefurl=http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/pdm.htm&h=896&w=800&sz=194&tbnid=fj3jJfcOcFsbTM:&tbnh=146&tbnw=130&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dm86%2Bpursuit%2Bdeterrent%2Bmunition&usg=__RC9201O5H9rI6b40GwErdNCzzYQ=&ei=9pbYS5OyA4fS8ATZ2sSXBw&sa=X&oi=image_result&resnum=4&ct=image&ved=0CAwQ9QEwAw)...

Fuchs

04-28-2010, 09:08 PM

My observation has been that MGs at Platoon level are misused and overused -- generally not because they're needed or in many cases even make tactical sense but simply because they're available. They are the least reliable Platoon weapon (now that the Dragon is gone :D), misused they can burn up a heavy ammo load, most Rifle Platoon Machine Gunners are not at all well trained (I said most, not all) and more. Placed in Co level MG Plat, they can be farmed to Platoons as required based on METT-TC, the gunners and squads train together and become true specialists instead of being just the guy who got stuck with (or loves...) the gun (neither of those two poles guarantees the best man for the job.

OK, (1) you mention the old "train separate, fight together" issue. It can find application in everything from infantry to armor/mech infantry battalion training up to the question why the AF is usually separate of the army.

(2) You seem to assume that tactics (one of the METT-TC "T"'s., after all) permit such a shifting of machine guns from the Coy Cmdr's pool to the Plt in need.
This is questionable in many situation because of the shortage of infantry and the therefore necessary wide spacing / dispersion.
You may end up with another recurring phenomenon:
Specialists pooled at HQ, but in the field de facto permanently attached to subordinate units.
The only reliable way to avoid this from happening is afaik to pool less support than subordinate units in the formation/unit. Like 2 machine guns for a Coy of 3 Plt.

GI Zhou

04-28-2010, 09:11 PM

I meant either a CS grenade or a M34, not taped together, but the effect could well be imagined. The Chinese have a tear gas grenade that would be good for breaking contact. The BZ 45mm explosive tear gas rifle grenade which utilises a bullet trap design.

It is heavy at 450g, and are very accurate being designed to be able to land in a 0.3 x 0.3m area at 100m. They however are dangerous in use, as their use by Thai security forces during the disturbances on 7 October 2008 showed. Three protestors were killed, and eight lost legs, feet or toes due to grenade explosions. Tests by Thai forensic examiners showed that there was a considerable amount of RDX explosive and that it ‘left a crater eight centimetres wide and three centimetres deep (three-inches wide and one-inch deep) in the ground’, further noting that it ‘left a hole in a metal pipe.

Kiwigrunt

04-28-2010, 09:54 PM

But I still the see the need for IW with at least an effective range of 300m+ and just wondered if a true IAR would be better along the lines suggested by webb.

I think it depends very much on what we really want to use that IAR for, and how it is classified and structured within the organisation.
I would be inclined to agree with you if the IAR is no or little heavier than an IW, like the HK416 or the LWRC. But in that case (and indeed along the lines of Webb) why call it an IAR? It would then really just be an improved assault rifle. That would make sense to me.

It is interesting how opinions differ so widely, even among people with ample experience on the two way firing lane (not yours truly). Regarding beltfeds we have Ken as one ‘extreme’ who doesn’t like to see them below coy level and JMA at the other end who much appreciated the MAG at fireteam level and even at a rate of one per two pers. 2 Para claimed to like two per section in the Falklands (yes Wilf, no proof of effect compared to having only one) and in the sandbox they keep working their way down to the lowest level, as GI Zhou alluded to. Attempts at replacing their ‘firepower’ potential (without going in to what that means) with lighter weapons has been tried with the likes of IARs and LMGs (Minimi) and appears partly successful, at times, but just doesn’t seem to do the trick :confused:(what trick?).

And I think that’s the danger of the IAR as a concept, as a class of weapon, rather than with the weapon itself. Treating the weapon as ‘the’ firepower of the team, and having the team manoeuvring around it so to speak, I think creates expectations beyond what the weapon can ever be capable of delivering. And that is why the gimpy keeps coming back down. That is why Brit patrols in A-stan now carry a bit of everything, IW, LSW, LMG, GPMG and sniper rifles (ignoring HE for now).

And that is what I can foresee happening with the USMC as well, once the IAR gets introduced.
(And as an opposing extreme the NZ army is currently testing the 7.62 MINIMI as a possible replacement for the 5.56.)
There appears to be much confusion indeed regarding what constitutes fire power and what is required for effect (at the receiving end) versus a perception of said firepower that possibly does more to boost our own morale than to reduce that of the enemy. That is of course still important but a clearer understanding (training and education) may help to keep the carried weight down a bit and also that confusing plethora of weapons, types and classes.

So I do think that a simplification here would make a lot of sense. Have ‘improved assault rifles’ that can be used on full auto when required and 7.62 beltfeds, anywhere between 7.62 Minimi and MAG 58. Then decide where those beltfeds need to be, and perhaps that should remain more flexible and situation dependant.
That of course negates Ken’s:

My observation has been that MGs at Platoon level are misused and overused -- generally not because they're needed or in many cases even make tactical sense but simply because they're available.

That is more likely to happen with IARs across the board as ‘improved assault rifles’.:eek: Yet it may still waste less ammo then the current situation with a bit of everything, or in fact so much of everything else that IWs are hardly carried anymore (slight exaggeration there;)).

Ken White

04-28-2010, 10:20 PM

OK, (1) you mention the old "train separate, fight together" issue. It can find application in everything from infantry to armor/mech infantry battalion training up to the question why the AF is usually separate of the army.True. The only thing that matters is the quality and capability of the Trainers. Separating some things lessens the requirement for super qualified trainers. Like many things, there are a number of ways to approach the issue. I merely posited one that I saw work very well and have yet to see any of the others systems I've seen work as well. Make no mistake, most all will work, I've seen a number do just that -- I cite and recommend the one I've seen work best in varying conditions, war and peace.
(2) You seem to assume that tactics (one of the METT-TC "T"'s., after all) permit such a shifting of machine guns from the Coy Cmdr's pool to the Plt in need.I don't assume it, I've seen it work very well a number of places to include Korea and Viet Nam. The US Marine Corps in WW II and in Korea and long after had a Machine Gun Platoon in each Rifle Company. That later changed to a Weapons Company and the MG Plat lost some ammo bearers and became a Section. That Weapons Platoon has an Assault section (Sappers of a sort -- or they may be an AT section by now), a Mortar Section and a MG Section with Section Leader and three Squads, each with a Squad Leader and 2 three man MG Teams of Gunner, Asst Gunner and Ammo Bearer (each team in Korea had two Ammo Bearers). The Guns are normally employed in pairs allowing sustained automatic fire from stable positions, tripod or bipod (a single gun has to reload and clear jams -- frequently -- the other gun increase its rate of fire until both guns can alternate firing). The Guns can be assigned, one Squad (two guns) to a Rifle Platoon and the same squad always goes to the same Platoon IF dispersed operation is necessary. Used to be a no-no to split the Squad, don't know about today -- a lot of hard won WW II lessons are gone...
You may end up with another recurring phenomenon:
Specialists pooled at HQ, but in the field de facto permanently attached to subordinate units.That can and has happened. Mostly in my experience it was avoided. The bit of having a Squad with two guns available for each Rifle Platoon gives you the flexibility to easily give gour or all six guns to a maneuver base of fire or two guns to each platoon. It's flexible -- and the Gunners are good...
The only reliable way to avoid this from happening is afaik to pool less support than subordinate units in the formation/unit. Like 2 machine guns for a Coy of 3 Plt.Either that method -- or better training... ;)

William F. Owen

04-29-2010, 03:46 AM

It is interesting how opinions differ so widely, even among people with ample experience on the two way firing lane (not yours truly).
Concur, which is why the specific context and thinking behind the opinion has to be considered. Different Armies, cultures, etc etc...

Regarding beltfeds we have Ken as one ‘extreme’ who doesn’t like to see them below coy level and JMA at the other end who much appreciated the MAG at fireteam level and even at a rate of one per two pers. 2 Para claimed to like two per section in the Falklands (yes Wilf, no proof of effect compared to having only one) and in the sandbox they keep working their way down to the lowest level, as GI Zhou alluded to.
Not "claimed" - 2 Para DID have 2 GPMG per rifle section = 6 per platoon, before, during and after the Falklands. It's an issue still causing very heated debate to this day!

What I take from it is the need to be able to group guns where needed, as and when. Personally, I could have a specialist section within the platoon, and I'd ditch the need to do indirect fire, which massively reduces the training needed for the Sustained Fire role.

Rifleman

04-29-2010, 06:06 AM

Once you have section or squads of 2-3 equally equipped fire teams, this type of "gun manoeuvre" becomes impossible, - which is a pity because it works really well.

That caught my attention.

I'm not disagreeing but I want to know why moving the gun becomes impossible in a squad of 2-3 balanced fire teams.

I thought that was how the current USMC squad developed in WWII. The BAR was the heart of the fireteam and three riflemen supported it. Is that not accurate?

William F. Owen

04-29-2010, 06:25 AM

That caught my attention.

I'm not disagreeing but I want to know why moving the gun becomes impossible in a squad of 2-3 balanced fire teams.

It's not impossible to move guns, it's just the type of manoeuvre that becomes impossible, when all fire teams have the same weapons.

What the UK Battle Craft idea progressed was that while the 3 man "Gun group"(3 man Fireteam?) was suppressing the enemy (hopefully) the the 5-man "Rifle Group"(5-man Fireteam?) moved forward or to the flanks, to find a better position for the gun. They would then signal the gun to move to the new position, and provide some covering fire.

This all stemmed from the idea of an attack being movement from fire position to fire position, until you got within grenade/"bayonet" range, by which time the enemy had hopefully jacked.

Doing it by 3 x 8-man sections, required considerable co-ordination, which is why Wigram Grouping was more sensible. Both ideas together create a very robust and simple system.

JMA

04-29-2010, 06:48 AM

It is interesting how opinions differ so widely, even among people with ample experience on the two way firing lane (not yours truly). Regarding beltfeds we have Ken as one ‘extreme’ who doesn’t like to see them below coy level and JMA at the other end who much appreciated the MAG at fireteam level and even at a rate of one per two pers. 2 Para claimed to like two per section in the Falklands (yes Wilf, no proof of effect compared to having only one) and in the sandbox they keep working their way down to the lowest level, as GI Zhou alluded to. Attempts at replacing their ‘firepower’ potential (without going in to what that means) with lighter weapons has been tried with the likes of IARs and LMGs (Minimi) and appears partly successful, at times, but just doesn’t seem to do the trick :confused:(what trick?).

Perhaps the differentiator will be the type of war being fought. In a type of warfare where you encounter the enemy in pockets (as we mainly did in Rhodesia) rather than in depth then it is the initial exchange of fire on making contact that makes the difference and allows small groups (sections, fire teams or sticks) to rapidly close with and kill the enemy without having to seek additional support from behind.

When we took on dug in and prepared positions in Zambia and Mozambique there were always preliminaries in the form of air strikes to soften up the enemy. But suffice it to say that in taking out bunkers and trenches the idea of launching a 9 man section attack did not make sense purely from the space point of view. In that only one man with a buddy behind him could deal with the type of bunkers we faced while the other two (including the MAG) covered them. The next stick also 4 men would be better employed to prevent enemy in other positions from interfering. Always we wanted the MAG right up there where we needed a high rate of direct fire.

In house clearing type situations (FIBUA) the MAG was needed but not right up front as everyone had to be prepared to enter doorways. We trained for this but never got anywhere near a Fullujah situation so you would need to ask those boys where they wanted their machine guns.

If the enemy is contacted where they are situated in depth (say in a defensive position) of say battalion strength your leading troops must pull back quickly before DF and other tasks come raining down on their heads. The MAG could be helpful in helping to disengage as well as using the other ideas mentioned such as smoke etc.

I genuinely believe that if there are those who believe that machine guns should be pooled at platoon and company level then is it not better to create an additional machine gun section or platoon as applicable? Are there still true believers in the effectiveness of indirect machine gun fire out there?

kaur

04-29-2010, 07:18 AM

About IAR.

G3Kurz (person close to HK USA) says in hkpro.com forum:

There is no requirement in the contract for the IAR to be built in the US. As the timeline is pretty tight, the guns will have to be built at HK GmbH as the US production is far from ready to build a MIL SPEC rifle. Would be a bad decision to make the gun at any other HK facility than HK GmbH. Their record for QA and lot testing is well established - they are the true experts on HK's, especially the 416. Why risk it?

This is a very good thing for the Marines and every other service/country that is watching this. This is the US Marine Corps! Remember that the Marines were expected to consider seriously what SOCOM decided on SCAR. A full fielding decision on SCAR is expected this month. It is anyones guess what will happen at Tampa. This confirms the wisdom of the selection of the HK416 by Tier 1 SOF units for which they have taken a bunch of crap over the years and begs the question why not just upgrade or replace the SOCOM M4's with COTS HK416's? Mother Army is looking to upgrade the M4 and conduct a new carbine competition. This "award" (downselect actually) raises the state of the science for 5.56mm rifles by a long margin, and just in time maybe.

Nice to see the troops getting the very best for a change. The Marines conducted the first "Field Experiment" on IAR back in the late 1990's wherein HK competed with the MG36 at that time and did well - pre HK416. The HK416 provides a substanially improved sustained rate of fire, improved accuracy, higher cook off rate, improved service life and decreased life cycle costs and likely it was not the most expensive candidate. What is amazing is that the Plain Jane standard production HK416 (okay a bayonet stud was added) as submittted (the lightest candidate also!) beat out the heavier and purpose built candiate from FN and Colt. Guess this sheds some light on the rumor control that said the HK416 was dead and it was having many problems with US users. Wrong. Hard to beat HK made hammer forged barrels and the op rod gas system. Now they just need a good reliable 75-90 round drum magazine like the G8 mag.

The first 5.56mm SOST ammo gets fielded in the Corps soon as well. If the reported performance of the 7.62mm SOST in Afghanistan is any indicator Marines armed with HK416 IAR's firing SOST ammo will gain a new found respect from our enemies there. Lighter. More manuverable. More "lethal" and at greater ranges and against protected targets? What's not to like about that?!

Things are looking up (finally). Congratulations to the folks at Quantico and to HK.

http://hkpro.com/forum/showthread.php?115055-HK-416-wins-IAR/page5

it appears SOCOM will not field the SCAR in any great numbers other than maybe some SCAR H's for use in Afghanistan and for a small component of SOCOM. They are a good company with mostly top notch product but they are not alone in the fight for business. In the end the HK416 IAR will be proven to be THE BEST conventional rifle on the market today. The ongoiing tests thus far are proving that to be true. All just in time for the upcoming M4 Upgrade program and new Army Individual Carbine effort. Let the best gun win.

http://hkpro.com/forum/showthread.php?120221-Marine-Corps-Times-IAR-article

Tukhachevskii

04-29-2010, 09:53 AM

It's not impossible to move guns, it's just the type of manoeuvre that becomes impossible, when all fire teams have the same weapons.

What the UK Battle Craft idea progressed was that while the 3 man "Gun group"(3 man Fireteam?) was suppressing the enemy (hopefully) the the 5-man "Rifle Group"(5-man Fireteam?) moved forward or to the flanks, to find a better position for the gun. They would then signal the gun to move to the new position, and provide some covering fire.

This all stemmed from the idea of an attack being movement from fire position to fire position, until you got within grenade/"bayonet" range, by which time the enemy had hopefully jacked.

Doing it by 3 x 8-man sections, required considerable co-ordination, which is why Wigram Grouping was more sensible. Both ideas together create a very robust and simple system.

This intrugues me. So am I right in understanding that once the gun group displaces fom its position the rifle group supports it with suppressive fire, presumably on the same target that the gun group had been engageing (or a different target within their arc of fire)? I find it intriguing that for however long the gun group was "out of action" because they were displacving to a new position they were expected to be covered by a rifle group without a LMG? Surely they would thereby be at a disadvantage compared to a section organised into two balanced fireteams each of comparable "suppresive" capabilties. It sounds like getting Tyson to disengage from a fight while Barry McGuigan covers him:rolleyes:

Tukhachevskii

04-29-2010, 09:58 AM

There appears to be much confusion indeed regarding what constitutes fire power and what is required for effect (at the receiving end) versus a perception of said firepower that possibly does more to boost our own morale than to reduce that of the enemy. .

This is precisely what I was getting at; its not what the GPMG/LMG/SAW can do but rather "what desired effects on target do we require?" that should determine weapon choice. I can't see 500rnds of 7.62mm link making much of a differance in a firefight given the numbers of rounds expended for any given number of kills (of which I am admittedly ignorant). I am aware that British units are arming themselves with all and sundry in Afghanistan but is that because they like those BOS or because they have nothing better with which to tilt the scales in the battle for fire superiority? I read a AAR recently which described a plt contact in Afghanistan where all IW and Saws were being fired without hitting the Taliban opposition until the plt cdr deployed his 51 and one smoke (target marking) and four HE later the Taliban were meeting their maker (actually, they were dead on the first round of HE while the others were insurance.

JMA

04-29-2010, 11:45 AM

This is precisely what I was getting at; its not what the GPMG/LMG/SAW can do but rather "what desired effects on target do we require?" that should determine weapon choice. I can't see 500rnds of 7.62mm link making much of a differance in a firefight given the numbers of rounds expended for any given number of kills (of which I am admittedly ignorant). I am aware that British units are arming themselves with all and sundry in Afghanistan but is that because they like those BOS or because they have nothing better with which to tilt the scales in the battle for fire superiority? I read a AAR recently which described a plt contact in Afghanistan where all IW and Saws were being fired without hitting the Taliban opposition until the plt cdr deployed his 51 and one smoke (target marking) and four HE later the Taliban were meeting their maker (actually, they were dead on the first round of HE while the others were insurance.

I would love to read this contact report. Especially as they knew where the TB were in order to engage then with mortar fire but were unable to direct any of the others weapons onto the target.

William F. Owen

04-29-2010, 12:42 PM

I find it intriguing that for however long the gun group was "out of action" because they were displacving to a new position they were expected to be covered by a rifle group without a LMG? Surely they would thereby be at a disadvantage compared to a section organised into two balanced fireteams each of comparable "suppresive" capabilties. It sounds like getting Tyson to disengage from a fight while Barry McGuigan covers him:rolleyes:
That is why "section F&M" is flawed, and better done as a platoon under tight control, with guns moving incrementally.

The "balanced" fire teams means neither can really do anything well.

William F. Owen

04-29-2010, 12:46 PM

Especially as they knew where the TB were in order to engage then with mortar fire but were unable to direct any of the others weapons onto the target.
Behind a wall or far side of a raised road would be my guess. The 51mm goes to 800m, so I'm not surprised that an HE round caused casualties when weapons fire did not.

Tukhachevskii

04-29-2010, 02:45 PM

Behind a wall or far side of a raised road would be my guess. The 51mm goes to 800m, so I'm not surprised that an HE round caused casualties when weapons fire did not.

Wilf has intuited the matter correctly. I'll get a full quote and paste it with a link to the book (not an AAR, my mistake) tommorow (and write up a fuller review for the "What are you reading" thread later, along with some other recently published British works). The platoon was under fire in some very uneven terrain (agricultural land, furrows, berms, reeds, etc) with the TB having occupied rather robust terrain features and the 51 negates all that by taking the path of least resisstance!!

Tukhachevskii

04-29-2010, 02:54 PM

That is why "section F&M" is flawed, and better done as a platoon under tight control, with guns moving incrementally.

The "balanced" fire teams means neither can really do anything well.

Right. I'm with you now. That brings the pre-WWII plt with two Gun sections and two rifles sections into greater clarity. Did the gun section contain a single LMG (in which case having a security/close protection rifle team makes more sense given the plt focus)? Were they split two by two (ie, 1 gun and 1 rifle section) as manouvre/fire elements or was their employment entirely METT-T (or whatever their equivalent mnemonic was, and just what was that exactly:confused:?) dependant.

William F. Owen

04-29-2010, 03:03 PM

Right. I'm with you now. That brings the pre-WWII plt with two Gun sections and two rifles sections into greater clarity. Did the gun section contain a single LMG (in which case having a security/close protection rifle team makes more sense given the plt focus)?

The 1918 Platoon was 4 x 7 man sections. 2 Gun Sections had 1 x Lewis gun each, and the other sections had Rifles and Rifle grenades. It grew out of what worked in WW1.

The scheme of manoeuvre was formally laid out in the 1919 "Soft Spots" manual. basically, no one moves unless there are 3 sections giving covering fire, and the aim is always to get the gun-sections closer to the enemy.

Tukhachevskii

04-29-2010, 03:12 PM

The scheme of manoeuvre was formally laid out in the 1919 "Soft Spots" manual. .

Is this avalibale in the open source media? (obviously "Soft Spots" isn't its true title, right:rolleyes:?)

Ken White

04-29-2010, 03:26 PM

Perhaps the differentiator will be the type of war being fought.Each one is different and different equipment, organizations and techniques are required and developed and what works is employed. Then comes peace and / or the budget people who cannot stand chaos (which is what war mostly happens to be...) and they attempt to impose order by defining a limited and limiting TOE. Those are usually designed for the last war and generally are biased toward cheap as opposed to effective. :rolleyes:
I genuinely believe that if there are those who believe that machine guns should be pooled at platoon and company level then is it not better to create an additional machine gun section or platoon as applicable? Are there still true believers in the effectiveness of indirect machine gun fire out there?I'd vote for the Platoon, separate section at a minimum IF -- big if -- a decent LMG (which the Minimi / M249 is not), preferably magazine fed were available for the rifle platoons. As there are none out there in common use today, the GPMG has logically become the preferred substitute. They work, they're just too heavy and require too much maintenance. Lighter belt feds like the Minimi and Mk 46 or 48 will work for in and out SOF like ops but aren't rugged enough to be beat up in line infantry combat for weeks on end.

The PKM is probably the best one out there right now with the Vektor VS 77 and the 5.56 version being a close second. The MAG is one of the more reliable jobs out there but the price for that reliability is excessive weight. All belt feds suffer from a weak link (pun intended), the belt and misaligned ammo plus twigs and leaves. That plus maintenance and weight. That and mostly weight... :(

As for indirect fire; almost never needed or useful in the offense or for any kind of assault. No one in the west other than Argentina has had to consistently defend fixed positions (not necessarily a defensive line, just any static defended position) since Korea. After we do that again and we will someday, somewhere, then the utility of indirect fire with MGs -- a lost art due to that lack of need to defend -- may become apparent to those who have not applied it... ;)

Ken White

04-29-2010, 03:51 PM

The "balanced" fire teams means neither can really do anything well.They're designed by such people. Easier to design, diagram, fill with equipment and people and so forth.

The key is to not hire those with that bureaucratic mindset as combat leaders. Flexibility is in ones head, not in the design or documentation.

A Marine Rifle Squad in Korea was designed with SL, 3 x 4 man Fire Teams, each with a Corporal leader, Rifleman / Scout, an Automatic Rifleman (then BAR, today a SAW M249) and Assistant AR man (who was a rifleman but theoretically carrying an extra BAR belt with Ammo. They were heavy and thus almost always got 'lost' :rolleyes:). At various times, I operated with:

Aslt Team - 1 Leader, 4 Rifles; Base of fire - Me plus everyone else including 2 ARs.

Point Team - 1 Leader, 2 Rifles; Hook / Develop Team - 1 Leader (Me), 1 AR, 5 Rifles; Base of fire - 1 Leader, 2 ARs.

LP Team - 1 Leader, 2 rifles; Line Team 1 - 1 Leader, 1 AR, 1 Rifle; Line Team 2 (Hot Spot) 1 Leader, 2 ARs, 2 Rifles; CP Team - Me, 1 Rifle / Runner.

Plus half dozen other variations including all the BARs in support and all the Rifles but 1 Fire Team Leader attacking. That big Marine Squad has beaucoup flexibility and can absorb a lot of casualties.

William F. Owen

04-29-2010, 04:04 PM

Is this avalibale in the open source media? (obviously "Soft Spots" isn't its true title, right:rolleyes:?)
IRRC it was called SS-148. I only know of one copy and it's in the Liddell-Hart archive at Kings Collage.

William F. Owen

04-29-2010, 04:08 PM

As for indirect fire; almost never needed or useful in the offense or for any kind of assault. No one in the west other than Argentina has had to consistently defend fixed positions (not necessarily a defensive line, just any static defended position) since Korea. After we do that again and we will someday, somewhere, then the utility of indirect fire with MGs -- a lost art due to that lack of need to defend -- may become apparent to those who have not applied it... ;)
Thought a lot about it. I trained to do it. Spent many happy hours firing through Hessian screens, but I am really not sure of the effectiveness versus the time spent training. All for learning how to hit buildings or wood frontages at 3,000m but I just see that as best done over open sights, with a little less "map prediction."

Ken White

04-29-2010, 04:33 PM

Thought a lot about it. I trained to do it. Spent many happy hours firing through Hessian screens, but I am really not sure of the effectiveness versus the time spent training. All for learning how to hit buildings or wood frontages at 3,000m but I just see that as best done over open sights, with a little less "map prediction."But...
Behind a wall or far side of a raised road would be my guess. The 51mm goes to 800m, so I'm not surprised that an HE round caused casualties when weapons fire did not. and MG plus Ammo is lighter and more flexible than a Mortar plus Ammo. ;)

Both can do good things, properly employed.

Plunging MG fire into defilade is easily possible with no tripod in visual range as well and at a greater distance than the 40mm LV can touch... :wry:

Training time spent on particular scenarios largely depends on where the guns are located, organizationally.

Fuchs

04-29-2010, 07:44 PM

JMA

04-29-2010, 08:44 PM

Each one is different and different equipment, organizations and techniques are required and developed and what works is employed. Then comes peace and / or the budget people who cannot stand chaos (which is what war mostly happens to be...) and they attempt to impose order by defining a limited and limiting TOE. Those are usually designed for the last war and generally are biased toward cheap as opposed to effective. :rolleyes:

Yes that sums it up pretty well. The trouble we see with the military is that most often the lessons learned from the previous war are applied to the next war regardless of whether the old war may have been in the jungle and the current one in a dessert. I use the term trying to turn a super tanker in rough seas. Always playing catch up.

I'd vote for the Platoon, separate section at a minimum IF -- big if -- a decent LMG (which the Minimi / M249 is not), preferably magazine fed were available for the rifle platoons. As there are none out there in common use today, the GPMG has logically become the preferred substitute. They work, they're just too heavy and require too much maintenance. Lighter belt feds like the Minimi and Mk 46 or 48 will work for in and out SOF like ops but aren't rugged enough to be beat up in line infantry combat for weeks on end.

Perhaps it would be helpful to try and identify where and how and in which type of warfare machine guns are best located. Close range low visibility environment (jungle and dense bush) demand a different approach to dessert conditions.

The PKM is probably the best one out there right now with the Vektor VS 77 and the 5.56 version being a close second. The MAG is one of the more reliable jobs out there but the price for that reliability is excessive weight. All belt feds suffer from a weak link (pun intended), the belt and misaligned ammo plus twigs and leaves. That plus maintenance and weight. That and mostly weight... :(

Well lets keep it simple for the colonial boys who still exist. Stick to one caliber of ammunition at company level. I think the armies of the world have experimented with 5.56x45mm and maybe its time to come back to 7.62×51mm NATO?

The weight issue with the FN MAG is often raised. I wonder why this is. Are soldiers becoming weaker (cause of all the junk food) or what exactly is the problem. One sees pictures of soldiers these days carrying even rifles on a sling or with the magazine resting on the webbing. A fit young man 18-20 should be able to not only carry an FN MAG with 500rds (10x50 round belts) but also be able to skirmish from cover to cover with the weapon (probably carrying it by the handle on the move). Mainly the farm boys with short string backs were the ideal gunners but there were city boys who managed pretty well. (Moral of this story seems to be don't get your soldiers out of the projects but rather go find them out in the farm lands or get the physical training component of training up a few notches.

I dished out the extra belts sometime 6 more, sometimes 10 more to myself and the others (for ops where resupply may not be immediately available). My Sgt dealt with this spreading of the load (for example you got a radio, you got radio batteries, you get 2 belts you got the medic pack and so on to evenly spread the load.)

It is (in my humble opinion) more important to carry more belts for the gunner than the riflemen to carry more magazines for themselves. In many cases in our little war it was the riflemen who were there to protect the gunner (with his fire being directed by the stick commander ) while he did the business. Don't think of the machine gun as a personal weapon like a rifle think... firepower.

JMA

04-29-2010, 08:53 PM

Behind a wall or far side of a raised road would be my guess. The 51mm goes to 800m, so I'm not surprised that an HE round caused casualties when weapons fire did not.

If the enemy is hiding behind a wall 800m away of even 300m away then there is no firefight. If you are receiving effective fire then the enemy can see you to aim at you. Likewise then you can see them and direct fire on them.

We need to read that report.

baboon6

04-29-2010, 10:02 PM

Perhaps it would be helpful to try and identify where and how and in which type of warfare machine guns are best located. Close range low visibility environment (jungle and dense bush) demand a different approach to dessert conditions.

The weight issue with the FN MAG is often raised. I wonder why this is. Are soldiers becoming weaker (cause of all the junk food) or what exactly is the problem. One sees pictures of soldiers these days carrying even rifles on a sling or with the magazine resting on the webbing. A fit young man 18-20 should be able to not only carry an FN MAG with 500rds (10x50 round belts) but also be able to skirmish from cover to cover with the weapon (probably carrying it by the handle on the move). Mainly the farm boys with short string backs were the ideal gunners but there were city boys who managed pretty well. (Moral of this story seems to be don't get your soldiers out of the projects but rather go find them out in the farm lands or get the physical training component of training up a few notches.

Don't think of the machine gun as a personal weapon like a rifle think... firepower.

1.Problem in Afghanistan is troops are often moving from the desert into close country like the Green Zone in Helmand with its dense bush, mud compounds and canals, and out again, in the same day.

2. Don't know about the US but from what I've read its common for British GPMG gunners to carry the gun plus 600-800 rounds of link, Minimi gunners sometimes even more. I think the problem is all the other stuff guys are carrying today- body armour, ECM kit etc. There is a very interesting thread on this on ARRSE at the moment; quite a few guys who have recently served in Helmand think that in many circumstances body armour is not worth the weight and that it should be up to commanders on the ground whether it is worn or not.

Kiwigrunt

04-29-2010, 10:03 PM

The weight issue with the FN MAG is often raised. I wonder why this is. Are soldiers becoming weaker.....

I’d say the weight issue today is compounded by all the other stuff carried in addition to primary weapons. Any photos I’ve seen from Rhodesia, the troopies seem to carry little more than their weapon, ammo and a bottle of water, and some obviously a radio. Today’s soldiers in the sandbox probably come close to that weight just with armour (including helmet) and all the additional gadgets (HE projectors, electronic, sights, coms etc). So even running around with an M4 carbine would be pretty exhausting, comparatively.

For what it’s worth, HK have remade (in metrics) the L7A2 (http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?166951-H-k-l7a2-gpmg) in two barrel lengths. It is supposed to be about 2 kg lighter. That should bring it down to about the same weight as an L4A4 and lighter than the standard Vector. Not sure why they didn’t just use the already metric (and heavier) MAG 58 as a starting point…..perhaps to do with licensing etc.

As an aside, I’ve never come across mention of balancing the barrel (http://www.arrse.co.uk/wiki/Balancing_the_GPMG) on the MAG 58. I’ve only ever come across it regarding the L7 with its 10 gas settings. I suppose it wouldn’t make much sense on the MAG with only three settings.

Kiwigrunt

04-29-2010, 10:11 PM

Don't know about the US but from what I've read its common for British GPMG gunners to carry the gun plus 600-800 rounds of link. I think the problem is all the other stuff guys are carrying today- body armour, ECM kit etc.

We hit the submit button at the same time.

quite a few guys who have recently served in Helmand think that in many circumstances body armour is not worth the weight

The ANZACs in NAM rarely used to wear even helmets, like the Rhodesians. I suppose you get used to it eventually (wearing a helmet that is). I'm pleased to say that I've had few exercises where we've had to wear them; I hated it. Then again, I've never had shrapnel coming in my direction.

baboon6

04-29-2010, 10:20 PM

For what it’s worth, HK have remade (in metrics) the L7A2 (http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?166951-H-k-l7a2-gpmg) in two barrel lengths. It is supposed to be about 2 kg lighter. That should bring it down to about the same weight as an L4A4 and lighter than the standard Vector. Not sure why they didn’t just use the already metric (and heavier) MAG 58 as a starting point…..perhaps to do with licensing etc.

Precisely. The British government has the licence for the L7 and they gave it to HK to build guns for them; HK has apparently already delivered quite a lot of normal-length GPMGs to the British Army.

baboon6

04-29-2010, 10:44 PM

The ANZACs in NAM rarely used to wear even helmets, like the Rhodesians. I suppose you get used to it eventually (wearing a helmet that is). I'm pleased to say that I've had few exercises where we've had to wear them; I hated it. Then again, I've never had shrapnel coming in my direction.

They weren't really complaining about helmets too much (as you said they have probably worn them a lot), apparently the new Mk7 is better than the Mk6, but bitching about the 13kg tortoise shell that is Osprey.

William F. Owen

04-30-2010, 02:21 AM

You seem think almost always of infantry as being on the attack (or on patrol).
Well that would be an erroneous impression. I do not, and we very rarely discuss the dismounted defence.

Light machine guns of WWI had afaik primarily the value of being able to bolster the defense of a weakly occupied captured trench against counter-attacks.
True. By 1918 Commonwealth troops hugged a creeping barrage

They weren't primarily an offensive suppression weapon - especially not in the zone of well-prepared entrenchments.
The Platoon organisation was primarily offensive. The manuals say so explicitly.

William F. Owen

04-30-2010, 02:47 AM

If the enemy is hiding behind a wall 800m away of even 300m away then there is no firefight. If you are receiving effective fire then the enemy can see you to aim at you. Likewise then you can see them and direct fire on them.
.
Beaten zone of a PKM at 800m? Chance of spotting the firing point if it's a 8 x8 inch whole knocked in a wall?
-------------------

Perhaps it would be helpful to try and identify where and how and in which type of warfare machine guns are best located. Close range low visibility environment (jungle and dense bush) demand a different approach to dessert conditions.
I submit, that if you've made the right choices the weapons set will work almost everywhere, with some small adjustments.

Well lets keep it simple for the colonial boys who still exist. Stick to one caliber of ammunition at company level. I think the armies of the world have experimented with 5.56x45mm and maybe its time to come back to 7.62×51mm NATO?
I would be extremely careful of that assertion. I grew up in both all 7.62mm and then all 5.56mm Platoons. After much contemplation and research, I feel a mix is called for. 5.56mm in magazines, 7.62mm 4-BIT in belts.
It's not quite the "BREN gun and STEN gun" approach of the Palmach, but the round that works well for hand-held fire, is not the round that works best in an MG.

Moral of this story seems to be don't get your soldiers out of the projects but rather go find them out in the farm lands or get the physical training component of training up a few notches.
Well today there are very, very few farmers and the guys from the projects have a great deal to offer, especially when working in urban terrain.
Sure, I've seen hard lads from East London, terrified and confused by their first night in the woods, but they quickly get used to it, plus they know about 30 different ways to steal almost anything - which can be useful. :D

It is (in my humble opinion) more important to carry more belts for the gunner than the riflemen to carry more magazines for themselves. In many cases in our little war it was the riflemen who were there to protect the gunner (with his fire being directed by the stick commander ) while he did the business. Don't think of the machine gun as a personal weapon like a rifle think... firepower.
I would strongly agree. This was very much the lesson from both WW2 and the Falklands. It is yet again being re-learnt currently. The current catch phrase for weapons effect is "GMPG PLUS" as being the thing that does the killing.

Tukhachevskii

04-30-2010, 09:08 AM

I would be inclined to agree with you if the IAR is no or little heavier than an IW, like the HK416 or the LWRC. But in that case (and indeed along the lines of Webb) why call it an IAR? It would then really just be an improved assault rifle. That would make sense to me.

So I do think that a simplification here would make a lot of sense. Have ‘improved assault rifles’ that can be used on full auto when required and 7.62 beltfeds, anywhere between 7.62 Minimi and MAG 58. Then decide where those beltfeds need to be, and perhaps that should remain more flexible and situation dependant.
That of course negates Ken’s:

That is more likely to happen with IARs across the board as ‘improved assault rifles’.:eek: Yet it may still waste less ammo then the current situation with a bit of everything, or in fact so much of everything else that IWs are hardly carried anymore (slight exaggeration there;)).

Exactly. I understand the ammunition expenditure problem but surely training/fire discipline will alleviate that to some degree. Lets take the following, admittedly simplistic (and, yes, somewhat childish), example as a point of discussion; In terms of full auto use imagine a 6 man fire team equipped with IARs / True Auto rifles...” Charlie fire team, 400m, enemy RPG team, full auto, one magazine, Fire!” For that specific engagement you have six barrels firing 30rds each at a specific target at, what, 600rds/pm on cyclic for each gun which amounts to 3,600 rds/pm total for the three seconds (and 180 rds down range) it takes each man to empty his 30 rd mag. That’s an impressive amount of “suppressive/ destructive” fire fired at a controlled rate with minimum expenditure (in a theoretically pure case rather than in combat conditions) compared with a SAW/LMG firing 200rds link (firing in bursts of say 10-20 and taking much longer). Ally that to HE projectors of the MGL-140/M203 kind firing HEDP or even Hellhounds (http://www.defensereview.com/1_31_2004/MEI%20HELLHOUND.pdf) (or even a SMAW/LAW) from an adjacent fire team and you’re most enemy’s worst nightmare (grammer?). The mag fed IARs ammunition expenditure should actually be less given proper fire discipline drills. Fire team cdr then orders fire team to revert to burst or single shot mode. Flexibility is retained all round while devastating firepower is available on tap as it were where and when needed (a SAW/LMG is always as SAW/LMG) for better overall weight distribution amongst the team (of course, I haven’t factored in the magazine weight or anything else a grown up would/should consider). Given that IARs would also weigh less than SAW/LMGs and, if issued as proper IW, would have better sights (an assumption based on literature rather than experience) and would be easier to “swing into action”. The weight saved having to carry an LMG/SAW could be replaced with something meatier (HE wise; say a couple of LAWs per man instead of the 200 rd belt). True GPMGs located in the coy spt plt (say a section of four guns manned by three-four men each) could then exploit the range and capabilities of a SF GPMG in the grazing, plunging, searching, traverse & search modes rather than just the usual fixed direction mode (single aim point) employed at squad/fire team level (although I realise that’s METT-T flexible/dependant). Forgive the maths, never was my strong point but the above is just an example of how I personally try to get my head around such matters.

Tukhachevskii

04-30-2010, 09:09 AM

I would love to read this contact report. Especially as they knew where the TB were in order to engage then with mortar fire but were unable to direct any of the others weapons onto the target.

The following quote is from Doug Beattie MC An Ordinary Soldier (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Ordinary-Soldier-Afghanistan-Ferocious-Impossible/dp/1847373763) which describes a contact by two Brit WMIKs and sixteen ANA with Taliban fighters on the outskirts of a village (not as I had earlier stated a fight between a pure Brit plt and Taliban);

There were three of them-no, four. Out in the open, just to the right of the building I had seen several Taliban fighters using as cover; repeatedly darting out of it to fire short bursts towards the Afghan policemen who were fifty meters in front of us.

The enemy were also using RPGs. As I put my binoculars to my eyes again, a blast shook the ground in front of our position.

“Geordie”, I yelled. “Bring up the 51mm mortar”

He ran forward, hunched over, carrying the short tube in one hand, a bag full of bombs in the other; they were a mixture of smoke and high-explosive rounds.

From where he was, crouched down beside my vehicle [Land Rover WMIK], he wasn’t able to see the human targets who were becoming ever more brazen, standing out in full view, squirting bullets in our direction, and now only occasionally disappearing back into and behind the house probably to reload. I estimated that they were some 400 metres away. It would be up to me to relay back the firing information to Geordie. I could see where his weapon was pointing and it didn’t look good. I shouted out instructions.
I glanced down again to see him adjusting the weapon’s range to 400 metres and then turn forty-five degrees clockwise. He bedded it into the soft sand so the recoil would not throw the bomb off its intended trajectory. He was ready.

‘I want you to fire a smoke round so I can see what you are like for line. I will bring you in from there’.

Geordie knelt up and dropped a shell down the barrel, grabbed hold of the firing lanyard and pulled it sharply. There was a whoomph as the mortar kicked into life and the smoke bomb shot out. I kept peering through my binos, waiting for the impact; waiting, waiting. There it was; a plume of white smoke billowing up from a point some twenty metres in front of the enemy position, drifting lazily towards them.

All four men were in view once more, three standing, firing with their rifles, the other down on one knee about to unleash another RPG.

‘Good line, Geordie. Try adding another 100 in range and this time go with the HE’

Chipper stood ready with another round as Geordie made the necessary changes. He took the bomb, safety pin out, and dropped it down the tube. Bang. The second mortar was spat out.

What I expected to see was the round dropping somewhere close enough to the enemy for them to be brought to their senses, forcing them to dash for cover. What I actually saw was an impact as precise as any I had ever witnessed. The bomb landed no more than five meters [my emphasis] from its intended target, just to the right of the group as I looked at them.
All four were flung to the ground as if rag dolls; either thrown off their feet by the force of the blast or cut down by shards of flying shrapnel and lumps of rock. Probably both.

‘Great shot, Geordie. Keep it there’. I shouted, professional pride overcoming any sense of revulsion, shock or horror at what I was seeing. For good measure Steve continued pumping away with the .50-cal.

My attention remained glued on the site of the explosion. Two of the men were motionless. The others were moving; one only just, the second writhing about. Geordie had fired three more HE rounds. The first of these landed almost exactly were the first had exploded, almost within spitting distance of the man who had been frantically twisting and turning on the ground. Now he lay completely still. The next two rounds landed well short, but it didn’t matter; the damage had been done’. (pp.183-185)

Kiwigrunt

04-30-2010, 09:54 AM

Hmmmm, that doesn’t look very impressive. Two WMIKs with at least one HMG and presumably 2 GPMGs, at least all of their IWs, and they need a mortar to deal to 4 TB hopping about in the open at 400 m. I hope that’s not an accurate account of what happened; certainly with regards to the ‘in the open’ bit.

Firn

04-30-2010, 10:17 AM

Looking back to WWI:

THE AEF WAY OF WAR: THE AMERICAN ARMY
AND COMBAT IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR

...

During the latter phases, when no barrage existed, “the officers and men were too reckless,” often charging enemy machine guns, instead of outflanking them. 102 Even the division commander remarked that generally “there was no time wasted in flanking these obstacles; the men . . . took them all by frontal attack and at the point of the bayonet.” 103

...

Buck reported that his “leading waves” were “not thin enough,” and he wanted at least eight toten paces between riflemen when advancing under fire. “Better still,” he suggested, would be an irregular line of small columns at wide intervals, each small column being an independent unit whose mission is to gain the flank or rear of machine gun nests, with the permission to advance rapidly or slowly according to conditions of the resistance met, always picking its way through barrages or areas swept by machine gun fire. These small columns (4, 6, or 8 men each) should have Chauchat rifles, or V-Bs [rifle grenades], or hand grenades, but the absence of any or all of these should not alter the action of purpose of the group.104

...

"It was by observation of the Moroccans in this action that the regiment learned the
method of advance ordinarily utilized by European veterans, whereby the assault line,
having lost the barrage, progressed steadily forward, individuals, under the eye of their
squad leaders, moving at a run from shell-hole to shell-hole. When stopped by
resistance,--usually a machine gun,--the squad, section, or platoon engaged it by fire
from the front, while flankers immediately worked around with rifles and grenades to
take it from the flank. It was a common saying in the 1st Division that the Moroccans
taught them how to fight." (p73)

...

The division’s officers took a number of actions to solve these problems. Junior officers who reported that “Infantry is handicapped against organized machine gun nests without the mortars or one pounders [37mm],” made certain they always went forward with those pieces in the future, and they learned to make good use of them.107 Summerall ordered an investigation into the use of machine guns and automatic rifles, directed changes to the way the guns were to be advanced during battle (always “from cover to cover” behind the leading waves, with a forward observer looking for prospective fire missions), made improvements in their method of ammunition supply (every rifleman would carry a clip for the Chauchat), and stressed the importance of their fire during the attack (he claimed that one of the primary “lessons” of Soissons “was the great advantage of employing all of the machine guns in the most powerful manner to support the infantry”).108 Summerall even announced the heresy that “the service rifle” was “greatly inferior in value” to the automatic rifle, and he directed that every rifleman be trained to shoot the automatic. (p74)

...

During this period Summerall also issued a directive specifying how he wanted his infantry tofight, and it shows that he expected it to make maximum use of its available firepower.

"Hostile strongpoints and machine guns must not impede the advance of any part of the
line not obstructed by them. They will be vigorously reduced by the intense fire of
machine guns, automatic rifles, Stokes mortars and 37mm guns, and the accompanying
artillery. Under cover of this fire the infantry must advance by rushes around the flanks,
in small groups or individually, accompanied by automatic rifles.5"

The standard service rifle was conspicuously absent from the list of crucial infantry weapons. Also, in keeping with the directives of Pershing’s newly issued Combat Instructions, Summerall intended to employ a few light guns as accompanying artillery pieces in order to give the infantry more power. He likewise directed that all twelve machine guns of each machine-gun company would be used to advance the infantry in all attacks, and that each gun was to follow all infantry advances with a minimum of 2,500 rounds.

This little snippets must of course be seen in the context of the concept of a late WWI set-piece attack. The relative importance on the infantry weapons increased in the more fluid phases and semi-open warfare as the coordination with the artillery became more difficult.

It really seems that the upper brass went to Europe with great faith in the rifle, the bayonet and the will of the soldier and tried to defend their doctrine. Younger and lower ranks adapted generally much more quickly.

Going back to the topic one can see just how much and how rapidly the importance of the auxiliary infantry weapons increased, just like the one of the combined arms (artillery, tanks and aircraft) did on a larger scale.

Machine guns, light 37mm guns, automatic rifles, hand grenades, (WP, HE) rifle grenades, flamethrowers, bangalore torpedos became very important indeed. Specialists like "bombers" were selected and trained for specific tasks with 10-15 hand or rifle grenades. (The same concept was used by German raiding parties in WWII) The automatic rifle (Chauchats) was a key element for the infantry during the attacks and seems to have had a very strong influence on the concept of the BAR.

I was never quite aware just how massive the production of rifle grenades was both in WWI and WWII. I have never fired a rifle grenade, perhaps this is the major reason why this important component of the platoons and squads of the two World Wars remained under my personal radar.

Firn

P.S: (Wiki)
The initial two-man Chauchat team was also found insufficient and eventually grew to a four-man squad by October 1917 (the squad leader, the gunner, the assistant gunner who handled the magazines plus one additional magazine carrier). Later on, during the German spring offensive of 1918, the war had moved out of the mud of the trenches and into open fields thus making the guns more reliable and easier to maintain. Furthermore, French infantry regiments had been reorganized into multiple small (18 men) combat groups ("Demi-Sections de Combat"). Those were made up of a full Chauchat squad plus four VB (Viven-Bessiere) rifle grenade specialists and eight conventional grenadiers/riflemen. At this point in time, in 1918, the preserved French regimental records and statistics of medals given to Chauchat gunners document that they had contributed in no small part to the success of the new infantry tactics. Those were focused on the suppression of enemy machine gun nests by the combined action of portable (Chauchat) automatic fire plus the VB rifle grenades, always used within a range of less than 200 yards.

Uboat509

04-30-2010, 11:19 AM

Exactly. I understand the ammunition expenditure problem but surely training/fire discipline will alleviate that to some degree. Lets take the following, admittedly simplistic (and, yes, somewhat childish), example as a point of discussion; In terms of full auto use imagine a 6 man fire team equipped with IARs / True Auto rifles...” Charlie fire team, 400m, enemy RPG team, full auto, one magazine, Fire!” For that specific engagement you have six barrels firing 30rds each at a specific target at, what, 600rds/pm on cyclic for each gun which amounts to 3,600 rds/pm total for the three seconds (and 180 rds down range) it takes each man to empty his 30 rd mag. That’s an impressive amount of “suppressive/ destructive” fire fired at a controlled rate with minimum expenditure (in a theoretically pure case rather than in combat conditions) compared with a SAW/LMG firing 200rds link (firing in bursts of say 10-20 and taking much longer). Ally that to HE projectors of the MGL-140/M203 kind firing HEDP or even Hellhounds (http://www.defensereview.com/1_31_2004/MEI%20HELLHOUND.pdf) (or even a SMAW/LAW) from an adjacent fire team and you’re most enemy’s worst nightmare (grammer?). The mag fed IARs ammunition expenditure should actually be less given proper fire discipline drills. Fire team cdr then orders fire team to revert to burst or single shot mode. Flexibility is retained all round while devastating firepower is available on tap as it were where and when needed (a SAW/LMG is always as SAW/LMG) for better overall weight distribution amongst the team (of course, I haven’t factored in the magazine weight or anything else a grown up would/should consider). Given that IARs would also weigh less than SAW/LMGs and, if issued as proper IW, would have better sights (an assumption based on literature rather than experience) and would be easier to “swing into action”. The weight saved having to carry an LMG/SAW could be replaced with something meatier (HE wise; say a couple of LAWs per man instead of the 200 rd belt). True GPMGs located in the coy spt plt (say a section of four guns manned by three-four men each) could then exploit the range and capabilities of a SF GPMG in the grazing, plunging, searching, traverse & search modes rather than just the usual fixed direction mode (single aim point) employed at squad/fire team level (although I realise that’s METT-T flexible/dependant). Forgive the maths, never was my strong point but the above is just an example of how I personally try to get my head around such matters.

My question would be, why do you need 180 rounds down range in three seconds? If they are disciplined then we can presume that even with the stress levels way up they can shoot well enough to get the rounds close to the target even if they don't hit it at first. I'm not sure that 180 rounds snapping past your head in three seconds really has that much more suppressive effect than say, 15-20 single shots snapping past your head in the same amount of time. I don't even know that a lot of people would register the difference once the stress response kicks in. In any case, fully automatic fire will never be as accurate as semi-auto and this is especially true with rifles which are lighter and more prone to barrel climb.
Taking all that into account, you have now expended ~ 14% of your ammunition (for those 6 guns) in the first three seconds of the engagement and you haven't even begun to maneuver on the target yet. You still have to suppress for whatever time it takes for whatever action is taken, whether it is the textbook bold flanking maneuver, bounding forward, breaking contact or whatever.

GI Zhou

04-30-2010, 01:24 PM

Uboat509

04-30-2010, 01:46 PM

I forgot to mention earlier that the Australian Army has apparently decided to get rid of the MAG-58 in the indirect fire sustained fire machine gun role. They will swap them for M2 .50cal Brownings which will be used to provide indirect fire. Now that will stop light vehicles as the projectiles will go through light steel even at long ranges and will be more accurate with its heavier streamilned projectile. Dead ground and light overhead cover has just become a mite less safer.

I am assuming that you are referring to the defense. We have never had an indirect fire role for our machine guns, unless that is just a different term for plunging fire but even that is not a role. The role of the machine gun is the same, it's just the terrain that may different. I am a bit confused by this change though. That is a pretty significant change in equipment, going from a GPMG that is common in many Western light infantry forces to a heavy machine gun that is rarely seen anywhere but mounted on a vehicle. There really isn't space in the infantry for an M2 except for mounted on a vehicle.

Ken White

04-30-2010, 02:34 PM

I am assuming that you are referring to the defense. We have never had an indirect fire role for our machine guns, unless that is just a different term for plunging fire but even that is not a role.in Viet Nam -- as did many things... :(

It is not a role, it is a capability that has uses, particularly but not only in the defense. It isn't that hard, basically just putting plunging fire on reverse slopes, in trench lines, wadis, ditches or other defilade positions. It is most accurate when done from the tripod but can be done on the bipod simply by walking the bullet strikes as long as they are visible.

Not many today have a clue about this:LINK (http://browningmgs.com/Clinometer/Clinometer.htm). :wry:

Tukhachevskii

04-30-2010, 02:36 PM

My question would be, why do you need 180 rounds down range in three seconds? If they are disciplined then we can presume that even with the stress levels way up they can shoot well enough to get the rounds close to the target even if they don't hit it at first. I'm not sure that 180 rounds snapping past your head in three seconds really has that much more suppressive effect than say, 15-20 single shots snapping past your head in the same amount of time. I don't even know that a lot of people would register the difference once the stress response kicks in. In any case, fully automatic fire will never be as accurate as semi-auto and this is especially true with rifles which are lighter and more prone to barrel climb.
Taking all that into account, you have now expended ~ 14% of your ammunition (for those 6 guns) in the first three seconds of the engagement and you haven't even begun to maneuver on the target yet. You still have to suppress for whatever time it takes for whatever action is taken, whether it is the textbook bold flanking maneuver, bounding forward, breaking contact or whatever.

Yep, all good points. It was just meant as an example if what could be done as a technique to replace SAW/LMG fire when needed without actually needing a SAW/LMG. More for me to chew over. Ta for the feedback.

William F. Owen

04-30-2010, 03:03 PM

GI Zhou

04-30-2010, 10:03 PM

JMA

05-01-2010, 12:07 AM

in Viet Nam -- as did many things... :(

It is not a role, it is a capability that has uses, particularly but not only in the defense. It isn't that hard, basically just putting plunging fire on reverse slopes, in trench lines, wadis, ditches or other defilade positions. It is most accurate when done from the tripod but can be done on the bipod simply by walking the bullet strikes as long as they are visible.

Not many today have a clue about this:LINK (http://browningmgs.com/Clinometer/Clinometer.htm). :wry:

I wonder how much emphasis is placed on teaching "the theory of small arms fire" to officers and senior NCOs today? Maybe a lack of understanding in this leads to missed opportunities?

I see this training as the means of keeping the use of machine guns in a sustained fire role alive as a concept and as a tactical option.

Of course all these permanent and semi permanent base camps are defensive positions and should theoretically benefit from the strategic siting of machine guns in the sustained fire role. Is it being done?

Ammunition to supply machine guns employed in this role is always going to be an issue and apart from in static bases and when deployed virtually right up to its firing position by vehicle I don't see their employment being feasiable. It seems todays soldiers can bearly carry the own weapons an personal load with out now expecting them to hump 1,000 roads for the MGs on top of that.

I found this link which I perused and it was such a happy nostalgia trip. It helps when an instructor loves his subject with a passion (as my sergeant major instructor did) as the enthusiasm tends to rub off:

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-22-68/index.html

JMA

05-01-2010, 12:25 AM

JMA

05-01-2010, 12:47 AM

I submit, that if you've made the right choices the weapons set will work almost everywhere, with some small adjustments.

I would be extremely careful of that assertion. I grew up in both all 7.62mm and then all 5.56mm Platoons. After much contemplation and research, I feel a mix is called for. 5.56mm in magazines, 7.62mm 4-BIT in belts.
It's not quite the "BREN gun and STEN gun" approach of the Palmach, but the round that works well for hand-held fire, is not the round that works best in an MG.

I would strongly agree. This was very much the lesson from both WW2 and the Falklands. It is yet again being re-learnt currently. The current catch phrase for weapons effect is "GMPG PLUS" as being the thing that does the killing.

I don't have an educated position on what caliber best to use for rifles so I will leave it there. I do however, note that the issue of range has come up in the odd thread... as has the effect thereof on individual markmanship ability (or the lack thereof) of the individual soldier.

JMA

05-01-2010, 01:12 AM

I said: “If the enemy is hiding behind a wall 800m away of even 300m away then there is no firefight. If you are receiving effective fire then the enemy can see you to aim at you. Likewise then you can see them and direct fire on them.”

Beaten zone of a PKM at 800m? Chance of spotting the firing point if it's a 8 x8 inch whole knocked in a wall?

Beaten zone? Don't know at that range but I have my doubts that the fire could be effective fired from a bipod. There is another thing here. These long range contacts where people actually take cover. Why are troops walking around in such open areas? Are they expecting to find the TB hiding under the stones? So then they get caught out in the open where the field of vision is 400, 500, 800m and they take cover????????

It seems that sometimes they have vehicles, then why don't they lay down some supporting fire and then carry the troops forward. Or has something changed recently? I was taught that the role of the infantry was to close will and kill the enemy. Not sit back and lob a few mortars then go home for tea.

----------------------

I said: “Moral of this story seems to be don't get your soldiers out of the projects but rather go find them out in the farm lands or get the physical training component of training up a few notches.”

Well today there are very, very few farmers and the guys from the projects have a great deal to offer, especially when working in urban terrain.
Sure, I've seen hard lads from East London, terrified and confused by their first night in the woods, but they quickly get used to it, plus they know about 30 different ways to steal almost anything - which can be useful. :D

Maybe not farmers but there are still a lot of rural boys whose day includes a high degree of physical labour. But then if the skinny malnourished city kids are recruited into the army then the physical development component (not just the physical exercise component) needs to be scientifically introduced into both training and the regimental life thereafter.

Some say the kit is too heavy. Too heavy for whom? Any kit will always be too heavy for weaklings but where is the benchmark in all this? I hear people say that the MAG and 500 rds is too heavy. So I ask again, too heavy for whom? Can you see where I'm coming from?

Chris jM

05-01-2010, 05:07 AM

errr.... really? How can you use the M2 for "Map predicted fire?".

I've never seen an indirect fire kit for an M2 - Will it use the C2 sight?
Beaten zone for an M2 at 3,000m?
Cyclic rate of an M2?

Does not sound well thought through to me.

I've done map-predicted on the M2 in training. It was explained that it served 'harassing' fire purposes against a particularly vulnerable enemy target but we were told unofficially that it also served to bridge a skill-set gap between HMG crews and mortar-men - the idea being that the FSCC could be manned by either branches, and having an elementary knowledge of throwing rounds indirectly from a .50 would assist in appreciating what a mortar crew went through.

I'm not going to defend either proposition - at the time I thought it rather pointless an endeavor, and still do. In answer to your questions though - yes, you do use the C2 sight in an identical fashion to calculating a mortar fire mission, only with the .50 tables. I cannot remember the beaten zone and would have to consult a manual but it was substantially smaller than a mortar pl's beaten zone in the default pattern of four guns converging.

As dubious as the effect is, conducting a pl night-shoot with all tracer is a sight to behold.

Chris jM

05-01-2010, 05:17 AM

I don't know much about it other than what I have read. I expect it would have a greater range than 3,000m and its cyclic fire is sufficient for the role as from memory they are not fired continuously. It would be great against choke points. I expect it would use the C2 sight for want of something better and a soft recoil mount.

The range is out to half-a-kilometer-ish, from rough memory. Using a C2 sight you do indeed require the soft-mount, although I do know that there are now computer units that will provide you a firing solution for both .50 and 40mm if your willing to invest sufficient dosh.

From my reading you would only ever fire all allocated guns simultaneously. Like anything indirect, the best effect would be achieved in the opening minutes of initiation when you have surprise on your side.

I can't think of a tactical situation where you would have the time to deliver HMG indirect fire against a target within the 5 km radius when mortars at the very least could do the job far better. Combine this with the fact that MG's are normally sited in a defilading position, it can be a very impractical undertaking to move your entire gun out of a pit to be orientated to the map-predicted target which it is unlikely to be able to cover from its primary arcs.

William F. Owen

05-01-2010, 05:31 AM

I've done map-predicted on the M2 in training. It was explained that it served 'harassing' fire purposes against a particularly vulnerable enemy target but we were told unofficially that it also served to bridge a skill-set gap between HMG crews and mortar-men - the idea being that the FSCC could be manned by either branches, and having an elementary knowledge of throwing rounds indirectly from a .50 would assist in appreciating what a mortar crew went through.
Do you mean "Map predicted" or "Pre-registered." Back in the day, "Pre registered meant direct fire, where you sighted in in daylight and had the shoot dialled in at night.
Map Predicted meant shooting to 4,000m + in the low trajectory against targets you could not see, or observe the fall of shot. - something that came from WW1 and not a very good idea, IMO.

I just cannot see how you can do that effectively with an M2. Very low ROF, very heavy, and very accurate - so no beaten zone!

William F. Owen

05-01-2010, 05:41 AM

Maybe not farmers but there are still a lot of rural boys whose day includes a high degree of physical labour. But then if the skinny malnourished city kids are recruited into the army then the physical development component (not just the physical exercise component) needs to be scientifically introduced into both training and the regimental life thereafter.
Well that's why you do training. :D My Regiment recruited from both rural area and big cities. I have to say, apart from the banter, I never really noticed a difference, but that was Britain in the 1980's not Rhodesia in the 60's.

Some say the kit is too heavy. Too heavy for whom? Any kit will always be too heavy for weaklings but where is the benchmark in all this? I hear people say that the MAG and 500 rds is too heavy. So I ask again, too heavy for whom? Can you see where I'm coming from?
The real issue today is body armour, not weapons weight. When your body armour weighs what a Mag does, the the weight of the Mag and 500 rounds is TOO heavy.

Chris jM

05-01-2010, 05:50 AM

Do you mean "Map predicted" or "Pre-registered."

No, I am talking about map-predicted. As in, (and this is from memory, so excuse any basic errors in process) orders come in to fire into Grid XXXX YYYY, which is then plotted onto a map, bearing calculated and converted to the gun-line, the range is likewise id'd and elevation is calculated through the use of tables (identical process to a mortar fire mission). The HMG crews then use their C2 site to level off their guns and put in the data from the FSCC which they then fire on command - so yes, when I say map predicted fire I'm not making a mistake nor making things up. Pre-registered is a far simpler undertaking!

William F. Owen

05-01-2010, 06:01 AM

- so yes, when I say map predicted fire I'm not making a mistake nor making things up. Pre-registered is a far simpler undertaking!
OK, just checking.... :)

And the M2 has some sort of effect? I was always very doubtful of the GPMG in this role and the M2 would seem even less so.

Chris jM

05-01-2010, 06:26 AM

OK, just checking.... :)

And the M2 has some sort of effect? I was always very doubtful of the GPMG in this role and the M2 would seem even less so.

Apologies, I didn't mean to come across up-tight or defensive (which on a re-read of my post, I did). Yours was a legitimate query wondering if I had got it wrong, as pre-registered fire is common sense and map predicted is not.

Effect? Would have no idea. However, given that we had been hauling the HMG kit dismounted for that FTX we were more enthusiastic about getting rid of the ammo than we were about what was happening at the other end!!

I agree with you in that a MG (HMG, GPMG, etc) in the indirect role is at best novel misuse, and at most completely stupid.

Tukhachevskii

05-01-2010, 10:14 AM

The 1918 Platoon was 4 x 7 man sections. 2 Gun Sections had 1 x Lewis gun each, and the other sections had Rifles and Rifle grenades. It grew out of what worked in WW1.

The scheme of manoeuvre was formally laid out in the 1919 "Soft Spots" manual. basically, no one moves unless there are 3 sections giving covering fire, and the aim is always to get the gun-sections closer to the enemy.

Wilfs comments jogged my memory and reminded me of Fuller’s regarding the lewis gun’s role in the platoon attack from J. F. C. Fuller, Foundations of the Science of War, Chapter VIII The Physical Sphere of War (http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/foundation/found_c8_c9.pdf) (the entire text, and some other very interesting works by other authors, is available here (http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/content.asp#found) courtesy of the US Army Command and General Staff College);

By strategy an enemy is out-manoeuvred; that is, he is placed in a bad position from which to hit out. First it should be remembered that the purpose of tactics is similar to that of strategy, namely to carry out the intention of the commander- his plan. The instrument is not only the troops but the organization of the troops. Organization must be maintained. Further movement must be maintained, or at least the power to move must exist when the commander desires to move. We here get as our battle problem the maintenance of a moving organized body of men. This body must be able to move, and it must remain organized. The enemy is attempting to stop this movement, not only by killing and wounding our men, but by destroying their organization. We must, therefore, protect our men and their organization, and we do so to a great extent through offensive action. By hitting we reduce the chances of being hit.

Tactical action may, therefore, be defined as: protected organized movement through offensive action. To accomplish this we require three orders of troops. Troops which will protect the attackers, troops which can attack, and troops which can pursue. These three orders remain fundamental, and to pull their full weight they must co-operate-that is, work together to attain a common object. In a present-day army these orders are represented by artillery, infantry, and cavalry; and the reason why in the last great war a decision was so long delayed was due to:
(i.) The immobility of artillery.
(ii.) The defensive strength of infantry.
(iii.) The offensive weakness of cavalry.

The number of guns employed and the enormous supply of ammunition required tied artillery down to definite areas, and as intensity of fire had to be maintained, and guns cannot fire when in movement, the result was that when they had to move the attack virtually had to be suspended. The defensive power of infantry and the lack of ability on the part of cavalry to pursue needs no accentuation. What we have got to do now is to think in the terms of the elements of war and make good the above deficiencies. Thus, artillery must be endowed with a higher power of movement. Infantry must be endowed with higher offensive power, and cavalry must be more highly protected. I have laid down three orders of troops from the major point of view, now I will examine them from the minor-the tactical organization and co-operation of the attackers themselves.

According to the accepted theory of war, the true attackers are the infantry. They attack from the base supplied them by the protective troops-the gunners-and on defeating the enemy’s infantry, theoretically, they form a base for cavalry action. If, from the major point of view, three orders of troops are necessary, so also are they necessary from the minor. Consequently an infantry platoon should be a threefold organization, and it virtually is one. To prove this I will first divide the platoon into two equal parts, a forward body and a reserve-the left and right fists of a boxer. Both consist of two weapons-a protective weapon, the Lewis gun, and an offensive weapon, the rifle. The object of the forward division is to deprive the enemy of power to move, so that the reserve division may move forward and destroy him. The reserve may assist the forward body by protective fire, but, in any case, the Lewis-gun section of the forward body should protect the advance of the rifle section. Thus we find, in miniature, the tactics of an army repeating themselves in the platoon. The forward Lewis gun is the field artillery, the forward rifle section the infantry, and the reserves the cavalry and horse artillery. But, whilst theoretically the cavalry in pursuit can move faster than infantry in flight, in the platoon battle the reserve cannot do so. Consequently, whilst in the main battle the object of the infantry is to disorganize the enemy's infantry so that the cavalry can pursue, in the platoon battle the object of the forward division is to fix or hold its antagonist until the reserve division can move forward and disorganize him. Each time such a disorganization is effected the enemy's battle-body sustains a scratch. In the infantry attack as conceived to-day an antagonist is scratched to pieces. The diagram (No. 13) shows what I mean [see image attached below]. D is the enemy; A is the forward Lewis-gun section; and B the forward rifle section; C is the reserve. Under the protective fire of A, B manoeuvres, and through offensive action fixes D. When once D is fixed, C makes the fullest use of movement to manoeuvre into a position from which D can be annihilated or compelled to surrender.

Even in so small an action as this we see the close interplay between the three physical elements of war, and, through them, back to the three elements of force. Stability, activity, and co-operation (mobility) demand three types of weapons; these demand three types of soldiers; and these soldiers express their combined action in a threefold order of tactics, namely to protect, to fix, and to destroy or paralyse. Again we get a close relationship between strategy and tactics. The position occupied by A is first of all tactical-that is, offensive; secondly it is strategical-to cover the movement of B. B's movement is strategically, then tactical; and so also is C's. If strategy and tactics cannot be separated in the platoon, neither can they be separated in an army. Even if our force comprises three men, one should act protectively, one offensively, and the third in a mobile manner; even if only one man, he should protect himself with one fist, hit out with the other, and move by leg-power; and one man is our ultimate model, for one man is our military molecule. (my emphasis underlined, pp.170-173)

The mere addition of new weapons and means of movement and protection must not delude us into supposing that an army is guided by progress, for the " test " of progress is tactical idea. How are they being used ? This is the question. The answer is to be sought in the training manuals and on the manoeuvre grounds. Here we can learn how they are being used, and then, possessed with this information, we should turn to the weapons and means and ascertain their powers and limitations. Does tactical theory express them? If it does, then we learn that an army is thinking scientifically;
if not, then that its command is composed of alchemists. This is a tremendous and decisive discovery to make.

Next we should examine the military structure of organization. Does it admit the true tactical values of the means being expressed, and does it permit of a co-ordination of tactical structure and maintenance, and is it easily controllable ? To be controllable and maintainable it must be simple. Is it simple or complex ? Is it growing like the body of a man, or like an amorphous polypus : that is, is each new means accentuating the power of the elements of war by correlation, or by mere addition? If by addition, then we are faced by a monster, and monsters are seldom to be feared. As the power of each weapon is limited, so also is the force of an organization limited. What are its limitations, and how can they be overcome. (p.174, Fuller’s emphasis in italics; mine underlined)

William F. Owen

05-01-2010, 12:34 PM

Wilfs comments jogged my memory and reminded me of Fuller’s regarding the lewis gun’s role in the platoon attack from J. F. C. Fuller, Foundations of the Science of War, Chapter VIII The Physical Sphere of War (http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/foundation/found_c8_c9.pdf) (the entire text, and some other very interesting works by other authors, is available here (http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/content.asp#found) courtesy of the US Army Command and General Staff College);
Tukhas mate,

a.) Good job and well done for finding this. All new to me, as in...
b.) More good stuff, turned into utter b*llocks by Fuller's style of writing and byzantine thought process. He excelled in taking the simplest of ideas and making endlessly complicated and confusing.

Ken White

05-01-2010, 04:25 PM

I agree with you in that a MG (HMG, GPMG, etc) in the indirect role is at best novel misuse, and at most completely stupid.both novel misuse and stupid for the reasons that Wilf cites("Very low ROF, very heavy, and very accurate - so no beaten zone!").

For the GPMG, I don't agree that it is misuse or stupid though I fully acknowledge it would have little use in the types of warfare in which the the west currently engages. However, given an even slightly more intensive war against a like armed opponent and some use of the defense, be it hasty or deliberate and if delays and combat outpost lines are employed, the technique is valuable. Nor is it as complex as ChrisJM seems to imply. Further, while the mortar can indubitably do a better job in the indirect role, there are not nearly as many of them and they should go to the priority targets while the GPMGs with their poor accuracy and thus large beaten zone can do enough damage on the less important targets. Not to mention the times when the mortars are not available for one reason or another. Particularly valuable technique if your enemy has counterfire radar -- Mortar guys hate those, I bet...

I can see why Chris and Wilf alone here (of all you kids... :D) seem to have practiced it:
The Vickers was used for indirect fire against enemy positions at ranges up to 4,500 yards. This plunging fire was used to great effect against road junctions, trench systems, forming up points, and other locations that might be observed by a forward observer, or zeroed in at one time for future attacks, or guessed at by men using maps and experience. Sometimes a location might be zeroed in during the day, and then attacked at night, much to the surprise and confusion of the enemy. New Zealand units were especially fond of this use. A white disc would be set up on a pole near the MMG, and the gunner would aim at a mark on it, knowing that this corresponded to aiming at the distant target. There was a special back-sight with a tall extension on it for this purpose. The only similar weapon of the time to use indirect fire was the German MG 08, which had a separate attachment sight with range calculator. LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vickers_machine_gun).(emphasis added / kw)More here: LINK (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-22-68/c05.htm#sectioni), LINK (http://browningmgs.com/Clinometer/Clinometer.htm). The US used the firing tables and the clinometer as opposed to using the C2 Sight. The M60 MG had milled flats for placement of the Clinometer atop the two bands that attach the gas cylinder to the barrel.

William F. Owen

05-01-2010, 05:02 PM

For the GPMG, I don't agree that it is misuse or stupid though I fully acknowledge it would have little use in the types of warfare in which the the west currently engages. However, given an even slightly more intensive war against a like armed opponent and some use of the defense, be it hasty or deliberate and if delays and combat outpost lines are employed, the technique is valuable.
I fully concur that it is a skill that would have application in more regular warfare. Our "ideal" target was enemy bridging or ferry sites, to try and disrupt work rates etc - but it does require a lot of practice.

Nor is it as complex as ChrisJM seems to imply.
I never found it that easy either. While the C2 sight isn't that complex calculating the line of flight in the low trajectory and "terrain shadow" gave me a few problems!! :)

JMA

05-01-2010, 07:18 PM

Well that's why you do training. :D My Regiment recruited from both rural area and big cities. I have to say, apart from the banter, I never really noticed a difference, but that was Britain in the 1980's not Rhodesia in the 60's.

But just as we had "approach march" or "march and shoot" exercises to test the fitness for battle levels of the soldiers there should be a measure to test this in todays army. But it is yet another training question mark. It is strength and fitness which we can now add to question marks about marksmanship. To this we add question marks about tactical nous where platoons and companies patrol vast areas of open ground either as instructed or by choice and then we are left with the minor ractics ability. The prognosis is not good.

The real issue today is body armour, not weapons weight. When your body armour weighs what a Mag does, the the weight of the Mag and 500 rounds is TOO heavy.

When on the staff of the School of Infantry I came across a US publication where the wound locations from Vietnam were assessed. I remember a diagram of the human body front and rear where the areas of wounds by percentage were indicated. I am wondering if they have such stats on Afghanistan already? And any which relate to wounds and injuries which have been avoided through the use of body armour?

Don't see any chance of taking the body armour way at this stage as soldiers are probably psychologically 'hooked'. But I would suggest that they be required to wear the full body armour for at least a month prior to their 'tour' during their full working day including during and PT or runs etc. Conditioning is the key and this applies to the heavy helmets as well. After a month of that they won't notice the weight anymore. Then all you need to find is a hill for them to climb in full kit everyday just to tone those calf muscles up.

82redleg

05-02-2010, 02:23 AM

Don't see any chance of taking the body armour way at this stage as soldiers are probably psychologically 'hooked'. But I would suggest that they be required to wear the full body armour for at least a month prior to their 'tour' during their full working day including during and PT or runs etc. Conditioning is the key and this applies to the heavy helmets as well. After a month of that they won't notice the weight anymore. Then all you need to find is a hill for them to climb in full kit everyday just to tone those calf muscles up.

No amount of conditioning can make you superhuman. There is plenty of research that says the fighting load should be limited to about 45lbs before you start interfering with the ability to fight effectively. Well, full IBA and helmet is over 30lbs, so you are GOING to bust this, and no amount of conditioning is going to fix it. Guys that wear their kit and hump the mountains day-in and day-out for a year still get smoked, and can't catch a Taliban wearing a pair of flipflops and carrying an AK and 3 mags. That's part of the reason that we are using plate carriers, and testing other means of lightening the load.

Yes, the weight of just a MAG/M240 + ammo is doable. When you are carrying the weight of MAG + ammo, vest + helmet, and the rest of the crap you need, it becomes a serious degradation of capability.

Here is study done of my BDE during its first deployment to OEF, in 2003. It has been posted before. The weight of body armor has increased significantly since 2003, although it has started to drop. Where should we start cutting weight?

http://thedonovan.com/archives/modernwarriorload/ModernWarriorsCombatLoadReport.pdf

William F. Owen

05-02-2010, 04:11 AM

But just as we had "approach march" or "march and shoot" exercises to test the fitness for battle levels of the soldiers there should be a measure to test this in todays army. But it is yet another training question mark. It is strength and fitness which we can now add to question marks about marksmanship. To this we add question marks about tactical nous where platoons and companies patrol vast areas of open ground either as instructed or by choice and then we are left with the minor ractics ability. The prognosis is not good.
Well I cannot speak for the US, but the UK infantry are probably just as fit and just as robust as in past times. The same is probably true for their shooting.

..... but there are a number of pressing questions to be asked about UK infantry training, if only because what we did "back in the old days" was not good, and we might still be doing the same things today. IMO, a lot can be simplified. In my Kingdom, infantry training would be different from today and nothing like the bad old days.

I remember a diagram of the human body front and rear where the areas of wounds by percentage were indicated. I am wondering if they have such stats on Afghanistan already? And any which relate to wounds and injuries which have been avoided through the use of body armour?
For the UK, there is masses of data on every injury from Iraq and A'Stan, and it's all used to inform body armour design.
IMO, there are some sensible questions to be asked about body armour, especially the ballistic standards in relation to aerial density, and coverage.

jcustis

05-02-2010, 09:05 AM

The weight of body armor has increased significantly since 2003, although it has started to drop. Where should we start cutting weight?

At the level of the individual Marine or Soldier, conducting a foot patrol or similar offensive movement in a small war, there aren't to many weight savings to achieve, from what I have thought of. There are certainly ways to have troops hot rack sleeping bags or forego carrying an entire sleep system if the weather is temperate, but that's typically not a tough nut to crack because we have so many vehicles to move us about the battlespace and from COP to COP, when we get in the rut of commuting to work. Having said that, every ounce counts, and I think I posted a few thoughts on this topic in another thread:

-For starters, not every Marine needs to carry the exact same load during every mission. For example, does every rifleman need an entrenching tool when 1/2 should be posting security as the digging commences? This is a deliberate planning process that requires not only leadership, but someone who can be a critical thinker in terms of what is actually required. We've gotten dumb over the years and gone away from good mission planning at the small unit level. Remember the warnord format with special equipment and equipment common to all?

-Not everyone needs to carry the same ammunition loadout. Corpsmen may be carrying rifles for their T/E weapon nowadays, but do they really need a full 210 rounds? Maybe he could carry more IV bags, or a portion of some other Marine's water supply.

-We are issued water filtration systems to attach to our issued hydration bladders, and maybe some units do use them, but I suspect it's often as an in-extremis measure only. Taking their use seriously and planning for it can cut down on a margin of weight.

-As we strive to make webbing more durable, we invariably increase the weight. Again, it's just a few ounces we are dealing with, but it adds up. It would be nice to have a lighter piece of equipment like a chest rig harness, and know that if it becomes unserviceable, I won't have to go through a lot of drama with a damaged gear statement in order to get a replacement.

-Our IFAKs are too big for what we need them for, and most troops will plod along with that paperweight hanging on their belt until someone who thinks about the problem tells them to modify things. I'm likely in violation of the strict letter of the law with even my own unit's SOP, but I don't need both a boo-boo pack and a trauma pack on my person. I can get band-aids, tylenol, neosporin from the corpsman, so I don't carry that out on foot movements.

-We probably carry too much ammunition as a whole, considering the other assets that are around to support us. Foot patrolling in the Korengal? You probably need all you can carry. Conducting census operations in southern Helmand, with a section of MRAPs in support of your squad (rein) patrol? Perhaps some of your ammo can be left in an assault bag in the truck.

JMA

05-02-2010, 11:05 AM

No amount of conditioning can make you superhuman. There is plenty of research that says the fighting load should be limited to about 45lbs before you start interfering with the ability to fight effectively. Well, full IBA and helmet is over 30lbs, so you are GOING to bust this, and no amount of conditioning is going to fix it. Guys that wear their kit and hump the mountains day-in and day-out for a year still get smoked, and can't catch a Taliban wearing a pair of flipflops and carrying an AK and 3 mags. That's part of the reason that we are using plate carriers, and testing other means of lightening the load.

May I make a few comments.

Who defines what is superhuman? I am suggesting that we are starting to look at this from the wrong angle. If it is decided that the basic combat and approach march loads are to be set at a certain level then surely the ability of potential recruits to operate within these parameters is essential? The RAR (Rhodesian African Rifles) used to include a 'run' as part of their recruiting process. Something like 5 miles. Dropped the applicants off and then saw how long it took for them to get back to camp.

There is absolutely no point in signing up a weakling who will never be able to cope with the weight which is deemed to be 'essential' (what is essential or otherwise can be the subject of another debate).

Yes, the weight of just a MAG/M240 + ammo is doable. When you are carrying the weight of MAG + ammo, vest + helmet, and the rest of the crap you need, it becomes a serious degradation of capability.

OK, so its the body armour that is the center of the problem. One solution is to drop the body armour, another is to issue all soldiers 9mm pistols, then even another is to offer a $100m prize for the design and production of lightweight body armour. (all this said tongue firmly in cheek)

Then of course the next problem is that the soldiers arrive in a new war zone with the equipment scale from the last war. Has anyone sat down and worked through the modifications that are possible or necessary in the changing environment in Afghanistan? Or are they kitting up for a major sniper risk from another war zone which is a minor one in this one?

I believe that these units should arrive in Afghanistan dressed only in their fatigues and be issued with what kit and uniforms they need for AFGHANISTAN. How many years have the US been in Afghanistan? Is it not possible to have a specific Afghanistan equipment scale by now?

Troops on arrival in Afghanistan should route through a "battle school" where their fitness for battle is assessed. Certainly fitness would be a major component but also other theater specific training and information is passed on. (Maybe able to be carried out stateside as well)

Here is study done of my BDE during its first deployment to OEF, in 2003. It has been posted before. The weight of body armor has increased significantly since 2003, although it has started to drop. Where should we start cutting weight?

http://thedonovan.com/archives/modernwarriorload/ModernWarriorsCombatLoadReport.pdf

Thank you for that. That was dated 2003. Has there been a revision?

Actually it makes it worse. Yes it pegs the maximum combat load at 48lbs (21.7kg in the new language) but goes on to state that 72lbs (32.6kg) is the limit for approach marches. Is this being applied? Can it be applied?

Then it says: "When the mission demands that Soldiers be employed as porters, loads of up to 120 pounds can be carried for several days over distances of 20 km a day." How would that be possible? and what % of todays soldiers could achieve that?

So the logical question is whether the 82nd has as an annual test a long march over 4/5 days with a 120lb (54.4kg) load at 20km per day? And what would happen to soldiers who fail such a test?

JMA

05-02-2010, 11:25 AM

Well I cannot speak for the US, but the UK infantry are probably just as fit and just as robust as in past times. The same is probably true for their shooting.

Is that supportable with data?

..... but there are a number of pressing questions to be asked about UK infantry training, if only because what we did "back in the old days" was not good, and we might still be doing the same things today. IMO, a lot can be simplified. In my Kingdom, infantry training would be different from today and nothing like the bad old days.

I would love to hear more of your ideas.

For the UK, there is masses of data on every injury from Iraq and A'Stan, and it's all used to inform body armour design.
IMO, there are some sensible questions to be asked about body armour, especially the ballistic standards in relation to aerial density, and coverage.

What about using that data to assess whether given the cost, the actual reduction in wounding and the loss of mobility etc etc that body armour is in fact necessary for general issue rather than for issue only for certain types of operations. ( note I said "for certain types of operations" as oppossed to "to certain types of units only".)

I don't see any chance of the Brits making that data available in the public domain. Maybe the US have such data available?

JMA

05-02-2010, 11:35 AM

At the level of the individual Marine or Soldier, conducting a foot patrol or similar offensive movement in a small war, there aren't to many weight savings to achieve, from what I have thought of. There are certainly ways to have troops hot rack sleeping bags or forego carrying an entire sleep system if the weather is temperate, but that's typically not a tough nut to crack because we have so many vehicles to move us about the battlespace and from COP to COP, when we get in the rut of commuting to work. Having said that, every ounce counts, and I think I posted a few thoughts on this topic in another thread:

-For starters, not every Marine needs to carry the exact same load during every mission. For example, does every rifleman need an entrenching tool when 1/2 should be posting security as the digging commences? This is a deliberate planning process that requires not only leadership, but someone who can be a critical thinker in terms of what is actually required. We've gotten dumb over the years and gone away from good mission planning at the small unit level. Remember the warnord format with special equipment and equipment common to all?

-Not everyone needs to carry the same ammunition loadout. Corpsmen may be carrying rifles for their T/E weapon nowadays, but do they really need a full 210 rounds? Maybe he could carry more IV bags, or a portion of some other Marine's water supply.

-We are issued water filtration systems to attach to our issued hydration bladders, and maybe some units do use them, but I suspect it's often as an in-extremis measure only. Taking their use seriously and planning for it can cut down on a margin of weight.

-As we strive to make webbing more durable, we invariably increase the weight. Again, it's just a few ounces we are dealing with, but it adds up. It would be nice to have a lighter piece of equipment like a chest rig harness, and know that if it becomes unserviceable, I won't have to go through a lot of drama with a damaged gear statement in order to get a replacement.

-Our IFAKs are too big for what we need them for, and most troops will plod along with that paperweight hanging on their belt until someone who thinks about the problem tells them to modify things. I'm likely in violation of the strict letter of the law with even my own unit's SOP, but I don't need both a boo-boo pack and a trauma pack on my person. I can get band-aids, tylenol, neosporin from the corpsman, so I don't carry that out on foot movements.

-We probably carry too much ammunition as a whole, considering the other assets that are around to support us. Foot patrolling in the Korengal? You probably need all you can carry. Conducting census operations in southern Helmand, with a section of MRAPs in support of your squad (rein) patrol? Perhaps some of your ammo can be left in an assault bag in the truck.

I believe you are about to do your duty on OEF. Happy hunting.

Why not start with a blank sheet?

As the days pass you can list the items that you actually use and the frequency. The same with the men. At the end of a few months of combat you will have the basis for a Marine Crops Afghanistan essential equipment scale.

William F. Owen

05-02-2010, 12:28 PM

Is that supportable with data?

March and shoot qualifying times haven't changed, in some 35 years, and they didn't even formally exist until the mid 1970's. Details alter but the basics have all stayed the same.
...and I really don't buy the idea that the Infantry men of WW1 and 2 were physically fitter than those of today. Many of them may been more used to hard physical labour, but many more were not. The 1914 "Infantry Training" doesn't even specify any type of fitness standards apart from to say "men should be exercised."

I would love to hear more of your ideas.
I think I've got about 2,500+ posts, so there all basically in there somewhere. Type "William F. Owen" + Infantry into Google. May be interesting. Nothing very original.

What about using that data to assess whether given the cost, the actual reduction in wounding and the loss of mobility etc etc that body armour is in fact necessary for general issue rather than for issue only for certain types of operations.
That's a policy question. It's nothing to do with "Operational Effectiveness," It's all about "risk management."

I don't see any chance of the Brits making that data available in the public domain.
Correctomundo!

82redleg

05-02-2010, 03:50 PM

Thank you for that. That was dated 2003. Has there been a revision?

Actually it makes it worse. Yes it pegs the maximum combat load at 48lbs (21.7kg in the new language) but goes on to state that 72lbs (32.6kg) is the limit for approach marches. Is this being applied? Can it be applied?

Then it says: "When the mission demands that Soldiers be employed as porters, loads of up to 120 pounds can be carried for several days over distances of 20 km a day." How would that be possible? and what % of todays soldiers could achieve that?

So the logical question is whether the 82nd has as an annual test a long march over 4/5 days with a 120lb (54.4kg) load at 20km per day? And what would happen to soldiers who fail such a test?

There was not a revision- it was a fact finding mission that was conducted in 2003. The numbers are all from FM 21-28 (it's probably been re-numbered, but not updated), Footmarches, so it is standard US Army doctrine, not something specific to the 82nd.

I think most, if not all, of my Soldiers could have executed 120lbs over 20kms for several days, given that the pace wasn't too fast- we would probably have taken 8 hours (just a guess), with regular breaks, to cover the 20kms, instead of 3 hours like we practiced with 50lb loads. You can move fast, or you can carry alot of weight, but you can't do both.

Regarding what is superhuman, I mean that top 1% that physical behemoths can execute- that point that makes Olympians special, that you can't train to. There is a specific average capacity in human beings, and you can't train most past that. A few can do outstanding things- that's why they are special and set world records. If you set your "standards" too high, you will eliminate most of the recruiting pool. And being used to hard physical labor is only a partial solution- when you work on a farm you use every trick in the book to minimize the brute strength you use- yeah, somethings just have to be manhandled, but most can be worked around. In Infantry combat, you don't have that option- if you have to go over the wall, you go over the wall, you can't think about how to find a way around it while you are getting shot at, like you can while you are doing other things that need doing on a farm.

JMA

05-02-2010, 05:43 PM

There was not a revision- it was a fact finding mission that was conducted in 2003. The numbers are all from FM 21-28 (it's probably been re-numbered, but not updated), Footmarches, so it is standard US Army doctrine, not something specific to the 82nd.

And these figures were arrived at through what method? There must have some means used to arrive at the 48lbs (21.7kg) limit for combat load just as for the approach march load of 72lbs (32.6kg).

I think most, if not all, of my Soldiers could have executed 120lbs over 20kms for several days, given that the pace wasn't too fast- we would probably have taken 8 hours (just a guess), with regular breaks, to cover the 20kms, instead of 3 hours like we practiced with 50lb loads. You can move fast, or you can carry a lot of weight, but you can't do both.

If that is a specific army requirement then shouldn't that form part of an annual test of sorts? Should you not use the 72lbs (32.6kg) test if you are marching for three hours (approach march)?

Regarding what is superhuman, I mean that top 1% that physical behemoths can execute- that point that makes Olympians special, that you can't train to. There is a specific average capacity in human beings, and you can't train most past that. A few can do outstanding things- that's why they are special and set world records. If you set your "standards" too high, you will eliminate most of the recruiting pool. And being used to hard physical labor is only a partial solution- when you work on a farm you use every trick in the book to minimize the brute strength you use- yeah, somethings just have to be manhandled, but most can be worked around. In Infantry combat, you don't have that option- if you have to go over the wall, you go over the wall, you can't think about how to find a way around it while you are getting shot at, like you can while you are doing other things that need doing on a farm.

I am just questioning whether the modern soldier is able to function under these loads. For example if we are saying that in combat a person should have the ability to move, skirmish, fight etc in a measurable manner. We can then keep adding to his personal load until we reach tipping point. This exercise would either confirm the 'old' load levels or lead to a change. The result would read something like "The conclusion is that for a soldier who passes the standard military fitness test the maximum combat load is found to be 50 lbs." (or something like that).

Once these historical loads levels have been verified under modern conditions with todays soldiers one can make educated statements about personal loads of the infantry.

I suspect though that if the 48lb limit continues to stand that the avergae infantry rifleman not to mention a machine gunner would br over that limit what with body armour and all.

Perhaps it is best to start again from scratch with a clean slate and figure out what the load limits should be and what constitutes essential equipment that the infantry should carry.

JMA

05-02-2010, 06:06 PM

March and shoot qualifying times haven't changed, in some 35 years, and they didn't even formally exist until the mid 1970's. Details alter but the basics have all stayed the same.
...and I really don't buy the idea that the Infantry men of WW1 and 2 were physically fitter than those of today. Many of them may been more used to hard physical labour, but many more were not. The 1914 "Infantry Training" doesn't even specify any type of fitness standards apart from to say "men should be exercised."

You made a claim that the modern soldier was just as fit and robust and able to shoot as were his predecessors. Until someone can provide data to support that or the converse it must be seen merely as speculation. This is why I have suggested that research be carried out to take the guesswork out of this.

Remember this started by people saying that the modern troops are overloaded (I happen to agree with this) but we surely need to explain and qualify the statement on the basis that through research we have found that 48lbs (21.7kg) is the maximum combat weight assessed as being fit (as measured by the standard army fitness test what ever that may be).

I think I've got about 2,500+ posts, so there all basically in there somewhere. Type "William F. Owen" + Infantry into Google. May be interesting. Nothing very original.

I was responding to your statement "In my Kingdom, infantry training would be different from today and nothing like the bad old days." Perhaps you have an article or a post which deals with this matter in some detail?

That's a policy question. It's nothing to do with "Operational Effectiveness," It's all about "risk management."

There should always be a trade off between the two, I believe. So it seems then that "they" (whoever that may be) has opted for 'risk management' at the expense of 'operational effectiveness'. So why send the squadies out then if they are too heavy to fight? They may be partially protected against small arms fire by not against IEDs.

But I must tell you that I don't see this risk aversion so often spoken about when both the US and the Brits still seem to cling to road transport as if it were the holy grail. Then certainly the Brits seem to love inviting TB snipers by walking all over the show exposed by the lack of cover from fire and view. Now this idiotic patrolling method would be OK if loitering 30 seconds out were a flight of Apaches waiting for the TB to expose themselves through opening fire. Somehow i don't think that is the case.

William F. Owen

05-03-2010, 03:50 AM

You made a claim that the modern soldier was just as fit and robust and able to shoot as were his predecessors. Until someone can provide data to support that or the converse it must be seen merely as speculation. This is why I have suggested that research be carried out to take the guesswork out of this.
Research is carried out. I,personally have spent a great deal of the last 8 years doing it, and talking to those who do it. That's my opinion based on research, and how far back? Based on data, since the 1970's, I know that the shooting standards have improved, and again fitness standards have not declined

Remember this started by people saying that the modern troops are overloaded (I happen to agree with this) but we surely need to explain and qualify the statement on the basis that through research we have found that 48lbs (21.7kg) is the maximum combat weight assessed as being fit (as measured by the standard army fitness test what ever that may be).
My working baseline figure is 22kg, but that's just used for fitness testing, based on one possible load - which I have also discussed in some detail with the Australian DSTO - so I'm pretty happy with it. It's NOT the maximum weight that can be carried in combat. Overloading is purely a doctrinal, organisational and leadership problem. It could be solved, with ease. We choose not to because of other policies and doctrines.

I was responding to your statement "In my Kingdom, infantry training would be different from today and nothing like the bad old days." Perhaps you have an article or a post which deals with this matter in some detail?
This may help (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2675)

GI Zhou

05-03-2010, 08:57 AM

JMA

05-03-2010, 10:26 AM

Research is carried out. I,personally have spent a great deal of the last 8 years doing it, and talking to those who do it. That's my opinion based on research, and how far back? Based on data, since the 1970's, I know that the shooting standards have improved, and again fitness standards have not declined

OK, so fitness levels have remained the same and shooting ability has improved.

This shooting ability is that out to 300m or beyond?

My working baseline figure is 22kg, but that's just used for fitness testing, based on one possible load - which I have also discussed in some detail with the Australian DSTO - so I'm pretty happy with it. It's NOT the maximum weight that can be carried in combat. Overloading is purely a doctrinal, organisational and leadership problem. It could be solved, with ease. We choose not to because of other policies and doctrines.

I understood that 22kg (48lb) figure to be a maximum not a baseline nor a mere guideline. The figure for maximum combat load is surely cited as the load level beyond which the soldiers ability engage in combat is seriously degraded. A seriously degraded combat fighting ability is surely not negotiable?

This may help (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2675)
Thank you, I'll work through that.

Firn

05-03-2010, 10:45 AM

There are US Army studies that were conducted on weight and battle skill performance done in the 60s and 70s. That is where the figures came from. From memory the German Army used 35lb as a guide and obviously a MG-34 or MG-42 gunner would carry more. Troops in Winter carried heavier uniforms than those in the Afrika Korps and a different diet.

From the "British commandos" manual I quoted in the other thread.

Each man wore battle dress, carried his own: arms, and kept all his rations and ammunition in his rucksack. Every effort was made to keep the weight of the load down to a minimum; the pack usually averaged about 35 pounds. As one instructor expressed it: "I tell them the job to be done; the number of days we will be out; the arms and ammunition required; and leave to the individual to decide what he will carry for his own personal comfort. As each man carries his own load, only the bare necessities are taken along.

...

If a man knows that others have marched 30 miles over mountainous country with heavy loads, and that he is fit and properly equipped, he will feel that he is able to do it, too. The men should camp out several days at a time, using different types of equipment, and living on concentrated rations. This will give them confidence. Gradually, as they get physically conditioned, they will think nothing of doing 30 miles a day in mountainous country with 40-pound packs

Firn

P.S: Sometimes higher loads seem to have been a necessary evil, most likely for longer missions. The quality and the type of the packs gets stressed. The standard loads were between 35 and 40 pounds ...

Awkward loads, such as Bren guns and amlmunition boxes, should be carried on Everest carriers,' whose frames leave the chest and arms free, do not interfere with balance, and can be adjusted to carry the weight in the right place. Another advantage is that they do not show a definite outline to the enemy. With such carriers, loads of 60 to 80 pounds can easily be carried with practice. For heavier loads a tumpline, or sling that passes from the load up toand around the forehead, should be employed to take up part of the weight. Once the neck muscles have been developed-in about 2 or 3 weeks-loads of 80 to 150 pounds can be carried with ease.

Uboat509

05-03-2010, 02:10 PM

The figure that was always quoted to us all through my time in the infantry was 30% of the soldier's body weight was the max that a soldier should carry. That means that someone like me at 170 pounds could carry around 51 pounds. That makes more sense to me. Bigger soldiers can carry more weight than smaller ones, theoretically anyway. I suspect that the 48lb figure comes from 30% of an expected average weight of 160 pounds for soldiers. I have no idea if that figure (160lbs) is accuarate or not.
Having said that, as much as they preached that number, we violated it on a regular basis. I can remember being at NTC walking to our company ORP for our trench live fire. We were short handed in my squad which meant that each of the Joes, in addition to their normal weight, carried two 60MM HE mortar rounds and each of the leaders, myself and the squad leader, carried the two HE rounds plus one smoke and one illum. I also had both a live claymore and a training claymore because they had failed to provide a means for us to download our training aids when we got the live stuff. At the ORP, before we downloaded our mortar rounds and any training ammo we had the OCs weighed all of our equipment. Mine was the heaviest in the squad, it weighed 139lbs. At the time I weighed 138lbs (this was several years and a lot of beer ago). So much for no more than 30% the soldiers body weight. ;)

Tukhachevskii

05-03-2010, 03:46 PM

Tukhas mate,

a.) Good job and well done for finding this. All new to me, as in...
b.) More good stuff, turned into utter b*llocks by Fuller's style of writing and byzantine thought process. He excelled in taking the simplest of ideas and making endlessly complicated and confusing.

Yes, Fuller’s “byzantine prose” is definitely an acquired taste although I must admit to having a taste for it. It brings out something of the era in which it was written with its post-war (WWI) fad pseudo-philosophies and mysticism. Fuller was, after all, “enamoured” with theosophy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theosophy) and through it found his way to...Aleister Crowley ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aleister_Crowley) :eek:(Fuller even wrote a book ( http://www.amazon.com/Star-West-Critical-Aleister-Crowley/dp/1410211436) about him) and, though in no way connected to it (that I can surmise), a brief flirtation with the British Union of Fascists ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Union_of_Fascists):confused:. Indeed, it’s interesting how many post WWI military types got sucked into the mysticism of the times and such like (i.e., Ludendorff). Anyway, having been informed about the post WWI rifle platoon by yourself I have to say that I have been given a new spin on the doctrinal imbroglio of the time as well as the fact that Fuller, for all his other(worldy?) insight into realms military and strategic (and we can disagree on that), doesn’t seem to have grasped the infantry or small unit aspect of it very well. Still, I like him (is there a “byzantine” personality type?) and at least he’s easier to read than the Prophet Naveh!:cool:

William F. Owen

05-04-2010, 04:53 AM

Still, I like him (is there a “byzantine” personality type?) and at least he’s easier to read than the Prophet Naveh!:cool:
I cannot say I do. I think he and Liddell-Hart did immense damage to the British Army. I've just given up with reading and re-reading Naveh. His work has, IMO, little or no contribution to military thought.
Annoyingly I am aware of an Israeli officer who really does have some really useful stuff to say, and is far more useful and insightful then Naveh, - but only writes in Hebrew. Luckily he speaks excellent English, and drinks beer, so not all is lost! :D

B.Smitty

05-07-2010, 01:00 PM

Looks like the XM-25 is finally going to Afghanistan.

http://defensetech.org/2010/05/06/army-sending-precision-grenade-launcher-to-afghanistan/

"The Army is set to send its high-tech “counter defilade” weapon to the war zone in the next few months, the first real-world deployment for the much-anticipated XM-25 Individual Airburst Weapon.
Officials announced May 5 that a group of Army Special Forces Soldiers will take the weapon with them to Afghanistan sometime this summer.

reed11b

05-11-2010, 04:41 PM

Kiwigrunt

05-28-2010, 10:47 AM

The new AK-200 (http://www.thefirearmblog.com/blog/2010/05/27/ak-200-rifle-the-21st-century-ak/) with a 60 round mag. Could be just what the doctor ordered for the IAR. Reading the comments it appears there are some reliability issues with the mag though.

JMA

05-28-2010, 01:53 PM

Fuchs

05-28-2010, 04:16 PM

Why on earth would that need a bipod?

It's a combined bipod/fore grip. That kind of combination has even become widely used with M4 featherweights.

JMA

05-29-2010, 12:11 PM

It's a combined bipod/fore grip. That kind of combination has even become widely used with M4 featherweights.

Interested in this trend. Who and under what circumstance would someone want to fire a rifle from a bipod?

82redleg

05-29-2010, 12:34 PM

Interested in this trend. Who and under what circumstance would someone want to fire a rifle from a bipod?

Firing from the bipod makes you more accurate. You might not always be able to employ it, but when you can, why wouldn't you take advantage of the extra stability?

It's often used by SDMs when attempting longer range shots- 300+m. The Gripod (similar, but not exactly what's pictured) combined with an ACOG and a shooter who knows what he is doing makes the M4 good out to 500m, maybe more.

Fuchs

05-29-2010, 03:59 PM

Interested in this trend. Who and under what circumstance would someone want to fire a rifle from a bipod?

I think it's a consequence of three factors

- magnifying optical sights on assault rifles and carbines
- the acceptance of the idea that a fore grip improves the chance of hits (and once you've got a fore grip, you don't need much additional weight for a bipod)
- the fact that fore vest pouches and front armour plate raise even the lying soldier by about 5-15cm, thereby making the use of a bipod more reasonable

baboon6

05-30-2010, 01:42 PM

Interested in this trend. Who and under what circumstance would someone want to fire a rifle from a bipod?

The Israeli Galil ARM, which as I am sure you know a slightly-modified form of which, the R4, is the standard service rifle of the South African Army (and has been in service here for about 30 years), comes with a bipod as standard:

http://world.guns.ru/assault/as23-e.htm

jcustis

05-30-2010, 02:17 PM

MARCORSYSCOM has released limited fielding info for the M27 Infantry Automatic Rifle, due to hit the streets in 2nd of FY 11. Looks like each MEF is going to get a battalion's worth (84) pushed to a single battalion, and Marine Forces Reserve is going to get a battalion fielding of 84 as well, to a unit slated for an OEF rotation. One LAR battalion (mine :D) is getting 72.

The battalions are getting charged with recording maintenance actions and parts usage to provide a written assessment at the conclusion of the limited fielding event.

Associated Weapons Systems and Equipment will consist of:

M27 IAR
Squad Day Optic (SDO)
3-pt combat sling
Grip Pod
cleaning Kit
TM 11810A-OR
10 x Government Issue Aluminum Magazines

I guessed at an expected combat loadout of 10-12 magazines, and now this confirms my theory on what we would see. Now, if only the box magazine of choice was a PMAG and not the basic GI-issue. :wry:

Looks like it will trim out at 11.46 pounds, if my math is correct.

If I am very, very lucky, my replacement will show up about the time I re-deploy, and I can scheme my way into a special project officer billet to incorporate this weapon into the battalion's training cycle, and work on the doctrinal constructs for its employment...Hmmm, to be a senior lieutenant again.

Kiwigrunt

05-30-2010, 09:22 PM

The Israeli Galil ARM, which as I am sure you know a slightly-modified form of which, the R4, is the standard service rifle of the South African Army (and has been in service here for about 30 years), comes with a bipod as standard:

http://world.guns.ru/assault/as23-e.htm

And so did the G1, STG58 (http://www.frontlinearmory.com/FAL/stg58/stg1.htm) and the Dutch version of the FAL. I have never understood why the other 90 or so nations using this rifle have never used the bipod. It is an excellent piece of kit. Sure, it adds some weight, but so does a scope. Both increase accuracy.

Kiwigrunt

05-30-2010, 09:24 PM

If I am very, very lucky, my replacement will show up about the time I re-deploy, and I can scheme my way into a special project officer billet to incorporate this weapon into the battalion's training cycle, and work on the doctrinal constructs for its employment...Hmmm, to be a senior lieutenant again.

Just be naughty, they may bump you down and put you into that slot as a punitive measure. That would be a bummer.;)

qp4

05-31-2010, 04:41 PM

I was an immediate convert the "gangster grip" as it's often called, and went to the gripod as soon as we got them. Another great feature not mentioned is that it makes for a much more stable shooting platform when in a hatch of a flat topped armored vehicle. It also lets you keep the weapon at the ready while mounted with minimum fatigue.

jcustis

06-01-2010, 12:13 PM

Kiwigrunt and I were discussing via PM about the IAR, and the question we had revolved around the BAR. Although it is not reasonable to compare the BAR to the various SAWs and even the new IAR, what was the employment technique for the weapon?

Did the BAR support the team, or was the team supposed to support the BAR< and seize the next piece of dirt to allow it to get into action?

JMA

06-01-2010, 12:47 PM

The Israeli Galil ARM, which as I am sure you know a slightly-modified form of which, the R4, is the standard service rifle of the South African Army (and has been in service here for about 30 years), comes with a bipod as standard:

http://world.guns.ru/assault/as23-e.htm

Yea and the bipods can be used to cut wire as well.

I am still trying to find out the circumstances under which a rifleman would use this bipod.

JMA

06-01-2010, 01:01 PM

I think it's a consequence of three factors

- magnifying optical sights on assault rifles and carbines
- the acceptance of the idea that a fore grip improves the chance of hits (and once you've got a fore grip, you don't need much additional weight for a bipod)
- the fact that fore vest pouches and front armour plate raise even the lying soldier by about 5-15cm, thereby making the use of a bipod more reasonable

Is there some data proving that the universal use of these sights has imporved accuracy? I wonder.

I don't see the weight factor as an issue. The fore grip advantageous only on weapons which are light and have minimal recoil. Do the people who fit these things get taken to the range to prove that their marksmanship has at least not deteriorated after fitting or is it just assumed that all is OK?

When I see pictures or video from Afghanistan the first word that comes into my mind is silhouette. Can be receiving effective enemy fire if they all are standing head and shoulders above a mud wall? Doubt it.

Long magazines make things worse. What ever happened to "count your rounds", "pull back into cover to change a magazine and come back up in a different place", and "put on a full mag at the beginning of an assault"? Saw a photo around here with a comment by Ken as to what the story told about poor basic soldiering. I absolutely agree. Something is not right.

Uboat509

06-01-2010, 02:28 PM

Is there some data proving that the universal use of these sights has imporved accuracy? I wonder.

I don't see the weight factor as an issue. The fore grip advantageous only on weapons which are light and have minimal recoil. Do the people who fit these things get taken to the range to prove that their marksmanship has at least not deteriorated after fitting or is it just assumed that all is OK?

I can't speak for the military as a whole but there are a lot of us in my organization who like the fore grips for CQC. It is isn't intended to give you any advantages at longer ranges, just a steadier and more comfortable grip for engaging targets quickly at CQC ranges (typically 3-7 meters though it can, of course, be more or less) while moving. The addition of bipods or grip pods is a personal choice and it does increase accuracy at longer ranges although not everyone considers the increase worth the weight/hassle. Also, again, I cannot speak for the military as a whole but we have to go to the range with any equipment that we want to use on a deployment.

William F. Owen

06-01-2010, 03:14 PM

Is there some data proving that the universal use of these sights has imporved accuracy? I wonder.
Extensive testing, and extensive operational experience. It basically the most effective thing you can do to enhance a weapon. The British Army could have block issued an optic sight in 1976, but it got snowed under by the "musketry" folk

Do the people who fit these things get taken to the range to prove that their marksmanship has at least not deteriorated after fitting or is it just assumed that all is OK? Trials suggest folk shoot better with them, than without them- thus the new L85 fit for UK forces.

When I see pictures or video from Afghanistan the first word that comes into my mind is silhouette. Can be receiving effective enemy fire if they all are standing head and shoulders above a mud wall? Doubt it.
Actually this has been noted, and is of concern to a lot of the folks I talk to at least. There are grounds for better understanding some of the behaviours observed on videos allegedly shot during fire fights.

Fuchs

06-01-2010, 05:02 PM

kaur

06-01-2010, 05:06 PM

1 comment about ARM. Estonia has ARM's. If soldiers have choice, they prefer AR (rifle without bipod), because rifle without this kind of bipod is more accurate. The problem is that bipod is attatched directly to the barrel. And barrel does not like this :)

JMA

06-01-2010, 06:00 PM

I can't speak for the military as a whole but there are a lot of us in my organization who like the fore grips for CQC. It is isn't intended to give you any advantages at longer ranges, just a steadier and more comfortable grip for engaging targets quickly at CQC ranges (typically 3-7 meters though it can, of course, be more or less) while moving. The addition of bipods or grip pods is a personal choice and it does increase accuracy at longer ranges although not everyone considers the increase worth the weight/hassle. Also, again, I cannot speak for the military as a whole but we have to go to the range with any equipment that we want to use on a deployment.

OK, my essential point is that the idea of a soldier buying something by mail order and fitting it and arriving 'ready' for ops the next day is a worry. I am just questioning whether this 'customisation' of weapons actually improves performance and also whether this is tested and measured. From my personal experience we found that soldiers often did things to impress their mates. That needed oversight and control.

What I am suggesting is that more than merely going down to the range and firing off a some ammo when changes are made the soldier should really be required to reclassify fully before being allowed to take the 'mod' out on ops. Is this not a more professional approach given the importance of each soldiers weapon ability especially at close ranges?

JMA

06-01-2010, 06:01 PM

Fuchs

06-01-2010, 06:05 PM

The effect on the barrel varies from weapon type to weapon type and even among weapons of the same type.
The barrel's vibrations are being distorted by the additional mass that's connected to the barrel.

It can add a MOA or more to the dispersion diameter.

The effect is closely linked to the keyword "free floating barrel".

JMA

06-01-2010, 06:13 PM

Humans are humans, no exception - and those behaviour patterns are quite normal.

The 'problem' is that Taliban aren't lethal enough to punish careless behaviour sufficiently. The 'I'm here, hit me or my plate' behaviour was regularly erased during the first days of combat in major wars.
Some careless soldiers die, most others learn their lesson and are careful.

If they were just standing there looking over the wall we could assume that there was merely the odd stray round in the area. But when you see these soldiers firing rapidly with rifle and machine gun (often without the cheek positioned on the butt) you know you are either looking at a Mickey Mouse unit or soldiers hamming it up for the camera.

MANY patterns, customs, 'lessons learned' and equipment choices of blue helmet missions and unnecessary small wars are completely unsuitable for major wars and might cost the Western world much more blood in a later conflict than these did.

Yes, I think that is fair comment.

Just examples;
I have a very strong suspicion that 8 kg level IV body armour is a disadvantage, not an advantage in a indirect fire kills 80%, armour kills 5%, air kills 5% major war environment.

I'm afraid the need has reached a psychological level. I asked a while ago whether there was any data on the reduction of injuries through the use of body armour and got no reply. I once saw the stats from the US in Vietnam indicating the injuries to the various parts of the body. Probably quite simple to pull these off the medical records and make some sort of intelligent comparison.

It seems clear that it hinders the movement of the wearer so either the stuff weighs too much or the soldiers are not trained to a fitness level wearing the body armour. Should wear it all the time other that in the shower or in bed (if in a secure camp).

The whole "presence patrol" idea is antiethical to the importance of not being seen&identified by effective enemies in a major war.

Yes indeed this 'type' of patrol has appeared since my time. We had reservists, policemen and other odds and sods who escorted civilian specialists to visit villages etc, so perhaps it was an escort patrol of sorts. Not a task for any self respecting soldier... in any war.

JMA

06-01-2010, 06:19 PM

Fuchs

06-01-2010, 06:36 PM

And how long did it take someone to notice this?

Well, the PSG-1 of 1972 already had a free-floating barrel to reduce its dispersion. Maybe the tech is even older.

Steve Blair

06-01-2010, 06:44 PM

Free-floating barrels is certainly older than the PSG-1. I'd say in some quarters it goes back to at least the 1950s.

Fuchs

06-01-2010, 07:34 PM

On the other hand, weapons like the RPK probably have a bipod on the barrel in part to create this dispersion. It's not always a disadvantage, especially not in cyclic fire.

Ken White

06-01-2010, 09:36 PM

...around the BAR...what was the employment technique for the weapon?

Did the BAR support the team, or was the team supposed to support the BAR< and seize the next piece of dirt to allow it to get into action?I'd guess about 90% of the time. The other 10% or so was somewhat situation but more often Leader dependent, a few gave preference to automatic fire but most Marines were then into aimed fire. The dual rate full auto capability of the BAR was in fact often modified to eliminate the low rate full auto and produce semi-auto fire on that setting while retaining the high rate full auto -- this had the added advantage of lightening the weapon and the Bipods were often discarded as well. It was possible to squeeze off a single shot on low rate by deft trigger manipulation but given adrenalin or other jitters, often an inadvertent burst was fired at night, thus disclosing the position of an automatic weapon.

Most use of the BAR was in the assault as a supporting fire weapon; people were known to modify the organization and place two or even all three BARs under one FT Leader. It was often carried by assaulting teams and on combat patrols but was rarely carried on recon patrols.

Recall also that at the time, the Co MG Platoon had 6 M1917A1s AND 6 M1919A4s. They carried the A4s in the assault or movement to contact, then, for the defense or a static position, converted to the Water Cooled and the A4s were passed out two each to the rifle platoons to augment defensive fires. Thus a G Series TOE Rifle Co had not 6 but 12 MGs -- plus 27 BARs. The MGs were supported and provided support; the BARs mostly provided support and were rarely supported by their assigned FT.

Kiwigrunt

06-01-2010, 10:35 PM

That’s pretty clear Ken, that makes a lot of sense IMO.

So in simplistic terms, for a true MG the team (pertaining to the gun at least) exists for the benefit of the gun, and for lighter weapons like BAR and IAR the gun exists for the benefit of the team. I think that is an important conceptual differentiation towards answering some of Jon’s questions. And that may be where the SAW creates a bit of confusion since it is perhaps too little to take on the support role usually associated with at least a MMG/GPMG, and too big and hungry to be much less than that.

Your mentioning the dropping of the bipod on the BAR follows nicely on the previous few posts as well.

The L86 first came out with the bipod fixed to the barrel and had the supporting frame extending from the receiver added to free-float it.
I wonder how much effect adding a pod directly to the barrel has compared to fixing it to the hand guard, with standard rifles like FAL and M16 where the hand guard is itself fixed to the barrel. So the barrel is not really free floating anyway. Would it make much difference here?

JMA, with regards to scopes on rifles. The Brits had to actually change the numbers pertaining to their qualification shoots (I can’t find anything on it in a hurry) when they changed from L1A1 to L85. Every rifleman had suddenly become a marksman. Where the average score with the L1 may have been (and I’m just stabbing here) 50%, it jumped up to somewhere in the eighties. Mind you, lighter recoil would also have played a part in this.
And I think it may have been similar for us ANZACs, but have never seen any text on it.

For shorter range work, well, up to around 200 I think, red-dot sights are great. I’m not sure if there is any hard data on the difference it makes but I’d be surprised if it is not in a few orders of magnitude, certainly regarding snap-shooting at ranges above say 20 or so. Hmmm, I'm sure this too has been discussed elsewhere....
Added later: Just refreshed my memory. A bit on it here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2687&highlight=red+dot+sight) and here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8305&highlight=red+dot+sight).

Chris jM

06-02-2010, 12:51 AM

JMA, with regards to scopes on rifles...And I think it may have been similar for us ANZACs, but have never seen any text on it.

I'm not going to dispute the Brits findings, however I will say that the simple 'score' at the end of a weapon's qualification test isn't a good measure of a sight's worth.

Last week I fired a weapon's qual both with an ACOG and a std 1.5 scope - and scored higher on the 1.5, somewhat perplexingly. Unfortunately ACOG doesn't manufacturer an scope that improves ones' innate marksmanship! My results aren't unique, though. An ACOG/ 4x-like scope won't necessarily improve a shooting "score" in many tests.

Put it this way - when you have time to identify, align (especially if you know the exact range of the tgt) and place your shots, it will come down to your abilities as a shooter more than your ability to align your sights on a target.

This is misleading, however, as I agree that the ACOG/ 4x like sights are a huge leap ahead. They allow you do detect, recognise, identify and (if you need to) engage at a greater range - no small benefit. Further (apologies to the anti-Boydists out there, but his cycle fits in nicely to my point) the OODA-loop process is far faster with an ACOG. You can observe a target sooner, judge the distance far better using the provided human-dimension bars and once you start shooting it is a lot easier to judge your fall of shot, thus leading to a more effective application of fire (aim-off) process so your hitting what you need to. These benefits combined are a huge elevation in capability, but can be very hard to measure on a range shoot when you know the serials that will appear (thus negating the benefits of observation), you know the distances (no need to use the scope's ability to estimate range) and have no rounds/ opportunity to apply proper aim-off so repeated fire is effective.

Kiwigrunt

06-02-2010, 05:30 AM

Last week I fired a weapon's qual both with an ACOG and a std 1.5 scope - and scored higher on the 1.5, somewhat perplexingly.

Agree with all you say, except that you are comparing a scope against a scope, rather than open sights. The std 1.5 scope on the Steyr is fairly basic compared to other scopes available today, yet I still think it's a fairly good scope for its intended purpose, including short range with both eyes open. And the Kiwi version with X-hairs is probably the best one for longer ranges.

Kiwigrunt

06-02-2010, 08:39 PM

Maybe the last few posts should pop over to this (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9069&highlight=presence+patrol) thread. A lot has been discussed there.

JMA

06-02-2010, 08:40 PM

I'm not going to dispute the Brits findings, however I will say that the simple 'score' at the end of a weapon's qualification test isn't a good measure of a sight's worth.

Last week I fired a weapon's qual both with an ACOG and a std 1.5 scope - and scored higher on the 1.5, somewhat perplexingly. Unfortunately ACOG doesn't manufacturer an scope that improves ones' innate marksmanship! My results aren't unique, though. An ACOG/ 4x-like scope won't necessarily improve a shooting "score" in many tests.

Put it this way - when you have time to identify, align (especially if you know the exact range of the tgt) and place your shots, it will come down to your abilities as a shooter more than your ability to align your sights on a target.

This is misleading, however, as I agree that the ACOG/ 4x like sights are a huge leap ahead. They allow you do detect, recognise, identify and (if you need to) engage at a greater range - no small benefit. Further (apologies to the anti-Boydists out there, but his cycle fits in nicely to my point) the OODA-loop process is far faster with an ACOG. You can observe a target sooner, judge the distance far better using the provided human-dimension bars and once you start shooting it is a lot easier to judge your fall of shot, thus leading to a more effective application of fire (aim-off) process so your hitting what you need to. These benefits combined are a huge elevation in capability, but can be very hard to measure on a range shoot when you know the serials that will appear (thus negating the benefits of observation), you know the distances (no need to use the scope's ability to estimate range) and have no rounds/ opportunity to apply proper aim-off so repeated fire is effective.

OK, thanks for that.

Surely the optics in a range setting must enhance the ability of of even the previously poor shot to hit the target more accurately and more often?

Nothing replaces the "aiming, holding, breathing, squeezing" skills but it must surely be better than the standard metal sights.

We issued early versions of the optical sights to the more skilled, senior and experienced soldiers. and they were happy to use them on ambush and recce tasks for the perceived benefit (say taking out the driver of the leading vehicle) but for close fluid contact (in fire force) settings it was found that it was easier and more efficient to use both eyes and the metal sights than to switch from open eyes to optics multiple times.

So after confirming the obvious (which in your experience is not so obvious it seems) that the use of optical sights will improve range scores I would move on to ask how that translated into a higher kill rate in contacts. Difficult I know as there is no before and after to compare and the war evolves. But what I do hear is that there is some concern about the rifle and the calibre as at the ranges the contacts apparently take place the rifles perform sub-optimally (meaning they don't hit the enemy).

Now one would be forgiven for thinking that at these longer ranges these rifles with optical sights would perform optimally, yes? It appears not.

Is it the soldier? Is it the rifle? Is it the calibre, is it the optical sights?

William F. Owen

06-03-2010, 05:40 AM

So after confirming the obvious (which in your experience is not so obvious it seems) that the use of optical sights will improve range scores I would move on to ask how that translated into a higher kill rate in contacts.
Not sure anyone has ever gathered the data, but we know from field trials that soldiers with effective optic sights hit more targets at greater range then without.

Is it the soldier? Is it the rifle? Is it the calibre, is it the optical sights?
There is a massive amount of work done on this. Rifles are more accurate than the soldiers. The optic sights make hits more likely.
IMO, if there are shortcomings or room for improvement, they are in training and application of fire.
It's been proven in testing done in 2005, that the UK APWT qualification makes no difference to a soldiers ability hit targets under pressure, and you cannot train out what makes soldiers miss the target, for reasonable cost.

Kiwigrunt

06-03-2010, 11:35 AM

Not sure anyone has ever gathered the data, but we know from field trials that soldiers with effective optic sights hit more targets at greater range then without.

There is a massive amount of work done on this. Rifles are more accurate than the soldiers. The optic sights make hits more likely.

So here’s a thought. Maybe ‘ease of aiming’ is a more sensible focus than ‘accuracy’. We tend to fixate on accuracy in the sense of reducing a 116 mm group down to 67 mm at exactly 100 or 200 in the prone position one and a half hours after lunch on Thursday afternoon.
In combat, for the average rifleman (not talking about marksmen here), that difference in accuracy as such may not be as crucial as simply the ability to throw his rifle on target with the aid of a user friendly scope, compared to being miles off as a result of less user friendly open sights, where front and rear sight have to be lined up. Sure, the more one trains with open sights, the more proficient one should become. But is the extend to which that rifle range proficiency turns to kak under combat conditions to some degree mitigated with the use of scopes? And how indeed do you measure that? So again, not talking accuracy as such, but just ease of ability to get that rifle into aim. And for this purpose, a scope probably doesn’t even want to be too fancy, just rugged and user friendly.

JMA said:

We issued early versions of the optical sights to the more skilled, senior and experienced soldiers. and they were happy to use them on ambush and recce tasks for the perceived benefit (say taking out the driver of the leading vehicle) but for close fluid contact (in fire force) settings it was found that it was easier and more efficient to use both eyes and the metal sights than to switch from open eyes to optics multiple times.

Perhaps this having to close one eye has a more negative effect than we may be aware off, under combat conditions. I wonder if that has ever been looked into?

Hmmm, that 1.5 X scope on the Steyr may indeed not be so bad after all. Easy to use with both eyes open. I believe the Ozzies are the only ones who used this scope relatively extensively under combat conditions. Any Ozzie feedback?.....I think however that they too are upgrading more and more to Elcan and Acog type scopes.

William F. Owen

06-03-2010, 11:59 AM

So here’s a thought. Maybe ‘ease of aiming’ is a more sensible focus than ‘accuracy’. We tend to fixate on accuracy in the sense of reducing a 116 mm group down to 67 mm at exactly 100 or 200 in the prone position one and a half hours after lunch on Thursday afternoon.

Well there's a difference between "grouping" and "hand-held" dispersion. Grouping is usually done in relation to "zeroing" but it has very obvious relevance to the effective range that you can reasonably engage a target. In the British Army those distances remained the same for 7.62mm AND 5.56mm.
Most people have never trained for, or even tested, their dispersion of shots from the standing un-supported position at a target 100m away, while firing at a consistent rate.

In combat, for the average rifleman (not talking about marksmen here), that difference in accuracy as such may not be as crucial as simply the ability to throw his rifle on target with the aid of a user friendly scope, compared to being miles off as a result of less user friendly open sights, where front and rear sight have to be lined up.
I broadly concur. I'm not a kit junky, but I am impressed with ACOG TA-32 and similar. There is also an Israeli sight unit, built by ITL, that is used on the Tavor, which is pretty impressive.

In all honesty it never occurred to me that optics were not an advantage. Common sense really. Why would you not?

Uboat509

06-03-2010, 01:50 PM

So here’s a thought. Maybe ‘ease of aiming’ is a more sensible focus than ‘accuracy’. We tend to fixate on accuracy in the sense of reducing a 116 mm group down to 67 mm at exactly 100 or 200 in the prone position one and a half hours after lunch on Thursday afternoon.
In combat, for the average rifleman (not talking about marksmen here), that difference in accuracy as such may not be as crucial as simply the ability to throw his rifle on target with the aid of a user friendly scope, compared to being miles off as a result of less user friendly open sights, where front and rear sight have to be lined up. Sure, the more one trains with open sights, the more proficient one should become. But is the extend to which that rifle range proficiency turns to kak under combat conditions to some degree mitigated with the use of scopes? And how indeed do you measure that? So again, not talking accuracy as such, but just ease of ability to get that rifle into aim. And for this purpose, a scope probably doesn’t even want to be too fancy, just rugged and user friendly.

I would say that those are completely different issues. You can do quick aimed fire with an ACOG and I have had friends who were proficient at it but it is generally avoided by most. Eye relief and the need to be directly lined up behind the sight make it a huge pain to deal with. Some of us use a red dot sight mounted on top of the ACOG although that is not perfect either as it raises the sight well above the barrel. Many other prefer to use non-magnified red dot type sights like the M68 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aimpoint_CompM2) or the EOTECH (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EOTech). Red dot type sights are great for quick target aquisition at closer ranges and some swear by them at longer ranges over iron sights.

Chris jM

06-03-2010, 07:49 PM

In reply to JMA and to build upon Wilf's statement, a magnified optic won't improve your grouping. You are very right Kiwigrunt in pointing out that the 1.5 scope is different to iron sights - something I had taken for granted.

Regardless, I will hand-on-heart say that if you can align a low-powered scope/ iron sights on a visible point of a target and take repeated shots, a magnified optic won't improve your ability to shoot more accurately in the same circumstance. The marksmanship factors at play will be dictating the grouping size, not ones ability to see the target, and being able to 'reach out and touch' the point of aim will not solve the factors that make a shooter inaccurate, such as a firer's poor breathing techniques, changing grip, trigger pull, etc. I can say this with some experience, as I myself am far from an inspired shot!

The major assumption to my above claim is in regards to a sight picture. If the iron sights aren't effective in ensuring the firer is always aligning the weapon the same way, obviously they will create further issues. That is on benefit to a sight - if you can see the target picture, you know where your rounds are going. Not only do you have to see a target picture with iron sights, you have to ensure you are aligned correctly.

However the benefit of optics is beyond grouping size - you can detect, recognise and identify targets to shoot out too further away and adjust your own fire faster, thus making you able to deliver more accurate fire quicker. Your marksmanship abilities have not changed from when you picked up the optic, but your abilities to deliver fire as part of a tactical unit have increased.

Also, the sight picture of a magnified optic normally has aides to assist in judging distances. That is a further assistance.

Kiwigrunt, please never defend the steyr's 1.5 power scopes! They are not bad, as such, but they are directly comparable to iron sights - in some cases worse, especially as you cannot accurately shoot at night with the built-in sights.

Uboat509 - you have a good point in that a red dot sight can be great for close-in shooting, however my experience in this area is minimal so I won't comment further in this area. I am interested in the claim that a red dot can be good at longer ranges... very interested. I know there is a sight (I think it is called the ECLAN, I'll have to check later) that a lever changes the picture from a red dot image, 0 x mag to a bullet drop compensator sight picture, 4 x mag. When we tested sights for the NZDF we opted for the ACOG TA family, but this dual mode scope may have special benefits.

Kiwigrunt

06-03-2010, 08:19 PM

In reply to JMA and to build upon Wilf's statement, a magnified optic won't improve your grouping. You are very right Kiwigrunt in pointing out that the 1.5 scope is different to iron sights - something I had taken for granted.

Kiwigrunt, please never defend the steyr's 1.5 power scopes! They are not bad, as such, but they are directly comparable to iron sights - in some cases worse, especially as you cannot accurately shoot at night with the built-in sights.

You are contradicting yourself here;) I agree that it's useless in low light.

Uboat509 - you have a good point in that a red dot sight can be great for close-in shooting, however my experience in this area is minimal so I won't comment further in this area. I am interested in the claim that a red dot can be good at longer ranges... very interested. I know there is a sight (I think it is called the ECLAN, I'll have to check later)

correct (http://www.armament.com/SpecterDR_Dual_Role_Optical_Sight.PDF). Reading up on it in some other forums suggests some mixed opinions about it.

Chris jM

06-04-2010, 01:20 AM

You are contradicting yourself here;) I agree that it's useless in low light.

Wow. I never cease to be amazed at just how utterly stupid I can be at times. :eek:

The value gained by a detailed proof-reading, huh...

JMA

06-04-2010, 01:51 AM

In reply to JMA and to build upon Wilf's statement, a magnified optic won't improve your grouping. You are very right Kiwigrunt in pointing out that the 1.5 scope is different to iron sights - something I had taken for granted.

Regardless, I will hand-on-heart say that if you can align a low-powered scope/ iron sights on a visible point of a target and take repeated shots, a magnified optic won't improve your ability to shoot more accurately in the same circumstance. The marksmanship factors at play will be dictating the grouping size, not ones ability to see the target, and being able to 'reach out and touch' the point of aim will not solve the factors that make a shooter inaccurate, such as a firer's poor breathing techniques, changing grip, trigger pull, etc. I can say this with some experience, as I myself am far from an inspired shot!

The major assumption to my above claim is in regards to a sight picture. If the iron sights aren't effective in ensuring the firer is always aligning the weapon the same way, obviously they will create further issues. That is on benefit to a sight - if you can see the target picture, you know where your rounds are going. Not only do you have to see a target picture with iron sights, you have to ensure you are aligned correctly.

This is good stuff.

I have mentioned the basics before (aiming, holding, breathing, squeezing) and noted throughout my career that many soldiers had never mastered these basics and therefore were effectively "bad shots" with the resulting lack of personal confidence in a combat setting making them effectively a liability.

We worked on our troopies to improve their application of the basics and a certain amount of peer pressure built up in that "so-and-so couldn't hit a cow on the head with a banjo at three paces" and that "he should be issued with a machete rather than rifle". Peer pressure among soldiers is brutal but on the positive side it does make those on the receiving end more susceptible to this coaching.

The officers I trained were coached and were able to group 4" at 100m and 1" at 25m and had the importance of the basics repeatedly emphasized. This is not an instruction task but rather a personal one on one coaching task (probably why its often not done throughly enough). They needed to coach their troopies in this manner (or know what their sgt was supposed to be doing). I hope they did.

The aiming over iron sights must be checked using the aiming disc (unless there is some new gizmo now in use). See it here. (http://www.rifleman.org.uk/Aim_teaching_devices.htm#AIMING_DISC) It was good in 1909 and it works today.

My honest suggestion to you is that if you have any reservations about your own personal ability you should find one of the old school weapon instructors who knows and understands the four principles of marksmanship and approach it as a matter of "revision" and reinforcement.

Helpful would be the following: The Marksmanship Principles (www.staffswing.org.uk/downloads/Lesson4.ppt)

and, Four Fundamentals of Marksmanship (http://www.armystudyguide.com/content/army_board_study_guide_topics/m16a2/four-fundamentals-of-mark.shtml)

JMA

06-04-2010, 01:57 AM

I would say that those are completely different issues. You can do quick aimed fire with an ACOG and I have had friends who were proficient at it but it is generally avoided by most. Eye relief and the need to be directly lined up behind the sight make it a huge pain to deal with. Some of us use a red dot sight mounted on top of the ACOG although that is not perfect either as it raises the sight well above the barrel. Many other prefer to use non-magnified red dot type sights like the M68 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aimpoint_CompM2) or the EOTECH (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EOTech). Red dot type sights are great for quick target aquisition at closer ranges and some swear by them at longer ranges over iron sights.

What conclusions can be drawn from this?

JMA

06-04-2010, 02:29 AM

Perhaps this having to close one eye has a more negative effect than we may be aware off, under combat conditions. I wonder if that has ever been looked into?

Not sure about a negative effect but I'm not sure how you train a soldier to shut out 80% or more of his vision by looking through an optic sight when in contact at ranges from 5m-50m (or even 100m if the fire is effective). It is not a natural thing to do in such a stressful situation. Peripheral vision is what you need to 'watch' the men on your left and right and keep in line (and know when a gook pops up unexpectedly to the flank). To shut that down (or restrict it) is unthinkable (to me at any rate).

Once the decision has been made to do something (like universally introduce optical sights) nothing will be allowed to get in the way. For example I was back in the South African army when the final tests for the introduction of the R4 rifle were being carried out. I had to take my company to the range and do some basic shooting with the R1 then the ARMSCOR guys laid out R4s on the firing point and everyone had a few shots and we asked for comment. Crap like "did it feel lighter" "was there less recoil" ...

When they asked me I said the change lever (like the AK) was on the wrong side (for a right hander) and asked if it came in different but lengths. I could see the see the senior guy saying "don't write that down". The decision had been taken and nothing was going to get in the way of the roll out.

So to answer your question. Nothing will be "looked into" if it is likely to cast any doubt on the universal use of optic sights.

William F. Owen

06-04-2010, 06:38 AM

The officers I trained were coached and were able to group 4" at 100m and 1" at 25m and had the importance of the basics repeatedly emphasized.
Some context may help here.
That is the standard to basic British Army SASC FSR standard, dating from the 1890's. It is believed to have been based on game shooting standards used to qualify guest shots on sporting estates and big game hunts.
You can get that standard of shooting in about 1 training day.
All it tells you is that that shooter has no bio-mechanical or ophthalmic impediment applying fire out to 300m - group 12 inches at 300m. It is merely the most basic standard for range shooting - safe to train. Everyone should do it. I understand it is still taught today.
....but it has little or no relevance to the operational application of fire. That is not just my opinion, but a fact proven in trials.
This was learnt (and forgotten) back in 1942. The "Battle Drill" Schools basically came up with the idea that what soldiers actually needed, was not lots of hour lying in a range, but to learn the limitation of their weapons and what they could reasonably be trained to hit, under stress, on operations.

- so can you hit a 5-second exposure of a Fig-11 at 100m, from the standing position, wearing your patrol pack and body armour? Can you do it wearing NVGs? etc etc etc.

For those interested in Optic sights and bi-pods, it is worth reflecting that the in theatre modifications for all Infantry L-85's have an improved optic sight, and mono-pod fore-grip - all based on operational trials, and feed back from theatre.

JMA

06-04-2010, 07:56 AM

This post from the Rhodesian COIN (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=96946&postcount=88) thread indicates the history of my comments in relation to shooting and marksmanship.

It must be recognised that the majority of recruits into the modern British army have limited or no prior weapon handling and shooting expertise. Marksmanship training therefore should be carefully and throughly conducted and reinforced.

* Starting with basic weapon handling the recruits are taken through the drills by repetition until fully proficient in load, unload, ready and all stoppage drills.

* Concurrent with this the 4 Principles of Marksmanship are taught and coached (dry firing) until a clear understanding and application is demonstrated.

* The recruit is then introduced to live firing (many for the first time in their lives).

* The recruit must achieve the level that he is able to group 5 rounds within 4" from the prone position on the range at 100m consistently. With dedicated coaching this standard may be achieved with the majority of recruits over the period of their training.

* During recruit training the recruit will progress through the number of standard shooting exercises (laid down for recruits) on the range during which his basic marksmanship skills level can be measured.

Once this process has been completed the real training can begin.

This would entail what some armies term "Battle Shooting" and is carried out at various ranges and in various forms.

There is absolutely no evidence that a person who at recruit level is unable to meet Marksman or at least First Class Shot level will prove to be 'deadly' at battle shooting.

It is therefore a simple two step process. One, get the basic skills right, then two, apply them in battle simulated conditions.

William F. Owen

06-04-2010, 08:44 AM

There is absolutely no evidence that a person who at recruit level is unable to meet Marksman or at least First Class Shot level will prove to be 'deadly' at battle shooting.
I think I agree, if you are saying that being a good shot on the range has almost nothing to do with shooting stressful operational conditions.

It is therefore a simple two step process. One, get the basic skills right, then two, apply them in battle simulated conditions.
Again, I think I agree, but the debate that I have been having for the last 7 years falls around the idea of "basics." The devil is in the detail of the two-steps approach

As concerns basics of step 1, and in no order, my conclusions thus far are:
a.) Be able to group well enough to zero his weapon - 10.1cm -"4 inches" at 100m. - 0.01% of range.
b.) Be able to perform effective magazine changes and clear stoppages.
c.) Be able to clean and maintain his weapon.
d.) Be "safe" under training and operational conditions.
e.) Be able to consistently hit a 1 x 0.5m target at 100m from the standing position (soles of both feet on the ground) - using single aimed shots.
Now, if someone can do that, within 3-4 range days, I'm happy.

JMA

06-06-2010, 02:50 PM

I think I agree, if you are saying that being a good shot on the range has almost nothing to do with shooting stressful operational conditions.

Again, I think I agree, but the debate that I have been having for the last 7 years falls around the idea of "basics." The devil is in the detail of the two-steps approach

As concerns basics of step 1, and in no order, my conclusions thus far are:
a.) Be able to group well enough to zero his weapon - 10.1cm -"4 inches" at 100m. - 0.01% of range.
b.) Be able to perform effective magazine changes and clear stoppages.
c.) Be able to clean and maintain his weapon.
d.) Be "safe" under training and operational conditions.
e.) Be able to consistently hit a 1 x 0.5m target at 100m from the standing position (soles of both feet on the ground) - using single aimed shots.
Now, if someone can do that, within 3-4 range days, I'm happy.

Why the 3-4 range days? There is 3-4-5-6 months (depending on the army) of recruit training to coach the recruit up to the ideal standard.

Pace the training, use regular repetition and practice, allocate more time to it, if needed... a process that should continue throughout a soldiers whole career.

Set a standard, reach it, maintain it.

PS: a good way to 'teach' a recruit to handle a 'ready' weapon is to issue each with a blank round and make sure it is up the spout all the time. Works a treat.

William F. Owen

06-06-2010, 04:34 PM

Why the 3-4 range days? There is 3-4-5-6 months (depending on the army) of recruit training to coach the recruit up to the ideal standard.
The 3-4 days on the range is just to get him ready to go and do field firing and actual applications of fire. He's safe, and he has a measurable standard on which to build.

Set a standard, reach it, maintain it.
...and the standard is? That's the issue. Standard versus cost versus operational relevance.

PS: a good way to 'teach' a recruit to handle a 'ready' weapon is to issue each with a blank round and make sure it is up the spout all the time. Works a treat.
True. We tried to teach/test all the AI's and Stoppage drills, with blanks. Told to stop because of cost - so we could fire blanks on exercise for almost zero training value.

Kiwigrunt

06-08-2010, 10:12 PM

Uboat509

06-09-2010, 08:47 AM

And here it is, Magpul's new quad mag. (http://www.thefirearmblog.com/blog/2010/06/08/magpuls-quad-stack-magazine/)

The lack of design flexibility imposed by the M16 mag-well is apparent in this design, as it is a shame that not more 'quad-height' is available.

I will reserve judgement until I see this thing in action but I am always suspicous of things that are over complicated. I can see a lot of potential issues with this mag.

JMA

06-09-2010, 08:00 PM

I will reserve judgement until I see this thing in action but I am always suspicous of things that are over complicated. I can see a lot of potential issues with this mag.

Yes indeed, I can't see the value in this especially when there are reliability issues with larger spring loaded magazines.

Count your rounds and change magazines in seconds that should remain the training. If I could do it so could just about anyone.

If there is ever a situation where that sort of volume of fire without the possibility of few seconds break to change mags is going to be required, tape two together for a quick change and hope to hell no dirt got into the second taped mag.

Then the increased weight. One minute that's a problem, the next its not.

JMA

06-09-2010, 08:18 PM

The 3-4 days on the range is just to get him ready to go and do field firing and actual applications of fire. He's safe, and he has a measurable standard on which to build.

OK, but I would say that there should be some flexibility in the program to allow for more time to be allocated if needed. Shooting is coaching not merely instruction and the basic standard should be met by every recruit.

...and the standard is? That's the issue. Standard versus cost versus operational relevance.

Well its the old selection and maintenance of the aim thing. You guys think you are constrained by cost in todays environment you should have been in Rhodesia in the 70's. Its all about careful use of resources to the best effect. No just blasting off on the range, always needed a plan. Good troop sergeants noted who shot what, when, why and how many rounds and measured results.

Seems that platoon level soldiering is getting a little too 'academic' with the subsequent loss of time and priority for the basics like shooting and fieldcraft. I hope I am wrong.

True. We tried to teach/test all the AI's and Stoppage drills, with blanks. Told to stop because of cost - so we could fire blanks on exercise for almost zero training value.

Keeping one up the spout is not a drain one ammo, but may be an issue of health and safety in your modern army.

We didn't get too much blank ammo, maybe some clever procurement staff officer asked "why do we need blanks if we are fighting a war?" Live firing from early and then often.

William F. Owen

06-10-2010, 05:26 AM

Well its the old selection and maintenance of the aim thing. You guys think you are constrained by cost in todays environment you should have been in Rhodesia in the 70's. Its all about careful use of resources to the best effect. No just blasting off on the range, always needed a plan. Good troop sergeants noted who shot what, when, why and how many rounds and measured results.
The problem is what to select. What standard do you want, that is relevant to operations?
IMO, and in my day -the British Army actually wasted a vast amount of money, doing range training that did not create more effective soldiers.

JMA

06-10-2010, 12:55 PM

The problem is what to select. What standard do you want, that is relevant to operations?
IMO, and in my day -the British Army actually wasted a vast amount of money, doing range training that did not create more effective soldiers.

I believe we agree on the need for a standard to be reached and maintained.

What that particular standard would be (and that it would differ from existing exercises/tests is probably clear) is perhaps a new topic which would take some discussion to reach consensus.

William F. Owen

06-10-2010, 01:25 PM

I believe we agree on the need for a standard to be reached and maintained.
I believe we do.

What that particular standard would be (and that it would differ from existing exercises/tests is probably clear) is perhaps a new topic which would take some discussion to reach consensus.
You may be right. The real issue is that standard really has to be the minimum acceptable, and the standard the equates to what can be achieved and maintained in terms of time and money.

JMA

06-10-2010, 03:13 PM

I believe we do.

You may be right. The real issue is that standard really has to be the minimum acceptable, and the standard the equates to what can be achieved and maintained in terms of time and money.

How about a School of Infantry definition:

The marksmanship standard represents the minimum level of combat shooting competence as achieved through the most cost effective use of training time and resources.

This standard is measured by... (over to you all)

William F. Owen

06-10-2010, 03:33 PM

How about a School of Infantry definition:

"The marksmanship standard represents the minimum level of combat shooting competence as achieved through the most cost effective use of training time and resources."

Well that's strangely similar to, "standard really has to be the minimum acceptable, and the standard the equates to what can be achieved and maintained in terms of time and money".

For Rifle or IW,
a.) Group 10cm at 100m so that he can sight his weapon to consistently hit a 0.5 x 1m tgt at 300m, from the prone supported position
b.) Hit a 0.5 x 1m tgt exposed for 5 seconds at 100m, from the standing position, using multiple shots if required and do it 75% of the time.

I would go on to give him a lot more training, but I would only TEST him to that standard.
I'd also make all platoon weapons part of a bi-annual test.

Firn

06-10-2010, 06:38 PM

Not sure about a negative effect but I'm not sure how you train a soldier to shut out 80% or more of his vision by looking through an optic sight when in contact at ranges from 5m-50m (or even 100m if the fire is effective). It is not a natural thing to do in such a stressful situation. Peripheral vision is what you need to 'watch' the men on your left and right and keep in line (and know when a gook pops up unexpectedly to the flank). To shut that down (or restrict it) is unthinkable (to me at any rate).

I personally have little difficulty to shoot through a 6x scope with both eyes open, it is only a question of proper training, and the lower the magnification it is the easier and natural it comes. Closing one eye should be a very big no-no in most situations for the reasons you mentioned. It also strains the open eye, at least in my experience. With a 1x reflex sight keeping both eyes open and the rifle on target is as easy as it gets, more so than with the iron sights, but this is once again only in my humble opinion.

Firn

P.S: The massive spread of the European wild boar in the last decades has led through the many driven hunts not only to the wide-spread use of reflex hunting sights but also to a new class of rifle scopes. They offer mostly something between 1-4, 1-6 or 1.5-6 magnification in a light frame with a wide field of view and long eye relief. The reticle can often be illuminated. A quite affordable example is this one (http://www.meopta.com/index.php?id=243)

JMA

06-11-2010, 07:04 AM

I personally have little difficulty to shoot through a 6x scope with both eyes open, it is only a question of proper training, and the lower the magnification it is the easier and natural it comes. Closing one eye should be a very big no-no in most situations for the reasons you mentioned. It also strains the open eye, at least in my experience. With a 1x reflex sight keeping both eyes open and the rifle on target is as easy as it gets, more so than with the iron sights, but this is once again only in my humble opinion.

Firn

Thank you. I would just ask if the level and detail in the training manuals covers what you say... or is it a bit like everyman for himself as he explores his way through using these sights?

Then I am interested in how this all applies to the range at which the contact takes place. Is there a personal perspective on this or has some clear data taken shape?

Again with this eyesight issue in mind some time ago I asked whether the latest night vision goggles have reached the stage where soldiers can feel comfortable rolling from day into night. For example in my day when night fell everything changed and always contact was broken off and the gooks got away (perhaps because they had local knowledge of the area and knew they had to put some distance between the contact scene and them before first light). Our tactical options were severely limited and also subject to the moon phase (which if it benefited us it also benefited them).

Now all that said about eyesight in contact situations I also note that the modern soldier also has one ear effectively closed off. Maybe this is why they are having such a problem locating the enemy firing positions?

William F. Owen

06-11-2010, 07:19 AM

Maybe this is why they are having such a problem locating the enemy firing positions?
Not sure I understand.
Locating the enemy "battle Drill 3" in the old days has always been about the single most challenging aspect of dismounted operations. Once you've located him, 50-80% of your problems are over.
I cannot see how the guys in Helmand are finding this any more difficult than the boys in 1943 or 44. In fact give then amount of TI kit and optics, they are almost certainly finding less of a problem.

jcustis

06-11-2010, 08:01 PM

Fuchs

06-11-2010, 09:15 PM

Not sure I understand.
Locating the enemy "battle Drill 3" in the old days has always been about the single most challenging aspect of dismounted operations. Once you've located him, 50-80% of your problems are over.
I cannot see how the guys in Helmand are finding this any more difficult than the boys in 1943 or 44. In fact give then amount of TI kit and optics, they are almost certainly finding less of a problem.

Actually, a WW2 sniper in camouflage or flanking WW2 machine gun positions with tripod, periscopic sight, a bush in the back and a cleared periphery (no dust) should be an order of magnitude tougher enemies than almost all Taliban.

It's sometimes terrifying to learn that modern soldiers consider contacts with Taliban to be problematic. The Taliban are likely less of a problem than Soviet soldiers during the collapse of their pocket in '41.

82redleg

06-12-2010, 12:30 PM

Actually, a WW2 sniper in camouflage or flanking WW2 machine gun positions with tripod, periscopic sight, a bush in the back and a cleared periphery (no dust) should be an order of magnitude tougher enemies than almost all Taliban.

It's sometimes terrifying to learn that modern soldiers consider contacts with Taliban to be problematic. The Taliban are likely less of a problem than Soviet soldiers during the collapse of their pocket in '41.

Have you been to OEF? Or were you in WW2? Then you have no room to compare the two.

The Taliban are NOT superman, but the ones that are still alive are pretty good fighters. Some of the older ones fought the Soviets (and survived), fought for 10+ years after the Soviets left (and survived), and have now fought us for almost 10 years. They are NOT stupid, but they are tough, dedicated warriors fighting on their home turf.

06-15-2010, 04:32 AM

Ditto what Red Leg said. Plus, the Afgan fighter is on is home ground, and is carrying a hundred to two hundred larger caliber, longer distance rifles. .303 Enfields older than their owners are still found in Afganistan.

The average grunt from the West is humping anywhere from 60 to 100 pounds of ordinace, and a third of the weight is bullet armor.

The Afgani can pick his spot, Rip off a couple of dozen rounds and maybe even trigger a IED. Then he scoots away, over a planned withdrawal route.

If the man knows how to shoot and has been shooting that old family gun for a decade or three, he can score from ranges beyond an M-16 accurate fire distance.

William F. Owen

06-15-2010, 04:43 AM

82redleg

06-15-2010, 12:27 PM

So lots of .303 SMLE are being encountered in Theatre?

I wouldn't say "lots", but they are there. There's a little of everything. The unit before us had what I THINK was a Remington Rolling Block rifle that they'd pulled out of a cache somewhere.

William F. Owen

06-15-2010, 12:38 PM

I wouldn't say "lots", but they are there.
Well good luck to the man carrying it.
At best it's a poor-mans DMR and probably not a very good one either because the ammunition is probably of very poor quality the barrel's gone to rats, with lack of cleaning.
If the guy has all the zeroing tools and knows how to use the sights properly, then that's all a plus.

Fuchs

06-15-2010, 12:55 PM

The presence of maybe a battalion's worth of old simple rifles is being counted as argument against the assertion that most Taleban don't come close to a decent WW2 sniper or MG team?

That seems to rather support my assertion.

You're talking of a fraction of the total enemy force, emphasize their survivability (only one aspect of competence) and hint at the potential of their outdated hardware instead of actually asserting that they come close.

I know that the hard body armour is a huge protection (in Afghan firefights), but nevertheless, a MG42 team or a WW2 sniper could relatively easily exact a higher toll on a patrol than the Taleban seem to do in about 99% of all engagements, even with much more personnel.
There's a reason why the Taleban kill almost no-one in firefights and on average only a few hundred per year (mostly with explosives).
They suck. They are so incompetent that their repertoire has been reduced to almost nothing, to little more than mining and harrassing. They aren't even close to the league of a regular, well-trained infantry force.

It's about time to face the truth; the Taleban are an enemy of marginal lethality.
It is extremely important to acknowledge this, for we would otherwise draw wrong lessons learned for later conflicts from firefights in Afghanistan.

Our infantry would be slaughtered Somme-style in the first weeks of a later conflict if it applied the standards and tactics/behaviour from Afghanistan. Unexperienced and untrained troops would probably have no worse first weeks than troops who confuse competent opposing infantry with Taleban-quality opponents.

JMA

06-15-2010, 06:30 PM

Fuchs

06-15-2010, 08:05 PM

My exact point is a combination between the above, this
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9841
(especially the suppression thing) and a third phenomenon:

Imagine you've got a very irritating itching. That can annoy a lot and easily be considered an urgent problem, ruining your day.
Now imagine you get a gunshot wound in a leg. I bet you forget the itching immediately.
Well, WW2 was a gunshot wound, AFG is the itching. AFG is being taken seriously, TB are (only) being taken seriously for lack of a greater (and sufficiently obvious) problem.

The Taliban would not have been considered to be a noteworthy power in WW2, ranking perhaps below the Filipino guerrilla's level. Taliban small units wouldn't have been considered as serious force or even a tactical challenge either in 1940-1945.

The Taliban have been suppressed to a marginal degree of effectiveness (they have almost no usable repertoire and options left), and were smart enough to avoid destruction and maintain recruiting (their political activities are likely more interesting than their primitive efforts in combat).

Again, the worst thing that could happen is that we allow these marginally effective skirmishers with their marginal harassment capability to coin our mental image of a serious enemy!

-----

In regard to Western competence in Afghanistan:
I'd like to see a statistic how many KIA and WIA were likely avoided by hard body armour alone (even before taking into account the consequences of a KIA/WIA on small unit actions and performance).
The reports don't seem to offer much good news about the performance of troops in absence of air or heavy weapons (arty/mortar) fire support.

We're in my opinion in a '1911' situation. Our understanding of modern ground war is based on theory, fashions, obsolete military history, small wars and too specific small modern wars. We might experience disastrous surprises in the next great war.

Ken White

06-15-2010, 09:39 PM

Taliban small units wouldn't have been considered as serious force or even a tactical challenge either in 1940-1945.both the scale and social acceptance of violence in WW II are almost totally different when compared to the current fight in Afghanistan. While your statement is correct, it provides a comparison so bizarre as to be almost meaningless. It's tantamount to saying Berlin is larger and more sophisticated than is Lashkar Gah. Yep, sure is. Yet to the kid who hasn't seen more than a few small houses in his life, Lashkar Gah is a big city...

You're forgetting context.
...were smart enough to avoid destruction and maintain recruiting (their political activities are likely more interesting than their primitive efforts in combat).That is true and is a valid premise. It also part of the reason, along with their marginal military but absolutely superb population blending capability why they are problematic to western forces forced by political correctness to fight under significant handicaps.
Again, the worst thing that could happen is that we allow these marginally effective skirmishers with their marginal harassment capability to coin our mental image of a serious enemy!We can agree on that. Frankly, I don't think that is happening except in the eyes of the ignorant news media and a few others who seem to have little appreciation for the terrain and type of fight there. Or those who base their opinions on other wars -- all wars are different. Quite different. ;)
We're in my opinion in a '1911' situation. Our understanding of modern ground war is based on theory, fashions, obsolete military history, small wars and too specific small modern wars. We might experience disastrous surprises in the next great war.It's the war of the moment, so such attention is perfectly natural and this war then is not really a problem. Your comment on theory and fashions though do accurately reflect a real problem.

One that's bugged Armies around the world for many years. Why do you think "Generals always prepare for the last war" is such prevalent platitude... :rolleyes:

Fuchs

06-15-2010, 10:53 PM

You're forgetting context.

I disagree. You narrow down the context to a tunnel vision.

Taliban:
marginal opponents

army on the European model:
Able to create a big mess, and everybody who thinks in 'Taleban are tough fighters' terms is screwed in such a war.

I don't care whether an Afghan boy may think that some Afghan town is big. I care about Western troops believing that the Taleban are problematic opponents (because they didn't see a real war yet and repressed what they were told about real wars).
The Taleban are the equivalent of straggling soldiers on a disorderly retreat or low morale support troops in a pocket that's about to be eliminated.
Their dangerousness is obviously on an anecdotal level.

We can recall the location and year of "battles" when a single platoon was in danger of being overrun by Taleban. In WW2, such failures would hardly have made it into an infantry division's daily report.

Ken White

06-15-2010, 11:46 PM

I disagree. You narrow down the context to a tunnel vision...Taliban:marginal opponents..army on the European model:
Able to create a big mess, and everybody who thinks in 'Taleban are tough fighters' terms is screwed in such a war.I doubt that, Some will be screwed, no doubt -- most will not be, they'll adapt. Thus, I think you're the one with tunnel problems. ;)
I care about Western troops believing that the Taleban are problematic opponents (because they didn't see a real war yet and repressed what they were told about real wars).I'm not sure who told them about real wars; been my observation that isn't being done. As for the Talibs being real opponents -- they are to those who are there; those safely elsewhere can carp but it's unbecoming IMO. Still you're correct -- most have not seen a real war yet. What they may do when the encounter such a war is not known by you, me or anyone else. What history says they will probably do is adapt. Just like all those kids from many nations on both sides of World War II had to do -- most of them had never seen a real war either...:rolleyes:
Their dangerousness is obviously on an anecdotal level.Easy to say from your computer. Less easy out there walking around in Platoon sized packets.
We can recall the location and year of "battles" when a single platoon was in danger of being overrun by Taleban. In WW2, such failures would hardly have made it into an infantry division's daily report.Sigh. No kidding. Nor would they in Korea or Viet Nam. Even in those post WW II scuffles, society was different, the rules were different and the forces committed were several orders of magnitude larger. WW II was even larger and it was an existential, all out war in a time of very different social mores, to compare it to the minor scuffle in Afghanistan in today's dipwad society with excessive niceness is just silly.

Rex Brynen

06-16-2010, 01:31 AM

No kidding. Nor would they in Korea or Viet Nam. Even in those post WW II scuffles, society was different, the rules were different and the forces committed were several orders of magnitude larger. WW II was even larger and it was an existential, all out war in a time of very different social mores, to compare it to the minor scuffle in Afghanistan in today's dipwad society with excessive niceness is just silly.

Nor would they again, were the West fighting existential, full-scale wars. We're not. I doubt we will be any time soon (although that's not in itself a reason not to prepare them.)

We're sensitive to individual casualties now because we can afford to be. When we can't afford to be, we won't be. Israel is a case in point: when its military actions are limited and marginal to national survival, every casualty is the focus of intense national angst. Nonetheless, if the Syrians tried to roll across the Golan tomorrow, the IDF wouldn't hold back a bit.

Fuchs

06-16-2010, 10:29 AM

...and the forces committed were several orders of magnitude larger.

That's why I referred to a DIVISION's daily report. A smaller force.

@Rex Brynen:

Years of uninterrupted peace in continental Europe before WWI:

for UK: 58
for Austria-Hungary: 46
for Italy: 46 (except if you count the actions against the Ottomans in 1913)
for Germany: 43
for France: 43
for Russia: 36

rating of small wars experiences of mentioned powers in 1913: A-C
rating of great war readiness of the mentioned powers in 1913 : D-F

description of the 1871-1914 period:
quick technological advance, huge growth of wealth, prosperous culture, greatly increased world trade, greatly improved physical and communication connections between countries (railroad, telephone)

Ken White

06-16-2010, 02:32 PM

That's why I referred to a DIVISION's daily report. A smaller force.The snip you quote referred to Korea and Viet Nam but the principle is the same for WW II. The issue is not really the size of forces; it is the magnitude of effort expended as well as the nature of the rules of a particular war and the overall intensity of the combat. Afghanistan really cannot be usefully compared to either of those two wars or to WW II.

Nor can it even be compared to the small wars of even a generation ago, much less to those far earlier -- to include Afghanistan itself -- due to the level of effort exerted by the western forces and the vast changes in societal mores and attitudes. An existential war would change those societal attitudes but the Afghan operations of today are no more than minor effort to most nations. While that "minor effort" is tough on the troops involved, virtually all are volunteers, doing what they get paid to do. Western society is largely uninterested in the whole affair.

Afghanistan can be contrasted to the three earlier wars I mentioned as the differences are extremely significant in all aspects. Those differences make attempts at comparison almost meaningless.

JMA

06-16-2010, 03:10 PM

In regard to Western competence in Afghanistan:
I'd like to see a statistic how many KIA and WIA were likely avoided by hard body armour alone (even before taking into account the consequences of a KIA/WIA on small unit actions and performance).

The reports don't seem to offer much good news about the performance of troops in absence of air or heavy weapons (arty/mortar) fire support.

I have a similar question which questioned KIA/WIA avoidance through the universal use of body armour. This I would wish to trade off again the resultant loss of combat mobility of dismounted troops wearing the the heavy stuff.

Is your question based on the effect a higher KIA/WIA incidence would have on troops morale and the respective nations 'will' to keep their troops in Afghanistan?

As to the effect on combat performance of a lack of air and other fire support I agree.

You take some kids out of London and stick them in a totally foreign environment half way round the world and don't give them the fire support needed to offset the lack of local knowledge and combat expertise then little wonder why a handful of Taliban can tie down and 'play' with whole companies at a time.

Yes the Taliban are refusing to take on the US forces head on and choosing to rather give way and let them pass and thereby living to fight another day. This is a sane decision IMO.

My personal assessment is that the Taliban are doing pretty well. Certainly the Brits are at the end of their tether and looking for a way out all because they have been unable to counter the Taliban tactics of IEDs and the odd ambush. I fear history will be harsh on the Brit actions in Afghanistan.

JMA

06-16-2010, 03:37 PM

Afghanistan can be contrasted to the three earlier wars I mentioned as the differences are extremely significant in all aspects. Those differences make attempts at comparison almost meaningless.

Wars are fought successfully when the enemy and terrain (and more recently population) considerations are properly thought through.

Whatever happened in other wars it is certain that these factors have not been carefully thought through in the case of Afghanistan.

William F. Owen

06-16-2010, 04:01 PM

I have a similar question which questioned KIA/WIA avoidance through the universal use of body armour. This I would wish to trade off again the resultant loss of combat mobility of dismounted troops wearing the the heavy stuff.
What you "wish" is actually the debate. That's what the discussion has been focussed on. BUT- the issues come down to rigourous operational analysis, and feed back from theatre.
Having had a professional background in body armour design and testing, I can tell you that the issue is trade-offs, and the big areas for trade-offs is standards and coverage.
Body armour works. There is no doubt about it. Trade-offs are the issue.

I fear history will be harsh on the Brit actions in Afghanistan.
I fear the same, but because folks will opt for the "Armchair" version of events and not actually engage with the issues in a constructive way.

Fuchs

06-16-2010, 04:52 PM

The trade-off is itself dependent on the scenario.

Keep in mind the very much varying kill share of fragments and bullets. The fashionable hard body armour plates would probably be much inferior to a greater soft body armour coverage in more fragmentation-dominated scenarios.

Again, a topic where small war experience might lead to horrible long-term misunderstandings.
The Russian Permyachka kit is so far the only almost full coverage soft body armour known to me (excluding bulky EOD equipment, of course). There are probably dozens in existence, but they don't get even nearly the desirable attention because of the hard body armour frenzy of 2003 - ~2006.

MILITARY PROTECTIVE KIT (MPK) "PERMYACHKA"

In most armies in the world of modern means of body armor - helmet and flak jacket, and their total area of protection does not exceed 30 - 35% body surface area, thus remain unprotected limbs and face of the soldier. At the same time, statistical analysis of the causes of losses among military personnel during combat operations in modern conditions has shown that over 75% of them are on ballistic injuries, 80% of which are caused by the impact of fragments of shells, mines and grenades, more than half of these injuries have on the upper and lower limbs. These facts provide irrefutable evidence of the lack of protection, a fighter, equipped with a bulletproof jacket and traditional helmet. To address the comprehensive protection of a military personnel company "Kirisa" in conjunction with leading scientists and specialists of the Ministry of Defense developed MPK "Permyachka." This outfit a soldier of the XXI century is made of aramid materials, and provides a circular ballistic protection not less than 80% body surface area from low-speed fragments as well as protection against short-term exposure to open flame. The basis of the suit, depending on your choice of usage, make overalls or protective jacket and trousers. Torso of a soldier is protected by a more reliable light fragmentation vest, to protect vital organs from damage by bullets of small arms bullet-proof vest reinforced steel or ceramic armor, the other elements of the ballistic protection, part of a package - helmet and protective mask. In addition to the ballistic-protected equipment, set "Permyachka" incorporates elements of the camoflage (for summer and winter conditions), vest designed for easy placement of the weapons, ammunition and other items of equipment, raid backpack, etc. - a total of 20 items. Using the MPK in the military units of Joint Military Group that conduct counterterrorism operations in the North Caucasus region of Russia confirms its effectiveness at protecting personnel and high ergonomics; According to the participants of tests, the use of MPK preserves ability to fight and the life of a real soldier in combat conditions.

Ken White

06-16-2010, 06:39 PM

Whatever happened in other wars it is certain that these factors have not been carefully thought through in the case of Afghanistan.In fact I believe that is generally untrue. Rather the thinking in Afghanistan has been forced into an adverse reactive mode by domestic politics in the western nations involved. Such thinking as has occurred at the upper levels of most armies is further adversely impacted by rote adherence to lessons learned (often poor lessons, badly modified) in earlier wars that cannot be applied in Afghanistan due to political constraints, international, western domestic and local.

At the lower levels, poor training and education, lack of familiarity and practice in the combat basics induced by the current social mores of democratic societies compounds the difficulty stemming from the above pair of problems. I am convinced that shortfall is broadly endemic and will not be changed in the near term due in large part (and again...) due to domestic politics. I know that is the case in the US.

To say that the apparent operations in Afghanistan are nor going as most would prefer is true. However there are things occurring that are not open source that might if known counter that perception. They will not be apparent for some time and those good things do not counter totally -- and are no excuse for -- those three bad items.

Add in the terrain, the culture, the location and other non military factors plus logistic difficulties and Afghanistan today is a unique military problem. No one should discount those factors in assessing what appears to be happening there.

Pete

06-16-2010, 09:42 PM

So lots of .303 SMLE are being encountered in Theatre?
Some years back on an American gun forum I saw it said that when the Russians were occupying Afghanistan the U.S. Government bought Canada's war reserve of No. 4 Enfields in .303 caliber and gave them to the Mujahadeen. I'm skeptical of much of what I see on the net, this forum excepted of course, so I'm merely mentioning that for what it's worth.

The unit before us had what I THINK was a Remington Rolling Block rifle that they'd pulled out of a cache somewhere.
Back in the 1960s the international firm Interarms imported into the U.S. a tremendous number of .45-caliber Martini-Henry rifles as well as some Remington rolling-block actions with Arabic markings on them. Some of the Martini-Henrys had Arabic markings as well. I believe they were imported from the former British Raj--India, Pakistan, or both. Therefore Remington rolling blocks being in the region wouldn't be that far-fetched at all.

JMA

06-19-2010, 07:30 PM

What you "wish" is actually the debate. That's what the discussion has been focussed on. BUT- the issues come down to rigourous operational analysis, and feed back from theatre.
Having had a professional background in body armour design and testing, I can tell you that the issue is trade-offs, and the big areas for trade-offs is standards and coverage.
Body armour works. There is no doubt about it. Trade-offs are the issue.

This post (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=100802&postcount=132) of mine on another thread has relevance.

One aspect that appears not to be considered is that as the foot soldiers are 'overloaded' there should be a concern for the physical nature of the tasking given this limitation. In addition there should be a concern for to what extent the ability to maneuver in combat is degraded and the effect this has on the ability to kill the enemy. Returning to my point then that to send these Michelin men out on patrol is merely setting them up for failure.

I fear the same, but because folks will opt for the "Armchair" version of events and not actually engage with the issues in a constructive way.

History as presented is harsh and not always accurate, I know this from personal experience, but what have or are the Brits doing to dispel the erroneous impression that they are out of their depth in Helmand? I feel desperately sorry for the Brit squaddie and Tom for the impression being created that they are not up to it when the problem lies with how they are deployed and the restrictions placed upon them.

JMA

06-19-2010, 09:52 PM

I have witnessed firsthand, as well as viewed on a lot of video of recent OIF and OEF contacts, that the problem isn't so much knowing where the fire is coming from as the rounds crack overhead, but a two-fold issue.

These days, there are a lot of folks, and especially the leaders who are supposed to be directing traffic, wearing personal radios. Contact is made and the net crackles to life, in turn reducing situational awareness because everyone is listening to someone submit a contact report, or a casualty report, or call-for-fire. It complicates auditory sensing of the crack-thump that they should be listening for to assist with orientation.

The second issue stems from the return fire that results, amidst a lot of yelling and attempts to at least direct the focus of the fire, which totally overwhelms one's senses and often allows for withdrawal. With all that going on, the opponent has often fired off his magazine for Allah and boogied out of the area. It reminds me of some of the field problems when I was a student at the Infantry Officer Course. The enlisted instructors loved to hit us during movements to contact, and on good ground that allowed for withdrawal. This was in the woods of Quantico to boo, so we are talking about limited visibility down to about maybe 200m at most. By the time student platoon or squad got oriented to the direction of attack and started to suppress/maneuver, the EIs were falling back to the next ambush position. We'd chase and chase, but never got effects.

This is a slight tangent to my point about thermal optics and such. There are tons of whizz bang devices out there, but they come at a premium of weight that some grunts don't want to lug around (despite being a matter of ounces), or are new enough that the proper amount of training has not occured for anyone to feel comfortable with the device's use. We have the stuff Wilf, but it's use is sadly not as prevalent as it should be. When it is used, I've seen the equipment resigned to static work, and that is a good place for it too.

I waited to see if others would respond to your post.

I agree totally and would ask whether the loss of situational hearing in one ear was a good trade off for gaining access to the radio net?

If these radios 'work' then why is there so much shouting during a contact? (as witnessed on all of the videos)

The long range of these supposed contacts 300m+ in the open and 100m+ in bush/cultivation seems to be merely the Taliban playing with the soldiers with a little shoot and scoot. Yet there seems to be little attempt made to "close with and kill the enemy". This restriction on movement probably sensible in response to the IED threat effectively makes it near impossible to do anything by pull back and call in an airstrike (except where the Taliban are clever enough to initiate contact close to a location of civilian presence. So i ask once again what exactly is the point of this patrolling if no positive result can be achieved? So whats the solution?

In my time we lacked enough night vision equipment even in choppers so we made the best of night movement using mark-one eyeball. The biggest problem we had when a contact ran into the night was that the choppers departed and the troops went static (because the troops on the ground we all over the place and could not risk walking into each other). If we had had sight at night we could have continued and if we had had thermal imaging in choppers and on the ground we could have cleaned them up and increased the kill rate even more. I would have suggested that rather than just drop off the night vision equipment to the troops who were already on the ground if would have been better to drop in fresh troops who were well rehearsed in taking contact actions forward into the night probably guided by and in conjunction with aircraft likewise fitted with thermal equipment but with a good over target endurance. To have had the option to take the contact into the night would have been really exciting stuff. I did quite a lot of night work and once the nav and tactical movement stuff has been mastered the confidence level makes anything possible especially in an African full moon phase. Surely there must be enough 'wackos' out there who would volunteer to specialise in night follow-up/night tracking activities? If the stuff is easily portable then I suggest you use it.

Kiwigrunt

07-13-2010, 10:52 AM

Here (http://www.military.com/news/article/corps-set-to-field-saw-replacement.HTML?col=1186032325324) is the latest (that I know of) on the IAR. Link retrieved from The Firearm Blog.

Kiwigrunt

11-18-2010, 05:16 AM

It could (http://kitup.military.com/2010/11/infantry-automatic-rifle-could-replace-all-saws.html) happen.

jcustis

01-17-2011, 04:34 PM

Kiwigrunt

01-17-2011, 08:52 PM

I have spent a while searching the threads, but I cannot find a link to the 1943 War Department publication detailing how the German squad fought. I have the .pdf, but need a link to an online archive.

Here (http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/wwIIspec/number09.pdf), from here (http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/wwIIspec/index.asp).

(Pretty sure there are no copy right issues here. I rightfully received a polite yet firm telling off a few days ago for such a breach.)
:o

jcustis

01-17-2011, 09:42 PM

Many thanks.

William F. Owen

01-18-2011, 05:51 AM

Here (http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/wwIIspec/number09.pdf), from here (http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/wwIIspec/index.asp).

B*stard!! Oh thanks mate..... Now I'll never get any work done. How I didn't know about this, I cannot fathom!

...load up the printer.... it's going to be a long night! :D

Ken White

01-18-2011, 06:27 AM

How I didn't know about this, I cannot fathom!I'm sorry I didn't know about it -- there's a LOT of well stated wisdom in that booklet. Many things I had to learn the hard way -- and yet, it was out six years before I followed the Recruiter home... :rolleyes:

Base on what I see and hear today from both theaters, Benning should make this required reading...

SethB

01-18-2011, 06:44 AM

I'm about to print the part about leadership and hang it up at work...

jcustis

01-19-2011, 02:43 AM

Wow, you're slipping Wilf...you never saw that publication before, or the link to the archive?

Fuchs

01-19-2011, 04:09 PM

I read it long ago and don't remember unusual stuff in it. What's so special about it?

Ken White

01-19-2011, 05:15 PM

I read it long ago and don't remember unusual stuff in it. What's so special about it?and more combat and reality focused than most of it's western contemporaneous documents -- and vastly superior to most of today's.

While I don't particularly agree with the then Squad organization, the combat actions and degree of detail are impressive -- no wonder the WW II German force was such a tough opponent. :cool:

As an aside, your earlier comment on the German troops 'talking it up' in combat also applies to others. Good units know when to talk it up and when to be silent -- and what to say when talking where. Dare I say METT-TC yet again...:D

Fuchs

01-19-2011, 05:32 PM

Ken White

01-19-2011, 06:43 PM

It's also inaccurate...
Wartime publications about opfor tactics were often outrageously inaccurate. I've seen this in many, many publications. Authors were either mislead or described what individual units had done in the assumption that it was representative.Those are the factor you cite -- seeing a limited sample and assuming it's universal ( a lot of that still going on... :D ); translation flaws; and the inability of generally civilian artists to properly capture the military nuances. Those and the inability or unwillingness of supposed military (but often very inexperienced) reviewers to get all three types of flaws (and more) corrected.

Such publications should be reviewed by a board of competent and experienced, not 'specially selected and long serving' -- very different things, those -- NCOs but that would mean that a lone Captain or Major, even the odd LTC or COL, was not 'competent.':rolleyes:

Even if he or she had no combat experience... :wry:

The errors you mention and others not withstanding IMO it is still a more useful publication than most.

Pete

01-19-2011, 09:48 PM

... and more combat and reality focused than most of it's western contemporaneous documents ...
Halt, this is the Apostrophe Police! Be advised you've been issued a warning for conduct subversive of good astrophical order and discipline! :eek: Now go forth and sin no more.

Ken White

01-19-2011, 10:04 PM

Ain't no possessive or possessed 'it'...:(

Pete

01-19-2011, 10:41 PM

I suspect that a lot of First World War experience influenced the content of that Wehrmacht infantry squad manual, particularly the emphasis upon riflemen in the squad supporting the machine gun, instead of the other way around.

During that war change happened so fast that the lengthy review and approval process for official publications couldn't keep pace with new innovations on the battlefield. Because of that the British army artillery began publishing unofficial bulletins on changes in artillery practices, and the "Field Artillery Notes" put out by Fort Sill is the continuation of a practice begun by us in emulation of the British during that war.

The old Sturmtruppen appelation adopted by Hitler and the Nazis in the 1930s was a reference to the specialized assault battalions formed by the German army during WW I. Back then they were considered to be cutting-edge and their influence on German line infantry units then was similar to how some practices of Airborne units in the U.S. Army migrated over to straight-leg outfits post-1945.

Rifleman

01-20-2011, 02:16 AM

The gist of it seems to be that the German squad leader led from the front and usually concentrated on getting his LMG into action. That type of leadership and employment is more like something we expect to see at fire team level today instead of squad level. That's close to Paul Melody's recommendations for squads too.

Changing the subject a little: I thought there was a light infantry article that had some operational history on the Chindits and Galahad somewhere on the cgsc.edu link but I can't find it. The search function didn't work for me. Anyone have a link to the article I'm talking about?

Rifleman

01-20-2011, 02:22 AM

...found it: http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/historic/hist_intro.pdf

Pete

01-20-2011, 03:05 AM

I don't want to belabor the point, but part of the reason for stalemate on Western Front during the First World War wasn't because tactics were outdated and stayed mired in the past, but because of dramatic advances in the siting and employment of machine guns and artillery fire planning and techniques during a relatively short period of time.

JMA

01-20-2011, 06:04 AM

It's also inaccurate.

Let's look at Fig.8. It makes no sense whatsoever.
MG1 in prepared position, riflemen in the open? Nonsense.
MG1 without MG2? Nonsense.
Riflemen separated like that from MG? I have never, ever seen, read or heard anything like that. It makes no sense anyway, other than extending the hand grenade range.

Fuchs, you need to review the illustration after reading the following text:

When a light machine gun fires through a gap in the line, it should be located behind the center of the gap, and the distance from the gun to the gap should be less than the width of the gap (fig. 8). Overhead fire with the rifle and light machine gun is undertaken only when the weapons are located on high ground immediately above the troops over which the firing is directed.

As to the positions of the riflemen... everywhere (except in Afghanistan apparently) soldiers do not walk/sit/lie in the open. So see that merely as an illustration relating to distances as marked on the diagram.

Figure 10:
Again nonsense; the defensive positions are depicted on the front slope!
Different barrage areas for different types of support weapons are also highly questionable (and I've never seen anything that confirms the assertion).
the practice of pre-planned barrage positions has afaik never been weapons-type specific. The infantry mortars were preferably used against point targets because of the limited supply of ammunition.
A main line of resistance without forward observation and listening posts was totally contrary to doctrine. Very few tactics that weren't and didn't become doctrine were universally applied.

Figure 13.: Again forward slope defence...

Wartime publications about opfor tactics were often outrageously inaccurate. I've seen this in many, many publications. Authors were either mislead or described what individual units had done in the assumption that it was representative.

Again... when in doubt read the text... and never say never about forward slope defensive positions.

The context is defensive fire plans and interlocking arcs of fire machine guns (and anti-tank weapons) which have been sited in depth.

Don't knit-pick the illustrations or you will get a reputation like some others around here ;)

Kiwigrunt

01-20-2011, 07:08 AM

...found it: http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/historic/hist_intro.pdf

And here (http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/content.asp#hist) are all the other chapters.

Pete

01-20-2011, 07:49 AM

Don't knit-pick the illustrations ...
I think you mean nits, those little things left by the bugs who live in your bed. It's not like I'm trying to sharpshoot you or anything ... I had them once myself after I got really drunk but I never went back to that particular establishment again.

JMA

01-20-2011, 10:14 AM

I think you mean nits, those little things left by the bugs who live in your bed. It's not like I'm trying to sharpshoot you or anything ... I had them once myself after I got really drunk but I never went back to that particular establishment again.

Out here we call those things crabs (http://www.onlinedatingmagazine.com/STDs/crabspubiclice.html)...

Firn

01-20-2011, 01:08 PM

I suspect that a lot of First World War experience influenced the content of that Wehrmacht infantry squad manual, particularly the emphasis upon riflemen in the squad supporting the machine gun, instead of the other way around.

Indeed and depends. In "Development of Tactics", which I posted some times ago it is clearly stated that in the last phase of WWI the squad/sections in the outposts and front-line of the "Vorfeld" supported the MGs and not the other way around. This "field in front" which screened the main defense zone, often on and behind the reverse slope, from ground observation, recce and thus firepower had of course also to be strong enough to fend off small assaults and combat patrols. Being exposed to the full weight of enemy firepower meant that it had to perform with as few men as possible. This could only be achieved by a high share of loud and silent automatic weapons, switching between positions and good, heavy indirect fire support.
In other situation, for example during limited (night) assaults it was the MG which would support the riflemen (pistol-men, bombers).

Of course combat, gained experienced and things lost and METT-T would lead both in WWI and WWII to many very different types of sections. For example that manual of the WWII ski-troops shows the demand for a larger section with a strong demand for telescopic sights, automatic weapons and rifle grenades (especially if no mortar could be taken) and careful marksmanship training. On the other hand mechanized infantry was partial to the heavy firepower of the MG, especially in defense, which numbers often increased in relation to the riflemen due to heavy infantry combat losses. Assault groups should have according to official training material a high amount of different hand grenades, demo charges (bundled, on staffs, etc) rifle- and pistol grenades and machine pistols (or assault rifles). Artillery, infantry cannons, mortars and MGs shouldered (should shoulder) almost all fire support, the MG(s) of the assault group were mostly there to provide defense against counterattacks. One could go on and on. Generally the challenge as a leader was to get as much as one needed and to get most out of what one had in men and material.

Blah

01-21-2011, 09:08 PM

According to this:

http://www.armytimes.com/news/2011/01/army-what-to-expect-in-2011-010111w/

The MK48 will serve as the fire team automatic weapon. It is 32 percent lighter than the 27-pound M240B, but lacks its effective range.

The US Army appears to be adopting the Mk 48 as their fireteam automatic weapon in Afghanistan. The quote is brief, however, and I haven't been find much more info on it.

Kiwigrunt

01-21-2011, 10:10 PM

According to this:

The US Army appears to be adopting the Mk 48 as their fireteam automatic weapon in Afghanistan. The quote is brief, however, and I haven't been find much more info on it.

The article also states this:

The Army is working to reduce ammo weight — and with good reason. The average M240B gunner carries six pounds of ammo, while the A-gunner carries 30 pounds. The shell represents half that weight. Engineers are looking to construct a stainless steel cartridge case that will reduce ammo weight by nearly 20 percent.

So now the fireteam gunners (automatic riflemen?:eek:) will get to carry the same weight in ammo (in terms of calibre, not necessarily quantity) as the platoon gunners, with nearly similar weapon weight.
With this move the US army will move in a direction directly opposing that of the USMC. Interesting.

Blah

01-21-2011, 10:18 PM

The article also goes on to say:

The Army’s Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center also is fielding a 5.56mm telescoped ammunition that uses a thin plastic casing instead of the traditional brass shell. This would reduce the weight by 42 percent.

If this pans out, and the technology is applied to 7.62, then it would weigh close to what 5.56 currently weighs, wouldn't it?

Ken White

01-21-2011, 10:27 PM

Kiwigrunt

01-21-2011, 10:49 PM

The article also goes on to say:

If this pans out, and the technology is applied to 7.62, then it would weigh close to what 5.56 currently weighs, wouldn't it?

That looks interesting and promising. But we are not there yet. So that will not help today's grunts.

Also, I should think that this totally new ammo should be (yet another) opportunity to come up with a better, half way between calibre....:(

Blah

01-21-2011, 10:51 PM

With regards to reliability... the bolt of the Mk 48 has to be replaced after 15,000 rounds, and the receiver after 50,000. So if nothing else, it's more maintenance-heavy than the M240.

Kiwigrunt

01-21-2011, 11:05 PM

Sustained Infantry use of small arms induces more stresses than does the use of the same weapon by SOF elements. That's true in several respects. Add the fact that decreased weigh in most weapons has historically led to reliability issues...

Yup. I’d say it is likely that the durability of the Mk48 will be similar to that of the 5.56 variants we know.

What gets me about this move is the fact that (with the light 240) the army platoon will have two different 7.62 guns with weights that are not all that much different (too lazy to look into exact weights now).

So the large USMC platoon will end up with no organic 7.62 guns while the smaller army platoon will end up with 8 x 7.62 guns. I doubt that either of these two extremes is going to prove satisfactory.

Blah

01-21-2011, 11:05 PM

That looks interesting and promising. But we are not there yet. So that will not help today's grunts.

Also, I should think that this totally new ammo should be (yet another) opportunity to come up with a better, half way between calibre....:(

I assume you mean something like the 6.5 grendel or 6.8 SPC? While that would increase the terminal effect (6.8), or both terminal and external ballistics (6.5) of IWs, it would also decrease the "punch" so-to-speak, of GPMGs and LMGs (if the Mk 48 sticks). I feel as if the strength of the GPMG/LMG is more important than the strength of the IW as far as modern war is concerned. Also, the 6.5 proponents who say the 6.5 grendel has superior external ballistics than .308 are comparing open tip/high-bc ammo with a pretty standard ball for .308.

Even when looking for a mid-way point, I don't think the designs shown with the 6.5 and 6.8 are the way to go. They're (relatively) inefficient at increasing energy. A better investment would be developing sabot ammunition for small-arms. A 7.62x39 round generates about 2000 Joules of energy, and has a poor trajectory compared to 5.56. A 7.62x51 with a 5.56 bullet wrapped in a sabot will generate 2400 - 3000 Joules, have a far superior trajectory, far better armor penetration, and it will weigh roughly the same as M43 7.62x39. Essentially what I am advocating is that you should increase powder weight when you want to save weight, not bullet weight.

82redleg

01-22-2011, 12:15 AM

So the large USMC platoon will end up with no organic 7.62 guns while the smaller army platoon will end up with 8 x 7.62 guns. I doubt that either of these two extremes is going to prove satisfactory.

The USMC platoon has never had 7.62mm MGs, AFAIK- they went from BARs to M14 ARs to M16 ARs to M249s and now are going to IARs.

The US Army platoon has, AFAIK, always had 7.62mm MGs, at least since the introduction of the M60, which replaced M1919 Brownings (IIRC).

Different strokes for different folks, I guess, although their not all that different in final execution. Both companies (USMC and USA) have 9 rifle squads and 3 MG/weapons squads- the differnence is in the weapons platoon HQ in the USMC. AIUI, however, the weapons PLT CDR is the CO FSCOORD, and rarely operates as a HQ for the MG squads.

Rifleman

01-22-2011, 02:05 AM

Also, I should think that this totally new ammo should be (yet another) opportunity to come up with a better, half way between calibre....:(

I'm sure you meant "adopt" a better, half way in between caliber. At least two have already been come up with.

Added: Ooops, posted before I read Blah's response.

Kiwigrunt

01-22-2011, 03:47 AM

I assume you mean something like the 6.5 grendel or 6.8 SPC? While that would increase the terminal effect (6.8), or both terminal and external ballistics (6.5) of IWs, it would also decrease the "punch" so-to-speak, of GPMGs and LMGs (if the Mk 48 sticks). I feel as if the strength of the GPMG/LMG is more important than the strength of the IW as far as modern war is concerned.
-snip-
A better investment would be developing sabot ammunition for small-arms.
-snip-
Essentially what I am advocating is that you should increase powder weight when you want to save weight, not bullet weight.

I agree with you that the strength of the GPMG is more important that the strength (or weakness for that matter) of the IW. However, the problematic balancing act that we have been performing now for a few decades, where we want 7,62 punchability for 5.56 weight and size, just doesn’t seem to go away. In the sandbox, GPMGs seem to have a habit of working their way down to section/squad level. And now it seems the US army (UK and NZ are also looking into this) want to replace their 5.56 Minimi’s with 7.62 variants. We are going full circle so we can predict the outcome.

So to me it would seem more prudent to first try to knock weight and size for GPMGs down as far as possible without loosing too much punch, although some loss would be unavoidable. If and only if that could get us to something like a (stretched-case?) 6.5 Grendel GPMG that can competently replace both the 7.62 MAG and Minimi type guns and the 5.56 Minimi types, without loosing so much punch that we are still going to want the 7.62 back, then we could look into using that same calibre for rifles. So yes, GPMG-ability trumps, me thinks. Now it does of course pay to keep IW-ability in mind throughout the process, but if too much focus is there then I think we will again end up with something that won’t work for true GPMGs (light enough for the LMG role and heavy enough for the MMG role). And then the resulting balance will be the same (type and number of) 7.62 guns with heavier rifles; an overall increase in weight.

For me the attraction would be in making the GPMG more user-friendly at lower levels without giving away too much of its current attributes. That, rather than trying to (a) improve on the current GPMG capabilities (since I don’t think they are in question), or (b) improve on current 5.56 support weapons capabilities. The latter I think would be trying to push a losing envelope, while never coming up with anything that will ever be more than a stop-gap between rifles and GPMGs.

I am by no means an expert in ballistics so I’ll refrain from arguing the sabot suggestion, other than to say that the concept comes across to me as promising for niche roles like armour piercing and perhaps less so for much else. Increasing powder weight to save weight….hmmm, dunno. A M193 has more powder per unit of bullet weight than a Mk 262.

SethB

01-22-2011, 06:27 AM

The correct answer is 7x46. A 175 grain bullet at 2,400 feet per second, or a 120 at 3,000 or even something in between. With a 16 inch barrel.

If a PKM weighs in at 18 pounds, then a 16 inch LMG could weigh more like 12 without sacrificing durability.

JMA

01-22-2011, 08:12 AM

Again nonsense; the defensive positions are depicted on the front slope!

[snip]

Figure 13.: Again forward slope defence...

I don't know what your problem is with forward slope positions but perhaps we should post the advantages and disadvantages of each in case impressionable people read this and think that forward slope is always a no-no.

From the Brits then:

0225. Forward and Reverse Slopes. A clear understanding is needed of the
tactical difference between forward and reverse slopes and their respective advantages and disadvantages.

a. Reverse Slope Positions. A reverse slope position is a position on
ground not exposed to direct fire or observation. Although in each case the
choice of a forward or reverse slope position should be decided on its merits,
reverse slopes almost invariably provide the best position for defence. The
advantages and disadvantages are as follows:

(1) Advantages. The advantages are:
(a) Hidden from enemy observation, except from the air.
(b) Enemy cannot use direct fire weapons.
(c) Enemy indirect fire less effective owing to lack of observation.
(d) Movement is possible therefore easing the problems of resupply, etc.

(2) Disadvantages. The disadvantages are:
(a) Shorter fields of fire.
(b) Enemy can approach in cover.
(c) Enemy will have a downhill assault.
(d) More manpower is needed to patrol, observe and cover dead
ground.

b. Forward Slope Positions. A forward slope position is a position which is
exposed to direct fire and to observed indirect fire. The advantages and disadvantages are:

(1) Advantages. The advantages are:
(a) Good fields of fire.
(b) Little dead ground.
(c) Enemy approaches are dominated.

(2) Disadvantages. The disadvantages are:
(a) Little cover and natural concealment from enemy direct fire
and observed indirect fire.
(b) Easier to disclose positions.
(c) Movement and administration can be done only at night.

JMA

01-22-2011, 09:20 AM

So to me it would seem more prudent to first try to knock weight and size for GPMGs down as far as possible without loosing too much punch, although some loss would be unavoidable.

Why would one need to reduce the weigh and size of GPMGs?

I suggest that this point of departure is wrong. The current weigh factor is exacerbated primarily by the weigh of body armour. It is accepted that the use of body armour is non negotiable and as such the primary effort should be to reduce the weight of body armour "without loosing too much" protection.

The second weight factor is all the stuff soldiers take along in case they might need them. This can be fixed at subunit level and would be made easier if CAS reaction times were short enough to give confidence to soldiers who may get caught out in a contact.

The third weight factor is that of weapons and ammunition. Its fine (IMO) to have a special weapon for CQB or jungle COIN warfare which is more suited to the conditions of that war.

But with the utmost respect how can anyone discuss the weight reduction and calibre issues of a GPMG without consideration of the employment of such weapons in a conventional setting where interlocking and overlapping arcs of fire and mutual support are critical success factors? You see when the Brits switched to the SA-80 no one seemed to take into account the reduction in the effective section fire range.

I suggest that you qualify what you are recommending as a use for a lighter GPMG with an application you see it being used in. Light hearted comments about "loss of punch" in a trade off for weight savings need to be explained.

Why for example does one need to reduce the weight of a GPMG and its ammo?

Fuchs

01-22-2011, 06:09 PM

(2) Disadvantages. The disadvantages are:
(a) Shorter fields of fire.
(b) Enemy can approach in cover.
(c) Enemy will have a downhill assault.
(d) More manpower is needed to patrol, observe and cover dead
ground.
a) No problem, for most defenders do not need to open fire at long range - that's the job of snipers, mortars and artillery.
b) Not true unless you omit observer positions on the ridge.
c) No problem, that's what barbed wire is for.
d) I don't get why.

An anecdote (recalled from memory, slight deviances from the original story are possible):

An U.S. army platoon dug in in a defensive position overnight sometime in 1944. It was on a froward slope.
The next day, German observers detected the new position and phoned them to Bn HQ.
There was some unidentifiable noise over the next night.
The third day began calmly, but when morning fog had cleared, a camouflaged assault gun began opening fire on the forward slope position, decimating the platoon. The Platoon 2nd in command finally decided to evacuate, but when he did so many machine gunners and snipers opened fire. Almost no-one escaped.
(The same effect could have been had on the second morning already if light infantry guns were used or even on day one if modern bazooka-type weapons were used, but the assault gun provided near-immunity to OPFOR mortars.)

Ridge position are for observers,
ridge (and forward slope) positions are for (daring) snipers.
reverse slope positions are for the counter-attacking force,
counter-slope positions and 2nd ridge positions are for the main force.

You can differ, but a capable opponent will punish you terribly.

Firn

01-22-2011, 07:38 PM

Ridge position are for observers,
ridge (and forward slope) positions are for (daring) snipers.
reverse slope positions are for the counter-attacking force,
counter-slope positions and 2nd ridge positions are for the main force.

You can differ, but a capable opponent will punish you terribly.

At the core the argument is sound, however one must add "it depends" (METT-T). How much cover, how much concealment, how difficult is the terrain, how easily can it be covered by (indirect, direct) fire and mines, how easily can the enemy observe, detect, move, defeat forward positions, and soon...

....

On the Mk 48. The loss of four inches should not greatly affect range and firepower, as the bullets should not lose too much velocity, roughly 100 fps or even less, depending on the barrel, bullet and powder. Blast and Flash will likely increase.

Blah

01-23-2011, 01:33 AM

If and only if that could get us to something like a (stretched-case?) 6.5 Grendel GPMG that can competently replace both the 7.62 MAG and Minimi type guns and the 5.56 Minimi types, without loosing so much punch that we are still going to want the 7.62 back, then we could look into using that same calibre for rifles.

I must ask why you think adopting one caliber would be a better option than using 2 different calibers. Keep in mind that the weight saved with the 5.56 compared to a hypothetical mid-range cartridge could be used to help carry some of the slightly heavier 7.62. As you've read in the article, they are trying to reduce the weight of 7.62 so that it becomes more user-friendly at the platoon and squad level. Do you feel that pursuing an entirely different caliber is a better pursuit than this route?

I am by no means an expert in ballistics so I’ll refrain from arguing the sabot suggestion, other than to say that the concept comes across to me as promising for niche roles like armour piercing and perhaps less so for much else.

It can be used to create an effective AP cartridge, but it doesn't have to. Let's take the M855 as an example... A lot of people seem to claim that it's only effective at ranges where it fragments (not saying it's true or untrue, just that people say that). I've heard 200m from a 20" barrel, so I'll go with that for the sake of this discussion. If you were to fire an M855 bullet wrapped in a sabot from a 7.62x51 case (doesn't have to be 7.62, just using it as a reference), it would maintain that vaunted fragmentation velocity to a much greater distance due to its increase in velocity, and fragment more violenty/reliably at closer ranges.

Also, if for some reason you need the greater momentum of of 7.62 ball... simply use 7.62 ball, it would be perfectly usable in a firearm designed for 7.62 Sabot.

There would also be the significant increase in flatness of trajectory, which is (to be a bit redundant) significant.

Increasing powder weight to save weight….hmmm, dunno. A M193 has more powder per unit of bullet weight than a Mk 262.

Ahh, no no, I meant absolute powder weight, not relative powder weight.

Typically, the 2 heaviest components of a cartridge are the bullet and casing. You rarely hear someone say that 9mm NATO is more effective than 5.56, even though the 9mm uses a heavier bullet. Why is that? Obviously it's because the 5.56 is launched at a much higher velocity due to the significantly higher amount of powder behind it. 5.56 and 9mm also weigh almost exactly the same per cartridge!

My point is to draw a parallel with the 5.56 and 9mm, to 7.62 Sabot and intermediate cartridge x, respectively. While both would weigh roughly the same, I feel that the former would result in a better increase in effectiveness, with more quantifiable perks than "stopping power".

Blah

01-23-2011, 01:35 AM

The correct answer is 7x46. A 175 grain bullet at 2,400 feet per second, or a 120 at 3,000 or even something in between. With a 16 inch barrel.

That seems awfully close to what a 7.62x51 would achieve with a 16" barrel. :eek:

The case is smaller than 7.62's as well, which would imply to me that it either runs at a much higher pressure, or is using some kind of special propellant.

JMA

01-23-2011, 01:57 PM

a) No problem, for most defenders do not need to open fire at long range - that's the job of snipers, mortars and artillery.
b) Not true unless you omit observer positions on the ridge.
c) No problem, that's what barbed wire is for.
d) I don't get why.

An anecdote (recalled from memory, slight deviances from the original story are possible):

An U.S. army platoon dug in in a defensive position overnight sometime in 1944. It was on a froward slope.
The next day, German observers detected the new position and phoned them to Bn HQ.
There was some unidentifiable noise over the next night.
The third day began calmly, but when morning fog had cleared, a camouflaged assault gun began opening fire on the forward slope position, decimating the platoon. The Platoon 2nd in command finally decided to evacuate, but when he did so many machine gunners and snipers opened fire. Almost no-one escaped.
(The same effect could have been had on the second morning already if light infantry guns were used or even on day one if modern bazooka-type weapons were used, but the assault gun provided near-immunity to OPFOR mortars.)

Ridge position are for observers,
ridge (and forward slope) positions are for (daring) snipers.
reverse slope positions are for the counter-attacking force,
counter-slope positions and 2nd ridge positions are for the main force.

You can differ, but a capable opponent will punish you terribly.

Of course your story is possible. But it appears that the this US Army platoon was isolated and had no fire support of its own. Does not seem likely.

At the School of Infantry we had TEWTs (Tactical Exercises Without Troops) which were designed to exercise ground appreciations for all phases of war. For the defence there were specific ones which lent towards both forward and reverse slope positions and even those where there was no other option other than for one a forward slope position and for another a reverse slope position. These were designed to exercise officers on a wide range of terrain variations.

A capable opponent would love to know that his enemy would always site his defence on a reverse slope without fail ;)

Fuchs

01-23-2011, 02:22 PM

SethB

01-23-2011, 02:59 PM

That seems awfully close to what a 7.62x51 would achieve with a 16" barrel. :eek:

The case is smaller than 7.62's as well, which would imply to me that it either runs at a much higher pressure, or is using some kind of special propellant.

It is around the same bullet weight and velocity, but the bullets have a better form factor and so they essentially have a much longer range. Tracer burnout will occur sooner.

As for how that velocity is achieved, for every 4% increase in powder you have a 1% increase in velocity. The rest of that energy is heat and blast. The smaller cartridge has less powder, but that is a good thing.

It runs at the same pressure as 7.62x51. And it is well adapted to short barrels. In fact, some cartridges shouldn't be run from long barrels. 7.62x39 is an example of a cartridge that gains almost nothing with a barrel over 12 inches long.

Ken White

01-23-2011, 04:31 PM

Hmmph!!!:eek::wry:

JMA

01-23-2011, 04:54 PM

Fire support did not help the U.S. platoon because there wasn't much it could have done in the few minutes. Calls for artillery fire are slow and calls for company mortar fire not really effective against an assault gun and dispersed infantry.

No opponent would always "know" that the line of defence is reverse/counter slope, for there are usually several slopes and the first one could be largely a decoy. German defence doctrine advocated a deep defence which had a zone for skirmishing and delaying in front of the real deal. There were often even two fully prepared defensive positions plus if possible decoy positions. The secondary defensive position was a necessity against Soviet offensive preparatory shelling, and the Soviets rarely kept both positions under simultaneous fire.

You do not increase the uncertainty for the opponent by presenting your troops in the showcase.

Besides; forward slope defensive positions are easily detected, thus never an advantage from a detectability point of view. A defensive position that's well done does not tell to an aerial photo interpreter what's decoy and what not.
Reverse slope defences on the other hand cannot be observed permanently like forward slope defences and allow thus for much less reconnaissance by the enemy.

JMA; the key is -as so often- that I wrote about capable opponents. Some dinosaur calls it METT-T. The "E" stands for "enemy". Forward slopes defences ARE suicidal against capable enemies. I doubt that the Rhodesian army cared much about capable enemies. It didn't fight one for a generation in the 70's.
The WW2 booklet in question was about a war between first and second-rate powers. A forward slope defence was suicidal in that war. Even Romanian infantry regiments of '44 and Italian Bersaglieri of '42 were capable enough to rip forward slope defences apart, even the ones set up by the Argentinians in '82.

I know many gimmick and have added some gimmicks* to counterslope, reverse slope and ridge defence positions. The forward slope on the other hand is simply hopeless.

*: One gimmick is for example to set up an additional concealing screen (a fence of netting, for example) a metre ahead of the ridge in order to increase the survivability of the ridge defenders and observers. Gaps created by shelling can be plugged with the concealing "umbrella frame" trick of snipers, even in the midst of a fight.
This gimmick solves a problem which occurs on very straight ridges; the problematic silhouettes of the defenders.

I agree with most of what you say and will add that trying to hold ground in the traditional sense is pointless against a mobile (mechanised) enemy capable of rapid maneuver and bypass. As to a reverse slope defensive position modern observation through satellite and drone make it just about as vulnerable as a forward slope.

Yes competence together with the necessary weapons and equipment make for a tough opponent but take away most of the supporting weapons and Air Effort available to modern armies and the playing field is leveled pretty soon.

I quote again from the Brits: "Although in each case the choice of a forward or reverse slope position should be decided on its merits, reverse slopes almost invariably provide the best position for defence."

Your reference to Rhodesia needs to be addressed.

Yes the enemy (being the guerrilla forces - ZANLA and ZIPRA) were pathetic against even the most basic standard. We had few troops so had to work out how best to take then on with what we had. So we were able to take them on on ratios of (not 3:1 but) 1:30 (Op Dingo) or more if we used what little air we had to maximum effect and achieved the element of surprise. ZANLA (Mugabe) kept pushing ill trained cannon fodder over the border which we culled in turkey shoot after turkey shoot so in reality the numbers of so-called insurgents was not as significant as some latter day observers would like to make out. ZIPRA (Nkomo) had Russian advisors who prepared them for a mechanised invasion from Zambia down one of two routes (or both), Victoria Falls-Bulawayo and Kariba-Salisbury. Too many bridges on those routes which we could cut and the advance would grind to a halt. (What were the Russians thinking). So what you are capable of, what your enemy is capable of and the terrain you will be fighting on is important - METT-TC - if you like.

As the man said..."If you know the enemy and know yourself you need not fear the results of a hundred battles." - Sun Tzu

So true.

Firn

01-23-2011, 07:11 PM

No opponent would always "know" that the line of defence is reverse/counter slope, for there are usually several slopes and the first one could be largely a decoy. German defence doctrine advocated a deep defence which had a zone for skirmishing and delaying in front of the real deal. There were often even two fully prepared defensive positions plus if possible decoy positions. The secondary defensive position was a necessity against Soviet offensive preparatory shelling, and the Soviets rarely kept both positions under simultaneous fire.

Actually the need to deny the forward zone to the enemy of the MLR was already present in WWI, if in more static form. Through heavy patrolling, scouting, trench raids and strictly limited attacks the Allies tried often to gnaw this screening zone away. The Soviets put a great deal of effort in many directions to gather as many information as possible about the composition of the enemy defenses and operational intent. Heavy night attacks were at least once used to pull more German troops into the front zones.

You do not increase the uncertainty for the opponent by presenting your troops in the showcase.

Besides; forward slope defensive positions are easily detected, thus never an advantage from a detectability point of view. A defensive position that's well done does not tell to an aerial photo interpreter what's decoy and what not.
Reverse slope defences on the other hand cannot be observed permanently like forward slope defences and allow thus for much less reconnaissance by the enemy.

If we consider the fact that the construction, supply and relieve of relatively exposed defensive positions and outposts were in WWII usually done under the screen of darkness the advances of modern sensors and optics certainly don't help the forward slope defense, especially in relative open terrain and static situations and a highly capable "E". Factors of the METT-TC like Urban areas, dense vegetation, available and useable firepower and so on will ever influence this debate.

...............

To come back to the topic. Is it just me or isn't it striking that despite all the words and ink spread about the need to lighten the load at least two key weapons systems tested by US Army, the Mk 48 or the XM25? will be heavier then the ones they replace?

Pete

01-23-2011, 10:53 PM

An U.S. army platoon dug in in a defensive position overnight sometime in 1944. It was on a forward slope ... when morning fog had cleared, a camouflaged assault gun began opening fire on the forward slope position, decimating the platoon.

At the risk of being another old f*rt who repeats himself, the following is from Paul Gorman in The Secret of Future Victories (http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/gorman/gorman.asp).

DePuy was at odds with both propensities, being convinced that field fortifications should primarily provide cover from frontal fire, and should be wholly concealed from the enemy. In 1973, in explaining to the Commandant of the Infantry School and the Combat Arms Training Board what he expected them to do, and why, he told of an incident toward the end of the Battle of the Bulge, in early February 1945, when his battalion had pushed forward toward the Belgian-German border against stiffening German resistance. One company had dug in one evening along the military crest of a high, open snow-covered ridge, the soldiers' exertions with their entrenching tools ringing each foxhole with "dark doughnuts in the snow." After dawn the next day, from a ridge facing them, the Germans opened fire with high velocity, pinpoint-accurate cannon, probably from Jagdpanzer. "It was murder":17

I do not believe that infantry can survive on the modem battlefield against a modem enemy if our positions can be seen by their side. The issue ... is field of fire, cover and concealment. The reason that I feel [so strongly] is because I just happened to see German tanks kill a lot of my soldiers.... (My battalion) dug in where they could be seen, and a couple of tanks on a hill opposite just picked them off one by one. They couldn't get out and run, couldn't get away. [The enemy] just walked his tank cannon right down that one company--C Company--[I had] a pretty awful, hopeless, and helpless feeling. They were dug in wrong. They could be seen ... the lesson I hoisted aboard back in World War II is still valid for today and the future.
DePuy taught his troops to employ rear slope defenses when they could, and to dig cover and concealment when they could not. His ideas did not always agree with concepts of contemporaries.18 DePuy tells of a clash with Army Training Test umpires when he was commanding 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, in Germany in 1953. Because of his World War II experiences, DePuy had trained his battalion to dig defensive positions in such a way that they were wholly invisible from the front. Typically, a 2/8 Inf soldier would dig his foxhole directly behind a tree or a rock, or in the midst of a bush, with his field of fire across the front of adjacent holes similarly sited. Spoil was concealed, and great pains taken to maintain the "natural appearance" of the position as seen from the enemy perspective. Emplacements with extensive frontal views were reserved for indirect fire observers, or for accompanying tanks. Many of the Army Training Test umpires were veterans of Korea, and most were graduates of the Infantry School. They held that the 2/8 Infantry positions little resembled a proper defense. DePuy knew why:19

[In Korea] they built big forts. When you got out in front, you could see everything.... The umpires who came to test [2/8 Inf] thought I was crazy. They didn't understand why I hadn't built Korean pillboxes on the military crest or at the bottom of the hill. Instead I had my guys behind rocks, trees and bushes. I wouldn't let them disturb the bushes, so you couldn't see a thing from the front.... All the company and platoon umpires ran back to the battalion umpire and said, "This battalion is totally unsatisfactory. They don't know how to dig in." They were also sceptical about the overwatch and bounding [in the atack]....

(Fortuitously, it turned out the the Chief Umpire was a Colonel who had served in the 5th RTC in Korea, and who readily agreed with DePuy; the 2/8 Infantry passed its test.)

DePuy's field fortification techniques received a rigorous test in Vietnam. There his troops in the 1st Infantry Division were taught to erect a frontal parapet of earth constructed of spoil from the foxhole, camouflaged with vegetation, with partial overhead cover as well. In 1967, shortly after DePuy's departure from command of the Big Red One, 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, dug in after that fashion, defeated an all-out attack by a regiment, with an enemy-to-friendly mortality ratio of 198 to 1.20.