The Roles and Weapons with the Squad [Archive] - Page 4

JMA

01-27-2011, 07:03 PM

...and what standard defensive principle would those be?

A FOB is a facility from which to mount operations, and the location itself may provide operational advantages, such as surveillance of a route or an area. The Surveillance Towers in South Armagh, were sited to give the most efficient coverage of the boarder. Had a Soviet MRR been coming north from the Republic, they would not have been where they were.

A FOB in A'Stan is in a very, very low threat environment. Siting is in no way critical. Taking on a proficient mobile enemy with AFVs is a different game altogether.

Having said that, the base at Wanat was clearly badly sited and there for all the wrong reasons. The SF Base at Lang-Vei, over run during Tet, was never constructed with Tanks (PT-76's) in mind. Compare and contrast, the SF Base at Kontum, which straddled the main road.

The differentiation is really all down to your core functions analysis. A FOB in A'Stan is "Found." If you were an Armoured Coy in Germany facing the Soviets, and you got "found" you were probably going to be dead before the fight began.

May I suggest that you access and read the following without delay:

Army Field Manual (AFM)
Volume One - Combined Arms Operations
Part 10 - Counter Insurgency Operations
ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 8
FORWARD OPERATIONAL BASES

All will be revealed.

OK so getting found is the problem. So in the defence you have have resources that will find the enemy forming up/gathering/grouping then you have the ability to break up their attack before it begins, yes?
(See:
ARMY FIELD MANUAL
VOLUME 1 COMBINED ARMS OPERATION
PART 1 - FORMATION TACTIC
PART 2 – THE CONDUCT OF FORMATION LEVEL OPERATIONS
SECTION 4 — OFFENSIVE SUPPORT
712. General
a. (1) Engaging the enemy early to disrupt the cohesion of his attack, reduce his information gathering capability and his ability to mass combat power.)

OK, so that said you also need to make urgent reference to the following:

ARMY FIELD MANUAL
VOLUME 1 - COMBINED ARMS OPERATION
PART 2 - BATTLEGROUP TACTICS
PART B - TACTICS AT THE BATTLEGROUP LEVEL
CHAPTER 7 - DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
SECTION 1 - THE FUNDAMENTALS

Trust me its all there...

The problem in Afghanistan is that "young" and inexperienced Brigadiers, Lt Cols and majors have been allowed to make it up as they go along.

...sadly the Brits have never been able to learn from their own mistakes. I'm told by those who know that it is due to the levels of arrogance which rise in step with officer promotions. That is why it is widely accepted that apart from a rare few, British officers are mainly followed out of curiosity.

William F. Owen

01-28-2011, 06:39 AM

May I suggest that you access and read the following without delay:

Army Field Manual (AFM)
Volume One - Combined Arms Operations
Part 10 - Counter Insurgency Operations
ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 8
FORWARD OPERATIONAL BASES

All will be revealed....

Don't need to read it. I spend a lot of time pointing out why what in the manual is complete rubbish. Most of what is wrong today is because of what is written in the manual.

Siting a FOB is predicated on completely different conditions to the "conduct" of defensive operation against a combined arms enemy. IF the AFM you cite, does not make that clear, then it is just wrong. - like a great deal of British AFMs.

BushrangerCZ

01-29-2011, 01:51 PM

Were you in a combat zone at that time. I can't see you trusting your life to a rifle with so little care esp a M16/M4

The problem is that you don't have the luxury to quickly change the bolt and carrier group in combat. That is why soldiers are finding it hard to find the time to clean their weapons 3 or 4 times a day as new policy requires. But you don't have a choice because their life depends on it.

I used the M16 in training and if I had a missfire, I just raised my hand and shouted out that I had a malfunction. When I got in combat there was no one to tell I had a malfunction. All it matterd that if your weapon malfunctioned then you were helpless for however long it took you to clear it. I have more than a few gray hairs today because of this.:rolleyes:

First, the M16 went into cambat in 1965, it shouldn't still be having teething problems.

Secondly, I took the flak as a platoon leader because I had a AKMS (folding stock) made in Czechoslovakia. There were problems such as battle field identification (AKs and M16 sounded different, AKs also went "Clack" when you went from safe to fire mode), also you had to scrounge your own ammunition. However, that was a help in some operations when they couldn't supply you properly. Airmobile relied on a thin supply line.:o

There has never been a single AK made in Czechoslovakia:rolleyes:. If you look a bit closer, or better strip the bolt, you will see a difference...

JMA

01-29-2011, 07:12 PM

Don't need to read it. I spend a lot of time pointing out why what in the manual is complete rubbish. Most of what is wrong today is because of what is written in the manual.

Siting a FOB is predicated on completely different conditions to the "conduct" of defensive operation against a combined arms enemy. IF the AFM you cite, does not make that clear, then it is just wrong. - like a great deal of British AFMs.

Wilf, that you have strong opinions on certain matters does not necessarily make you correct (I assume you realise this).

I'm not sure what your military service and counter insurgency credentials are but I suggest that you may be making to bold a use of the red pen.

The Brits normally place the following in the Preface:

"The subject matter contained within this publication is authoritative. However, its application is a matter of military judgement."

So where does the problem lie? With the doctrine or the military judgement of commanders on the ground?

Pete

01-29-2011, 09:32 PM

How come siting and defending a base in Afghanistan is not governed by standard defensive principles?
The use of fortified bases in low-intensity conflicts such as in Afghanistan or Iraq isn't the same thing as trying to use them to defend against a corps of German Panzer and Panzer-Grenadier divisions during World War II. This goes back to the many different permutations of tactical and operational situations that come under the all-encompassing category of "Full-Spectrum Operations."

JMA

01-30-2011, 06:32 PM

The use of fortified bases in low-intensity conflicts such as in Afghanistan or Iraq isn't the same thing as trying to use them to defend against a corps of German Panzer and Panzer-Grenadier divisions during World War II. This goes back to the many different permutations of tactical and operational situations that come under the all-encompassing category of "Full-Spectrum Operations."

Pete, I would have thought it was obvious that the enemy capabilities would be taken into account when such a based is sited.

Neither you nor Wilf seem able to explain that if the Principles of Defence are not used to guide the siting and development of an FOB then what basis is used.

82redleg

01-30-2011, 10:13 PM

Pete, I would have thought it was obvious that the enemy capabilities would be taken into account when such a based is sited.

Neither you nor Wilf seem able to explain that if the Principles of Defence are not used to guide the siting and development of an FOB then what basis is used.

Frankly, in most places, the capabilities of the Taliban and other associated militants (HIG, Haqqani network, etc.) against a well-established fixed-site defense are negligible. Witness exactly ZERO coalition outposts overrun in the last 9 plus years, and only one fully set outpost even seriously threatened, AFAIK.

Sometimes, you have to fight where you need to be for operational and/or strategic reasons (population centers, etc), instead of getting to choose to fight from the best tactical position. It sucks, but that's the way it is.

Ken White

01-30-2011, 10:27 PM

However, they are often (too often, I and some say...) modified to adapt to one to three other factors; in no particular order as that order will vary depending upon location, from time to time and from unit to unit, those are:

- Desires (presumed or real) of the next higher commander or (more scarily) one of his staff weenies. This includes those cases where a Grid reference was given, arrival on site showed it to be a poor choice but the base was established where directed anyway rather than a simple call back saying "It's not a good location, I'm moving 850m north..." :mad:

- Desired or directed (by someone who likely has not been on the ground but relied upon a map or aerial recon) proximity to a Village or feature. :(

- Equipment and labor available. That needs a bit explanation to anyone with Commonwealth (or similar) service. Unlike the British and many other Armies, US Troops do not defend well. They never have. Nor do they dig well. We are too lazy. We'd rather build sandbag castles to be RPG targets and hope that doesn't happen. There are many reasons, most a bit flaky in the eyes of some but in sum they mean that the US Army has never done well at defense. It may be noteworthy that most British battles of renown are defensive while almost all US battles of significance are offensive. One would think the US would adapt to that and make USE of known strengths while avoiding known weaknesses. One would think... :rolleyes:

That explains most or at least some poor location selections by the US. Can't speak for the UK or others.

Added: Slow typing strikes again, 82redleg beat me with a more concise and good answer. His point on zero successful attack / overuns is important as it contributes to the "It's not worth a whole lot of effort" attitude. His final comment is also correct -- as it always is, in every Army...

P.S.

To the impersonator of 82redleg below: He, the real 82redleg, is smarter than that -- he noted ol' Ken couldn't even spell 'use' correctly... :(

82redleg

01-31-2011, 12:56 AM

Added: Slow typing strikes again, 82redleg beat me with a more concise and good answer.

Anytime I get an "attaboy" from Ken, it makes me feel good:D

JMA

01-31-2011, 07:58 PM

The principles are used.

That I suppose should read "The Principles of the Defense should be being used."

However, they are often (too often, I and some say...) modified to adapt to one to three other factors; in no particular order as that order will vary depending upon location, from time to time and from unit to unit, those are:

- Desires (presumed or real) of the next higher commander or (more scarily) one of his staff weenies. This includes those cases where a Grid reference was given, arrival on site showed it to be a poor choice but the base was established where directed anyway rather than a simple call back saying "It's not a good location, I'm moving 850m north..." :mad:

- Desired or directed (by someone who likely has not been on the ground but relied upon a map or aerial recon) proximity to a Village or feature. :(

- Equipment and labor available. That needs a bit explanation to anyone with Commonwealth (or similar) service. Unlike the British and many other Armies, US Troops do not defend well. They never have. Nor do they dig well. We are too lazy. We'd rather build sandbag castles to be RPG targets and hope that doesn't happen. There are many reasons, most a bit flaky in the eyes of some but in sum they mean that the US Army has never done well at defense. It may be noteworthy that most British battles of renown are defensive while almost all US battles of significance are offensive. One would think the US would adapt to that and make USE of known strengths while avoiding known weaknesses. One would think... :rolleyes:

That explains most or at least some poor location selections by the US. Can't speak for the UK or others.

Yes, partially. There are obviously poor location selections and then there are poor defensive sitings of the positions on the locations themselves.

My sole point was in contrast with what Wilf appeared to suggest and that was that the standard Principles of Defence are indeed always important in siting a defensive or base location whether at formation level or down to even platoon outposts and temporary bases. I maintain quite simply that the Principles of Defense are universal. I asked if the Principles of Defence don't apply, what does.

Yes it is generally understood that "the US Army has never done well at defense" and that this has not been taken into account in US military planning remains a mystery.

Not sure that all the blame can be moved upwards for what happens on the ground.

Added: Slow typing strikes again, 82redleg beat me with a more concise and good answer. His point on zero successful attack / overuns is important as it contributes to the "It's not worth a whole lot of effort" attitude. His final comment is also correct -- as it always is, in every Army...

But Ken his answer is not relevant in the context of what was being discussed. Where does the measure of a base/outpost being overrun become the yardstick by which it is assessed whether the Principles of the Defence have been adhered to on the construction and development of a base or outpost?

Months ago I raised the issue of the futile construction and occupation of Beau Geste Forts supposedly as a platform from which to launch offensive action against the Taliban (and in so doing deny them freedom of movement).

The history shows that the Taliban through the widespread use of IEDs and small arms harassment turned what was envisaged as platform from which to launch offensive action into nothing more than an isolated (from the community) fort from which ISAF soldiers ventured out at the their peril (from IEDs and ambushes).

Ken White

01-31-2011, 09:23 PM

That I suppose should read "The Principles of the Defense should be being used."No, it mean what it says. The 'Principles of Defense' have their place and should be considered by anyone siting a position or emplacement that may need to be defended. They should never be slavishly followed because NO doctrine can be applicable to all situations.My sole point was in contrast with what Wilf appeared to suggest and that was that the standard Principles of Defence are indeed always important in siting a defensive or base location whether at formation level or down to even platoon outposts and temporary bases. I maintain quite simply that the Principles of Defense are universal. I asked if the Principles of Defence don't apply, what does.In order, as Wilf said "Siting a FOB is predicated on completely different conditions to the "conduct" of defensive operation against a combined arms enemy." I agree with him, you do not. That's okay or should be. IMO, the METT-TC factors, properly or even improperly considered can lead to the omission of some principles, the modification of others and the inclusion of additional factors; flexibility and METT-TC being paramount as opposed to a rather slavish adherence to doctrine.

Such deviations will sometimes be determined on the ground, sometimes by higher echelons. Usually, they will work out well for all concerned, occasionally they will not. Sometimes that will be due to errors in the adaptations, sometimes due to other factors. The fact that it generally works out well is more important than the fact that it is not done by the book.Yes it is generally understood that "the US Army has never done well at defense" and that this has not been taken into account in US military planning remains a mystery.That's easy to answer, it's due to our far too strict adherence to the European model and a concomitant refusal to adapt our doctrine to our manpower predilections, insisting that the Troops must adapt to the model. The fact that they have never done so and unlikely to ever succumb is neatly overlooked by military 'scholars' as opposed to practitioners who adapt on the ground, generally successfully. Regrettably, the scholars write the books and are not about to let the unwashed review and change them...

As a possibly apocryphal story has it, the Germans in WW II were perplexed as they knew US Doctrine and sometimes had access to US plans but had to acknowledge "They never follow their doctrine or plan..."

I once complimented a Korean Officer for great performance by his unit. He said "Well, everything we do, you teach us. Why don't you do what you teach us to do?":eek:

European Armies -- and the ROK Army -- are good and do what they should pretty well. The US Army is not too bad but it suffers from trying to emulate European TTP - the US soldier won't do much that European soldiers do automatically and will do some things rather differently. Our rather slavish adaptation of European military models means we use methods not always appropriate for the human material provided.Not sure that all the blame can be moved upwards for what happens on the ground.Of course it cannot. In the end analysis, errors are the responsibility of the level at which they are committed, so that portion of 'blame' remains there. However, the portion of 'blame' that accrues to the level of training and / or education of the persons involved most always defaults to ever higher levels. As does 'blame' for the culture of the Force -- are innovation and initiative encouraged or not? Sad answer for the US... :mad:But...his answer is not relevant in the context of what was being discussed. Where does the measure of a base/outpost being overrun become the yardstick by which it is assessed whether the Principles of the Defence have been adhered to on the construction and development of a base or outpost?It is true there is an apparent lack of relevance but if you examine it, think for a second and know Soldiers -- as you obviously do -- then it becomes apparent some relevance lies in the fact that no such overruns have occurred has led to complacency and complacency leads to sloppy performance. His second point, re 'directives,' is a burden all Soldiers have borne for centuries. My comment on the "Sandbag Castles" is reflective of that complacency and sloppiness as my "desired or directed' comment agrees with 82redleg's second point. There's relaevance there -- shouldn't be but there is... :(Months ago I raised the issue of the futile construction and occupation of Beau Geste Forts...from which ISAF soldiers ventured out at the their peril (from IEDs and ambushes).That was true then and still is today -- but only at some times and in some places. Afghanistan is too large, the enemy too varied and the rotation of Coalition troops (and their overshadowing of Afghan National Army troops) causes too many variations for any theme or seeming trend -- bad or good -- to be universally applicable.

Fuchs

01-31-2011, 11:16 PM

In order, as Wilf said "Siting a FOB is predicated on completely different conditions to the "conduct" of defensive operation against a combined arms enemy." I agree with him, you do not.

I think the problem is rather that certain practices are a no-no in either case, and were still applied in AFG. An example would be setting up a base on (relatively) low ground - until it's being harassed by fire from a higher position (I don't call it an assault if it's just fire).

There are also certain fighting positions known from photos and videos that were either never meant to be used as such or were the result of an extremely stupid (and eventually lucky because few get hurt in them) order.
I mean stone/sandbag walls over which the soldiers need to peek in order to return fire. No firing slits, no camo net concealment. The sophistication of these fighting positions was not only inferior to 15th century angle bastions, but even inferior to Hellenic Age fortifications! I don't mean materials (which are certainly an difficult to come by on an Afghan hill), but principles of construction.
A simple camo net can largely prevent aimed fire at defenders/guards, but I have yet to see it in use. Even the lesser alternative - setting up a background that looks just like the soldier - was not seen on published photos yet.

Ken White

02-01-2011, 01:05 AM

I think the problem is rather that certain practices are a no-no in either case, and were still applied in AFG.True. Same thing happened in all the Armies involved in WW II -- and To the Caesars -- among many others...

Poor tactical employment and siting is not a new phenomenon nor is it likely to disappear in the future. Even superbly trained folks can do dumb things -- and no Army operating in Afghanistan today is superbly trained (though several have some units and / or SOF elements that come close).

JMA

02-01-2011, 03:18 AM

No, it mean what it says. The 'Principles of Defense' have their place and should be considered by anyone siting a position or emplacement that may need to be defended. They should never be slavishly followed because NO doctrine can be applicable to all situations.

OK so we have come full circle.

That you say the Principles of Defence "should be considered by anyone siting a position or emplacement that may need to be defended" actually indicates that we agree.

Then your qualification in the next sentence seems to be in agreement with an extract which I posted from Brit doctrine pamphlets a while ago, "The subject matter contained within this publication is authoritative. However, its application is a matter of military judgement." Which again places us in agreement.

In order, as Wilf said "Siting a FOB is predicated on completely different conditions to the "conduct" of defensive operation against a combined arms enemy." I agree with him, you do not.

...but does that mean that one throws all existing doctrine out the window? Of course not what it means is that in siting such a position under a given set of circumstances (enemy capabilities or METT-TC) "military judgement" is applied to how best to site the position.

That said now please explain to me which of the Principle of Defence can be ignored:

Offensive Action
All Round Defence
Depth
Mutual Support
Concealment
Deception
Striking forces

That's okay or should be. IMO, the METT-TC factors, properly or even improperly considered can lead to the omission of some principles, the modification of others and the inclusion of additional factors; flexibility and METT-TC being paramount as opposed to a rather slavish adherence to doctrine.

Yes as I quoted: "The subject matter contained within this publication is authoritative. However, its application is a matter of military judgement." Still not sure of where we disagree (other than for the sake of it ;)

JMA

02-01-2011, 03:31 AM

I think the problem is rather that certain practices are a no-no in either case, and were still applied in AFG. An example would be setting up a base on (relatively) low ground - until it's being harassed by fire from a higher position (I don't call it an assault if it's just fire).

There are also certain fighting positions known from photos and videos that were either never meant to be used as such or were the result of an extremely stupid (and eventually lucky because few get hurt in them) order.
I mean stone/sandbag walls over which the soldiers need to peek in order to return fire. No firing slits, no camo net concealment. The sophistication of these fighting positions was not only inferior to 15th century angle bastions, but even inferior to Hellenic Age fortifications! I don't mean materials (which are certainly an difficult to come by on an Afghan hill), but principles of construction.
A simple camo net can largely prevent aimed fire at defenders/guards, but I have yet to see it in use. Even the lesser alternative - setting up a background that looks just like the soldier - was not seen on published photos yet.

Well if the yardstick that justifies where these outposts are located and how their defenses are sited is whether any have been "overrun" then one can see why the tactical and defence-works standards are so low.

(I agree with your comment on camo nets)

Ken White

02-01-2011, 03:34 AM

That you say the Principles of Defence "should be considered by anyone siting a position or emplacement that may need to be defended" actually indicates that we agree.Never said I disagreed with anything other than your assertion "That I suppose should read "The Principles of the Defense should be being used." I simply said my statement was what I meant, then agreed there should be considered in all things defensive or potentially so... :wry:...but does that mean that one throws all existing doctrine out the window? Of course not what it means is that in siting such a position under a given set of circumstances (enemy capabilities or METT-TC) "military judgement" is applied to how best to site the position.True.That said now please explain to me which of the Principle of Defence can be ignored:

Offensive Action
All Round Defence
Depth
Mutual Support
Concealment
Deception
Striking forcesGive me the map, a troop list, the principal locations, the assessment of the enemy (broad based, don't need a detailed OB workup...), log and perstats -- all that OpOrd / METT-TC stuff and I'll be happy to do so. ;)

Lacking that I'll quickly point out that in most COIN / FID situations, Depth (classic type) is neither available or required, Concealment may be undesirable or even directed to not be applied in some cases and mutual support is rarely achieved or available...

82redleg

02-01-2011, 12:54 PM

But Ken his answer is not relevant in the context of what was being discussed. Where does the measure of a base/outpost being overrun become the yardstick by which it is assessed whether the Principles of the Defence have been adhered to on the construction and development of a base or outpost?

Regarding my first point- If the principles are truly principles, then 100% success must show their application in some form. The specific application may be different based on the circumstances, but they are applied none-the-less.

Regarding my second point- There are many reasons that the tactical military commander may be forced to accept less than optimal positions, especially in pseudo-war operations like what we are currently engaged in. While many (if not all) of the principles remain the same, the details of their application change, and sometimes higher considerations (operational, strategic) supersede tactical considerations.

Provide the principles that you feel are being violated, and I will attempt to explain to you the TTPs with which those principles are employed in OEF, limited by OPSEC (of course), my own knowledge limitations (I'm 5 years out of OEF now) and the separation caused by this means of communication.

JMA

02-01-2011, 04:09 PM

Regarding my first point- If the principles are truly principles, then 100% success must show their application in some form. The specific application may be different based on the circumstances, but they are applied none-the-less.

Regarding my second point- There are many reasons that the tactical military commander may be forced to accept less than optimal positions, especially in pseudo-war operations like what we are currently engaged in. While many (if not all) of the principles remain the same, the details of their application change, and sometimes higher considerations (operational, strategic) supersede tactical considerations.

Provide the principles that you feel are being violated, and I will attempt to explain to you the TTPs with which those principles are employed in OEF, limited by OPSEC (of course), my own knowledge limitations (I'm 5 years out of OEF now) and the separation caused by this means of communication.

My comment on your post was simply that whether any bases had been overrun or not had little or nothing to do with what was being discussed and that being that the Principles of the Defence should be considered in every defensive instance or ignored in a counter insurgency setting.

My point was simply that they should always be considered... but with the rider (I borrowed from the introduction to that Brit doctrine pamphlet) "The subject matter contained within this publication is authoritative. However, its application is a matter of military judgement."

I'm happy to leave it there... unless you want to put up the costs for a trip to Afghanistan (when it warms up) where we can discuss the matter further on the ground.

BushrangerCZ

02-01-2011, 05:17 PM

Guys, I have no interest in breaking your discussion, but here is what makes me most wonder about today´s small teams composition:
What sense does it make to train and deploy, let´s say, army LRS teams, consisting of six soldiers, to A-stan, if they will never be allowed to leave the base in such a small number?

Ken White

02-01-2011, 07:19 PM

What sense does it make to train and deploy, let´s say, army LRS teams, consisting of six soldiers, to A-stan, if they will never be allowed to leave the base in such a small number?Really good. Embarrassing but good. Really embarrassing...

I await an answer from some serving senior Field Grade Officer on the board...

82redleg

02-01-2011, 08:16 PM

Really good. Embarrassing but good. Really embarrassing...

I await an answer from some serving senior Field Grade Officer on the board...

I don't think I qualify as a senior field grade, but it doesn't make sense to me. I know a couple of people that had LRS-D or Pathfinder commands in OEF- I'll have to ask them their thoughts on operations.

Ken White

02-01-2011, 09:49 PM

My understanding is that it is very much a Commander / AO - METT-TC thing and that some units are more Patrol friendly than others (and obviously. location can have a bearing.). I hear a few units are less risk averse than most but that generally, Cav Platoons and Scout Platoons are converted to palace guard or personal protection (which should be a Court Martial Offense for he or she who directs that :mad: ) and the use of LRS patrols is 'not robust.'

The OpSec issue bothered me in making my post above and this one -- but the risk aversion is IMO more worrisome. It fascinates - and worries -- me that I had more latitude as a Squad Leader in Korea and as an acting Platoon Leader in Viet Nam than most Company Commanders appear to have today. We should be better trained, more trusting of a professional force and they should have more freedom of action. Sadly, none of those things appear to be true.

Pete

02-01-2011, 10:30 PM

I remember in 2003 shortly after the fall of Baghdad when Jake Garner and and his military government crew were said to have been holed up in their compound because there were no force protection escorts to accompany them out the gate. These force protection policies seem to originate at high levels with the intention of preventing little detachments and groups from being picked off by the bad guys. When taken to extremes though it makes one wonder why we bother sending people overseas if we're going to lock them down in FOBs.

Infanteer

02-01-2011, 10:43 PM

I routinely deployed 4-6 man patrols for layback, OPs and ambushes. These weren't LRRPs, but I was sending small teams out.

Ken White

02-02-2011, 12:08 AM

I routinely deployed 4-6 man patrols for layback, OPs and ambushes. These weren't LRRPs, but I was sending small teams out.Many do that and for more than a day or two as well but one unit that did not do so would be too many IMO. I hear there's more than one.

The LRS guys should be out for a week or two at a time. There are a lot of reasons why that isn't routinely being done, some good, some not so much...

BushrangerCZ

02-02-2011, 02:23 PM

I routinely deployed 4-6 man patrols for layback, OPs and ambushes. These weren't LRRPs, but I was sending small teams out.

Really? You deployed 4-6 man team away from the FB/FOB/COP, where it acted independently for more than couple of hours? I am not talking about cut off/security elements or OPs who are part of the bigger element, I am talking about sending out independent recon/combat patrol, just by itself. LRS units train like that, and organize like that, but never get deployed just like that (current organization of LRS team can be found on their official site in free-to-download presentation). At the end, they drive around stuck in body armor in humwees as whole detachments, not teams (who are supposed and trained to operate by themselves if needed- and I think it´s needed, you can´t hide whole detachment anywhere in that place). I PM´d you the rest od the story.

BushrangerCZ

02-02-2011, 02:25 PM

I don't think I qualify as a senior field grade, but it doesn't make sense to me. I know a couple of people that had LRS-D or Pathfinder commands in OEF- I'll have to ask them their thoughts on operations.
Just read the rules for ISAF and OEF operations, you will find out.

Infanteer

02-02-2011, 02:55 PM

Really? You deployed 4-6 man team away from the FB/FOB/COP, where it acted independently for more than couple of hours?

Yes.

BushrangerCZ

02-02-2011, 03:08 PM

Thanks for the info Infanteer, I will try to find out exactly where was stated what I PM´d you, to this point I was sure it was for the whole operation - maybe not.

Ken White

02-02-2011, 05:01 PM

Just read the rules for ISAF and OEF operations, you will find out.I agree with the thrust of your question that started this sub-thread and it is as I said an embarrassing question -- or should be -- but while you address the norm, there have been and are exceptions.

Remember that rules change over time and what is the rule for one tour in country may differ from earlier or later tours (the US does not have 10 years experience in Afghanistan, it has ten one year tours experience there...:rolleyes: ). Recall also that what is written is not always followed. I know of units that did send out patrols for days at a whack and LRS elements that did get to do their job -- however, and unfortunately, also know or heard of more that did not. So rules change and all units are not the same. The Country and the coalition force is too big and varied to make a lot of generalizations very accurately.

BushrangerCZ

02-02-2011, 05:20 PM

I agree with the thrust of your question that started this sub-thread and it is as I said an embarrassing question -- or should be -- but while you address the norm, there have been and are exceptions.

Remember that rules change over time and what is the rule for one tour in country may differ from earlier or later tours (the US does not have 10 years experience in Afghanistan, it has ten one year tours experience there...:rolleyes: ). Recall also that what is written is not always followed. I know of units that did send out patrols for days at a whack and LRS elements that did get to do their job -- however, and unfortunately, also know or heard of more that did not. So rules change and all units are not the same. The Country and the coalition force is too big and varied to make a lot of generalizations very accurately.

Fortunately, you are right... thanks for accurating my statement guys, I like to see that things were better somewhere. However, as you said, it´s more an exception rather than norm. Still, I think we all have the same experience with body armour - it was, is and probably will be mandatory everytime outside the wire, no matter what GFC thinks, and it effectively prevents LRS type of operations (reasons are obvious). Even if you use quads, you can´t move in many parts of the mountains, plus tracks are very distinctive, and you are limited with suitable hides for them. But there probably is "body armour" thread already somewhere on this forum, so I will not move off-topic. Thanks all for good brainstorming;).

82redleg

02-02-2011, 07:03 PM

Just read the rules for ISAF and OEF operations, you will find out.

I know what the rules say, or at least what they said during a couple of different rotations.

I was answering Ken, as a field grade (albeit not a senior one).

Training units one way, and employing them another doesn't make sense to me, and neither does the restriction of decision-making. Ken said it better than I can, based on his experiences. I don't understand why we allow a CO CDR to take $$ and rank, but not spend $$ (or not very much $$) and make decisions about force protection, etc.

Maybe I'll never get it, maybe I'm still here because I haven't completed the lobotomization process yet.:rolleyes:

P-Hustle

02-06-2011, 02:06 PM

As a LRS guy myself, currently deployed to Afghanistan, this a point of major frustration for me. While not currently serving in a LRS unit (a long and sordid chain of events brought that on), I am still in a unit whose primary mission (when not deployed) is dismounted reconnaissance. Yet, we spend a majority of our time bundled up in body armor and MRAPS, driving around like idiots and not influencing the battlespace in any long term manner. Our influence extends as far as our LOS from the trucks, and disappears as soon as we drive past.

Yet the leadership still uses terms like "surprise" and "ambush", as if 4 diesel fume excreting MRAPS will get the jump on 5 guys on foot with no heavy equipment and an AK apiece. Coming from a LRS background, this kills me daily. And when I repeatedly bring up the idea of dispatching small teams for several days to operate quietly within the battlespace, commanders who should know better look at me as if I have horns.

Amusingly, or depressingly, this complete misunderstanding of how to utilize R&S units has led to all of our dismounted operations consisting of at most 8-10 men, as the command simply imposed a conventional unit structure on an R&S unit with much smaller numbers. So now to run the trucks and foot patrols, we are understrength in both areas.

Keep in mind, those 8 man patrols are not reconnaissance patrols where stealth and speed are used, but very basic conventional presence patrols.

As a caveat to all of this, I do not know of one R&S unit currently in country who is actually operating as they train. My other LRS brethren are tasked as either mounted units, or in one case basic trainers to the ANA. All of this is very, very sad IMHO.

Someone may hit me on OPSEC issues, but frankly all of this is easily observable and I think that ignoring the issue is more detrimental than admitting it exists and discussing it. What would be an OPSEC violation would be advertising that we have numerous small elements operating all over the battlefield gathering intelligence and planning interdiction operations. Sadly....

BushrangerCZ

02-06-2011, 02:17 PM

Thanks much for the input P-Hustle... this is exactly what I have meant. Imagine one fictional FOB in, let´s say, south-eastern Afghanistan, which gets shelled by 107mm rockets almost every week. It´s widely known from what approximate distance this munition can be fired using primitive and effective methods which are used in that area, and direction is easy to figure out many former impacts. Due to hard and limited terrain, it´s possible, by ordinary common sense, to determine couple of areas, which are most commonly used for priming the rockets. Classical FOB reaction is, after the indirect fire attack, to start mortaring the place and call CAS. What´s the result?? Next week the attack goes on again. I can clearly see the job for covert, fast moving recce patrol here, with good observation devices and attached sniper, waiting fot their prey in those NAIs. I guess they would freak the insurgents out much more than predictable (and thus avoidable) current reaction. Yes, it could mean that weak recce unit will get into the contact with stronger enemy element and sustain casualties, but this risk still sounds better to me than be like a sitting duck, waiting for a hit, just showing it´s harmlessness.
PS: Sorry for my grammar

jcustis

02-06-2011, 07:12 PM

P-Hustle, welcome aboard brother.

Firn

02-07-2011, 04:34 PM

.. but the risk aversion is IMO more worrisome. It fascinates - and worries -- me that I had more latitude as a Squad Leader in Korea and as an acting Platoon Leader in Viet Nam than most Company Commanders appear to have today. We should be better trained, more trusting of a professional force and they should have more freedom of action. Sadly, none of those things appear to be true.

Indeed and this is far from only true for the US forces, the standard Italian units are subjected possibly to an even tighter leash. From what I have heard first hand a lot of the scouting, infiltration and patrolling which would have done in past wars by simple conscripts with only some if any additional training has been SFed or greatly reduced for the professionals....

The key problem seems to be that the standing of a commander might get harmed far more by a potential disaster then bolstered by the potential success. At least after the political upheaval which followed the last Italian KIA the smart guys should know that they should play it safe and work-to-rule which might even be work-to-the true political intent.

Pete

02-08-2011, 10:22 AM

BushrangerCZ

02-08-2011, 04:55 PM

Welcome, BushrangerCZ. In May 1945 my late Dad was in the outskirts of Pilsen with the 97th U.S. Infantry Division when World War II ended. Later when he was in Prague in the 1970s a Communist Party official asked him whether he'd ever been to Czechoslovakia before and he said yes, near Pilsen in May 1945. The official said no, that can't be true, we were liberated by the great Red Army!

Pete, if I only could, I would buy your father whole crate of Pilsen Urquell. Commies really tried to persuade everybody that US soldiers in Pilsen were in fact soviet soldiers dressed up like Americans. Most people knew the true, but it was not good to talk about it. My grandfather handed some german POWs to US troops in my own hometown, so it is obvious that most people could not be blamed, but for example history teachers who taught about this facts could loose the job. Commies ruined the whole country, and now we are trying to catch up:wry:.

BushrangerCZ

02-08-2011, 04:59 PM

BushrangerCZ

02-09-2011, 04:01 PM

And to not to only complain, I´m going to post something positive:
Last month I was lucky enough to fire couple hundred rounds from both .223 and .308 SCAR rifle, plus some grenades from grenade launcher, and I am very impressed. So far the best rifle I ever fired from.

Pete

02-09-2011, 10:56 PM

Pete, if I only could, I would buy your father whole crate of Pilsen Urquell.
The day before Pilsen was officially liberated by the U.S. Army Dad's division G-2 intelligence officer had Dad drive him in a jeep into downtown Pilsen, where they found no Germans. They went back to division headquarters, which requested permission to occupy the city immediately. Corps and/or Third Army replied that they should stick to the original plan, and accordingly the next day the 16th Armored Division, a unit which had previously seen no combat, entered the city. The 2nd Infantry Division was then on the southern flank of Dad's 97th Infantry -- in fact the 97th ID had occupied positions of the 2nd ID a couple of days earlier so the 2nd ID could shift further south.

http://www.lonesentry.com/gi_stories_booklets/97thinfantry/pics/97th_infantry_front_cover.jpg

Pete

02-10-2011, 12:10 AM

Back in the 1970s there was a memoir of the OSS and CIA entitled Germans by one George Bailey, probably a pseudonym. It stated that on V-E day in 1945 there was an OSS team in Prague that included Eugene Fodor, author of the 1960s Fodor's Guide handbooks for American tourists in the countries of Europe. The OSS team also included an enlisted guy who was an old crown prince of the Romanov dynasty.

The book said a group of Soviet soldiers were intrigued to be able to have a conversation with one of their princes, but a self-important U.S. Army colonel butted into the discussion and insisted that he being the ranking officer, the translators present should ignore the enlisted man and tell the Russians the things that he had to say. The translators obliged, and what ensued was one of those "When the general and I were in the whorehouse the other night" kind of discussions. The colonel couldn't understand why the Russian soldiers were laughing at the wrong times.

Those of a conspiratorial mind might want to speculate on how it was that the author of the most popular series of guidebooks for American tourists in Europe in the 1960s was a former OSS guy with CIA associations. "Bill and Susan Smith operate a very nice bed and breakfast in Oxford which I highly recommend ... " It may have been a way of keeping track of American tourists in Europe at the time.

JMA

02-10-2011, 05:24 AM

JMA

02-10-2011, 05:47 AM

This response to Wilf of 19 June 2010 refers

This post (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=100802&postcount=132) of mine on another thread has relevance.

One aspect that appears not to be considered is that as the foot soldiers are 'overloaded' there should be a concern for the physical nature of the tasking given this limitation. In addition there should be a concern for to what extent the ability to maneuver in combat is degraded and the effect this has on the ability to kill the enemy. Returning to my point then that to send these Michelin men out on patrol is merely setting them up for failure.

From the The British Army Review Number 150 we read the following in the article Donkeys led by Lions:

We’re getting to a point where we are losing as many men making mistakes because they are exhausted from carrying armour (and the things that go with it) than are saved by it. The weight of protection and firepower also induces some unusual and undesirable combat behaviour.

OK, problem belatedly identified. Now wait and watch for the reaction...

BushrangerCZ

02-10-2011, 04:04 PM

Which one... the .223 or the .308?

I would choose 10 inches barrel in .223 and 13 or 16 inches barrel in .308. I really liked the shape, weight, cocking handle, safety selector, bolt catch, mag release, pistol grip, buttstock, behaviour during shooting, ambidextrousness (does this word exist?), reliability etc., basically whole weapon system was excellent, no matter what caliber. I also liked the FN guy:).

P-Hustle

02-10-2011, 06:52 PM

P-Hustle, welcome aboard brother.

Thank you jcustis, it's good to see a familiar face (err...name).

On the issue of being overloaded, while we still carry too much gear in my opinion, we have come leaps and bounds from when I first started deploying as a young LCPL. My first tour, where we relieved 1/8 after they were chewed up in Fallujah, it was common to find a Marine with 12-15 magazines on his body, as well as grenades, flashbangs, camelback, and whatever else we could drape over ourselves. And that was just on our Interceptor vests, leaving out the daypack most of us carried for crew served ammo and more water. While this set up worked for the Marines who were slugging it out in the Jolan, we operated in a much larger AO and required speed and agility, neither of which we had. We were not hunters, but armored turtles.

Today, plate carriers abound and I don't allow anyone in my platoon to carry more than 8 magazines on their second line kit (I myself stick to 6). While there is still a tendency to carry more than we need (side plates on anything but a raid/mounted operation sticks out), at least the men are analyzing their gear needs. Much of this weight cutting is done counter to requirements that come down from on high, but at least the common sense seems to exists at company level and below.

That brings me to a point that Ken White made about the inability of lower level leaders to make decisions that in past wars were made by men of the same position. Whether it be dropping equipment for certain missions, or modifying the number of men on patrol, today's Officers and NCO's at the company level and below can rarely make these decisions. And when they do, it is almost always in direct violation of some requirement from higher. This has created an entire generation of leaders who have plenty of combat experience, yet very little in what you could call "outside the box" thinking. What is sad here is that "outside the box" these days would involve sending out a rifle squad, sans armor, for a few days to hunt around the hills. When I read about the actions of infantrymen in past wars, it seems as though this kind of activity would not require the approval of a brigade commander. But today, I know of few company commanders who would risk their careers by approving this kind of activity without asking permission.

The result here is that almost all (almost being the operative word) conventional units, no matter what their supposed specialties, are relegated to very simplistic mounted and dismounted patrols. Anything else, and you'd better have "Special" before your unit name.

I realize I am generalizing here, but when I read about Marine CAP platoons in Vietnam spending months running their own operations with not so much as a Sergeant or Staff Sergeant running the show, it's frustrating to watch Captains unable to have the same leeway. Remember, Herman Hanneken snuck into an enemy camp and assassinated Peralte, when he was still an enlisted man. While I don't advocate Corporals taking off alone and killing people, I think it's a good benchmark to show how much we have been stifled by bureaucracy and risk aversion.

ekaphoto

02-10-2011, 08:15 PM

I realize I am generalizing here, but when I read about Marine CAP platoons in Vietnam spending months running their own operations with not so much as a Sergeant or Staff Sergeant running the show, it's frustrating to watch Captains unable to have the same leeway. Remember, Herman Hanneken snuck into an enemy camp and assassinated Peralte, when he was still an enlisted man. While I don't advocate Corporals taking off alone and killing people, I think it's a good benchmark to show how much we have been stifled by bureaucracy and risk aversion.

And without that type of flexability of the lower enlisted the US military has lost a large part of its ability to fight. In the cold war days the inflexable command structure of the Soviet Army was the first thing we were trained to attack so as to paralize their ability to move. We were told if we had no orders and didn't know what to do find something to attack don't sit on our ass and wait for orders or wonder what to do.

BTW I have no problem an enlisted man taking out some bad guy if it is the right thing to do and circumstances dictate it. Why wait for orders and pass up an oppurtunity?

JMA

02-11-2011, 06:53 AM

... no matter what caliber.

You have an opinion on the calibre issue?

BushrangerCZ

02-11-2011, 02:24 PM

You have an opinion on the calibre issue?

Yes, I do, but it would take probably longer discussion... (especially for what purpose it would serve).
My army is now buying the CZ 805 rifles with interchangable barrel/caliber (.223 and 7,62x39), and SCAR ended second. Personally I would certainly prefer SCAR, and have my opinion on whole affair, but I can´t affect it.
If you would like to talk about calibre issue into the depth, pls PM me. (I am no expert, but I am interested in shooting and have some ideas and experiences.)

JMA

02-12-2011, 01:41 AM

Yes, I do, but it would take probably longer discussion... (especially for what purpose it would serve).
My army is now buying the CZ 805 rifles with interchangable barrel/caliber (.223 and 7,62x39), and SCAR ended second. Personally I would certainly prefer SCAR, and have my opinion on whole affair, but I can´t affect it.
If you would like to talk about calibre issue into the depth, pls PM me. (I am no expert, but I am interested in shooting and have some ideas and experiences.)

No surprise there that the contract would go to a Czech company.

On the calibre issue nothing worth taking to PM. The fact that it was deemed necessary to have the ability to switch calibres through a quick change barrel system indicates that the debate at national level has not been resolved and they want to keep their options open.

I'm sure it will be of interest to all to hear what the official Czech opinion is on the issue and also yours personally if it differs.

Firn

02-12-2011, 04:00 PM

My army is now buying the CZ 805 rifles with interchangable barrel/caliber (.223 and 7,62x39).)

CZ makes certainly some fine firearms.

Just curious. How is that CZ 805 stock? It seems to be quite interesting, being foldable, having an adjustable lenght of pull and an addable cheek piece.

Seems that stocks like that are becoming more and more the norm, which is IMHO a good thing if the hold up.

BushrangerCZ

02-13-2011, 10:51 AM

CZ makes certainly some fine firearms.

Just curious. How is that CZ 805 stock? It seems to be quite interesting, being foldable, having an adjustable lenght of pull and an addable cheek piece.

Seems that stocks like that are becoming more and more the norm, which is IMHO a good thing if the hold up.

Stock was one of the things that was pointed out during the recent field tests, for me it seemed too "competition" and not too "army". Imagine throwing buttstock full of holes and screws into the mud, you would clean it forever. I think the current one will be fine, it´s similar to SCAR stock, and I guess a bit lighter.

Firn

02-15-2011, 07:43 PM

Stock was one of the things that was pointed out during the recent field tests, for me it seemed too "competition" and not too "army". Imagine throwing buttstock full of holes and screws into the mud, you would clean it forever. I think the current one will be fine, it´s similar to SCAR stock, and I guess a bit lighter.

Thanks. We will have to see if the "competition" stock will hold up the "army" time.

BTW Beretta is on a pretty similar route with their "carabina futura". I do like folding stocks and I do think adjusting the lenght of pull is a good idea. Even an addable or raisable cheek piece is helpful for normal scopes which are mounted a bit higher. But will the designers come to a soldier-proof solution?

BushrangerCZ

02-18-2011, 12:54 PM

First is old stock, below is the new one.
http://i840.photobucket.com/albums/zz324/photoamateurcz/old.jpg
http://i840.photobucket.com/albums/zz324/photoamateurcz/new.jpg

Firn

02-18-2011, 05:31 PM

Thanks. Somehow it seems that the external look of the conventional "future" Nato rifles becomes more and more similar. Not saying that this is a bad thing, and in this area the experiences of the Afghan war have certainly played a big role, especially for countries with deployed units.

Standardization is in many a technical area a good thing. Mounting optics and other stuff has certainly never been easier.

---------------------------------------

Personally I do find it interesting to see that during WWI the squads became far more diverse. Training was partly specialized, with bombers, grenadiers, scouts/snipers/observers, automatic riflemen. machinegunners etc with the rifleman usually supporting them. Defensive patrols differed from fighting patrols, scouting parties from trench raiders or assault units. No hard and fast rules about their composition were set in late WWI.

jcustis

02-18-2011, 11:29 PM

So I took my two youngest daughters the local used bookstore and what do I find but a very good condition copy of War Department's FM 7-10, Infantry Field Manual, Rifle Company, Rifle Regiment, June 2, 1942.

From some basic google strings, it looks like I made out and picked up something with much greater value than what I paid (but yet the Paladin Press pamphlet on ambushes was highway robbery!).

Anyway, I open the manual to a random page, and what a jinx:

from pg 139. 4) The automatic rifleman supports the rapid advance of other members of the squad from flank positions. Because of the difficulty of maintaining an adequate supply of ammunition, the fire of automatic rifles is conserved to the actual needs of the situation. Thus, when the fires of individual riflemen serve to accomplish the desired effect, they are used in preference to the automatic rifle.

The front cover of the FM is signed by a C. J. Fox, and it seems to have been sold for 40 cents at some point. Sometimes the amateur bibliophile is rewarded with a gem. I am going to put this one away in a cool, dark place, and brush up on the contents via the online version I found here:

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/FM7-10/index.html

Ken White

02-19-2011, 01:04 AM

It was also one more reason many BAR Men converted their weapons from slow and fast rate full auto to semi and full auto, a move that also got rid of almost a pound of weight. Weight reduction was further aided by ditching the bipod and carrying handle... :D

JMA

02-19-2011, 03:46 PM

... and I do think adjusting the lenght of pull is a good idea.

Why?

JMA

02-19-2011, 03:59 PM

First is old stock, below is the new one.
http://i840.photobucket.com/albums/zz324/photoamateurcz/old.jpg
http://i840.photobucket.com/albums/zz324/photoamateurcz/new.jpg

The SCAR (as good as it no doubt is) is a designer rifle. As has been written (http://www.americanrifleman.org/ArticlePage.aspx?id=1552&cid=0):
"The purpose of the program, titled SCAR (SOF Combat Assault Rifle), was to develop a new rifle “designed for SOF by SOF,” with operator input required in the initiation, generation, testing and selection of the new system."

OK, so the SCAR was designed for special forces by special forces.

But what of the line infantry? Why do the line infantry (these days) end up with crappy peashooters like the M4 and the SA80?

... and what would be the principle differences between a SOF weapon and that of a standard line infantry issue?

BushrangerCZ

02-20-2011, 08:41 AM

The SCAR (as good as it no doubt is) is a designer rifle. As has been written (http://www.americanrifleman.org/ArticlePage.aspx?id=1552&cid=0):

OK, so the SCAR was designed for special forces by special forces.

But what of the line infantry? Why do the line infantry (these days) end up with crappy peashooters like the M4 and the SA80?

... and what would be the principle differences between a SOF weapon and that of a standard line infantry issue?

Only difference between SF and infantry in the matter of assault rifles I see in caliber and barrel lenght (SF should have the infantry standard issue rifle, plus the same with shorter barrel and/or different caliber, due to the fact that they have some similar, but some different tasks than infantry, like hostage rescue, VIP protection etc., where .308 caliber, which I suppose to be the best for infantry, would not be the best for the task). Also SF rifle needs details like ability to carry a supressor. But SCAR rifles have all these options, that´s the reason I see SCAR rifle as the best choice for whole army, even if it was developed for SOF purpose. I see every day in job that everybody and his dog wants to call himself SF (cooks, staff officers, logistic guys are experts on this), but that´s another story. Reliability, simplicity, accuracy, easy maintenance are the same principles for everybody.
PS: I agree that M4 is not the best rifle, but it´s not bad either. It´s light and accurate, and if you choose right manufacturer, it is also reasonably reliable. SA80 is heavy, and usable only for right shoulder - or at least it used to be, I am not sure about the newest version. On the other hand, I like the safety selector, and cocking handle is definately better designed than in AR15 family.

Firn

02-20-2011, 05:33 PM

Why?

Usually the stock is made to fit the median soldier, and large and small guys would profit from a better fitting stock. If you add body armor things can get very difficult for the smaller soldiers. Lenght of pull is greatly influenced by body shape, clothing and body armor, so it is perhaps the most worthy of the hassle to making it adjustable.

I think Bushranger called that stock "competition" because for example in biatholon the stocks are individually shaped and adjustable to fit the shooter in question.

BushrangerCZ

02-20-2011, 06:50 PM

Usually the stock is made to fit the median soldier, and large and small guys would profit from a better fitting stock. If you add body armor things can get very difficult for the smaller soldiers. Lenght of pull is greatly influenced by body shape, clothing and body armor, so it is perhaps the most worthy of the hassle to making it adjustable.

I think Bushranger called that stock "competition" because for example in biatholon the stocks are individually shaped and adjustable to fit the shooter in question.

I think that there is no doubt that ability to adjust lenght of stock is a positive progress. I just did not like the design of first version stock on CZ805, I like the newer design, and I like SCAR stock too. M4 stock is not bad either. All these stocks are possible to adjust.

JMA

02-21-2011, 05:15 AM

I think that there is no doubt that ability to adjust lenght of stock is a positive progress. I just did not like the design of first version stock on CZ805, I like the newer design, and I like SCAR stock too. M4 stock is not bad either. All these stocks are possible to adjust.

It is (or should be) standard to purchase rifles with a combination of long, standard and short butt-stock lengths. The user information should be easily available through historical record of the applicable army or branch of the military. For standard infantry (and also everyone else) this has been the standard up until recently (when individually adjustable butt-stocks have become the norm).

My question was simple in that not coming from a cold climate where an additional amount of padding and other stuff in the area of the shoulders during winter may be necessary. Does this padding affect the length of pull to the extent that a length of butt-stock adjustment would be necessary? I can't think of any other reason why a person would need to adjust the length of his butt-stock.

BushrangerCZ

02-21-2011, 06:52 AM

It is (or should be) standard to purchase rifles with a combination of long, standard and short butt-stock lengths. The user information should be easily available through historical record of the applicable army or branch of the military. For standard infantry (and also everyone else) this has been the standard up until recently (when individually adjustable butt-stocks have become the norm).

My question was simple in that not coming from a cold climate where an additional amount of padding and other stuff in the area of the shoulders during winter may be necessary. Does this padding affect the length of pull to the extent that a length of butt-stock adjustment would be necessary? I can't think of any other reason why a person would need to adjust the length of his butt-stock.

It is necessary mostly in case of use/unuse of hard body armor, or when you switch from red dot to scope (usually from reflex/aimpoint to ACOG due to character of AO) and need do have your eye directly on it. With rigid army system, I can´t see as a solution issuing different unadjustable lenghts of stock. I personally had to change rifle many times already, while still in one unit, just because it was easier for paperwork for my superiors. I am sure sooner or later someone would ended up with wrong lenght. Adjustable stock is not even expensive and easily solves all this problems. Question is, why NOT to use it then?

JMA

02-21-2011, 05:11 PM

It is necessary mostly in case of use/unuse of hard body armor, or when you switch from red dot to scope (usually from reflex/aimpoint to ACOG due to character of AO) and need do have your eye directly on it. With rigid army system, I can´t see as a solution issuing different unadjustable lenghts of stock. I personally had to change rifle many times already, while still in one unit, just because it was easier for paperwork for my superiors. I am sure sooner or later someone would ended up with wrong lenght. Adjustable stock is not even expensive and easily solves all this problems. Question is, why NOT to use it then?

I can understand the length of pull requirement changing if the shoulder padding thickness changes significantly. I would have thought that the use of body armour is by now not negotiable so that would not change. Hence my comment about winter clothing.

I have noted that very often the butt-stock is not positioned in the shoulder when the weapon is fired. (see photo below) Only possible with a pea-shooter. This leaves me wondering whether angle of the butt stock (in relation to the plane of the barrel) should also be adjustable?

http://www.motherjones.com/files/images/marines-shooting-helmand-province.jpg
The man closest to the left has only the toe of his butt-stock on his shoulder while the second man seems to have it pulled right into the shoulder. What accounts for the difference? (other than that the second man adjusts his cheek position accordingly while the first man seems to keep his head upright and moves his weapon to suit) - I make the observation that the sight may well be viewing over the wall but it will be touch-and-go whether a bullet fired will clear the wall.

What in an AO changes your requirement for a specific butt-stock length? An how often do you change AOs?

Firn

02-21-2011, 05:14 PM

JMA

02-21-2011, 05:52 PM

BushrangerCZ answered the question already pretty well. Basically there are four ways to get a very good gunfit:

a) An individual stock as for high-end rifles and guns. Clearly not possible for an army and it would not address the clothing/body armor changes.

b) A simple stock with various spacers. Just take the recoil pad off, insert or take off the right amount of spacers, screw everything in place and you are good to go. Light and very robust. (Thicker recoil pads are also an option)

Some cheek pieces are also made of spacers fixed in a variety of ways.

c) An adjustable lenght of pull mechanism, just like the ones seen on the M4 and a couple of newer assault rifles. Pretty much standard on high-end match rifles. The most flexible and neat solution if it is soldier-proof.

d) A combination of b and c. So you might have a adjustable cheekpiece and spacers for the lenght of pull. Cheekpieces are not that important for red dot sights, but can help when using (big) scopes.

Lets just make sure we are on the same page with regard to "length of pull" (see photo below):

http://www.accurateinnovations.com/images/DSC07061.jpg

That said and done it still leaves the ability to adjust "comb height" (cheek position) and how many weapons have that ability? The normal cheek position is based on the use of the iron sights.

In the photo of the shooters above, there is no way that the closest man has the correct length of pull.

BushrangerCZ

02-21-2011, 05:53 PM

I can understand the length of pull requirement changing if the shoulder padding thickness changes significantly. I would have thought that the use of body armour is by now not negotiable so that would not change. Hence my comment about winter clothing.

I have noted that very often the butt-stock is not positioned in the shoulder when the weapon is fired. (see photo below) Only possible with a pea-shooter. This leaves me wondering whether angle of the butt stock (in relation to the plane of the barrel) should also be adjustable?

http://www.motherjones.com/files/images/marines-shooting-helmand-province.jpg
The man closest to the left has only the toe of his butt-stock on his shoulder while the second man seems to have it pulled right into the shoulder. What accounts for the difference? (other than that the second man adjusts his cheek position accordingly while the first man seems to keep his head upright and moves his weapon to suit) - I make the observation that the sight may well be viewing over the wall but it will be touch-and-go whether a bullet fired will clear the wall.

What in an AO changes your requirement for a specific butt-stock length? An how often do you change AOs?

To the pic - soldier closer to us is not firing, just looking over that compound wall. Today´s trend is to shift pressure from shoulder almost to the center of the chest, because of better reflexive and natural aim, but still you are supposed to press it firmly against the body. When I used to fire Czech Sa58 rifle with collapsible stock, I had sometimes bruise under eye, because I am lanky and stock was too short. When I pushed stock to the shoulder and looked into the foresight, the back of the rifle was kicking me in the face. When I switched to commercial adjustable stock from FAB, problem was solved. If we talk about optics, I think that average US Army infantry grunt gets issued Reflex and ACOG (not sure). I have nothing against good old iron sights, but for hundred meters, I can hit a coin with M4 and ACOG when lying prone, I can´t do that with iron sights, I would not even see such a small target. Also iron sights are not so good with NVG (even if you use DBALL or AN/PEQ, it´s still good to have an option to aim without it at night). When I mentioned change of AO, it was according to the optics, red dot vs. scope, not because of the stock. Also sometimes you just get issued something and no one asks if you want ACOG or Reflex or whatever.

SethB

02-21-2011, 07:01 PM

He is correctly mounting the weapon. It's an M4, not a Perazzi.

Ken White

02-21-2011, 07:14 PM

He is correctly mounting the weapon. It's an M4, not a Perazzi.this to an old guy who doesn't know about 'mounting' weapons or understand the reference to a shotgun? :wry:

SethB

02-21-2011, 07:22 PM

The only people that still use rulers to measure length of pull are the wing shooters. When they bring the weapon up from the high ready that they favor, they call it mounting, and for those purposes a long length of pull is an asset.

Most people that shoot M4s these days use the stock in, with their elbow down like shown in the picture. It gives you a short package, keeps your elbow from running into things, and squares your body up to the target.

Most people assume that this helps your rifle plate to catch lead, but it also helps the but to stay on your shoulder. If you turn too much it will slide off.

Some guys actually make pads that will help keep the toe of the stock from sliding.

He's using just the toe so that he doesn't have to lean his head down over the rifle to see the sight.

As for the finger on the trigger... that part is just plain wrong.

jcustis

02-21-2011, 07:56 PM

That fireteam leader appears to be issuing commands, and has probably come out of the TM-prescribed eye relief of 1.5" for the sight in doing so.

I don't think he has mounted the weapon properly though, and he certainly doesn't seem to be taking advantage of the use of a supported position (from the wall) to gain stability when firing. We don't shoot from those types of positions (save the prone) in training, and it tends to show as in these types of photos.

I recently spied video of a rifleman firing his A4 with the legs to his gripod extended, yet the weapon was elevated and the gripod useless because he was employing a magazine well hold.

This fireteam leader is not applying the fundamentals, and appears to simply be "putting rounds downrange" in a fashion that most of us find fairly difficult to swallow. Then again, it's also probably just silly showmanship for the reporter. The patrol leader could probably employ a little "fix and maneuver" finesse and move an M-ATV right down on top of the insurgents, given what the terrain looks like. He might be doing just that, but I doubt it.

The more I look at this Marine's loadout, the more I'm convinced we need to find another way in terms of M203 assignments. Take away all you want to say about using it to control illumination, or to employ HE fires that the TL can personally employ, and focus of just the weight math for a bit; just does not add up in their favor.

On top of the radio that he could be carrying, extra batteries, admin gear, low-density optics, etc., the TL has to carry more than the average rifleman by way of all the gold and white eggs he has on hand. There's some good reason for a bit of it, but when fatigue sets in, they are overall less effective as a leader and you can't tell me they are able to concentrate and lead as effectively. Mission essential equipment needs to be distributed across the element, and we have slipped a bit in the fieldcraft department over the years.

Kiwigrunt

02-21-2011, 08:59 PM

Just an observation. Neither the dude on jcustis’ photo nor the dude on BushrangerCZ’s photo (the one on the left) are looking through their scopes.

SethB, thanks for that rundown, that explains a lot. Body armour became a fashion just after I left so I was trained on the ‘old’ ways.
I can certainly see how that would work well for CQB. Just wondering, do these stances work equally well for longer range shots? It would appear to me that the posture is not quite so stable.

Ken White

02-21-2011, 09:35 PM

Pete

02-21-2011, 10:54 PM

Like Savile Row suits, Purdey guns are bespoke -- crafted to fit the shooter -- usually through measurements taken by a West London Shooting School instructor. He will use a "try gun," which can be adjusted until size and sight lines are perfect. Purdey stocks new guns in its South Audley Street shop for customers who don't want to wait 12 or more months for a custom job.
Click here (http://www.purdey.com/#) if you have $80,000 to spend on a shotgun! :eek:

SethB

02-21-2011, 11:00 PM

Nothing about shooting works well when you are wearing body armor.

The best thing to do is still go prone or find a barricade.

The downside being that if someone hits your barricade there is spall that could hit you.

Pete

02-21-2011, 11:10 PM

Most people that shoot M4s these days use the stock in, with their elbow down like shown in the picture.
How times change. When I was taught to shoot on the middle 1960s for the offhand position a right-handed shooter was taught to have his right elbow held up as high as possible. When firing offhand -- with the hasty sling, of course -- the World War II Dads coaching us also didn't like the practice of the left forearm being held down flush against the left torso.

SethB

02-22-2011, 01:16 AM

The chicken wing creates a pocket for the recoil pad/plate to sit in. I still shoot some hunting rifles like that.

With the M16/M4, you have to adapt a little bit for best results. You don't need the stock in the pocket to absorb recoil.

It's all about accuracy and follow ups.

Here is a good photo.

http://demigodllc.com/photo/EAG-Carbine-2007/small/D101_5351_img.jpg

JMA

02-22-2011, 03:50 PM

To the pic - soldier closer to us is not firing, just looking over that compound wall.

Oh? Then what's his finger doing on the trigger?

Then of course there was Blah who asked earlier about locating the enemy by obvious signs such as dust and muzzle flash. Here we see dust. But changing fire positions would be meaningless as they stick out like dogs b*lls above the parapet. - (as Fuchs would tell you if the Taliban was a half decent enemy those two Marines would be history in a matter of seconds.)

Today´s trend is to shift pressure from shoulder almost to the center of the chest, because of better reflexive and natural aim, but still you are supposed to press it firmly against the body.

Never heard of this before. Who says "you are supposed to ..."?

"When I used to fire Czech Sa58 rifle with collapsible stock, I had sometimes bruise under eye, because I am lanky and stock was too short. When I pushed stock to the shoulder and looked into the foresight, the back of the rifle was kicking me in the face. When I switched to commercial adjustable stock from FAB, problem was solved.[/QUOTE]

You have an armourer in your battalion? I picked up a brand new FN folding butt (stock) on an unannounced visit to Mozambique and found that the length of pull was short so got the unit armourer to bolt on a standard FN recoil pad to fix it. The cheek position was sorted by taping a first-field-dressing onto the frame of the butt (stock) with a few rolls of insulation tape.

If we talk about optics, I think that average US Army infantry grunt gets issued Reflex and ACOG (not sure). I have nothing against good old iron sights, but for hundred meters, I can hit a coin with M4 and ACOG when lying prone, I can´t do that with iron sights, I would not even see such a small target. Also iron sights are not so good with NVG (even if you use DBALL or AN/PEQ, it´s still good to have an option to aim without it at night). When I mentioned change of AO, it was according to the optics, red dot vs. scope, not because of the stock. Also sometimes you just get issued something and no one asks if you want ACOG or Reflex or whatever.

Yes lets talk about optics. First I must say that I am not talking about "designer weaponry" for special forces. On a recent BBC TV programme:

At War: The Soldiers and Their Families
Queens Royal Lancers Herrick XII (April – Oct 2010)

It was said:
The insurgents are hardly ever seen. Out of more than a hundred exchanges of fire this troop only set eyes on them twice.

So lets talk optics and red-dots and all that stuff. Obviously did not help the Queens Royal Lancers one little bit.

So I wonder what the teaching is on how to suppress/kill the enemy if you know roughly where they are but can't see them?

JMA

02-22-2011, 04:19 PM

The only people that still use rulers to measure length of pull are the wing shooters.

Really? That probably accounts for the general drop in standards then.

The simple method is take hold of the pistol grip turn the knuckles downwards with the butt (stock) flat on your forearm then lift the weapon up by bending the elbow. The perfect fit is when the weapon locks in the perpendicular position. If you can't get to the perp then the butt is too long and if you can get past the perp then it is too short. (adjust for any shoulder padding)

When they bring the weapon up from the high ready that they favor, they call it mounting, and for those purposes a long length of pull is an asset.

Where is the butt (stock) in the "high ready'?

In the days when weapons which had a recoil were used the butt rested in the shoulder so that in one movement the barrel was raised and pointed at the target as your cheek found its position on the butt.

It appears that with low recoil weapons the position of the butt seems less important. The principles of marksmanship remain the same (aiming, holding, breathing, squeezing) Holding indicates a stable platform as being important. I would be interested to observe the fall of shots fired by weapons half in or half out of the shoulder or even with no shoulder contact at all. That is before we consider aiming, breathing and trigger action.

Most people that shoot M4s these days use the stock in, with their elbow down like shown in the picture. It gives you a short package, keeps your elbow from running into things, and squares your body up to the target.

Not sure the position of the right arm makes that much difference other than at 45 degrees downwards being the most comfortable.

Most people assume that this helps your rifle plate to catch lead, but it also helps the but to stay on your shoulder. If you turn too much it will slide off.

How so?

Some guys actually make pads that will help keep the toe of the stock from sliding.

You see what lengths one has to go to if the butt (stock) is in the wrong position to start with.

He's using just the toe so that he doesn't have to lean his head down over the rifle to see the sight.

Yes thats kind of weird. I read in a Brit weapon pamphlet the other day that after all this time they now advocate that the head when shooting should be in the upright position to help maintain your balance. Funny that in all my time I never heard of a soldier falling over because he cocked his head slightly to the right when aiming.

As for the finger on the trigger... that part is just plain wrong.

Agree and already noted.

BushrangerCZ

02-22-2011, 05:36 PM

Oh? Then what's his finger doing on the trigger?

So lets talk optics and red-dots and all that stuff. Obviously did not help the Queens Royal Lancers one little bit.

So I wonder what the teaching is on how to suppress/kill the enemy if you know roughly where they are but can't see them?

His finger on the trigger is the mistake, but he really is not shooting to the wall 50cm in front of him, he is just looking over the wall, with all respect Sir, it´s obvious.

With this attitude, you could cut off the sights at all, as Taliban fighters do sometimes. If you have ACOG, you can use it successfully also as an observation device. I am not going to discuss if it´s advantage or not. And yes, we have armourer, but there is no Sa58 recoil pad. Israelis do nice, cheap new stocks and that solves the problem, as they ship for free worldwide;).

Ken White

02-22-2011, 07:09 PM

His finger on the trigger is the mistake, but he really is not shooting to the wall 50cm in front of him, he is just looking over the wallEasy for one not familiar with weapon mounted optics to miss that, no one familiar with them should...

Agree with JMA on the length of pull. It is important -- try teaching small persons to shoot with an M1 designed for big Americans. Even more fun is to watch a large person shoot an M4 that has a stock that will not extend. Length of pull may be ignored but there will be an accuracy / muscle memory penalty. One can work up various innovations to get around the issue but such 'fixes' always seem to not work when one really needs them. :wry:

As an unrelated aside, being ancient and having walked around four Continents and an Island or two with unfriendly, even hostile, lurkers abounding and my finger on the trigger of a loaded weapon not on Safe far more often than not, I do not see that rigid finger outside the trigger guard except to fire as much more than a compensation for inadequate training (or marginally capable persons). Others may differ... :D

Fingers on triggers worry me far less than does the seeming increase in use of full auto fire and the practice of using the Magazine for a handgrip. For that matter, hand grips in my experience are not counducive to single shot accuracy because the upper edge of the thumb and forefinger aren't as sensitive to cant as the palm and that orientation puts undue strain on the muscles of the forearm as compared to a bottom of the stock hold with the palm of the supporting hand. :cool:

JMA

02-23-2011, 04:15 AM

His finger on the trigger is the mistake, but he really is not shooting to the wall 50cm in front of him, he is just looking over the wall, with all respect Sir, it´s obvious.

Do modern sergeants make "mistakes" like that? Things are slipping.

With this attitude, you could cut off the sights at all, as Taliban fighters do sometimes. If you have ACOG, you can use it successfully also as an observation device. I am not going to discuss if it´s advantage or not. And yes, we have armourer, but there is no Sa58 recoil pad. Israelis do nice, cheap new stocks and that solves the problem, as they ship for free worldwide;).

Perhaps I should say that I note that the line infantry units are tends to mimic and adopt the "special forces" way of doing things which in most cases is not a good idea for line infantry. I suggest that it is good to question what is going on around you rather than just go with the flow.

For example you may consider asking the question as to the point of having optics on weapons if they are used to improve individual observation but are seldom used in a contact (see a hundred examples on YouTube).

Second how many times have you heard on a YouTube clip a commander issuing a fire-control order? You suppress the enemy by winning the "fire fight" through laying down directed and controlled section fire into likely cover on their position.

I could go on.... sadly I see little evidence of the current crop of soldiers questioning, adapting and above all thinking about how better to close with and kill the enemy. Maybe it is because of a lack of depth in their training I don't know.

JMA

02-23-2011, 05:06 AM

Israelis do nice, cheap new stocks and that solves the problem, as they ship for free worldwide;).

... and your army lets you modify your weapon (and presumably your kit) as you like?

William F. Owen

02-23-2011, 06:33 AM

T
From the The British Army Review Number 150 we read the following in the article Donkeys led by Lions:

I think I am safe to say that I was pretty familiar with the content of that article before it was published, though I place no claim as to authorship! :D

William F. Owen

02-23-2011, 06:48 AM

So lets talk optics and red-dots and all that stuff. Obviously did not help the Queens Royal Lancers one little bit.

I spend a lot of time playing with weapons optics. To discuss it seriously you need to talk specifics. "Red-dots" for example may have no magnification power what so ever.

What you have from the QLR is a snap shot opinion. Not operational analysis. If you talk to audiences composed entirely of infantrymen recently returned from operations, then they have a very different perspective about optics and sensors.

So I wonder what the teaching is on how to suppress/kill the enemy if you know roughly where they are but can't see them?
Go online and read this. (http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/RDS_Oct2010_Storr.pdf)

Hope that helps.

82redleg

02-23-2011, 10:51 AM

Do modern sergeants make "mistakes" like that? Things are slipping.

A modern US Army "sergeant" is not the same thing as the "sergeants" I've seen in the Commonwealth armies I'm familiar with. I have no idea where the Rhodesian Army fits into the spectrum, but it seems the rough equivalent of ranks (in responsibility and time to achieve the promotion) between US Army, USMC and Commonwealth is:

USArmy USMC Commonwealth
PVT Pvt PVT
PV2 Pfc
PFC LCpl
SPC LCpl
SGT Cpl Cpl
SSG Sgt
SFC SSgt Sgt
MSG GySgt/MSgt WO1
SGM/CSM MGySgt/SgtMaj WO2

JMA

02-23-2011, 12:30 PM

A modern US Army "sergeant" is not the same thing as the "sergeants" I've seen in the Commonwealth armies I'm familiar with. I have no idea where the Rhodesian Army fits into the spectrum, but it seems the rough equivalent of ranks (in responsibility and time to achieve the promotion) between US Army, USMC and Commonwealth is:

USArmy USMC Commonwealth
PVT Pvt PVT
PV2 Pfc
PFC LCpl
SPC LCpl
SGT Cpl Cpl
SSG Sgt
SFC SSgt Sgt
MSG GySgt/MSgt WO1
SGM/CSM MGySgt/SgtMaj WO2

The photo comes from here (http://motherjones.com/mojo/2009/09/were-still-war-photo-day-september-8-2009), they are Marines, so you must help me understand the Marine rank structure.

http://www.freewebs.com/blacksnakekiller/1551.gif

E5 is the fifth rank level? Who (what rank) would be the platoon sergeant?

The Brit (Rhodesian) platoon sergeant would be the fourth rank level. How long does it take the average marine to make E5 or platoon sergeant? Five years? Seven years?

Look by the end of the war (1980) we had some pretty over promoted guys at all rank levels so don't take my comment the wrong way.

JMA

02-23-2011, 12:32 PM

I think I am safe to say that I was pretty familiar with the content of that article before it was published, though I place no claim as to authorship! :D

I think it is a very good article. I had it emailed to me so can't provide a link here but if you can I'm sure it would be of interest around here.

JMA

02-23-2011, 01:05 PM

I spend a lot of time playing with weapons optics. To discuss it seriously you need to talk specifics. "Red-dots" for example may have no magnification power what so ever.

Is there a need for short range stuff for troops in Afghanistan (other than special forces)?

And what impact has the general issue of optics to Brit soldiers on the kill rate per contact and the ability to lay down good old fashioned suppressive fire to win the fire-fight? Has it been positive by any stretch of the imagination?

What you have from the QLR is a snap shot opinion. Not operational analysis.

If that's the spin you want to apply then... OK ;)

Given the six months of operations the QRL experienced in Helmand that particular troop of the squadron experienced just that. Lets take the report on its merits. 100 exchanges of fire, actually saw the TB twice.

Maybe it indicates the folly of deploying armour in a dismounted infantry role? No value in the optics? Lack of training? You tell me...

If you talk to audiences composed entirely of infantrymen recently returned from operations, then they have a very different perspective about optics and sensors.

We have been through this before Wilf. Everyone has an opinion but if you want to learn what really happened you need to know who to talk to... and not in an audience... but rather man-to-man over a cup of tea (no booze).

Go online and read this. (http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/RDS_Oct2010_Storr.pdf)

Hope that helps.

Yes it helps... that is the best motivation of the Rhodesian style Fire Force tactic I have ever read. I need to put your man Storr in contact with Group Captain (Rtd) Petter-Bowyer who is retired in the UK. The next RLI book (to be published July/August) will also have a section on the Fire Force.

Did you note the comment on the benefit of experienced soldiers being able to conserve ammo? You don't find experienced soldiers amongst a group of six month wonders. Been through this before as well.

As far as the shock of HE is concerned again the Rhodesian Air Force knew about that (speak to Petter-Bowyer) as that allowed us to go to Chimoio with 184 SAS/RLI to take on 5,000 plus.

I would make one further comment. Storr says "... ‘ﬁnding’ obviously involves movement..." Well yes and no. In the case where you employ small highly professional OPs to locate the enemy it is their movement that allows them to be found.

We have discussed this before. I maintained that high frequency patrolling (movement) by Brits plays into the Taleban hands through giving away location and being IED bait. What is the idea? To separate the Taleban from the villagers... surely? And there are many ways to skin that cat.

82redleg

02-23-2011, 03:26 PM

E5 is the fifth rank level? Who (what rank) would be the platoon sergeant?

A rifle platoon sergeant is supposed to be a SSgt (E6). Specialty platoons (weapons, mortars, snipers, etc) are supposed to be GySgt (E7). Often may be a rank lower due to shortages.

The Brit (Rhodesian) platoon sergeant would be the fourth rank level. How long does it take the average marine to make E5 or platoon sergeant? Five years? Seven years?

Based on the Marines I've worked around, promotion at the minimum times (either service or grade) are not as common as in the Army.

2001 statistics for average promotion points in the USMC:
* Private First Class (E-2) - 6 months
* Lance Corporal (E-3) - 14 months
* Corporal (E-4) - 26 months
* Sergeant (E-5) - 4.8 years
* Staff Sergeant (E-6) - 10.4 years
* Gunnery Sergeant (E-7) - 14.8 years
* Master Sergeant/First Sergeant (E-8) - 18.8 years
* Master Gunnery Sergeant/Sergeant Major (E-9) - 22.1 years

Promotion to E2 and E3 are automatic, but above that it is based on vacancies. I would expect these numbers to have been reduced somewhat since 2001, based on expansion and wartime changes. These numbers appear somewhat lower than the equivalent Army positions (USMC Cpl = US Army SGT = fire team leader; USMC Sgt = US Army SSG = squad leader).

Ken White

02-23-2011, 04:06 PM

at three words a minute (Hey, I'm old and never learned to type, takes longer with one or two fingers...), I submit this better late than never compost. Er, composition...

The 'E' designations below are Enlisted Pay Grades, 1 being the lowest, 9 the highest. Here are a couple of charts: LINK (http://military.ehpdesigns.com/compare_enlisted.php), LINK (http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Comparative_military_ranks).

In the US, Marine LCpl (E3) and Army Spc [Specialist] (an E4) are effectively senior privates, normally not in leadership positions -- though the good ones become de facto leaders or 'acting' leaders on occasion. Marine Corporals are Team (4 man) Leaders and Sergeants (E5) are Squad (13 man) Leaders. The US Army does not use generally use the rank of Corporal and uses Sergeants(E5) as Team (4 man) leaders while Staff Sergeants (E6) are Squad (9 man)Leaders. A Marine Platoon has three rifle squads and a small Hq element; an Army Platoon has three rifle squads , a Weapons Squad with assigned or organic MG and ATGW as well as the small HQ element.

Note the Marines have lower rank leading more people. Or the Army rewards leaders with more pay... :wry:

In peacetime, Team Leaders in both services will normally have about three to five years service, Squad Leaders four to eight. In wartime, those periods will be less and will vary considerably depending on many factors. Marine Platoon Sergeants are as 82Redleg noted while Army Platoon Sergeants are by TOE, E7s and that rank is hit at about 10-15 years in peace time and only slightly more rapidly in war time. Obviously, persons one or even two ranks below the TOE or normal rank are sometimes leading units and often, Platoon Sergeants are acting Platoon Leaders in the absence of an Officer -- as a Platoon Sergeant for almost seven years, I spent about five of them as an Acting Platoon Leader in three different Battalions on three continents in war and peace. ;)

I even ran across an Artillery Battery in Viet Nam that had a SGT (E5) as First Sergeant (Co Sgt Maj), normally an E8 position. The Kid was doing a good job, too. To top that off he was not a long service NCO but a graduate of the NCO Candidate Course, a Viet Nam era 90-day school to convert likely Privates to Sergeants to replace the high losses in NCOs in Viet Nam. Not present today.

A part of the problem is that our promotion system in all services must, by Congressionally written laws and pressure be totally 'fair.' As you can envision, that forces mediocrity. :mad:

It is also my opinion that our training is, while better than it has ever been, still sub-par in many respects. We try to cram too much in too short a period to "save money." As usual, penny wise - pound foolish...:rolleyes:

That training shortfall is most apparent with initial entry people, officer and enlisted but it also applies to NCO training. That, too is better but it's still not adequate and it focuses on too many things not remotely germane to combat proficiency.

While many in the US Armed Forces have fought and are today fighting, the broader Armed Forces and the Nation missed that. The Nation and the bulk of the Forces have been at peace since 1945 -- and it shows...

BushrangerCZ

02-23-2011, 05:26 PM

... and your army lets you modify your weapon (and presumably your kit) as you like?

It does to certain extent, depends on the regiment. But I was talking about my own rifle, for which I have a license and keep it at home (it´s the same one as issued in army). Well, for 300 bucks, it´s brand new assault rifle directly from factory, 3x cheaper than decent pistol, so it´s natural choice:D.
PS: Just a detail - guys on the picture are not US Army but USMC (it makes no difference I know).

JMA

02-23-2011, 09:06 PM

It does to certain extent, depends on the regiment. But I was talking about my own rifle, for which I have a license and keep it at home (it´s the same one as issued in army). Well, for 300 bucks, it´s brand new assault rifle directly from factory, 3x cheaper than decent pistol, so it´s natural choice:D.
PS: Just a detail - guys on the picture are not US Army but USMC (it makes no difference I know).

OK, it was no catch question but what I was trying to establish was if soldier produced a fancy optic scope he had bought somewhere would he be allowed to use it in your army? Would he need to demonstrate his ability with it before being allowed to use it?

Kit wise we bought our own stuff or had it made up for us. Like in the early days we modified captured chest webbing to take FN pouches. Later chest webbing was made by local hunting and camping shops and eventually became general issue.

There were virtually no weapon mods in those days in terms of sights etc (although we did get a x3 power sight on limited issue for which there were few takers as our contacts were generally at such close range). One mod that was quite often done was to the change lever (safety catch) on the FN which people with short thumbs needed and that was to fit a (Brit) SLR change lever. Some even built up the button with a type of Pratley's Putty that was available at the time. While I do not have a short thumb I did have a problem with the FN change lever once. When flying into a scene one winter morning (Rhodesian winters are like your summers) there was a bit on wind chill through the open doors. Landed on the ground and while moving into a stop position had a gook run past. couldn't move the change lever even with both thumbs. The gook and I looked each other in the eye and he kept on running. Had to talk the gunship in to convert him to a martyr to their cause. It made me think. BTW... gloves? only pilots wore golves.

this http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3317/3594867172_796ab1e12d.jpg as opposed to this http://www.deactivated-guns.co.uk/images/FAL/FN%20FAL-12.jpg

I'm sure certain units or patrols would find optics useful under certain circumstances. With local experience I'm sure that decision can be better made by those on the ground. I just question whether it is a blanket "good thing" for all units and soldiers (as in the case of the Queens Royal Lancers).

You may have heard me question the net value of the line infantry adopting the special forces one ear radio headset across the board? I do that because we tested such a one ear head set in 1976 (for stick cmdrs - fire team and above - the aim of which was to place a pressel-switch (push to talk) on the pistol grip so both hands could remain on the weapon when talking on the radio) and it was not adopted because of technical problems at the time and resistance from stick comds at having their one ear closed off). I continue to question the PRR on the same basis and especially that every soldier now has one ear closed off. I don't doubt that it is beneficial tactically but believe that a non restrictive headset would be a better bet. ... and remember what the intention of the special forces rig was in the first place.

BushrangerCZ

02-24-2011, 06:49 AM

Thanks for a pics JMA, that´s a fine rifle. I never shot from that, but it´s capability seems similar to me like ours SVD Dragunov. And about ear pro, it´s big issue for me. I personally hate peltors with active hearing. If rain drops on your helmet, or walking along the stream, the sound is deafening, and in hot weather, you are getting very uncomfortable after a while. Also, it´s crushing my skull, especially with shooting glasses underneath it (even if I have glasses with flat legs), or helmet over it, and I surely can´t buy own helmet. If I wear goggles with rubber strap, they became foggy too often no matter what type or treatment in very hot weather when moving. Peltors are OK for a three hours raid, but not for 2 days dismounted patrol, where you need to concentrate on observation, and not being tortured by hearing set. Next option are normal ear plugs, which are comfy, but restrict significantly your hearing - not an option when on foot patrol. You can have them half-in, and during the contact plug them deeper, but again that´s not ideal for hearing nor protection in the first moments of contact. I bought SureFire EP4 plugs (about 13 USD), which are possible to connect to one-ear hearing set. This plugs can be adjusted for better hearing and reasonable protection, but again, still it´s not ideal. Sometimes I just had them slightly in my ears, as I wrote above. When the contact is on closer range, usually there is no time to plug them in, but never had my ears go ringing, and even machine gunners had the same experience (if I would do the same on the range, I would go ringing for a week, I guess it´s because of adrenaline rush). Nobody wants to get kicked from the job because of decreased hearing, or lower medical level and go for a desk job. I admit I couldn´t find any non-restrictive, but effective ear pro, possible to wear for days on foot patrols, so far. About team radios - I agree it´s total nonsense to give everybody in the squad own personal radio. I still prefer yelling in contact and hand signals otherwise. When whole platoon is on the same frequency, someone´s still talking and disrupting the net while trying to listen and observe (radio discipline can decrease that significantly, but not solve the whole problem), and it becames mess when sh.t hit the fan. When every squad is on own frequency, some armies or unit´s team leaders have to carry two personal radios, so they can talk in the same time to superiors and subordinates, switching frequencies doesn´t work well, because your commander is gonna call you in the moment you switch on team frequency. I did not find any radio with two push-to-talk buttons each on different frequency, able to receive on both. Also getting wrapped in cables is annoying. There are situations, when somebody from the team is talking to his TL over the radio, someone next (local, interpreter, other team´s member) talks to him personally, and commander needs to issue some order over the other radio, and that´s just over one´s brain capability.

Kiwigrunt

02-24-2011, 08:31 AM

One mod that was quite often done was to the change lever (safety catch) on the FN which people with short thumbs needed and that was to fit a (Brit) SLR change lever.

Is that an easy fit, given it is from imperial to metric? If it is, I'll have to get hold of one for my G1. I tend to find the L1 (imperial) magazine release preferable to the FAL type as well; not sure if they will be exchangeable.

JMA

02-24-2011, 10:12 AM

Is that an easy fit, given it is from imperial to metric? If it is, I'll have to get hold of one for my G1. I tend to find the L1 (imperial) magazine release preferable to the FAL type as well; not sure if they will be exchangeable.

Not sure... I suggest its a job for the unit armourer. It took minutes.

JMA

02-25-2011, 11:51 PM

Thanks for a pics JMA, that´s a fine rifle. I never shot from that, but it´s capability seems similar to me like ours SVD Dragunov.

I thought the Dragunov was a sniper rifle? But certainly the FN/SLR was fit for purpose. As most of our action was at very close ranges the range of the weapon did not come into play but it was the knock down effect and the terrible wounding it caused that set it apart from the AK47. Yes, our guys went down when hit by a 7.62mm intermediate but the wounds were not of the same magnitude. I would say the huge advantage we had was carrying the FN MAG on a one in four basis as having gunners who built up fearsome reputations through much combat experience. Int reports from captures indicated how much the insurgents feared the MAG.

And about ear pro, it´s big issue for me. I personally hate peltors with active hearing. If rain drops on your helmet, or walking along the stream, the sound is deafening, and in hot weather, you are getting very uncomfortable after a while. Also, it´s crushing my skull, especially with shooting glasses underneath it (even if I have glasses with flat legs), or helmet over it, and I surely can´t buy own helmet. If I wear goggles with rubber strap, they became foggy too often no matter what type or treatment in very hot weather when moving. Peltors are OK for a three hours raid, but not for 2 days dismounted patrol, where you need to concentrate on observation, and not being tortured by hearing set. Next option are normal ear plugs, which are comfy, but restrict significantly your hearing - not an option when on foot patrol. You can have them half-in, and during the contact plug them deeper, but again that´s not ideal for hearing nor protection in the first moments of contact. I bought SureFire EP4 plugs (about 13 USD), which are possible to connect to one-ear hearing set. This plugs can be adjusted for better hearing and reasonable protection, but again, still it´s not ideal. Sometimes I just had them slightly in my ears, as I wrote above. When the contact is on closer range, usually there is no time to plug them in, but never had my ears go ringing, and even machine gunners had the same experience (if I would do the same on the range, I would go ringing for a week, I guess it´s because of adrenaline rush).

You have identified the problem... now what is the solution?

IMHO the hearing problem takes two forms. One is the obvious inability to locate the position of the enemy by his fire which is a life and death issue when in contact and then it is the protection acoustic trauma. We hardly used ear defenders even on the range in the 70s and we have paid the price. But that said all the use of ear protection is meaningless after a series of cave clearing contacts with loud bangs in confined spaces. And then we had a number of guys who hit a number of landmines... I think their ears are still ringing ;)

I thought that ear plugs which allow normal speech and sounds through but protect against gunshot noise were freely available from gun shops or mail order?

Nobody wants to get kicked from the job because of decreased hearing, or lower medical level and go for a desk job.

Yes this is weird isn't it. I see the Brits are getting clever about this too. Soldiers beyond the ten years service are being found to be unfit for operational duty due to reduced hearing. Idiots. It was the army that did it to them and they should be fitted with the best available "hearing aids" to fix that not only in an operation context but also for after their service as well. What makes this so damn laughable is that on operations they give them a head set that blocks out the hearing in one ear anyway.

What would entice me back into the military at this stage of my life would be to carry out a "Stalinist type purge" of all the deadwood and idiots who seem to do more than the average enemy to hamper/sabotage military performance.

I admit I couldn´t find any non-restrictive, but effective ear pro, possible to wear for days on foot patrols, so far.

You need a gizmo? The yanks will have it and in this case some damn fine stuff too. Why not ask around here I'm sure you will get good advice.

About team radios - I agree it´s total nonsense to give everybody in the squad own personal radio. I still prefer yelling in contact and hand signals otherwise. When whole platoon is on the same frequency, someone´s still talking and disrupting the net while trying to listen and observe (radio discipline can decrease that significantly, but not solve the whole problem), and it becames mess when sh.t hit the fan. When every squad is on own frequency, some armies or unit´s team leaders have to carry two personal radios, so they can talk in the same time to superiors and subordinates, switching frequencies doesn´t work well, because your commander is gonna call you in the moment you switch on team frequency. I did not find any radio with two push-to-talk buttons each on different frequency, able to receive on both. Also getting wrapped in cables is annoying. There are situations, when somebody from the team is talking to his TL over the radio, someone next (local, interpreter, other team´s member) talks to him personally, and commander needs to issue some order over the other radio, and that´s just over one´s brain capability.

Again you have identified the problem (well done - I read the situation as you do, and had a current Brit special forces sergeant major (WOII) tell me the same on November last year.) There are of course situations where personal radio (PPR) is useful but not I suggest for the line infantry for the majority of the time.

I used a dog whistle.

http://furlongspetsupply.com/ProductImages/booda/Aristo%20Silent%20Dog%20Whistle.jpg
Attached to my dog tags I started with it at a normally audible level and slowly tuned it higher and higher till only a trained ear (and a dog could hear it). You can get quite fancy with the whistles mixing long and short for different meanings.

Does it work? Well one day I showed a fellow officer how in a situation where my troop were playing volleyball against another about 30m away. I blew it. My troopies looked towards me, the others did not. It works. Try it.

BushrangerCZ

02-26-2011, 07:15 AM

I thought the Dragunov was a sniper rifle? But certainly the FN/SLR was fit for purpose. As most of our action was at very close ranges the range of the weapon did not come into play but it was the knock down effect and the terrible wounding it caused that set it apart from the AK47. Yes, our guys went down when hit by a 7.62mm intermediate but the wounds were not of the same magnitude. I would say the huge advantage we had was carrying the FN MAG on a one in four basis as having gunners who built up fearsome reputations through much combat experience. Int reports from captures indicated how much the insurgents feared the MAG.

You have identified the problem... now what is the solution?

IMHO the hearing problem takes two forms. One is the obvious inability to locate the position of the enemy by his fire which is a life and death issue when in contact and then it is the protection acoustic trauma. We hardly used ear defenders even on the range in the 70s and we have paid the price. But that said all the use of ear protection is meaningless after a series of cave clearing contacts with loud bangs in confined spaces. And then we had a number of guys who hit a number of landmines... I think their ears are still ringing ;)

I thought that ear plugs which allow normal speech and sounds through but protect against gunshot noise were freely available from gun shops or mail order?

Yes this is weird isn't it. I see the Brits are getting clever about this too. Soldiers beyond the ten years service are being found to be unfit for operational duty due to reduced hearing. Idiots. It was the army that did it to them and they should be fitted with the best available "hearing aids" to fix that not only in an operation context but also for after their service as well. What makes this so damn laughable is that on operations they give them a head set that blocks out the hearing in one ear anyway.

What would entice me back into the military at this stage of my life would be to carry out a "Stalinist type purge" of all the deadwood and idiots who seem to do more than the average enemy to hamper/sabotage military performance.

You need a gizmo? The yanks will have it and in this case some damn fine stuff too. Why not ask around here I'm sure you will get good advice.

Again you have identified the problem (well done - I read the situation as you do, and had a current Brit special forces sergeant major (WOII) tell me the same on November last year.) There are of course situations where personal radio (PPR) is useful but not I suggest for the line infantry for the majority of the time.

I used a dog whistle.

http://furlongspetsupply.com/ProductImages/booda/Aristo%20Silent%20Dog%20Whistle.jpg
Attached to my dog tags I started with it at a normally audible level and slowly tuned it higher and higher till only a trained ear (and a dog could hear it). You can get quite fancy with the whistles mixing long and short for different meanings.

Does it work? Well one day I showed a fellow officer how in a situation where my troop were playing volleyball against another about 30m away. I blew it. My troopies looked towards me, the others did not. It works. Try it.

Thanks JMA, I will try that whistle. Yanks I worked with usually used peltors, or two-color earplugs which did not really protect or allowed perfect hearing. They were half way between this two issues, which is still not solution, but compromise. There is also device which is on the same principle as earmuffs with active hearing, but much smaller, pushed inside your ear, with the same function. I never tried that one, someone here did?? I agree that army should understand the problem, but as we do not wage a full scale war, and soldiers with this issue are rather exception than norm, they don´t bother with some official exceptions.
Solution for that radio issue would be letting just TL and his 2IC having the ICOM (even the team splits sometimes for a while), and use only one frequency. Personally, I would prefer that. (We talk just about team radios, not about HF, of course).

Pete

02-28-2011, 02:08 AM

I suppose I'm old-school, but I think the basic infantry weapon should deliver accurate and lethal fire out to around 600 meters. That means a rifle and not a carbine. If portablility and the ease of getting in and out of vehicles are such major issues reverse the old rifle-to-carbine ratio in unit MTOEs and make carbines the norm, around 80 percent, and rifles about 20 percent.

Pete

02-28-2011, 03:10 AM

Were the Army to decide that carbines and bare minimum marksmanship intruction are okay for the main-force Army maybe a new niche could be found for the straight shooters out there. To take my previous message a step further, perhaps the "Designated Marksman" initiative could be expanded into an Infantry MOS with career progressions leading into scouting, sniping, Special Ops, etc. You'd want to give guys like them a real man's rifle, something in 7.62. Maybe having the gun nuts in an MOS that satisfies them and encourages them to do their utmost would be a good thing for the Army.

SethB

02-28-2011, 05:49 AM

Realistically, if you think an infantry rifle should have a 600M range, then the M4 can already do it.

For that matter, the 95% of Soldiers that aren't tasked with shooting the enemy with an IW would be best served by something small and portable.

Ken White

02-28-2011, 03:28 PM

Realistically, if you think an infantry rifle should have a 600M range, then the M4 can already do it.How much damage will the bullet actually do when it gets there?For that matter, the 95% of Soldiers that aren't tasked with shooting the enemy with an IW would be best served by something small and portable.Whoa. 95%. 95%?

Aside from the basic fact of combat life that ALL soldiers, by definition (and location) may well have to shoot the enemy with an IW and they had better be adequately trained (and practiced...) to be able to that with a weapon that is reliable and effective in worst case scenarios, I suggest that if the percentile cited were to be in fact correct, then the Army to which it applied would have some really significant organizational and purpose problems...

I think considering SOF, Scouts and everything else, it's nearer 90%. :D

Minor quibble made only to present the point that the exact numbers aren't critical. Regardless of the exact number, any figure in that range is still way too high and an indictment of the aforesaid organizational and purpose problems. Not to mention the training attitude and impact...:rolleyes:

jps2

02-28-2011, 08:22 PM

Is our main problem regarding light infantry main weapon and its efficiency in AfPak and small war is that they were design (M4, SA80, and others compact carbines) for high intensity conflicts where infantry have to fix the opponent infantry while support fire (machine guns, tanks, artillery) suppress the opponent.

The failure is that support fire can't be used in COIN because of collateral casualties.

So we re-discover that rifles are more effective than carbines in trained and composed infantrymen (should I say riflemen ?)

SethB

02-28-2011, 11:41 PM

How much damage will the bullet actually do when it gets there?

According to most people that I've talked to, it will do enough. A friend of mine has killed people at 900M with an SPR.

Aside from the basic fact of combat life that ALL soldiers, by definition (and location) may well have to shoot the enemy with an IW and they had better be adequately trained (and practiced...) to be able to that with a weapon that is reliable and effective in worst case scenarios, I suggest that if the percentile cited were to be in fact correct, then the Army to which it applied would have some really significant organizational and purpose problems...

Once you add up all the CS and CSS guys, then add the guys that use crew served weapons, indirect fire systems and the like, and then the leadership, you have a minimal number of people actually shooting a rifle at the enemy.

My MTOE weapons is an M16A2, but I feel that I would be best served by an M9 and a CSW.

Pete

03-01-2011, 12:40 AM

Rifles do things carbines can't, but carbines can't do some of the things rifles do. The other issue with the M16/M4 family of weapons is the caliber. For those reasons, if it comes down to an either-or choice for an Infantry rifle I'd opt for a long barrel in something more potent than 5.56mm.

Ken White

03-01-2011, 01:18 AM

According to most people that I've talked to, it will do enough.Most of mine, mostly grunts and workaday SF with a random other operator type (all Army) here and there disagree, as do I. S'okay, we can do that. :wry: A friend of mine has killed people at 900M with an SPR.Possible. Also exceptional -- and the word 'reliably' comes to mind...Once you add up all the CS and CSS guys, then add the guys that use crew served weapons, indirect fire systems and the like, and then the leadership, you have a minimal number of people actually shooting a rifle at the enemy.True. One can figure 3 x 27 =111/160 Rifle Co for 69%. Arbitrarily take about ~ 80% of that for Mech inf or ~ 55%. Average about 60% per Bn..

Figure roughly 100-120 Bns (Varies and depends); using 100 Bns that's ~75,000 X .6 = 45,000 / 535,000 = ~ 8.5% ± plus SF, LRS, the odd Convoy escorting MP (or other Branch person) and the like. So either figure, thine or mine is in the neighborhood. Put another way, anyway you slice it, we have too many 'others' not involved in combat by design.

How many of those 'others' get involved in actual shooting combat not by design is another question entirely...My MTOE weapons is an M16A2, but I feel that I would be best served by an M9 and a CSW.I'm old, CSW to me is crew served weapon and I suspect that is not what you're referring to. The plethora of initials out there is amazing.

Take the "SPR," I presume you mean a Mk 12 in 5.56 but there are several "SPRs" in various calibers out there including this one LINK (http://www.impactguns.com/store/fn_spr.html) and there are others -- proving that any High Speed, Low Drag piece of gear will draw cloning in name if nothing else...:D

Blah

03-01-2011, 01:32 AM

In my opinion, the adequacy or inadequacy of the 5.56's lethality could be argued all day, but in the absence of any satisfactory scientific studies on the matter, the only things that can be provided are anecdotes.

That said, there are more concrete and indisputable attributes of both 5.56 and 7.62.
To isolate 2: The 7.62 provides superior penetration of light cover, potentially allowing troops to end the engagement faster. The 5.56 allows a greater amount of ammunition to be carried, letting them operate longer without resupply.

All very obvious stuff. My question is... If we were to go back in time to 2003 and make 7.62 the service cartridge, would we have been hearing about troops running out of ammo in 2 minutes instead of insurgents taking 30 rounds and not falling? (Hyperbole was intentional)

I often hear something along the lines of, "You cannot carry enough 7.62 in a modern war!" I've never heard an actual quantitative figure stated. How much ammo do you "need" exactly? I realize there is no "average" firefight, which makes the answer to that question more elusive. However, the less that number is, the less the difference in weight between those 2 cartridges. Something to keep in mind.

Pete

03-01-2011, 02:09 AM

Way back when, what was the main reason for equipping Infantry with small arms?

Ken White

03-01-2011, 03:22 AM

In my opinion, the adequacy or inadequacy of the 5.56's lethality could be argued all day, but in the absence of any satisfactory scientific studies on the matter, the only things that can be provided are anecdotes.It is not an issue that can be decided by "scientific studies." There are too many variables in human physiology and psychology (both shooter and target, two almost infinite variables right there...), in range, in atmospheric conditions, weapons quality and cleanliness, time of day, vision aids, shooter's ability, cartridge consistency and other factors to really do that. Nor is there any need.That said, there are more concrete and indisputable attributes of both 5.56 and 7.62.
To isolate 2: The 7.62 provides superior penetration of light cover, potentially allowing troops to end the engagement faster. The 5.56 allows a greater amount of ammunition to be carried, letting them operate longer without resupply.Those are a few for both, there are more, not least range. Add recoil and ease of training...All very obvious stuff. My question is... If we were to go back in time to 2003 and make 7.62 the service cartridge, would we have been hearing about troops running out of ammo in 2 minutes instead of insurgents taking 30 rounds and not falling? (Hyperbole was intentional)

I often hear something along the lines of, "You cannot carry enough 7.62 in a modern war!" I've never heard an actual quantitative figure stated. How much ammo do you "need" exactly? I realize there is no "average" firefight, which makes the answer to that question more elusive. However, the less that number is, the less the difference in weight between those 2 cartridges. Something to keep in mind.Not really. State of training of troops and / or their net combat experience (not time in a 'combat zone' but actual fire fight experience) make a tremendous difference in the amount of ammo carried and used. Basically, the newbies fire on full auto or just fire a lot; the old guys do not. New people will want to carry a LOT of ammo, ten or more magazines plus a few cartons in the pack.

Consider the fact the the basic load for a rifleman in Korea was a full cartirdge belt plus two bandoleers. 10x8 + 2x6x8 = 176 rounds occasionally plus 8 in the M1 for a total of 184. Initially many new guys wanted a couple of more 6 clip bandoleers -- so the old guys who didn't want to carry unnecessary weight would hand over theirs. Old hands went out with 88 rounds and rarely fired all of it while the new guys had 2-300 or more and tended to fire it all in a day...

Viet Nam saw the same thing except with 20 round magazines. Seven was the issue norm, thus 140 rounds -- but the new guys scrounged extra mags and carried cartons, sometimes as much 10 mags plus ten or twelve cartons -- 400 or more rounds. Not likely many ever fired anywhere near that. Most older hands carried their seven mags and found that was more than enough.

Same thing is happening today. I saw an article last week on the topic on present day experience in Afghanistan. Can't find it right now but I'll keep looking and if I find, I'll post a link on this thread.

Bottom line on amount of Ammo is that it's absolutely METT-TC related. One may need more or less than the planned basic load depending on the mission -- but the fact is that a statement like this ""You cannot carry enough 7.62 in a modern war!"" is totally specious IMO.

03-01-2011, 03:53 AM

Ken,

Remember "Every Marine is a rifleman first"!

The Marines still require all manner of its troops to qualify annually with a rifle. That includes pilots, air crew and the scopedopes from the Marine Air Control Squadrons. And I believe the requirement includes all Women Marines as well.

Point of fact, after the Fall of Baghdad, the 11th Marie Regt. (Artillery) began rotating their big gun units back to California. Volunteers were called for from the ranks of the cannoncockers to flesh out the Infanty units that had taken casulties. Many of the 11th Marines stayed in Iraq for another three months while 0311 replacements were shipped in to replace them. The volunteers included cooks and bakers from the Artillery Regt who performed as infantrymen.

Picking the fly ash out of the pepper and arguing about the best choice is all well and good. It seems to me the M-16 and its variants wa excellent in Iraq for the most part. More city town activity and not a lot of long range rifle requirements.

Afgahanistan is a wider and more spread out Area of Operations. Seems a 7.62 or 6.5 lupara round is needed to reach out to 800 or 1,000 yards.

There are a lot of Britsh .303 Enfields in Afganistan and the range of that
old man killer is 1,000 yards.

It is very inconvient to have a 20 round magazine that cannot kill the guy who is killing your friends because the shooter is 300 yards beyond their capacity to kill him.

Some where last year in this thread, some Marine units were experimenting with a 12 man squad configeration and possibly using some of the automatic rifles the Marines are concidering to replace the SAW. I believe there are 4 different AR's in the study.

Has any feed back on those activities floated to the top yet?

Kiwigrunt

03-01-2011, 04:45 AM

Same thing is happening today. I saw an article last week on the topic on present day experience in Afghanistan. Can't find it right now but I'll keep looking and if I find, I'll post a link on this thread.

You may be thinking of the link that Wilf supplied in post 845.

Granite_State

03-01-2011, 05:53 AM

Some where last year in this thread, some Marine units were experimenting with a 12 man squad configeration and possibly using some of the automatic rifles the Marines are concidering to replace the SAW. I believe there are 4 different AR's in the study.

We bought the HK model, it is now being fielded by five Marine Corps battalions as the M27 Infantry Automatic Rifle (mine's one of the five). Spent most of today sitting through classes on it, will be on a range with it (more watching than shooting) tomorrow afternoon.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M27_Infantry_Automatic_Rifle

JMA

03-01-2011, 06:53 AM

How much damage will the bullet actually do when it gets there?

Good point. Are you asking about the 5.56 or the 7.62 or both?

But then the aim of section fire out to 600m is what?

JMA

03-01-2011, 07:01 AM

Picking the fly ash out of the pepper and arguing about the best choice is all well and good. It seems to me the M-16 and its variants wa excellent in Iraq for the most part. More city town activity and not a lot of long range rifle requirements.

and the 5.56 could adequately penetrate the brick and concrete cover found in such urban environments?

There are a lot of Britsh .303 Enfields in Afganistan and the range of that old man killer is 1,000 yards.

But luckily, not too many shooters who can achieve that are to be found there.

Have you heard of any ISAF troops been taken out by single aimed shots from 400m and beyond?

kaur

03-01-2011, 09:41 AM

JMA asked RJ

Have you heard of any ISAF troops been taken out by single aimed shots from 400m and beyond?

I found those claims.

Recruited from Pakistan, Egypt and Chechnya, the snipers could kill from up to 650 yards away and were considered a serious threat by British commanders.

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1305337/Taliban-hired-snipers-believed-killed-British-soldiers-killed-air-strikes.html

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703824304575435403980423346.html?m od=WSJ_hpp_LEFTTopStories

JMA

03-01-2011, 10:16 AM

JMA asked RJ

I found those claims.

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1305337/Taliban-hired-snipers-believed-killed-British-soldiers-killed-air-strikes.html

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703824304575435403980423346.html?m od=WSJ_hpp_LEFTTopStories

Yes, we have spoken about those "imported" snipers before somewhere here.

I understand they were foreign and were finally taken out.

The context of my post related to the availability of "a lot of Britsh .303 Enfields" in Afghanistan and my question as to whether they were being effectively used.

So I guess I should have reworded my question as follows:

"Have you heard of any ISAF troops been taken out by single aimed shots fired by an Afghan from a .303 Enfield from 400m and beyond?"

I will try to be more accurate in future.

03-01-2011, 11:53 PM

Granite_State

03-02-2011, 12:41 AM

granite state - thanks for the catch up. What caliber is the new ar the marines are transitioning to?

5.56.

Demon Fox

03-02-2011, 01:18 AM

Every squad needs designated marksmen. Many, if not most, of the engagements in AF are 200m or less. The typical SOP is for the squad leader to call in a HIMARS, JDAM, or Excalibur to take out one or two enemy riflemen. They get the bad guy, but find dead women and children at the impact site as well. These situations could be resolved with a rifleman and a bit of good aim. At 200m, that's a head shot even with an M4 - especially with the ACOGS sites most soldiers use these days!

SPRs combined with the 77 grain 5.56 match round makes a good sniper rifle. My team was training at the High-Angle Sniper Course in Hawthorne, NV a few years ago. We had one SPR, and its owner consistently hit targets out to 1,000 meters in very heavy winds. He even started plinking at 9mm targets on the other side of the valley, which had to have been at least 1,300 meters away. The Marine instructors weren't too happy to find the 5.56 rounds burned holes through the steel 9mm targets even at that range! :-D So, for anyone wondering about the capabilities of a 5.56 round - there you go.

It's interesting how much a difference there is in the performance between the 62 grain green tip standard issue 5.56 and the 77 grain. Ops in Iraq demonstrated an insurgent could take several green tip hits and keep running, but one hit from a 77 grain puts him down flat.

Like some of the folks here, I am a believer in the power of the 7.62x51. While conducting training in Drake Shoots (Rhodesian Cover Shoots), it was very clear that the 7.62 weapons could penetrate completely through medium-sized trees that stop 5.56 cold. It makes the enemy rethink his definition of "cover". Oh, by the way, if any of you guys reading this are combat leaders I highly recommend you teach your men Drake Shoots. It is one of the most effective techniques I've seen - just be cognizant of collateral damage when using the technique.

As already discussed, there is definitely a weight problem with 7.62 - yes, it's friggin' heavy and soldiers carry enough weight as it is. Also, the magazines will generally only carry 20 rounds due to size. Less ammo, more weight. You can't always have an attached MG team with your squad, so I think the solution is to have a 7.62 designated marksman weapon or two assigned to the squad. It sounds like a better job for the rifleman found in each Army fire team. A solution could be something like the 7.62 SCARS rifle, or perhaps introduce a new and improved weapon similar to the Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR)? SR-25 or M110 SWS may be the answer.

DF

JMA

03-02-2011, 02:30 AM

Welcome Demon Fox,

It's interesting how much a difference there is in the performance between the 62 grain green tip standard issue 5.56 and the 77 grain. Ops in Iraq demonstrated an insurgent could take several green tip hits and keep running, but one hit from a 77 grain puts him down flat.

So I wonder who can explain why the 62 grain is standard issue?

Like some of the folks here, I am a believer in the power of the 7.62x51. While conducting training in Drake Shoots (Rhodesian Cover Shoots), it was very clear that the 7.62 weapons could penetrate completely through medium-sized trees that stop 5.56 cold. It makes the enemy rethink his definition of "cover". Oh, by the way, if any of you guys reading this are combat leaders I highly recommend you teach your men Drake Shoots. It is one of the most effective techniques I've seen - just be cognizant of collateral damage when using the technique.

May I suggest that you consider adding the "Dead and Alive Shoot" to the Drake Shoot training.

Simply, on a field firing range you have a section/squad approach a second squad who are positioned in a firing position/trench line/whatever. At the moment the "defending" squad leader would order his men to open fire give the advancing squad the order to "take cover". They take cover and you turn the "defending" squad around to as not to see the next step.

A figure 12 target (http://farm1.static.flickr.com/152/354802396_9ec3252232.jpg) is then positioned at each point where an advancing squad member has taken cover. The advancing squad are then withdrawn behind the firing point to watch. The "defending" squad are then turned around and conduct a Drake/Cover shoot into the area where the advancing squad took cover.

The "advancing" squad are then taken by instructors/platoon NCOs to their positions to see if they came out of the contact "Dead or Alive". Remedial training can be conducted then and there.

Once completed swap the squads around. The squad with the most "dead" pay for the first round in the canteen later.

The aim of the exercise (apart from simply training troops to seek proper cover) is to indicate that the Drake/Cover shoot works both ways.

As already discussed, there is definitely a weight problem with 7.62 - yes, it's friggin' heavy and soldiers carry enough weight as it is. Also, the magazines will generally only carry 20 rounds due to size. Less ammo, more weight.

I have said this before and will say it again... that before anyone starts to consider compromising on the type of weapons and the amount of ammo carried because of weight considerations look elsewhere to see where weight can be shed from the infantryman's burden.

It is interesting to note that the Brits are finally coming to the realisation that the additional weight being carried by soldiers nowadays is having serious negative side effects.

We’re getting to a point where we are losing as many men making mistakes because they are exhausted from carrying armour (and the things that go with it) than are saved by it. - from Donkeys led by Lions - The British Army Review Number 150

Now many of these patrols are a few thousand metres long and probably don't move beyond the range of indirect supporting weapons (which they should have) in their base of origin. So why carry all the kit?

You can't always have an attached MG team with your squad,...

Why not? I suppose you are talking about a 7.62mm LMG?

... so I think the solution is to have a 7.62 designated marksman weapon or two assigned to the squad. It sounds like a better job for the rifleman found in each Army fire team. A solution could be something like the 7.62 SCARS rifle, or perhaps introduce a new and improved weapon similar to the Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR)? SR-25 or M110 SWS may be the answer.

DF

Good to see someone out there is looking for "the answer". You are in the minority as too many these days just seem to not only to go with the flow but when questioned aggressively defend the status quo.

JMA

03-02-2011, 02:41 AM

JMA,

Good or better than good snipers come in all sizes and shapes. Trained snipers are the norm, but the Afagini in the tribal areas produce the occasional excellent shot that could devastate a M-16 only enviroment at will.

In a recent ops a Marine Bn. encountered such an individual. He used cover, concealment and a deep firing point where he had a narrow, but effective field of fire. He wounded at least 4 marines and killed one before he was licated and eleminated. It wasn't a Enfield 303 that did the work but a Russian sniper rifle.

Mypoint is if you only have M-16 capabilities, you are going to lose in the long shot environment of Afgahistan. The small caliber is not the only option.

JMA I doubt that all the foreign elements in Afganistan have been eleminated?

I suggest we are talking at crossed purposes. I was merely reacting to the comment that because there are many 303 Enfields in Afghanistan there is necessarily a risk from long range sniping. The fact that foreigners are being brought in as snipers and where Afghans have the skill they use proper sniper rifles probably indicates that the presence or otherwise of 303 Enfields is somewhat academic.

That ISAF forces need weapons that are capable of effective fire out to the longer ranges is self evident. This could just as well be a LMG as a specialist rifle.

Fuchs

03-02-2011, 11:34 AM

The aim of the exercise (apart from simply training troops to seek proper cover) is to indicate that the Drake/Cover shoot works both ways.

That's part of the reason why I'll never be a good trainer at anything, I guess.
I take too much for self-evident and not in need of a demonstration.

Demon Fox

03-02-2011, 05:50 PM

So I wonder who can explain why the 62 grain is standard issue?

Good question, JMA. The 77 grain was made specifically for the SPR. It's too hot of a round to put through a M4 or M16. You risk damage to the weapon and injury to the firer. It's the same problem as using match 7.62x51 ammo intended for sniper rifles in an M240B MG. Match ammo is hotter. A couple of years ago some guys from one of the SF groups were trying to get rid of fiscal year ammo and linked up a bunch of match 7.62 and started firing it through an M240B. The gun blew up and injured two men. MGs and rifles are designed to have specific types of ammo put through them. Going outside these specifications can lead to bad things. Another example is taking a 40mm grenade made for a Mk-19 and putting it into an M203 or M79. Not good.

May I suggest that you consider adding the "Dead and Alive Shoot" to the Drake Shoot training.

Simply, on a field firing range you have a section/squad approach a second squad who are positioned in a firing position/trench line/whatever. At the moment the "defending" squad leader would order his men to open fire give the advancing squad the order to "take cover". They take cover and you turn the "defending" squad around to as not to see the next step.

A figure 12 target (http://farm1.static.flickr.com/152/354802396_9ec3252232.jpg) is then positioned at each point where an advancing squad member has taken cover. The advancing squad are then withdrawn behind the firing point to watch. The "defending" squad are then turned around and conduct a Drake/Cover shoot into the area where the advancing squad took cover.

The "advancing" squad are then taken by instructors/platoon NCOs to their positions to see if they came out of the contact "Dead or Alive". Remedial training can be conducted then and there.

Once completed swap the squads around. The squad with the most "dead" pay for the first round in the canteen later.

The aim of the exercise (apart from simply training troops to seek proper cover) is to indicate that the Drake/Cover shoot works both ways.

I haven't heard of that training being done. Good stuff. The most difficult thing about training the Drake Shoots is finding a range to do it on!! Almost all ranges are cleared out open areas with long fields of fire. To train Drake Shoots, you must ask your Range Control Office to get you a range with lots of trees, bushes, and other cover and concealment to hide the targets. With proper application of Drake Shoots, your unit will achieve 100% hits on the targets without being able to see the targets! Trust me, it works!!

I've watched YouTube videos and such where the US soldiers were firing back at Taliban attacks and complaining they can't see their enemy to fire accurately. Drake Shoots actually eliminates the necessity of seeing your enemy to hit him. Instead, you aim at his likely locations for cover and concealment.

I have said this before and will say it again... that before anyone starts to consider compromising on the type of weapons and the amount of ammo carried because of weight considerations look elsewhere to see where weight can be shed from the infantryman's burden.

It is interesting to note that the Brits are finally coming to the realisation that the additional weight being carried by soldiers nowadays is having serious negative side effects.

Now many of these patrols are a few thousand metres long and probably don't move beyond the range of indirect supporting weapons (which they should have) in their base of origin. So why carry all the kit?

I have never been a believer in always wearing Level IV body armor. It's ridiculous. Commanders enforce it for the purpose of reducing their own blame if a soldier gets killed. Yes, that Level IV has saved several soldiers lives by stopping a 7.62 round, but every incident I have personal knowledge of the round struck in an unarmored area of the body. I personally believe only Level II should be worn to protect from shrapnel - the biggest killer. Only in door-kicking CQB situations where enemy contact is likely should soldiers slide in their plates.

Being a sniper myself, I and my team mates would investigate sniper incidents in our area in Diyala Province, Iraq. We would locate the unit that was there and interview them on what happened. We found some interesting similarities in all the attacks:

1. The shot was never heard by any friendly forces. This indicates good sniper TTP of setting back inside a room.

2. The bullet never hit an armored part of the body. Usually the side of the soldier.

3. The range of the shot was always less than 200 meters - usually around 100 meters.

4. The sniper never took more than two shots then withdrew. If he got a first time hit, then only one shot was fired. Good sniper discipline.

5. Sniper attacks ALWAYS occurred during a MOUT clearing operation approximately one hour into the operation. This means the sniper team was called into the area by his HQ after hearing CF were operating in an area. An hour into the operation, all buildings are cleared and secured and people are starting to "relax" a little.

6. Sniper attacks ALWAYS occurred when the supporting Air Weapons Team (AH-64s or OH-58Ds) had left station to refuel (guess what - that's about an hour into an operation!). They greatly feared attack helos.

7. The snipers targeted the soldiers who looked like they are in charge. This was usually the officer or senior NCO who is standing around in the open.

8. Sniper aim wasn't that good. "Sniper" is a misnomer. It was more like some guy who could use a site fairly well and hit a person at about 100 meters. Additionally, reporting it as a "sniper" has a negative affect on soldier morale. It induces fear that is probably injustified.

Why not? I suppose you are talking about a 7.62mm LMG?

MG teams in the platoon aren't always available to direct support a squad.

Good to see someone out there is looking for "the answer". You are in the minority as too many these days just seem to not only to go with the flow but when questioned aggressively defend the status quo.[/QUOTE]

Thanks,

v/r

DF

Demon Fox

03-02-2011, 05:51 PM

Demon Fox

03-02-2011, 05:52 PM

Hey, how the heck do you get those blue quote boxes from other people's input?

v/r

DF

Fuchs

03-02-2011, 06:05 PM

press the "quote" button

SethB

03-02-2011, 10:28 PM

So I wonder who can explain why the 62 grain is standard issue?

It was designed for the SAW and adopted because it could penetrate a helmet.

The 77 grain was made specifically for the SPR.

No. It was made specifically for the AMU. It was taken to Afghanistan as a stopgap round in 2001. The design was later changed.

It's too hot of a round to put through a M4 or M16. You risk damage to the weapon and injury to the firer.

No, you don't. Besides, the M4/M16 are essentially the same in every way. You want to show me some documentation.

It's the same problem as using match 7.62x51 ammo intended for sniper rifles in an M240B MG. Match ammo is hotter.

No. 7.62x51 has pressure limits.

A couple of years ago some guys from one of the SF groups were trying to get rid of fiscal year ammo and linked up a bunch of match 7.62 and started firing it through an M240B. The gun blew up and injured two men. MGs and rifles are designed to have specific types of ammo put through them. Going outside these specifications can lead to bad things.

I rolled my eyes on this one. I really did.

Who are you? You haven't filled out a profile, nor have you introduced yourself.

Demon Fox

03-03-2011, 12:48 AM

Well, now that I'm aware there is a profile page, I'll fill it out.

For everyone: hello, I am a retired 18Z (plus 18F and 18E). I live in Colorado Springs and currently doing contract work. I find the blogs and stories here in the SWJ very interesting and informative. I like seeing the differences in opinions and experiences.

SethB: you say you rolled your eyes at the M-240 story, but just because you didn't hear about it doesn't mean it didn't happen. My own battalion leadership suggested linking the 7.62 match to get rid of it before fiscal year turn-in, and we told them no - bad idea.

When experienced 18Bs say not to use certain ammo in certain weapons, I tend to believe them.

v/r

DF

Ken White

03-03-2011, 02:02 AM

The 240 incident you cite is probably not one I know of but there have been at least two others that I'm aware of. In all those cases, there's a possibility the ammo was not causative -- could well have been simply coincidence. Lot of things can cause weapon failure, even age.... :wry:

The standard pressure for 7.62x51 in US service hovers around 50K psi -- that includes the M118 Match. However, some folks buy special lot, off DODIC stuff like the special purpose M993 AP which pops at 55,115 psi. Those same guys buy some also special lot M118 for longer range usage and those can go up to 60,200 psi.

All 7.62 issue weapons are batch tested with the M60 High Pressure Test cartridge at 67.5K psi so theoretically that even 60.2K psi should be a no worries item.

Since the M240 has to be able to handle that max, the blow up may well have been caused by something else...

Demon Fox

03-03-2011, 02:20 AM

OK, back to the ammo stuff:

The following is copied straight out of FM 3-22.9 (12 August 2008) Chapter 2, pages 2-35 thru 2-36:

-------------------------------------------------------
This section provides information about different types of standard military ammunition used in M16- and M4-
series weapons.

Use only authorized ammunition manufactured to U.S. and NATO specifications (Table 2-8).

Table 2-8. Authorized ammunition.

M193 cartridge –
5.56-mm, ball
Plain tip The M193 is the
standard cartridge for
field use with the M16A1
rifle.
The M193 cartridge is a center-fire cartridge
with a 55-grain, gilded metal-jacketed, lead
alloy core bullet.

M196 cartridge –
5.56-mm, tracer
Red or orange tip The M196 cartridge is
used only in the M16A1
rifle.
Its main uses are for
observation of fire,
incendiary effect, and
signaling.
Soldiers should avoid long-term use of 100
percent tracer rounds, which could cause
deposits of incendiary material or chemical
compounds that could damage the barrel.
When tracer rounds are fired, they are mixed
with ball ammunition in a ratio of no greater
than one-to-one with a preferred ratio of
three or four ball rounds to one tracer round.

M199 cartridge –
5.56-mm, dummy
Six grooves along
the sides of the
case beginning
about 1/2 inch
from its tip
The M199 dummy
cartridge is used in all
M16-/M4-series
weapons during dryfiring
and other training.
This cartridge contains no propellant or
primer.
The primer well is open to prevent damage
to the firing pin.

M200 cartridge –
5.56-mm, blank
(no projectile)
Case mouth is
closed with a
seven-petal
rosette crimp,
violet tip
The M200 blank
cartridge is used in all
M16-/M4-series
weapons.
N/A

M855 cartridge –
5.56-mm, ball
Green tip The M855 cartridge is
used in the M16A2/3/4
and in M4-series
weapons.
The M855 cartridge has a 62-grain, gilded
metal-jacketed, lead alloy core bullet with a
steel penetrator.
The primer and case are waterproof. This
round is also linked and used in the M249.
NOTE: This ammunition should not be used
in the M16A1 except under emergency
conditions, and only at targets less than 90
meters away. The twist of the M16A1 rifling
is not sufficient to stabilize the length of the
round's projectile.

M856 cartridge –
5.56-mm, tracer
Red tip (orange
when linked 4 to 1
for the M249)
The M856 tracer
cartridge is used in the
M16A2/3/4 and M4-
series weapons.
The M856 tracer cartridge has
characteristics similar to the M196 tracer,
with a slightly longer tracer burnout distance.
This cartridge has a 63.7-grain bullet.
The M856 does not have a steel penetrator.
NOTE: This ammunition should not be used
in the M16A1 except under emergency
conditions, and only at targets less than
90 meters away. The twist of the M16A1
rifling is not sufficient to stabilize the length
of the round's projectile.

M862 cartridge –
5.56-mm, short-range
training ammunition
(SRTA)
N/A The M862 SRTA is used
in all rifles and is
designed exclusively for
training.
The M862 SRTA can be used in lieu of
service ammunition on indoor ranges and by
units who have a limited range fan that does
not allow the firing of service ammunition.
If adequate range facilities are not available
for sustainment training, SRTA can be used
for any firing exercise of 25 meters or less.
This includes the 25-meter scaled silhouette,
25-meter alternate qualification course, and
quick-fire training.
SRTA can also be used for urban operations
(UO) training.
NOTES: 1. See Appendix A for use of SRTA
in training.
2. Although SRTA closely replicates the
trajectory and characteristics of service
ammunition out to 25 meters, the settings
placed on the sights for SRTA could be
different for service ammunition. SRTA
should not be used to battlesight zero
weapons that will fire service ammunition.
3. SRTA ammunition must be used with the
M2 training bolt.

M995 cartridge –
5.56-mm, armor piercing
(AP)
Conventional
brass cartridge
case
Aluminum cup sits
at the rear of the
projectile (for the
purpose of
properly locating
the penetrator
within the
projectile)
The M995 cartridge is
used by the M249
(SAW), M16/A2/A3/A4,
and M4-series weapons.
It is intended for use
against light armored
targets.
The M995 offers the capability to defeat light
armored targets at ranges two to three times
that of currently available 5.56-mm
ammunition.
The M995 cartridge consists of a projectile
and a propelling charge contained in a brass
cartridge case. The projectile is a dense
metal penetrator (tungsten carbide) enclosed
by a standard gilded metal jacket. The
cartridge utilizes a double base propellant. A
standard rifle cartridge primer is used in the
case to initiate the propelling charge.

--------------------------------------------------------

You may notice that neither Mk262 Mod 0 nor Mk262 Mod 1 77 grain ammo is NOT on this authorized list of ammunition for the M16 and M4 family of rifles. SethB, you ARE correct that the 77 grain can be put through M4/M16s with documented good range and effects; however, if the Army didn't put it on the authorized list they probably had a reason. Additionally, the 77 grain is usually in such short supply that it is reserved for the unit's SPRs/Mk12s.

You'll also notice that some of the ammo is restricted when it comes to the M16A1, to include the M855 standard green tip.

As for the development of the 77 grain, below are some websites that discuss it. Most claim it was developed specifically for the SPR; a couple mention development for competition purposes (which makes logical sense). One source also mentions that USAMU indeed led the development for combat purposes.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/5.56x45mm_NATO

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mk_12_Special_Purpose_Rifle

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/mk12.htm

http://www.snipercentral.com/223.htm

http://www.angusarms.com/SPR.htm

http://www.gunsandammo.com/content/black-hills-mk-262-mod-1?page=2

http://www.thegunzone.com/556faq-nb.html

http://www.bravocompanyusa.com/Articles.asp?ID=145

http://ammo.ar15.com/ammo/project/hist_mk262.html

http://m4carbine.net/showthread.php?t=28326

As for the 7.62x51 173 grain M118 and 175 grain M118LR match ammo: if you want to link it up and give it a shot through an M240, go right ahead. I'll be standing back behind the line when you do. :-)

v/r

DF

Pete

03-03-2011, 02:48 AM

This makes me feel old. When I was a kid we bit the end of the cartridge to pour the powder in before we rammed the ball home. When the barrel was badly fouled British .577 rounds were easier to ram than the U.S. .58 stuff. No doubt JMA remembers .577-calibre from his rhinoceros-hunting safari days.

Demon Fox

03-03-2011, 02:51 AM

Ken, you could very well be correct on the M240 issue. It happened in a different group than mine and word got around. My Bn leadership also suggested lining up a bunch of sniper rifles and burning the ammo. OK, we had over 53,000 rounds of M118 7.62x51 match ammo - you do the math! I told the commander that he would have to buy a bunch of new sniper barrels after we were done! We wound up just eating the ammo on our FY report. There was just no legal or safe way to get rid of it.

I once witnessed an M240 have an accidental discharge due to poor maintenance. It was new guy on our team using another team's MG at a convoy live-fire range. We broke apart the M240 to see if there was mechanical malfunction to explain the AD. When we opened the feed tray the metal was literally peeling off from rust. I was furious at the blatant neglect and our new guy was cleared of wrongdoing.

Here is the list of authorized M240B ammo from FM 3-22.68 (Jul 06):

The M240B machine gun uses the following types of ammunition. See also table 3-3:

􀁹 Cartridge, 7.62-mm Ball M80—for use against light materials and personnel, and for range training.

􀁹 Cartridge, 7.62-mm Armor-Piercing M61—for use against lightly armored targets.

􀁹 Cartridge, 7.62-mm Tracer M62—for observation of fire, incendiary effects, signaling, and for training. When the gunner fires tracer rounds, they mix with ball ammunition in a ratio of four ball rounds to one tracer round.

􀁹 Cartridge, 7.62-mm Dummy M63—for use during mechanical training.

􀁹 Cartridge, 7.62-mm Blank M82—for use during training when simulated live fire is desired. The gunner should use a BFA to fire this ammunition.

v/r

DF

SethB

03-03-2011, 02:59 AM

Not particularly concerned about shooting heavy OTMs through a short barrel. I've done enough of it.

It may not be on the approved list, but it wasn't designed for combat use and the fact that it was eventually approved for anything is a tribute to a few people that shepherded it through the system.

See Ken's post for a coherent discussion of pressures.

And for M855, you can't shoot it through an M16 or M16A1 because the 1:12 twist barrel wont stabilize the longer bullet.

M4s and recent M16s have a 1:7 barrel, although 1:9 will stabilize M855 just fine.

Demon Fox

03-03-2011, 03:04 AM

LOL, Pete:

A few months ago I was reading an article in a hunting magazine (can't remember which one) and there was an Africa safari story in there. The author described the standard light, medium, and heavy rifles taken on safari. I was laughing, because in this case the "light" gun was something like a .458, the "medium" gun was a .600, and the "heavy" gun was a friggin' .700 with a 1,000 grain bullet!! The article had a pic showing the author test firing the .700 . . .

Fuchs

03-03-2011, 12:12 PM

'59 document on ranges

http://www.cfspress.com/sharpshooters/battle-ranges.html

Ken White

03-03-2011, 02:28 PM

It colored the thinking of the Army -- to no good end, consumed massive amounts of research and development money and produced -- nothing.

Other than harm.

It was a farce and it has adversely impacted my thinking about about statistical analyses by academics on combat matters since it hit the street in the mid-50s. The '59 and 60s date mentioned are from the time it was declassified, the study was completed in the early 50s.

Combat is not a numeric exercise and 'statistics' gathered invariably reflect specifics at a time and place -- those may or, more likely, may not be applicable at another time and place with different people doing ostensibly the same thing in a setting only slightly modified. Numbers and metrics should be used to assess combat efforts with great caution.

This study was also the lever for much US Army foolishness in attempting to use technology to compensate for poor training, a disastrous failure that is still entirely too prevalent.

Fuchs

03-03-2011, 03:25 PM

This study was also the lever for much US Army foolishness in attempting to use technology to compensate for poor training, ...

To be honest, that became a hallmark as early as '42, then rooted in the lacking numbers of experienced leaders.

Firn

03-03-2011, 04:13 PM

Combat is not a numeric exercise and 'statistics' gathered invariably reflect specifics at a time and place -- those may or, more likely, may not be applicable at another time and place with different people doing ostensibly the same thing in a setting only slightly modified. Numbers and metrics should be used to assess combat efforts with great caution.

I just wonder how the study could get so bad markmanship results at 300 yards, and such a small difference between the experts and standard shooters.

Ken White

03-03-2011, 05:26 PM

To be honest, that became a hallmark as early as '42, then rooted in the lacking numbers of experienced leaders.In itself indicative of a training shortfall. Training cannot substitute for experience in all cases -- but it does a better job than technology in most.

Particularly when emphasis on that technology leads to near total reliance upon it -- and it fails...:eek:

Firn:

Good question. A good deal has to do with weapon quality and with over-maintenance which in the US Army at least causes significant early wear with resulting mechanical looseness and even deformed parts. Heavily used combat weapons also develop microscopic and almost undetectable barrel droop from excessive heat buildup; that can only be ascertained by bore scoping and that's a depot operation (not always performed to save time and money...). There is also a US Army issue with what is an "expert" shooter. The nominal standard has always been rather low. :wry:

That's one flawed 'study.' :rolleyes:

Pete

03-04-2011, 12:06 AM

This study was also the lever for much US Army foolishness in attempting to use technology to compensate for poor training, a disastrous failure that is still entirely too prevalent.
True, but that's always been the American way. There were the Spencer rifles and carbines during the Civil War and the Pedersen Device idea during War I.

If I recall correctly the statistical study Fuchs posted was cited as one of justifications cited for adopting the M16 in 1965. At the time when the M14 vs M16 thing was going on I've also gotten the impression that McNamara had a big grudge against U.S. Army Ordnance, particularly its sprawling empire of depots and installations, which he wanted to convert into DoD facilities. I also read something to the effect that the comparative shoot-off by Ordnance between the M14 and the FN was then regarded at the DoD level as having been rigged in the M14's favor. The old Army Ordnance gave us some true subject matter experts like Julian Hatcher but I fear they had begun to think they had all the answers about everything. It could have been sort of a "Pride comes before a fall" kind of thing.

Compost

03-04-2011, 04:17 AM

Only difference between SF and infantry in the matter of assault rifles I see in caliber and barrel lenght (SF should have the infantry standard issue rifle, plus the same with shorter barrel and/or different caliber, due to the fact that they have some similar, but some different tasks than infantry, like hostage rescue, VIP protection etc., where .308 caliber, which I suppose to be the best for infantry, would not be the best for the task). Also SF rifle needs details like ability to carry a supressor. But SCAR rifles have all these options, that´s the reason I see SCAR rifle as the best choice for whole army, even if it was developed for SOF purpose. I see every day in job that everybody and his dog wants to call himself SF (cooks, staff officers, logistic guys are experts on this), but that´s another story. Reliability, simplicity, accuracy, easy maintenance are the same principles for everybody.
PS: I agree that M4 is not the best rifle, but it´s not bad either. It´s light and accurate, and if you choose right manufacturer, it is also reasonably reliable. SA80 is heavy, and usable only for right shoulder - or at least it used to be, I am not sure about the newest version. On the other hand, I like the safety selector, and cocking handle is definately better designed than in AR15 family.

Currently shoulder arms for Australian forces are procured on two distinct paths: one primarily for infantry that flows on to most of the armed forces, and a second for special forces.

Most infantry are issued with the 5.56mm F88 AUG bullpup as a carbine (405mm barrel in 690mm overall) or rifle (505 in 790mm), but some have 5.56mm M16A2 forward-mag rifles (505 in 1000mm). Infantry marksmen and the 2nd member of sniper teams are armed with either a heavily telescoped AUG or a 7.62mm SR25 fwd-mag semi-automatic rifle. The SR25 is to be largely succeeded by a recently ordered batch of 7.62mm HK417 fwd-mag semi-auto rifles.

Australian special forces commonly employ the 5.56mm M4 fwd-mag carbine and the 7.62mm SR25 fwd-mag semi-auto rifle, complemented by the close-range 9mm MP5 SMG and 12 gauge Rem870 shotgun. The M4 was/is reportedly favoured - over the sometimes issued AUG - because of its lower weight, ready availability of a SOPMOD kit, and better reliability after immersion due to larger bore gas cylinder. Low weapon weight and ease of portability are highly valued by special forces where personnel often carry a second long barrel weapon and usually an auxiliary sidearm. Hence direct gas action in the M4 and SR25 (and also the sometimes issued M16A2) is accepted despite the affect on serviceability.

The standard flash suppressor on the M4 carbine (370mm barrel in 840mm overall) cannot handle the problem of flash from 5.56mm ammunition developed for common use in carbines and longer barreled weapons. To suppress muzzle flash - especially at night - the long and bulky M4 noise suppressor can be used although it increases length by about 15cm out toward that of a fwd-mag rifle. That is apparently acceptable, and anyway muzzle flash can for some SPECFOR operations be useful to increase shock and intimidation.

Infantry operations are likely to be of much longer duration with a corresponding need for weapon ruggedness and reliability. Also suppression of muzzle flash that otherwise serves as a bullet magnet is a vital and ever-present concern for infantry.

In place of SMGs and shotguns Australian infantry rely on the AUG bullpup carbine plus 40mm single shot attachments. Addtionally, several types of bolt-action and semi-automatic sniper rifles are on issue including the SR98 (AI AW-F), Blaser Tactical 2 and AI AW-50F mostly in 7.62mm, 8.59mm and 12.7mm resp. Typically, each of those sniper rifles has been procured in small quantities and each of the current types have progressed by way of various pathways into common use.

Shifting to the general case, special forces in Australian and all other armed forces have special needs including rapid delivery of small batches of new types of equipment. They may finish up using common equipment but that should never become an objective.

It is necessary that procurement for special forces is - and continues to be - under SPECFOR control and that it be kept separate from (but known to) procurement for infantry and other. There is an ancillary benefit in that rapid procurement for special forces can enable early assessment and trial use by infantry. That applies to armies everywhere and can be especially useful for large armies that have tortuous procurement procedures.

JMA

03-04-2011, 05:30 AM

That's part of the reason why I'll never be a good trainer at anything, I guess.
I take too much for self-evident and not in need of a demonstration.

Well I hope you realised that back when you were serving ;)

My experience is that the average 18 year old infantry trainee is generally not rocket scientist material and if he has the smarts at 18 his mind is on other things ;)

So that is why a regime of demonstration, explanation, imitation where the seemingly obvious is stated and thereafter repetition, repetition, repetition... until it becomes second nature is an absolute necessity. The right people to carry out this training are hard to find and once found should be looked after like the crown jewels.

JMA

03-04-2011, 05:36 AM

Currently shoulder arms for Australian forces are procured on two distinct paths: one primarily for infantry that flows on to most of the armed forces, and a second for special forces.

[snip]

Infantry operations are likely to be of much longer duration with a corresponding need for weapon ruggedness and reliability. Also suppression of muzzle flash that otherwise serves as a bullet magnet is a vital and ever-present concern for infantry.

Yes there is certainly a need to differentiate between the golf-bag type selection ability of weapons for different special forces operations and the more standard requirements of the line infantry.

Demon Fox

03-04-2011, 09:33 PM

The standard flash suppressor on the M4 carbine (370mm barrel in 840mm overall) cannot handle the problem of flash from 5.56mm ammunition developed for common use in carbines and longer barreled weapons. To suppress muzzle flash - especially at night - the long and bulky M4 noise suppressor can be used although it increases length by about 15cm out toward that of a fwd-mag rifle. That is apparently acceptable, and anyway muzzle flash can for some SPECFOR operations be useful to increase shock and intimidation.

In my experience, the choice to use suppressors for a mission weren't so much the reduction of muzzle flash as the reduction of noise and increase of stealth. Even with suppressors, the M4 still makes a fairly loud POP, but it is suppressed enough to minimize drawing attention to your presence. So, a team could assault and clear an enemy headquarters and kill the commanding officer and his staff while the 100 soldiers in the barracks next door are completely unaware of their presence.

v/r

DF

Compost

03-06-2011, 09:40 AM

The British and French armies each have a 5.56mm bullpup as their standard carbine and rifle. Each also has a 7.62mm fwd-mag rifle on issue to marksmen. But neither army provides a complete variety of bullpup and fwd-mag alternatives for the 5.56 carbine and rifle, 7.62mm carbine and rifle and 7.62mm marksman rifle.

Other large NATO armies such as the Canadian, German and US armies each have a one configuration suits-all inventory of fwd-mag 5.56mm and 7.62mm carbines and rifles. Of course a fwd-mag shoulder arm with adjustable butt can be used by either a large or a small person. But aiming and firing are the last part of a sequence that involves tactical movement in open terrain, through vegetation and narrow urban passageways and also in and on/off many types of vehicle and aircraft/helicopter.

Nowadays any army that relies exclusively on fwd-mag shoulder arms is stuck in the past and is probably - without any form of test - just assuming that tradition, standardized training and commonality of spares outweigh every tactical consideration.

The main advantage of the bullpup configuration is reduction in overall length. For example the AUG 5.56mmm bullpup carbine with 405mm barrel is 690mm overall whereas the widely used M4 5.56mm fwd-mag carbine with 370mm barrel is 840mm overall.

Commonly supposed disadvantages of the bullpup configuration can be briefly discussed. Lack of a foldable butt is unnecessary on a bullpup which hence can be kept ready for use. Minimum adjustable pull length can be too large for a short-armed user but if choice were available then that user could choose a fwd-mag alternative. Cheekweld is high but many fwd-mag weapons also have a straightline stock. Ejection is close to user's face but close-by ejection is distracting to only some users. Butt-heavy weight distribution can reduce off-the-shoulder accuracy but does assist with carriage of forward-mounted items such as ranging and sighting devices and/or a grenade launcher. Overall the bullpup configuration has only one intrinsic disadvantage: magazine replacement is generally slower than that achievable with a fwd-mag shoulder arm.

Tradition may suggest that initially only a minority of personnel in any armed force would choose to be issued with a bullpup in preference to a fwd-mag shoulder arm. But over time the proportion would change as suitability to task and/or user was demonstrated or disproven. Change upward or downward is certain but the bullpup/fwd-mag split and confidence limits for any kind of equilibrium cannot be estimated without some form of trial.

So the concept is that the tactical and individual needs of infantry (and other arms) can be better satisfied by providing choice of a limited variety of bullpup and fwd-mag shoulder arms, rather than by the usual mandate of one configuration fits all - which applies almost as much to the British and French armies as it does to the others ! It means also ongoing scope for choice which has in other areas proven to be productive and good for morale.

It should be fairly easy to conduct a trial to determine bullpup/fwd-mag preference. First, select a batch of home-based light infantry platoons and cav/armoured infantry platoons that have recent combat experience. Enough platoons to provide say at least 50 marksmen and somewhat larger numbers of rifle and carbine users. Second, withdraw all current carbines, rifles and marksman rifles and let each member of those units select an equivalent bullpup or fwd-mag carbine/rifle/marksman rifle in the same caliber (with/without 40mm GL as per current). Third, after a period of say 4 months of base and field training and exercise, replace all bullpups in the three categories by the fwd-mag alternative, and all fwd-mags by the bullpup alternative. After another 4 months of applied base and field training and exercise, poll all personnel to determine bullpup/fwd-mag preference in the three categories.

Several manufacturers are currently offering 5.56 and 7.62mm carbines and rifle families in which various uppers can be combined with a common fwd-mag gripstock. One or more of those families may in time be modified and extended to include a bullpup gripstock. However, in the near term a user trial should be structured to avoid ingoing bias and also bias toward successor planning, such as a new type of fwd-mag shoulder arm to succeed an obsolescing type of fwd-mag.

One possible set for a user trial is:

5.56 bullpup carbine and rifle - AUG,
5.56 fwd-mag carbine and rifle - FN Mk16

7.62 bullpup carbine and rifle - Kel-Tec RFB
7.62 fwd-mag carbine and rifle - HK417

7.62 bullpup marksman - Kel-Tec RFB-T
7.62 fwd-mag marksman - HK417-S

An alternative set would be:

5.56 bullpup carbine and rifle - Tavor,
5.56 fwd-mag carbine and rifle - HK416

7.62 bullpup carbine and rifle - Bulldog 762
7.62 fwd-mag carbine and rifle - FN Mk17

7.62 bullpup marksman - Bulldog 762-S
7.62 fwd-mag marksman - FN Mk17-S

There will be some (few ?) who are already converted. Others should be convertible and others will be resolutely opposed. But it is best to start early and might not be any harder than persuading armies to demand common magwells and interchangeable magazines across all shoulder arms of a particular calibre. And look where that has got to.

Fuchs

03-06-2011, 10:23 AM

Demon Fox

03-06-2011, 03:15 PM

Compost

03-07-2011, 11:29 AM

The disadvantage of a bullpup (ambidextrous operation, for example when firing around corners) can be neutralised mechanically, but its advantages are still mostly diminished by

* forward mag weapons getting folding buttstocks (can be even shorter than bullpup if folded)
* overall moderate required barrel lengths in comparison to the early rifles
* shorter sight line for (backup) iron sights
* greater difficulty of reloading under stress

The difference is simply not large enough to require a general conversion to bullpups.

1. disadvantage of a bullpup (ambidextrous operation . Often exaggerated and less important than average speed of changing magazine. Reversed hand firing of a shouldered side-ejecting bullpup is very awkward unless ejection can be quickly flipped to the other side. However, away-from-shoulder a 5.56 bullpup can be readily aimed around-the-corner with or without hands reversed. A multi-adjustable elbow sight for that and also over-the-top aiming has been developed for the AUG. Weapon control is possibly more troublesome than ejection for around-the-corner fire of a 7.62 bullpup and similarly for a 7.62 fwd-mag.

2. length of folded buttstock fwd-mag. can be close to and in some instances is marginally less than overall length of a bullpup, for example M4 and AUG. However, it is more difficult to aim and control a fwd-mag with folded buttstock than a bullpup that is always ready for use. Partly for those reasons folding butts on carbines and rifles (as distinct from SMGs) are being succeeded by telescoping ones.

3. moderate barrel length. If this is applicable, then it applies to a bullpup just as much as to a fwd-mag.

4. shorter sight line for (backup) iron sights. Valid under limited conditions. A short sight radius is adequate for close range snap-shooting using the iron sights on a carbine/rifle. Hence the ultra short radius expedient V and blade included on top of some optical sights. Reflex sight is often preferred for snap-shooting. Iron sights used only if/when expedient, reflex and the usual variable magnification sight are inoperable or not installed

5. greater difficulty of reloading under stress. Conceded early-on in original post that changing mags on a bullpup is slower than on a fwd-mag. The approx average time difference is not known to me. However your comment implies that stress would increase average unstressed reload time of bullpup, by more than it would the average unstressed reload time of a fwd-mag. Doubt there is much difference or any research on that.

6. general conversion to bullpups. A general conversion was not proposed. It was instead supposed that user trial would confirm appreciable number of would-be users for bullpup and for fwd-mag. Also that such would apply across carbine, rifle and marksman rifle. So ultimately inventory will have to be changed in order that each infantryman can be issued an individual shoulder arm in bullpup or fwd-mag configuration as determined by his experience and preference. If preference changes then a reissue would be necessary, or configuration could be changed by an armourer. It was not intended that each infantryman have ready access to a golfbag of uppers and lowers to assemble own shoulder arms in bullpup and/or fwd-mag configuration. My mistake for not spelling things out clearly.

Compost

03-07-2011, 11:35 AM

Change
2. Change length of folded buttstock fwd-mag. can be close to and in some instances
to become
2. length of folded buttstock fwd-mag. For a given barrel length, the length of a folded buttstock fwd-mag can be close to and in some instances

Compost

03-07-2011, 12:04 PM

In regards to the SA-80, all I've ever heard from Brit soldiers is complaints. I was sharing a range with some Brits in AF a couple of months ago and they were ogling over my M4. They mentioned they were supposed to be transitioning to the M4 sometime in the future. I don't know the truth of that - maybe just soldier rumor mill.

The bullpup design certainly has its advantages. In regards to some such as the Steyr AUG, the manufacturer needs to modify it a bit with standard rail systems to allow for attachments and a choice of optics.

For those who really need to shorten the M4 length, there is always the option of the "shorty" barrels a lot of SOF guys like to use. Good for MOUT, but obvious a little less on the max effective range in long engagements. But, if you know the ballistics of your rifle you can always engage effectively with your weapon - whatever it is. An M4 can hit man-sized targets consistently 500 - 600 meters if you know how to judge the winds. It just takes practice.

About ten years ago the Brits wanted to improve the reliability of the SA-80 5.56mm standard issue shoulder arm. The German arms design and manufacturing company Heckler and Koch was employed and reportedly did a good job. It is likely that Brit soldiers in Afghanistan have been issued the upgraded SA-80. So their complaints could be instance of poor reputation following like a bad smell regardless of improvement, or the improvement was inadequate. SA-80 has been in service for several decades and perception - even if misguided - counts for a lot, so Brit Army may have decided to succeed the SA-80 with a weapon that is clearly better. That weapon could be the M4. But the M4 operates with direct gas which also smells. Successor for the SA-80 is more likely to be the FN Mk16 or the HK416 as both have gas piston operation. Externally the HK416 resembles the M4 so that is a possible source of confusion.

The F88 AUG currently produced by ADI has Picatinny sight rail plus forward lower assembly with handgrip or 40mm grenade launcher plus side rails for laser designator/pointer, taclight, etc. For operation in Afghanistan and elsewhere the F88 carries many different combinations of reflex, and variable magnification day and night sights. The particular combination can be partly a user choice.

For rifle shooting at 500m and beyond it would be preferable to use a 7.62mm big brother such as the fwd-mag FN Mk17 or HK417. FN and H&K each seem to have plenty of corporate energy, so hopefully and before long it will be possible to use a bullpup relative of the Mk17 or HK417.

Fuchs

03-07-2011, 12:21 PM

The British have budget troubles, I doubt there's any new standard rifle program that eluded my sight. They spent quite a lot on the upgrades a few years ago and the more special arms such as sniper rifles as well as the other infantry modernisation programs are already quite pricey.

Btw, a few years ago many SA-80 problems were officially explained as being the result of too long intervals between cleaning. You can even have jams in an AK if you don't clean it.

Pete

03-21-2011, 04:08 AM

These are questions for Ken White: which rifle or carbine did you like the best? Why did you like it, and what could have been better about it? What did you like or dislike about the other ones that weren't your favorite ones? Memory lane and nostalgia, as it were.

I have a factory-new condition Inland M1 Carbine (like Dad had in the big one, a Winchester-made one IIRC) with a barrel dated December 1943. My carbine doesn't have any of the later design changes or MWOs, but I'll admit the cartridge was anemic and its accuracy and knock-down power were wanting.

Ken White

03-22-2011, 02:14 AM

which rifle or carbine did you like the best? Why did you like it, and what could have been better about it? What did you like or dislike about the other ones that weren't your favorite ones? Memory lane and nostalgia, as it were.I'm not a gun nut, weapons are, to me, tools and no more. All had strengths and weaknesses. As far as "like" goes. the '03 with a scope was fun to shoot and the M-14 was a decent compromise. The M1 was the hardest to harm, the BAR the most all round reliable and the M-16 was the easiest to handle (outside of the so-called Manual of Arms, which is sorta dumb IMO anyway...). I didn't like the weight of the M1 or BAR, did not and do not like that cartridge of the M-16. I carried both M1 and M2 Carbines briefly, bad cartridge as you say and the short stroke piston, like gas impingement is not optimum. If I had to use an issue long gun in combat today, I'd go with the M-14 as a decent compromise (and yes, that short stroke piston isn't ideal... :o ).

Of non-issued (US) weapons I have fired, I like the Bren, the Japanese Type 99, the M1941 Johnson LMG (not the rifle, haven't fired it) and the FN FAL. I did not like the G3 (or most of the H&K models). I do not like bullpups (compactness is vastly overrated IMO, all weapons are compromises but one gives up too much in the way of range, reliability and functioning for small envelopes). If I could pick any long gun w/o regard to issue status, I'd probably go with an updated FAL like a DSA for range and power in arctic, desert, mountains or most temperate areas; probably a Valmet Rk 95 for jungle (there are some newer types out there but these two have proven reliability records...). However, weapons, like most everything else should really be chosen with an eye on what one is to do -- METT-TC...:wry:

Pete

03-22-2011, 02:37 AM

I have a Japanese Arisaka Model 99, 7.7mm, that Dad brought back from Occupation Japan. It had the Mum on top of the chamber ground off it because of some U.S. occupation policy to eradicate all of the symbols of the emperor. Its sling was of the M1907 U.S. type that used to be used on the '03 Springfield, leather with the double holes and claw hooks. Dad won the rifle at the Christmas party raffle of the Stars and Stripes-Pacific in 1945. Later I got a bayonet for it that was a bring-back souvenir from a Seabee on Okinawa. It hangs on the wall -- I've never fired it and I go years without oiling it.

Compost

04-21-2011, 02:04 PM

I do not like bullpups (compactness is vastly overrated IMO, all weapons are compromises but one gives up too much in the way of range, reliability and functioning for small envelopes).
Understand 'functioning' if that refers to extraction/ejection. Do not understand 'range, reliability'.

However, weapons, like most everything else should really be chosen with an eye on what one is to do -- METT-TC...:wry:
Yes indeed and that makes me a gun-nut. It is easier to start with infantry specialists, excluding snipers many of whom already seem able to choose from a variety of weapons. Also easier to consider 5.56 and 7.62mm as the in-service calibres for carbines and rifles.

To produce deliberate semi-auto fire, a marksman needs a long barrel weapon with a fwd-folding bipod (preferable to a gripod) and commonly also a MP-suppressor. That task and the frontend weight could be well handled with a 7.62mm bullpup rifle.

Grenadiers could be using a specialised multi-shot launcher, capable of firing for example 40x46 low-vel and 40x51 medium-vel ammunition. A pistol's useful range is very short and many other PDWs use dubious types of micro ammunition. Integrating a PDW into a specialized launcher would tend to result in a bulky and/or awkward combination. So a grenadier's PDW could be a separate 5.56mm carbine in whichever configuration - fwd-mag or bullpup - is the lighter. If a grenadier were using a single shot launcher attachment, then the bullpup configuration provides good access to the attachment's breech and reduces the frontend weight which is even more useful if a bipod were also fitted. A rifle length barrel would probably be needed to support the launcher attachment, again in 5.56mm calibre as all-up weapon and ammunition weights are problematic for grenadiers. Multiple shots stacked in a single barrel would involve even more frontend weight and hence the same 5.56mm bullpup configuration.

The infantry crews of heavy weapons can be variously engaged in moving and operating the weapon, and then waiting for targets of opportunity or fire orders. The most frequently used crew-served weapons are the medium MG and the medium assault weapon (shoulder fired recoilless rifle or larger variety of rocket-propelled grenade launcher). Their crews would preferably have compact, lightweight PDWs: 5.56mm bullpup carbines. The crews of other weapons usually - and even in light infantry units - operate with access to transport resources for replenishment purposes, so 7.62mm bullpup or fwd-mag carbines.

That leaves the individual weapon for a 'rifleman'. For CQB a fwd-mag carbine is a useful configuration for absolute speed of reloading. If light infantry and if regular drill is prophylactic fire then a fwd-mag carbine in 5.56mm seems preferable, otherwise 7.62mm. If however, the CQB 'rifleman' is routinely expected to carry - in addition to hand grenades - other disposable weapons such as one or even two light assault weapons (eg: M72) or directional mines (eg: M18), then that individuals weapon should be a 5.56mm fwd-mag carbine. At longer range the rifleman would preferably have a 7.62mm rifle. In any conflict against a peer adversary that rifle would have to be issued together with a QA/D MP-suppressor and the suitable weapon (excluding long range tele-sight) would tend towards that of a sharpshooter.

My bias toward 7.62mm is clearly indicated above. But many other arrangements would be practicable. Infantry need scope to obtain shoulder arms that cater for user aptitude and experience/preference for either a fwd-mag or a bullpup, and also to some extent that weapon's calibre: 5.56 or 7.62mm. A future that insists on the bullpup configuration would be as backward as a present that insists upon the fwd-mag. Hence my previous posts.

Ken White

04-21-2011, 03:40 PM

I just do not like bullpups... :o

The action cycling under my cheek is a minor distraction on occasion, mag replacement is awkward. It's a familiarity thing as much as anything...Understand 'functioning' if that refers to extraction/ejection. Do not understand 'range, reliability'.That fact, the dislike, has little relationship to the statement that any drive for compactness (or light weight not mentioned and not necessarily involved in attaining small size) in a weapon is likely to affect those factors I cited. As an example, a compact 7.62x51 is going to have a shorter barrel even as a bullpup that almost certainly reduces optimum range. The driver for compactness as you note can affect extraction and ejection which in tune can affect reliability. I simply think the desire for compactness is not a terrible thing, it's just not as important as many seem to think.

Couple of minor comments:To produce deliberate semi-auto fire, a marksman needs a long barrel weapon with a fwd-folding bipod (preferable to a gripod) and commonly also a MP-suppressor. That task and the frontend weight could be well handled with a 7.62mm bullpup rifle.My combat use of bipods and / or front hand grips or combinations thereof leads me to believe that both / one is or are an assist device as you note but that there are also disadvantages in terms of handiness and weight that I believe best avoided. Suppressors are a mixed bag, add muzzle weight and a cost and logistic burden that is not needed in most cases. In the case of both, I think they are unnecessary for most riflemen. YMMV.... many other PDWs use dubious types of micro ammunition.Agree.So a grenadier's PDW could be a separate 5.56mm carbine in whichever configuration...I'd go with a good pistol and multi-purpose 40mm rounds. Again, YMMV.That leaves the individual weapon for a 'rifleman'. For CQBCQB is an exception in most combat, therefor it should not drive design IMO.In any conflict against a peer adversary that rifle would have to be issued together with a QA/D MP-suppressor and the suitable weapon (excluding long range tele-sight) would tend towards that of a sharpshooter.I think you may be complicating the logisitics of riflemen a bit. Suppressors have uses but they're specialized and not necessary or even desirable for most combat purposes.... A future that insists on the bullpup configuration would be as backward as a present that insists upon the fwd-mag. Hence my previous posts.True. All weapons will be compromises. However, in the end, they're simply tools, no more. :wry:

reed11b

04-21-2011, 10:31 PM

Ken White

04-22-2011, 02:22 AM

I'm curious Ken, how tall are you? I'm a short guy, and my limited experience with bullpups has been mostly positive, and most short guys I have served with prefer them when they get the chance to shoot them. I don't think they are the next step in battle rifle design, but I wouldn't rule it out either. Reedfrom 6'2" to 6' -- good catch. As I said, it's a personal preference thing. Both my 5"5" and 5'9" sons like Bullpups (both are AUG fans), the 6'3" guy does not. Rifles are like everything else, METT-TC rules... ;)

Agree they have a place. Most Infantrymen in a bigger war will do little CQB but some folks do a lot -- Bullpups are good for that.

How you been?

Pete

04-22-2011, 09:08 PM

I think the primary considerations should be reliability, accuracy, range and stopping power. That is of course in reference to small arms, not to guys who have shrunk. :p :D

carl

04-22-2011, 09:50 PM

Does anyone know how the XM-25 is working out?

reed11b

04-23-2011, 06:12 AM

f

How you been?

Good, moved to sunny :rolleyes: WA and I am now in a sniper section (WANG).
Been hanging out mostly on SOCNET these days.
Reed

tequila

04-23-2011, 11:12 AM

Does anyone know how the XM-25 is working out?

Apparently the grenade launcher system has deployed to Afghanistan in very limited numbers, with limited results (http://kitup.military.com/2011/02/inside-the-xm-25-after-action-reports-from-afghanistan.html).

The XM-25 has fired 55 rounds in nine firefights between Dec. 3 and January 12, when the formal Forward Operational Assessment ended. Officials say the weapon “disrupted” two insurgent attacks against an observation post, destroying one PKM machine gun position in one of those attacks. That is where the ”usually our engagements last for 15-20 minutes. With the XM-25 they’re over in a few minutes” line came from.

The XM-25 also “destroyed” four ambush sites during engagements on foot patrols or movements to contact. In one instance, the 25mm HE round exploded on a PKM gunner and he was either wounded and fled or scared and fled, but dropped his machine gun, which Soldiers later recovered.

Read more: http://kitup.military.com/2011/02/inside-the-xm-25-after-action-reports-from-afghanistan.html#ixzz1KLNJSaXO
Kit Up!

jcustis

06-04-2011, 06:10 PM

Here (http://www.military.com/news/article/corps-set-to-field-saw-replacement.HTML?col=1186032325324) is the latest (that I know of) on the IAR. Link retrieved from The Firearm Blog.

The Marine Corps' Commandant has decided, based on the results of testing and further field evaluation by using units, to recommend ending the limited test and evaluation fielding for the M27 IAR and going straight to full-fielding of rifles to each infantry battalion and its LAR battalions.

The Gunner community is surprisingly very much behind the fielding and employment of the weapon. I'm surprised because the grizzled veterans are typically the most vocal critics of the move to a lightweight automatic rifle as a replacement for the SAW (to be precise, SAWs will remain in a infantry company's T/E for some time to come, in the qty of at least six)

A pair of recent articles from the Marine Corps Gazette have touched on this topic again.

Save the Infantryman's Firepower (http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/article/save-infantryman%E2%80%99s-firepower)

and

The M249 Light Machine Gun in the Automatic Rifle Role (http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/m249-light-machinegun-automatic-rifle-role)

My article from the June Gazette is not adrift on the web yet, but I am curious to see the responses. Of note, the Gazette does not present coffee mugs to writers any longer, but instead Quill pens are mailed out. They are a lot more expensive form of compensation than a mug, but the cartridge is blue ink...(wry grin)

Granite_State

06-04-2011, 08:43 PM

The Marine Corps' Commandant has decided, based on the results of testing and further field evaluation by using units, to recommend ending the limited test and evaluation fielding for the M27 IAR and going straight to full-fielding of rifles to each infantry battalion and its LAR battalions.
)

I heard that recently, wasn't sure if it was a rumor or the truth. Wasn't the plan to get combat feedback from 1st LAR and the four infantry battalions currently fielding it before making a decision?

jcustis

06-04-2011, 08:59 PM

That's correct granite_state. The Commandant decided that he had enough available data from the results thus far though, and decided to skip the combat deploys it would seem.

AdamG

06-08-2011, 07:53 PM

Kind of an indicator of the Talibans' counter-move(s).

A former Royal Marine helped smuggle scopes for sniper rifles to Iran which ended up in the hands of the Taliban, an investigation has revealed.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/8562301/Royal-Marine-linked-to-Iranian-arms-smuggling-ring.html

Fuchs

06-08-2011, 11:48 PM

Smuggling? Decent hunting scopes are good enough for the job, and easily available even in countries with gun control laws. It should be extremely simple to get some - even without some form of smuggling (save for smuggling into AFG).

Compost

06-17-2011, 05:47 AM

Quote:
Originally Posted by carl
Does anyone know how the XM-25 is working out?

Apparently the grenade launcher system has deployed to Afghanistan in very limited numbers, with limited results.

Quote:
The XM-25 has fired 55 rounds in nine firefights between Dec. 3 and January 12, when the formal Forward Operational Assessment ended. Officials say the weapon “disrupted” two insurgent attacks against an observation post, destroying one PKM machine gun position in one of those attacks. That is where the ”usually our engagements last for 15-20 minutes. With the XM-25 they’re over in a few minutes” line came from.

The XM-25 also “destroyed” four ambush sites during engagements on foot patrols or movements to contact. In one instance, the 25mm HE round exploded on a PKM gunner and he was either wounded and fled or scared and fled, but dropped his machine gun, which Soldiers later recovered.

Read more: http://kitup.military.com/2011/02/in...#ixzz1KLN
[/URL].

Was the US Army expected to report that initial use of the pre-production XM25 was disappointing, inconclusive or going well ? Did anyone expect something more than a folksy anecdotal press release ?

Re-reading the PR blurb it may even include some double counting. One predictable outcome of the XM25 project is that those who devised and promoted it for issue to each “infantry squad and special forces team” will be seeking cover from verbal fire. [Quote from en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XM25_CDTE]

Currently the US Army infantry squad has a squad leader plus two 4-man teams each equipped with a 5.56mm LMG and three 5.56mm carbines/rifles, or an LMG plus 2 carbines/rifles and a 5.56 or 7.62mm DMR. To provide baton, buckshot, HE, smoke, AP and other chemical support each team has at least one carbine/rifle fitted with a 1.5kg single-shot UBL attachment that can fire a 40x46mm LV projectile weighing 160 to 180gm to about 150m against point targets, or 350m against area targets. The squad leader may also have a UBL attachment.

The 6-shot semi-automatic XM25 was ostensibly developed as a partial successor for the M203 UBL. Weighing about 6.5kg unloaded the XM25 includes an electronic ranging and fuzing system and can fire a projectile of about 100gm (estimated on basis of acceptable recoil into the shoulder) at more than 200m/sec. Its reported range with a low elevation trajectory is up to 500m against point targets and 700m against area targets.

However, the infantry squad is intimately concerned with close range firepower extending outward to rifle range. So is a squad or team likely to relinquish one or more of its simple, rugged and ubiquitous 40x46mm UBLs in exchange for the substantial capability and system weight of an XM25 ? That’s as likely to happen as requiring one of its infantrymen to give up hand grenades because the Claymore is available.

Also - unlike the Claymore - the XM25 is an attempt to validate the attractive ballistic paradigm in which a sophisticated sight overcomes dispersion with range and hence improves the feasibility of a small payload. For the infantry squad and even were it to be carried in place of one of the LMGs, it is apparent that adding an XM25 together with its need for yet another variety of ammunition would be burdensome.

Due to its system weight, complexity and range capability the XM25 should have been developed as a platoon support weapon rather than as a component of squad level fire and movement. The question that keeps surfacing is ‘ Was it necessary to develop a flyweight range of 25mm ammunition ’ ?

Currently there are three basic types of 40mm grenade ammunition (approx data from Wiki etc):
40x46 LV: 160 to 180g at 75m/sec, max effective range 350m from M4/M203 (5.5kg unloaded);
40x51mm MV: 160 to 180g at 110m/sec, max eff rge 700m from M32 MGL (5.5kg unloaded);
40x53mm HV: 240gm at 230m/sec, max eff rge 1600m from Mk47 AGL (inc tripod 30kg unloaded).

A strong selling point for the XM25 has been that its air-burst proximity to target derives from a precise correlation of range and spin count. Presumably - but not certainly - that fuze performance and also weight have been evaluated against those of the air-burst fuzes that are already available for 40mm grenades.

Regardless of the brilliance of its ranging/fuzing system, there are at least two alternatives to the XM25. One, development of a magazine-fed semi-automatic weapon to fire 40x53mm HV ammunition from a recoilling over-the shoulder barrel. Such a weapon might have an unloaded weight with bipod up to the 12kg of the M240 MG and yet be acceptable at platoon level provided it could deliver radio and impact fuzed 240gm projectiles accurately to say at least 300m, and 900m against area targets. To reduce system weight it might be practicable to also fire LV and/or MV rounds.

Two, there is the less ambitious but rapid LV/MV path adopted by the USMC with the 6-round M32 semi-automatic MGL as a platoon or squad weapon. It has a capable sight that can be used to fire 40x46mm LV rounds with better accuracy than the M203. It can also fire 40x51mm MV rounds to about 275m against point targets, and 700m on a high trajectory against area targets. The 13-man USMC squad with three 4-man teams seems well structured to add one M32 and drop one LMG or other auto weapon.

Fuchs

06-17-2011, 07:53 AM

It's in practice likely less a grenade launcher than a thermal sight that uncovers even some camouflaged opfor and can see through smoke and night.

People get too fixated on firepower at times.

ganulv

06-17-2011, 05:45 PM

Decent hunting scopes are good enough for the job
And here I thought your average Afghan male was supposed to be able to drop a goat at 1,000 yards with open sights. That was the story when I was growing up during the Reagan Administration, anyway.

Fuchs

06-17-2011, 05:55 PM

Average probably not, but there were times when Enfield bolt action rifles and their copies dominated the popular Afghan armament. Those rifles were made for long-range rifleman fire, albeit not for single shots.

jcustis

06-18-2011, 01:43 AM

One, development of a magazine-fed semi-automatic weapon to fire 40x53mm HV ammunition from a recoilling over-the shoulder barrel. Such a weapon might have an unloaded weight with bipod up to the 12kg of the M240 MG and yet be acceptable at platoon level provided it could deliver radio and impact fuzed 240gm projectiles accurately to say at least 300m, and 900m against area targets.

I haven't seen this sort of solution in the works, but it sounds interesting. Over the shoulder has worked well for one of the most prolific weapons, the RPG-7 for ages.

Kiwigrunt

06-18-2011, 04:26 AM

Regardless of the brilliance of its ranging/fuzing system, there are at least two alternatives to the XM25. One, development of a magazine-fed semi-automatic weapon to fire 40x53mm HV ammunition from a recoilling over-the shoulder barrel. Such a weapon might have an unloaded weight with bipod up to the 12kg of the M240 MG and yet be acceptable at platoon level provided it could deliver radio and impact fuzed 240gm projectiles accurately to say at least 300m, and 900m against area targets. To reduce system weight it might be practicable to also fire LV and/or MV rounds.

This (http://world.guns.ru/grenade/ch/qlz-7-w7-e.html) seems to fit your description fairly well except it is not over-shoulder.

Compost

06-18-2011, 03:08 PM

I haven't seen this sort of solution in the works, but it sounds interesting. Over the shoulder has worked well for one of the most prolific weapons, the RPG-7 for ages.

The residual difficulty with over the shoulder recoil for a 40x53mm HV barrel is the need for a correspondingly taller bipod. But that would be preferable to having the barrel recoil in a tube that extends under the butt to pass below the shoulder.

This (http://world.guns.ru/grenade/ch/qlz-7-w7-e.html) seems to fit your description fairly well except it is not over-shoulder.

35mm QLZ-87 is an interesting weapon with its full auto presumably usable only when tripod mounted. That site also reveals that China went on to develop a 35mm QLB-06 semi-auto with ergo features well suited for use by light infantry. Their projectile weight is likely to be less than that of 40mm LV and MV ammunition but higher than that of the XM25.

Compost

06-18-2011, 11:38 PM

But that would be preferable to having the barrel recoil in a tube that extends under the butt to pass below the shoulder.

Re-reading the somewhat pompous sentence above it is likely that Kiwigrunt will note a need to recruit proven contortionists to train as grenadiers.

PsJÄÄK Korte

06-20-2011, 03:11 PM

Greetings.

1.I just read from news that finnish army is going to replace traditonal 7-men infatry squad with new 9-men squad in light infatry battlegroups.
In Finland "basic" squad has consisted of
1.half-squad/gun group with
Squad leader
Machine gunner
Assistant machine gunner
2.half-squad with
Anti-tank guy with M72
Anti-tank guy with M72
Assistant squad leader
Assistant squad leaders buddy pair.
+possibly vehicle driver some times

All that is disclosed about new nine men squad is that it consist of 3 teams of 3 soldiers.
Educated quesses have been that squad will have "command team", rifle team and MG team and not three identical teams.

2.I have (maybe silly) question. Does land mines belong to standard equipment of infantry squads in armed forces of other countries?
I am asking this because here in Finland part of infatry squads standard equipment are 10-12 anti-tank mines (https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/TM-65_mine).

Ken White

06-20-2011, 03:50 PM

All that is disclosed about new nine men squad is that it consist of 3 teams of 3 soldiers.
Educated quesses have been that squad will have "command team", rifle team and MG team and not three identical teams.That would work, though I tend to think fewer but larger squads are better for sustained combat than more smaller squads. The trade off is in leaders trained, though...

The US Marines briefly had a ten man squad, three teams of three plus a Squad Leader; each team had an Automatic Rifle / LMG. Combat experience quickly led to the team size being increased to four men for a 13 man Squad.I have (maybe silly) question. Does land mines belong to standard equipment of infantry squads in armed forces of other countries?
I am asking this because here in Finland part of infatry squads standard equipment are 10-12 anti-tank mines (https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/TM-65_mine).For the US, that was true in Europe World War II and it was true in the early days in Korea. In the Pacific Theater in WW II and later in Korea and in most of our wars since, we've gotten out of the habit due to lack of need. It's a METT-TC thing...

Finnish defense concerns make it perfectly understandable on that basis.

Fuchs

06-20-2011, 04:00 PM

That would work, though I tend to think fewer but larger squads are better for sustained combat than more smaller squads. The trade off is in leaders trained, though...

It shouldn't.

Armies that expect real wars - not petty expeditions - have to expect that even entire battalions get crushed in a matter of hours. Squads certainly have to expect multiple casualties per fight.

An army with such expectations HAS TO have way more leaders than its TO&E requires. Squad leader need to be able to assume command of a platoon, senior enlisted need to be able to assume command of a squad.

An infantry squad - no matter 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, or 13 men - has to have several men capable of assuming command of a squad on the spot - even do it on their own initiative seconds after squad leader became incapable.

The difference should be marginal between a 5 and a 13 men squad, simply because platoon leaders might in the hours after a fight transfer more promising replacement leaders from one squad to another anyway.

In the best peacetime case, you approach the personnel-constrained Reichswehr or Napoleon's Old Guard; both were essentially replacing enlisted men with NCO-capable men both in selection and qualification.

Ken White

06-20-2011, 07:04 PM

Agree with all you wrote. From the NCO leader standpoint, the size of the Squad makes little difference. The absolute number of them is only marginally an issue.

My too cryptic comment was aimed not at training NCOs, that's easy and even democracies can and do get that done in short time periods with few problems -- the issue is training Officers. Simply put, smaller Squads mean more Platoons, and thus more Companies and so more Battalions -- the latter two critical training and development positions for Officers in war or peace.

Training new Lieutenants is easy and we did it in '90 days' in WW II, seemed to work fairly well. However, at higher echelons, developing good commanders takes time and experience; more smaller units simply equals more opportunities to develop such experience in and for larger units.

Democracies will always have to sacrifice some efficiency and effectiveness for politically prescribed concerns and thus cannot undertake optimum training regimens -- particularly in peacetime... ;)

So while I totally agree and have long advocated a Reichswehr - like approach for the US Army and Marines (i.e. raise the standard for entry and in training considerably among other things), the probability of seeing that happen is not good. :(

Fuchs

06-20-2011, 08:01 PM

Demand for officers is less a problem than a solution in the medium term.

Kill 2/3 of staff positions, assign the officers to line units in new command jobs.

They'll be happier and you solve the staff madness.

PsJÄÄK Korte

06-20-2011, 11:03 PM

Probably problem at squad level leadership in FDF is that while corporals (and some times sergeants) who lead the infantry squads have gone through ~112 days long reserve NCO course, on other hand assistant squad leaders, who leads squad's four+ man assault element if situation warrants it and takes charge of squad if squad leader is absent or has fallen, is given no leadership training. Squad leader picks ASS.SL from one of 6 month rank-and-file guys appointed to his squad after basic training and at begining of specialisation training period (AIT? MOS?). Althought 4 months is propably long enough of time go through all squad members to choose for proper ASS.SL. Also proper attitude might compensate any deficiencies in training.:D
Only exception to this are MOUT infatry companies of Guard's Jaeger Regiment and some special and "special" forces units that have NCO as assistant squad leader.

Also on infatry squad compositions.
That new 9-men squad type will be used in so called regiona battlegroups, which are given specific area to do defence and delay actions. Operative brigades and battle groups will still use "traditional" 7+/-1-men squad.

My first thoughts when I read about this new squad structure was "if they want use nine men squad divided to half-squads, they should copy us army squad with tweaking or if they want three teams they should copy USMC. Are these kinds of thoughts arrogant as served neither in US army or marines?
:o
And I have never received any sort of officer or NCO training or led even team sized unit (Only expection was one voluntary MOUT course for reservists. On second day in each squad everyone acted as squad leader in turns. When it was my turn to lead assault I felt like was pushed into arctic sea:p)
Also how would I assemble 3x3 squad?
If only requirement is that it should be 3x3 I would go for
Squad leader, MG (PKM or LMG M62 (https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Kk_62)) rifleman (M72)
Team leader, MG (PKM or LMG M62) rifleman (M72)
Team leader, MG (PKM or LMG M62 rifleman (M72)
And best shot in squad is given scope

But if it has to be organized as command team, rifle team and MG team I would preferably go for
Command team: Squad leader, rifleman (with APILAS or MBT-LAW), rifleman(M72?)
Rifle team: Team leader, Designated marksman (either AR with rifle or dragunov), rifleman (with M72)
MG team: Team leader (with M72?), Machinegunner (PKM or LMG M62), and machine gunners assistant (withM72?)
...
Wall of text...
I hope my text makes sense.
More propably tomorrow. No I have to go sleep.

Ken White

06-21-2011, 03:25 AM

They'll be happier and you solve the staff madness.wish...:wry:

JMA

06-21-2011, 12:00 PM

It shouldn't.

Armies that expect real wars - not petty expeditions - have to expect that even entire battalions get crushed in a matter of hours. Squads certainly have to expect multiple casualties per fight.

An army with such expectations HAS TO have way more leaders than its TO&E requires. Squad leader need to be able to assume command of a platoon, senior enlisted need to be able to assume command of a squad.

An infantry squad - no matter 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, or 13 men - has to have several men capable of assuming command of a squad on the spot - even do it on their own initiative seconds after squad leader became incapable.

The difference should be marginal between a 5 and a 13 men squad, simply because platoon leaders might in the hours after a fight transfer more promising replacement leaders from one squad to another anyway.

In the best peacetime case, you approach the personnel-constrained Reichswehr or Napoleon's Old Guard; both were essentially replacing enlisted men with NCO-capable men both in selection and qualification.

As time passes I really do believe that armies need to be flexible with regard to organisational structure and weapons and equipment. More applicable (I appreciate) for armies that pick fights overseas than those who defend only their homeland.

Take (Vietnam and Afghanistan) two examples for comparison where give the different enemy and the different terrain certain changes from the standard "Cold War" organisational structure of those times would have been beneficial in the particular theater.

It seems that despite all the talk of flexibility and of adapting to local conditions no significant changes seem to get made. Is this because commanders believe in the "one size fits all" approach where current organisations are forced to fit current operational circumstances or they have neither the interest nor the ability to make the necessary changes?

Watching a repeat of the series the Scots at War on the History Channel I note (from the parts on Afghanistan) that apart from a water overload, the insanity of lugging Javelin anti-tank missiles (at 40lbs for missile and CLU) and the obvious absurd weight of radio equipment for 2-3 km patrol much stays the same in terms of structure, weapons and equipment.

I would have thought that by now we would have seen some (structural/weapons/equipment) innovations (probably initiated by special forces) filter their way through to the line infantry?

... and as I have mentioned before that most of the (mine protecting) vehicle mods could have been carried out in a local "factory" in Kabul (or suitable local place).

Seems modern soldiers not only carry too much weight but also labour under the burden of the inflexible military procurement bureaucratic nightmare that straight-jackets modern armies.

Is there really an ideal squad size or equipment scale? Surely you go to a new place and look, listen and learn and adapt before you have to put too many troopies in body-bags?

Ken White

06-21-2011, 03:46 PM

As time passes I really do believe that armies need to be flexible with regard to organisational structure and weapons and equipment...
...
Seems modern soldiers not only carry too much weight but also labour under the burden of the inflexible military procurement bureaucratic nightmare that straight-jackets modern armies.

Is there really an ideal squad size or equipment scale? Surely you go to a new place and look, listen and learn and adapt before you have to put too many troopies in body-bags?One would think...:(

Apparently it was not meant to be... :mad:

Several feelers out on the article. One negative back, others working.

Rifleman

06-21-2011, 09:32 PM

I would have thought that by now we would have seen some (structural/weapons/equipment) innovations (probably initiated by special forces) filter their way through to the line infantry?.....

.....Is there really an ideal squad size or equipment scale? Surely you go to a new place and look, listen and learn and adapt before you have to put too many troopies in body-bags?

It's been suggested. That was one of Wilf Owen's big things: a platoon of 30 or so divided into big fire teams without a permanent squad organization. His idea was that you could mix and match the fire teams in various ways. METT-TC as always.

SEALs and DELTA do it now: their 16-man troop can be employed 4x4, 2x8, 1x8 plus 2x4, etc. :cool:

But to do it with line infantry and keep the company end numbers the same you would have to add a platoon or two to the company. Maybe that's why it doesn't catch on: it messes up the idea that a rifle company is three rifle platoons and a weapons platoon because.....well, because it's three rifle platoons and a weapons platoon, of course. :wry:

Pete

06-21-2011, 09:56 PM

Rifleman

06-21-2011, 10:36 PM

The TO&E is an admin-log thing, done to simplify the manning and equipping of a lot of units in a hurry, such as in the U.S. during 1942-45. At the time of Pearl Harbor the U.S. Army had Tables of Organization and Tables of Equipment, which in the early days required a lot of cross-referencing back and forth between the two. Then around '42 or '43 someone at DA got smart and decided to combine the two together into the TO&E.

Those standard templates of organization should not drive tactics. Just because you're in a triangular straight-leg Infantry division or in an Armored division with three combat commands, it doesn't mean the organizational structure dictates tactics. Same for Pentogonal, ROAD, and whatever it is we have these days.

Pete,

I understand how we got there and I agree it should not drive tactics but it often does, doesn't it?

One example is a Bradley platoon. With four Brads in a platoon each able to hold up to six dismounts it seems sensible to me to deploy as four big fire teams under the PL for dismounted ops. Yet, the last FM I saw called for them trying to form standard squads after un-assing the Brad. Done to stay consistent with light infantry doctrine for their dismounted ops, I suppose.

Is that still doctrine for dismounts in the mech community?

Pete

06-21-2011, 11:41 PM

The experience of World War II led the U.S. Army to become more of a massive administrative and logistical apparatus rather than a professional fighting force. It has to do with combining guys of the right MOSs with LIN numbers of equipment. In part it dates from organizing an Army in a hurry during War I. So we put together guys who graduated from shake-and-bake school training with industrial output, weapons and vehicles, and voila, we have divisions. We report on whether they're combat-ready on DA Form 2715 every month, mainly in terms of the personnel and equipment they have assigned to them.

Much of what I've read about on SWJ/SWC has been about taking this business of forming organizations with personnel and equipment to a higher level of proficiency -- leader developent, soldier development, and tactics, tactics, tactics ...

Compost

07-22-2012, 08:17 AM

Time flies and back in March 2011 I speculated that FN and/or HK might have enough corporate energy to develop bullpup variants of their 7.62mm Mk17 and HK417 rifles. Since then they have shown only modified versions of fwd-mags.

However, in the interim Thales has upgraded its F88 variant of the 5.56mm AUG bullpup and is now offering the 5.56mm EF88 for export with additional features as the F90. It comes with a choice of barrels as the F90 carbine (407mm barrel in 700mm overall) and F90 marksman (508 in 802mm) each with optional 40mm UGL. There is also an F90 CQB carbine (360 in 653mm).

It is possible that Thales has enough corporate energy remaining to develop a 7.62mm version of the EF88/F90. That would be a suitable outcome and reward for the apparent ‘easy as it goes’ or timid attitudes of FN and HK.

ganulv

07-22-2012, 03:14 PM

Time flies and back in March 2011 I speculated that FN and/or HK might have enough corporate energy to develop bullpup variants of their 7.62mm Mk17 and HK417 rifles.

Going to war with a bullpup is like going to the beach in a Speedo. It just doesn’t work for Americans.

Ken White

07-22-2012, 05:45 PM

If I ever saw it... :D :D

Compost

07-22-2012, 11:49 PM

Going to war with a bullpup is like going to the beach in a Speedo. It just doesn’t work for Americans.
Amusing response but do Americans insist on swimming everywhere in boardshorts ? Some obviously do and will continue to. However, Speedo was bought out by an American conglomerate in the 1990s.

The F90 is probably aimed first at targets in Europe such as succeeding the 5.56mm Famas. Complementing the M16/M4 might come later.

Ken White

07-23-2012, 01:58 AM

Amusing response but do Americans insist on swimming everywhere in boardshorts ?Most of us prefer no shorts but the law -- like other things -- is humorless... Some obviously do and will continue to. However, Speedo was bought out by an American conglomerate in the 1990s.We will sell it to the Chinese and you can buy it back. :DComplementing the M16/M4 might come later.Been done, didn't sell, thus the comment from Ganulv -- and my effective concurrence thereto. :wry:

Why add a 'complement' to a flawed weapon anyway... :confused:

Compost

07-23-2012, 08:36 AM

Most of us prefer no shorts but the law -- like other things -- is humorless...That’s certainly a way to stress the front end. But why would any force rely mainly on a weeny 5.56mm that lacks power and range ?
Why add a 'complement' to a flawed weapon anyway... To accentuate the attributes of a bullpup.

Related topic. Believe we had sort of agreed elsewhere that 9x19mm Parabellum (plus alternate 6.5x25) was the way to go for pistols and SMGs. The other bookend could be 20x102 or less likely 20x128. The anaemic 5.56x45 will be around for a while yet. But it will ultimately be disposed of. My preference for that time is for three calibres between the bookends corresponding to infantry squad/platoon, platoon/company and company/other.

Those three – with say a 5 percent variance – could be as follows. One: 6.6mm with 8gm projectile, MV of 825mps from rifle barrel and supersonic to about 1000m. Two: 7.62 magnum with 13.5gm, 900mps from MG to about 1500m; and three: 9.5mm with 27gm, 900mps from MG to about 2300m. That era also is certain to include some poorly designed and flawed weapons.

And in the interim numerous commentators will continue pifing about the need for yet another rework of 5.56mm.

The 6.6mm rifle and carbine and the 7.62 magnum and 9.5mm sniper rifles should of course be available with bullpup and alternate fwd-mag gripstocks.

Ken White

07-23-2012, 02:04 PM

... But why would any force rely mainly on a weeny 5.56mm that lacks power and range ?We can agree on that.

We can also disagree on all the rest. While your arguments make take technical sense, they are less practical militarily or tactically. I, for one never agreed to any 9mm cartridge; I've always argued for 10mm or larger for pistols and SMG. Your 6.6mm caliber is IMO too light for the Company level machinegun and so should be avoided; all small arms in a Battalion should be of one of two calibers, pistol / SMG and rifle / MG. A medium MG is also required at about 12-15mm. My observation has been that the 20mm is not an effective military cartridge (it is both range and payload limited) and the 20x102 is particularly poor. IMO 25mm is a far better top end choice. A 30mm would be better yet but the size penalty is too great unless it is restricted to Armored / Mechanized forces (which probably should occur).

However, neither your nor my solution is likely. Nor is US use of a bullpup configuration likely (quite sensibly in my view...)... ;)

Compost

07-23-2012, 10:45 PM

We can agree on that.

We can also disagree on all the rest. While your arguments make take technical sense, they are less practical militarily or tactically. I, for one never agreed to any 9mm cartridge; I've always argued for 10mm or larger for pistols and SMG. Your 6.6mm caliber is IMO too light for the Company level machinegun and so should be avoided; all small arms in a Battalion should be of one of two calibers, pistol / SMG and rifle / MG. A medium MG is also required at about 12-15mm. My observation has been that the 20mm is not an effective military cartridge (it is both range and payload limited) and the 20x102 is particularly poor. IMO 25mm is a far better top end choice. A 30mm would be better yet but the size penalty is too great unless it is restricted to Armored / Mechanized forces (which probably should occur).

However, neither your nor my solution is likely. Nor is US use of a bullpup configuration likely (quite sensibly in my view...)... ;)

However 6.6mm is spot-on for what is needed at squad/platoon level, with 7.62mm magnum at platoon/company. The bookend at 20mm is a realistic limit for a man-packable rifle type weapon to equip some pioneers and snipers for EOD and anti-material tasks.

You surely included 25mm and 30mm as vehicle rather than man-pack weapons. US infantry already have plenty of variety and weight with 9mm Parabellum, 5.56mm NATO, 7.62mm NATO, 7.62mm magnum and 12.7mm Browning. And that's before 8.59mm magnum is added as a gap-filler or replacement.

My last words (on this thread) regarding bullpups are a repeat from way back.

A future that insists on the bullpup configuration would be as backward as a present that insists upon the fwd-mag.

Tukhachevskii

03-10-2013, 12:57 PM

... the Lightweight Medium Machine Gun (http://www.gdatp.com/factsheets/A139_MMG.pdf) in a whopping .338 calibre!

castellanoc1

04-10-2013, 09:11 PM

For squad level organization, I support the USMC model. For weaponry, particularly direct fire, I would argue for a baseline of squad level weapons being chambered in 300 Blackout, while granting the squad better access to 7.62x51 weapons based on the mission and environment.

As state-on-state conflict continues to lose utility, training and equipping for the small wars has a greater value than ever. Embodying past, present, and projected future trends, what capabilities should the infantryman’s primary weapon have? Former SEAL and tactical firearms trainer Kyle Defoor advocates that the modern fighting carbine should “be able to shoot effectively at CQB distance, take positive head shots at 100, and engage at the max distance for 5.56 - IMO 400 yds on the body.” By many accounts, practical combat accuracy out to approximately 300-400 yards seems to be the common understanding for the capabilities of an infantryman and his rifle.

Some have taken a look at the relatively new 300 Blackout (7.62x35) as a more ideal caliber due to its better terminal ballistics from shorter barrels, better intermediate barrier performance, acceptable external ballistics for the ranges considered, and better integration with suppressors. It is designed to operate reliably suppressed or unsuppressed, using supersonic or subsonic ammunition. Pairing this extremely versatile cartridge with the extreme versatility of the AR-15 platform is a natural match to arm the infantryman with a more effective weapon. At the squad level, this could materialize as a 7.62x35 service rifles, multiple auto-rifles for volumetric fire, and a squad designated marksman rifle for precision fire. By adding some improvements such as lightweight customizable free-float rail systems, improved triggers, and good optics/lights/lasers, you earn an improved AR-15 family of squad-level weapons ready to dominate at common combat ranges.

What do we give up in terms of capabilities compared to 5.56 chambered service rifles and squad support weapons? In the case of the US Army where current M4 training/qualifications are limited to 300 yards, there is no real change in hit-probability. However, the 400-600 yard ranges where auto-rifles/SAWs and designated marksmen rifles have the capability to reach out is generally outside the envelope of capabilities for 7.62x35. Nevertheless, even with 5.56 support weapons, what we see in Afghanistan is an increasing squad level reliance on 7.62x51 based precision semi-automatic rifles, lightweight variants of the medium machine guns, and essentially heavyweight variants of light machineguns chambered in 7.62x51. To mitigate the shortfalls when compared to 5.56, the theoretical 7.62x35 armed squads would benefit from even better access to 7.62x51 weapons in order to achieve true well-rounded effectiveness from CQB distances to ranges up to 800 yards and beyond. In this sense, the squad designated marksman would be proficient at both 7.62x35 and 7.62x51 chambered precision platforms, and have both available based on the nature of the operating environment and mission at hand. Squad auto-riflemen would enjoy a similar proficiency with 7.62x35 and 7.62x51 chambered fully automatic weapons. Having 2-3 M240s available for use if needed in each squad may sound excessive at first. However, when you consider the mobile patrols in the Iraq War where each HMMWV or MRAP had a crew-served weapon mounted, it seems not so excessive.

Basic breakdown of the two variations:

-Squad Leader

-TL: 7.62x35 carbine
-Auto-rifleman: 7.62x35 auto-rifle OR 7.62x51 medium machine gun
-Squad DM: 7.62x35 carbine OR 7.62x51 DM Rifle
-Grenadier: 7.62x35 carbine +assorted HE weapons

-TL: 7.62x35 carbine
-Auto-rifleman: 7.62x35 auto-rifle OR 7.62x51 medium machine gun
-Rifleman: 7.62x35 carbine
-Grenadier: 7.62x35 carbine +assorted HE weapons

-TL: 7.62x35 carbine
-Auto-rifleman: 7.62x35 auto-rifle OR 7.62x51 medium machine gun
-Rifleman: 7.62x35 carbine
-Grenadier: 7.62x35 carbine +assorted HE weapons

While I think this approach could make for some highly versatile and lethal squads, realistically it will likely be a little while before the US and NATO considers replacing 5.56 with another intermediate cartridge.