The Roles and Weapons with the Squad [Archive]

09-14-2008, 01:19 AM

Gentlemen,

Here is a item I just picked out of the Marine Corps Times.
The Corps is looking at a adopting a new Infantry Automatic Rifle in the 12.5 pound range.

FYI - Corps testing lighter alternatives to belt-fed M249
By Matthew Cox - Staff writer
Posted : Saturday Sep 13, 2008 7:31:52 EDT

Marine infantry units soon may replace their light machine guns with new automatic rifles designed to help gunners move faster on assaults.

Weapons officials at Marine Corps Systems Command in Quantico, Va., are testing magazine-fed weapons from at least six gun makers in a search for a lighter alternative to the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon, which weighs close to 17 pounds unloaded.

At the squad level, “the biggest hindrance to being able to effectively fire and maneuver is the weight of the SAW,” said Patrick Cantwell, capability integration officer for the Infantry Automatic Rifle program at SysCom.

The winning IAR design — which the Corps wants to weigh no more than 12.5 pounds — could begin replacing the SAW in infantry squads as early as next year.

“We see this being the automatic rifleman’s primary weapon,” Cantwell said. “We obviously want it as soon as possible, but we are looking at sometime in 2009.”

The M249 has been in service with the Corps since the mid-1980s. The standard model weighs about 22 pounds when loaded with a 200-round belt of 5.56mm ammunition.

Despite its weight, the weapon spits out up to 750 rounds per minute, providing small units with a tremendous rate of sustained automatic fire.

Why the Army says no thanks
That’s why the Army, which also uses the M249, has ruled out a soldier version of the Marine IAR.

“We are not considering adopting an auto rifle for the infantry squad,” said Col. Robert Radcliffe, director of the Infantry Center’s Directorate of Combat Developments at Fort Benning, Ga.

Currently, Marine and Army infantry squads equip their fire teams with one M249 each. The difference, Radcliffe said, is that Marine squads have three fire teams, and Army squads have two fire teams.

“It’s really all about firepower. The Marine Corps has a 13-man squad; we have a nine-man squad — that’s a four-man difference.”

I feel strongly that the Marine 13 Man Squad is still the best infanty assualt unit. Three automatic weapons provide flexibility and supression for the squad are always better than the two in the 9 man squads. And like the man said - That's a four man difference.:cool:

bikewrench8541

09-14-2008, 01:39 AM

I'm a little worried about this. None of the programs in the past have worked out that well.
M-16A1(in an AR role), LSW, the Norwegian Marines AR (correct?) et al.
In fact the M249 is one of the more popular and effective weapons in a rifle squad. Some are very worn but...:confused:

09-14-2008, 02:36 AM

The Marine Corps is only looking at an inital order of 4,000 IAR's. And half of those will be retained for testing and the other 2,000 will be tested in the field.

Hey, most Marines thought the M-1 Grand was a pos in the early 1940's. After they aquired a few from Army units on Guadacanal, they switched to the M-1 and got rid of the 03A1 bolt action Springfield as fast as they could.

The upgrade to the M-14 was easy in the early 1960's.
I saw my first M-14 and M-60 MG when the 503rd Airborne Regt. arrived on Okinawa in late 1959. The Paratroopers let us play with their new toys at a Fam-Fire exersize in the Northern Training Area on the Rock.

The Marine Divisions started getting M-14's in 1961. Then switched out to the M-16 after the Vietnam War Started.

They didn't like that shift at all.

I think you have to keep exploring the possibilities. If they can develop a solid IAR that is 6 pounds lighter, that will transfer into the ability of increase the individual AR gunner to carry more ammo, water, etc.

Rifleman

09-16-2008, 04:25 PM

Three things from infantry combat in WWII that I think are notable:

1) The big USMC squad with it's internal fire team structure developed around three automatic rifles, not light machine guns. I believe there were three squads to a platoon.

2) The smaller German squad with no internal fire team structure developed around a single light machine gun. I believe there were four squads to a platoon.

3) Both squads were successful in heavy combat. I think it would be hard to make a good argument that one squad proved more successful than another.

William F. Owen

09-17-2008, 05:27 AM

As I have said before, the M249 is based on a misreading of light weapons doctrine.

The barrel length of the M249 is 20 or 14 inches. Same as the M16 or M4 so it has the same muzzle velocity.

It’s cyclic rate is practically the same as the M4/M16, so it has no better terminal effect than an M16/M4 Carbine. It appears to be no more accurate, bar the bipod. – and it weighs more than double and eats rounds at an embarrassing rate.

Why is it even there?

This is sharp contrast to almost all other support weapons doctrine, where the “Squad LMG” has had a provably better performance than all the other squad weapons. UK testing seems to indicate that the M-249/LMG has a worse performance than all the other section weapons. It has added carried weight to the section for no useful increase in performance.

The other big problem is the very odd idea that all “Fireteams” need to have the same weapons mix. Again, I suggest this is doctrinally flawed.

IMO, the USMC search for some type of solution is long overdue, and everyone else should take note.

Jones_RE

09-18-2008, 05:43 AM

reed11b

09-18-2008, 06:20 AM

There's more to a weapon than the cyclic rate, muzzle velocity and carried weight. Before the M249, there was an attempt to use an M16A1 with a bipod as the squad automatic rifle.

Machine guns take more of a beating because sustained automatic fire is hard on a gun. The M249 is heavier because it's built to handle that work. The belt feed also means a lot less time spent reloading vs a twenty or thirty round magazine.

Not that I necessarily have an informed opinion on which is the better choice, but I do believe the M249 is not completely irrational. It's simply a different set of tradeoffs.

For all of that, how many soldiers (or Marines) do you know that have changed barrels on there SAW in combat? I was a SAW gunner for OIF and I never came close, and rarely had to reload my 100 round soft pouch. I do think that the 30 round magazine is to small and that a belt fed system would be better, but I question the conventional wisdom of "needing" an exchangeable barrel. I also question the need for “mirrored” fire teams and why is the LMG of a squad need to be 5.56? Large variety of 6-7mm rounds that offer better range and effects then the 5.56 NATO while still weighing much less then 7.62 NATO.
Reed

William F. Owen

09-18-2008, 07:14 AM

There's more to a weapon than the cyclic rate, muzzle velocity and carried weight. Before the M249, there was an attempt to use an M16A1 with a bipod as the squad automatic rifle.

There may be more but this is the frame of the discussion we can usefully progress. ROF does not = Suppression. Carried weight costs a lot, and muzzle velocity defines an number of things such as comparative ranges and terminal effects.

The flow down effects of an 5.56mm LMG were simply not calculated or argued in a constructive way. It was just assumed that the US, and then the UK, "needed" such a weapon so one appeared.

Agreed the M-16 LSW is a bit of a dog because of the direct impingement gas system, but the concept was basically sound.

The UK L86A2 is conceptually a very good weapon, though widely misunderstood, leading to bad doctrine and not taught well in training. It's now the DMR weapon in the fireteam for no reasons that make sense.

The HK-416 with a 20 inch barrel and a bipod would do the same/better job, as would the Ultimax Mk-5.

Render

09-18-2008, 06:46 PM

Wouldn't that SAW's inclusion in the squad TOE have something to do with the squads ability to fill the air with lead?

TIME
AND
PLACE,
R

Ken White

09-18-2008, 07:41 PM

I'm unsure why anyone would wish to do so. Seems sort of pointless to me.

Jones_RE

09-19-2008, 04:36 AM

William F. Owen

09-19-2008, 05:58 AM

Assuming that you don't need the belt feed ability of M249 often enough to justify the weight, complexity and extra maintenance. . . Should the automatic rifle fire the same round as the assault rifle? A more powerful round should still be controllable with the bipod and heavy barrel, but is it worth the weight and logistic hassles?

I think, that for the general fire teams, a 5.56mm Carbine, and 1-2 5.56mm LSW a good mix. Heavier weapons could go in other fireteams

On another topic - fire and maneuver at the squad level doesn't seem to have a lot of fans here. I can imagine why - how many enemies can one fire team suppress? Is there still a place for fire teams in an organization that's likely to fight as a single unit?

Trials would suggest a fire team of 4 men can suppress about 3-5m frontage. Fire teams are excellent for C2, movement and weapons control. We've always had them, but we just refuse to admit it. Gun Group and Rifle Group, were/are fire teams. The "Marshall error" of creating mirror fire teams meant that got lost.

120mm

09-19-2008, 12:36 PM

There's more to a weapon than the cyclic rate, muzzle velocity and carried weight. Before the M249, there was an attempt to use an M16A1 with a bipod as the squad automatic rifle.

Machine guns take more of a beating because sustained automatic fire is hard on a gun. The M249 is heavier because it's built to handle that work. The belt feed also means a lot less time spent reloading vs a twenty or thirty round magazine.

Not that I necessarily have an informed opinion on which is the better choice, but I do believe the M249 is not completely irrational. It's simply a different set of tradeoffs.

Exactly. Any machinegun that requires a sustained rate of fire needs to be heavier than a rifle.

But I'm liking what Wilf says about that theoretical "sustained" rate of fire at the fire team level. I think a "real" machinegun is a better choice, with a "real" machinegun round and rate of fire. And your automatic rifle can be a piston gun with a drum.

William F. Owen

09-19-2008, 02:59 PM

Exactly. Any machinegun that requires a sustained rate of fire needs to be heavier than a rifle.

But I'm liking what Wilf says about that theoretical "sustained" rate of fire at the fire team level. I think a "real" machinegun is a better choice, with a "real" machinegun round and rate of fire. And your automatic rifle can be a piston gun with a drum.

Yes, I concur.

I have always wondered why the UK loaded up the two section Fire teams with a Minimi LMG each, when giving one team a 7.62mm GPMG, and spreading the ammo across both teams would have created a proven, better and cheaper solution.

I have some issues with Drum Mags, even if they are reliable, but yes, an HG-416, or G-36, with a 100 or 150 drum Mag, and a bipod, does everything a Minimi does, for less weight, bulk and no loss of effect.

Norfolk

09-20-2008, 01:39 AM

I think I find myself like Rifleman here, torn somewhat between the German Group organized around a single GPMG, and the USMC Squad organized into three Fire Teams, each based upon an AR/LMG. Used properly, each gets the job done. However, I suspect that, all other things being equal, a USMC-type Squad with three of the new ARs that would be replacements for the SAW, might prove somewhat more agile, allow for a little bit quicker, quieter movement, and better chances for seeing without being seen and for achieving surprise and shock effect.

The "safe" choice is a Squad/Section based upon a single GPMG, with a Platoon containing up to 4 more or less identical Squads. There are no arguments with the firepower of a GPMG. None. I suppose though, this leads to the the only serious reservation I have about Wilf's proposed Platoon make-up (admittedly one entirely different from the German and old Commonwealth models), in that he proposes only 2 GPMGs per Platoon. The Germans switched to 4 GPMGs per Platoon in 1940, considering this to be the minimum required for winning the firefight quickly. And Commonwealth Platoons usually possessed at least 3 GPMGs or 6 LARs/LMGs plus a GPMG until the 1980's. Back then, if you wanted serious, sustained firepower, there were only GPMGs (or LMGs that weighed almost as much as the GPMGs). However, Wilf may well be right that only 2 GPMGs per Platoon might be needed, and each in its own dedicated gun team separate from the rifle teams. The Germans only had rifle grenades and got rid of their light mortar, but Wilf's platoon has 4 modern grenade-launchers as well as a light mortar. I don't know one way or the other, but that, together with the way his platoon functions, may make all the difference necessary.

On the other hand, the "bold" choice may be to pool the GPMGs at Company level, attaching them out to Platoons as needed, and to have the Platoons composed of Squads/Sections with no less than three ARs or magazine-fed LMGs, firing from an open-bolt and dispensing with belts and changeable barrels. Leaves the Squads (and the Platoon as a whole) more fleet-of-foot and better able to move. Basically, I'm arguing that this maximizes the potential for achieving surprise and shock-effect (and minimizing fatigue). Now with ARs or magazine-fed LMGs being available that are truly light but potent, perhaps GPMGs may no longer be usually necessary at Squad and Platoon levels. But the success of this approach depends in good part upon the usefullness of the AR's/LMG's round. If it is just going to be the old 5.56 (which is what's planned), then it's dubious, though if the Mk 262 round is used more or less exclusively (best of luck there :wry:), it may be doable. Personally, nothing less than something approaching the class of the Grendel (a military derivative of the Grendel would likely be rather more modest in "paper performance" than the Grendel itself) would completely allay my doubts on that matter. However, a pair of ARs putting rounds downrange (while the third is moving) may be able to suppress more or less as well as a single GPMG, but if the rounds aren't killling those people that they do hit, that suppression is partly wasted as you have to spend time digging out and killing folks that may have been hit and stunned or wounded, but not killed as they would have been by a 7.62. I'm hopeful about the potential of the new AR in the USMC Squad, but I still need to be fully convinced that three of the new ARs will be able to suppress more or less as well as having a GPMG in each Squad. And needless to day, I am not a fan of the Minimi/M-249.

In either case, the two-fire team Squad/Section only seems to make sense if the idea is to perform full frontal assaults (especially during mechanized ops) using a maximum of firepower and a minimum of manpower. Squad/Section TO&E and TTPs by bean-counter. Other than that, it doesn't seem to offer anything that either a GPMG-based Squad or a three-fire team Squad with ARs/LMGs can't do better.

William F. Owen

09-20-2008, 07:04 AM

I think I find myself like Rifleman here, torn somewhat between the German Group organized around a single GPMG, and the USMC Squad organized into three Fire Teams, each based upon an AR/LMG. Used properly, each gets the job done. ]
The 30-man model I use to start discussion is capable of 3 entirely different organisations, using the same number of men, ranks, weapons, sesnors and radios, so you don't have to choose between German or USMC if you train and organised correctly. You can do both.

However, Wilf may well be right that only 2 GPMGs per Platoon might be needed, and each in its own dedicated gun team separate from the rifle teams. The Germans only had rifle grenades and got rid of their light mortar, but Wilf's platoon has 4 modern grenade-launchers as well as a light mortar. I don't know one way or the other, but that, together with the way his platoon functions, may make all the difference necessary.

You are exactly right, that my thinking is far more focussed on HE Projection, rather than just direct fire suppression. The problem with discussing the Platoon structure is that very few folk discuss the how and why, rather than just counting the number of MGs.

Uboat509

09-20-2008, 01:50 PM

Based on my experience, I firmly believe that a belt fed machine gun is needed at the fore team level, although I personally don't like the SAW. A magazine fed weapon could never be a substitute for a belt fed one in that role. As someone who has been fired at I can tell you that there is no substitute for putting a lot of lead down range very quickly. Even if you don't hit the target it still has a profound psychological effect on the target. You are going to loose a good bit of that with a magazine fed weapon, plus you won't be able to carry as much ammunition.

GPMGs are not the answer either. A GPMG is a supporting weapon. Taking a GPMG on an assault is problematic at best and taking them in for CQC or trench clearing is simply impossible. Furthermore, whereas a light machine gun can be effectively carried and employed by a single soldier, a GPMG requires, at the very least, an AG and an ammo bearer is also a hell of a nice thing to have (I've heard anyway. I never had one) Add to that the fact that you just can't carry as much ammunition for the GPMG and you can see why they need to kept out of the fire teams and left in the weapons squad.

SFC W

Ken White

09-20-2008, 02:35 PM

Having a great deal of experience with magazine fed ARs in Squads here and there, I've never seen the magic of belt fed as worth the weight, parts problems and potential for misaligned belts, misfires and overheated weapons. Mag fed weapons, both the BAR and the M14E2 put out more than adequate suppressive fire -- and they were totally reliable. Aside from the fact it is quicker and easier to reload using a new magazine, an easily portable belt is only going to be about 100 rounds -- and an Ultimax can hit that. C-Mags aren't perfect but they are getting better; the problem is that no real effort has been made to provide better large magazines
As someone who has been fired at I can tell you that there is no substitute for putting a lot of lead down range very quickly. Even if you don't hit the target it still has a profound psychological effect on the target. You are going to loose a good bit of that with a magazine fed weapon, plus you won't be able to carry as much ammunition.I respectfully disagree in part. I acknowledge the truth of the statement when operating against inexperienced or poorly trained opponents but all the wasted ammo in the world will be totally ignored by competent enemies and you'll run out of ammo before they will...
GPMGs are not the answer either. A GPMG is a supporting weapon. Taking a GPMG on an assault is problematic at best and taking them in for CQC or trench clearing is simply impossible.Totally agree on that. Did take them occasionally during the SE Asia war games but always tried to avoid it if possible, more trouble than they're worth if you're patrolling and only of marginal use in most circumstances other than a pure meeting engagement or defensive battle. I'd keep 'em at a MG Platoon at Company level instead of in a Wpn sqd. ;)

William F. Owen

09-20-2008, 05:32 PM

Norfolk

09-20-2008, 07:10 PM

I think the problem is that some folks seem to want a single fire-team model that does everything. I don't and I rejected it long ago.

I have concentrated on GPMGs with 1 gun in 3-5 man fire-team. That team is protected/Supported by 1-2 other teams with, with carbines/rifles only, and some HE Projection (RG, 40mm and maybe M-72A6-9).

basically a platoon has a mix of two types of team. The first type is "Recce/CQC" and the second type is stand-off fires, GPMG/Sniper team. Change emphasis and weapons mix, based on METT-C.

There is fairly substantial historical evidence that this works. We just choose to ignore it.

No argument that this will work; Fire Team roles and compositions very much tend to reflect the parent Army's real opinion of its Infantry, thus the belt-fed LMGs that have appeared over the last quarter-century. Once again, the equipping of each Fire Team with a belt-fed LMG is a sort of "safe" option, hoping that whatever else a Fire Team may or may not be able to do, it will at least be able to bury its enemies under streams of lead. Pragmatic, up to a point, but probably unnecessary with properly schooled and disciplined troops, especially ones that aren't too bad at locating the enemy before the enemy locates them. Again, a matter of an Army's real estimation of the capabilities of its Infantry. And no argument with the basic premise that the Platoon needs to be as refined as possible. My concern arises from my understanding of how the Infantry's support weapons are best used - normally.

Where we fundamentally disagree here is on where the "Main"/"Support" Weapons should normally go - though the disagreement itself is perhaps not critically important. Normal pooling of heavy weapons at either
Company or Platoon works either way; personnally, having observed how it works at Platoon level, I think it really is better for them to normally be at Company level, though of course attached out to the Platoons as needed. Easier to haul, maintain, train, supply, and coordinate their fires and to greater effect, and without encumbering the Platoons directly, except when said weapons are attached out to the Platoons. As such, one ends up with identical Fire Teams, which is not such a bad thing if the main role of the Platoon's Fire Teams is locating the enemy for the Company's Main Weapons (or Platoon if the main weapons are detached from Coy), and then providing local suppression while one Squad or Fire Team from a Platoon performs an assault. Though it certainly leads to much larger Platoons, 40-50 men easily, and with greater command requirements.

Readily conceding that your placement of GPMGs and a 60 mm mortar at Platoon is effective, and may well be fully sufficient, I do think that it may heavy up the Platoon itself a little more than necessary, while sacrificing a little of the potential effect of the main weapons if they were normally held at Company level instead. Still, it works, and with some 32 men or some such, the Owen Platoon covers its bases, and with a maximum of efficiency and simplicity. It would be interesting to see what, if any, difference in wartime sustainability there would be between these two concepts. Unquestionably, though the Owen Platoon would be easier to maintain during peacetime, and this would reduce or eliminate at least one perennial resources/funding problem.

As to belt-fed LMGs in the Fire Teams, if it were to turn out that either the ARs or magazine-fed LMGs that are contemplated for the USMC somehow don't turn out to work in practice, either because of some unanticipated defect in the weapons themselves, or by inadequate training/conditioning provided to the users, then belt-fed LMGs are certainly something to fall back on. But while GPMGs are too unwieldy for CQB, neither are most LMGs fully a match in handling compared to a well-trained enemy with a rifle or carbine in the next room or around some dark corner. But then, Infantry Squads/Sections, if they're doing things right, are using their LMGs for support or security during CQB, not assault if they can at all help it. SF are another matter, and have access to weapons that are substantially different than what their conventional counterparts normally have, and in tactical circumstances that can be radically different.

Uboat509

09-20-2008, 09:04 PM

But then, Infantry Squads/Sections, if they're doing things right, are using their LMGs for support or security during CQB, not assault if they can at all help it.

The infantry units that I have been do use the LMGs for support in CQC but as local support vs. the support by fire position where the GPMGs were. As we moved we could drop off SAW gunners to cover areas that the SBF could not cover for whatever reason. Those that did come into the building with us stayed at the back of the stack and generally pulled rear security although there were times when we used them to fill a particularly tough room with lead. SAWs were also great because you could place them in the rooms of the building that you had just cleared to cover your movement to the next building.

SFC W

Rifleman

09-20-2008, 10:00 PM

Uboat509,

You give good examples about why you believe in the benifits of squad level LMGs. But do you think one SAW per squad would be enough in the situations you described?

I ask because one of the things that stands out to me in Paul Melody's article about the current nine-man rifle squad is his belief that one LMG per squad is just about right; that it's difficult to effectively employ more than one LMG in a nine-man squad - much less in an understrength squad that's really just an overstrength fire team.

Thoughts?

Uboat509

09-20-2008, 11:07 PM

SethB

09-21-2008, 02:03 AM

There is quite a bit of experience in this thread, so I'd like to ask how many rounds a box magazine would have to hold to make an AR viable.

Given length limitations, there is only so much longer you can make a 5.56 magazine. Variations include Steyr with 42 round magazines and the RPK-74 with a 45 round magazine. At a certain point these get rather long. How long is too long?

Second, how wide is too wide? There is the possibility of using a number of stacks to feed more rounds. The Russians and the Italians have done this with varying degrees of success.

The M16 magazine well will not be of assistance if a quad stack magazine is developed, but it may be the only way to get 60 or 75 rounds into a magazine that will both work and allow a decent prone position.

So, how many rounds would a magazine need to hold to viably replace a SAW?

Ken White

09-21-2008, 03:37 AM

50 ideal -- more would be too heavy and unwieldy and of benefit only if one subscribes to the theory that the more rounds fired regardless of accuracy the better. A proposition I emphatically do not agree with.

The old 60 rd Drum for the Ultimax was okay, the 100 is too heavy as is the C-Mag.

William F. Owen

09-21-2008, 04:04 AM

Where we fundamentally disagree here is on where the "Main"/"Support" Weapons should normally go - though the disagreement itself is perhaps not critically important. Normal pooling of heavy weapons at either
Company or Platoon works either way; personnally, having observed how it works at Platoon level, I think it really is better for them to normally be at Company level, though of course attached out to the Platoons as needed.

I'm not sure we do dis-agree. If you can 2-3 Fire Support teams in the 30-man Platoon, I don't see why you can't have a 1 Fire Support Platoon in a 3 Platoon Company.

The point is, that ANY of these fire support elements can become a normal fireteam, merely by ditching their Support weapon and picking up a couple of LAWs or rifle grenades.

Still, it works, and with some 32 men or some such, the Owen Platoon covers its bases, and with a maximum of efficiency and simplicity. It would be interesting to see what, if any, difference in wartime sustainability there would be between these two concepts. Unquestionably, though the Owen Platoon would be easier to maintain during peacetime, and this would reduce or eliminate at least one perennial resources/funding problem.

I'm not sure there is an "Owen Platoon", but I do advocate very simple and flexible principles of organisation. These work regardless of the overall number of men. The more you reduce the number, the less the flexibility becomes. What works with 30, works with 24. I guess it's really "Wigram Grouping."

reed11b

09-21-2008, 06:24 AM

Arguments about ideal squad size aside, I always liked having two LMGs per squad for the simple fact that it gave me one LMG for each of my maneuver elements. Whichever of them made contact first could lay down the same base of fire while the other moved. It was also nice even if my whole squad was the base of fire for another element. One saw can put down a lot of rounds but two saws talking to each other puts down a impressive amount of fire power and it helps keep the gunners from burning out their barrels. There is an old saying that two is one and one is none. Over the years I have come to wholeheartedly believe that. If I only have one LMG in my squad then when I need it most I will have no LMG in my squad.

SFC W

The binary orgsnization was pioneered by the Italians in WWII, in larger echelons, but for very simalier tactics. They found that the structure and tactic left them predictable and unable to truly "maneuver". Thw Army "base of fire" squad concept suffers the same failings. It makes sense at a glance, but IMHO does not work well.
Reed

Uboat509

09-21-2008, 01:51 PM

The binary orgsnization was pioneered by the Italians in WWII, in larger echelons, but for very simalier tactics. They found that the structure and tactic left them predictable and unable to truly "maneuver". Thw Army "base of fire" squad concept suffers the same failings. It makes sense at a glance, but IMHO does not work well.
Reed

I'm not sure that any problems that the Italians had in WWII were due to their tactics so much as their general lack of competence. The tactic has generally worked well for me when properly executed but what is the alternative?

SFC W

Jones_RE

09-21-2008, 03:51 PM

I think the alternative is a three team squad, which has twice the potential for suppression all other things being equal, or a two squad "section." Wilf's "fire team group" potentially offers both of those options at the same time.

Obviously, the SAW can work well. We know that because you've said that you've seen it happen. So can squad level fire and maneuver - we know that for the same reason. I don't think anyone can credibly say that the curretn weapons and tactics aren't working at all. However, your experiences (and those of basically every soldier using the same weapons and tactics) don't tell us how other weapons or techniques would have faired in the same situation. Or how the current system would do in more challenging circumstances.

The burden is almost always on those who would challenge existing doctrine. Especially when that doctrine has produced success in the past. If our weapons and tactics had lead to bloody failure everyone would be ready for change . . . .

That said, I'm concerned that we're drawing lessons from success that may not be justified. The current squad structure, equipment, and tactics were validated against an enemy force that is on the whole considered to be poorly trained, often badly outnumbered, and incredibly outgunned.

Ken White

09-21-2008, 04:16 PM

...That said, I'm concerned that we're drawing lessons from success that may not be justified. The current squad structure, equipment, and tactics were validated against an enemy force that is on the whole considered to be poorly trained, often badly outnumbered, and incredibly outgunned.The question applies to most Squads, USMC, US Army, commonwealth armies...

Uboat509

09-21-2008, 06:39 PM

I think the alternative is a three team squad, which has twice the potential for suppression all other things being equal, or a two squad "section."

I think that the issue of adding more members to each team (which I favor) or adding more teams to the squad is separate issue from the one I was addressing. No matter how many men you have in your team/squad/section/gaggle or whatever, one thing remains constant somebody is shooting (base of fire element) and somebody is moving (maneuver element). At least that is my take and I am wondering what the alternative that is that Reeb seemed to be alluding to.

As for squad composition I like the idea of adding a man to each of the fire teams that we have now. That way there are three riflemen, an AR with LMG and the team leader with an M203. I just don't think that three maneuver elements are needed at the squad level. The squad leader for the squad in contact is going to be in the fight. He needs to be thinking about firing element and his maneuvering element (if he has one). He doesn't need to be worrying about a reserve or whatever the third maneuver element would be doing. The platoon leader should be more removed from the immediate fight and can therefore initiate more complex tactics which is why three maneuver elements is a good thing at the platoon level and not so good at the squad level. In my opinion anyway.

SFC W

Norfolk

09-21-2008, 06:54 PM

I think that the issue of adding more members to each team (which I favor) or adding more teams to the squad is separate issue from the one I was addressing. No matter how many men you have in your team/squad/section/gaggle or whatever, one thing remains constant somebody is shooting (base of fire element) and somebody is moving (maneuver element). At least that is my take and I am wondering what the alternative that is that Reeb seemed to be alluding to.

As for squad composition I like the idea of adding a man to each of the fire teams that we have now. That way there are three riflemen, an AR with LMG and the team leader with an M203. I just don't think that three maneuver elements are needed at the squad level. The squad leader for the squad in contact is going to be in the fight. He needs to be thinking about firing element and his maneuvering element (if he has one). He doesn't need to be worrying about a reserve or whatever the third maneuver element would be doing. The platoon leader should be more removed from the immediate fight and can therefore initiate more complex tactics which is why three maneuver elements is a good thing at the platoon level and not so good at the squad level. In my opinion anyway.

SFC W

Generally speaking, many posters here seems to be thinking of using the third element not as a reserve but as part of the support element, with two teams suppressing while a third assaults. One Up, Two Back and all that.

Edited to Add:

Much agreed that Platoon should be the focus, just that Squads sometimes find themselves caught in situations where they have to provide for themselves what Platoon normally provides to the Squads.

Ken White

09-21-2008, 07:08 PM

No matter how many men you have in your team/squad/section/gaggle or whatever, one thing remains constant somebody is shooting (base of fire element) and somebody is moving (maneuver element). At least that is my take and I am wondering what the alternative that is that Reeb seemed to be alluding to.The most significant advantages of a third fire team are a little more redundancy in combat (always a good thing) and flexibility in personnel assignments. The additional Team Leader gives you some training flexibility as well.

Having worked with both the 13 man Marine Squad and the 50-70s era Army Squad with 11 men, both work well, the Marine version gives you an added AR / SAW and two more people to cover combat losses which can easily reach 40-50% in MCO. Maneuvering the Marine Squad is not difficult, most usually, you just use two Fire Teams as the base of fire and you can swap (more correctly, allow the Team Leaders to swap out as they see fit) base and maneuver elements easily. It is also possible to add the third AR / SAW to the base of fire and use rifles only for the movement / assault element.

I agree with you that there's no real alternative to fire and movement -- the only issue is the level at which that takes place. Generally, it will be at Company level, less frequently at Platoon and rarely at Squad -- but Squads will be forced to do it more often than not in the process of operating within a Platoon or Company effort. I'll flat guarantee you that Miles does not replicate MCO at the Platoon and Squad level; it's better than nothing but it can give you a false sense of your ability to move under fire.

Sabre

09-22-2008, 06:01 PM

I just don't think that three maneuver elements are needed at the squad level. The squad leader for the squad in contact is going to be in the fight. He needs to be thinking about firing element and his maneuvering element (if he has one). He doesn't need to be worrying about a reserve or whatever the third maneuver element would be doing. The platoon leader should be more removed from the immediate fight and can therefore initiate more complex tactics which is why three maneuver elements is a good thing at the platoon level and not so good at the squad level. In my opinion anyway.

SFC W

I find it interesting that those who put the focus on the platoon-level are less concerned with there being three fire-teams in a squad. I happen to agree that the fight is at the platoon level (unless you are SF...) and that two fire teams is fine for a squad - as long as there are at least FOUR squads in a platoon - that gives the organization the depth it needs to sustain casualties, and still more tactical options for the platoon leader, beyond flipping a coin to decide when to go from "one up two back" to "two up one back"... (so you end up with four squad leaders instead of three, and 8 team leaders instead of 9, so (very) slightly more leadership depth, in theory...)

I don't see the advantage to specializing the squad and platoon weapons too much - others here have more experience than I, but I can't seem to recall one single plan that went sufficiently smoothly that some squad that was supposed to "just" be assault didn't end up being support, and vice-versa. So I will have to agree with Uboat on that point as well (and I strongly agree with the "if you start with two, you will have one when you need it, and if you only start with one, you will have none when you need it" adage).

I also wonder at least a little bit at the focus on ensuring that the squad can take casualties and still not be reduced to functioning as one big fire team - why wait for that inevitable moment? After all, the three-fire team Marine squad was born of Pacific island battles where casualties were sometimes well past the 50% mark that would reduce even the mighty three-team USMC squad down to the strength of a single large fire-team.

I guess that I will have to go on record as being in basic agreement with Wilf and SFC W.

William F. Owen

09-22-2008, 06:15 PM

After all, the three-fire team Marine squad was born of Pacific island battles where casualties were sometimes well past the 50% mark that would reduce even the mighty three-team USMC squad down to the strength of a single large fire-team.

.

Having researched to origin of fire teams in some detail, I think I am safe in saying that the 3-Team Squad was copied from the Chinese, whom Evans Carlson observed them using in the 8th Route Army. I am still trying to confirm if the PLA still use the same structure. Apparently, and I am still trying to confirm this, some IDF platoons use 3 x 12 man squads, each of 3 fire teams.

Sabre

09-26-2008, 02:00 PM

Ah, Wilf. Now that you mention it, I have read that before. Probably in something that you had written. Perhaps I could have called it the "three teams of four men each" structure - I seem to recall that the Chinese used cells of three men each. Correct me if I am wrong.

Getting data on IDF organization isn't as easy as it is for other armies... I would be very interested in what you find /have found.

William F. Owen

09-26-2008, 03:23 PM

I seem to recall that the Chinese used cells of three men each. Correct me if I am wrong.

You probably read it in Doug Pikes work on the PAVN. - The three-person cell (to ba nguoi) is often referred to as the glue welded cell (to keo son) or the three participants cell (to tam gia).

10-02-2008, 10:28 AM

Sabre posted - "After all, the three-fire team Marine squad was born of Pacific island battles where casualties were sometimes well past the 50% mark that would reduce even the mighty three-team USMC squad down to the strength of a single large fire-team."

The 13 man, 3 four man fire teams was developed in the Pacific as you stated. It has remained thru thick and thin the basic Marine squad configuration for more than 65 years. Longer than any other successful other infantry squad configeration since WWII.

In today's environment 50% casualties are not the norm, and that fact increases effectiveness of the 13 man squad.

There are a hundred reasons for the difference in squad size, and that will probably remain the case well into the future.

65 years is a strong indicator that the Marines might have found the answer and see no need to change their tactical
basic unit.

William F. Owen

10-02-2008, 01:08 PM

The 13 man, 3 four man fire teams was developed in the Pacific as you stated. It has remained thru thick and thin the basic Marine squad configuration for more than 65 years. Longer than any other successful other infantry squad configeration since WWII.

All true, but, IMO, this does not "prove" the case for a 13-man squad. The principle it uses could equally well be applied to a 9 or 15 man squad - and even a 20-man squad.

As a UK Infantryman, I have never understood, why the US Squad Leader is not part of a Fire team. Both the Army and Marines cling to this, for no good reason that I can see.

pvebber

10-02-2008, 03:41 PM

How do you gents see the resurrection of the XM-25 affecting this? I've heard it would not replace the M203 and the desire is for 2 per squad. Not sure how that would shake out?

Seems it changes the calculus of cover at the least. Particularly in urban environments.

ODB

10-03-2008, 01:41 AM

Just getting caught up on this thread, too many points to specifically hit but a few stand out. There is so many pros and cons anyway you go and many of those are METT-TC dependent. There were times I would have loved another fire team, times I would have loved to have had a gun team attached, and times I wish I didn't have so many men. Personally I am a fan of an 11 man squad with a gun team. Part of this is my upbringing in a weapons squad, unfortunately as I have stated before in other posts we currently do not train enough or properly on MGs in today's Army. One has to look at how well squad leaders could incorporate a gun team into the fight. Definately agree with UBOAT "Two gets you one, one gets you none." Thoughts on the SAW, yes they are outdated and continually getting updated and upgraded. Another thought is looking at the metals available today that can lighten the overall load, but we all know money is an issue. Amazing that disciplined soldiers/units that demand weapons be properly cleaned and maintained seem to have fewer issues, same can be said with any weapon system. Nothing worse than a truck full coming at you and the supporting unit's gunner on the .50 cal goes kerchunk, then the Mark19 on the truck next to him goes kerchunk. Nothing wrong with either system except they looked like they hadn't been cleaned after riding through the desert for 2 months, could have filled my kids sandbox with the sand in them.

Something I believe that has been missed in this thread is the Stryker units. Many of these units employ an armsroom type technique. They keep multiple weapons systems on the vehicles and take what the situation warrants. As we look at today's Army how many units are humping rucks on their back and living out of them. No units are without vehicles. I do not believe you can equip a squad ideally for all situations all the time. In my opinion squads need to have a bevy of weapons at there disposal that they can arm themselves accordingly to METT-TC. The key here is flexibility.

Additionally have not noticed any mention of our transition from a spray and pray military to well aimed shots. Don't get me wrong nothing wrong with a heavy dose of suppressive fire raining down, but have we not transitioned over the years to being more disciplined when we shoot? This fact may have more to do with the bean counters than any tactical advantage but something I have notice over my time in.

M203 most under utilized under trained weapon period. 15 years and I have fired 1 that's right 1 HE round in training. I have shot more LAWs, AT-4s, Dragons (showing my age), Javelins, over the years than 40mm HE. So we need to either change our training and usage of it or find something else in my opinion.

Someone mention SF having more luxury with weapons or something along those lines. I'd like to see it. The only things I have at my disposal that I didn't have as an Infantryman is a UMP-45 and a .45. Everything else I had as an Infantryman. I have seen conventional units outfitted better as far as weapons and optics goes. Only difference really is I personally have more flexibility in the weapon I want to carry and usually base this on the situation.

Optics is another whole new can of worms. What sights with what weapons? What NVGs? There is a multitude of things that go into this. Honestly we all know the bottom line that dictates it all BUDGET!

50Bravo

10-15-2008, 04:19 AM

Machine guns:
Don't care much for any automatic weapon that jumps around as much as the different 5.56 derivatives. Most of them appear to be assault rifles on steroids. I had MUCH better results with the M-60 in medium to heavy undergrowth than with the 5.56. The M-60 is heavier but stays on target better and WILL cut brush. The 5.56 (at least the ones we were using) will not. The M-60 was also a very reliable belt feed and would shoot a LOT. We never bothered with the other barrel. Finally, an M-60 SOUNDS like a machine gun and that gets into peoples heads, your people and theirs... ;-)

Squad size:
Never felt the rifle squad was realistically designed to operate on it's own but as an administrative convenience to get enough infrastructure (Squad and fire team leaders) to let the platoon operate effectively. Maybe the all-volunteer thing has changed that equation but between rotation, casualties etc. there weren't many full to&e squads running around loose. When you start with nine and pare back from there for reality (rotation, illness etc), you got problems as a maneuver element.

If we were going out to ambush or interdict, we preferred to take 13 to 15 people. You need that many for a decent ambush if you are going to have any security at all and still have a decent KZ. Also some losses don't reduce your firepower in such a drastic fashion.

A TO&E rifle squad after R&R, illness etc which then takes a casualty or two is a fire team with lots of baggage and a seriously reduced ability to defend itself, let alone attack.

My 2¢

Sabre

10-15-2008, 09:55 PM

As a UK Infantryman, I have never understood, why the US Squad Leader is not part of a Fire team. Both the Army and Marines cling to this, for no good reason that I can see.

Wilf, I have definitely been wondering that myself (as someone who "grew up" in the US Army system of a squad leader, and two fire teams to a squad, each with a team leader).

One Fire-Team Leader? Absolutely, it is always useful for a squad leader, (heck, a leader at any level) to have a "second in charge", for a whole host of reasons. A second Team Leader? Hmmm... In combat, if the squad isn't operating as a single entity, then the squad leader is leading one fire team himself, anyway. It doesn't even provide any real "leadership depth", since (from what I saw) there weren't enough junior NCO's to fill all the slots, in any case.
Perhaps it is different in the USMC squads, with 3 fire teams.

William F. Owen

10-16-2008, 08:45 AM

Perhaps it is different in the USMC squads, with 3 fire teams.

I am pretty certain that the Chinese 8th Route Army Fire teams, that Carlson copied were 9 men strong and organised into 3 teams of 3. The Squad Leader was a buried HQ.

Bizarrely, the UK uses a "buried HQ" at the Section level, and an HQ team at the Platoon. The 1944 Pam actually states that the full manning of the Platoon HQ is a "priority!" - something I am still looking into.

10-19-2008, 06:28 AM

"Originally Posted by William F. Owen
As a UK Infantryman, I have never understood, why the US Squad Leader is not part of a Fire team. Both the Army and Marines cling to this, for no good reason that I can see."

William with respect, as a former Marine Squad Leader I submit the following experiences by the Marine Corps as proof enough for we who have been there

Iwo Jima, Okniawa, The Chosin Resevoir, The Battle of Hue City, The March Up to Bagdad and Fallujah II.

The one up and two back configeration needs the guiding hand of a squad leader who has been brought up in this unit configeration to direct the flow of the fight in progress.

I sense some inability from a few that the size of the Marine Squad is to them too big to control in combat.

It isn't, if you have been trained from Private thru L/Cpl to Cpl. to respond in this invironment.

It works for the Marine Corps. When vertical envelopment began in the 50's the air assets could not carry more than 8 Marines. A perfect excuse to break down the big 13 man squads to "fit" the size of the transportation available.

Didn't Happen! I was a squad leader in that period and the decision was made to put the extra squad members on the next chopper to load. The division of the big squad may have been discussed up the chain of command but it was not even considered at the troop level. We liked the way a three fire team squad "flowed" in the assualt phase of our training. 4 man rushes supported by 8 man covering fire is a thing of beauty as it moves forward to close with the enemy.

The forward movement was not a single 4 man unit moving ahead while being supported by the two other fire teams. The assualting fire teams interchanged between assualt and support in coordinated fire team rushes that constantly moved forward. The 8 man support is powerful and can not be duplicated by a 9 man squad with four assualting and five supporting.

The economy of putting a squad leader in the dual role of SL and FTL in an 8 man squad reduces the power of the support base by 35%. As in 35% less rounds moving down range in supressing the enemy.

It , in my opinion, would be the worst of both worlds. A weak unit with a dual-role SL who in the heat of battle is going to fight his fire team and focus on that and not the other fire team.

A Marine SL has the training to focus on manuevering his three fireteams as the terrain and the quality of the enemy's troops and defenses will allow. He is not part of the "uuuunnnnngggg" stress of moving forward under fire,
and he can develop his part of the battlefield as the power of his bigger squad projects itself under his direction. He is under stress and exposed to enemy fire, for sure, but his job is to fight his three fire teams without the distraction of having to lay down the base of fire or jump up and rush at the enemy with three other Marines in the fire team. He is also in direct contact with his platoon leader and keeps him informed on his squads status.

In a smaller 8 man squad, fighting a fire team, commanding a squad and keeping those above us informed seems a bit much, to me.

Running a Marine Squad ain't easy, but it is easier than trying to take the same terrain with 4 to 5 less guns in the fight. Especially when your gun is needed in the fight, while you are trying to figure out what has to be done.

This commentary on the 8, 9 and 13 man squads on up to a 20 man squad has the ability to become the "never ending story".

I submit 6 decades of success in combat with a 13 man squad works for the Marines!

The tour of a Marine Expeditionary Units in Helmand Provience this year seemed to have worked quite well. 500 to 600 dead opponents and only a single civilian casualty and a handful of Marines killed or wounded might be a model to study and learn from.

Please don't think my commentary is a "my way or the highway" kind of chatter. I hope my comments explain the reason the Marines continue to use the big squad configeration.

William Owen, How long has the UK had your squad configeration? And what were the composition of the squads before your current size? What were the squad sizes in WWI?

Were they bigger than today? The huge losses in that war
must have influenced changes that are still being felt.

William F. Owen

10-19-2008, 06:56 AM

William with respect, as a former Marine Squad Leader I submit the following experiences by the Marine Corps as proof enough for we who have been there

Iwo Jima, Okniawa, The Chosin Resevoir, The Battle of Hue City, The March Up to Bagdad and Fallujah II.

All testaments to the courage and determination of the the USMC, plus it's supporting arms and fires. It does not constitute empirical evidence in regard to the utility of the separated Squad HQ

The economy of putting a squad leader in the dual role of SL and FTL in an 8 man squad reduces the power of the support base by 35%. As in 35% less rounds moving down range in supressing the enemy.

It , in my opinion, would be the worst of both worlds. A weak unit with a dual-role SL who in the heat of battle is going to fight his fire team and focus on that and not the other fire team.

Economy is the word. The whole argument/discussion on the size and organisation is not about absolute numbers. What the argument lacks is how do you organise X-number of men, for a given mission or task, not "how big is the squad."

This commentary on the 8, 9 and 13 man squads on up to a 20 man squad has the ability to become the "never ending story".

I submit 6 decades of success in combat with a 13 man squad works for the Marines!

Concur

The tour of a Marine Expeditionary Units in Helmand Provience this year seemed to have worked quite well. 500 to 600 dead opponents and only a single civilian casualty and a handful of Marines killed or wounded might be a model to study and learn from.

...and there is a Royal Marine Company, in Helmand that may have achieved a greater Loss Exchange Ratio

William Owen, How long has the UK had your squad configeration? And what were the composition of the squads before your current size? What were the squad sizes in WWI?

Were they bigger than today? The huge losses in that war
must have influenced changes that are still being felt.

The current UK Section dates from 1985 as two mirror Fireteams. Prior to that we had an 8-10 man section organised as a Gun Group and Rifle Group. 10 men was the "War Time" establishment.

In 1918 the Section was 7 men but there were 4 sections not 3. There were 2 x Lewis Gun Sections and 2 x Rifle Sections. In 1934 they scrapped this excellent scheme to have the 3 combined sections, with the Bren Gun.

jcustis

10-19-2008, 09:14 AM

Wilf,

I'd offer that the repeated call for empirical evidence that supports the individual squad leader can be countered with the same call for empirical evidence that we need to change. Bottom line is that you'll never get the magic bullet of empirical evidence.

10-20-2008, 05:03 AM

Wilf - 50 Bravo posted "Squad size:
Never felt the rifle squad was realistically designed to operate on it's own but as an administrative convenience to get enough infrastructure (Squad and fire team leaders) to let the platoon operate effectively. Maybe the all-volunteer thing has changed that equation but between rotation, casualties etc. there weren't many full to&e squads running around loose. When you start with nine and pare back from there for reality (rotation, illness etc), you got problems as a maneuver element.

If we were going out to ambush or interdict, we preferred to take 13 to 15 people. You need that many for a decent ambush if you are going to have any security at all and still have a decent KZ. Also some losses don't reduce your firepower in such a drastic fashion.

It looks like the US Army grew its 2 fire team squads to 13 or 15 in Vietnam to provide a realistic size force to meet the minimum size unit to conduct tactically effective ambushes.

50 Bravo, I'll bet that the ambush team included at least one M-60 in the party. We would include a Machine Gunner and assistant gunner in our ambush squads and every fire team leader and rifleman would hump extra MG ammo for the gun team.

jcustics - Empirical evidence seems to be the modern version of the Holy Grail! I'll bet todays Marine Corps still fills out 13 man squads that have battle casualties with Cooks, Bakers, Remington Raiders and the occasional Cannon Cocker until they can get some 0311 replacement parts. I suspect "Every man a Rifleman" is still practiced and the temporary interchangable parts get the job done.

M/3/5 0369 once a'pon a time, long, long ago and far, far away.

William F. Owen

10-20-2008, 06:21 AM

ODB

10-20-2008, 05:26 PM

Wonder why 12 men was the answer for a SF ODA? Why not 10? 9? or 15? I understand in respect to the quality, experience, and education of an infantryman vs a SF soldier and the differences in mission requirements. My point is that some one much smarter than me saw this as the magic number. With 12 men there is enough redundancy built in to handle casulties and enough firepower to handle many situations. As I stated in and earlier post I am personally a fan of a 9 man squad with a gun team which brings us to the magic number of 12 men. Would like the historical perspective of why SF went with 12 man teams and that may help in figuring out the ideal sized squad.

Ken White

10-20-2008, 05:55 PM

plus two each Ops/Intel, Weapons, Comm, Medics and Demo = 12.

Apples and oranges to rifle squads, I think.

ODB

10-20-2008, 06:08 PM

Rifleman

10-20-2008, 08:07 PM

ODB,

Add vehicles. I think trying to keep unit size matched to transport size is a loosing battle.

It doesn't matter what the unit or transport type is either. It's a nice idea, but in the end we just have to accept the fact that crossloading and breaking up elements for transport will have to happen and get on with the job without worrying about it too much.

Hasn't it usually had to be sorted out in the assembly area anyway? Even if it was a hot LZ in the Ashau Valley? I think a UH-1D usually carried six for a combat assault. How many times was a platoon able to divide by six and have it come out even?

Ken White

10-20-2008, 08:44 PM

lost somewhere in the other jibberish. I was wondering if anyone knew why 12 men or was it more of that is just the way it worked out after looking at leadership requirements and having 2 of everything? Didn't know if some one thought 12 was the right amount of personnel and then tailored the make up to this number or the other way around. Understand the comparison is apples to oranges in some aspects.skills, generally doubling the number for redundancy (and insuring cross training to reinforce that) and was broadly based on the organization and experience of OSS Detachment 101 in Burma during WW II, by far the most successful large irregular warfare operation and way ahead of the success of the Jedburgh Teams.

The very different US Rifle squad, OTOH, is based primarily on Korean War experience and the two fire team leaders specifically date from there and a perceived need to have another NCO for both redundancy and for the training stream. The AR Man in each team (as opposed to a Machine Gun / Gunner) was due mostly to lack of an acceptable MG at the time plus the old "not invented here" syndrome which says that if another nation is doing 'A' we must do 'B.'
A question that arises is also mobility assets. Under the current composition a 9 man squad can move by two gun trucks or 1 UH-60(seats in of course). If the squad size increases then do our mobility platforms need to increase in size as well or do we simply increase the footprint (more vehicles). Might simply be to far into 9 man squads in the Army to change at this point. How do the other services handle this?The nine man squad is an abortion; it was introduced in the 80s simply to free up the other two men from the Squad to provide numbers to increase the number of Army divisions -- a process that sliced TOEs to the bone and really hurt the Divisions even as it created two more from the same manpower. Dumb idea then and a dumb idea now. Much more effective was the 11 man squad -- more staying power, also...

Part, not all , of the size of our vehicles is based on justifying that nine man squad -- can't be like anyone else...

Other organizations handle larger sizes with (a) bigger vehicles; and (b) splitting their squads -- just like the US Army has to do all too often...

Ken White

10-20-2008, 08:46 PM

Add vehicles. I think trying to keep unit size matched to transport size is a loosing battle.

It doesn't matter what the unit or transport type is either. It's a nice idea, but in the end we just have to accept the fact that crossloading and breaking up elements for transport will have to happen and get on with the job without worrying about it too much.

Hasn't it usually had to be sorted out in the assembly area anyway? Even if it was a hot LZ in the Ashau Valley? I think a UH-1D usually carried six for a combat assault. How many times was a platoon able to divide by six and have it come out even?It's not desirable but it's often necessary and it doesn't really have too bad an effect. Unit integrity is great; just hard to attain...

Uboat509

10-20-2008, 11:47 PM

I thought that the original ODA was ten men but they added a captain to act as a commissioned advisor to the Team-Sergeant and then a Warrant to do all the paperwork. :)

SFC W

ODB

10-21-2008, 01:18 AM

I tried googling it numerous times and could find nothing about it. Thank you Ken for the historical perspective.

I know it never comes out even but looking at the possibility if squad sizes increased would we increase vehicle capacity or increase the number of vehicles? Personally I'm a fan of the insert an infantry company plus with three CH-47's and extract with 2, 70 personnel per bird + 15,000 foot mountain passes makes for a lot of puking soldiers and over torqued aircraft.

Ken White

10-21-2008, 02:53 AM

I thought that the original ODA was ten men but they added a captain to act as a commissioned advisor to the Team-Sergeant and then a Warrant to do all the paperwork. :) SFC Wand a Lieutenant to provide someone to listen to the Captain. ;)

Warrants were a later-- and good -- idea...

Rifleman

10-21-2008, 04:29 AM

So now that ODAs have WOs - who were once probably SFCs - who listens to the Captain? ;)

Ken White

10-21-2008, 04:35 AM

.............

ODB

10-21-2008, 04:59 AM

So now that ODAs have WOs - who were once probably SFCs - who listens to the Captain? ;)

This is the sole reason for the 18X program. They had to find someone who would listen to the Captain

William F. Owen

10-21-2008, 09:07 AM

I thought that the original ODA was ten men but they added a captain to act as a commissioned advisor to the Team-Sergeant and then a Warrant to do all the paperwork. :)

SFC W

The original ODA was 2 Officers and 13 NCOs, as mandated by TOE 33-510. Ir was designed to train and then staff a 1,500 strong guerilla Army.

- so it might have some pointers for Unit command, but as you point out, it's nothing to do with Squad dynamics

Ken White

10-21-2008, 02:57 PM

The original ODA was 2 Officers and 13 NCOs, as mandated by TOE 33-510. Ir was designed to train and then staff a 1,500 strong guerilla Army.Combination of spinning half the Group to Germany as the 10th (and further splitting a Det from that to Berlin -- with a different TOE) and forming the 77th at Bragg with the other half of the original Group created a minor shortfall in people (as well as new commanders), thus the TOE mod to 12 for the A Teams while the B Teams stayed at 15.

Sabre

10-22-2008, 07:27 PM

The nine man squad is an abortion; it was introduced in the 80s simply to free up the other two men from the Squad to provide numbers to increase the number of Army divisions -- a process that sliced TOEs to the bone and really hurt the Divisions even as it created two more from the same manpower. Dumb idea then and a dumb idea now. Much more effective was the 11 man squad -- more staying power, also...

Part, not all , of the size of our vehicles is based on justifying that nine man squad -- can't be like anyone else...

Other organizations handle larger sizes with (a) bigger vehicles; and (b) splitting their squads -- just like the US Army has to do all too often...

Whoa, whoa, there Ken, the process only sliced TOEs to the bone for Infantry (and Cavalry). Some other branches (most notably Military Intelligence) have seen their representation consistently increased with every reorg (for little or no corresponding increase in combat effectiveness).

I agree with the vehicle size comment, the USMC, to site the obvious example, does design tracks and helos to accommodate more men. However, I think that there is a limit to how big a heavy APC can be, in terms of volume under armor (such as the Israeli Namer). Perhaps not relevant in this war, but in others such a vehicle might prove very useful. I would submit that as perhaps the one actual limit to carrying capacity.

Personally, I think vehicle carry capacity matters for any ("permanently") mounted unit, as operations go on and entropy naturally increases, the unit will find itself de facto organized along those lines more often than not.

Ken White

10-22-2008, 08:23 PM

Whoa, whoa, there Ken, the process only sliced TOEs to the bone for Infantry (and Cavalry). Some other branches (most notably Military Intelligence) have seen their representation consistently increased with every reorg (for little or no corresponding increase in combat effectiveness). (emphasis added / kw)I rest my case... :D
Personally, I think vehicle carry capacity matters for any ("permanently") mounted unit, as operations go on and entropy naturally increases, the unit will find itself de facto organized along those lines more often than not.Also true -- and a generally not well considered synergy by the force structure folks...

01-02-2009, 08:45 PM

The T/O of a SF Team is a going away peek from the standard infantry squad size and mission.

The Marines have let out contracts fo rtheir new AR for Infantry and Recon squad usage.

It is a magazine fed design.

FYI - Corps moves to replace M249

Staff report
Posted : Friday Jan 2, 2009 10:04:16 EST

The Corps has awarded four contracts to three companies to produce prototypes of the 5.56mm Infantry Automatic Rifle, which is slated to supplant the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon, or SAW, according a Dec. 26 Marine Corps Systems Command announcement.

The three firms will compete for a contract that could be worth up to $27 million. The firm selected will manufacture from 4,476 to 6,500 rifles.

The three companies are:

• FN Herstal of Herstal, Belgium.

• Heckler and Koch Defense of Ashburn, Va.

• Colt Defense of West Hartford, Conn.

Colt received two contracts because it has two candidate weapons sufficiently different to warrant separate evaluations, according to SysCom.

“Each [company] will produce and deliver a minimum of 10 weapons. The Marine Corps will next evaluate these weapons and then intends to select one weapon system from one company to meet the IAR requirement,” Marine officials said in a news release.

The IAR is a lightweight, magazine-fed weapon. It will provide a one-for-one replacement of the M249 in Marine rifle squads within infantry battalions and in the scout teams in light armored reconnaissance battalions.

The weapons will be tested by infantry Marines as SysCom works to solicit input from throughout the operating forces, the release states.

Happy New Year, y'all

02-02-2009, 10:44 PM

The Marine Corps Times has an up dated article on the new AR's the Marines are testing to replace their current automatic squad weapon.

To long to C&P for this forum, but ifyou are interested check it out at MCT.

SethB

02-02-2009, 11:47 PM

DefenseTech (http://www.defensetech.org/archives/004645.html?wh=wh).

I asked Mellors about the limited capacity a 30 round mar gives an automatic rifleman with this kind of setup. First of all, he said they'd been in talks with Maul to develop a higher capacity "quad-stack" mar akin to an experimental AK-74 one that feeds four stacks of ammo through a single channel in one 55-round magazine. But the company was reluctant to pitch the new mar with its IAR for fear it would undercut their bid as being too risky.

I found this online. It reiterates some of what I was told nearly a year ago, but it would have been inappropriate for me to mention it.

Kiwigrunt

02-03-2009, 12:06 AM

The Marine Corps Times has an up dated article on the new AR's the Marines are testing to replace their current automatic squad weapon.

Looks like only the big players get to play.......:wry:

They also seem to like the 40mm sixshooter. Not necessarily at squad level though.

02-03-2009, 02:30 PM

Kiwi - It looks like the Marines have adjusted their thoughts on the multi-grenade 40MM for squad level use.

The Marine Corps Times has a picture that shows the QRF enjoying the power of their new toy. Here is the caption!

CPL. ERIC C. SCHWARTZ / MARINE CORPS CAMP AL QA'IM, Iraq- Marines with Quick Reaction Force, Headquarters and Support Company, Task Force 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, attached to Regimental Combat Team 2, complete the sustained machine gun training and the Multiple Grenade Launcher 32, familiarization, fire and movement exercise at Camp Al Qa'im, Iraq. The training teaches Marines how to properly engage multiple targets performing suppressive fires and implementing a six-round semi-automatic grenade launcher instead of the single-shot M203 traditionally used by Marines in combat.

Use of multishot grenade launchers to grow

By Dan Lamothe - Staff writer
Posted : Monday Feb 2, 2009 17:20:01 EST

MARINE CORPS BASE QUANTICO, Va. — Prompted by its success in defending against convoy attacks and ambushes, the Corps will vastly expand the availability of a 40mm, six-shot rotational grenade launcher first fielded in Iraq on an experimental basis in 2006.

The article is new and the specs and uses are listed in it.

The picture is the first time I've seen the weapon. Its non lethal applications make it a multi-use weapon and the beefed up version has added significant range tothe weapons bag of tricks.

Enjoy the read!

Rifleman

02-21-2009, 06:17 AM

An interesting historical video clip that fits well with this thread: http://www.realmilitaryflix.com/public/250.cfm

William F. Owen

02-21-2009, 04:30 PM

An interesting historical video clip that fits well with this thread: http://www.realmilitaryflix.com/public/250.cfm

It is interesting because it's not actually how the German squad worked. They are putting allied thinking on to the Germans.

Rifleman

02-21-2009, 08:39 PM

That doesn't surprise me. :wry:

COMMAR

02-25-2009, 06:56 AM

William F. & RJ can I interject & refer back to your back & forth on page 3.

I believe RJ's best support for his position comes half way thru his long article when refering to the separation of the Marine SqLdr allowing him to coordinate the manuevering while separate fr/ the actual activity of the manuever.

Which frees his mind fr/ controlling his squad & his individual team. It also allows him the freedom to command the scene & float freely amongst the teams for optimum control.

I think the 2 of you are having a hard time sync-ing on this 1 b/c you fundementally view the Operations of the squad & SqLdr thru the eyes of your Institutions.

W. F. Owens, fr/ the little I know about Brit formations the Squads are design to operate pretty tightly together, under the control of the PLT CO.

Marine Squads operate much differently, much looser, the control of a Sqd fr/a SqLdr a Plt Cdr less of a direct control & is designed to be more fluid, more independent over a much larger area.

So W.F.O, its my take that when you visualize RJ explain to you about a separated SqLdr your visualizing a Brit Manuever w/ the Plt Cmdr exhibiting tight control over the Squads in his Plt.

Your not visualizing a USMC style Manuever, w/more men & more dispersion, covering much more ground where the SqdLdr is acting more like a Plt Cmdr throughout the Manuever.

The answer to the Q? of Squads... the right #'s & formations etc, etc, all comes down how do you does the Individual ENVISION them being used. Everything else is plug n play.

William F. Owen

02-25-2009, 02:48 PM

W. F. Owens, fr/ the little I know about Brit formations the Squads are design to operate pretty tightly together, under the control of the PLT CO.

Marine Squads operate much differently, much looser, the control of a Sqd fr/a SqLdr a Plt Cdr less of a direct control & is designed to be more fluid, more independent over a much larger area.

So W.F.O, its my take that when you visualize RJ explain to you about a separated SqLdr your visualizing a Brit Manuever w/ the Plt Cmdr exhibiting tight control over the Squads in his Plt.

Your not visualizing a USMC style Manuever, w/more men & more dispersion, covering much more ground where the SqdLdr is acting more like a Plt Cmdr throughout the Manuever.

Interesting. Obviously the level of fluidity or control is product of training, experience and even personality. UK Platoons also operate as Multiples, of 12-20 men in fire teams, either under a Sgt or Plt Cmd so are near identical to USMC 3 x 4 squads.

Point being, the organisation is subservient to the training and leadership. So my start point is how do you organised ANY given number of men, with any mix of weapons, to gain the levels of control you require to perform your mission. - and not many folk ponder than question.

COMMAR

02-26-2009, 02:36 AM

Interesting. Obviously the level of fluidity or control is product of training, experience and even personality. UK Platoons also operate as Multiples, of 12-20 men in fire teams, either under a Sgt or Plt Cmd so are near identical to USMC 3 x 4 squads.

Point being, the organisation is subservient to the training and leadership. So my start point is how do you organised ANY given number of men, with any mix of weapons, to gain the levels of control you require to perform your mission. - and not many folk ponder than question.

I don't see organization being subservient to training & leadership, but to Usage & Intent.

Again, it comes down to how you (whoever is creating said squad) visualizes its squad's usage & visualizes it in action.

And yes fluidity is the product of training, etc. But if you have a system that is designed for the Plt Cmd to exhibit tight control over the squads so "he" can keep the Plt's formation tight & concise during manuever then their make-up will reflect that, being tight & concise, streamline in its makeup. You will have fluidity, but fluidity relative to the concise design of how your Plt Manuevers.

--In a system like that, a 44 man Plt of 3x 13man squads w/ independently moving & directing SqLdrs would be far too large & unwieldly. In that kind of system the SL's independent movements & direction would seem redundant to that of the PC.

But when the USMC visualizes a Plt manuever they don't evision a concise tightly moving Plt based on the direction of a Central figure.

They envision using alot of Space & alot of Firepower coming fr/ multiple sides & angles over an area of dispersion that is too large for one man to -directly- control.

In that type of system you need independently operating SqdLdrs who can control & direct all of that FP, while controlling the spacing, & act in the sted of the Plt Cmdr, moving by the feel of the PC's overall intention & not his by direction.

Not saying this doesn't happen in concise more centralized Plt's but do to design its to a much different degree.

Kiwigrunt

02-26-2009, 04:51 AM

William F. Owen

02-26-2009, 11:23 AM

Interesting to see the different angle of approach by Wilf and Commar.
Wonder how the new Aus. 2012 platoon will fit in this picture. 40 man with 3 x 8 man sections of 2 'standard' fire teams and 1 x 12 man section with 3 x 4 man teams each based around a GPMG or potentially an HE projector. I imagine that the plt com will still be the central figure here.

The Aussie 2012 Platoon is very good, and has some real evidential substance to it. Dave Kilcullen and I talked it through at some length, when he was in London. Personally I think it's too big, and has a superfluous layer of command, but that's just knit picking.

William F. Owen

02-26-2009, 11:33 AM

I don't see organization being subservient to training & leadership, but to Usage & Intent.

Ahhh... American English ;)

But when the USMC visualizes a Plt manuever they don't evision a concise tightly moving Plt based on the direction of a Central figure.

I don't think the UK does either. UK Platoon doctrine is pretty flexible, with Section Commanders given pretty broad scope. The Plt Commander or the Platoon Sergeant can command the platoon, and both usually play to their strengths. Section commanders are certainly expected to be able to Command a platoon as a last resort - and train to do so.

If you're suggesting the UK screwed up by buying into "Section Tactics", then I'd agree, but that was the fault of the training, and not the doctrine.

tequila

02-26-2009, 10:28 PM

Ken White

02-26-2009, 11:26 PM

We beat this up before while you were in transit, I guess. Don't have time now but will see if I can link to the thread later tonight. In the interim, let me give you two heresies to contemplate.

Suppressive fire is vastly overrated and is not nearly as effective as some seem to think. Accurate fire, OTOH, is effective and few doubt that.

Belt fed weapons have a place. Many believe -- and I am one of them -- that they do not have a place in the Rifle Squad. They are too fragile, they require too much maintenance, they require extra training, they add to the log burden, they are unwieldy --even with assault or otherwise short barrels (which harm accuracy and effectiveness) and they're heavy. Recall also that the Corps got through WW II and Korea with the BAR and its 20 round magazine as the Squad AR (some had the Johnson LMG with a 30 rd mag -- but very few had it. It also had problems of its own).

More later.

Stay alert. ;)

COMMAR

02-27-2009, 02:42 AM

Now that the USMC is apparently doing away with the SAW (http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2009/02/marine_newsaw_020109w/) in the line platoons, I'd like to ask how this affects what people think as far as how squads should be set up?

To me, I think this is taking 'maneuver warfare' a bit too far. Losing the suppressive capabilities of the SAW for an IAR that only takes 30-round mags?

The call for an IAR goes back to at least 2001, pre 9/11, when 7th Marines out in MCAGCC performed a battery of tests in different scenario and found the SAW was only better than a smaller, lighter, more accurate Mag-fed LMG in about half the scenarios that would confront the Squad.

Not enough to end the SAW but enough to warrant the need for another OPTION in the tool bag. 9/11 saw the push back of this program but it seems to be back on track.

The SAW isn't going anywhere, a Squad will just have another option before leaving the wire.

The report fr/ 7th Marines in 2001 should be online, also a recent IAR story fr/ The Marine Corps Times gives some info on it.

Ken White

02-27-2009, 02:54 AM

If you haven't already discovered it, one earlier conversation was on this Thread; go back to Post 7 (LINK) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=56531&postcount=7) and read down to Post 24 when the thread re-concentrates on squad organization. However, if you skip forward to post 72 on page 4 of this thread, there's one more comment.

IIRC there was another discussion earlier but I'm having trouble finding it. Will keep looking.

Two things I would add, you'll note the Army is keeping the M249. FWIW some of the Army folks are not great M249 fans citing heavy maintenance and still frequent failures.

There are efforts to reduce the weight and improve the reliability. In my experience, those two efforts counteract each other. For example, the SEALs use the Mk 46, a lightened SAW and the 82d and some units have some modified SAWS. Both are okay for short term SEAL like missions but cannot take the day to day beating an infantry weapon has to live with, they're too fragile. Same is true for the Mk 48, a 249 on steroids for the 7.62 NATO cartridge; it's a lot lighter than the 240 -- and a lot less durable.

COMMAR

02-27-2009, 03:21 AM

The SAW isn't going anywhere, a Squad will just have another option before leaving the wire. The report fr/ 7th Marines in 2001 should be online, also a recent IAR story fr/ The Marine Corps Times gives some info on it.

Marines to Test, Evaluate 4 Auto-Rifle Models: http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2009/02/marine_newsaw_020109w/ ....A Change in Mindset (Note view entire article on link, text removed due to copyright issues)

Ken White

02-27-2009, 04:56 AM

However, in the future you might consider that to avoid copyright issues, this site encourages the posting of just an excerpt and a link instead of posting an entire -- or most of -- an article. The various service Times and Gannet in general are one crowd that occasionally get sticky about it. May not be a problem but it just keeps the board from getting in trouble with someone who's picky.

Granite_State

02-28-2009, 08:06 PM

1258dave

03-03-2009, 11:30 PM

So what sized SQD (and PLT?) did you come up with? How was it armed?

Also:

How long does it take to train a SQD?
What would the "personnel cycle"/rotation policy be like?
And most importantly - how would you build the NCO leadership cadre?

We all do the #s of widgets pretty well, but the purpose of the SQD is to enable decentralized NCO leaders to conduct fire and mnvr. So "how do you build a NCO" should be part of the equation.

Thanks.

03-04-2009, 02:30 AM

1258 Dave - How long to train a Squad?

Well, if the troops were trained in Boot camp and then the Marine version of AIT (Advanced Infantry Training) in my day ITR (Infantry Training Regt.) and then fed into a regular Marine Infantry Line Battalion as parts of a Squad - I'd guesstimate they would be functioning as a well oiled Marine infantry squad in 4 to 6 months, after being introduced tothe Infantry Battalion.

The Squad leaders and most fire team leaders would have at least one to two cycles of leadership exposure before the "new guys" were intergrated into the system.

Leadership exposure being trained up to the level of fireteam leader or Squad leader in previous cycles.

It has been working since the eary 1940's for the US Marines.

There have been very few instances in the history of the Marine Corps that a speeded up "shake and bake" system was used to create leadership for Marine Rifle Squads.

What type of time line has the history of the US Army 9 man Squad system been exposed to. Has there been a conserted effort to train young privates and PFC's to the responsibilities of Fire Team Leader?

Very few, Marine Squad Leaders become SL's unless they have passed thru the crucible of running a Fire Team under a Squad Leader who had paid his dues in that slot for a sufficient amount of time to be evaluated by his Squad Leader and his Platoon Sgt. They inturn pass on their opinions to the Platoon Cmdr and then up the line to the Co. Commander.

Time in grade does not a Squad Leader make. They are evaluated at many levels before being given the responsibility of running a squad. It is not a matter of being there, but it is a matter of measuring up. Marine Rifle Squads are made by proven building blocks.

I hope that helps understand the system the Marine Big Squad evolves from.

William F. Owen

03-04-2009, 08:16 AM

There are efforts to reduce the weight and improve the reliability. In my experience, those two efforts counteract each other. For example, the SEALs use the Mk 46, a lightened SAW and the 82d and some units have some modified SAWS. Both are okay for short term SEAL like missions but cannot take the day to day beating an infantry weapon has to live with, they're too fragile. Same is true for the Mk 48, a 249 on steroids for the 7.62 NATO cartridge; it's a lot lighter than the 240 -- and a lot less durable.

Ken makes a good point, but there are some additional factors in play.

The Mk48 is/was not an act of war. As Ken points out, indications are that it simply won't cut it on extended ops.

However FN's "Minimi 7.62" is as robust as an M249, but not as robust as an M240. Point being the Minimi 7.62 was designed for dismounted operation.

The M240 is a US built FN-MAG 58 which was designed as a multi-role MG for infantry, AFV's and even aircraft, so it weighs more than it should. It took it's cue from the MG-34/42/3 - also a beast!

However, both the UK and US have never really had any really good idea of the why and how of MGs in the platoon. It certainly does not seem to be based on evidence.

Another very good 7.62mm MG is the HK 21E / HK-11 modular design. Not much seen, but pretty good, all the same.

Kiwigrunt

03-04-2009, 09:14 AM

The Mk48 is/was not an act of war. As Ken points out, indications are that it simply won't cut it on extended ops.
However FN's "Minimi 7.62" is as robust as an M249, but not as robust as an M240. Point being the Minimi 7.62 was designed for dismounted operations.

I'm not sure there is actually much difference between the two Wilf. The 48 is made in the US, the standard in Belgium, both by FN. They weigh the same. The 48 has a different gasplug and (sturdier) bipod. Other than that they appear to be pretty much identical.

Your point on lighter weight guns for section/platoon level is well made I think. Keep the MAG 58 at coy.level or above, close to their SF kits with spare barrels etc. (and from there they can of course still be used in the light role when required.) For as far as weight is any indication of robustness, the 7.62 Mimini is not much lighter than the old L4 (agreed, mag fed). I don't think the L4 had any durability issues.

Distiller

03-04-2009, 01:08 PM

Ken White

03-04-2009, 07:01 PM

I'm not sure there is actually much difference between the two Wilf. The 48 is made in the US, the standard in Belgium, both by FN. They weigh the same. The 48 has a different gasplug and (sturdier) bipod. Other than that they appear to be pretty much identical.Not sure from whence that statement is derived. They are two very different weapons and concepts.

The Mk 48 weighs 18 pounds LINK (http://www.fnmfg.com/products/m249fam/mk48mod1.htm), the M240 weighs 27 pounds LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M240_machine_gun) -- plus. Folks using it today tell me that those carried in theater today easily weigh over 30 pounds.

Note that FN brags about the light weight of of the Mk 48 and provides that weight -- but for the M240 series ground guns does not provide the weight LINK (http://www.fnmfg.com/products/m240fam/index.htm) simply because it is the troops greatest complaint about an otherwise excellent weapon. Note also the FN is working on several mods to reduce that weight.

The Mk 48 is not robust enough to take the pounding an Infantry unit would give it; OTOH, it's okay to take out of a stock of weapons on a raid of relatively short duration and possible high intensity followed by return to an armorer to get ready for the next operation. It does not need to be excessively rugged.
For as far as weight is any indication of robustness, the 7.62 Mimini is not much lighter than the old L4 (agreed, mag fed). I don't think the L4 had any durability issues.No, the L4 was one of the most reliable guns of its type -- and that operating system is the basis of the M240 system. The Minimi / M249 / Mk 46 / Mk 48 operating system is different, based on but not as robust as the Kalishnikov system and it is not nearly as reliable. Weight is not an indicator of robustness, the type of construction and materials used plus the operating system are.

The MAG 58 / M 240 was designed at a time when those factors were dominant and the gun used heavy, thick plates and a strong riveted construction (The L4 from even earlier was even more so -- the receiver was milled fro one block of steel). The Minimi series OTOH was designed to be cheap to produce -- that was the dominant feature, so the construction is much more flimsy all round.

Ken White

03-04-2009, 07:20 PM

#1 -- Complicates ammo resupply. The Newer M4s have full auto capability, the 3 round burst feature was as predicted a failure.

Firepower is a vastly over stated and over rated issue. Volume of fire decides nothing, accuracy of fire is the determinant. Only very raw and inexperienced fighters are even remotely affected by the volume of fire. Everybody, no matter how experienced is affected by accurate fire...

#2 -- Aside from the lack of robustness in most belt fed weapons -- the PKM being one notable and great exception (If we had any sense, we'd just buy it and convert it to a good 6mm or so caliber...) the need for a whole lot of ammo is also questionable. C-Mags have reliability problems as do belt drums. This LINK (http://www.mwgco.com/Merchant2/merchant.mvc?page=MWG/PROD/AR-15_MAGAZINES/NMI-AR15-40RP) would be a better idea for someone who just had to have more capacity -- particularly if the magazine were inserted in the weapon horizontally instead of from below. Or one could just build these LINK (http://home.comcast.net/~sfischer397/stoner/bren.htm).

SethB

03-04-2009, 08:36 PM

Ken, your point on on construction is well taken. A friend of mine tells me that the Mk 48 is a reliable weapon until exactly 1100 rounds are fired, at which point the gas system freezes solid and a Small Arms Repairer is required.

The PKM has had a long and successful run, and it has been designed to use both 7.62N and a 6MM caliber. Versions using rimless calibers are actually much simpler.

I'm convinced that the IAR will work, and one of the reasons I'm so sure is because the USMC is also soliciting magazines that hold more ammunition. Information is publicly available about a 55 round magazine in development.

The PKM uses a stamped action, and VLTOR here in the states is making an action that is actually stronger than the original. I'm told that the originals used to crack on occasion.

As for alternate cartridges, there are many designs extant, all of which would outperform 7.62N on soft targets and some of which would outperform it on harder targets.

KAC makes a ten pound LMG that is an improvement on the Stoner 63.

The USMC is soliciting a thermally stable machinegun barrel that will extend barrel life and obviate the requirement for a quick change barrel. There is only one company, that I know of, that has a viable product. It is an SBIR set aside, if that matters.

Uboat509

03-04-2009, 09:01 PM

I always liked the M60. It sucked with blanks but I never had any significant problems with live ammo. 550 RPM is plenty as far as I am concerned.

As for the M249, when I was a SAW gunner, we called it the (expletive!) gun. The reason for that was that when you pulled the trigger it would often go ka-chunk at wich point you would shout (expletive!), perform immediate action, pull the trigger, ka-chunk (expletive!), and so on. I will never trust that gun again.

SFC W

Ken White

03-04-2009, 09:29 PM

The PKM has had a long and successful run, and it has been designed to use both 7.62N and a 6MM caliber. Versions using rimless calibers are actually much simpler.LMG, the SS 77 in its new Compact format is also a winner. Also a reliable peformer now that they've lowered the cyclic rate. It's based on the old USSR SGM action -- which is the Bren / MAG 58 / BAR action turned on its side.
I'm convinced that the IAR will work, and one of the reasons I'm so sure is because the USMC is also soliciting magazines that hold more ammunition. Information is publicly available about a 55 round magazine in development.Me too, not least because I once carried a BAR with a 20rd magazine and had no problems... ;D
As for alternate cartridges, there are many designs extant, all of which would outperform 7.62N on soft targets and some of which would outperform it on harder targets.Progress is all fields; the 7.62 NATO is getting old.
KAC makes a ten pound LMG that is an improvement on the Stoner 63.Yes, they do. My spies tell me it has reliability problems, though... Lightweight is good -- but it has a cost.
The USMC is soliciting a thermally stable machinegun barrel that will extend barrel life and obviate the requirement for a quick change barrel. There is only one company, that I know of, that has a viable product. It is an SBIR set aside, if that matters.Noteworthy the new Russian is essentially a PKM with a really heavy barrel (LINK) (http://world.guns.ru/machine/mg30-e.htm) allowing among other things movement of the bipod to the muzzle where it provides a far more stable firing platform. More accuracy is the result -- and it weighs more. Maybe they know something we don't... ;)

Ken White

03-04-2009, 09:34 PM

...As for the M249, when I was a SAW gunner...I will never trust that gun again.Nearly as I can gather, you've got a lot of company on that. The only person I've ever seen really defend that weapon is Schmedlap -- and even he admits it took extra loving care. Can't always provide that...

Agree on the M 60. It was a good weapon, almost impossible to screw up and did not require an excess of maintenance. No MG does well on blanks IMO -- but then, they don't need to...

Kiwigrunt

03-04-2009, 10:45 PM

Not sure from whence that statement is derived. They are two very different weapons and concepts.

The Mk 48 weighs 18 pounds LINK (http://www.fnmfg.com/products/m249fam/mk48mod1.htm), the M240 weighs 27 pounds LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M240_machine_gun) -- plus. Folks using it today tell me that those carried in theater today easily weigh over 30 pounds.

Sorry about the confusion. Wilf and I were referring to the 7.62 Minimi made by FN Herstal http://www.fnherstal.com/index.php?id=249&backPID=306&productID=19&pid_product=233&pidList=306&categorySelector=2&detail="][/URL]as opposed to the Mk48 of the US. The M240/Mag 58 are indeed a totally different ball game.
I like your suggestion on the PKM in 6+. The Russians did indeed try something like that with the 6mm Unified Machine Gun but that seems to have gone nowhere.

Darn....can someone please teach me how to tidy those links up (a computer geek I am not).:o

Kiwigrunt

03-04-2009, 11:24 PM

SethB;67682]Ken, your point on on construction is well taken. A friend of mine tells me that the Mk 48 is a reliable weapon until exactly 1100 rounds are fired, at which point the gas system freezes solid and a Small Arms Repairer is required.
That is interesting. Wonder is if that may indeed be different with the 7.62 Herstal Minimi with the 'original' adjustable gas plug.

Ken White

03-05-2009, 02:14 AM

Sorry about the confusion. Wilf and I were referring to the 7.62 Minimi made by FN Herstal http://www.fnherstal.com/index.php?id=249&backPID=306&productID=19&pid_product=233&pidList=306&categorySelector=2&detail="][/URL]as opposed to the Mk48 of the US. The M240/Mag 58 are indeed a totally different ball game.The 7.62 Mimimi is a Mk 48 without an upper handguard and a few very minor differences as the gas cylinder plug you noted.. Your link says it weighs 8.2 kg which is roughly 18.04 pounds, same as the Mk 48 and thus at least 9 pounds less than a MAG 58 / M240 / L7. No confusion. I note that the FN link you used also does not give the weight of the MAG 58... ;)

The Minimi in 5.56 is the M249 and the Mk 46; the 7.62 Minimi is the Mk 48. Minor differences but they are quite insignificant.
I like your suggestion on the PKM in 6+. The Russians did indeed try something like that with the 6mm Unified Machine Gun but that seems to have gone nowhere.Big armies have too many sunk costs in equipment to change it unless there is a pressing need. Right now, there is no pressing need for them or us.

A 6mm cartridge has a lot of advantages but its still a compromise, heavier and larger than 5,56 and without the reach and power of the 7.62.
Darn....can someone please teach me how to tidy those links up (a computer geek I am not).:oIntead of using the clickable link button here, I've found it easier just to type [ url= then copy and paste the link and add an end bracket ]type in 'link' or whatever name you want it to possess then close with [ /url ] with NO spaces between the brackets and the text.

Here's all that using parentheses instead of brackets:

(url=http://www.fnherstal.com/index.php?id=249&backPID=306&productID=19&pid_prod%20uct=233&pidList=306&categorySelector=2&detail=%22) LINK(/url)

And with brackets:
LINK (http://www.fnherstal.com/index.php?id=249&backPID=306&productID=19&pid_prod%20uct=233&pidList=306&categorySelector=2&detail=%22)

Kiwigrunt

03-05-2009, 03:42 AM

Thank you for the lesson, Ken.

Ken White

03-05-2009, 03:54 AM

Hope it was adequate...

Rifleman

03-05-2009, 04:45 AM

Ken,

You obviously prefer a larger squad in multiple fire teams with an automatic rifle in each team. I guess we can't deny the success the USMC had with it.

Question: what about smaller squads forced to operate (whether by design or attrition) without a fire team subdivison? Do you think a belt fed MG is preferable to an AR in that case?

Examples: the German WWII gruppe that relied on one MG42 and several rifleman; the average US Army squad in Vietnam that always seemed to be understrength and thus operating roughly along the same lines, even if fire teams were official by TOE.

I've heard more than one Vietnam vet say that they remember a "squad" of six to eight men that usually operated without fire teams with one M60 (usually employed at squad level even if not officially there by TOE), one M79 and a handful of riflemen. For example, James McDonough writes in Platoon Leader that he took over a rifle platoon that consisted of three six-man "squads."

Ken White

03-05-2009, 05:53 AM

or situations and the old METT-T applies. The advantages of the USMC Squad to me are ability to absorb casualties and still function, the training value for junior NCOs and flexibility it offers to organize in many ways.

Leading it I've been down to six people, usually had ten, rarely all thirteen. I've organized with all the ARs in one support team team and all the rifles in an assault team. I've held a line and sent out a four man FT patrol many times but have also sent out multiple two or three man patrols and two FT sized patrols -- depends on what the other guy seemed to be doing. Went to Recon where we supposedly had a 10 man Sqd with Three 3 man Scout teams; due to shortages, we usually operated as a Scout Sqd with six or seven total people.

Later, in the Army I ran an 11 man squad briefly in training but spent most of time in Recon thus had either a six bod squad or a 28 man platoon to worry about and I've used various combination of that for a lot of things -- to include Wilfs idea of four five man teams (less drivers or four six man teams with).

Whatever works. I did see 18-20 man platoons in the Army in Viet Nam. A lot of people liked to keep an M-60 with the Squads but there some that did not. Some folks, if short an NCO would combine a squad into a SL, x number of troops and an asst SL; others would try to keep two Ft and put a SP4 or even a PFC in charge.

A lot of Infantry Battalions took their Recon and anti Tank Platoons and combined them into a mini-Rifle Company. They had six M-60s and usually about 50 plus people, generally organized into one big platoon with six seven or eight man squads including an M-60. Some did okay, most got chewed up regularly because they'd give them company sized missions too often.

William F. Owen

03-05-2009, 06:40 AM

Two questions:

#1 -- Why the IAR not in 7.62 mm? Does using 5.56 mm for the IAR not just reinstate the lost full-auto option on the M16/M4 without really adding firepower?

#2 -- 30 rounds of 5.56 mm might in some situations be a little ... tight. What's the opinion here about using an adapted Beta C-mag for the IAR? Or a belt-drum?

#1 There's some interesting numbers when you look at mag-fed 7.62mm, but I don't have my note book to hand.

#2 I have only heard bad things about the C-Mag. There is new drum feed mag out now, that apparently works well, but they are bulky and heavy.

I'm not sure there is actually much difference between the two Wilf. The 48 is made in the US, the standard in Belgium, both by FN. They weigh the same. The 48 has a different gasplug and (sturdier) bipod. Other than that they appear to be pretty much identical.

Well I've examined both, and the Mk48 is a lot more "fiddly" than the M7.62, plus there is a body of complaint about it's robustness, which some at FN acknowledge, so I think the point that is worth making, is that while we load the boys down with all the other crap the push to lighten weapons comes at a cost. They needs to be considered in it's overall context.

William F. Owen

03-09-2009, 02:52 PM

For what it's worth, Bruce Gudmundsson had a short article looking at the historical evolution of the fire team around the automatic rifle, dating back to the Danish Army at the turn of the century. It's in Military History Quarterly, the Autumn 2008 issue, if you have a subscription or a good library, doesn't look to be available online.

I've never understood Bruce's fascination or reference to this. He made it when he revised English's "On Infantry", except in the book he said it was the German Army with the Danish Madsen.

In my opinion, it's not accurate or helpful. A Fire team is not "a 4 man team." It's a team dedicated to operating a weapon. It's historic roots are the field gun crews. The first MGs where mounted on field gun carriages, and had a field gun crews. Evolution just morphed them all into something, once infantry weapons required more than one man to operate and sustain them. It's historically irrelevant, but it's an argument worth study, once you see Fireteams trying to be mini-all arms entities, which they should not be.

AlexTX ret

05-18-2009, 09:56 PM

[QUOTE=William F. Owen;67891
In my opinion, it's not accurate or helpful. A Fire team is not "a 4 man team." It's a team dedicated to operating a weapon. It's historic roots are the field gun crews. The first MGs where mounted on field gun carriages, and had a field gun crews. Evolution just morphed them all into something, once infantry weapons required more than one man to operate and sustain them. It's historically irrelevant, but it's an argument worth study, once you see Fireteams trying to be mini-all arms entities, which they should not be.[/QUOTE]

I've fought this fight before. I think the idea of a fire team being a mini-squad is ridiculous. It may help C&C if all parts of a unit follow a set TO&E. But we need to keep the ability to operate with all sorts combinations of weapons and soldiers. I realize it's much more sanitized now then Vietnam was but who's to say we won't fight another war where we won't be able to resupply or bring in replacements at the drop of a hat.

I like big squads because I've fought mixed squads and platoons. I found it even advantagous at times. It taught me to be flexible in how I adaped my battleplan to the mission rather than try to adapt the mission to the organization I led. It also requires a certain amount of autonomity for unit leaders to get the job done as they see fit.

I realize that this is an anathma for the rigid C&C policy that has come with better, though more complex, telecomunication nets. In my "humble"opinion, leaders today seem as much worried about their careers as they do about accomplishing the mission. If this is true, I don't blame them when higher levels of command are as concerned about the political ramifications of a subordinate's actions and has the abiltiy to micromanage down to the squad level.

As for the concept of an IAR versus a belt fed mg, this is a critical one at the squad or platoon level. I think the squad should reduce the number of ammunition types it has to field. Secondly a squad should be as quick to react as possible. The use of 5.56 ammunition isn't such a liability. (The thought of the M262 mod 1 is interesting) Maybe the Platoon should be the lowest level that has a section that carries a belt fed 7.62 belt fed mg or however many it need to accomplish the mission. There is a need to have the capability of a platoon to be able to keep adversaries from picking a squad or platoon apart from a distance. In my opinion from handeling a SAW up close and personal, it's rate of fire is insufficent. It 's fragile and weighs too much for the little extra you gain from using it. The M48 is not the answer either. It has all the weaknesses of a SAW except for it uses a 7.62 NATO round. I liked the "Pig" too even though it got such a bad reputation over the years.

William F. Owen

05-19-2009, 04:23 AM

As for the concept of an IAR versus a belt fed mg, this is a critical one at the squad or platoon level. I think the squad should reduce the number of ammunition types it has to field. Secondly a squad should be as quick to react as possible. The use of 5.56 ammunition isn't such a liability. (The thought of the M262 mod 1 is interesting) Maybe the Platoon should be the lowest level that has a section that carries a belt fed 7.62 belt fed mg or however many it need to accomplish the mission.

In the British Army we did have an all 5.56mm Magazine section from when we lost the SLR-GPMG till they introduced the GPMG back into the platoon and then the Minimi-SAW into the fire teams.

reed11b

05-19-2009, 06:24 AM

I think the squad should reduce the number of ammunition types it has to field. Secondly a squad should be as quick to react as possible. The use of 5.56 ammunition isn't such a liability.

I disagree strongly. How many true "ammo is black" scenarios have there actually been? Even most of those were preventable if the unit had better HE projection. Giving HE projection (203 is inadequate) to the team is a force multiplier not an attempt to create an "combined arms team". For all of that I have been an advocate of moving belt-fed weapons out of fire teams and up to platoon level for years. The combat load for the SAW gunner creates a mobility imbalance in the team and that is bad.
Reed

William F. Owen

05-19-2009, 11:18 AM

I disagree strongly. How many true "ammo is black" scenarios have there actually been? Even most of those were preventable if the unit had better HE projection. Giving HE projection (203 is inadequate) to the team is a force multiplier not an attempt to create an "combined arms team". For all of that I have been an advocate of moving belt-fed weapons out of fire teams and up to platoon level for years. The combat load for the SAW gunner creates a mobility imbalance in the team and that is bad.
Reed

I think Reed11b and AlexTX may be closer than you think.

a.) Few units ever run out of ammo, but it is a constant and enduring fear, that has to be addressed - and though rare, has been a reality.

b.) Yes, HE projection is massively undervalued. Why? I have some idea, but a good mix of 40mm, rifle grenades and LASM/LAWs, would seem to address most issues, especially when the enhanced 40mm MV comes out.

c.) - and as I think I have said before, talking to some IDF guys a while back, they have reduced the number of Negev (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IMI_Negev) to as few as 2 per platoon.

Kiwigrunt

05-19-2009, 12:04 PM

b.) Yes, HE projection is massively undervalued. Why? I have some idea.....
.

Pray tell....
It does indeed appear that on this side of the old curtain we (over?) emphasize beltfeds to the detriment of HE.

Your point C. is also interesting, especially since they are 'only' 5.56 anyway. Do the Israelis carry more HE than the rest of us?

Reed, what do you mean by 'ammo is black'? :o

William F. Owen

05-19-2009, 01:30 PM

Pray tell....
It does indeed appear that on this side of the old curtain we (over?) emphasize beltfeds to the detriment of HE.

Your point C. is also interesting, especially since they are 'only' 5.56 anyway. Do the Israelis carry more HE than the rest of us?

I think the reason is blank firing on field exercises. GPMG makes lots of noise and confirms your participation. 40mm, LAW and 84mm, do nothing in field training!

Point C. The reasons vary from the 3-4 guys I've asked, but basically it's all about load and weight. They also scale the MAG-58 to at least one per platoon, but it seems to be an option, in concert with taking the Negevs or not. - and this all varies from unit to unit!

reed11b

05-19-2009, 01:47 PM

Pray tell....
It does indeed appear that on this side of the old curtain we (over?) emphasize beltfeds to the detriment of HE.

Your point C. is also interesting, especially since they are 'only' 5.56 anyway. Do the Israelis carry more HE than the rest of us?

Reed, what do you mean by 'ammo is black'? :o

"Black" is a status report meaning "none available" so ammo is balck means no ammo. While I have seen this in training, cases of this in the field are very very rare, and ussually the result of poor planning.
Reed

AlexTX ret

05-19-2009, 04:52 PM

In the British Army we did have an all 5.56mm Magazine section from when we lost the SLR-GPMG till they introduced the GPMG back into the platoon and then the Minimi-SAW into the fire teams.

I agree that we have sacrificed HE at the target. But I don't think that adding a SAW type weapon will add to that. And using a 7.62 NATO MMG will affect the maneuverability of your assault sections. I also agree that the 40mm grenade is too light and too short ranged to be effective in a lot of actions. The M79/M203 was considered too light back as far 'Nam. It was just that we didn't have anything else and we stretched its envelope beyond what was considered its capabilities.

I think that IARs and SDMs should be aquired as needed. I would think that this would be one of the assets that accumulate as unit progresses. (Sort of "lost" assets that just never is turned in by the unit so their availability grows far outside of the units static TO&E). Let the belt fed MMG be used at platoon level as needed.

However, I have a couple of of additions that I would like to add. The Russians in WW2 made an artform out of aggression and this with high fire power, (They made use of a lot of submachine guns in their Guard Units) created an amount of abject fear in thier opponents. While I have back pedaled a bit on this because of unnecessary casualties, an outwardly aggressive unit can be as effective when compared to a unit twice its size. I think that this has as much to do with tactical effectiveness as fire on the target.

The final thing that I would added to a squad liberally is some sort of equivalent of the Russian RPG system, especially the RPG 7 (newer model) and possibly RPG 16. They are compact, light and easily maneuvered. Just the thing to bunker bust as well as attacking bunched up troops. How much this would add to a squad's HE is up to how well it is utilized. In the movie, Blackhawk Down, they had to cut down the numbers pof RPG round expended by a devisor of 3. Think of that and how it could of affected other missions.

I like the RPG 29 and think highly of it as a replacement for all our smaller anti-tank weapons. However, I would again keep the Platoon as the lowest level of distibution.

As for the Negrev, I have had my hands on it once and was impressed with its robustness for what was basically a SAW. It did have the capability using Galili inf rifle magazines and M16 magazines with an adapter. How ever, it didn't have quite the range of a SAW, so it was even more limited in my opinion. A good weapon with very littel tactical usefulness. Howeve, when I was there, the IMF loved them. They even gave it the capability to fire rifle grenades. :o

William F. Owen

05-19-2009, 07:36 PM

I agree that we have sacrificed HE at the target. But I don't think that adding a SAW type weapon will add to that. And using a 7.62 NATO MMG will affect the maneuverability of your assault sections. I also agree that the 40mm grenade is too light and too short ranged to be effective in a lot of actions. The M79/M203 was considered too light back as far 'Nam. It was just that we didn't have anything else and we stretched its envelope beyond what was considered its capabilities.

I think you'll find that a few of us a SAW sceptics. You might also want to examine the capabilities of modern 40mm (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aX-99a1JCc4) natures.

There are also some very potent South African and German 40mm HEDP. IMO, 40mm is currently the way ahead, combined with RGs and LAWs. The new M72s are very capable weapons indeed.

reed11b

05-19-2009, 08:17 PM

Wilf,
Has the accuracy or range of the M72's increased along with the utility of the warheads?
Reed

AlexTX ret

05-20-2009, 03:27 AM

First I want to apologize for the grammer mistakes I made in my earlier post today. My only excuse is that I was running out the door of my motel for a meeting. For someone that seems to write memos all day, I really blew it! :rolleyes:

I think you'll find that a few of us a SAW sceptics. You might also want to examine the capabilities of modern 40mm natures.

There are also some very potent South African and German 40mm HEDP. IMO, 40mm is currently the way ahead, combined with RGs and LAWs. The new M72s are very capable weapons indeed.

My days are sometimes interesting when I can get out of the office. :D

It's interesting that the meeting I was running to was another demonstration (and a little play time) with the various FN Scar-L/M16 prototypes and the SCAR-H in all its 7.62 goodness. After all the various M16 variations and the HK 416 (very interesting weapon and possible upgrade for existing M16s and M4s) and HK 417, I find myself drawn to the FN SCAR and fire it every chance I get. I digress. :wry:

Anyway part of the demonstration was the easy on/off EGLM 40 mm grenade launcher. I can see your point of the newer 40 mm grenades. They are more effective now than they were 4-5 years ago. The effect of these new rounds, far exceeds their literature, in real life. I was especially impressed by the MEI Hellhound. I concede your point.

I have the literature for the Milkor M32 and M40 on my desk somewhere. (My assistant is worth her weight in gold but if she cleans my desk up, I can't find anything.) I fired the original South African Six Pack. However, it used only std 40 mm rounds. I was impressed by the extra rounds but still unimpressed by the std/old style 40 mm grenade. The new 40x46 rounds are most impressive even if fired in single shots. I have seen a video about the Milkor MGL and the effect of the various new 40x46mm rounds. Even more impressive after todays demonstration. However, Milkor has a new MGL called the M40 and it is a real b*d*ss.

I quote:

40x51mm

Ripple Effect – formerly Milkor – the South African designers of the Milkor MGL ("M32 MGL" in U.S. service) developed a new "Extended Range Low Pressure" (ERLP) 40x51mm cartridge. This round extends the range of the 40 mm grenade from 400 m (440 yd) to 800 m (880 yd). A new version of the MGL, the XRGL40 is chambered for the new round, but can still fire the regular 40x46mm grenade.

If it is as good as the video portrays, I'm going to make a date soon. This weapon could truly be a serious force multiplier. Old men need their toys too.

I have fired the Chinese QLZ - 87 35mm grenade launcher in it's 6 rnd bipod Light Infantry model. A good weapon, I think the system is lighter than the M32 but the grenades aren't as lethal. But is interesting in that it has a 6,9,12,15 rnd drum. Also could be a real force multiplier.

As for the M72 PI, it is a good weapon and can be supplied as single rounds and discarded. I still have a bias against it in that it is has such a short effective range. I also like the optics that are attached to the tube of the RPG 7v2 or 3. I also like the longer effective range. 900+m for the RPG7 vx 200m for the M72 PI though I like the fact that they have come up with so many variations of the M72 PI that could fill a broad range of missions.

William F. Owen

05-20-2009, 09:45 AM

Wilf,
Has the accuracy or range of the M72's increased along with the utility of the warheads?
Reed

oh yes... The trigger is now really good, and the specs I've discussed with NAMMO give it a dispersion of 1.5 mils at 250m.

William F. Owen

05-20-2009, 10:06 AM

First I want to apologize for the grammer mistakes I made in my earlier post today. My only excuse is that I was running out the door of my motel for a meeting. For someone that seems to write memos all day, I really blew it! :rolleyes:
Wat gramor?

After all the various M16 variations and the HK 416 (very interesting weapon and possible upgrade for existing M16s and M4s) and HK 417, I find myself drawn to the FN SCAR and fire it every chance I get. I digress. :wry:

Anyway part of the demonstration was the easy on/off EGLM 40 mm grenade launcher.

I have a few "issues" with the SCAR, and substantially fewer with HK-416, but they are not really relevant here. I see the Rangers are deploying with the SCAR any day now.

I rather like the G-36KV, but any 5.56mm with a 14-16 inch barrel will do the job.

The key to my mind is the MIL-STD 1913 rail and the ability to swap out Sighting Systems and things like the EGLM. It is in my opinion the most important development in infantry weapons since the advent of 5.56mm, and 40mm.

AlexTX ret

05-20-2009, 12:35 PM

Just got back from my mornng run so I feel I can take on anything...

Wat gramor?

I have a few "issues" with the SCAR, and substantially fewer with HK-416, but they are not really relevant here. I see the Rangers are deploying with the SCAR any day now.

I rather like the G-36KV, but any 5.56mm with a 14-16 inch barrel will do the job.

The key to my mind is the MIL-STD 1913 rail and the ability to swap out Sighting Systems and things like the EGLM. It is in my opinion the most important development in infantry weapons since the advent of 5.56mm, and 40mm.

I would like to know your issues are. I need all the info I can get. I live in a dream world most of the time. PR Hacks/Marketing make sure that their wares are shown in the best light possible and they "never" malfuntion. So any outside source is welcome. Sorry for using my public "open" Email account but it's hardly ever used so it's pretty secure.

I think I have the right HK 36KV, you are talking about the new version, right? It is a very good weapon though niether it or the XM8 take the std m16/NATO magazine. Not really a sticking point since HK will gladly change basically anything for a few hundred thousand unit order. :rolleyes:

However, the reliability tests were done with the special polymer magazines. I wonder what the tests would have been like if they had used std M16 magazines? The FN SCAR and the HK 416 were done with M16/NATO snd mags. However, it's just one of the things you have to consider when you evaluate "test' data.

However, it a very light weight weapon that hasn't been tested in the field enough to know how reliable it really is. All tests that I have knowlege of (Thank goodness for the God of coffee) have been done in controled enviorments. So time will tell.

It has the ugliest stock in existance. :eek:

As far as Mil accessory equipment rails, I think the British had the right idea of making a small optical sight as part of the standard rifle. Several companies are making optics as part of the overall package available. However, nothing comes free so most buyers still shun them.

Off topic: I think small optics and the M262 type round will be the wave of the future if there is going to be an upgrade of present rifles. This is where the HK 416 Upper receiver upgrade makes sense. Hope HK can keep its costs down.

Yes, I concure that the various new underbarrel GL launchers are a serious boost to unit effectveness, especially if they can use the new 40X51 rounds.

William F. Owen

05-20-2009, 07:12 PM

I would like to know your issues are.
My issues are actually with FN and some of the commercial reasoning and justification for the weapon. It's a rifle. There is nothing "special" about it, and I am really want to see the SCAR-H, with it's drop out, drop in barrel, match the accuracy of the a well maintained M14/Match/M-21. Not saying it can't be done, but I want to see it do it.

I think I have the right HK 36KV, you are talking about the new version, right? It is a very good weapon though niether it or the XM8 take the std m16/NATO magazine. Not really a sticking point since HK will gladly change basically anything for a few hundred thousand unit order. :rolleyes:
I am pretty sure HK will sell you the magazine housing for 1. It already exists. As for after market STANAG magazines, you are spoilt for choice.

Several companies are making optics as part of the overall package available. However, nothing comes free so most buyers still shun them.
What no one seem to cotton on to, is you can swap out sights and sighting systems, night vision, LPI, bipods and Grenade launchers, as the mission requires. That's all much more useful than deciding what length of barrel you want to fit - which is another part of the SCAR hype I just don't get.

reed11b

05-21-2009, 12:10 AM

oh yes... The trigger is now really good, and the specs I've discussed with NAMMO give it a dispersion of 1.5 mils at 250m.

If you ever get a test fire, drop me a line. My opinion on the LAW was that it's biggest failures were it's short range and difficulty in aiming it (hard to practice on a single shot disposable system). Fix those and I would disperse them fairly heavily if I could.
Reed

Kiwigrunt

05-21-2009, 01:51 AM

The accessory rails on the G36 (K) are really only good for bipods, torches etc. Not so good for aiming devices like IRADs etc because the fore stock is only held to the receiver with a single push-pin, and is therefore not very firm/solid. Also, a UGL requires a special fore-stock.
That is of course much better on the likes of HK 416, FN Scar, Robarms XCR etc.
However, it does appear (I have never been near one) that the bottom rail of the Scar is attached to the barrel, not the receiver. I would imagine that that would have a detrimental effect on accuracy when a bipod or UGL are attached to it.

What no one seem to cotton on to, is you can swap out sights and sighting systems, night vision, LPI, bipods and Grenade launchers, as the mission requires. That's all much more useful than deciding what length of barrel you want to fit - which is another part of the SCAR hype I just don't get.

I’m with you there Wilf. The same has been said for the Steyr AUG for the last three decades. I’ve yet to see a soldier with a backpack full of different barrels. You get issued with whatever barrel is on your rifle and that’s it. SF may have a bit more leeway but even for them I doubt that they will run around with an assortment of barrels. You would also need to re-zero your sights on every barrel-change.

Reed, I concur with regards to aiming the old M72. Could never quite get my head around that. And never got enough of them around my head to remedy that.:(

A number of posts ago (my God, this thread is moving again) you said this Wilf:

I think the reason is blank firing on field exercises. GPMG makes lots of noise and confirms your participation. 40mm, LAW and 84mm, do nothing in field training!
You may have hit the nail on the head there. However, when ammo is black (thanks Reed) and you are reduced to yelling “bullets, bullets, bullets”, then you can reintroduce HE by yelling “M72, M72, M72” :rolleyes:

ODB

05-21-2009, 02:01 AM

I get to get intimate with this in Oct. Rumormill most do not like it, but come Oct I will be putting it through it's paces and will share the feedback. Until then I'll remain silent on it.

Overall as a general purpose rifle still do not know why we are looking to replace the M4......makes no sense.

Without going into all the pros/cons in all environments. Have never had issues with it, all these so called studies, opinions, etc... in my mind are objectionable at best. Do not know many if anyone who puts as much ammo a year through their M4's. Then again maybe one only has to look as far as the maintainence on one throughout the year.

I will now wait for the shouting to begin and corrections to my observations by those much smarter than I to guide (pummel) me down the right path.

AlexTX ret

05-21-2009, 02:26 AM

My issues are actually with FN and some of the commercial reasoning and justification for the weapon. It's a rifle. There is nothing "special" about it, and I am really want to see the SCAR-H, with it's drop out, drop in barrel, match the accuracy of the a well maintained M14/Match/M-21. Not saying it can't be done, but I want to see it do it.

(snip)

What no one seem to cotton on to, is you can swap out sights and sighting systems, night vision, LPI, bipods and Grenade launchers, as the mission requires. That's all much more useful than deciding what length of barrel you want to fit - which is another part of the SCAR hype I just don't get.

Fabrique Nationale-Herstal is somewhat of a problem company right now. It designs and makes weapons of the first quality even if they are possibly over built for most large sales. However, a lot of countries, including the US, are caught in finacial situations where every corner must be cut. So even though they are fine rifles, the SCAR program is a bit pricey. However, I think that the basic rifles are such an improvement over the current M16/M4 that they don't come close.

However, I think the multi barrel option is a non-starter. I've never seen a specification where such an interchageable barrel system has been asked for. IMHO, it would increase an armorer's work load instead of decreasing it. It would create a supply problem in that how do you keep seperate barrels in stock to meet flexible TO&Es.

As far as the SCAR-H being the equivalence of the match M14/M1A or M21. I don't know. I haven't been able to compare them together since the DM program used up most M14/M21s and none of them have been released for international sales. On paper, it should be equal or better. It has a better magazine system while still being to use M14 mags. It is lighter and has a stronger more reliable action. Its interchangeable barrel system could allow for an accurized barrel using a dedicated sniper round. Optics would be no problem and other sniper gear would be easily added. However, the weapon that it would be compared to wouldn't be the M21/25 but the M110. There it would be a serious toss up. The M110 is a dedicated sniper weapon. I don't thing the SCAR-H was ever designed to match the precision of such a weapon. I would personally go with the M110 but they could create a dedicated sniper weapon out of the SCAR-H action and then it would be a serious contender.

I have compared the SCAR-H to the SVD and it was no contest. The SVD was specially buit for a DM/Sniper role and it showed. Even with good quality ammo, the SCAR-H wasn't optimized the same way that the SVD was. Also the 7.62x54r rounds the SVD uses are I think more than equal to the 7.62 sniper NATO round. The SVD and M110 are very similiar balistically. Again it would be the availability of the dedicated ammo both uses.

As for the advantage of Mil rails is that yes, you can selectably accessorize the weapon for any mission type. However, while I can see this being a great feature for a SOG group where you have the attention to detail required from your armorers. I wonder how effective it would be for non-specialized troops? Outside the possible use of "normal" things like night scopes and additional lights, will your unit have the prerequisite accessories? Does your armorer have the time and knowledge to optimize things for each trooper? It's a great idea that I think will become more and more used but there will have to be an increase in attention to detail by support personnel to make it work.

AlexTX ret

05-21-2009, 03:00 AM

The accessory rails on the G36 (K) are really only good for bipods, torches etc. Not so good for aiming devices like IRADs etc because the fore stock is only held to the receiver with a single push-pin, and is therefore not very firm/solid. Also, a UGL requires a special fore-stock.
That is of course much better on the likes of HK 416, FN Scar, Robarms XCR etc.
However, it does appear (I have never been near one) that the bottom rail of the Scar is attached to the barrel, not the receiver. I would imagine that that would have a detrimental effect on accuracy when a bipod or UGL are attached to it.

I’m with you there Wilf. The same has been said for the Steyr AUG for the last three decades. I’ve yet to see a soldier with a backpack full of different barrels. You get issued with whatever barrel is on your rifle and that’s it. SF may have a bit more leeway but even for them I doubt that they will run around with an assortment of barrels. You would also need to re-zero your sights on every barrel-change.

Reed, I concur with regards to aiming the old M72. Could never quite get my head around that. And never got enough of them around my head to remedy that.:(

A number of posts ago (my God, this thread is moving again) you said this Wilf:

You may have hit the nail on the head there. However, when ammo is black (thanks Reed) and you are reduced to yelling “bullets, bullets, bullets”, then you can reintroduce HE by yelling “M72, M72, M72” :rolleyes:

Yes, the Mil rails are weak though they do hold accessories that are mostly used in normal duty. THe UGL does use a differrent forestock/mounting system. I think many of the problems of the G36KV is the attempt by HK to try and make a rifle with lightness as one of its biggest issues.

As for the bottom rail on the FN SCAR being attatched to the barrel, it is. I don't like it either but it does seem to do its job well. I found no problems with the grenade launcher, probablely because the UGL doesn't knock the barrel out of zero when it's fired.

I've heard the same thing about the Steyr. Supposedly, it has turned into a real headache for supply.

The M72 PI is a much better weapon but I've already stated my thoughts on the weapon system in another post.

As for "ammo is black" scenarios, I think that the present wars have created a supply system that has matured to a great extent. However, if we have to commit serious numbers of soldiers, (Armies and above) I think that we'll see things not so sanitary.:(

AlexTX ret

05-21-2009, 03:22 AM

Overall as a general purpose rifle still do not know why we are looking to replace the M4......makes no sense.

Without going into all the pros/cons in all environments. Have never had issues with it, all these so called studies, opinions, etc... in my mind are objectionable at best. Do not know many if anyone who puts as much ammo a year through their M4's. Then again maybe one only has to look as far as the maintainence on one throughout the year.

I will now wait for the shouting to begin and corrections to my observations by those much smarter than I to guide (pummel) me down the right path.

The problem of the M4 is one of percieved usage. The usage of S109/M855 ammo is that it's marginal coming out of a 20" barrel. It takes a great amount of shot placement to be truly effective. Not that big a problem if the majority of your troops shoot Expert at the range. However, the M4 has been sold to the Army as a replacement for all other small weapons. From A 14" barrel, there is a significant amount of balistic energy lost. So again if the user didn't qualify expert at the range, it is even weaker than a std M16. If this reality is accepted then the M4 is a good weapon. However, it is my understanding that it still overheats in a serious firefight even if proper maintenace is done. But as you say, how much ammunition is put through a M4 in a year by the average user? I assume not that much. So overheating shouldn't be that big a problem. And for all the controversy, it is still better than a pistol and even superior to a submachine gun. :wry:

I hope I'm not raining on your day. I think you brought up a good point.

Ken White

05-21-2009, 03:55 AM

William F. Owen

05-21-2009, 07:59 AM

Guys,

I think we need to admit that physics and engineering are pretty much the limiting factors in terms of working with what we have. Weight for weight, the M4 Carbine is pretty good. Far from perfect, but it is "good enough."

Personally, as I implied in this article (http://rusi.org/downloads/assets/Owen,_UK_Platoon_Weapons.pdf), I don't really think we have a very good understanding of infantry weapons as a whole. We have snap shots of "best practice" and "seems to work," but having a debate about 14" versus 16.5" or even 20" seems pointless bearing in mind the limiting factor is someone shooting under stress, and the enemy seem not to care what is shooting at them, as long as it is!

Physics pretty much tells you what you can have for the weight. After that it seems to be very much a human performance discussion.

AlexTX ret

05-21-2009, 02:20 PM

I started to reply to a series of post on this thread when I realized that we're possibly being myopic about this discussion. The military bureaucracy is not on the same page as the soldier in the field. The squad and platoon are the tip of the spear. Why can't we develope a weapon or weapon systems that will best suit our troops and their mission. What's wrong with the military procurement system? I think the relatively micro managed war in Iraq and to a lesser sense, Afganistan, has lulled us into a sense of complacency. From what I hear from most of the returning Vets is that they feel that they were as much policemen as soldiers. Even in Afganistan, conflicts are sharp quick and sanitized. Are all future wars going to be like this?

So I propose that we change things a little bit here and actually come up with systems that we would really want our virtual squads and platoons to field. What existing systems that would best suit our troops is an important discussion. But like Wilt mentioning the Milkor M32 and M40 multiple round GL launchers, what other weapon systems would be optimum to give the best bang for the buck or just the best bang?

I'll start with a few questions and hope I can get a few answers.

First, the United States has millions of M16's ver A2 - A4. Is it worth scapping all these weapons for a new system and/or caliber cartridge? Should we keep our investment in the M16/M4 system and modify the upper reciever and barrel to optimize for the optimum 5.56 NATO round. Should we just say that there is no reason to change anything and just accept the status quo.

Should we develop an effective IAR and through that develope a SDM. Should we scrap the SAW or use it for special missions. The Saw seems to suffer from not only being fragile but it's a maintenance hog. However, if we create a IAR and SDM program to its extremes, should it be the same cartridge as the rest of the squad? It would ease supply issues if and when we fight a war that isn't as supply intensive as the ones we're fighting now.

What should be the extra weapons systems and how should they be depolyed? Wilt is a fan of the multiple warhead type M72 PI And I still like and trust the ancient RPG7v2-3. Is there something else that would work better. Should we scrap the AT4, the SMAW and the Javelin for something new or should we better deploy them?

I quess what I'm really asking is what should the "real" 21st century soldier be like? And I would like to extend it beyond the Iraq/Afganistan and think out side the box for many people I deal with are concerned that things maybe developing that are much larger than what we'ew involved in now.

One last example, The F22 program is in trouble and without it, we are using decades old technolgy. There is also a question that the F22 may not be the equal of the S 37. Do we cut the program to save money that could be used other places? Do we bite the bullet and order more F22 to replace our aging fighter aircraft? Or do we see if a better fighter can be built? This has nothing to do with SWC infantry squad and platoon weapons. I've just used this as an example of what I would like for us to do if possible.

Thank all of you for humoring me. :D

AlexTX ret

05-21-2009, 02:50 PM

M1 and M2 Carbine. They were issued by the ton in WW II and worked fairly well for the last year or so of the war. We took 'em to Korea. In the winter of 1950, it was discovered that the Carbine had a tendency to freeze up in extreme cold AND that it would not stop charging Korean or Chinese troops with heavy padded jackets. Voila, the Carbine disappeared almost overnight, replaced by the M1 which would stop most anything -- and do at reliably at 6-700meters.

The M4 worked reasonably well in Iraq, no one there had many complaints. OTOH, in Afghanistan, it had two big problems. Range for the open spaces and knockdown on stoned Afghans who are made of different stuff than Iraqis. Afghanistan was relegated to a side show so the fact that Iraq had no major complaints overrode the grumbling from Afghanistan. That grumbling will now get louder. We'll see what happens with that.

I mention the carbine only to highlight that we have in the intervening 59 years gotten so bureaucratic that we can no longer make life saving decisions in a timely manner...:mad:

I helped run the original troop test on then AR 15 in 1963. We -- the Army -- recommended that a few be bought for special purpose units but the M14 be retained for world wide service. That was based primarily on the 5.56 varmint cartridge rework poor results on the hundreds of pigs we killed for the Oscar Meyer Plant in Fayetteville. Instead, McNamara canceled the running M-14 contract and ordered the M-16 into production. I'm sure the fact that TRW had contributed to Nixon's campaign while Colt had contributed to Kennedy's had no bearing on the decision. :rolleyes:

I carried one in combat for two years, It is not a good weapon, never has been and the dumb things the Ordnance Corps did to it did not help. Nor did Barry Mccaffery -- the godfather of the M4 -- help. I've always been fascinated by that bolt closure device on the Ma1 and it's clones...

As AlexTX ret says it's the weapon we have and there are sure a lot worse ones around, all it needs for now is a decent cartridge; the new Brown Tip may do the job. We'll see about that as well, I guess.

I know a lot of people that swear by the M1 carbine. Some have tried to make them into deer rifles. However, you're right, the M1 cartridge is a might stained by practically everything it tries to do. However, the only criteria for its developement was that it could take the place of the various pistols used by most of the military. Given that parameter, was it better than a pistol to everyone not on the frontline?

As for the M4, it was never designed to take the place of the standard M16A2+. I think it was a failing of the Tactical Generals because they wanted to issue the M4 as an all purpose weapon. It still is better than a pistol or submachine gun.

As for the M16, 2 thoughts.

First: Where are all the advisors who said that the M16 would be a enemy force devisor. For every enemy soldier wounded would require up to as many as 4 other soldiers to get the wounded trooper back to an aid station? :mad:

Second: My AKMS never failed to fire. It had other issues such as battlefield identification because of its different sound when it fired. However, one SF soldier used a 30-30 so there was a lot of differences between established T&OE and what we actually fought with.

Going back to the M1 carbine, indirectly, it was part of the reason we got the M16. The military sort of fubared and forgot all the worst things about a small cartridge weapon. It rationalized that the the M1 Carbine was a success. I know they handed out enough of them to the ARVNs.

William F. Owen

05-21-2009, 03:02 PM

Wilt mentioning the Milkor M32 and M40 multiple round GL launchers, what other weapon systems would be optimum to give the best bang for the buck or just the best bang?

Wilt is a fan of the multiple warhead type M72 PI And I still like and trust the ancient RPG7v2-3. Is there something else that would work better. Should we scrap the AT4, the SMAW and the Javelin for something new or should we better deploy them?

I assume you mean me, and that would be WilF. My wife has called me Wilt, but at that is a long - very long- and sordid story....

What I am a "fan" of is limiting the number of weapons and ammunition natures in the fire team and the platoon to fewest and simplest options that will allow you to create and sustain the required effects on the enemy.

My opinions are based on achieving specific effects at specific ranges, based on a carried weight. Thus I am far more concerned with thinking about the range and the effect, than I am the weapon.

Ken White

05-21-2009, 04:36 PM

...Are all future wars going to be like this?Almost certainly not. We can and should avoid wars like these and when a real war comes along -- and it eventually will -- people are going to be in for a big shock...
I'll start with a few questions and hope I can get a few answers.Keep the M4 as is for now, minimal mods, no new upper, simply improve the cartridges in general issue.

There are multiple reasons to change; maintenance intensity not sustainable in heavy conflict, inadequate lethality, unreliability -- but we should take the time to do it right. Not that we will do that... :rolleyes:

One pistol or SMG cartridge (9mm has major lethality problems for moderately trained shooters) and one for a carbine / rifle / AR / GPMG. No belt fed below company level (maintenance and training problem). Four cartridges at Bn level, pistol / carbine etc. / .50 / 40mm or whatever grenade like rounds we finally select. A real war will be far more supply intensive than anything seen by us in the last 50 years.

The LAW is good, need more and better and that's achievable; Javelin is good and needs to stay until a lighter, better replacement is developed. RPG has more disadvantages than advantages.

The F-22 decision has been made, Congress may or may not go along. Why would /do we need a better fighter at this time -- and if we developed one, would it be manned or unmanned?
...Given that parameter, was it better than a pistol to everyone not on the frontline?Yes and no. More range, less handy, more rounds per magazine, less lethal, more maintenance, less reliable. All weapons are compromises.
Tactical Generals because they wanted to issue the M4 as an all purpose weapon. It still is better than a pistol or submachine gun.Thus my lambasting McCaffery on the M4. It is better than the existing pistol, we have no SMG and both those are better in the proper caliber for some jobs than the M4. All weapons are compromises and the M4 is adequate but not as good a compromise as is possible.
First: Where are all the advisors who said that the M16 would be a enemy force devisor.Good question, been my observation that those who spout such idiocy are rarely seen carrying the weapon they tout in combat.
I know they handed out enough of them to the ARVNs.That's more because the ARVN hated the M1 which they also had in large quantities; the weapon was bigger than they were in some cases and the recoil was, to them, vicious. They were given the option of Carbines with less lethality and less recoil so they took it. Proving that the US is not alone in making dumb weapons decisions.

AlexTX ret

05-21-2009, 10:09 PM

And I'm playing a highly paid secretary today. :rolleyes:

I assume you mean me, and that would be WilF. My wife has called me Wilt, but at that is a long - very long- and sordid story....

Sorry, "Wilf", I won't make the mistake a second time! Though the long and sordid story might be interesting. Then again if you don't tell me yours then I won't have to tell mine!

What I am a "fan" of is limiting the number of weapons and ammunition natures in the fire team and the platoon to fewest and simplest options that will allow you to create and sustain the required effects on the enemy.

That goes to the heart of my questing completely. IMHO, I don't want to limit the effectiveness or adaptability of a unit to acomplish a mission. However, I think that we need to make supplying that unit as simple as possible.

2nd: I think the less the number of different weapons (and cartridges) a squad or a platoon uses in most situations (excepting more complex missions) increases the possibility that all soldiers can be taught to be at least familiar (if not expert) on all the weapons used. This would be a great advantage as a unit takes casualties. It would also help when trying to get replacements settled.

3rd: Nevertheless, I think training to make total use of the weapons that supplied to such a unit may create a certain amount of creativity and problem solving. Again lower level leaders should be allowed a certain amount of anonymity to create solutions to various missions. If all squads do "a" when faced with problem "b" then the enemy knows to do "c" to counter it.

My opinions are based on achieving specific effects at specific ranges, based on a carried weight. Thus I am far more concerned with thinking about the range and the effect, than I am the weapon.

yes, but... The problem is that if you do not describe the weapon then emphasis on specific weigth and ranges get lost in the procurement proccess. Supposedly all attemps at creating a proper assault gun cartridge has ended up with a round near 7mm in size. But for the EM-2 which was very advanced for its time (Possibly too advanced to be accepted) there has never been a weapon to match with the cartridge. I know that "It wasn't designed here" had a lot to do with it but the US decided to create a weapon first. It was a modified M1 with improvements. It was then that they created a cartridge to fit the rifle. The acceptance/ overiding politics of the M16/AR15 and its cartridge had less to do with ranges and mission optimization than some poorly though out criteria. And the military as a whole has the same blind spots. We still have the M16/AR15 as our primary infantry weapon 46 years after the debacle of the M16 in the early years of the 'Nam.

AlexTX ret

05-21-2009, 11:15 PM

Almost certainly not. We can and should avoid wars like these and when a real war comes along -- and it eventually will -- people are going to be in for a big shock...Keep the M4 as is for now, minimal mods, no new upper, simply improve the cartridges in general issue.

There are multiple reasons to change; maintenance intensity not sustainable in heavy conflict, inadequate lethality, unreliability -- but we should take the time to do it right. Not that we will do that... :rolleyes:

Yep, we really scewed the pooch on our small wars in Iraq and Afganistan. though I know quite a bit of what went on in the administration and the military on the ground, I can't say much about it. Let us say that we took weak intelligence and used it to further our objectives. Then we exacerbated our problems by confused and conflicting after action orders.

However, a real war would be really messy and possibly "frightening". I agree that we are headed for it and if we don't start acting properly with indepth intelligence that may not be politically correct, a lot of people are going to wake up with a hot round in their laps. *sigh*

I agree on the M4 though it would reguire a barrel change to optimize for the better 5.56 cartridge. The M262 requires a 1 in 8 spin optimally. Not to say the M262 is the optimum cartridge.

As for taking our time, I agree. However, there is a problem with our procurement system To simplify and take more control of the procurement system, the military decides ahead of time what the parameters of the weapon, etc should be. Yes, this is the perogitive of the Generals and their civilian advisors. However, it keeps designers from thinking outside of the box. And I've seen little such thinking by the "Tactical Generals". So who will step up to the plate and speak for those who have to accomplish the mission?

One pistol or SMG cartridge (9mm has major lethality problems for moderately trained shooters) and one for a carbine / rifle / AR / GPMG. No belt fed below company level (maintenance and training problem). Four cartridges at Bn level, pistol / carbine etc. / .50 / 40mm or whatever grenade like rounds we finally select. A real war will be far more supply intensive than anything seen by us in the last 50 years.

The LAW is good, need more and better and that's achievable; Javelin is good and needs to stay until a lighter, better replacement is developed. RPG has more disadvantages than advantages.

I don't have an answer to the 9mm question. Would a 40S&W be the answer, I don't know because it isn't as acurate a round as the 9mm or the 45. Would a 45 be the answer, better accuracy but there would have to be more and better training for those men and women who are of a smaller stature to handle the recoil of the weapon. I'm not saying that they can't handle it, I just saying they would need more experience. However, that goes for any weapon. Without proper training and continued practice, any weapon might as well be a rock.

I would add the 40mm grenade launcher to the squad/platoon mix but I agree with your accessment. I'll bite my toungue and say that the M72 PI would also be a good addition to the squad/platoon mix since it is issued a single round and doesn't require a weapon to fire it. You either have it or not.

I think your also correct to most weapons requireing a crew be regulated to company level. In my years as a RA, I found such weapons confusing to both leaders who needed to field and fight them and to training of other members of the squad/platoon to pick up the weapon and operate it in an aggresive manner, when casualties occured. People get hurt out ther you know! :o

The F-22 decision has been made, Congress may or may not go along. Why would /do we need a better fighter at this time -- and if we developed one, would it be manned or unmanned?Yes and no.

Both China and Russia are showing much improved fighters than possibly we can field now. I don't know if they are just a handfull of protoypes in which we could be wasting money for nothing. However, we can't compete with the 2nd world countries in number of aircraft, so we need to create better aircraft that will give us air superiority. We need good intel more and more. it might be the best investment we can make now!?!

More range, less handy, more rounds per magazine, less lethal, more maintenance, less reliable. All weapons are compromises.Thus my lambasting McCaffery on the M4. It is better than the existing pistol, we have no SMG and both those are better in the proper caliber for some jobs than the M4.

Agreed!

All weapons are compromises and the M4 is adequate but not as good a compromise as is possible.

Agreed! But when we try to fit weapons that don't fit their supposed mission then the "feet on the ground" suffers.

Good question, been my observation that those who spout such idiocy are rarely seen carrying the weapon they tout in combat.That's more because the ARVN hated the M1 which they also had in large quantities; the weapon was bigger than they were in some cases and the recoil was, to them, vicious. They were given the option of Carbines with less lethality and less recoil so they took it. Proving that the US is not alone in making dumb weapons decisions.

My opposite number on one of my rotations was so disgusted with the M1 carbine that he cried when I got him a M16. It was kind of sad really. I thought the "Mattel" rifle was terrible but it was so much better than the M1 carbine. And so the story goes...

Ken White

05-22-2009, 03:11 AM

...though I know quite a bit of what went on in the administration and the military on the ground, I can't say much about it...Wow.No one else here can say that. Or would.
.Then we exacerbated our problems by confused and conflicting after action orders.We exacerbated our problems by incompetence at high levels in uniform and showed the result of 25 years of poor training.
However, a real war would be really messy and possibly "frightening".War is not frightening to those who are prepared for it. It will be for those who want to fight nicely.
...we don't start acting properly with indepth intelligence that may not be politically correct.Democracies in peacetime do not do good intel -- or adequately train their military forces; Legislators and Mommies get upset. I can accept that for the benefits of the system.
The M262 requires a 1 in 8 spin optimally. Not to say the M262 is the optimum cartridge.The Mk262 (I guess that's the one you're referring to) has a 77 grain bullet; the new one has a 70 grain bullet. Barrel change either way but that's okay because we don't teach people how to clean weapons well so barrels get excessive wear from over maintenance.
I'll bite my toungue and say that the M72 PI would also be a good addition to the squad/platoon mix...There are some new ones in the works.
Agreed! But when we try to fit weapons that don't fit their supposed mission then the "feet on the ground" suffers.True, that's why the M16 as purely political for the initial purchase is pretty sad.
My opposite number on one of my rotations was so disgusted with the M1 carbine that he cried when I got him a M16. The Viet Namese Airborne Brigade had a number of purchased AR-15s; 15 to 20 per Rifle Company. If a troop carrying one got hit, they'd get five men killed to get that weapon back. We got some 'to be scrapped' M-60s to use in lieu of the BARs -- bear to scrounge Ammo for 'em. The little guys loved the Pig as well. :D

AlexTX ret

05-22-2009, 04:59 AM

I'm glad to see a smiling face!!!

Wow.No one else here can say that. Or would.

I worked for a time as as contract intell. Everything I know is hearsay but at the right time and the right place, a simple question can verify the most complex of concepts. Also everything I say, I know that it has been reported in the media repeatedly. Everything else, I'll tell my grandchildren when they'e grown, if I live that long. I don't get a thrill out of being a hero. That should be left to one's children and the young. Who knows after 9/11, anyone could be listening and I might find myself on a list. I just hope they get my name right. :D

We exacerbated our problems by incompetence at high levels in uniform and showed the result of 25 years of poor training.War is not frightening to those who are prepared for it. It will be for those who want to fight nicely.Democracies in peacetime do not do good intel -- or adequately train their military forces; Legislators and Mommies get upset. I can accept that for the benefits of the system.

Our Founding Fathers created a system that freedom and the ability to say, without fear, what we felt was neccessary. So it's not unreasonable that we have a system that is unperfect but flexible. The problem is when we turn from that path. In certain ways, the military has turned to the dark side. It is bloated and dictitorial. So we find ourselves unable to come up with clear, comprehensive and tested policy that can comprehend shades of gray.

The military has changed little since I was a shave tail 2lt. If anything, it has gotten worse. I'm not discussing sedition but there may come a time for new blood to rise to the top and let in some light. However, it won't come anytime soon. So we do with what we have and try and make it better.

War is frightening no matter how prepared you are for it. It is how you handle that fear that dictates ow effect you are. It's like a new man in your squad or platoon. He talks like he's big and bad but you know to keep an extra eye on him when he is baptised by fire. Sorry for stating the obvious to one as distingished as yourself. I think the problem is that we've become complacent and have forgotten the true sting of combat. Those who play nice are going to be the ones hurtiing the most. I think we are doing a diservice to our troops by trying to make it anything but a terrible, gory business. But like you say, it would upset the kiddies.

I too accept the benefits of the system and would fight again if came to that. I think most veterans would. That is our way. And I hope to God that it never changes.

The Mk262 (I guess that's the one you're referring to) has a 77 grain bullet; the new one has a 70 grain bullet. Barrel change either way but that's okay because we don't teach people how to clean weapons well so barrels get excessive wear from over maintenance.There are some new ones in the works.

Yeah, I had an interesting discussion about the 6.5 MPC and how the goverment is taking a serious look at it. It is shorter ranged than the Mk262 but it hits with more authority. It also gives a greater pulse than the 5.56 and that would make the impinged gas system more reliable. And all it would reguire is a barrel change. And your right, most of the Army's M16/M4s are close to needing a rebuild/refit. From what I've heard tonight the Army has decided already that the SCAR-L is too unreliable even before the Rangers get a chance to test it. They are saying the same thing about the HK416. It seems that they feel that the short stroke piston gas system is an unwarranted change. Go figure.

True, that's why the M16 as purely political for the initial purchase is pretty sad.The Viet Namese Airborne Brigade had a number of purchased AR-15s; 15 to 20 per Rifle Company. If a troop carrying one got hit, they'd get five men killed to get that weapon back. We got some 'to be scrapped' M-60s to use in lieu of the BARs -- bear to scrounge Ammo for 'em. The little guys loved the Pig as well. :D

I can imagine. Why did we do so poor a service to the ARVN and then complain that they couldn't fight their own war? Scrounge? Didn't you have the magic mojo. Contraband or anything hard to get would open all sorts of doors. I always wondered if it was corruption that added to our failure in 'Nam.

Ken White

05-22-2009, 06:16 AM

I'm glad to see a smiling face!!!

I worked for a time as as contract intell.As have a good many here, contract or otherwise. Most don't broadcast; no need to, as you say it'll come out.
In certain ways, the military has turned to the dark side. It is bloated and dictitorial. So we find ourselves unable to come up with clear, comprehensive and tested policy that can comprehend shades of gray.Been true in my observation since I was big enough to notice, my Father was in the Navy before WW II and I can recall the period well, I went in in the Marine corps in '49 after a couple of years in the NG, then in the Army, retired and worked for 'em as a civilian -- been dictatorial and bureaucratic ever since I can remember. Not to worry, the kids make it work.
I'm not discussing sedition but there may come a time for new blood to rise to the top and let in some light. However, it won't come anytime soon. So we do with what we have and try and make it better.New blood comes with every war; we'll see how this batch does. Hopefully the kids will do better that the post Viet Nam crowd who got more enamored of protecting the institution than they did of doing their jobs.
War is frightening no matter how prepared you are for it. ... I think we are doing a diservice to our troops by trying to make it anything but a terrible, gory business. But like you say, it would upset the kiddies.I don't think I said that and I certainly didn't mean to. War is only frightening if you decide it should be; decide you're okay with it and you can be. Some people cannot do that but most can. Some people actually enjoy it and they aren't crazy. Different strokes. You can tell a 19 year old how bloody and gory war is for hours, they don't care, they're immortal. ;)

I can imagine. Why did we do so poor a service to the ARVN and then complain that they couldn't fight their own war? Scrounge? Didn't you have the magic mojo. Contraband or anything hard to get would open all sorts of doors. I always wondered if it was corruption that added to our failure in 'Nam.Because a pathetically bad personnel system and the one year tour in Viet Nam produced a systemic disregard for the nation and its people. I don't mind scrounging, I did and do mind contraband. Corruption by US folks in country or 'corruption' by the Viet Namese doing what they'd always done in their country?

Keeping dead men on muster rolls was viewed by many Co Van as corrupt -- most didn't realize and in a year didn't find out that money usually didn't go the the commander -- the pay for one dead soldier would support the families of three or four dead ones in a system that had no pensions, death gratuities or insurance...

Corruption is in the eye of the beholder. Anyone who believes the Viet Namese were corrupt will enjoy the Middle East or South Asia...:wry:

William F. Owen

05-22-2009, 07:10 AM

The acceptance/ overiding politics of the M16/AR15 and its cartridge had less to do with ranges and mission optimization than some poorly though out criteria. And the military as a whole has the same blind spots. We still have the M16/AR15 as our primary infantry weapon 46 years after the debacle of the M16 in the early years of the 'Nam.

Whoah there! Let's separate a few things out.

a.) The reasoning behind a small calibre was good and has been proven. Low-recoil high velocity rounds mean low dispersion during handheld auto/semi-automatic fire.

b.) That the AR-15 was poorly designed and that the original M193 round was a bit of mess, in no way invalidates the concept.

c.) Like it or not, 5.56mm has gone on to be one of the, (perhaps the) most successful, widely used military SAA rounds of all time.

AlexTX ret

05-22-2009, 01:51 PM

Was a bit under the weather when I replied last...

As have a good many here, contract or otherwise. Most don't broadcast; no need to, as you say it'll come out.

Exaserbated a problem. I'll paraphrase Gary Cooper who supposed to have said this when his party wasn't admitted to a celebrity restrant. A member of his party was supposed to have said that Gray Cooper should have told the Maitre De (spl) who he was. "If I have to tell them who I am then I'm not."

Been true in my observation since I was big enough to notice, my Father was in the Navy before WW II and I can recall the period well, I went in in the Marine corps in '49 after a couple of years in the NG, then in the Army, retired and worked for 'em as a civilian -- been dictatorial and bureaucratic ever since I can remember.

Good, God, I'm a mere babe in arms.

Not to worry, the kids make it work.New blood comes with every war; we'll see how this batch does. Hopefully the kids will do better that the post Viet Nam crowd who got more enamored of protecting the institution than they did of doing their jobs.

1949, It must have been the same after WW2 or Korea, My father talks about the same problems that I had after 'Nam. yea, I know Nicaragua all over agqain. I guess it really never changes.

Yea, its all about youth. We went into WW2 with our expectations of WW1 intact. We did the same in Vietnam and every confrontation I've been in since. However, young soldiers and officers are resilient. They are always there to correct us when we lose our sight of the objectives. However, I think the military as a whole slowly failed when officers failed to protect the soldiers under them, failed to give them proper respect. In return the enlisted grades realized this and felt that they needed to protect themselves or said fubar and got out. It sort of took out the heart of the Army. In the end all we got was a lot of leaders that became self serving and political. It's kind of sad, really. But it happens to almost every country in the world so we shouldn't feel alone. Though it don't make it right.

I don't think I said that and I certainly didn't mean to. War is only frightening if you decide it should be; decide you're okay with it and you can be. Some people cannot do that but most can. Some people actually enjoy it and they aren't crazy. Different strokes. You can tell a 19 year old how bloody and gory war is for hours, they don't care, they're immortal. ;)

No you didn't say that. I said it all on my own.

I guess I see the same thing you see just reacted to the situation differently. I was afraid and it never wore off. I just never let it become destructive. Instead I learned to channel it constructively so that I could do what ever was neccessary to complete the mission. Not pleased in all of my actions but I got the mission done. However, in the end it became a job, just a job. However, I always ascribe it to patriotism. And that is what I'm most proud of. no matter how sordid my job was, I realized that it furthered our country in some way. what more could one ask for.

I still remember 19 and being very bulletproof. My son is 22 and he is truly immortal and he' not shy about saying to. Yea, I have all the success you can probably imagine telling him different.

Because a pathetically bad personnel system and the one year tour in Viet Nam produced a systemic disregard for the nation and its people. I don't mind scrounging, I did and do mind contraband. Corruption by US folks in country or 'corruption' by the Viet Namese doing what they'd always done in their country?

I think that Americans for the most part were naive and the South Vietnamese were glad to take advantage of it. But we lost our virginity and got caught up in the game. Sort of childhoods end. I was willing to do what ever it needed to get the tools and suppies to do the mission that was required of my unit irregardless of what cost it did to me as a man/soldier. I guess everyone loses somethng in the end.

Keeping dead men on muster rolls was viewed by many Co Van as corrupt -- most didn't realize and in a year didn't find out that money usually didn't go the the commander -- the pay for one dead soldier would support the families of three or four dead ones in a system that had no pensions, death gratuities or insurance...

Corruption is in the eye of the beholder. Anyone who believes the Viet Namese were corrupt will enjoy the Middle East or South Asia...:wry:

Oh, yea! Operators over there will sell you anything from a senator's robes to a senator inside them. Paraphrasing Robert Heinlein if it matters.

AlexTX ret

05-22-2009, 02:52 PM

Whoah there! Let's separate a few things out.

Okay...

a.) The reasoning behind a small calibre was good and has been proven. Low-recoil high velocity rounds mean low dispersion during handheld auto/semi-automatic fire.

Yes, a smaller round is always better than a full sized cartridge to do these things. The problem is that what is too small. The M16 and the 5.56 was and still is marginal without precise shot management. Something not always attainable in most fire fights. And now we have a significant number of M16/M4s. Do we scrap these weapons to find another possibly better round.

There is talk of creating another round that will better take down an enemy soldier. If not the Mk 262, then another one. I've heard over the last couple of weeks that the Army is looking to replace the 5.56 round with a 6.5 MPC round. It uses a modified 5.56 case with a heavier bullet. Same basic range as the SS109/M855 cartridge with a greater energy released into the target. It also has a greater pulse that improves the reliability of the Impinged direct gas system in the M4.

But you're right all of these are smaller cartridges. Though all the experts say that the 7mm round is the best overall cartridge for an assault weapon. The major parties in the world use a 5mm+/- bullet in a smaller case. The problem is that do we need to follow established protocal and not take the chance of upsetting our NATO allies for not remaining with the 5.56 ss109 cartridge or do we think outside the box?

b.) That the AR-15 was poorly designed and that the original M193 round was a bit of mess, in no way invalidates the concept.

No but it didn't help matters. I'm not a one to change things if the old design still work. However, we have had the basic 5.56 round for over 46 years and once again there is talk about changeing. I don't see this happening for political and entrenchmentissues. However, even in Russia there is a clamoring amoung their SOG groups to return to the 7.62x39 round.

c.) Like it or not, 5.56mm has gone on to be one of the, (perhaps the) most successful, widely used military SAA rounds of all time.

Yes, but why? Is it because it is really that good or did America strong arm the rest of NATO into accepting our cartridge? There has been at least one change in the bullet weight to try and make 5.56 more effective. Will there soon be another? Anything else would require a upper receiver change instead of only a barrel change. All of this costs money, something the goverment doesn't have a lot of at this time. so the reason that we may not change to another round from 5.56, is purely economics.

William F. Owen

05-22-2009, 04:01 PM

Yes, a smaller round is always better than a full sized cartridge to do these things. The problem is that what is too small.

Too small to do what? 9mm suppresses as well as .308 Winchester at 200m.
There is simply no coherent body of evidence to support that assertion. Most evidence supports the assertion the fact that the calibre of round used by the infantry is utterly irrelevant. No tactical actions have ever been consistently lost, or operations failed because troops were using 5.56mm. Lots of armies using 5.56mm have no complaints.

But you're right all of these are smaller cartridges. Though all the experts say that the 7mm round is the best overall cartridge for an assault weapon.
Yet when you actually crunch the numbers on weapons weight, recoil, and weight of carried rounds, this is not true, unless you go for a very short 7mm like 7.62mm x 25 (PPSH - TT33 etc). When all is said and done, 5.56mm is good enough. Why change?

reed11b

05-22-2009, 04:16 PM

Yet when you actually crunch the numbers on weapons weight, recoil, and weight of carried rounds, this is not true, unless you go for a very short 7mm like 7.62mm x 25 (PPSH - TT33 etc). When all is said and done, 5.56mm is good enough. Why change?

I believe the logic is that an "intermediate" round would allow the MG and AR to effectively use the same round; i.e. a round heavy enough to knock down cover and have decent range and trajectory, and a round small enough and low enough recoil to be a good AR round. I would argue that the numbers say between 6 and 7mm rounds are ideal for that concept, but the question is, is the concept itself valid? As for me, 5.56 worked pretty well for me in the M4, but I was wanting for something more substantial for the SAW (the old tank berms on the side of the MSR back in '03 stopped the SAW round cold).
Reed

William F. Owen

05-22-2009, 04:39 PM

I believe the logic is that an "intermediate" round would allow the MG and AR to effectively use the same round; i.e. a round heavy enough to knock down cover and have decent range and trajectory, and a round small enough and low enough recoil to be a good AR round.

Something like this (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/5.8x42mm_DBP87)

Right now, I can live and thrive with 5.56mm for ARs, 7.62mm NATO for MGs, and 8.59mm for snipers

AlexTX ret

05-23-2009, 03:00 AM

The President signed it into law this afternoon. IMHO, it's going to change the way the Pentagon does business. However, I'm afraid it's going to tie the procurement system closer to the whims of Congress. What the Military couldn't do for itself, will be done by politicians. Net loss for the Military. Is it a net gain for the taxpayer or just a gain for the Lobbyists?

Too small to do what? 9mm suppresses as well as .308 Winchester at 200m.

I could argue that one but it would be IMHO, relatively fruitless.

There is simply no coherent body of evidence to support that assertion. Most evidence supports the assertion the fact that the calibre of round used by the infantry is utterly irrelevant. No tactical actions have ever been consistently lost, or operations failed because troops were using 5.56mm. Lots of armies using 5.56mm have no complaints.

The problem with what you aserting is that it becomes to a great extent dependant on what you want to achieve. The 5.56 is exceptional for some situations. The problem is that you have to define your TO&E to fit those expectations. I have a terabyte and half hard drive filled with all sorts of tests, ballistics and even force projections based on different cartridges that are operational and some that are still in the "testing" stage. It's all relatively black magic and I have accumulated it over a period of 25+ years. And in the final result it all comes down to what compromises you want to accept and those you don't.

The 5.56 round is a compromise. So is the Russian 5.54 or the Chinese 5.8. The Russians have a real killer of a cartridge but their use of materials in the construction of the round leave a lot to be desired. Because of this, the effectiveness of the cartridge, the rifle and the infantry man using it are all in jeopardy. The Russian SOG units and Contract NCOs want a return to the 7.62x39. The Chinese 5.8 doesn't fragment or yaw when it hits flesh. It over penatrates in contact with non-armored body parts. However, this is what the Chinese want.They have built thier cartridge to penetrate body armor esp. the US Army's Interceptor armor package. This it will do except for the cerramic inserts.

As for the present S109/M855 round, there is a great debate going on in the halls of the Pentagon. There have been reports of complaints by troops in both Iraq and Afganistan that the 5.56 overpenatrates and will not knock down enemy combatants. The Military has done a great job of squashing this but there are other sources than the "official" ones. So the Army has changed it's tune and now says the problem isn't the cartridge but the combat skills of the soldier. (Shades of "Nam all over again) They say that present day soldier is insufficent in training and needs to gain greater skills in shot placement. This may work for some but the majority of troopers I've known in my life try their best (it's their *ss on the line) but become less focused during a serious fire fight. So shot placement becomes less effective.

There are also complaints about the range of the 5.56 cartridge (200m+) vs the 7.62 which hits harder and has shown better effective range. However, I'll leave that for another time.

So shot placement will solve the problems of the 5.56 round. Why should we have to rely on a crutch when there might be other cartridges that would shoot farther, hit harder and create a better pulse to help impinged gas systems work better. The latter has become a problem with the M4. The shortness of the barrel, besides causing a serious drop in Balistic Energy, show a great tendency to jam because of material build up in the gas system and a much reduced gas pulse from the shortened barrel that is unable to overcome the partial blockage to fully operate the bolt. The Army has countered with a series of bulletins that say it's all the fault of the soldier again. This time he's not providing enough maintinance. If this is the case, why did we build a rifle that requires that amount of care. The sad part is that systems like the HK416 and the SCAR-L which use short throw pistons do not have this problem but are being judged already not reliable and upset the zero of the rifle barrel because of the movement of the piston. This rush to judgement is coming before the test by the Rangers can take place.

The marines knew the problems of the 5.56 round when they raided all the depots in America for M14/M21/M25 rifles to give to their best riflemen. The DM program was a force multiplier as well as giving greater range and hitting power to Sqauds and platoons.

And our soldiers aren't the only ones complaining. If I could get the link system working I know of a lot other countires that have complaints. Though it's not so negative as to require the the removal of the 5.56 round from use. I don't think anyone has the finacial support to consider that.

Yet when you actually crunch the numbers on weapons weight, recoil, and weight of carried rounds, this is not true, unless you go for a very short 7mm like 7.62mm x 25 (PPSH - TT33 etc). When all is said and done, 5.56mm is good enough. Why change?

I've said that before myself. We are in an economic crunch that any expenditure is looked at long and hard before agreed upon. Also I think Ken said, we should use what we have until something can be done to come up with a truly better concept. For the Cartridge determines the parameters of the rifle and the rifle determines the parameters of the soldier. We are fighting a war of 200m. Would it be better to fight a war that has an effective range of 500m-600m+ and the rounds hit harder and guarentee more combatants will fall with one shot. But there are compromises. This round is heavier reducing the total rounds carried by the soldier. So we are trading off some full auto capability for a more lethal one shot capability.

And this all has an effect on the makeup of squads and platoons because it determines how we fight and where we pick our fights. It also determines what is the optimum support weapons will be. So everything hindges on everything else. In the end, what compromises are we willing to make? :o:

Ken White

05-23-2009, 04:23 AM

I do not agree at all that the 5.56mm is an adequate military cartridge or that the caliber of the weapon used by the infantry is irrelevant.

The number of rounds fired in a fight are directly proportional to the damage the average Soldier thinks he will inflict -- I'll guarantee you that those using a 5.56mm weapon will fire more than those using a 7.62x51. That has psychological and logistic impacts (and yes , I'm allowing for the difference between weapons that will fire full auto and those that will not. I never allowed people that worked for me to fire M16s on full auto -- and more than one kid got a Steel Helmet thrown into his back for forgetting. Yeah, I know that, too; Article 93, throw in 117 and 128 if you want to stack charges...).

I also strongly disagree with suppression as a tactic or technique, I know many studies and a lot of observers and combat experienced leaders say it works but most of those efforts have been against poorly trained troops. You go up against well trained troops and try to hold them in place with 'suppression' and you'll get a shock. Suppression doesn't work against good troop but accurate shots do.

Wilf said:
"No tactical actions have ever been consistently lost, or operations failed because troops were using 5.56mm. Lots of armies using 5.56mm have no complaints."I'll grant the operations not lost is probably correct but I'm not at all sure you're correct on tactical actions, even with the caveat you added, 'consistently.'

Not the question -- question is how many people have been killed unnecessarily due to an inadequate round failing to drop an opponent? You can start by looking at the PPSh 41 / 43 carriers... :D

(Acknowledging the Finns did better with their KP31s, partly a function of the Finns, partly the woods, partly a bigger caliber... ;) )

Then look at US M1 / M2 Carbines used by the US, the UK and others in WW II -- then 5.56 in Viet Nam and in Afghansitan.

Size does make a difference. :D (so do terrain and vegetation, 5.56 will deflect on many leaf hits; the 7.62x39 rarely does that)

William F. Owen

05-23-2009, 07:10 AM

The problem with what you aserting is that it becomes to a great extent dependant on what you want to achieve. The 5.56 is exceptional for some situations. The problem is that you have to define your TO&E to fit those expectations.
I am not sure what organisation has to do with the calibre of the round, but I am open to opinion.

As for the present S109/M855 round, there is a great debate going on in the halls of the Pentagon. There have been reports of complaints by troops in both Iraq and Afganistan that the 5.56 overpenatrates and will not knock down enemy combatants.
Reports of complaints? Rumours of opinions? Half the problem with debate is the lack of empirical data. Soldiers in combat do not make reliable witnesses, but autopsy reports do.

So shot placement will solve the problems of the 5.56 round. Why should we have to rely on a crutch when there might be other cartridges that would shoot farther, hit harder and create a better pulse to help impinged gas systems work better.
Testing done by both the UK MOD and the Canadian DOD, showed that under stress, fully train infantrymen, who have qualified with their personal weapon, can only get consistent hits at 35-55m, from the standing position against man sized targets. I would also suggest that multiple hits are far more likely to yield results under operational conditions, than striving for an impossible "one shot kill."

I do not agree at all that the 5.56mm is an adequate military cartridge or that the caliber of the weapon used by the infantry is irrelevant.
Technically it is not a great round, but I don't know any that is. The calibre of the infantry weapon may not be irrelevant, if you compare like with like in a specific environment, and weapons of differing calibre's are the only weapons used.
I merely suggest that the combined effects of training, leadership, and weapons mix within the platoon/Company, make the benefits or one calibre versus another a very minor element in the overall capabilities to be discussed.

I also strongly disagree with suppression as a tactic or technique, I know many studies and a lot of observers and combat experienced leaders say it works but most of those efforts have been against poorly trained troops. You go up against well trained troops and try to hold them in place with 'suppression' and you'll get a shock. Suppression doesn't work against good troop but accurate shots do.
My definition of "suppression" is creating the failure to act through fear or harm. So if we want to question the effect of suppression, we have to ask does weapons fire, a.) Create fear? b.) Stop people doing things they would normally do, if not being shot at? - eg: shoot back, change position, advance.
I would agree that calling "suppression" a tactic, and relying on it alone to break the will of the enemy is only going to work against the less than determined.

Not the question -- question is how many people have been killed unnecessarily due to an inadequate round failing to drop an opponent? You can start by looking at the PPSh 41 / 43 carriers... :D
...but would this not apply only to those circumstances were two men encounter one another - at close range? - and one hits the other, fails to kill him - with single or multiple shots, and then dies when the man who was hit, returns fire. For the Police, I can see this as a concern, but is it that common in infantry operations?

Ken White

05-23-2009, 04:45 PM

My standard answers apply. Oh, you can also add the human element... :D
Reports of complaints? Rumours of opinions? Half the problem with debate is the lack of empirical data. Soldiers in combat do not make reliable witnesses, but autopsy reports do.Unfortunately, the troops do not get to read all those and they regrettably rely on rumors of opinions and that affects quite strongly their perceptions -- and their willingness to fight (that's minor).
Testing done by both the UK MOD and the Canadian DOD, showed that under stress, fully train infantrymen, who have qualified with their personal weapon, can only get consistent hits at 35-55m, from the standing position against man sized targets. I would also suggest that multiple hits are far more likely to yield results under operational conditions, than striving for an impossible "one shot kill."That's a function of training; we -- most all Armies -- do not adequately train Soldiers to shoot. To do so requires time and lots of ammo, both in short supply. Those costs have forced Armies to try shortcuts like full automatic weapons for all which only worsened the problem. It's notable that penuriousness in spending money for training Ammo is more than outweighed by the excessive use of Ammo in combat engendered by that shortfall. (that training shortfall, OTOH, is MAJOR).
I merely suggest that the combined effects of training, leadership, and weapons mix within the platoon/Company, make the benefits or one calibre versus another a very minor element in the overall capabilities to be discussed.I agree in that sense. However, in the end, a Soldier and his weapon are the critical element as far as that Soldier is concerned. Even good training and good leadership plus an effective organization can be counteracted by Soldiers who do not want to fight because they distrust their equipment. Add the practical effect -- enemy troops killed or disabled (versus those temporarily scared) and minor element it may be but it should not be ignored. Armies have a bad habit of touting their belief in the human element then ignoring it based on 'empirical data.' The majority of which is genned up by people who aren't out there carrying a weapon or being fired upon... :mad:
...but would this not apply only to those circumstances were two men encounter one another - at close range? - and one hits the other, fails to kill him - with single or multiple shots, and then dies when the man who was hit, returns fire. For the Police, I can see this as a concern, but is it that common in infantry operations?Two men or two small units, yes -- but there's also the possibility of range overmatch. Ideally I can hit him before he gets close enough to hit me in some locales; in others I can kill him when his round will not penetrate my cover or protection but mine will overcome his.

Take the M1 Carbine problem in Korea. It outranged the PPsh clone carrying North Koreans but it did not stop them and thus allowed them to advance to a range that allowed those little 7.62 rounds to do some damage. OTOH, If said NK Troopie got hit with a .30-06 he generally became a non-problem. The Chinese, not dumb, quickly dumped their PPShs for Nagants. Less fire, more damage. Same thing occurred in Viet Nam with M1 Carbine carrying ARVN vs. AK carrying NVA. In both wars, the better cartridge made a TACTICAL difference in vastly different terrain and vegetation.

It later with M16 armed ARVN became apparent that vegetation would easily deflect 5.56 rounds but had little effect on 7.62 rounds. I can also recall on several occasions as an Advisor with an M1 being called by the troops or the Commanders to use said weapon when a range or a hut wall penetration problem appeared... ;)

Thus I believe that Strategically or Operationally, your argument is correct. However, at a tactical and practical level, the weapon and caliber have to fit the organization, leadership and training levels of the troops involved. Conversely, training and organization are also affected by caliber and weapon...

Also affected can be the ability of even the best leadership to persuade people to do what's needed if they're worried about the kit... :wry:

AlexTX ret

05-23-2009, 11:04 PM

But here goes.

I am not sure what organisation has to do with the calibre of the round, but I am open to opinion.

Balistics and the effect on human flesh is not the "black art" that everyone claims. Every cartridge is a total of its compromises. Unfortunately, the creation of a cartridge is subject all sorts of things that we have no control over. Tecnology (Such as the effects of different powder or bullet weight which in turn determines size) determines the majority of what the compriomises you will have to choose from. So you just can't decide on a set of abilities that your new cartridge will have. And all the wannas that a military may want don't mean a thing if the technolgy of the time doesn't support it.

However, it is the cartridge design which determines the best and worst atributes of the rifle that is designed to fire it. Again there is no amount of wanna will change that.

So you have a cartridge with a set of balistics and qualities and a rifle that fires the round in a way that the military wants the rifle to work. Auto vs Semiauto, accuracy vs reliability and so on but is greatly effected by cartridge parameters.

The combinations of both effective range and knockdown power determine what ranges you will fight at and its effect on the enemy combatant at those ranges. The Russian Guards Unit was an awesome (frightening to most German units) fighting machine but in the face of units with strong morale and Esprit de Corps, these Russian juggernaughts could be picked apart at range. So you have two different units here whos tactics and TO&E weree determined by the weapon type and how each side determined the war should be fought.

The deciding factor here was training which would help the arguments you put forward. The Russians had little more than peasants of little understanding of war was about. So training was limited and its linch pin was aggression. The German's were the exact opposite. More and detailed training showed greater results.

However, the weapons were created to further the decisions of the different armies and came about because of the technlogy of the times. So it is with the M16. SecDef Mcnamara had a need to produce a weapon that would be handy to be carried by Air Force security forces and to increase its chances of being aquired, he said that it would be a better weapon than the M1 rifle for the South Asian soldiers that were to rise up against the Communists.

He found that wasn't enough. So the famous Small Round Tactics came about. It was better to wound the enemy than to kill him. If you wounded the a enemy soldier than up to 4 extra men would leave the fighting frontline to get the wounded soldier to an aid station. And if you threw in Auto Fire, then your troops wouldn't require the extra training that was required for expert marksmenship. This also worked better for our Military because the Army and Marines were made up mostly of Conscripts. An automatic weapon would be better in lesser trained hands and it cost less money on soldier's training that would only be in the services for 24 (usually 18+ months). So the Army and Marines were told to accept the 5.56 cartridge and the "Mattel" M16. The marines tried to keep thier M14s but to no avail.

This wasn't only something that the US came up with. The Russian army was also made up of conscripts and they created a similar weapon.

There was hesitation on the part of the Allies to accept the cartridge but were finally convinced (strong armed) to accept the round in the name of standardization.

Thie is all factual and is for the most part findable by the average web browser if one uses a little smarts and a real desire to find out the truth.

Reports of complaints? Rumours of opinions? Half the problem with debate is the lack of empirical data. Soldiers in combat do not make reliable witnesses, but autopsy reports do.

The one thing that the weatern military orginizations esp the US isn't is proactive. So a lot of these "Rumors" and "Complainrs" actually come out on the internet. So if you have a reason to keep your ear to the ground, these matters of interest become readily available. The problem is that if the military decides this puts them in a bad light, it will try to squash them and say that they are untrue and made up by conspiracy theorists. However, it helps me in my job to know the truth. No, it is essential to know truth from propoganda. Because the military might want to lie or at least put a better face on a problem than what the truth is, I have to know what is really going down because I'm highly paid to "know" what my opinions are based on. I agree autopsy reports are valuable and I have them too. Analysts do their own studies rather than trust the "official" reports for they might have an agenda to forward.

Testing done by both the UK MOD and the Canadian DOD, showed that under stress, fully train infantrymen, who have qualified with their personal weapon, can only get consistent hits at 35-55m, from the standing position against man sized targets. I would also suggest that multiple hits are far more likely to yield results under operational conditions, than striving for an impossible "one shot kill."

Do they also show what a small percentage of soldiers in the frontline (the pointy end of the stick) actually shoot to kill. To the West, the small round shows great rewards in the fact an Auto fire rifle allows for soldiers that can't fire at a human target or are reticient to do so, the capability to spray downstream a number of rounds that might hit a enemy combatent or at least keep his head down. Still true today. Expert qualifying marksmenship is of little use if some if not most won't shoot to kill. That was the concept behind the Rangers in WW2. Men that could shoot to kill given the best training possible to do what couldn't be done by regular soldiers.

Technically it is not a great round, but I don't know any that is. The calibre of the infantry weapon may not be irrelevant, if you compare like with like in a specific environment, and weapons of differing calibre's are the only weapons used.
I merely suggest that the combined effects of training, leadership, and weapons mix within the platoon/Company, make the benefits or one calibre versus another a very minor element in the overall capabilities to be discussed.

I know that is what most military systems would like to say. And I agree with it in part. However, I would be wrong to say that it is a minor part. The weapons you use determine the effective range that your unit is active at. The S109/M855 (they are marginally different) allows our troops to be effective at 200+m. How can you say the weapon doesn't have a great effect on our small group tatics? If we don't accept that fact and make our descions on tactics, TO&E and C&C reflect that limitation then we are doing a disservice to our troops and leaders. We can't wish things to be different. We can only accept the truth. This limitation also decides what support weapons we use and how they are placed in our battle formations for maximum effect.

My definition of "suppression" is creating the failure to act through fear or harm. So if we want to question the effect of suppression, we have to ask does weapons fire, a.) Create fear? b.) Stop people doing things they would normally do, if not being shot at? - eg: shoot back, change position, advance.
I would agree that calling "suppression" a tactic, and relying on it alone to break the will of the enemy is only going to work against the less than determined.

...but would this not apply only to those circumstances were two men encounter one another - at close range? - and one hits the other, fails to kill him - with single or multiple shots, and then dies when the man who was hit, returns fire. For the Police, I can see this as a concern, but is it that common in infantry operations?

Ever since the Romans took on the world it comes down to Mano A Mano. Automatic weapons may make this less of a situation and superior small group tactics may catch the enemy when he is surprised and unable to defend himself. But it always comes down to the moral of your men and can they take down the enemy. When he looks through his sights he is engaging a single enemy. Can he pull the trigger is all that matters.

As for hand to hand, in Vietnam it came down to distances that you could reach out and touch your enemy. Broken Arrow is a Hollywood term. And on the lighter side. Yes, the Russian SOG types are taught to use an entrentching tool. It can be pretty damn effective. :o

AlexTX ret

05-23-2009, 11:20 PM

Sorry!

William F. Owen

05-24-2009, 06:48 AM

The combinations of both effective range and knockdown power determine what ranges you will fight at and its effect on the enemy combatant at those ranges.
For me, effective range is a function of target size and a definable terminal effect. I don't know what "knockdown power" is.

However, the weapons were created to further the decisions of the different armies and came about because of the technlogy of the times. So it is with the M16. SecDef Mcnamara had a need to produce a weapon that would be handy to be carried by Air Force security forces and to increase its chances of being aquired, he said that it would be a better weapon than the M1 rifle for the South Asian soldiers that were to rise up against the Communists.
The 5.56mm round came out of the "SALVO" study papers that accumulated after the Korean War, long before McNamara. The British used the AR-15 in combat in 1963, - with reportedly good results

He found that wasn't enough. So the famous Small Round Tactics came about. It was better to wound the enemy than to kill him. If you wounded the a enemy soldier than up to 4 extra men would leave the fighting frontline to get the wounded soldier to an aid station.
What Small Round Tactics? The "wound rather than kill" is an urban myth. The observation about soldiers not fighting because they are assisting the wounded goes back to the Napoleonic Wars and specifically observations as to Austrian Infantry leaving the firing line while under long range fire from skirmishers and cannon. Ardant Du-Pic mentions it long before WW2 (1870?)

However, it helps me in my job to know the truth. No, it is essential to know truth from propoganda. Because the military might want to lie or at least put a better face on a problem than what the truth is, I have to know what is really going down because I'm highly paid to "know" what my opinions are based on.
So what do you do? Back in 06 I took part in a British Army Light Weapons workshop, specifically about 5.56mm lethality, where we had all the open US data (including the US ARDEC OA from 93), plus all the UK data, plus some other stuff. The conclusions were many but nowhere did we conclude that the UK needed to replace 5.56mm.

Do they also show what a small percentage of soldiers in the frontline (the pointy end of the stick) actually shoot to kill. To the West, the small round shows great rewards in the fact an Auto fire rifle allows for soldiers that can't fire at a human target or are reticient to do so, the capability to spray downstream a number of rounds that might hit a enemy combatent or at least keep his head down.
Sorry, but that is proven rubbish based on Marshall's work(Men Against Fire) and then regurgitated by Grossman (On Killing). It is simply not true and confuses a supposed moral objection to killing with a lack of participation in combat caused by "suppression." As a specialist in this area, I would suggest you re-read Fitz-Gibbon, Jary and Wigram. If you are military you can also access all the UK DRA reports on combat participation, and I think Griffith's rebuttal of Grossman is available on line. Obviously there is Spillers analysis of Marshall data.
The inability to hit a target on the range, while exhausted/pressured is purely bio-mechanical, and is a function of the hand held dispersion. What testing has shown, is that when hand-held dispersion is a factor, fully automatic fire incrases the chance of a hit. Go look at the SALVO studies. - 3 rounds into 24 inch radius etc etc.
If full automatic fire is not a factor in creating suppression or the increased likelihood of a hit, then you probably need to drop the SAW from the Platoon, - but that's actually another issue.

I know that is what most military systems would like to say. And I agree with it in part. However, I would be wrong to say that it is a minor part. The weapons you use determine the effective range that your unit is active at. The S109/M855 (they are marginally different) allows our troops to be effective at 200+m.
OK, I have shot the old UK Sniper Test with a 5.56mm rifle, out to 600m, an seen folks hit targets out at 800m (M16A4 with ACOG). M855 will "kill and suppress" out to 800m.

How can you say the weapon doesn't have a great effect on our small group tatics? If we don't accept that fact and make our descions on tactics, TO&E and C&C reflect that limitation then we are doing a disservice to our troops and leaders. We can't wish things to be different. We can only accept the truth. This limitation also decides what support weapons we use and how they are placed in our battle formations for maximum effect.
I'm not sure what you point is here, but let me put it this way. Given exactly the same contact drill for a 10 man patrol, how would you differ the drill, given each man carrying a G3, or each man carrying a G-36? Add or subtract rifle grenades?
Or, given a 3-man Gun group in a Section, or supporting a Platoon, how would you differ their employment, based on 2 x Bren Guns/LARs or 1 x GPMG/MG.

As for hand to hand, in Vietnam it came down to distances that you could reach out and touch your enemy.
Hand to hand combat with hand's reach. There's a thing.

Ken White

05-24-2009, 04:40 PM

Having been involved with the US Army Troop test of the M-16, I read most of the SALVO papers in 1963 and have looked at some of them since. It's a classic case of a senior officer espousing a theory and the data being assembled to validate said theory. The study was done by a number of people with no combat experience who scanned 'data' and decided, to simplify, that the number of friendly rounds fired was directly related to the number of enemy casualties.

Aside from the 'duh' factor on that, it overlooked the fact that most of the Soldiers and Marines involved in WW II were only marginally trained -- and combat experience, while it teaches many things, does NOT improve marksmanship. It also neglected the fact, which Wilf acknowledged above, that suppressive fire will not deter competent troops to any great extent. The SALVO study led to a host of idiotic ideas like 'salvo' rounds, flechettes from small arms and other essentially civilian or technician driven idiocy.

The first people to use the M-16 in combat were the Viet Namese whom we had presented with a thousand of the then little green rifles in 1962. They had mixed results with the weapon but generally were positive and wanted more. The problem is that the weapons and cartridge supplied to the Viet Namese and initially tested by the 82d Abn Div were not the identical to the weapon the Army later fielded as the M-16. Both were adopted on a political, not a proven efficiency, basis and both were tinkered with by the Ordnance Corps until they were LESS effective than the tested weapons.

S.L.A. Marshall and Grossman are both wrong. Troops will fire -- and they will hit targets if they are well trained. Western Armies do not invest enough in training and the inability to fire accurately in combat or when exhausted is the result. That can be -- and should be -- fixed.

The M855 will kill (as opposed to hitting a target on a range) past 500 meters only with luck, a better than average shooter and the right weapon -- the M16 rifle beaten about in infantry combat is not that weapon. An M4 Carbine even if specially selected and brand new is not that weapon.

William F. Owen

05-24-2009, 05:17 PM

Having been involved with the US Army Troop test of the M-16, I read most of the SALVO papers in 1963 and have looked at some of them since.
I've never actually seen the complete set of papers. What I know of them is the ARDEC data that relates to hand-held dispersion. I concur the data they gathered was very much open to abuse, and lacked certain aspects of operational reality. However a lot of basic ballistics and physics is pretty useful stuff.

The SALVO study led to a host of idiotic ideas like 'salvo' rounds, flechettes from small arms and other essentially civilian or technician driven idiocy. No argument there.

S.L.A. Marshall and Grossman are both wrong. Troops will fire -- and they will hit targets if they are well trained. Western Armies do not invest enough in training and the inability to fire accurately in combat or when exhausted is the result. That can be -- and should be -- fixed.
yep, but these guys won't stay down! I fully concur that there are things you can teach, that reduce the bio-mechanical effects, associated with fatigue, but I am not sure you can do anything about the mental. One NATO country has just done some trials on sleep depravation effects on marksmanship, and they show very sever drop offs after only 24 hours without sleep

The M855 will kill (as opposed to hitting a target on a range) past 500 meters only with luck, a better than average shooter and the right weapon - Can't say you're wrong. I have little faith in individual combat shots over 200m.

Ken White

05-24-2009, 06:31 PM

One NATO country has just done some trials on sleep depravation effects on marksmanship, and they show very sever drop offs after only 24 hours without sleep...I totally agree and I are not a NATO Country. :D

Only solution to that I've seen work is rotating elements in and out of contact -- and that obviously is not possible in all circumstances. However, I've seen it done quite often in a couple of places and scenarios by a few people who fought smart instead of the way everyone else seemed to...

Variation instead of repetition is the key to tactical survival... :cool:

This too:
Can't say you're wrong. I have little faith in individual combat shots over 200m.is true though I'd argue for 300m with a decent weapon but it goes back to the weapon / caliber choice plus tactical procedures, plus organization and, of course training. IOW, it can be bettered -- but whether to do it or not is a METT-TC decision. In an ideal world, forces would be able to adapt fairly quickly to the type of combat skill / TTP needed.

Pity we don't live in an ideal world... :wry:

Rifleman

05-24-2009, 08:29 PM

.....suppressive fire will not deter competent troops to any great extent.

Or troops with a sense of purpose and calling, I guess. Sgt. York is the example that comes to mind. A man with a five shot bolt action rifle and a M1911 against several machine gun crews was not deterred.

.....weapons and cartridge supplied to the Viet Namese and initially tested by the 82d Abn Div were not the identical to the weapon the Army later fielded as the M-16.

Was the weapon and cartridge first used by SF in the early days of Vietnam different from those fielded by the Army in 1965? I've read accounts saying that SF really liked the AR-15 when it first came out in the early '60s (War Story by Jim Morris and The New Legions by Donald Duncan).

Ken White

05-24-2009, 10:11 PM

Was the weapon and cartridge first used by SF in the early days of Vietnam different from those fielded by the Army in 1965?were Stoner and Sullvan's original rifles and the cartridges were the original Remington designed and manufactured 5.56 -- you're asking a lot from an old guy with a flaky memory... :wry:

The original had no bolt closure device (dumb item to add, but the Ord Corps insisted for some unknown reason...) and the gas tube was larger in diameter. There were other minor differences, one being the method of attaching the bolt carrier key and another had something to do with the gas seal rings on the bolt. They also changed the rifling twist from 1:14 to 1:12 to achieve better stability for the traveling bullet -- a factor that lessened the yawing and therefor wounding capability (and then later we went to 1:7 for the SS109 / M855 which made it reach out further but with less energy and upset potential...).

They changed the cartridge from a DuPont extruded powder to Olin ball; slower burning, to lower the chamber pressure, they then had to lighten the original bullet (whose weight I can't recall, 58 gr, I think...) down to 55 grains to meet the MV specs so they shortened it making it less stable -- not realizing or, more likely, not caring, they had decreased the energy at all ranges and increased the propensity to be deflected on contact with a brisk wind in so doing. With that MV, you had a light Gopher hunting pill that traveled too fast to upset on a hit except at the end of its range envelope; in close range shooting it passed right through bods and did little damage. Overpenetration, they said... :rolleyes:

So given a weapon that the Troop Test had clearly shown was deficient in lethality, they bought it anyway, made it less lethal and issued it to people in combat.

Politically purchased weapon. Fault of the Pols. Politically modified to satisfy whims. Fault of the Army.

05-25-2009, 01:36 PM

AlexTex posted - "The combinations of both effective range and knockdown power determine what ranges you will fight at and its effect on the enemy combatant at those ranges. The Russian Guards Unit was an awesome (frightening to most German units) fighting machine but in the face of units with strong morale and Esprit de Corps, these Russian juggernaughts could be picked apart at range. So you have two different units here whos tactics and TO&E weree determined by the weapon type and how each side determined the war should be fought.

The deciding factor here was training which would help the arguments you put forward. The Russians had little more than peasants of little understanding of war was about. So training was limited and its linch pin was aggression. The German's were the exact opposite. More and detailed training showed greater results."

You are exactly right. I made friends with an old Panzer Grenadier who made if back from the Eastern Front to Germany for wounds received. He was in the fight against the US in the Hedgerows of Normandy in 1944.

Gunther Storrjohann has pass on, but over several decent dinners in Wilmington DE, where he worked for VW and my company hauled his vehicles he spoke of actions on the steppes that had reduced German infantry companies dug in that defeated Russian Regiments.

German Artillery would engage the assualt columns out to a mile or more, and pound them almost to 200 yards of the dug in infantry. The Infantry MG's would begin hitting the mob of Russian Infantry at about 1200 yards and the riflemen would chime in at 400 yards.

He said you could see them coming by the dust they stirred up. There was no place to hide and the Russians would push their troops at the dug in Germans. It was a slaughter.

In one fight he said his officer ordered the company to fix bayonets and charge to remmnants of a regiment at about 100 feet. He said the Russians broke when the Germans came at them.

Diciplined troops who are good shots can do enormous damage on poorly trained troops who have to be herded and goaded into assualting them.

Gunther said there was no fire and maneuver, just a herd of men being driven to attack them. He also admitted that if the Russians didn't break they would have overwhelmed his company.

He retired to a beach community in NC and pass on about ten years ago.

AlexTX ret

05-25-2009, 08:06 PM

So I'm sort of having people time with my family so this will be short.

I've not forgotten you, Wilf. You raised some interesting and factual points. However, since you made your comments, I have realized that I need to research my statements and come up with more compelling facts. I don't mind. It is what I do a lot of. Nevertheless, bringing up "Salvo" without mentioning all the research that was going on before, concurrently, and later, will not help our discussion make any sense. It certainly won't help our discussion, if we focus only one aspect.

One thing that I will say is that the Small Round Tactics are not an Urban Myth because I first heard of these ideas in Officer Training (early Vietnam war). However, the first person of any importance to put them forth as new policy was Air Force General Curtiss Lemay. There has been a push to discredited this by many sources because he was actually looking for a SCHV weapon to replace the M1/M2 carbines of his security troops.

RJ, Your description fits everything I've heard from the German side except that it was a perfect killing ground for the Germans. However, too many times, the Germans found themselves attacked from much closer ranges or were not so couragous. Then it was the Germans that were slaughtered.

For a while I had direct contact with either the actual members of thse Guards Units or there sons and daughters. The Russians saw this as a great honor and were for the most part the cores of rifle units that had shown courage and tenacity in the face of the enemy. However, no matter how patriotic the men felt, there was always a line of political officers and dedicated troops, (usually not the racial mackup of the men that made up the frontlines) that pushed the men forward. They also shot any soldiers that either fell back or tried to flee.

I bring this up in that most of the conflicts we've fought since Mogadishu, have had strong tribal ties and have the same callous disreguard toward deserters or even actual fighting men as the Russian politcal officers had for the fighting man. However, there is something to be said for blind aggression
and not questioning orders. The poor Soviet soldiers that fought in Afganistan or Russian Soldiers in Chetznia showed the same reliance on these tactics and in both cases it was the SOG troops that did all the fighting. I understand that in Chetznia, they used a lot of Airborne but to the Russian forces, Airborne is mostly made up of VDV troops and they would be concidered SOG troops.

William F. Owen

05-26-2009, 05:52 AM

One thing that I will say is that the Small Round Tactics are not an Urban Myth because I first heard of these ideas in Officer Training (early Vietnam war). However, the first person of any importance to put them forth as new policy was Air Force General Curtiss Lemay. There has been a push to discredited this by many sources because he was actually looking for a SCHV weapon to replace the M1/M2 carbines of his security troops.

So let me get this right. Curt LeMay set down on paper that the US Army light weapons doctrine was to produce weapons that "Wounded and did not KILL" and/or "wounded in preference to killing."

a.) If such a document exists, it would support my thesis that light weapons applications is severely mis-understood.

b.) It would also indicate Le May was an idiot, because once you overrun he enemy position, (central tenet of infantry and land warfare doctrine) the enemy wounded become your responsibility - and if you don't care and are going to kill them anyway - a war crime - then why not do it sensibly in the first place?

The object behind "SCHV" was to create low recoil, low dispersion automatic fire to increase the likelihood of hits, and also multiple hits. Now translating that into an operational reality may be suspect, but I see nothing to refute the logic and thus validity of that thinking.

One aspect of SCHV actually overlooked at the time was the intended or accidental fragmenting of the round, causing multiple would channels. This why UK light weapons doctrine focusses on the 400+ Joules on striking, to enable the high % fragmentation of the L1A1 service round.

William F. Owen

05-26-2009, 01:03 PM

Nevertheless, bringing up "Salvo" without mentioning all the research that was going on before, concurrently, and later, will not help our discussion make any sense. It certainly won't help our discussion, if we focus only one aspect.

Well I only reference those papers because they are the only published ones I know of that directly informed the design of the AR-15. I know of no others, bar Marshall's "Weapons Usage in Korea," which I think garbage.

If you have access to US light weapons testing data pre-1945, then I would be extremely grateful to see it.

As concerns that done since, I think you can take you pick of that you wish to prove. CRISAT data springs to mind as something that may be of dubious relevance, and whose beauty is in the eye of the beholder.

AlexTX ret

05-26-2009, 07:49 PM

So let me get this right. Curt LeMay set down on paper that the US Army light weapons doctrine was to produce weapons that "Wounded and did not KILL" and/or "wounded in preference to killing."

I don't know if he set it down on paper directly but he used several studies done that promoted a biased view of the SCHV (Small Caliber High Velocity) rifle. You can't use todays experiences to evaluate these studies because they were in entirely uncharted territory. Like the 6mm M1 rifle, they were fighting a bias of the majority of the military towards anything that wasn't a full sized round or at least at the upper limit of the FACR weapons.

Everything that I have on file (I'm reaserchng on the Net now for other information) shows that politics was becoming the great battleground and it was sort of becoming a battle of "theologies" sort of like the 9mm vs the 45 cal. It is a battle that has never been won and there is still fanatics that are fighting the good fight today.

a.) If such a document exists, it would support my thesis that light weapons applications is severely mis-understood.

I have no disagreement that SCHV rifles are misunderstood. However, I have a problem in that discussions have turned 180 degress. People/countires have too much invested in the SS109/M855 round and the various systems that use it that they are willing to sacrifice tactical sense to maintain the status quo. IMHO, there needs to be a new discussion about tactics and weapons that fit those tactics. Primarily, is the present bias against infantry rifles because the powers at be still think that MGs and Artillery are the real killers of the enemy. This is done from studies done in WW1, WW2, Korea and actually some done in Vietnam which I would of thought impossible because of our objectives and the reliance on the rifleman to hold ground.

I'm realize you are making sense in touting the the SCHV rifle advantages. However is the 5.56 round the best for our present day tactics or is it the most expediant? Could greater tactics be created if the small units had a cartridge that was effective farther out and hit harder with out sacrifising the ability to engage the enemy with automatic rifle fire?

There is a round that does that in spades, the 6.5 MPC. It will fit in existing magazines with out modification. The same can be said for the upper reciever. The only part that must be changed is the barrel. It even plays nice with shorter barrels (M4) and the problems with the impinged gas sytem of the M16 family. It is a better round for IARs, Saws and SDMs. Without a dangerous increase in chamber pressure, it is longer ranged and has a greater penetration at these ranges. The only problem with that it requires a change in tactics and politics of the military. There are various studies that are positive about the 6.5 MPC. The problem is that can the cartridge over come the prejudice of the procurement system of the military.

The other problem that I have seen about the SCHV/Salvo is that as far back as 1957, there were set parameters that were to determine the capabilities of the M1/M2 carbine replacement. The parameters were 500yds range and penetrate a steel helmet at that range. There were others requirements but these were the big two. However, the 22 cal bullet was the darling of the SCHV crowd and had been so since the 1890s, So the 222 Remington/224E1 was the preordained caliber with a wieght of the bullet dropped from 68 grains to 55 grains. There was a few tests done in various artificial mediums but no tests done on live animals at this time. There was a test on Army mules at one time but none done with modern (1950s) test criteria. Later on the 224E2 round becames the 5.56 as to not confuse the testers and observers when the early 224 LWMR was being tested.

Gen. LeMay was at first looking to replace the M1/M2 carbines used in the Air Force by security forces. He found that the 224 LWMR, as it was first known, with the 5.56 cartridge was more effective than the carbines. However, he also found that he couldn't get the funding for a simple repacements for the under powered M1/M2 carbines. So he sold the powers to be that this was a better weapon than the problem riddled M14 rifle. (That's another story)

So with the support of LeMay and various small orders by various countries looking for a replacement for AK47 that could be supported by the Free World, the 224 LWMR became the defacto replacement of the M14. However, this took several years and much modification to the original 224 LWMR rille, in physical changes and the basic concept behind it.

a.)b.) It would also indicate Le May was an idiot, because once you overrun he enemy position, (central tenet of infantry and land warfare doctrine) the enemy wounded become your responsibility - and if you don't care and are going to kill them anyway - a war crime - then why not do it sensibly in the first place?

LeMay wasn't an idiot, he was head of the Air Force with a political agenda. The Air Force claimed to be top dog because it controlled the Nukes. And for the most part, Gen LeMay made sure that stayed the way it was. He wasn't an infantryman, he just brow beat the Army and Marines into accepting that they were lower on the feeding chain and would have to accept what the Air Force wanted.

All my studies show LeMay had no knowledge of the infantry of any kind. All he had was a set of data points and it showed him that he wanted the AR15/M16. The Army is not blameless here. When the M16 was problematic when the main supplier of the rounds being use changed the powder that was specified to save money, they said it was the soldiers fault and he needed to keep up the maintance on his rifle. It took too long for this problem to rectify itself.

The object behind "SCHV" was to create low recoil, low dispersion automatic fire to increase the likelihood of hits, and also multiple hits. Now translating that into an operational reality may be suspect, but I see nothing to refute the logic and thus validity of that thinking.

I will agree with you in principle. The problem is that there were so many different theories that tried to show how that would be done. From flagettes to multiple barreled weapons, the situation was confused from the beginning. The only group with any coherency was the 22 cal group. There were other rounds that showed more promising numbers but the .22 crowd kept to their agenda and won in the end.

Could we of done better with more and clearer discussion? Also rounds as potent as the 7x43 mm were shown to be effective automatic fire weapons. All the power of a 7.62 NATO out to 800yds with all the advantage of a SCHV rifle. What kind of tactics could we have created then Especially with all of our overlapping calibers reduce to a single cartridge size.

One aspect of SCHV actually overlooked at the time was the intended or accidental fragmenting of the round, causing multiple would channels. This why UK light weapons doctrine focusses on the 400+ Joules on striking, to enable the high % fragmentation of the L1A1 service round.

As for the fragmentation of the 5.56 round, it lost most of this when the SS109/M855 round was standardised. I have checked my notes and this shows up as a problem by studies done by many countries. At present, there is a move by many to go back to the old M193 cartridge because it does fragment.

Ken White

05-26-2009, 10:10 PM

... politics was becoming the great battleground and it was sort of becoming a battle of "theologies" sort of like the 9mm vs the 45 cal. It is a battle that has never been won and there is still fanatics that are fighting the good fight today.That's sure the truth. Plenty of logic and studies to back up any position and most will work to at least some degree; it boils down to politics and preferences.
...the present bias against infantry rifles because the powers at be still think that MGs and Artillery are the real killers of the enemy. This is done from studies done in WW1, WW2, Korea and actually some done in Vietnam which I would of thought impossible because of our objectives and the reliance on the rifleman to hold ground.Function of the type of warfare. In medium to high intensity combat, Artillery may again be the big killer. What is problematic in my view is that a well armed and trained infantryman has not been available to the US in large numbers really since the end of WW II -- and those infantrymen mostly came out of Italy and the Pacific, the northwest European battles were, after July 44, not Infantry battles but combined arms in the greatest sense; infantry skills were of marginal value except for the period in the Ardennes -- and we payed heavily for not having them. In any event, the senior leadership of the Army will invest heavily in the Infantry but the priorities get skewed and tend to emphasize technology as a substitute for training.

We'd be far better off without laser pointers and with a better cartridge. Not weapon, it's adequate -- the cartridge isn't. However, that would require better marksmanship training...
The only problem with that it requires a change in tactics and politics of the military. There are various studies that are positive about the 6.5 MPC. The problem is that can the cartridge over come the prejudice of the procurement system of the military.Agree on politics but I believe the tactical changes would be quite minor.
LeMay wasn't an idiot, he was head of the Air Force with a political agenda. ... he just brow beat the Army and Marines into accepting that they were lower on the feeding chain and would have to accept what the Air Force wanted... All he had was a set of data points and it showed him that he wanted the AR15/M16.LeMay was not the big Kahuna; he was a peripheral player but was an asset to McNamara in the decision. The determinant factor well known at the time, though it obviously didn't make the mainstream press.

The M-14 contacts had gone from Springfield Armory (the government original and the developer of the tooling who also manufactured some 50K or so for issue) to Harrington & Richardson with a contract for 150K (IIRC) ~$145.00 each; Winchester got the contract for the second batch of the same size at about $109. each. Having completed proofing test production runs, DA was going to let a contract for 1M. TRW had never made a weapon before but wanted in the defense business and they had some good Engineers; they said we won't bid on 1M but if you'll give us a contract for 2M, we'll make them for $90.00 each (and that was four dollars cheaper than the M1 at the time...). So they got the contract and were in mid stream when McNamara decided to kill the contract (paying a cancellation penalty) and buy the M-16 for about $210.00 apiece.

The decision was based as much or more on the fact that TRW had contributed to Nixon's campaign and were big time Republican supporters while Colt had contributed to Kennedy's campaign. Bobby Kennedy was a vindictive little guy.

It is also noteworthy that McNamara repaid the Army's insistence on not going to a varmint cartridge by insuring Sprigfield Armory was closed in 1968.
...The Army is not blameless here. When the M16 was problematic when the main supplier of the rounds being use changed the powder that was specified to save money, they said it was the soldiers fault and he needed to keep up the maintance on his rifle. It took too long for this problem to rectify itself.Not exactly. Olin didn't do that on their own, the Army dictated the powder change to get a lower chamber pressure. That also resulted in lower energy and more powder fouling. Regrettably, the first year of service in Viet Nam did see a lot of failure due to not keeping weapons clean.

The M16 and M4 are adequate combat weapons; they aren't great but they're okay. They DO require, IMO an excessive amount of maintenance.

Kiwigrunt

05-26-2009, 11:06 PM

There is a round that does that in spades, the 6.5 MPC. It will fit in existing magazines with out modification. The same can be said for the upper reciever. The only part that must be changed is the barrel. It even plays nice with shorter barrels (M4) and the problems with the impinged gas sytem of the M16 family. It is a better round for IARs, Saws and SDMs. Without a dangerous increase in chamber pressure, it is longer ranged and has a greater penetration at these ranges. The only problem with that it requires a change in tactics and politics of the military. There are various studies that are positive about the 6.5 MPC. The problem is that can the cartridge over come the prejudice of the procurement system of the military.

6.5 MPC is still only a compromise, designed to fit within the 5.56 envelope. It may have some nice advantages but little that would strike me as breathtaking (also not sure how well it defeats body armour). 6.5 Grendel would be a little more breath taking but even that is a compromise for the same reason (length-wise anyway). These are all rounds that are designed to suit, to some extent anyway, existing platforms. Going for a marginal compromise would probably not end the conversation.

I think the US have missed (another) beautiful opportunity in the late seventies/early eighties with the 6 mm SAW, which was said to have been dropped for fear of adding a third calibre. That could have been a good round to replace both other calibres. The M16A1 was in need of replacement anyway, so the A2 might as well have been a totally different weapon, me thinks. Back then most NATO members had not yet committed to 5.56 either….....hindsight.

It appears to me that the 5.56 is indeed marginal, but ‘kind-a’ does the job it was meant to do. The round sort of sits on the fence. Whether or not it is okay seems to depend more on which side of the fence the observer is on, agenda’s and all.

All that said, I would agree with Ken, and probably Alex, that a ‘true’ general purpose round makes sense. And the 6.5 Grendel does seem to be close to it. (I know Wilf…..weight….)

....At present, there is a move by many to go back to the old M193 cartridge because it does fragment.

Really? With 1 in 7 barrels? That would make for a short-range weapon.

William F. Owen

05-27-2009, 04:27 AM

I think we can all agree that 5.56mm SS109 may not be perfect, but what is?

Carried weight, human performance, doctrine (tactics?) and training are all more critical issues - or more important than calibre. Put another way, I can't see a need to alter training, (apart from the handling) doctrine and tactics, if I change my main infantry weapon from M4/5.56mm, to an M4/6.5mm, or even an AK/7.62. Actually an optic sight might have more overall impact.

In 1987 I went from using a 7.62mm SLR and GPMG to an all 5.56mm platoon, and tactical doctrine did not miss a beat, except for some very minor issues, caused by now having everyone with a fully automatic weapon. Even today the minor tactics of 1919 remain relevant, regardless of calibre.

IMO, Fragmentation is the best primary wounding mechanism, for a small calibre round, but it is not useful to suggest that the primary purpose of an infantry round is to break up inside the human body. Perforating cover is just as important - thus the CRISAT criteria. After that, multiple hits would seem to be a very strong determinant in providing the relative state of incapacity required - or much more likely to kill.

All that said, as a point of tactical doctrine, I assert that infantry minor tactics should emphasise the use of projected HE, as the primary means of breaking enemy will. I fully recognise that this has some problematic issues associated with it, but it is a viable solution.

FRAGMENTATION
The data I have on this is that the M855 cartridge (62-grain, gilded metal-jacketed, lead alloy core bullet with a steel penetrator) will at high velocities, (900m/s) fragment up to 50% after travelling 5-8cm into a 10% gelatine medium. M855 remains intact at velocities below 763m/s, so from an M4 barrel, M855 will not fragment on impact. In fact it will only achieve viable fragmentation (30-20%) out to 100-125m.

However, I think it is fair to say that the actual requirement for immediate incapacitation is a close range issue, bearing in mind that even with multiple fatal wounds into the heart and lungs some men may continue to function, to the degree he can walk and return fire for up to 15-20 seconds.

According to ARDEC, this would account for why some soldiers assume that their fire has not been effective.

As a correction to an earlier post the UK round is actually L2A2, not L1A1.

Jones_RE

05-27-2009, 05:23 AM

Why not issue both a full power rifle and an assault rifle? Everyone seems to be in absolute agreement that you have to select one single caliber to issue to the entire squad.

WWII infantry used a combination of automatic rifles/machine guns, full power rifles and submachine guns. This provided a combination of accurate long range fire, full automatic suppressing fire, and close quarters automatic fire.

These weapons used at least two different types of ammunition and somehow the supply system held up. Why not consider it again?

The full power rifle has to be as powerful as possible without being overly heavy. The assault rifle has to be controllable when fired fully automatic. It's impossible to do both.

To me the answer to this dilemma is just to use two weapons. For example you could issue full power rifles to most of the squad and reserve fully automatic assault rifles for the squad and team leaders. The weaker round of the assault rifle requires better marksmanship and the fully automatic feature requires more discipline - qualities you expect in your more experienced soldiers. The squad loses three full power rifles, but it gains a significant advantage if the enemy gets close.

You could also issue a full power rifle to your squad's designated marksman. That gives a measure of range and power but doesn't come with quite the same cost in weight. It also overcomes failures in marksmanship (whatever the cause) by hand selecting the squad's best shot.

Having the two weapons already in inventory also simplifies the transition if the environment contraindicates one or the other. E.g. in the desert you would just withdraw the short range assault rifles while in a jungle or urban area you'd likely move away from bulky battle rifles.

I know that the logistical and training issues are supposed to be too complicated. However, all the major combatants in the second world war overcame these obstacles! They covered many different training regiments, philosophies and every type of environment you can imagine. Why is it that we have an absolute commitment to the one proposition that supplies such a ready counterexample?

William F. Owen

05-27-2009, 06:12 AM

Why not issue both a full power rifle and an assault rifle? Everyone seems to be in absolute agreement that you have to select one single caliber to issue to the entire squad.
It's not an impossible idea, but the descision would have to be based on some pretty rigourous testing because right now the case is not proven to my mind.
In the British Army between 1963 and 85 it was common to issue 1-2 AR-15/M-16 to SLR equipped sections in Northern Ireland, Belize, or Brunei, to provide close range full automatic fire. - so a variation of what you suggest was commonly done by the UK.

WWII infantry used a combination of automatic rifles/machine guns, full power rifles and submachine guns. This provided a combination of accurate long range fire, full automatic suppressing fire, and close quarters automatic fire.

These weapons used at least two different types of ammunition and somehow the supply system held up. Why not consider it again?

The current UK platoon issues 3-4 different SAA natures. The US also. The problem is not the supply system. The problem is the sub-unit and platoon management and scales. If the Platoon just has 5.56mm Ball as it's SAA nature, it's vastly easier to manage, carry and scale than having

5.56mm ball
5.56mm link
7.62mm link
7.62mm ball - Marksman.

Plus there is all the other ammunition nature you need, like 40mm, (3 types), grenades (2 types) LAWs, etc etc.
IMO, if you focus just on small arms ammunition, you are not solving the problem.

SethB

05-27-2009, 05:41 PM

Ken, I would be interested to know what you mean by maintenance intensive.

You can be specific, I've had a dozen AR15s over the last decade. :D

Ken White

05-27-2009, 07:59 PM

daily -- or, in an adverse environment, two or more times a day. If you clean the M-16 - M4 in combat that often they're fairly reliable. That has generally been acceptable in Afghanistan and Iraq as it has been in all our wars since the weapon was adopted.

Problem is in heavier combat, you cannot always do that. It's reall bad with the M-16series since you have to clean out the residue from the gas tube excess in the receiver and that's not done effectively without breaking the weapon open and rendering it temporarily inoperable, something you cannot always do. The bolt closure device is a dumb idea -- but it is there for a reason...

Ideally, a weapon that can go three to five days (or three to five basic loads +, which ever comes first) with no attention other than reasonable care in handling and be 100% reliable should be the goal.

If parts are fragile or sensitive enough that replacements should be carried or readily available, that's inadequate reliability IMO.

I think the M1, BAR and M14 were less maintenance intensive and were more reliable (though they had other problems...); as I said somewhere above, all weapons are compromises. The M16 series are IMO decent weapons but they require excessive cleaning (they also get it and that creates other problems).

AlexTX ret

05-27-2009, 08:36 PM

This is somethng from Rec Guns that I think is a good start at trying to unravel this mess. I don't agree with many of its findings for I have different sources. Also, I feel that there is a certain bias but where would I find a place that wouldn't be. Gun Theology being what it is, everybody (including me) thinks they have a clue. ;)

http://www.thegunzone.com/556dw.html

I hope this gives Wilf a sense of how long this SCHV rifle disscussion has been going on. I have a few of the reports mentioned in the timeline so they're not pulling all of this stuff out of their *sses. But I can't vouch for the report's voracity. It's free, you get what you pay for.

AlexTX ret

05-27-2009, 09:25 PM

I have a question for everybody...

You all say to one extent or another that the effectve range and hitting power of the Infantryman doesn't effect tactics. But even here, I 've heard people say that we need a better cartridge than the SS109/M855 round. On the oppsosite tack, there are those who say that the cartridge doen't mean that much, it's all about tactics. My Officers training and the War College said similiar things to the effect that obediance to well conceived operational plan will over come minor weaknesses in the soldier's equipment.

However, in the 45+ years that I have been playing soldier, (somehow I still remember running around the neighborhood with plastic guns) I've been in some very non-standard spaces and fought in some unusual places. In these environments, the soldier's effectiveness was closely tied to the weapon he carried. There weren't a lot of LMGS and heavy support weapons. Supply was also important. The fewer different rounds involved the more the ammo loadout could be achieved.

So today the average soldier has an effective range of 200m and a bullet that overpenetrates, possibly making a lot of small caliber holes in the enemy's body for little imediate effect. If you created a round that increased the range of engagement and increased the chances of creating immediate shock in the target so that he can't fire back, wouldn't that change tactics at least on the small unit level.

Wilf. the effect of "Knock down power" (as it is misnamed) is well known to Law Enforcements Agents. The 357 Mag as it was originaly loaded had tremendous power but ineffective bullets that didn't open or mushroom most of the time. Simply blowing a small caliber hole through the body with little effect on the perpetrator. This was the one of the major findings of the FBI Miami incident. I digress. :o

However, the opposite is true in that a weapon with too heavy a recoil in either semi or full auto mode is going to cause problems for the soldier. I know this to be a fact. I'm not a proponent to go back to the 7.62 Nato round to be used in all weapons. However, wouldn't it be for the best to create a weapon that maximizes the abilities of the soldier to fight and is a sufficently effective cartridge that it can be be used in all a squad/platoon rifles, LMGs and SDMs. Wouldn't that give the Individual trooper more trust in the abilities of his weapon. And since it would increase the effective ranges of engagement and be better suited to the ranges of his support weapons, such as the Milkor M40 GL, wouldn't make the small unit more effective across the board?

SethB

05-27-2009, 09:40 PM

It's reall bad with the M-16series since you have to clean out the residue from the gas tube excess in the receiver and that's not done effectively without breaking the weapon open and rendering it temporarily inoperable, something you cannot always do. The bolt closure device is a dumb idea -- but it is there for a reason...

I've fired 3500 rounds over three months through a gun with no malfunctions. I added lubricant by squirting oil through the gas vents on the side of the carrier. On the 3501st round the cases stuck (a hot day and a hot gun with 800 rounds of dirty Remington ammunition fired in several hours) and revealed the biggest problem that I have with the rifle. The case has a thin rim and a stuck cases often loses a rim. You need a rod to clear that.

I would have thought that grit from a desert or sand from a beach would be worse.

If parts are fragile or sensitive enough that replacements should be carried or readily available, that's inadequate reliability IMO.

Most parts on an AR15 derivative can be replaced easily. A spare bolt and carrier weigh twelve ounces and drop in in less than fifteen seconds. The trigger is a different issue and I have had several trigger groups fail.

I think the M1, BAR and M14 were less maintenance intensive and were more reliable (though they had other problems...); as I said somewhere above, all weapons are compromises. The M16 series are IMO decent weapons but they require excessive cleaning (they also get it and that creates other problems).

John Garand was interviewed about the M16s teething issues. He said that his rifle went through the same issues in 1942. As for reliability, a Marine friend told me that the M16 was too small and the M14 had too many reliability issues. He favored the AKM. I didn't argue.

AlexTX ret

05-27-2009, 10:00 PM

What is problematic in my view is that a well armed and trained infantryman has not been available to the US in large numbers really since the end of WW II -- and those infantrymen mostly came out of Italy and the Pacific, the northwest European battles were, after July 44, not Infantry battles but combined arms in the greatest sense; infantry skills were of marginal value except for the period in the Ardennes

The whole concept of Blitzkreig took the emphasis of the infantryman away from the effectiveness of mobile warfare. Even today, I hear stories of infantry sections being couped up in their IFVs for up to 11-12 hours. The only effective use of infantry was to keep Hunter-Killer groups away from their tanks and to hold ground from counter attacks by the enemy. It's a bit different situation in urban areas bu there the military tries to marginalize that as muchas possible. One factor I think is that the Civilian Govenment is afraid of casualties on civilian moral.

In any event, the senior leadership of the Army will invest heavily in the Infantry but the priorities get skewed and tend to emphasize technology as a substitute for training.

I feel that Airmobile tactics in Vietnam sort of blew a hole in the concepts of the higher ups and they have never caught up since then. The helicopter was as hightech as it came in the beginning and the tactics of the 7th air mobile division were astonishing. I didn't get in on the ground floor but even by the time I became involved, most higher commanders didn't know how to handle the troops.

Since then till the COIN activites today, IMHO, the upper levels of the military's bureaucracy have been left behind and unfortunately what they don't understand, they won't allow lower level commanders to effectively attempt.

The M-14 contacts had gone from Springfield Armory (the government original and the developer of the tooling who also manufactured some 50K or so for issue) to Harrington & Richardson with a contract for 150K (IIRC) ~$145.00 each; Winchester got the contract for the second batch of the same size at about $109. each. Having completed proofing test production runs, DA was going to let a contract for 1M. TRW had never made a weapon before but wanted in the defense business and they had some good Engineers; they said we won't bid on 1M but if you'll give us a contract for 2M, we'll make them for $90.00 each (and that was four dollars cheaper than the M1 at the time...). So they got the contract and were in mid stream when McNamara decided to kill the contract (paying a cancellation penalty) and buy the M-16 for about $210.00 apiece.

The decision was based as much or more on the fact that TRW had contributed to Nixon's campaign and were big time Republican supporters while Colt had contributed to Kennedy's campaign. Bobby Kennedy was a vindictive little guy.

All true by my memories and papers that I read of the times.

Olin didn't do that on their own, the Army dictated the powder change to get a lower chamber pressure. That also resulted in lower energy and more powder fouling. Regrettably, the first year of service in Viet Nam did see a lot of failure due to not keeping weapons clean.

The papers that I have read that Olin went to Army first saying they could save the Army money. Also that by not using the spec powder, which was turning out to be harder to get, they could keep to their contract of so many rounds in a certain time.

The M16 and M4 are adequate combat weapons; they aren't great but they're okay. They DO require, IMO an excessive amount of maintenance.

Yes, the are "okay" and because of finacial restraints, maybe what we can afford for a while. I just wish the Army would admit to it rather then blaming the poor private that he isn't doing his part.

AlexTX ret

05-27-2009, 10:16 PM

6.5 MPC is still only a compromise, designed to fit within the 5.56 envelope. It may have some nice advantages but little that would strike me as breathtaking (also not sure how well it defeats body armour). 6.5 Grendel would be a little more breath taking but even that is a compromise for the same reason (length-wise anyway). These are all rounds that are designed to suit, to some extent anyway, existing platforms. Going for a marginal compromise would probably not end the conversation.

The group of us who say the 6.5 MPC would be a better round say so because only a barrel change would be needed. We're still paying for the banks you know.

I think the 6.5 Grendal would be a better round but would reguire a upper reciever change plus the barrel replacement. If you're going to do that, maybe you should go for a whole weapon change. The HK416 in 7x43 would be advantagess. The 7x43 is the best cartridge that I have found that balances all the factors of the modern day tactics. However, beside the cost of the weapon you would have to increase training cost for each individual trooper.

I think the US have missed (another) beautiful opportunity in the late seventies/early eighties with the 6 mm SAW, which was said to have been dropped for fear of adding a third calibre. That could have been a good round to replace both other calibres. The M16A1 was in need of replacement anyway, so the A2 might as well have been a totally different weapon, me thinks. Back then most NATO members had not yet committed to 5.56 either….....hindsight.

Yep! That is why I wonder if our leaders understand what the job of a rifleman is all about.

Really? With 1 in 7 barrels? That would make for a short-range weapon.

No, they actually want to change the barrels to optimize the M193 round. They're talking about going back to the 1:12 to 1:14 barrels. Who would of thunk. :confused:

Rifleman

05-27-2009, 11:47 PM

I feel that Airmobile tactics in Vietnam sort of blew a hole in the concepts of the higher ups and they have never caught up since then. The helicopter was as hightech as it came in the beginning and the tactics of the 7th air mobile division were astonishing. I didn't get in on the ground floor but even by the time I became involved, most higher commanders didn't know how to handle the troops.

:confused: 11th Air Assault Division? :confused:

AlexTX ret

05-28-2009, 12:02 AM

Carried weight, human performance, doctrine (tactics?) and training are all more critical issues - or more important than calibre. Put another way, I can't see a need to alter training, (apart from the handling) doctrine and tactics, if I change my main infantry weapon from M4/5.56mm, to an M4/6.5mm, or even an AK/7.62. Actually an optic sight might have more overall impact.

Well we can agree on the advantage of opitics espiecially if it's the new Aimpoint that doesn't need batteries. :D

However, I fight this point that the weapons don't affect basic doctine all day long. I even asked a question about it in another post. The problem is that it has affected the training and tactics of other countries. The Russians and the Chinese for examples. The Chinese are going through a renaissance of their Infantry tactics since they've cut their dependance on Russian operational doctrine. They are building a new military in all areas, in all directions. However for their Infantry they are creating small units that fight at 400m-500m and their infantry cartridge and rifle is suppose to defeat body armor at those Ranges. This plus a new range of support weapons like their new Multi shot grenade launcher, could put our troops at a serious disadvantage. If an infantryman's fighting tool is so unimportant, was is?

In 1987 I went from using a 7.62mm SLR and GPMG to an all 5.56mm platoon, and tactical doctrine did not miss a beat, except for some very minor issues, caused by now having everyone with a fully automatic weapon. Even today the minor tactics of 1919 remain relevant, regardless of calibre.

I'll ask a question I asked a person today. What area of combat did you prove this to be true? I'm not being an *ssh*le nor am I despariging your record or experiences. But there seems to be a disconnect between the small unit commanders and the bureaucracy. I see no discussion between levels of command about what our basic operational policy is and can it be made better.

IIMO, Fragmentation is the best primary wounding mechanism, for a small calibre round, but it is not useful to suggest that the primary purpose of an infantry round is to break up inside the human body. Perforating cover is just as important - thus the CRISAT criteria. After that, multiple hits would seem to be a very strong determinant in providing the relative state of incapacity required - or much more likely to kill.

Yes but that is becoming more and more questionable. Yes, the prenetration of cover is important. But multiple small calliber hits are showing a certain weakness. There are more and more stories from troops in the field where are getting good hits and the enemy combatant still is capable of firing. Or as one special incident that I got a paper on a few weeks ago. The shortness of the range of the 5.56 round when fired from a IFV meant that try as they may they couldn't hit the enemy effectively. The enemy was quickly reinforced and only the IFV's abillity to speed away saved them from the RPGs shot at them.

All that said, as a point of tactical doctrine, I assert that infantry minor tactics should emphasise the use of projected HE, as the primary means of breaking enemy will. I fully recognise that this has some problematic issues associated with it, but it is a viable solution.

Maybe in rural Afganistan, but in the neighborhoods of Afganistan and Iraq, it really does have its limitations. As the Russians found in Cheznia, only boots on the ground had the capability of knockingout the Cheznians hunter-Killer groups. Of course, they also found out that their Contract Soldier program showed no advantages over conscription. In the final result it was the SOG groups that did the actual fighting.

FRAGMENTATION
The data I have on this is that the M855 cartridge (62-grain, gilded metal-jacketed, lead alloy core bullet with a steel penetrator) will at high velocities, (900m/s) fragment up to 50% after travelling 5-8cm into a 10% gelatine medium. M855 remains intact at velocities below 763m/s, so from an M4 barrel, M855 will not fragment on impact. In fact it will only achieve viable fragmentation (30-20%) out to 100-125m.

However, I think it is fair to say that the actual requirement for immediate incapacitation is a close range issue, bearing in mind that even with multiple fatal wounds into the heart and lungs some men may continue to function, to the degree he can walk and return fire for up to 15-20 seconds.

According to ARDEC, this would account for why some soldiers assume that their fire has not been effective.

First I would like to see the report that these figures come from. They counter what I have seen. However, I live in a dream world that makes it hard to get different views. However, it is unusual that my reports minimize the effects of fragmentation of the SS109/M855 round. This is possible because the latest information I have was a study done on pigs. Cartridge effects is a real science but it seems that we try to turn it into black magic. :p

As for the length of time that a combatant is effective after being shot and the onset of incapacitation is one of the most controversal parts of determining the effectiveness of a particular cartridge. The Army seems to more interest in keeping the status quo then actually doing tests on the soldiers in the field complaints. I'm not saying they're wrong but nowadays it seems the there is a lot of bias in the reports I read.

AlexTX ret

05-28-2009, 12:27 AM

I've fired 3500 rounds over three months through a gun with no malfunctions. I added lubricant by squirting oil through the gas vents on the side of the carrier. On the 3501st round the cases stuck (a hot day and a hot gun with 800 rounds of dirty Remington ammunition fired in several hours) and revealed the biggest problem that I have with the rifle. The case has a thin rim and a stuck cases often loses a rim. You need a rod to clear that.

Were you in a combat zone at that time. I can't see you trusting your life to a rifle with so little care esp a M16/M4

Most parts on an AR15 derivative can be replaced easily. A spare bolt and carrier weigh twelve ounces and drop in in less than fifteen seconds. The trigger is a different issue and I have had several trigger groups fail.

The problem is that you don't have the luxury to quickly change the bolt and carrier group in combat. That is why soldiers are finding it hard to find the time to clean their weapons 3 or 4 times a day as new policy requires. But you don't have a choice because their life depends on it.

I used the M16 in training and if I had a missfire, I just raised my hand and shouted out that I had a malfunction. When I got in combat there was no one to tell I had a malfunction. All it matterd that if your weapon malfunctioned then you were helpless for however long it took you to clear it. I have more than a few gray hairs today because of this.:rolleyes:

John Garand was interviewed about the M16s teething issues. He said that his rifle went through the same issues in 1942. As for reliability, a Marine friend told me that the M16 was too small and the M14 had too many reliability issues. He favored the AKM. I didn't argue.

First, the M16 went into cambat in 1965, it shouldn't still be having teething problems.

Secondly, I took the flak as a platoon leader because I had a AKMS (folding stock) made in Czechoslovakia. There were problems such as battle field identification (AKs and M16 sounded different, AKs also went "Clack" when you went from safe to fire mode), also you had to scrounge your own ammunition. However, that was a help in some operations when they couldn't supply you properly. Airmobile relied on a thin supply line.:o

Ken White

05-28-2009, 12:50 AM

http://www.thegunzone.com/556dw.htmlThis particular item:
General Wheeler recommends:

1. In FY 1964, procure between 50,000 and 100,000 AR-15 rifles and use them to equip Air Assault, Special Forces, and Airborne units;is very close to my recollection of the Recommendation that 82d Abn Div sent to DA. Only difference was the number of AR-15s to buy was 50K, period and they would be for special purpose units (type not specified) and the recommendation was to retain the M-14 in a shortened and lightened version for airborne units.

H&R and Springfield both made variants as the M14E1. This is an early one, the later models had an 18" or so barrel.

Ken White

05-28-2009, 01:29 AM

I is courteous... :D

I've fired 3500 rounds over three months through a gun with no malfunctions...The case has a thin rim and a stuck cases often loses a rim. You need a rod to clear that.First, are you saying you did this with no cleaning? Second, what if you have no rod?
I would have thought that grit from a desert or sand from a beach would be worse.In combat you get that, rain / snow, falling in mud puddles, wading through creeks, blown debris from nearby explosions, falling with weapon in front of you while running, rapping people up side the head with the muzzle (accidentally, of course), spotty ammo quality, bad magazines, overheating from excessive automatic fire causing carbon bake, particularly on the firing pin, carbon build up within the gas tube and dozens of other things.

Ever suffer a gas tube getting bent? Got a frozen front sight post so you can't adjust for a zero? Ever jam the Bolt Closure device accidentally on a feeding round -- or on a double stack? What do you do if the stake on the Bolt Carrier Key screws loosens? Not to mention firing it in sub zero cold where you can use no lube...

I can live with it but there are better out there that do not take as much care. All weapons can have problems and all require some maintenance; the issue is what's excessive.
Most parts on an AR15 derivative can be replaced easily. A spare bolt and carrier weigh twelve ounces and drop in in less than fifteen seconds. The trigger is a different issue and I have had several trigger groups fail.See Alex. You may not have 15 seconds -- or a spare bolt -- and having to take a weapon out of service in a fire fight is not a comforting idea...
John Garand was interviewed about the M16s teething issues. He said that his rifle went through the same issues in 1942. As for reliability, a Marine friend told me that the M16 was too small and the M14 had too many reliability issues. He favored the AKM. I didn't argue.I'll argue with him; the AK series is super reliable, no question. It also requires almost no maintenance. You get what you pay for; it is also woefully inaccurate, has even less range than an M4 and has little more knockdown power. It's one plus aside from being low maintenance is tha the larger bullet isn't easily deflected by vegetation. I also never had an problems with the M14; no reliability issues back in the day but these nowadays are cobbled together from parts laying around in depots so a mismatch is possible. Still, I'll take an 'unreliable' M14 and he can have his AK. We start at 800 meters and move toward each other...

True on teething; the M1 did have some. So did the M-14. So did the M-16 -- but as Alex said, the weapon is our longest serving rifle since the trap door Springfield. Time for teething problems to be long gone. I stand by my comments, the weapon requires more maintenance and provides less reliability than is desirable in a combat weapon. Not a shooting weapon; a combat weapon.

AlexTX ret

05-28-2009, 01:41 AM

:confused: 11th Air Assault Division? :confused:

I was still in College when the 11th Air Assault Division was showing what could be done. I also missed the first year (1965) of the 1st air cav in country. I was trying to get there but you can only do so much.:D

If I had a hero, it was Hal Moore. I met him once and he didn't look anything like Mel Gibson. ;)

AlexTX ret

05-28-2009, 02:05 AM

I is courteous... :D

I'll argue with him; the AK series is super reliable, no question. It also requires almost no maintenance. You get what you pay for; it is also woefully inaccurate, has even less range than an M4 and has little more knockdown power. It's one plus aside from being low maintenance is tha the larger bullet isn't easily deflected by vegetation. I also never had an problems with the M14; no reliability issues back in the day but these nowadays are cobbled together from parts laying around in depots so a mismatch is possible. Still, I'll take an 'unreliable' M14 and he can have his AK. We start at 800 meters and move toward each other...

Okay,Okay I wouldn't take that bet. However, if you didn't have 800m to "sneak up on me", it might be interesting. The AK47s were, as you say, very short ranged and inaccurate. However, that had a lot to do with the ammunition that the Chinese and Vietnamise used. Pure Crap! However, I did some astute trading and managed to get a Czech made AKMS and a large ammount of ammo from a certain Russian advisor that got foolish. :D

Hey, it was almost a "real" assault rifle, it didn't jam and it had twice the range of a Chinese AK47 or if I remember rightly a type 56.:rolleyes:

Ken White

05-28-2009, 02:16 AM

However, if you didn't have 800m to "sneak up on me", it might be interesting.I cannot believe that you would imply that I would even contemplate the seeking of an unfair advantage...:eek:

:D:D

Rifleman

05-28-2009, 02:16 AM

Still, I'll take an 'unreliable' M14 and he can have his AK. We start at 800 meters and move toward each other...

Sounds like a man who's spent time on a KD range wraped up in a M1907 leather sling. ;)

The late Jeff Cooper would approve. :)

Excuse me: "looped up" in a M1907 leather sling!

Kiwigrunt

05-28-2009, 04:19 AM

Just for those of you who haven't come across it:

ammo-oracle (http://ammo.ar15.com/project/AmmoOracle_061808.pdf)

jcustis

05-28-2009, 05:50 AM

Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
Carried weight, human performance, doctrine (tactics?) and training are all more critical issues - or more important than calibre. Put another way, I can't see a need to alter training, (apart from the handling) doctrine and tactics, if I change my main infantry weapon from M4/5.56mm, to an M4/6.5mm, or even an AK/7.62. Actually an optic sight might have more overall impact.

Well we can agree on the advantage of opitics espiecially if it's the new Aimpoint that doesn't need batteries.

I believe that optics indeed make a ton of difference, and we are in fact just starting to realize this, even if we don't know it right now. I think that problem stems (at least from the Marine Corps perspective) from the fact that our training and courses of qualication fire do not address these issues. Most rounds fired during the various combat marksmanship courses of fire in the CMP run out no further than 50m, which I think is a shambles of a training setup.

SethB

05-28-2009, 07:30 AM

Were you in a combat zone at that time. I can't see you trusting your life to a rifle with so little care esp a M16/M4

Certainly wasn't, and wouldn't. I just wanted to see what would happen. The guy who gave me the idea routinely shoots uppers for five times that long without cleaning and has fewer issues than I did.

The problem is that you don't have the luxury to quickly change the bolt and carrier group in combat. That is why soldiers are finding it hard to find the time to clean their weapons 3 or 4 times a day as new policy requires. But you don't have a choice because their life depends on it.

Understood. I just brought it up because most of the parts that I've seen break are on the carrier. Dropping a new one in is easier than sourcing a new bolt or replacing the extractor.

I used the M16 in training and if I had a missfire, I just raised my hand and shouted out that I had a malfunction. When I got in combat there was no one to tell I had a malfunction. All it matterd that if your weapon malfunctioned then you were helpless for however long it took you to clear it. I have more than a few gray hairs today because of this.

The first shooting course that I took was from Marine and NYPD cop who first went overseas in 1965. He told us that he wasn't told how to fight; he had to figure that out on his own. He had a few simple methods for getting the weapon back up and running. If you want to know PM me and I will tell you his methods.

First, the M16 went into cambat in 1965, it shouldn't still be having teething problems.

But it did. Not all of which were the fault of the designer. One of the engineers from Colt pointed out that it took almost twenty years to get the military to alter the TDP on the M4 carbine to allow for a superior extractor spring and buffer. The parts commonality between the M16A2 and the M4 was more important than extractor tension.

First, are you saying you did this with no cleaning?

I did. And I have not run the most extensive test to that effect.

Second, what if you have no rod?

Then you are ####ed. That is why the extractor and the inferior rim on the NATO cartridge is one of the biggest problems with the gun.

In combat you get that, rain / snow, falling in mud puddles, wading through creeks, blown debris from nearby explosions, falling with weapon in front of you while running, rapping people up side the head with the muzzle (accidentally, of course), spotty ammo quality, bad magazines, overheating from excessive automatic fire causing carbon bake, particularly on the firing pin, carbon build up within the gas tube and dozens of other things.

I understand that those are issues. I had thought that you would cite them as more of an issue than carbon debris in the receiver. And as for carbon build up in the gas tube, I've never seen or heard of that. Lots of people use pipe cleaner to try to clean the gas tube, but they often break. Now, PRI makes a "Fat Boy" gas tube that has a larger internal diameter to try and change the timing of the M4 gas system. It has a shelf that carbon deposits on.

Ever suffer a gas tube getting bent?

No. My rifles have Colt gas tubes and free float rails. They are protected by the rail and the Colt tubes are almost impossible to melt.

Got a frozen front sight post so you can't adjust for a zero?

Never been that cold, thankfully.

Ever jam the Bolt Closure device accidentally on a feeding round -- or on a double stack?

Many time. 25 times in a row once, just for the practice. Lock the bolt to the rear, insert fingers and clear debris, rack three times and reload the weapon.

What do you do if the stake on the Bolt Carrier Key screws loosens?

Ned Christiansen makes a great tool that stakes the keys better than the factory job. I know a guy who had a key come loose in RVN and when he builds guns now he stakes the #### out of the key. That reduces the chances of a key coming loose.

Not to mention firing it in sub zero cold where you can use no lube...

Never been there. I'm told that the Finns did a test with the AKM, the M16A1 and the SIG. All three passed although when they froze the guns outside, but they couldn't open the M16 without firing it...

Big issue with the cold is that the gas system operates on a more narrow range than an AKM. Lots of guns work fine until it gets cold and then they are undergassed. I'm told that Colt has designed a gas port that meters gas, but I haven't seen it.

I can live with it but there are better out there that do not take as much care. All weapons can have problems and all require some maintenance; the issue is what's excessive.See Alex. You may not have 15 seconds -- or a spare bolt -- and having to take a weapon out of service in a fire fight is not a comforting idea...

I wasn't saying that replacing the bolt should be a routine thing, but it is an option when something breaks.

I'll argue with him; the AK series is super reliable, no question. It also requires almost no maintenance.

I had a Chinese AKM clone with a bent reciever and while shooting a friends rifle a spent case got stuck behind the carrier. While I think an Izmash built rifle or one from an arsenal abroad would be better, I don't think that they are perfect.

You get what you pay for; it is also woefully inaccurate, has even less range than an M4 and has little more knockdown power. It's one plus aside from being low maintenance is tha the larger bullet isn't easily deflected by vegetation. I also never had an problems with the M14; no reliability issues back in the day but these nowadays are cobbled together from parts laying around in depots so a mismatch is possible. Still, I'll take an 'unreliable' M14 and he can have his AK. We start at 800 meters and move toward each other...

He'd grease you with an M40. He wasn't an 0311 the whole time...

True on teething; the M1 did have some. So did the M-14. So did the M-16 -- but as Alex said, the weapon is our longest serving rifle since the trap door Springfield. Time for teething problems to be long gone. I stand by my comments, the weapon requires more maintenance and provides less reliability than is desirable in a combat weapon. Not a shooting weapon; a combat weapon.

I'm not going to disagree, just post my perspective, limited as it is. I would point out that product improved M16s have been designed by various engineers for the last 40 years. The lack of a buyer is the most serious issue. Its hard to make progress when the Army isn't serious about improving the design, as evidenced by the failure to change the extractor spring at the earliest opportunity...

Sounds like a man who's spent time on a KD range wraped up in a M1907 leather sling. ;)

The late Jeff Cooper would approve. :)

Excuse me: "looped up" in a M1907 leather sling!

I sat in Cooper's living room and he told me that the ideal combat rifle is the M1903A3.

William F. Owen

05-28-2009, 01:19 PM

Well we can agree on the advantage of opitics espiecially if it's the new Aimpoint that doesn't need batteries. :D
I'm not so worried about batteries as the ability to still use it, when wearing NVGs, and matching it's ability to enable quick and accurate shooting, with increasing the ability to detect targets - this being a sore point with me, having had to suffer the SUIT then SUSAT in the British Army.

However, I fight this point that the weapons don't affect basic doctine all day long. I even asked a question about it in another post.
Fight away. I never said weapons don't effect tactics. I said the calibre of weapons has a very negligable effect.
Please tell me how your tactical doctrine is based on the range and terminal effect of your infantry rifle, based on a comparison of 7.62mm v 5.56mm?
My understanding has always been on applying weapons capabilities to tactics. Not basing my tactics on what my weapons might be able to do.

The problem is that it has affected the training and tactics of other countries.
As concerns other countries, so what? I'd ignore anything the Chinese do. I have spent a lot of time handling Chinese equipment, talking to PLA officers as well as Royal Thai and Indian Army officers who have studied them close up. They aren't that good.

The Chinese are going through a renaissance of their Infantry tactics since they've cut their dependance on Russian operational doctrine. They are building a new military in all areas, in all directions.
So they keep saying. It will still be same mindset handling the new equipment. When was the PRC dependant on Russian/Soviet Doctrine. Yes they copied lot of Soviet equipment, but for example, I know of no Deep Battle writing within PLA "Literature and Arts," or that they sought to practice it, or ever could. From 1945-75 the PLA was predominately light infantry, where as the Soviets were mostly "Motor Rifle."

However for their Infantry they are creating small units that fight at 400m-500m and their infantry cartridge and rifle is suppose to defeat body armor at those Ranges. This plus a new range of support weapons like their new Multi shot grenade launcher, could put our troops at a serious disadvantage. If an infantryman's fighting tool is so unimportant, was is?
So do I take it that your response to this one item of information is to address it by changing the calibre of the issue US infantry?

I'll ask a question I asked a person today. What area of combat did you prove this to be true? I'm not being an *ssh*le nor am I despariging your record or experiences. But there seems to be a disconnect between the small unit commanders and the bureaucracy. I see no discussion between levels of command about what our basic operational policy is and can it be made better.
Disparage away. I have no operational experience that proves this point, and unless I had compared both weapons sets under identical conditions, it would be irrelevant.
You may see no discussion, but that is exactly the discussion I have been involved in for the last 8 years. In relation to infantry science it is what I do.

There are more and more stories from troops in the field where are getting good hits and the enemy combatant still is capable of firing. Or as one special incident that I got a paper on a few weeks ago.
There may be stories. Let me put it this way, in the British and Israeli armies, there are no stories, or none that indicate a trend which there a body of empirical evidence to merit attention.

First I would like to see the report that these figures come from. They counter what I have seen. However, I live in a dream world that makes it hard to get different views.
The figures come from notes I took based on presentations from ARDEC and NATO Light Weapons working group.

However, it is unusual that my reports minimize the effects of fragmentation of the SS109/M855 round. This is possible because the latest information I have was a study done on pigs.
And did these tests produce accurate, measurable and repeatable data?

Cartridge effects is a real science but it seems that we try to turn it into black magic.
Having spent 3 years of my life intermittently, but actively involved in testing body armour, against a very wide range of rounds, I would submit that the terminal performance of bullets on various homogenous mediums is nearly an exact science. Reading that across into wounding is not an exact science, for very obvious reasons.

As for the length of time that a combatant is effective after being shot and the onset of incapacitation is one of the most controversal parts of determining the effectiveness of a particular cartridge. The Army seems to more interest in keeping the status quo then actually doing tests on the soldiers in the field complaints.
I am not aware of the controversy. The length of time someone can function is directly related to the time it takes them to exsanguinate, and the level of incapacity required. The wounding mechanisms are extremely well understood, if you talk to doctors.
What testing would you do? The alleged terminal effect of a given infantry round on the human body is a minor part of the factors that have to be balanced.
Now if you want to can change the M4 to 6.5mm if you want. It will make no difference to tactics, or the effectiveness of your infantry. The same money is almost certainly better spent on training.

Ken White

05-28-2009, 03:42 PM

But it did. Not all of which were the fault of the designer. One of the engineers from Colt pointed out that it took almost twenty years to get the military to alter the TDP on the M4 carbine to allow for a superior extractor spring and buffer. The parts commonality between the M16A2 and the M4 was more important than extractor tension.Whether the original design was flawed or Army mandated changes were flawed is irrelevant -- the Troops have the weapon that exists, not an idealized variant.
I did. And I have not run the most extensive test to that effect.And the combat relevance of this is?
Then you are f%$&@d. That is why the extractor and the inferior rim on the NATO cartridge is one of the biggest problems with the gun.Again, reality bites.
I understand that those are issues. I had thought that you would cite them as more of an issue than carbon debris in the receiver.It's not any one issue, but the synergistic effects of two or more that cause problems in combat.
No. My rifles have Colt gas tubes and free float rails. They are protected by the rail and the Colt tubes are almost impossible to melt.Everyone doesn't have free float rails and some that do remove them from time to to time...

Many time. 25 times in a row once, just for the practice. Lock the bolt to the rear, insert fingers and clear debris, rack three times and reload the weapon. If that's adequate combat reliability for you, enjoy.
Ned Christiansen makes a great tool that stakes the keys better than the factory job. I know a guy who had a key come loose in RVN and when he builds guns now he stakes the s**t out of the key. That reduces the chances of a key coming loose.Regrettably, most military contractors aren't that conscientious.
I wasn't saying that replacing the bolt should be a routine thing, but it is an option when something breaks.Seth has spare bolts; Joe does not.
He'd grease you with an M40. He wasn't an 0311 the whole time...I thought you said he wanted an AKM... Where did he get the M40? :D
I'm not going to disagree, just post my perspective, limited as it is. I would point out that product improved M16s have been designed by various engineers for the last 40 years. The lack of a buyer is the most serious issue. Its hard to make progress when the Army isn't serious about improving the design, as evidenced by the failure to change the extractor spring at the earliest opportunity...Welcome to reality. What should be and what is are generally quite different. The soldier in combat has to deal with what is.
I sat in Cooper's living room and he told me that the ideal combat rifle is the M1903A3.He had a point, it is better than most -- not least because it is absolutely reliable and someone who's hit by a .30-06 knows they've been hit...

Combat and shooting are different things.

Daniel Watters

05-28-2009, 06:18 PM

This is something from Rec Guns that I think is a good start at trying to unravel this mess. I don't agree with many of its findings for I have different sources. Also, I feel that there is a certain bias but where would I find a place that wouldn't be. Gun Theology being what it is, everybody (including me) thinks they have a clue. ;)

http://www.thegunzone.com/556dw.html

I hope this gives Wilf a sense of how long this SCHV rifle discussion has been going on. I have a few of the reports mentioned in the timeline so they're not pulling all of this stuff out of their *sses. But I can't vouch for the report's voracity. It's free, you get what you pay for.

As the author of the linked article, thank you for the plug. With the 5.56mm Timeline, I'm not trying to reach any conclusions. It is meant merely as a historical record of events. When I state the findings and conclusions from a specific report, I am merely repeating what was written by the authors of that report. Everything that I use is open source, although it is not always easily found. I prefer to go back to the primary sources where ever possible. Things can get twisted as they are repeated by successive authors. Of the secondary sources, I trust Ezell and McNaugher as they worked from archival documents and started early enough to interview most of the participants while they were still alive and had reasonably fresh memories of the events.

I have been working on the Timeline for 10 years, and it is currently just shy of 600 pages in length. It really couldn't be published anywhere other than the Net as I have no pretty pictures, and the subject matter is often too esoteric to be of broad interest. However, by being on the Net, I have no constraints as to length. For instance, the publisher of the recent book "American Rifle" demanded that the author's lengthy bibliography be left out in order to save pages, and thus, reduce printing costs.

If anyone has other original documents and sources that they'd like to provide or recommend, I'd gladly take a look.

AlexTX ret

05-28-2009, 08:54 PM

I won't deny Ken's responses. I'm a consultant for a a living and I was none too gentle in my post. It's not that I feel that your experiences aren't valid. It's just that I'm usually being drowned by literature that promotes this mod and that improvement by people who at best had some combat training but ususally have no combat experiences at all. So they're talking out their collective *ss. At least you're not selling something and you seem to ready to listen. For that I'm grateful.

The first shooting course that I took was from Marine and NYPD cop who first went overseas in 1965. He told us that he wasn't told how to fight; he had to figure that out on his own. He had a few simple methods for getting the weapon back up and running. If you want to know PM me and I will tell you his methods.

I learned more ways to overcome the weaknesses of the M16 system than I will admit to. The problem isn't that I could create work arounds. It is that I have to and spend so much of the time doing that. The M16 system has its advantages but reliability isn't one of them. Now I question if there isn't a better weapon system that could be found. In the time since the introduction of the the M16 and the SS109/M855, there has been much technology that has come around our way. Shouldn't there be a better way and why are we not trying to find it.

The Rangers are supposedly testing the FN SCAR-L M16 concept but I've heard that most of the test rifles aren't going to the troops in Afganistan but staying here in the United States. That plus a round of critisims by the military and the procurement system that the SCAR-L isn't reliable enough even before the system is given its day in the sun. This rush to judgement without a good testing by experienced soldiers smacks of a determination that the test has already being considered a wash and the SCAR-L will be found not to be acceptable. The HK 316 system has already found a similiar fate. Why aren't these systems given an adequate test and then evaluated on their merits. I mean the opinion put forth by the procurement board that the fact that they have short stroke pistons gas systems that cause the rifle to lose its zero and the weapon is not as accurate because of the piston. This without any studies to prove that this is so, smacks of some agenda being put forth. The only reason I can see this being so, is that the military doesn't want to spend money on the individual soldier but doesn't want the same trooper to become less trusting of his weapon.

But it did. Not all of which were the fault of the designer. One of the engineers from Colt pointed out that it took almost twenty years to get the military to alter the TDP on the M4 carbine to allow for a superior extractor spring and buffer. The parts commonality between the M16A2 and the M4 was more important than extractor tension.

When soldiers die because of such stupidity, I could beat my head on a heavy object with frustration. There has been to much of this and yet we still talk stupidly about the M16/M4 system being the best all around weapon system. :mad:

I understand that those are issues. I had thought that you would cite them as more of an issue than carbon debris in the receiver. And as for carbon build up in the gas tube, I've never seen or heard of that. Lots of people use pipe cleaner to try to clean the gas tube, but they often break. Now, PRI makes a "Fat Boy" gas tube that has a larger internal diameter to try and change the timing of the M4 gas system. It has a shelf that carbon deposits on.

You use what you are issued. No more, no less. And the M16 has been problematic since its inception. You're friend's AKM would have him heavily (draconian) disciplined. Modifications you apply to your own weapon is a article 15 offense if not higher because you damamged goverment property and reduced the effectiveness of your unit.

I had a Chinese AKM clone with a bent reciever and while shooting a friends rifle a spent case got stuck behind the carrier. While I think an Izmash built rifle or one from an arsenal abroad would be better, I don't think that they are perfect.

Almost all AK type weapons found on the international market are parts guns thrown together by the Chinese. For the most part, they "S*CK". But that is a fact of life. I'm still able to make puchases of Czech and a few other ex-Warsaw Pact Nation's best but the market is drying up. If you find a newer Russian weapon inspect it fully to make sure it isn't a Chinese manufactured out of Russian parts. They have certain quality conditions.:wry:

QUOTE=SethB;72922]I'm not going to disagree, just post my perspective, limited as it is. I would point out that product improved M16s have been designed by various engineers for the last 40 years. The lack of a buyer is the most serious issue. Its hard to make progress when the Army isn't serious about improving the design, as evidenced by the failure to change the extractor spring at the earliest opportunity...[/QUOTE]

All you can do is understand this fact and go on. There is nothing that can be done for the regular soldier.

QUOTE=SethB;72922]I sat in Cooper's living room and he told me that the ideal combat rifle is the M1903A3.[/QUOTE]

I one time thought that the sun rose and set on Jeff Cooper. Then I got a different perspective and realize he was the product of his experiences. This is what most people are and it takes a great deal of work to change yourself.

He was a product of his time and times change. He still is one of the most intelligent analysts that I've ever found but he had an agenda and he wouldn't modify it to meet the future that is coming upon us.

However, I am still truly heart struck by his passing.

AlexTX ret

05-28-2009, 11:12 PM

Please tell me how your tactical doctrine is based on the range and terminal effect of your infantry rifle, based on a comparison of 7.62mm v 5.56mm? My understanding has always been on applying weapons capabilities to tactics. Not basing my tactics on what my weapons might be able to do.

No can do about the comparing 7.62 NATO vs the present 5.56 NATO. I would like to see crew served weapons, such as the 7.62 MMG taken away fro the squad/platoon and regulate it to the company's discretion. To do that requires a change in the cartridge to something more effective than the present 5.56 round. I've never bee a fan of the 7.62 NATO given to the individual rifleman as a weapon. I was/am a fan of the FN Fal but don't believe that is the way to fight a battle. Now there are better rifles in 7.62 NATO than the FNFal/M14 weapons systems but I still don't think they should be applied to a small group except as a possible DM rifle.

I think a change to the most effective small unit cartridge should be looked into and evaluated to the small unit's needs. I think that is the 7x43 round for a lot of reasons. However, that will never get a fair trial because that would be too big an upset to higher level leaders policies. For one thing it would cost a lot of money we man not have because we're in a serious recession/depression. Valid point. So we need to go over our possible cartridge types and pick the one that best fits our needs be that physical or finacial. So since so many of our present M16/M4 need a refit to keep them first class, this would be a greater opportunity to look for the best round that addresses the weaknesses without requiring a total weapon change.

If it only needs a barrel change then we were going to do that anyway. So the 6.5 MPC looks better and better. Side effects are increased range (500m) which could be best utilized by an acceptance of optics on the individual rifleman's weapon. Add to that such as the Milkor M40 with its 800m range. Also a IAR/Saw autofire weapon plus a SDM specialist (though this would be less needed because you 've increased the marksmanship and situational awareness of the common soldier.

As concerns other countries, so what? I'd ignore anything the Chinese do. I have spent a lot of time handling Chinese equipment, talking to PLA officers as well as Royal Thai and Indian Army officers who have studied them close up. They aren't that good.

To paraphase SunTzu: Don't underestimate your enemy prowess for that way breeds arrogance.

The Chinese are trying to create a first world military. I agree they have a way to go and it takes a long time to address a training system that addresses the training of millions of basically peasants but they are attempting that. And they are learning everday. We haven't heard the last from China.

"Snip"

Disparage away. I have no operational experience that proves this point, and unless I had compared both weapons sets under identical conditions, it would be irrelevant.
You may see no discussion, but that is exactly the discussion I have been involved in for the last 8 years. In relation to infantry science it is what I do.

Okay...

In the real world there are little possibility of such tests. However, the effect of doctrine affects the abilites of your soldiers and units. So even if the tests you want can't provide an unequivocal answer, the result of not considering the answers in the light of up to date experience can destroy you. The world is full of just such disconnects.

I'm a maverick. I see a disconnect between the theory and the factual reality. I also see a lot of evidence dismissed due to unfavoriable cosequences. We have been blessed that since Vietnam in that we have not actually fought a major war. At least one that posed a direct strain on our abilties to supply or created a direct threat to our battlefield assetments and policies. I think we have lulled ourselves into a false world that makes everything we do come out alright. Is there going to come a time we aren't going to be so fortunate?

There may be stories. Let me put it this way, in the British and Israeli armies, there are no stories, or none that indicate a trend which there a body of empirical evidence to merit attention.

The figures come from notes I took based on presentations from ARDEC and NATO Light Weapons working group.

And did these tests produce accurate, measurable and repeatable data?

The Israelies that I've talked to they found a big test to their operational policy in their missions against Lebanon and the Palistine state. I realize that they have to train for 2 types of war but they always were one of the most important testing grounds and hot beds of operational policy testing. Now they found that their pollicies aren't what they need to keep peace in their region. They also have to keep up appearances due to world opinion and present operational policies are failingin that arena too.

I know this is a big picture review and has little supposed effect on small unit tasks. However, large unit tasks are proving to be insuffient in either achieving their adjectives or being acceptable to the world opinion as a whole.

So is it going to become a small unit battle field? Are the use of heavy big units becomeing a liability? If it does, then weapons mix is going to become of primary importance. For the small unit may not be able to expect the off the board assets that are available now because the world grows less accepting of Israeli colateral damage. Just a thought. However, the Israelis admit they don't have an effective policy to counter it. And Hamas grows bolder by the day.

Having spent 3 years of my life intermittently, but actively involved in testing body armour, against a very wide range of rounds, I would submit that the terminal performance of bullets on various homogenous mediums is nearly an exact science. Reading that across into wounding is not an exact science, for very obvious reasons.

I hope you got it right for everyone's sake. The US Army shows that it has too many agenda's to overcome to be impartial about it. Starting with the Dragonskin debacle...

I am not aware of the controversy. The length of time someone can function is directly related to the time it takes them to exsanguinate, and the level of incapacity required. The wounding mechanisms are extremely well understood, if you talk to doctors.
What testing would you do? The alleged terminal effect of a given infantry round on the human body is a minor part of the factors that have to be balanced.

Yes, what you and they say is true. But no matter how many hits you get on your enemy unless you get a telling hit, your adversary could be up a while. however, Ken talked about the 1903a3 hitting a person and the person really knew he had been hit. Most people hit by a 30.06 or 7.62 NATO suffer catastrophic failure ususally due to shock. Yes, bullet placement has a lot to do with the effectiveness of the round inside the body. But no matter where the wound is, the combatant knows he's been hit and usually stays down.

Now if you want to can change the M4 to 6.5mm if you want. It will make no difference to tactics, or the effectiveness of your infantry. The same money is almost certainly better spent on training.

Wilf, I surrender. We seem to be working at cross purposes here. IMHO, you are working to make sure that Britain's military doesn't change without some real world gain from that change. A very noble occupation for I see so many cluless people try to make their point heard and accepted as much for egotism as for any real world knowledge or gain. I'm inundated with so much "cr*p" that I can find the bliss in your path.

The problem is that I don't have that ability. I have to weed through tons of drek to develop policies that will help clients who need the biggest bang for their dollar. And I have to weed through policies like the US stated requirement of Military funds given to small nations that says it must go to a American weapon system is such exist. Some counties try to get around it by building maufacturing plants in the US making their particular weapon system acceptable for those funds. Israeli is trying that with the Travor rifle among other things. Many small countries complain that the US's policy gives America too much power in these country's foriegn policies. the United States can just refuse these country's American made weapon to be used by the country in question. So what to do?

These countries have to rely on small unit tactics for they don't have a lot of financies to develope good support assets. There is more than one company that rebuilds and updates UH-1 helicopters. So you would be surprised at the number of "Huey" airframes that are still flying. Combine this with a great number of companies that are manufacturing spare parts and in some places you would think that you were back in 'Nam.

The major part I see to this is the agendas of big world nations limit the abilities of smaller impoverished countries to develope the thier own policies.

As for training, I wish what you said was a possibility but most 1st world countires seem to do neither. They find training a unreasonable expence and won't give their soldiers weapon systems to refect this. I still find use for the RPG7v2-3 because it requires little training to make a hunter killer groups effective. There are newer more efficent weapons out there but they require much more training than the small country can afford.

AlexTX ret

05-28-2009, 11:31 PM

As the author of the linked article, thank you for the plug. With the 5.56mm Timeline, I'm not trying to reach any conclusions. It is meant merely as a historical record of events. When I state the findings and conclusions from a specific report, I am merely repeating what was written by the authors of that report. Everything that I use is open source, although it is not always easily found. I prefer to go back to the primary sources where ever possible. Things can get twisted as they are repeated by successive authors. Of the secondary sources, I trust Ezell and McNaugher as they worked from archival documents and started early enough to interview most of the participants while they were still alive and had reasonably fresh memories of the events.

I have been working on the Timeline for 10 years, and it is currently just shy of 600 pages in length. It really couldn't be published anywhere other than the Net as I have no pretty pictures, and the subject matter is often too esoteric to be of broad interest. However, by being on the Net, I have no constraints as to length. For instance, the publisher of the recent book "American Rifle" demanded that the author's lengthy bibliography be left out in order to save pages, and thus, reduce printing costs.

If anyone has other original documents and sources that they'd like to provide or recommend, I'd gladly take a look.

I researched the web for the best resource that I could fine that did all that could be done to answer the questions of when and why without being filled with holes caused by classified matterials and didn't have an agenda such as the 6.8 SPC vs 6.5 Grendel. I'm so glad that you put forth so much work. I hope it's okay but I've pointed many people towards your sight. Never had a complaint yet.

The fact that your work is was so specific and knowledgeable, its length was a plus. It tells some uncomfortable facts to those who would argue from any point. But in the same breath, I think your site would clear up so many misconceptions that almost any of us have.

Thank you...:D

Xenophon

05-29-2009, 01:49 AM

I believe that optics indeed make a ton of difference, and we are in fact just starting to realize this, even if we don't know it right now. I think that problem stems (at least from the Marine Corps perspective) from the fact that our training and courses of qualication fire do not address these issues. Most rounds fired during the various combat marksmanship courses of fire in the CMP run out no further than 50m, which I think is a shambles of a training setup.

Amen! We train at 50m or less with optics that are only good at 100 or more meters and worthless for clearing rooms. Whiskey Tango Foxtrot.

Has anyone brought up the Americanized RPG system yet?
http://www.defensereview.com/airtronic-usa-rpg-7-amerikansky-rocket-propelled-grenade-launcher/

William F. Owen

05-29-2009, 04:02 AM

I would like to see crew served weapons, such as the 7.62 MMG taken away fro the squad/platoon and regulate it to the company's discretion. To do that requires a change in the cartridge to something more effective than the present 5.56 round.
So why have a support weapon that is an MMG. Why not 84mm RCL?

Side effects are increased range (500m) which could be best utilized by an acceptance of optics on the individual rifleman's weapon. If range is an issue, why assume that the infantry rifle has a role to play at over 300m? Why not give that role to other weapons?

To paraphase SunTzu: Don't underestimate your enemy prowess for that way breeds arrogance.
Can't argue. If the Chinese were a threat, they would pose a substantial one, but the quality of their infantry weapons is not the problem.

I see a disconnect between the theory and the factual reality. I also see a lot of evidence dismissed due to unfavoriable cosequences.
Well you see exactly the same two things I do.

Now they found that their pollicies aren't what they need to keep peace in their region. They also have to keep up appearances due to world opinion and present operational policies are failingin that arena too.
Israeli policy is not, and never has been about keeping peace. It is about the territorial security of the state. For those of us who live here, that is not a problem and never has been. If "operational policies" are so flawed why have Hezbollah sat on their hands for last 3 years? Do not assume the situation is as the Washington Post, the NY Times or "Blogers" see it.

However, large unit tasks are proving to be insuffient in either achieving their adjectives or being acceptable to the world opinion as a whole.

So is it going to become a small unit battle field? Are the use of heavy big units becomeing a liability? If it does, then weapons mix is going to become of primary importance.
World opinion can be effected by a small unit action, as much as a big. If you are referring to the precise, proportionate, and discriminate use of force as concerns its political impact on operations, that is a sensible discussion. I talk directly the IDF on a weekly and sometimes daily basis, and they understand the issues better than you can believe.

I hope you got it right for everyone's sake. The US Army shows that it has too many agenda's to overcome to be impartial about it. Starting with the Dragonskin debacle...
Can't say we did. The issue in body armour is not what materials can do, but what the specification states. The specification is always the issue. Not the testing. Can't comment on Dragonskin, but body armour manufacturers are generally very poor scientist and don't under specifications or testing. I could tell you horror stories, you wouldn't believe.

Most people hit by a 30.06 or 7.62 NATO suffer catastrophic failure ususally due to shock. Yes, bullet placement has a lot to do with the effectiveness of the round inside the body. But no matter where the wound is, the combatant knows he's been hit and usually stays down.
I know many men who were hit by 7.62mm NATO, and one who was hit in the chest with 30.06 and is still working today.
The only thing that can cause "catastrophic failures" is blood loss and nerve severing. Those events cause the onset of "biological shock", not the bullet.
There is no evidence (look at Facklers work) to suggest that the temporary cavitation seen mediums like ballistic gelatine, translates into an equivalent mechanism inside the body.

Wilf, I surrender. We seem to be working at cross purposes here. IMHO, you are working to make sure that Britain's military doesn't change without some real world gain from that change. A very noble occupation for I see so many cluless people try to make their point heard and accepted as much for egotism as for any real world knowledge or gain. I'm inundated with so much "cr*p" that I can find the bliss in your path.
Well I am not trying break your will on any issue, so please don't surrender. I am far from noble, and the British Military will change based on the political agenda, personalities and opinions of the day. I merely suggest logic and actual evidence as alternatives.

Israeli is trying that with the Travor rifle among other things. It's actually Tabor, or Tavor to the white people. It's a fun little gun, and extremely popular with the troops. 3 Brigades are now equipped. I don't like bullpups, but it would be a good choice if you had to have one.

These countries have to rely on small unit tactics for they don't have a lot of financies to develope good support assets. I'd be a bit careful assuming that there is a relationship between "small unit tactics" and funding. It strays into "justification" rather than "need."

There is more than one company that rebuilds and updates UH-1 helicopters. So you would be surprised at the number of "Huey" airframes that are still flying. Combine this with a great number of companies that are manufacturing spare parts and in some places you would think that you were back in 'Nam.
Very well aware. Big fan of the Slick, and the S-64 is still being built as well. Plus you can buy a good Mil Mi-171 for 25% of the price of Blackhawk, ship it to Israel and get it better equipped than most Apaches or UH-60's!

The major part I see to this is the agendas of big world nations limit the abilities of smaller impoverished countries to develope the thier own policies.
No one in Israel would argue with that.

reed11b

05-29-2009, 05:26 AM

So why have a support weapon that is an MMG. Why not 84mm RCL?
If range is an issue, why assume that the infantry rifle has a role to play at over 300m? Why not give that role to other weapons?

That is the first time I think I have seen my small unit fire support concept validated. I prefer the 25mm "payload" rifle for versatility but old Carl or a Foglore with updated fire control would be a close second. I do feel infantry has a role past 300m however, just not the fire teams.
Reed

William F. Owen

05-29-2009, 05:39 AM

That is the first time I think I have seen my small unit fire support concept validated. I prefer the 25mm "payload" rifle for versatility but old Carl or a Foglore with updated fire control would be a close second. I do feel infantry has a role past 300m however, just not the fire teams.
Reed

Going back as far as we do Reed, I think we've always agreed on the merit of something more than bullets. I'm really not worried which weapon it is, as long as 3-5 can effectively carry and employ it. You may want to look at the ALCOTAN-100
http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_kdcsVoFMTKM/ScJZEbiQx3I/AAAAAAAAS1I/T-IJkP9T3xc/s400/_0BAM3Dentro.jpg
Mix of a AT-4 LAW type weapons with a Fire Control System. Goes to 600m. M-32 with MV 40mm with go to 800m. Do you care?

jcustis

05-29-2009, 05:48 AM

What target are we going afterwith a support weapon that big, heavy, and slow to get into action? I certainly hope we aren't talking about troops in the open, even if at a range of 300m and beyond.

reed11b

05-29-2009, 06:19 AM

What target are we going afterwith a support weapon that big, heavy, and slow to get into action? I certainly hope we aren't talking about troops in the open, even if at a range of 300m and beyond.
25mm payload rifle and MK-32 can get into play pretty darn quick, at least as quick as a 240B if not quicker.
Reed

jcustis

05-29-2009, 06:52 AM

25mm payload rifle and MK-32 can get into play pretty darn quick, at least as quick as a 240B if not quicker.
Reed

I buy where you are going with those types. above 40mm and I start to wince. :D

AlexTX ret

05-29-2009, 03:36 PM

Amen! We train at 50m or less with optics that are only good at 100 or more meters and worthless for clearing rooms. Whiskey Tango Foxtrot.

There is an answer for this. There are several good short ranged optics packages, Aimpoint is the one I recommend esp Comp3-4 series. Effective at short ranges 100m or less and still effective out to 400m-500m with practice.

However, if your mission is up close and personal, why haven't your armorers changed your weapons profile to match your tasks? The downside to optics is that they create a larger work load for Armorers.

Nevertheless, where are you that you are only clearing rooms? Even in urban combat, there is room for the optics to be useful. In your opinion, are optics worth the better effect at longer ranges if you have to create a work around for them in conditions of less than 20m or much less?

Has anyone brought up the Americanized RPG system yet?
http://www.defensereview.com/airtronic-usa-rpg-7-amerikansky-rocket-propelled-grenade-launcher/

I've handled it but not actually fired it. It has better optics then a Russian RPG7v2-3. However, there are questions of its reliability, though all this could be b*llsh*t for I don't know anyone who has put it thorugh any kind of trials. This could be a problem with the testers rather than the weapon itself. The newest Russian RPG7 is practically indestructable. So there could be an agenda here.

If someone out there has actually fired it then don't keep it a secret!

William F. Owen

05-29-2009, 03:49 PM

The newest Russian RPG7 is practically indestructable. So there could be an agenda here.

Which RPG-7 and which PG-7 type grenades. There are very many different manufacturers and a lot of quality control issues.

AlexTX ret

05-30-2009, 03:45 AM

Going back as far as we do Reed, I think we've always agreed on the merit of something more than bullets. I'm really not worried which weapon it is, as long as 3-5 can effectively carry and employ it. You may want to look at the ALCOTAN-100
http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_kdcsVoFMTKM/ScJZEbiQx3I/AAAAAAAAS1I/T-IJkP9T3xc/s400/_0BAM3Dentro.jpg
Mix of a AT-4 LAW type weapons with a Fire Control System. Goes to 600m. M-32 with MV 40mm with go to 800m. Do you care?

Wilf, I finally found out our major sticking point. Recognized policy for most counties small unit tactics reduce (maybe to almost nothing) the value of the individual rifleman except to keep the enemy from disrupting the crew served weapon. This comes straight from WW2. The Germans kept rebuilding the 10 man squad with its embedded M34/m40 LMG. It proved its effectiveness over and over. The American squad with its BAR wasn't the killer it was supposed to be. I won't go into the supply problems that a normal squad/platoon went through because of all the cartridge types that the squad/platoon had. The M1 rifle was effective but the BAR proved less than spectaclar. It was too light and fragile to be used as an effective LMG. The platoon's M1919 30 cal MMGs were effective but there weren't enough of them in a platoon.

So today, it matters little what the cartridge or rifle is as long as it can keep the bad guys at bay. The real killing will be done by crew served weapons.

In this case, you're right in your convictions. It fits the prevalent operational mission of the squad/platoon. The SAW is sort of a aberation. All the minimum parameters of the inefficent rifle round and all the requirements of a crew served weapons. No wonder so many feel that it is a pile of sh*t.

I on the other hand work with nonstandard requirements and getting the best bang for the buck. Most of my clients are knowledgeable about the effect of crew served weapons but they feel the need to put them under the control of more experienced (and politically correct) officers and ncos. So I have a reason to try and get the most out of thier riflemen and see a need for a family of weapons that has a greater effective range, reliable, semi and controllable auto fire and needs less training. They have to take up the slack of the fewer crew served weapons and those that they have are usually older and proven reilable. For the most part if they'e using the American system (High overal cost is a disadvantage) this means the "pig" (M60) and there is really no answer to the RPG7v2-3 unless they fall back on a recoiless rifle of some sort. Most American weapons are expensive, cumbersome and need a lot of expesive training.

I sort of see it as a view of the future. We are going through cost cuts and restructuring of our military to fit a smaller profile. maybe it's time to look at all our assumptions and see if changes need to be made.

Actually I will take it one step further. While foot powered units show weaknesses, there are more than a few countires that are seeing a tendency of using less tanks (expensive and too big to ship easily) and instead of going to a more and more effective IFVs caring a section of Infantry. In Russia, this means the new BMP 4 with its 100mm gun and (hopefully) fanatical soldiers, that can be shipped easily to the point of conflict. The Contract Soldier program has been a failure for it is no more effective than their present conscript program. So there go the "fanatical" soldiers. But the creation of more intense squad weapon assets on the IFV show a need for more simple riflemen, IAR and SDM (SVD rifle) specialists.

The Americans tried this and is failing. The Bradley was effective for a while but now there are a larger and more powerful weapons packages out there. Also, the Bradley was never that easy to pack up and ship anywhere. Also it didn't fit our squad profile of 9 men easily. Under such conditions, it is cramped and in the case of long rides/confinment, it is very taxing.

I have studied the Israeli system and while it is more effective in most areas, it show a certain weakness in urban environments. ESP. in anti-terrorist insurgency missions. I have my masters in the international relationships though my specialty was in insurgency and non traditional forms of government. So I'm a bit sensitive to the effects of world wide political opinion on the actions of the individual state. :rolleyes:

AlexTX ret

05-30-2009, 04:00 AM

Which RPG-7 and which PG-7 type grenades. There are very many different manufacturers and a lot of quality control issues.

Only the newest one will do for the Russians have created a new series of rounds for it and it has fixed all the problems the earlier RPG-7s. I personally like the RPG system, esp the RPG 29 versions for they have proven effective against Chobbam and reactive armor. There has been one confirmed kill on a M1A. As for the RPG-7v2-3, it isn't limited to the size of the barrel of the launcher for the warhead can be much larger. The launcher only has to fit the tube of the rocket/grenade.(problem of the RPG-16 and most Western systems. It also has an effective range of 900+m, so that most western weapons systems can't disrupt the RPG if the target is stationary or moving slowly.

Ken White

05-30-2009, 04:49 AM

The M1 rifle was effective but the BAR proved less than spectaclar. It was too light and fragile to be used as an effective LMG. The platoon's M1919 30 cal MMGs were effective but there weren't enough of them in a platoon.That's a statement that is questionable. The BAR did what it was supposed to and did it well. There were better weapons available-- the Johnson for one example; the Bren and Type 99 for a couple of more -- but the BAR , like the M4 tank or the M16 series was adequate. It was light, it was not fragile.

The issue raised is whether the US / British squad was not as effective as the German squad due to weapons selection -- or training level.
So today, it matters little what the cartridge or rifle is as long as it can keep the bad guys at bay. The real killing will be done by crew served weapons.Not against a well trained enemy they won't...
I see a need for a family of weapons that has a greater effective range, reliable, semi and controllable auto fire and needs less training.The 'need' for automatic fire is vastly overstated and is a compensation for marginal training. ;)

William F. Owen

05-30-2009, 06:15 AM

Wilf, I finally found out our major sticking point. Recognized policy for most counties small unit tactics reduce (maybe to almost nothing) the value of the individual rifleman except to keep the enemy from disrupting the crew served weapon. This comes straight from WW2. The Germans kept rebuilding the 10 man squad with its embedded M34/m40 LMG. It proved its effectiveness over and over.
Not sure of your point here. Yes, some weapons are disproportionately effective in breaking the enemies will. Obviously how you sustain, manoeuvre and apply those weapons within your tactical doctrine, is extremely important.
The German Squad of 1940 was 13 men, not 10. Treat with extreme caution what folks say about German infantry organisation. By mid 1944 almost all German infantry units task organised and threw the TOE in the bin.

The M1 rifle was effective but the BAR proved less than spectaclar. It was too light and fragile to be used as an effective LMG. The platoon's M1919 30 cal MMGs were effective but there weren't enough of them in a platoon.
Like Ken, I'd dispute the BAR as fragile.
The M1 and BAR fired the same cartridge from the same barrel length. The BAR had a bi-pod, was fully automatic and useable by 1 man (the MG-42 was not) - so the BAR was an enhanced M1. It was a true Light Automatic Rifle, and it was a very good idea in 1919. Not so great by 1940, but in terms of what it was designed for, more than adequate.

So today, it matters little what the cartridge or rifle is as long as it can keep the bad guys at bay. The real killing will be done by crew served weapons.
That's too simplistic, but yes you need a combination of weapons in the platoon. Heavier weapons will have heavier effect.

In this case, you're right in your convictions. It fits the prevalent operational mission of the squad/platoon. The SAW is sort of a aberation. All the minimum parameters of the inefficent rifle round and all the requirements of a crew served weapons. No wonder so many feel that it is a pile of sh*t.
Thanks, and that is essentially mine, Ken's, Reed's and many others case. Convictions and a body of empirical evidence are not the same thing.

Actually I will take it one step further. While foot powered units show weaknesses, there are more than a few countires that are seeing a tendency of using less tanks (expensive and too big to ship easily) and instead of going to a more and more effective IFVs caring a section of Infantry.
The Americans tried this and is failing. The Bradley was effective for a while but now there are a larger and more powerful weapons packages out there. Also, the Bradley was never that easy to pack up and ship anywhere. Also it didn't fit our squad profile of 9 men easily. Under such conditions, it is cramped and in the case of long rides/confinment, it is very taxing.

Well that's another can of worms, and it comes down to what you actually want the infantry to do. I think IFVs are not good for infantry. APCs are however essential.

I have studied the Israeli system and while it is more effective in most areas, it show a certain weakness in urban environments. ESP. in anti-terrorist insurgency missions.
What system? Almost everything the IDF does makes extremely good sense, if you see the problem in the way they do. This is very hard for modern Brits and Americans because few if any have ever fought a war within 100km of where you were born.

So I'm a bit sensitive to the effects of world wide political opinion on the actions of the individual state. :rolleyes:
Individual states like the US or smaller non-Christian individual states? :rolleyes:

AlexTX ret

05-30-2009, 05:58 PM

That's a statement that is questionable. The BAR did what it was supposed to and did it well. There were better weapons available-- the Johnson for one example; the Bren and Type 99 for a couple of more -- but the BAR , like the M4 tank or the M16 series was adequate. It was light, it was not fragile.

The issue raised is whether the US / British squad was not as effective as the German squad due to weapons selection -- or training level.Not against a well trained enemy they won't...The 'need' for automatic fire is vastly overstated and is a compensation for marginal training. ;)

The BAR was an old concept and an old weapon by the time I was ready to play with it. I lugged it for a while. There were problems with it that couldn't be fixed. It would over heat easily esp. in extended fire fights. Its rate of fire was to0 slow for my tastes. Finally the mags had a distinct problem of the mouth of the magazine deforming. I trained the troops I was with to fight a M60. All teams finally did the same at one point or another. Yes, Ken, ammunition was a bitch but it was worth the hassle. Then, suprisingly, all problems were magically whisked away.

Wilf, maybe it took one man to fight it but it took the whole squad to support it. For one thing, it took everyone in the unit to carry a mag or two for the gunner (me) couldn't carry all the ammo that we would need for a mission.

Problem with adquate is that it is almost a mathematical proposition. The Panther or Tiger tank could be overcome by 5:1 or 10:1 ratio of Shermans to either German tank. But we would comeout victorious in the end. Yeah! But what happen to those other 4 or more American tanks that were lost trying to stop the German tank.? At 5 men per Tank, how many casualties were there? I see a problem there.

The American Rifleman with his M1 rifle and sufficent ammunition was the best equipped on the field. His moral had a tendency to break but then squads/platoons would quickly reform (with or without the leader being present) and go back into fight. I think the Japanese reliance on "fighting spirit" was over rated but in anycase, it was the American soldier that showed who had fighting spirit. That overcame the need for auto fire.

However, I'm torn. If your training is excellent and your group has Espirt de Corps, no, auto fire can be more trouble that its worth. But today's operational policies being what they are. I don't have that faith. A barely adquate weapon with quick and dirty training bring what to the small unit. Ken, as you said before armies seem to reduce training costs but are willing to spend so much more in action cost in material if not casualties.

Not sure of your point here. Yes, some weapons are disproportionately effective in breaking the enemies will. Obviously how you sustain, manoeuvre and apply those weapons within your tactical doctrine, is extremely important.
The German Squad of 1940 was 13 men, not 10. Treat with extreme caution what folks say about German infantry organisation. By mid 1944 almost all German infantry units task organised and threw the TOE in the bin.

First of all, yes, the original German squad was 13 men and a M34 LMG. I learned to look at it as a 10 man team and one LMG section. However, losses reduced it to a 10 men total, of which 2 would fight the M34/M42.

Yes, your tactical doctrine is formost in its importance. However, The Germans refused to add new technology or change its Small Unit Tactics until casualties force them to change their policies. That's your task orientated units. They didn't have the manpower to keep creating "old" squad TO&Es. The was the driving force behind the Sturmgewehr 44. SMGs were too short ranged to be affective and the full power round took too much training to be put to best use. So they relooked at their tactics and decided the STG 44 was the perfect compromise.

AlexTX ret

05-30-2009, 07:02 PM

The funny thing is that I'm in a similar argument on another forum and I think they're mostly staff types without any real combat experience. So they are able to quote me chapter and verse but not explain why. It's kin of sad.:rolleyes:

That is not the problem here...

Not sure of your point here. Yes, some weapons are disproportionately effective in breaking the enemies will. Obviously how you sustain, manoeuvre and apply those weapons within your tactical doctrine, is extremely important.

Yes, but does these superior weapons that do more damage slow down the small unit to a point that it can't maneuver effectively. This is where I go back to the individual rifleman. In WW2 and for the most part, Korea, our rifleman was the best in the field. It took Chinese massive body of troops to overwhelm us and then we regrouped and struck back time after time.

We have barely adquate rifle but that is not as big a thing that it could be, for everybody uses something similar. So crew served weapons gain a preeminence on the field of battle. Except for room sweeping and such very confining extremely short range stuff, I read tactical theory that shows more men are killed by artillery than anything else. However, the crew served weapon comes a close second.

However, all countries are looking into bring the fight back to the very manueverable small unit. From what I read there is still much debate on the effectiveness of the Ind. Rifleman and should it be increased. Is training important enough to increase spending for it. In the British Regimental System where soldiers would sign up for enlistmants as long as 20 years. There could be an overwhelming need to increase training and spend the money on a soldier that would be there for the long haul. However, in most countries the average enlistment is for 3-4 years. Is it worth the expense to better train a soldier that will be up and out when his first enlistment is up.

Crew served weapons would be the resoncibility of the troops that would stay more than one term. Extra training would be worth the training there. So there are factors other than tactical doctrine that are being researched by many countries.

Like Ken, I'd dispute the BAR as fragile.
The M1 and BAR fired the same cartridge from the same barrel length. The BAR had a bi-pod, was fully automatic and useable by 1 man (the MG-42 was not) - so the BAR was an enhanced M1. It was a true Light Automatic Rifle, and it was a very good idea in 1919. Not so great by 1940, but in terms of what it was designed for, more than adequate.

The Russians took that concept and made a better IAR in the RPK system. It is more than adequate and is quite effective. Its much more than a heavy barreled AKM. Of course there have been a few technolgical changes since 1919.

Thanks, and that is essentially mine, Ken's, Reed's and many others case. Convictions and a body of empirical evidence are not the same thing.

Yes, but the SAW fails in both reguards. :D

Well that's another can of worms, and it comes down to what you actually want the infantry to do. I think IFVs are not good for infantry. APCs are however essential.

I think that IFVs make more sense if you can afford them for they carry sufficent weapons to become the tactical support for your section of dismounted troops.

However, this quickly falls into an argument if IFVs are worth the added expense and usefulness over the ability of the "Battle Taxi" to carry your soldiers comfortably and ready for combat if not better protected armor wise.

Nevertheless, Is the Styker system any better. People have used wheeled vehicles for combat carriers and I still provide them upon request. But are they the answer for wheeled carriers have a distinct disadvantage as they are force to stay on level terrain or just have a tendency to do so. So is the wheeled IFV worth anything at all?

What system? Almost everything the IDF does makes extremely good sense, if you see the problem in the way they do. This is very hard for modern Brits and Americans because few if any have ever fought a war within 100km of where you were born.

I don't find it hard to understand. I was confused when Israel traded land for peace with people who have distinct problems with Isreal existing at all. Except for Eygpt which keeps its own counsel, all other countires are at best concerned about their populations rising up in a religous jihad if they don't show proper disrespect for Isreal. But it isn't my call...

Individual states like the US or smaller non-Christian individual states? :rolleyes:

Hmmm. This is a discussion best served over a few beers. ;)

reed11b

05-30-2009, 07:19 PM

Well that's another can of worms, and it comes down to what you actually want the infantry to do. I think IFVs are not good for infantry. APCs are however essential.

Disagree in a way... IFV's manned by Infantry as an intregal part of the infantry platoon is bad from infantry becouse it creates a huge tax on infantry skills and manpower. IFV's manned by dedicated IFV crewmen, i.e. 19Whatevers, in a dedicated IFV platoon, could be a valuable battlefield support. Still chewing on Ken's dragoon concept as an alternative to my infantry is infantry is infantry theory.
Reed

Ken White

05-30-2009, 07:33 PM

The BAR ... problems with it that couldn't be fixed. It would over heat easily esp. in extended fire fights. Its rate of fire was to0 slow for my tastes. Finally the mags had a distinct problem of the mouth of the magazine deforming.I saw with the BAR. First thing one should do is dump that clunky bipod and useless carrying handle, then take out and discard the actuator, actuator spring, sear release and buffer key -- that cuts the weight down to about 17 plus pounds and converts your officially dual auto fire weapon to an illegal (regulation-wise) but practical one that fires semi-auto and full auto at about 600rpm cyclic, 200rpm effective -- slightly faster than an M-60 but not quite as fast as an M-240. Got in a fight or two here and there, never had an overheat problem if the weapon was used as it should have been. Anyone who tried to use it as a LMG probably would have problems.

Magazine lips were easily disturbed, no question. Simple solution was operator training which was effective. Not a difficult fix. Though one did have to occasionally throw a steel helmet at a Troop to insure he paid attention and didn't just drop or fling his BAR Belt...

The key a fire fight is accurate suppressive fire, not volume of fire -- the BAR, Bren and Type 99 (arguably one of the best LMG/AR designs ever) are about 3x as accurate as any MG that was available before the M-60 / MAG 58 / M-240 / PKM / SS-77 and the BAR is twice as accurate as those. It was adequate for the task at the time.

AlexTX ret

05-31-2009, 12:39 AM

I saw with the BAR. First thing one should do is dump that clunky bipod and useless carrying handle, then take out and discard the actuator, actuator spring, sear release and buffer key -- that cuts the weight down to about 17 plus pounds and converts your officially dual auto fire weapon to an illegal (regulation-wise) but practical one that fires semi-auto and full auto at about 600rpm cyclic, 200rpm effective -- slightly faster than an M-60 but not quite as fast as an M-240. Got in a fight or two here and there, never had an overheat problem if the weapon was used as it should have been. Anyone who tried to use it as a LMG probably would have problems.

Problem was that there just wasn't enough fire power in the mix of troops with me. Also training wasn't as good as it could of been. But I've made my comments obout ARVN policies and how we reacted to them.

Wish I had thought about that before I went in the bush. It would of solved a lot of my problems though when we got the pig a lot of my problems dried up. And when I got through training the troops with me, even more problems solved themselves. :D

Magazine lips were easily disturbed, no question. Simple solution was operator training which was effective. Not a difficult fix. Though one did have to occasionally throw a steel helmet at a Troop to insure he paid attention and didn't just drop or fling his BAR Belt...

You had a busy helmet...

The problem was that I had to distibute my extra magazines among the troops and how they were taken care of was out of my hands, though not out of my thoughts.

The key a fire fight is accurate suppressive fire, not volume of fire -- the BAR, Bren and Type 99 (arguably one of the best LMG/AR designs ever) are about 3x as accurate as any MG that was available before the M-60 / MAG 58 / M-240 / PKM / SS-77 and the BAR is twice as accurate as those. It was adequate for the task at the time.

Yep, right up untill you found youself in a place that Charlie really didn't want you there. Then it was like trying to mother a group of brownies. Just keeping them from running like scared rabbits at first was my job one. They got much better as time got on but then in the genius of the Army, they were all taken away. :wry:

I thiink there is a definate place for a IAR. It has advantages across the board. After the SAW, things can't get much worse.

Ken White

05-31-2009, 02:58 AM

My good fortune perhaps was that my combat BAR experience was in the Marines and having three of the monsters with 13 (or more often, 10 ;) ) men made a difference -- particularly when all the others knew to pick up the BAR and belt (carefully) if necessary and keep moving.

Yes, Helmet was busy, would've used a 2x4 but there were never any around; Helmet worked fine. My fearless leaders, Marine and Army, could never figure out why my hats always had so many dents... :cool:

Learned the trick from an old Gunnery Sergeant who'd been a Corporal in Nicaragua. He also taught me that I could see at night -- and told me not to write stuff down because if I lost the paper I wouldn't know what I was s'posed to do. That last was really beneficial -- I cheerfully drove a number of meeting holders nuts for over 40 years by not taking notes. :D

Rifleman

05-31-2009, 05:43 AM

.....my combat BAR experience was in the Marines and having three of the monsters with 13 (or more often, 10 ;) ) men made a difference.....

This seems important to me. My understanding is that the traditional 13-man USMC rifle squad (and the fire team concept as we know it) was built in 1944 to maximize the BAR's strengths. The BAR is what the USMC had to work with and they made the most of it by having three BARs per squad and three Garand riflemen manuvering around and supporting each BAR. I think the USMC squad had one (or two?) more BARs than Army squads of the same era did.

But could it not be said that the smaller German squad during the same era made best use of what they had to work with: the MG42? My understanding is that the German SOP was to get the gun into action; the Mauser riflemen screened and packed ammo to the gun.

So might not the AR v. LMG argument hedge on squad size and organization? It just seems to me that larger TOE squads can make best use of the AR and fire teams, but that smaller TOE (plus often being understrength) squads built around an LMG, a grenadier, and a handful of riflemen (and too small for internal fire teams) have been just as successful. Of course that type of squad requires fire and manuever to begin at platoon and not squad level. A smaller squad can usually fire or manuever but usually not both without being reinforced.

I know I've stated this idea before but it seems worth repeating - especially considering the recent posts. But my experience is peacetime light infantry, not combat, so someone tell me if their combat experience says that I'm way off base here.

Ken White

05-31-2009, 06:23 AM

having run the gamut from 13 man to 11 man to 9 man rifle squads plus playing around here and there with six man scout squads I don't really think it makes much difference. IMO, the quality of the troops is the biggest determinant of success or failure. You take what you have and use it to the best of your -- their -- ability. This was before the days of easy Chaptering people out so you had to work a bit. :cool:

The three fire teams and 13 men of the Marine squad give you a lot of flexibility so that's the easiest to use but all of them work. I've gone out with none, one, two and three automatic weapons; three is better (not for the added 'firepower' but for redundancy and flexibility), two will work fine, one is okay and none, job dependent, can range from okay to not so okay... :wry:

If the element is well trained, they all work.

William F. Owen

05-31-2009, 12:30 PM

William F. Owen

05-31-2009, 12:55 PM

I read tactical theory that shows more men are killed by artillery than anything else. However, the crew served weapon comes a close second.
It's not theory, it's fact, based on the RAMC collated causality figures from WW1, WW2 and Korea.

However, all countries are looking into bring the fight back to the very manueverable small unit. From what I read there is still much debate on the effectiveness of the Ind. Rifleman and should it be increased. Is training important enough to increase spending for it.
I don't see this at all. I see no interest in developing the Platoon in the US, the UK except via hanging computers off them. Training is everything, and it's not that expensive. I have a personal opinion that we don't do it very well, because we don't seem to see a relationship between what training costs and what performance increase it actually creates.

If you can't train operationally effective infantrymen in under 6-8 months, you are doing something wrong.

The Russians took that concept and made a better IAR in the RPK system. It is more than adequate and is quite effective. Its much more than a heavy barreled AKM. Of course there have been a few technolgical changes since 1919.

Well prior to the RPK the Russians had the RPD. They replaced the RPD with the RPK. Why? I have a few theories.
Almost every rifle built since 1945 has seen an LAR version - http://www.fulton-armory.com/M14E2_50.jpg

AlexTX ret

05-31-2009, 04:56 PM

Disagree in a way... IFV's manned by Infantry as an intregal part of the infantry platoon is bad from infantry becouse it creates a huge tax on infantry skills and manpower. IFV's manned by dedicated IFV crewmen, i.e. 19Whatevers, in a dedicated IFV platoon, could be a valuable battlefield support. Still chewing on Ken's dragoon concept as an alternative to my infantry is infantry is infantry theory.
Reed

Is your IFV a minitank that carries a section of infantry on the side?

Is it a battle taxi with support weapons added to it as an upgrade ie. M113A3 ACCV?

Is it supposed to take the place of larger, greater weapons load and more expensive MBT or is it an addtional asset? Can it be used in the anti-tank Role? Is it easily transportable with a possible reduction in armor?

Is it meant to operate on its own (or with others of its kind) or must it operate in a mixed weapons force? Is it part of a greater weapons system that does as many of the battlefield tasks as possible ie Stryker with a 90mm gun?

I'm not asking these as b*llsh*t questions for in many (those that can afford them) countries this is a raging fire storm. The loss of the IFV/APC if loaded is 3 crewman and a section of infantry in one strike. If it's an IFV unloaded, there is the loss of small unit assets. In both cases, if unloaded, there is the psychological loss of all the section's personal assets such as extra clothing and possibly extra ammunition as well.

The US answered the question with the Stryker which came out of our Iraq experience. But will it work in a bigger more intense battlefield?

One final question. Where do the vehicle crewmen fit in the command structure? Are they part of the squad/platoon or are they part of the company's assets?

What is your take in all this?

jcustis

05-31-2009, 08:34 PM

The US answered the question with the Stryker which came out of our Iraq experience. But will it work in a bigger more intense battlefield?

Which expoerience was that...OIF, or Op Desert Storm?

RSTA squadron doctrine was already being published (with Strykers symbolized in the print vice Brads) as late as 2002.

jcustis

05-31-2009, 09:04 PM

Wilf wrote: I don't see this at all. I see no interest in developing the Platoon in the US, the UK except via hanging computers off them. Training is everything, and it's not that expensive. I have a personal opinion that we don't do it very well, because we don't seem to see a relationship between what training costs and what performance increase it actually creates.

If you can't train operationally effective infantrymen in under 6-8 months, you are doing something wrong.

Often, it isn't that we are doing something wrong, but rather that we cannot control outside influences (base-level working parties anyone?) or constraints.

A lot of things influence training, and certainly basic precepts of safety worry us the majority of the time to a degree that I think is dangeriously exaggerated. Ask a platoon commander to take his platoon from a cold start and conduct a non-illuminated night attack, and I doubt many could do it without extensive rehearsals beyond what we execute for reasonable safety considerations as a dry run. Why can't he do that you ask, when he is certainly trained in its execution? We tend to get too busy doing a lot of other things that are deemed necessary by folks outside our immediate sphere.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
.....my combat BAR experience was in the Marines and having three of the monsters with 13 (or more often, 10 ) men made a difference.....

Rifleman wrote: This seems important to me. My understanding is that the traditional 13-man USMC rifle squad (and the fire team concept as we know it) was built in 1944 to maximize the BAR's strengths. The BAR is what the USMC had to work with and they made the most of it by having three BARs per squad and three Garand riflemen manuvering around and supporting each BAR. I think the USMC squad had one (or two?) more BARs than Army squads of the same era did.

But could it not be said that the smaller German squad during the same era made best use of what they had to work with: the MG42? My understanding is that the German SOP was to get the gun into action; the Mauser riflemen screened and packed ammo to the gun.

So might not the AR v. LMG argument hedge on squad size and organization? It just seems to me that larger TOE squads can make best use of the AR and fire teams, but that smaller TOE (plus often being understrength) squads built around an LMG, a grenadier, and a handful of riflemen (and too small for internal fire teams) have been just as successful. Of course that type of squad requires fire and manuever to begin at platoon and not squad level. A smaller squad can usually fire or manuever but usually not both without being reinforced.

I know I've stated this idea before but it seems worth repeating - especially considering the recent posts. But my experience is peacetime light infantry, not combat, so someone tell me if their combat experience says that I'm way off base here.

I think you are on to something with this. Considering the derision with which our own infantry seem to view the SAW (just look at how it gets issued to "the boot" when the TO/E calls for the next senior man after the TL), I don't think the Corps will get its head around just how the AR/LMG fits into our tactics because we are for the most part very immature about the concept of employment in the first place. It just seems as though very few officers and senior enlisted have though about the issue in the least.

We definitely do not organize ourselves to support the SAW-man. He predominantly humps his own ammo, while other team and squad-mates get the burden's share of 60mm ammo and AT-4 rounds, as well as batteries, specialized kits for tacital site exploitation, etc. Heck, it may just be that we simply do not have a large enough loadout of ammo for the SAW-men to make them effective for any duration, thus the heavier reliance on the combined arms concepts of M203 and direct fire employment.

The SAW is also integral to the movement of the team as a whole, since we preach fire and maneuver down to the squad level, more than we preach establishing a base of fire where the riflemen support the SAWs (we do bases of fire, but just not with the SAWs so prominently figured.

I have not seen it first-hand, but I know that there is a degradation of lightfighter skills occuring, since nowadays just about every rifleman also has to have an incidental HMMWV license, be qualified in escaping from it while hanging inverted, and has to have (sometimes to the extreme) familiarity with CSWs because we have killed more troops through NDs that we have killed bad guys it seems.

I started out as a light infantryman and am now in the light armored recce community, where we transport scouts in what could be considered hybrids (certainly considering how we fight them). Our recce/cav doctrine should very clearly delineate who supports whom, when, and where, but in practical application we have some difficulties deciding just what to do.:wry:

Ken White

05-31-2009, 09:39 PM

Considering the derision with which our own infantry seem to view the SAW (just look at how it gets issued to "the boot" when the TO/E calls for the next senior man after the TL)...Peacetime foolishness (both the TOE design and the boot getting the weapon) and the Squad Leader (and the Platoon Sergeant. Not the PL) is at fault for allowing it, it'll change in a real war when it will go to the guy who can use it best.
We definitely do not organize ourselves to support the SAW-man. He predominantly humps his own ammo, while other team and squad-mates get the burden's share of 60mm ammo and AT-4 rounds, as well as batteries, specialized kits for tacital site exploitation, etc. Heck, it may just be that we simply do not have a large enough loadout of ammo for the SAW-men to make them effective for any duration, thus the heavier reliance on the combined arms concepts of M203 and direct fire employment.FWIW, I think the emphasis is right. HE stuff is better than 5.56 rounds
(we do bases of fire, but just not with the SAWs so prominently figured.That's right IMO, the SAW is just one weapon and is not as likely to keep heads down as accurate fire from the rifles or HE from the 203. Plus, the automatic weapon always draws attention; they should be fired less than they usually are...

Ken White

05-31-2009, 09:59 PM

Which expoerience was that...OIF, or Op Desert Storm?

RSTA squadron doctrine was already being published (with Strykers symbolized in the print vice Brads) as late as 2002.pressure on the Army to 'modernize.' They talked about and tested tracks and wheels in 2000-2001 -- came up with tracks are better but there's nothing out there now (then) light enough. Solution: develop lighter tracks (FCS), buy an interim wheeled vehicle. It was acknowledged there were better wheel vehicles available than the Stryker but since this was an interim buy, the decision was made to go with the cheapest wheeled vehicle that had been judge adequate. Or in version 2, one of Shinseki's cronies went to work for General Dynamics which were in process of buying GM Canada, producer of the vehicle under license from Mowag of Switzerland (also later bought by GD...). Take your pick.

Iraq had nothing to do with the purchase of the Stryker.

reed11b

05-31-2009, 11:57 PM

Is your IFV a minitank that carries a section of infantry on the side?

Is it a battle taxi with support weapons added to it as an upgrade ie. M113A3 ACCV?

Is it supposed to take the place of larger, greater weapons load and more expensive MBT or is it an addtional asset? Can it be used in the anti-tank Role? Is it easily transportable with a possible reduction in armor?

Is it meant to operate on its own (or with others of its kind) or must it operate in a mixed weapons force? Is it part of a greater weapons system that does as many of the battlefield tasks as possible ie Stryker with a 90mm gun?

I'm not asking these as b*llsh*t questions for in many (those that can afford them) countries this is a raging fire storm. The loss of the IFV/APC if loaded is 3 crewman and a section of infantry in one strike. If it's an IFV unloaded, there is the loss of small unit assets. In both cases, if unloaded, there is the psychological loss of all the section's personal assets such as extra clothing and possibly extra ammunition as well.

The US answered the question with the Stryker which came out of our Iraq experience. But will it work in a bigger more intense battlefield?

One final question. Where do the vehicle crewmen fit in the command structure? Are they part of the squad/platoon or are they part of the company's assets?

What is your take in all this?

As far as Squad - Platoon - CO level asset, in my view they should definitely be a CO or Higher level asset and should operate in at least platoon level formations (4-6 vehicles) to allow for independent C&C capabilities. As far as the Psychological impact of "your" gear going boom, that is part of what we do wrong with IFV's. Infantry platoons should take there gear w/ them and whatever is left on the IFV in support should be generic supplies (ammo, food, water, etc.) IFV should not be "assigned” to individual infantry Platoons except for insertion and extraction. They should be able to operate in support or independently of the infantry they support. They are not tanks, and should not have an anti-armor mission except in extreme situations. Of course I am a believer that infantry that supports tanks should be in vehicles with truly tank levels of armor. IFV's should be generalist fighting support vehicles capable of quickly moving infantry and supporting them by fire, advanced c3 and RSTA capabilities, and resupply. They should operate in platoon size elements Unfortunately this is not how any military that I know uses or organizes them so proving my concept would be difficult to say the least.
Reed

William F. Owen

06-01-2009, 05:03 AM

I don't think the Corps will get its head around just how the AR/LMG fits into our tactics because we are for the most part very immature about the concept of employment in the first place. It just seems as though very few officers and senior enlisted have though about the issue in the least.

If this is true, and I am not doubting you, it would strongly suggest that the USMC has no clear idea as the relative effects and benefits of the weapons in the platoon. The UK certainly has the same problem, because it has focussed on loading up 3 sections, with identical fire teams, and wants to treat the "section as a platform."

This problem will persist as long as we train folks "how do things" and not "why to do things."

jcustis

06-01-2009, 06:36 AM

If this is true, and I am not doubting you, it would strongly suggest that the USMC has no clear idea as the relative effects and benefits of the weapons in the platoon.

I'm not sure that it is necessarily such a bad thing, except when it comes time to look for a candidate to replace the SAW, hence the LMG vs. AR debate, which often gets mired down solely in issues of weight, caliber, range, etc., and not a question of effects desired.

I invited CWO4 Eby to check out some of the trigger puller threads, as he has written the most of late about rifle grenade, buddy tactics, and the search for a new SAW/AR in the Marine Corps Gazette. Sadly, he either could not, or chose not to, come.

William F. Owen

06-01-2009, 06:51 AM

I invited CWO4 Eby to check out some of the trigger puller threads, as he has written the most of late about rifle grenade, buddy tactics, and the search for a new SAW/AR in the Marine Corps Gazette. Sadly, he either could not, or chose not to, come.

I've read a lot of Eby's stuff. Now I don't like the SAW, but I don't see the LAR as a one for one replacement. A lot of the testing described in his articles is not the effort I would have supported.
Unless you can actually measure the "effectiveness" of an M4 v M16A4 v M249 v X-LAR, then you have a debate populated by opinion and war stories, and not something most of us could take seriously.
All my evidence (and that includes some opinion) is that is it not about weapons. Sighting systems and other ancillaries seem to be far more potent, and efficient than merely fixating on what equipment best turns 5.56mm into empty cases.

06-12-2009, 04:46 PM

Here (http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=54745) is a note from DoD Defense Link to consider--11 Man squads?

WASHINGTON, June 11, 2009 – The U.S. military is studying how to improve smaller-unit capabilities to better confront enemies who practice irregular or conventional warfare, or both, a senior U.S. military officer said here today.
The studies are part of U.S. Joint Forces Command’s National Program for Small Unit Excellence initiative, Army Maj. Gen. Jason K. Kamiya, chief of the Norfolk, Va.,-based command’s joint training directorate, and the commander of its Joint Warfighting Center, told reporters at a Pentagon roundtable meeting.

Senior U.S. military leaders believe that highly trained, smaller units would be better able to battle future foes that practice irregular warfare, Kamiya said, as well as enemies that wage hybrid warfare, a combination of irregular and conventional warfare.

An example of such squad-sized “super” units can be found in the special operations realm, Kamiya said, where the diverse and honed talents and capabilities of 11-member teams make them more powerful than some larger, conventional military units.

Rifleman

06-13-2009, 05:59 AM

Actually, the article made it sound like is wasn't so much about increasing the size of the rifle squad as it was about subdividing light infantry units into something akin to SF ODAs. At least that was my take on it.

Don't know if that's a good idea. Others more experienced than me can comment on that.

William F. Owen

06-13-2009, 06:45 AM

Here (http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=54745) is a note from DoD Defense Link to consider--11 Man squads?
Stupidest thing I have read in a long time. 9,11 or 12 man squad will make, and can make NO difference. Maybe those guys should come read these threads.

It's not the squad. It's the platoon. What works for combat operations, works for security operations.

Fuchs

06-13-2009, 04:55 PM

It's not the squad. It's the platoon.

Unless a platoon is the sum of multiple identical squads. That would trivialize the difference that you see.
The platoon is the sum of multiple identical (TO&E) squads in many if not most countries...

Another problem is the limitation that the independent employment of a platoon sets on its stealth. A squad or a smaller team can remain undetected or at least thwart tracking efforts much easier than a platoon.
A platoon hasn't much superior capability to call for indirect fires in comparison to even a two-man sniper team.
The use of directional fragmentation mines for an ambush is also pretty much a fixed size and doesn't vary much with friendly head count beyond the first squad.
Armies that focus on indirect fires (or ambushes) in their infantry tactics will find the squad organization more important than platoon organization - because a platoon would often just be 2/3 excess fat.

I think you rest your platoon emphasis a lot and probably too much on thinking about platoon assaults. The advantageous differentiation between assault and suppressive fire elements in a platoon looks very much like an exception that's limited to assaults.

The use of identical squad TO&E would instead lead to squad-centric thinking.

William F. Owen

06-13-2009, 05:02 PM

I think you rest your platoon emphasis a lot and probably too much on thinking about platoon assaults. The advantageous differentiation between assault and suppressive fire elements in a platoon looks very much like an exception that's limited to assaults.

Absolutely not.

My thinking for platoons focusses on generating patrol multiples. That is relevant, regardless of the conflict, terrain, or threat. Supporting and sustaining dismounted operation, regardless of numbers or weapons types, is something that has to focus thinking on the platoon level.

The fixation on squad size has proven worthless. We need to move beyond it.

reed11b

06-13-2009, 06:15 PM

Unless a platoon is the sum of multiple identical squads. That would trivialize the difference that you see.
The platoon is the sum of multiple identical (TO&E) squads in many if not most countries...

Acttualy it is the sum of multiple, not always identical SECTIONS in most countries. the fireteam/squad dynamic a fairly recent additional layer of command unique to infantry. Better training would easily eliminate the need for it
Reed

ODB

06-14-2009, 12:01 AM

Many dicussions throughout the SWJ revolve around weapons. Everyone talks about the ideal round, ideal lethality, ideal caliber, firing rates, etc..... Finally someone brought up one of my biggest pet peeves (Thanks Coldstreamer). POSITIVE ID. At what distance with the naked eye can a soldier positively ID (PID) his threat in any environment? Yes, the environment makes a difference and I know all the associated factors. For arguements sake let's say open desert:

1. In local attire carrying an AK or RPG?

2. In local attire hiding an AK or RPG under his clothes?

3. In military uniform carrying an AK or RPG?

4. In military uniform with no weapon visable?

Aditionally lets use the same constraints with common current optics found within our force.

1. ACOG 4x power

2. M68 or EOTECH 0x power

3. Binos (showing my age by allowing the old M22) 7x50

4. Thermals (lightweight)

5. ELCAN M145 3.4x power

Staying in the daylight only realm, night becomes a completely different story.

I'm not talking capabilities with sniper teams and other specialties. Most discussions center around the "force" in general.

Additionally this changes based on the fight your in. Yes one can PID someone shooting from a much further distance or can they?

Based on being able to PID your target then what becomes the ideal weapon systems?

As far as anything 25mm, 40 mm or whatever the hell the next great idea fairy dreams up, maybe they should look at an effective way to train Soldiers on the weapon system. M203/M79 (yes they are still around) is the most underutilized weapon in the inventory. No one gets ammo to train with it and since this has been the case for too many years no one knows how to use it. I love seeing the deer in the headlight look when I ask why they do not have "hold off" markings taped onto their sling. Before we keep throwing new weapons, ammo, technology at the "force", we need to be able to ensure it can be effectively trained and therefore utilized to it's full capability.

jcustis

06-14-2009, 04:14 AM

Using the lower end ACOG and ELCAN, I can do all four of those PID tasks at ~700 meters. Being able to engage said tgts is of course a different story.

I agree 110% that sometimes, we merely need to be better with what we already have.

jcustis

06-14-2009, 05:00 AM

I've read a lot of Eby's stuff. Now I don't like the SAW, but I don't see the LAR as a one for one replacement. A lot of the testing described in his articles is not the effort I would have supported.
Unless you can actually measure the "effectiveness" of an M4 v M16A4 v M249 v X-LAR, then you have a debate populated by opinion and war stories, and not something most of us could take seriously.
All my evidence (and that includes some opinion) is that is it not about weapons. Sighting systems and other ancillaries seem to be far more potent, and efficient than merely fixating on what equipment best turns 5.56mm into empty cases.

Eby wrote an article that described a significan bit of testing and experimentation between the SAW, Ultimax, HK candidate, and Colt HBAR candidates. The last few paragraphs are indicative of why the effort continues.

Despite the small margin of accuracy between the replacement candidates and the SAW that would otherwise mean a replacement is not necessary, the SAW still does not provide the requisite mobility and ability to fire in a semi-automatic mode.

The testing also identified that optics, and often a spotter of some sorts, matter.

The original material came out of a Marine Corps Gazette article that I found published elsewhere.

---------------------

Automatic Rifle Concept: Part I—History and Empirical Testing

by CWO3 Jeffrey L. Eby

‘Those German units fortunate enough to have officers who understood the effect of modern firepower went into battle in dispersed skirmish lines, with as many as six meters between each man and with each man granted the freedom to make use of whatever cover was available during his forward movement.’1

—Bruce Gudmundsson
Stormtroop Tactics

The relationship between the lethality of weapons and the dispersion of the troops found on the same battlefield has been a consideration for commanders since man first engaged in combat. From the Spartan phalanx to German stormtroop operations, combat leaders have been forced to adjust their tactics to the technology of the day. The dispersion of the troops has always been a critical aspect of the tactics employed. As the lethality of weapons has increased so has the dispersion necessary to preserve combat power.

History
Throughout history, advances in technology have driven tactical changes. As smaller units of combatants have gained greater firepower, dispersion has become a critical function of survivability on the battlefield. Dispersion is not merely a function of physical distance between elements but also incorporates the elements of mobility, command, and control. One end of the spectrum of dispersion is a massed armed force in physical contact, slow to move, and under the direct observation and control of its senior leader. The opposite end of the spectrum is a force of individual skirmishers moving quickly and guided only by a general intent. Commanders have continually adjusted the deployment of their forces in order to most effectively bring fire to bear on the enemy while simultaneously attempting to minimize the effects of enemy fire on their own forces.

The combatants of World War I learned a number of lessons as they attempted to resolve how to increase dispersion in the face of increased firepower, while still maintaining some type of control over their squads and platoons. By increasing the training standards of the individual soldier they hoped to enable themselves to decentralize command and increase dispersion.2 Better trained soldiers could operate more effectively without direct supervision.

Realizing that coordinated rushes drew fire, soldiers began advancing using stealth, microterrain, and individual rushes.3 The development of a light machinegun and trench mortar—fielded at the squad level—increased the unit’s firepower without having to resort to linear formations of riflemen.4 Without the need to “build up the skirmish line,” squads could maneuver freely, furthering dispersion while maintaining offensive momentum.5

By the beginning of World War II almost all combatants possessed squad organizations built around light machineguns and automatic rifles (ARs). Armies fielded units capable of the dispersion necessary to survive and operate on this new, more expansive battlefield in both offensive and defensive operations.

As World War II progressed, American Army and Marine Corps squads focused on gaining further firepower that improved their survivability and allowed for further dispersion and movement. Army experiences in the bocage country of Normandy and the woods of the Huertgen forest led to two and even three Browning ARs (BARs) at the squad level. The American “light” machinegun—a water-cooled, .30 caliber model—could not be used in the assault due to its weight.6

The Marine Corps developed the fire team concept. As early as the Corps’ Nicaragua experience, Marines recognized the need for a squad-level automatic weapon.7 Through World War I and into the Pacific campaigns of World War II, Marine Corps squad development continually evolved toward smaller maneuver elements, each armed with an AR. In keeping with the “triangle” concept, the Corps finished World War II with the 3 fire team, 13-man squad still utilized today.8

By Vietnam the Marine Corps rifle squad lost the BAR as an AR largely due to logistical, vice tactical, concerns.9 Attempts to replace the BAR with a modified M14, a never fielded M15, or the M60 medium machinegun proved to be failures.10

After the Vietnam War the Marine Corps led development of the M16A2 to replace the M16A1. However, with the loss of the M16A1’s full automatic capability, even the fiction of an AR at the fire team and squad level disappeared.11 As the M16A2 was fielded the Marine Corps searched for an available weapons system to fill in the AR void. While some testing apparently occurred, the vagaries of the contracting system and the urgency of fielding demands led to the selection of the FN Minimi light machinegun—the M249 squad automatic weapon (and the introduction of the term “SAW” to the Marine Corps lexicon).12

The Assessment
The relationship between lethality and dispersion has recently come under scrutiny in the context of a debate over the role of the M249 SAW within the Marine rifle squad and the need for a true automatic weapon in the infantry. Two articles will discuss the role of the M249 SAW, the need for a true automatic weapon in the infantry, and the constrained reorganization of the infantry company to best utilize the strengths of organic weapons systems. This article will address the relationship between lethality and dispersion, examine the historical background of the AR, and provide the results of a 1st Marine Division (1st MarDiv) sponsored assessment of three ARs and the M249 SAW.

In May 2001 the 1st MarDiv commissioned a study tasking 2d Battalion, 7th Marines to execute a quantitative and qualitative assessment of several AR candidates alongside the M249 SAW. The objective of this assessment was twofold:

• Determine if the AR is more effective than the SAW in an operational environment during day, low-light, and night in selected offensive and defensive operations.

• Evaluate the SAW through organizational change by considering constrained reorganization that will experiment with a SAW consolidation within the infantry squad and platoon.

Once the quantitative results were obtained (detailed results are included in this article), the battalion attempted to answer the following two questions:

jcustis

06-14-2009, 05:02 AM

• Will the inclusion of the AR in the infantry squad and the consolidation of the SAW at the squad level enhance the effectiveness of the platoon?

• Will the inclusion of the AR in the infantry squad and the consolidation of the SAW at the platoon level enhance the effectiveness of the company?

In attempting to answer the two questions above, several other questions were generated that created more debate on the utility of the SAW and its role in the battalion and the role of the AR in the fire team. The debate centered on the following:

• Should the M249 be replaced outright or have its role tailored to meet its capabilities (light machinegun or AR)?

• Can the historical progression of increased lethality be forwarded and, if so, how?

• How or should the Marine Corps rifle squad and platoon be organized to maximize strengths and minimize weaknesses of the SAW, increase dispersion in the face of the new lethality that might be developed with more automatic weapons in the rifle squads, and take advantage of new technologies?

Before the assessment began the following generally held weapons definitions were adopted. A machinegun is a weapon possessing interchangeable barrels in order to allow continuous high-volume fires. The high volumes are achieved by using belt-fed ammunition. The machinegun will have an effective range beyond that of rifles as impacts of rounds can be directed onto targets by other members of the machinegun team.

An AR will be designed around the battle rifle of the infantry (currently the M16A2) but may come with a heavy barrel to retard heat buildup. It will be magazine fed and possess the capacity to be employed in a fully automatic role. The effective range of the AR should be comparable to the rifle. According to Chuck Taylor, author of The Fighting Rifle:

The automatic rifle is a small arm intended for short-term automatic fire missions against point targets. It is incapable of sustained automatic fire due to the lack of a quick-change barrel, which in turn, causes overheating, and the removal of the weapon from serviceable status. The AR is also fed from a detachable box magazine, not a belt, as is a true machine gun. Automatic rifles are NOT machine guns!13

An AR should be employed by an individual shooter and used in close combat. The AR, with its lower rate of fire, buffer spring, and greatly reduced recoil, gives added advantage of accuracy and shooter endurance. Unlike a light machinegun, an AR is designed to engage point or small area targets. It is intended to be a “mobile base of fire” around which the fire team maneuvers. The AR provides the maneuver element itself with an organic, moving volume of fire in the attack.

Only infantry could gain ground. To make possible the advance of infantry in such circumstances required that some weapon, dominant in its firepower, readily mobile, extremely accurate at short range, capable of being handled by one man and easily concealed, should be available to fill in the gap between the lifting of the artillery barrage and the moment at which the arme blanche could be used.14

Based on the generally held weapons definitions adopted, three ARs were acquired off-the-shelf to participate in the assessment with the M249 SAW. These three weapons were the Colt AR, the Ultimax 100 (manufactured by Singapore Arms), and the Heckler & Koch (HK) G36.

The Weapons
The Colt is a variant of the current M16A2 with the exact same sights and commonality of parts. The Colt AR weighs 15 pounds—8 more pounds than the M16A2. The additional weight is due primarily to a heavy barrel intended to retard heat buildup. Other alterations include a pistol grip attached to the fore end, a hydraulic buffer to retard recoil and rise, and a design change enabling the automatic variant to fire from the open bolt, reducing the possibility of cookoffs from excessive heat buildup. The Colt has a rate of fire of 650 rounds per minute.

The Ultimax 100 is similar in look to the M249 SAW. Like the SAW it fires from the open bolt but does not possess a spare barrel and is fed by magazine only. Because it weighs only 9 pounds, s******* can easily employ the Ultimax in a variety of methods. An adjustable gas regulator with 3 settings allows for a rate of fire varying from 450 to 600 rounds per minute.

The HK is a lightweight rifle capable of being fired in a fully automatic role from the closed bolt. The version tested had optical sights with an over/under system. The lower sight system has a 3.5 magnified scope with multiple crosshairs. The upper system was an aim point dot variation for limited visibility shooting. Total weight of the weapons system tested was 7 pounds. The rate of fire is 650 rounds per minute.

Testing
Phase I began 21 July 2001 with the receipt of the test bed of ARs. Forty-eight Marines en route to the battalion from their recent graduation at the School of Infantry were selected as the test bed s******* in order to eliminate as much preexisting bias concerning the SAW as possible. The tradeoff for using new Marines was a lack of marksmanship understanding and a failure to grasp open-bolt firing concepts. The 48 Marines were divided into four 12-man squads labeled A, B, C, and D. Marines in each squad were then numbered 1 through 12. Each squad was armed with one of the four weapons systems (Colt, HK, Ultimax, and SAW). Each weapon was then zeroed to the individual shooter. Once a weapon was zeroed to a specific Marine, the other three Marines in his number series would shoot for an offset aim point; i.e., shooter A1 zeroed the SAW and then s******* B1, C1, and D1 used offset aim points for the SAW. All number one s******* would shoot all four of the number one weapons on each test. This allowed a much quicker transition from weapon to weapon throughout the test.

Class SAW Colt Ultimax HK
1st 2 7 1 2
2d 8 19 10 6
3d 19 12 12 7
4th 19 10 25 33

Table 1. Test 1 results.
Eight separate tests were designed to assess the accuracy of the three AR candidates and the SAW in various operational situations. The main focus of these tests was to determine if the ARs were more accurate than the SAW in various attitudes, ranges, and conditions.

Test 1 was the M249 SAW paper qualification course fired from 36 yards. The purpose of this test was to use the M249’s strongest event to establish a baseline for comparison. The other weapons would compete against the SAW in its most favored environment. The most accurate weapon for this event was the Colt and the least accurate the HK. Table 1 shows that s******* using the Colt qualified in the first or second class two and a half times higher than s******* using the other weapons.

Test 2 was a quick-kill course established at Range 105A. S******* engaged three targets from the standing, kneeling, and prone positions with nine rounds in a time frame of 20 seconds. A target hit was valued at 1; a miss was valued at 0. The quick-kill targets were established at ranges of 25, 50, and 100 yards. The purpose of Test 2 was to determine the accuracy of the weapons in the critical, last 100 yards of an assault. The Marines used all of the field firing positions to duplicate the firing methods of combat Marines in urban or jungle warfare. Table 2 shows the results of Test 2.

25 Yards 50 Yards 100 Yards
Weapon Hits Rounds Accuracy Weapon Hits Rounds Accuracy Weapon Hits Rounds Accuracy
SAW 130 432 30.09% SAW 119 432 27.55% SAW 100 432 23.15%
Colt 161 432 37.27% Colt 161 432 29.86% Colt 176 432 40.74%
Ultimax 130 432 30.09% Ultimax 130 432 24.54% Ultimax 131 432 30.32%
HK 139 432 32.18% HK 139 432 28.94% HK 120 432 27.77%

Table 2. Test 2 results.
Figure 1. Extracted Table I from FM 23–9.
RD Range (M) Time (Sec) RD Range (M) Time (Sec)
1 50 3 11 100 8
2 200 6 12 200
3 100 4 13 150 10
4 150 5 14 300
5 300 6 15 100 9
6 250 7 16 250
7 50 3 17 200 6
8 200 6 18 150 5
9 150 5 19 50 6
10 250 7 20 100

Weapon Hits Rounds Saved Rounds Accuracy
SAW 231 1920 1 12.04%
Colt 427 1920 64 23.00%
Ultimax 368 1920 69 19.88%
HK 386 1920 173 22.10%

Table 3. Test 3 results.

Figure 2.
Task Range (M) Time (Sec) Rounds
1 200 5 6
2 300 10 6
3 100 10 6
4 300 15 6
5 100, 300 20 12
6 200, 300 20 12
7 100, 200, 300 25 18

Weapon Hits Rounds Saved Rounds Accuracy
SAW 279 3168 327 09.82%
Colt 384 3168 580 14.84%
Ultimax 323 3168 642 12.79%
HK 330 3168 338 11.66%

Table 4. Test 4 results.

Figure 3.
RD Range (M) Time (Sec) RD Range (M) Time (Sec)
1 250 10 11 400 10
2 400 10 12 500
3 800 15 13 700 20
4 300 10 14 300
5 500 10 15 800 20
6 700 15 16 400
7 300 10 17 600 20
8 400 10 18 800
9 600 15 17 300 10
10 800 15 20 500 10
Weapons Hits Rounds Saved Rounds Accuracy
SAW 148 4800 0 3.08%
Colt 219 4800 290 4.86%
Ultimax 216 4800 280 4.78%
HK 151 4800 243 3.31%

jcustis

06-14-2009, 05:02 AM

Table 5. Test 5 results.

Standing results without masks Standing results with mask
Weapon Accuracy Time (Sec) Weapon Accuracy Time (Sec)
SAW 4.73% 1132 SAW 6.12& 1013
Colt 10.70% 1355 Colt 9.18% 1138
Ultimax 9.80% 1272 Ultimax 8.64% 1300
HK 13.51%
1621 HK 10.99% 1926

Table 6. Test 6 results.

Kneeling results without masks Kneeling results with mask
SAW 3.85% 1116 SAW 5.40% 1131
Colt 8.24% 1309 Colt 10.63% 1304
Ultimax 10.70% 1410 Ultimax 9.00% 1459
HK 11.22% 1490 HK 14.59% 1753

Table 7. Test 7 results.

Task Range (M) Time (Sec) RD
1 200 5 6
2 300 10 6
3 100 10 6
4 300 15 6
5 100,300 20 12
6 200,300 20 12
7 100,200,300 25 18

Figure 4.

Weapon Hits Rounds Saved Rounds Accuracy
SAW 43 3102 728 1.81%
Colt 50 3102 526 1.94%
Ultimax Not available for this event.
HK 88 3102 641 3.58%

Table 8. Test 8 results.

During Test 2 minor issues developed with each of the weapons systems. S******* repeatedly had negligent discharges with the Colt, attributable to the Marines forgetting the difference between the closed-bolt M16A2 and the open-bolt AR. The young Marines kept riding the bolt home on a live round, thereby firing the round. With the Ultimax, the s******* realized that the sights were set too low in the rear. Once they achieved stock weld the sights proved to be lower than the eye could see, forcing stock weld to be broken and causing the shooter to search for the sights. With the HK the 3.5 power magnification proved too much at 25 and 50 yards but beneficial at 100 yards. Overmagnification at shorter ranges slowed down the presentation of the weapon onto the target. For the M249 SAW, the weight and length in general made this an extremely cumbersome weapon in field firing positions. Another problem resulted from the commonality of the Colt AR and the M16A2. The familiarity led to initial accuracy, as the young Marines had not yet become familiar with the other weapons.

Test 3 was fired from the prone position, using bipods for stability, engaging popup targets ranging in distance from 50 to 300 meters, with a varied time limit (See Table 3.) A 20-target exposure using 40 rounds was fired from Field Manual 23–9 (FM 23–9), M16A1 and M16A2 Rifle Marksmanship Table I. (See Figure 1.) This evaluation determined quick reaction from a defensive position to an attacking enemy.

Test 4 occurred on the same range as Test 3, firing Table II of FM 23–14, M249 Light Machinegun in the Automatic Rifle Role (see Figure 2), the SAW transition course of fire. A shooter in the prone position with 66 rounds engaged popup targets ranging in distance from 100 to 300 meters with a varied time limit. (See Table 4.) This test again gave the M249 the benefit of the doubt by firing a course of fire designed for the light machinegun. However, the only weapon that could qualify as a light machinegun, the M249 SAW, posted the worst results.

Test 5 was fired using long-range popup targets without team leader assistance. Targets ranged from 250 to 800 meters. (See Figure 3.) Testing employed a 20-target exposure firing 100 rounds per weapon from a supported prone position with varied time exposures. (See Table 5.)

The results from Test 5 identified difficulties for a single shooter to engage targets beyond 300 meters. To effectively and accurately engage targets at these ranges, weapons systems need to be operated by a team, fired from a tripod, and assisted by team leaders using magnified optics.

Tests 6 and 7 (see Tables 6 and 7 for test results) consisted of field firing at elevated targets (simulating urban patrol engagements) placed at distances of 100 to 150 meters. The targets were automated, three-dimensional “Ivan” popup targets. A 5-target exposure was used and engaged with 15 rounds with no time limit, but total time for each shooter was recorded. S******* fired from standing and kneeling positions with and without the field protective mask.

Test 8 consisted of night fire on an automated range with targets arrayed from 75 to 300 meters. (See Figure 4.) Ambient light was less than 20 percent. All weapons were zeroed with PEQ–2s using the laser bore light prior to the range. (See Table 8.) The Ultimax 100 was not tested because there was no way to mount the PEQ–2 to the weapon.

The final evaluation of the assessment was aimed at capturing intangible characteristics and qualities of the weapons that numeric data could not capture. Marines involved in the test filled out a shooter evaluation questionnaire that attempted to capture the intangibles of each weapon. The comparison of these questionnaires with actual range performance produced some interesting results. On average, during Tests 1 through 4 the 48 s******* preferred the weapons in the following order: Ultimax 100, HK, Colt, and M249 SAW. The questions on the questionnaire focused on nine areas: (1) overall performance, (2) using system sights, (3) detecting and identifying targets, (4) adjusting windage, (5) adjusting elevation, (6) adjusting weapons zero, (7) maintaining zero, ( malfunctions, and (9) stoppages. Even though the Colt fired the most accurately in most stages, it was next to last in shooter preference.

Recommendations for modifications were requested for each of the weapons systems. The M249 and Colt were viewed as too heavy. The HK failed to stay on target in burst fire while the Ultimax sight system did not present to the eye at all. When the shooter laid his cheek on the stock of the weapon and achieved a proper stock weld he found the sights of the weapon lay below the line of sight capability of his eye. Accuracy—although according to raw data better than the current M249 SAW in every test—was of such a limited amount as to be statistically insignificant. Only on Test 3 did any weapon outperform the SAW by more than 10 percent accuracy.

“Automatic fire is inherently less accurate than semiautomatic fire.”15 The difficulty becomes achieving a balance between weapons that provide a combination of the accuracy of semiautomatic fire while maintaining the ability to employ full automatic fire when required. This is the reason the Marine Corps modified its BARs so they could fire semiautomatically—to provide both capabilities.

Infantrymen feel strongly about replacing the M249 SAW with a true AR inside the fire team but feel just as strongly about keeping the M249 SAW for its automatic fire suppressive capability. Given the results of this assessment, accuracy alone is not a strong enough reason to replace the M249 SAW. However, most would argue that accuracy was never the problem with the M249 SAW. The problem with the M249 SAW was the lack of mobility when manned by an individual while attempting to move at the pace of a rifle team.

The M249 SAW provides the accuracy that fire teams and squads require. The quantitative tests of Phase I proved the variation in accuracy between the M249 SAW and its competitors small enough to not be worth the time, money, and effort to replace it. Despite the mitigation of the accuracy issue, the M249 SAW could not meet the requirements of mobility and semiautomatic fire accuracy.

Unfortunately, the competitors tested during Phase I of the AR assessment do not appear to offer what the Marine Corps needs. As stated previously, the HK failed to stay on target in burst fire while the Ultimax sight system did not present to the eye at all. The commonality of the Colt AR with the M16A2 appeared to be advantageous. Yet the Colt proved to be the only weapon that experienced negligent discharges during the firing of 120,000 rounds. This fault resulted, in part, from young Marines failing to understand the open-bolt system but also, in part, from weapon design. Open bolts are inherently dangerous. Traditionally, we fear carrying an open-bolt weapon in the condition one mode of ready to fire. The primary shooter can be trained to be safe with the weapon, but primary shooter casualties will soon place the weapons in untrained hands, quickly leading to friendly fire hazards.

Using the assessment as a “jumping off” point, at the conclusion of Phase I of the AR test, a universal need statement (UNS) was drafted and submitted through 1st MarDiv. The statement requested that the M249 be replaced with a “true” AR. The weapon envisioned would fire 5.56mm ball ammunition, be capable of receiving the M16A2’s 30-round magazine, and would possess a selector lever that went from safe to automatic to semiautomatic (in that order), weigh less than 12 pounds loaded, employ sights equal to the M16A2, use clip-on bipods, and have a 450 to 600 rounds per minute rate of fire.

Phase I testing did not provide a “yes” to the original question—“is an AR more accurate than the M249 SAW?” It did, however, highlight the need for a mobile AR, capable of semiautomatic fire at the fire team level. Further, it illuminated the need to address the future employment and role of the M249 SAW light machinegun and a “true” AR in the fire teams, squads, and platoons of the Marine Corps.

Because of the results achieved in Phase I, testing carried forth with the same automatic weapons into Phase II. Experimental squad and platoon organizations were constructed in order to examine the idea of consolidating the SAWs at various levels of command. The next article in this series will fully addresses the AR UNS submitted by 1st MarDiv and the issues that arose from the experimental organizations.

William F. Owen

06-14-2009, 05:18 AM

Eby wrote an article that described a significan bit of testing and experimentation between the SAW, Ultimax, HK candidate, and Colt HBAR candidates. The last few paragraphs are indicative of why the effort continues.
Thanks for posting

Despite the small margin of accuracy between the replacement candidates and the SAW that would otherwise mean a replacement is not necessary, the SAW still does not provide the requisite mobility and ability to fire in a semi-automatic mode.

The testing also identified that optics, and often a spotter of some sorts, matter.
...but the problem isn't the one-for-one comparing of accuracy, with other types of 5.56mm LARs. As I said, this is where I differ with Eby on his approach to testing.

Optics are critical. There is a pretty huge body of evidence to support this, from the UK if nowhere else.

jcustis

06-14-2009, 05:21 AM

...but the problem isn't the one-for-one comparing of accuracy, with other types of 5.56mm LARs. As I said, this is where I differ with Eby on his approach to testing.

What is the issue then?

William F. Owen

06-14-2009, 07:21 AM

What is the issue then?

Ah! Sorry, thought I had dealt with this else where.

Basically the problem was framed as "Replace the SAW for X-reasons." This lead to comparative testing against replacements.

I would have suggested trying to measure

How effective the Fire team was, with and without the SAW? - so how effective is the SAW, kilogram for kilogram?
Can the M32 replace the SAW?
Do you actually need a SAW, if all the M4's or M16A4s have good optics and a bipod?

If the testing is limited to punching holes in targets, then the usefulness of the results are going to limited as a result.

Kiwigrunt

06-14-2009, 10:02 AM

I think those are good points Wilf. (And we have of course discussed this else where ;)).
That’s where a weapon like LWRC IAR is IMO interesting because it weighs hardly any more than ‘its’ standard carbine/rifle version. Replace all M4’s, M16’s, Minimi’s, IW’s, LSW’s, SAW’s, LMG’s, AR’s, carbines etc. etc. with it and call it a……uhhmmmm….rifle. Next weapon up is a 7.62 beltfed at section/squad level (or platoon level for Wilf, or company level for Ken:p). (fit sniper rifles and DMR’s in there somewhere.) And that will IMO make it much easier to add other weapons like M32 or anything shoulder launched to any fireteam/squad/whatever, since the emphasis is no longer on manoeuvring the fireteam around the (overweight) SAW.

William F. Owen

06-14-2009, 10:44 AM

That’s where a weapon like LWRC IAR is IMO interesting because it weighs hardly any more than ‘its’ standard carbine/rifle version. Replace all M4’s, M16’s, Minimi’s, IW’s, LSW’s, SAW’s, LMG’s, AR’s, carbines etc. etc. with it and call it a……uhhmmmm….rifle.
Sweet looking AR there. Yeah, this is pretty much the way it think it is useful to progress. The variety in sighting systems enabled by the MIL-STD 1913 rail can gain far more capability for existing weapons than adding new ones.

I've just been looking at <1kg laser range finding sniper scope with an automatic ballistic range reticule. It accounts for temperature and wind.

Put dot on target.
Press "range" button.
Dot moves.
Put dot back on target.
Squeeze trigger

Could take a 7.62mm rifle out to 1,200-1,300m for a first round hit. Now you have to have pretty steady hands for that, so skill is still required.

jcustis

06-14-2009, 06:17 PM

Kiwigrunt

06-14-2009, 09:38 PM

Kiwigrunt,

When you say that other systems can be integrated b/c an AR would mean a change to maneuver around the SAW, are you thinking more that the team has to slow its movement down to the speed that the SAW gunner can move, or that the team is built around the SAW, and supports it (in militaries that use it)?

Jcustis, I’m thinking more the latter. In the NZ army the Minimi replaced the GPMG on a one to one basis for the first decade or so and was therefore the section machinegun, just like the gimpy used to be. Then we adopted the fireteam structure and added a Minimi and pretty much started using it as the fireteam machinegun (which it is of course), so a fireteam almost became a mini-section with its own baby-machinegun. Problem is, the section of old had enough bods to fill other roles like rifleman, radio op, scout and cover-scout, anti tank etc., and that way the gunner could totally concentrate on his gun and get maximum effect out of it. The fireteam is so small that, especially after some minor redundancy, the gunner has no option but to be one of the ‘bods’. And that than still goes back to your first point anyway, regarding weight, by the time they carry the additional stores.

And then things started getting silly. The Minimi was so cool (and I have to say, I really do like it myself) and 'light', and superior to any rifle, that for instance six man CMA teams in East Timor typically carried three of them. Now that to me is not using a MG in its intended role as a group support weapon, where its weight is justified against its effect, but as a supercharged SMG on steroids. (And that’s not to say that it can’t do that job quite nicely, but that would be a choice; maybe more suitable to SF than to line-infantry)

And I suppose that is where the USMC IAR concept comes in. The issue I see with it is that the tactics applied still revolve around the AR as being pivotal, with the rest of the team manoeuvring around it. It appears to me that the weapon is so close to being a standard assault rifle that the differentiation becomes silly. So the whole concept of the team being formed around this weapon could IMO be dropped completely (provided of course that a weapon like the LWRC can prove itself). If everyone has this rifle, then anyone can fulfil the role of AR as and when required, or all if the situation is desperate enough to require it (I can hear your teeth grinding Ken). And they could do it without even stepping into that role, since that role would not exist as such. It would just be a matter of switching to full auto when needed.

A shift in mindset that may create whole new possibilities???

I suppose the question I have is, are we trying to fill this spot of gunner or AR because we are so used to having it (there almost appears to be some kind of mystique about it) and we’d feel naked without it? Or do we really need that extra firepower at those low levels, even if only 5.56? I think the answers to those questions can only be found by you trigger-pullers, as long as emotions can be set aside and a clear differentiation can be made between a perception of power on the part of the gunner (the hard-on factor), and the real on-target effects. I always felt that when I carried the C9 on exercises (and even with blanks), those figure 11 targets were just sh#t out of luck!

By the way, Wilf, you may be able to answer this. Did the Israelis not try to do this with the Galil, with its bipod and 35 and 50 round magazines? What happened there?

Fuchs

06-14-2009, 10:53 PM

I've just been looking at <1kg laser range finding sniper scope with an automatic ballistic range reticule. It accounts for temperature and wind.

Put dot on target.
Press "range" button.
Dot moves.
Put dot back on target.
Squeeze trigger

Could take a 7.62mm rifle out to 1,200-1,300m for a first round hit. Now you have to have pretty steady hands for that, so skill is still required.

That was feasible (and done) -except the weight cap- 20 years ago.
Even a comparably simple red dot+LRF sight (http://www.zeiss.de/C12567A80033F8E4/Contents-Frame/DC856B6FAE6B9C7CC125710000294A68) is an overkill at typical ranges, though.
Snipers operate in teams and need neither integral LRF nor a red dot. Long range shots require a lot of skill besides calm hands anyway (altitude difference, wind, optical distortions, lead aiming).
A designated marksman could use such a toy, but they're so numerous that the toy's price becomes a factor - and designated marksmen need sights for very short range. This favours variable sights with minimum 1-1.5x and maximum 3.4-6x - unsuitable for 1,200m shots.
An alternative is the use of two sights, of course.

Any general infantry weapon that's meant to hit at more than 400-600m is suspicious to me.
That's fine for snipers, but infantry would merely force the enemy to become less sloppy (invisible) by shooting+hitting at extreme distances.
That also gives away the own presence (if not location).

I'd say reserve anything between 300 and 500m for the designated marksmen (and designated marksman rifles+automatic carbines should probably succeed 'assault rifles' in general), snipers and indirect fires.
Reserve anything 500m+ for snipers and indirect fires.

Sometimes you should simply hide and observe, provoke carelessness and maybe prepare an ambush instead of shooting.

Infantry wouldn't achieve many 1,200m hits anyway. First week maybe - then it'll simply have an empty battlefield and be frustrated because it lacks 'situational awareness'.

William F. Owen

06-15-2009, 03:58 AM

Snipers operate in teams and need neither integral LRF nor a red dot. Long range shots require a lot of skill besides calm hands anyway (altitude difference, wind, optical distortions, lead aiming).
Being pretty familiar with the technical and operational aspects of long range prescsion engagement (sniping) I would agree.

A designated marksman could use such a toy, but they're so numerous that the toy's price becomes a factor - and designated marksmen need sights for very short range. This favours variable sights with minimum 1-1.5x and maximum 3.4-6x - unsuitable for 1,200m shots.
An alternative is the use of two sights, of course.
This sight was developed for sniper type applications, not marksmen. Cost wise, it is less than a TI sight and a lot of armies, are looking to equip each fire team with a TI sight.
The 1,200m statement is an example of technical capability, not an example of operational need. Yes, I'm pretty sceptical of it, but I am making no assumptions about the things you state, until I've seen it working.

Any general infantry weapon that's meant to hit at more than 400-600m is suspicious to me. I'd agree.

That's fine for snipers, but infantry would merely force the enemy to become less sloppy (invisible) by shooting+hitting at extreme distances.
That also gives away the own presence (if not location).

I'd say reserve anything between 300 and 500m for the designated marksmen (and designated marksman rifles+automatic carbines should probably succeed 'assault rifles' in general), snipers and indirect fires.
Reserve anything 500m+ for snipers and indirect fires.

Sometimes you should simply hide and observe, provoke carelessness and maybe prepare an ambush instead of shooting.

Infantry wouldn't achieve many 1,200m hits anyway. First week maybe - then it'll simply have an empty battlefield and be frustrated because it lacks 'situational awareness'.
Well all that assumes a direct cause and effect between actions and reactions, which is not what activity on current operations shows. What "First Week?"