Habitual association versus modularity

[Rifleman]

I'm sure no one doubts that there are advantages to each. At what level do we draw the line?

When I was active, brigades and above were considered modular. Battalions and below were really permanent teams, to the extent that a battalion commander would often get the same attachments each time a battalion combat team was formed.

Should this level change? Upward or downward?

Also, should we skip levels between habitual association at lower levels? For example: permanent platoons with permanent fire teams, but with the teams to be mixed and matched into modular squads? Or, permanent companies with permanent squads, but with the squads to be mixed and matched into modular platoons?

You get the picture. Where's the proper balance?

[Norfolk]

Well, this is an excellent issue to raise Rifleman.:)

First off, do what works in the situation you're in (we all agree on that as is). Secondly, maybe a general guideline for many situations might be to consider a Company as more or less permanent, but its constituent sub-units as more or less modular, though they may have a permanent structure for administrative purposes. Battalion and above, that could be more interesting. So, Thirdly, I am inclined to view the Battalion (or Battle Group when all the Combined Arms Atts and Dets are made) as best suited for modularity, especially with such routine attachments as Tank Companies, Artillery Batteries, Engineer Companies, etc., that render these sub-units practically more a part of said Battalion than the Rifle Companies that are routinely detached to other Battalions.

The Armored Cavalry Troop, Squadron, and Regiment (I'm thinking of 3rd ACR and a few of the Heavy Div Squadrons here) are often held up as an "ideal" Combined Arms tactical organization. Few would disagree with this. The only persistent problem that the Arm Cav has is a relative lack of Infantry, and when performing typical Arm Cav tasks, that's actually not a problem, since the Arm Cav is not normally intended to seize and hold ground in quite the same way as a Battalion or Brigade.

But for the Battalion to achieve something approaching the combined-arms excellence of the Arm Cav, the Combat Team concept may offer a useful modular approach to that ideal. Infantry Companies of a reasonable, but preferably modest size - such as what Wilf has been proposing - paired with Tank Companies along with AT and AA Sections, plus a Reconnaissance and an Engineer Platoon (each attached from Reconnaissance and Engineer Companies attached to the Battalion), to form Combat Teams, may be a way to achieve this. And back to the point about modest-sized, but nevertheless tactically effective (of course) Rifle Companies; with Companies of such a size, perhaps an Infantry Battalion could muster six such Rifle Companies for administrative purposes, plus a Weapons Company. For operations, however, it would cross-attach Companies with a Tank Battalion similarly organized. If, say, 3 Companies of each were so cross-attached, then the Infantry and Tank Battalions so involved could form 3 Combat Teams each, using habitually-attached Companies.

Or we could just reorganize Battalions permanently along the lines of Arm Cav Squadrons, but incorporating permanent Combat Teams of a Rifle Company and a Tank Company each. That would mean permanent relationships rather than either habitual attachment or modularity per se.

[William F. Owen]

I think the Australians have it about right, with permanently formed battle group HQs able to command 4-6 sub units as and when required. - so you just bolt on the Companies, Squadrons and Batteries as required. This is also pretty much the way the UK is going.

This is why I think sub unit doctrine is so critical and so under studied.

I do like the idea of near permanently formed Brigades as that's where you'd get your cap badge/tradition/culture from. - so a Brigade would be 4 Battle Group HQs, and then 16 Sub units.

IMO, currently a lot of sub-unit roles and TOE's do not make a whole lot of sense, bearing in mind the current progression of weapons and sensors, but that's another issue.

[Cavguy]

Or we could just reorganize Battalions permanently along the lines of Arm Cav Squadrons, but incorporating permanent Combat Teams of a Rifle Company and a Tank Company each. That would mean permanent relationships rather than either habitual attachment or modularity per se.

More later, but in the new US Army Heavy Brigade Combat teams, each Combined Arms Battalion (CAB) is 2x Armor Companies, 2x Inf Companies, and a Combat Engineer company - regardless of their infantry or armor titles.

Here's a good summary:


The four heavy BCTs are balanced combat organizations built around a brigade special troops battalion (BSTB), two combined arms maneuver battalions, a fires battalion, a reconnaissance squadron, and a brigade support battalion (BSB). The BSTB, contains the BCT headquarters and headquarters company (HHC), military intelligence and signal companies. The BSTB HHC contains the military police platoon, NBC platoon, medical platoon, support platoon, maintenance platoon, and all other attachments. The two balanced, combined arms, maneuver battalions are the BCT maneuver and close combat elements. They are modular in design, combining two Armor, two Infantry, one Engineer, and a forward support company with organic reconnaissance, snipers, mortars, and a fire support element. The reconnaissance squadron is responsible for conducting reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance and includes three ground troops equipped with M3 fighting vehicles and M1114s. The fires battalion is organized to provide responsive and accurate fire support using two batteries of self-propelled 155 mm howitzers, plus counter-fire radar for target acquisition. The brigade support battalion (BSB) is organized and equipped to sustain brigade operations and is organized around the BSB’s forward support companies.


The above pretty much lays down the new modular Heavy BCT's. Most of your comments seem based on knowledge of the Limited Conversion/Army of Excellence Division design, which is almost phased out. SBCT's and IBCT's have a different laydown, but have the same general structure of a recon bn, two maneuver bn's, a troops bn, fires bn, and a support bn.

As a final comment, in OIF my company tasked organized down to the platoon level, with four tank/infantry/engineer mixed platoons from a deployed task organization of two armor, one mech infantry, and a combat engineer platoon. More later on why.

[Norfolk]

The above pretty much lays down the new modular Heavy BCT's. Most of your comments seem based on knowledge of the Limited Conversion/Army of Excellence Division design, which is almost phased out. SBCT's and IBCT's have a different laydown, but have the same general structure of a recon bn, two maneuver bn's, a troops bn, fires bn, and a support bn.

As a final comment, in OIF my company tasked organized down to the platoon level, with four tank/infantry/engineer mixed platoons from a deployed task organization of two armor, one mech infantry, and a combat engineer platoon. More later on why.

I have been following not only the SBCT and IBCT, but also the HBCT as it develops, and have doubts. The perspective that I am coming from is informed by a few different things: 1. Coming from the Commonwealth, which does use some different tactical concepts; and 2. The new HBCT and its Heavy CAA Battalions seem a little understrength, especially considering that the Brigade reserve has to be formed out of hide and each of the two manoeuvre battalions only has two companies of tanks and infantry, respectively, to begin with. On the surface, it appears to be a case of stretching things a little too thinly - but I've never operated in such a Unit or Formation so that leaves me somewhat ill-equipped to comment on how it works in practice.

The US Army's preference for forming Company Teams by cross-attaching Tank and Infantry Platoons between Companies of the other Arm is different from the Commonwealth preference for pairing pure Companies of the two arms together to form a Combat Team when possible - different strokes for different folks - but we form Company Teams in the same manner as the US Army does when available forces render it impossible to form full-fledged Combat Teams. Even as far back as the 1950's, the Canadians would go so far as to form "Ploops" - a Rifle Platoon and a Tank Troop (Platoon) paired together - to perform infiltrations.

The problem with the Combat Team concept was that there often wasn't enough Armour to go around, so an Armoured Regiment or an Armoured/Mechanized Infantry Battalion would muster at most only 2 Combat Teams, leaving no Reserve at Battalion-level. The US Army Company Team concept (almost) always allows for a Reserve at Battalion-level. The HBCT and its two Heavy Combined Arms Battalions seem to impinge on that, as there is no third Battalion to form a Brigade Reserve; thus, companies from the two Battalions must be drawn off to form said Reserve. The 12-tube Arty Battalion also seems "light" - in fact, it almost seems "Pentomic" in concept.

Cavguy, the task organization that you mentioned, down to Platoon level within the Company, presumably finds a way around this - how?

[Cavguy]

I have been following not only the SBCT and IBCT, but also the HBCT as it develops, and have doubts. The perspective that I am coming from is informed by a few different things: 1. Coming from the Commonwealth, which does use some different tactical concepts; and 2. The new HBCT and its Heavy CAA Battalions seem a little understrength, especially considering that the Brigade reserve has to be formed out of hide and each of the two manoeuvre battalions only has two companies of tanks and infantry, respectively, to begin with. On the surface, it appears to be a case of stretching things a little too thinly - but I've never operated in such a Unit or Formation so that leaves me somewhat ill-equipped to comment on how it works in practice.

I have most of these same concerns. A recent study from the CTC's indicate that only one of 13 BCT's that came through the training center used its recon squadron for reconnaissance, the other 13 used it as an additional maneuver battalion. The HBCT has overall about 20% less assets than its predecessor in terms of manpower. However, we have basic task organization for the first time, and the engineers are embedded in the combat battalions, which is a plus. The good news is that the issue is not "settled", and the army is closely studying the perfomance of the new organizations and has promised to continue and improve them.



The problem with the Combat Team concept was that there often wasn't enough Armour to go around, so an Armoured Regiment or an Armoured/Mechanized Infantry Battalion would muster at most only 2 Combat Teams, leaving no Reserve at Battalion-level. The US Army Company Team concept (almost) always allows for a Reserve at Battalion-level. The HBCT and its two Heavy Combined Arms Battalions seem to impinge on that, as there is no third Battalion to form a Brigade Reserve; thus, companies from the two Battalions must be drawn off to form said Reserve. The 12-tube Arty Battalion also seems "light" - in fact, it almost seems "Pentomic" in concept.

Agreed on the reserve - it will be problematic, and the two up one back or one up two back standard maneuver formation for BCT's is essentially eliminated, and one or two companies must be pulled out of a CAB to form a reserve.

I would only add that the positive change is that maneuver BN's have four companies again, which adds a tremendous flexibility that the limited conversion model removed in the early 90's, when BN's all had four companies instead of three.

I assume the reduction in Arty is due to the new capabilites of PGM Bombs and precision MLRS (GMLRS) which don't need good weather - only a grid. The assumption of air dominance reigns. Also improvements in the M109A6 enables faster firing and quicker actions than in the past.


Cavguy, the task organization that you mentioned, down to Platoon level within the Company, presumably finds a way around this - how?

I wouldn't say it was a way around, it was my way as a commander to configure my assets in the way it made the most sense for the area, operations, and terrain. I'll break down what I did and why. Timeframe was Jan 2006.

Initial set on deployment (pure)-

1/B/2-37 AR(Red)- 4x M1A1, 18 Pax, (16 tankers, 1x mechanic, 1x medic)
3/C/1-36 IN (White) - 4x M2A2 (38 Infantrymen)
3/B/2-37 AR (Blue) - 2x M1A1, 2x M1114, 18 Pax, (16 tankers, 1x mechanic, 1x medic)
1/C/16th EN - (Green) 26 Pax (+med/mech)- 4x M113A3 with add-on slat armor and cupola.
HQ/B/2-37 - 2x M1114 + 1x M113A3(+)

Mission: Conduct security and stability operations in west Tal Afar, in a sector with approx 30,000 inhabitants at a 50/50 Sunni Shia (Turkomen, not Arab) mix.

Key Tasks:
1) Secure sector, defeat AIF forces, and enable host security forces and government to assume responsibility.
2) Maintain security of main supply route for BCT that ran through sector.

We were based in a company sized combat outpost, co-located with our partner IA BN HQ. Based on these missions, I initially allocated as follows:

Red - Route Security on MSR
White - Patrolling Ops
Blue - Patrolling Ops, secondary Route Security
Green - Patrolling Ops, secondary Route Security

for the first three months I maintained my Red and White Platoons pure, using the tankers on route security and the infantry as the default raid/search force due to their manpower. One platoon was constantly rotated into a base defense and maintenance cycle.

Blue and Green platoons presented a problem.

The tank platoon was essentially unable to dismount a sufficient force AND secure the vehicles that brought them there. The engineers had manpower but lacked firepower. I learned in OIF 1 that when under fire, you want a big gun available. To solve this problem, I task organized Blue and Green, so they looked like this:

2x M1A1, 2x M113A3(+), 20 pax. The platoon could mix platforms, and dismount a squad of up to 12 on the ground and continue to man vehicles for over watch and/or reaction in support of the dismounts. (All my tankers were cross-trained as dismounted infantry)

Over time this organization proved EXTREMELY flexible for the environment I was in. The units liked the mix too.

About three months in, I received an additional 9x M1114's to my company. At the same time, route security was turned over to IP's and IA's in the daytime, freeing my Red Platoon.

I was faced with a similar dilemma to the Blue/Green platoon - one hyper capable mech infantry platoon, and one under-capable dual purpose tank platoon. Based on my success, I task organized them as well.

So by May each platoon looked like the following:

Red - 23 pax, 1x M1A1, 2x M2A2, 3x M1114
White - 23 Pax, 1x M1A1, 2x M2A2, 3x M1114
Blue - 22 pax 2x M1A1. 2x M113, 2x M1114
Green - 22 pax 2x M1A1, 2x M113, 2x M1114
HQ - 2x M1114 (CO, 1SG), 1x M113 (XO and Jump CP)

Sometimes platoons (esp on base security duty) would loan/swap vehicles to cover for broken ones. HQ personnel (except for my crew) would rotate in and fill shortages in the line when guys went on leave. When I rolled, I used one of the platoons to secure me during negotiations and meetings. Often I would just accompany their patrols and observe.

My reserve once the three non-base defense platoons were comitted was a section from the base defense platoon, (it only took about half to supervise the security for a shift, due to augmentation from the Iraqi Army) I never ran into a fight that really needed more than two platoons in it in Iraq except during the Sadr rebellion in 2004.

With the additional wheeled assets we were able to shift from tracked to wheeled patrolling in most areas, which pleased the populace as the tracks were no longer tearing up the roads and knocking down power lines. As security improved, tanks/brads were replaced by HMMWV's, and the tracked vehicles could be brought in for psychological effect/information operations purposes. The PL's were granted the "menu" to configure their platoons for each patrol. It got to the point that the tanks rarely rolled, and the M113's typically were left behind (horrible ride, noisy, and really didn't have much extra protection over M1114 Frag Kit 5, truth be told). The M2's stayed employed because of their flexibility and firepower, but didn't often roll to friendly areas.

My PL's loved the flexibility, the soldiers of different MOS's bonded through working together, and the company operated much smoother.

I would never advocate this as a "right" answer, it was a solution that worked well in my particular AO and circumstance. On occasion, we un task-organized for some missions that needed a full infantry or engineer platoon. But for day to day ops, I found this organization best met the overall needs in Tal Afar 2006 given available forces. It wouldn't be appropriate for fighting the Fulda Gap, but I would organize different for that too, or Afghanistan. For example, we were never far from our base, so the M1's in Red/White couldn't be self-recovered without external support. If operating across long distances, I might have changed that.

To end on the discussion topic, every commander ideally needs flexibility of systems and weapons type into his task organization so he can adapt the organization to the challenge his situation presents. We need to avoid systems that force units into solutions rather than developing adaptive leaders and systems that can be employed in unique ways that the doctrine/MTOE writers didn't foresee. (Note I also cut four mechanics and four medics from the Company HQ to each platoon for emergency purposes)

[Ken White]

Or is that Yay! Recon!!!

Anyhow, Cav Guy said:
...A recent study from the CTC's indicate that only one of 13 BCT's that came through the training center used its recon squadron for reconnaissance, the other 13 used it as an additional maneuver battalion.

That's been a US Army problem since the end of WW II. At the tail end of the war, when we finally got Recon right just before the West Wall crumbled, it didn't have time to embed before it was high speed into and across Germany so the Euro-Centric Army never learned how to do it right. It was poor in Korea also and really poor in Viet Nam.

Both Irwin and Polk have always reported Recon as as Blue Force failing (yet, IIRC, the Blue forces generally reported that the OpFor at both places did a great job at Recon. That, is to say the least, odd. I thought we were supposed to learn from the CTC expereince...).

We have always paid the mission short shrift and, just as Humint is subordinated in value to 'technical means' all to often, we try to rely on technology instead of decently training AND equipping our Recon units.

The problem is, I think, branch warfare -- the Infantry doesn't understand Reconnaissance well and, in my time, USAIS did not teach it well. The capability existed in Infantry units from WW II forward but (and I speak from experience) very few Commanders knew how to use it or did use it. Since Infantry forms the bulk of committed maneuver forces. Even some tankers do not understand as much as they should about employment of Recon or Cav elements...

My son was recently in a BCT Cav Squadron. The BCT intended to employ it as maneuver element on an upcoming (now ongoing) deployment and his (and some others) complaints about such misuse fell on deaf ears at the Bde level. In earlier deployments (old TOE), he noted the same problem with the Scout Platoons at Battalion level.

That really needs to be fixed and a good Recon element can operate very effectively in COIN roles. In major combat, they're absolutely imperative -- unless one just wants to take casualties one need not take...

[Norfolk]

My PL's loved the flexibility, the soldiers of different MOS's bonded through working together, and the company operated much smoother.

I would never advocate this as a "right" answer, it was a solution that worked well in my particular AO and circumstance. On occasion, we un task-organized for some missions that needed a full infantry or engineer platoon. But for day to day ops, I found this organization best met the overall needs in Tal Afar 2006 given available forces. It wouldn't be appropriate for fighting the Fulda Gap, but I would organize different for that too, or Afghanistan. For example, we were never far from our base, so the M1's in Red/White couldn't be self-recovered without external support. If operating across long distances, I might have changed that.

To end on the discussion topic, every commander ideally needs flexibility of systems and weapons type into his task organization so he can adapt the organization to the challenge his situation presents. We need to avoid systems that force units into solutions rather than developing adaptive leaders and systems that can be employed in unique ways that the doctrine/MTOE writers didn't foresee. (Note I also cut four mechanics and four medics from the Company HQ to each platoon for emergency purposes)

Great post Cavguy!:D

If you could have, would there have been anything about what you had to work with, namely your Cav Troop, that you would like to have changed? Or was it just fine as is, and can be easily adapted for whatever mission (within reason) that you think you could have been tasked with? (Not including mission-specific outside attachments and the like).