The Advisory or Advisor Challenge [Archive]

SWJED

06-12-2007, 10:09 AM

Latest at the SWJ Blog - It's Time for an Army Advisor Corps (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/06/its-time-for-an-army-advisor-c/) by LTC John Nagl.

In the linked paper I argue that, just as the new realities of warfare demanded the creation of the Special Forces in the 1960's, winning the Long War will require that the Army develop a standing Advisor Corps. It has been informed by the experience of many advisors with service in Iraq and Afghanistan, and may prove of some interest to the Small Wars Journal / Small Wars Council community of interest.

"Institutionalizing Adaptation: It's Time for an Army Advisor Corps (http://www.newamericansecurity.org/publications/Nagl_AdvisoryCorp_June07.pdf)" was published by the Center for a New American Security.

The most important military component of the Long War will not be the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our allies to fight with us. After describing the many complicated, interrelated, and simultaneous tasks that must be conducted to defeat an insurgency, the new Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual notes “Key to all these tasks is developing an effective host-nation (HN) security force.” Indeed, it has been argued that foreign forces cannot defeat an insurgency; the best they can hope for is to create the conditions that will enable local forces to win for them…

Old Eagle

06-12-2007, 01:45 PM

Once again, Colonel Nagl offers an eloquent and persuasive piece on Long War requirements. Hopefully it will engender some meaningful discussion, not just a lot of head nodding.

With that in mind, I have problems with a tactically organized force structure being tasked to provide both "Title 10" type support while simultaneously being responsible for operations on the ground. Can the corps commander fulfill his force provider duties while deployed as an advisor to a minister of defense?

On the blog post, Rob Thornton offers the additional insight for including other JIIM players in the mix. This is also critical. Even if you limit the military involvement to advising security forces, that is still best done by full spectrum joint forces, augmented by civilian experts from other agencies. IMHO.

Jimbo

06-12-2007, 02:55 PM

In the Army it exists: It is called the AC/RC units that are set up to advise the ARNG. There has been heistatnce by the Army to deply regular Army AC/RC brigades and battalions to support the training mission. This has been done in limited numbers. What you have is a sturcture as brigade ready to cover down on an entire division. The upside is that when the unit isn't deployed, it is working with the ARNG. Working with the ARNG involves bringing expertise and recent TTP's to to training focused on tactical and administrative requirements. Granted the cultural and language differences are not close to being the same, but it still is enough to "keep your mind right". As far as JIIM, it is going to be 5 years at best beffore anything on the civilian side catches up in the capacity that we would like to see, and that is best case involving the upcoming election not screwing up needed legislation to make this happen.

Rob Thornton

06-12-2007, 04:07 PM

Hey Old Eagle, Jimbo,

Jimbo are you saying the AC/RC example is a good pattern for hashing out Title 10 turf? Or are you saying that AC/RC is the way to go for advising foreign security forces? It sounds like both.

I've seen one AC/RC unit deploy as MiTTs - 2nd IA DIV MiTT down to the BN level - we replaced them. They had some real challenges as they tried to figure out what was different from the methodology they used working with USARNG units and Iraqis. I think the gap may be too far to bridge and have them do both missions good enough.

I think the value of what LTC Nagl puts forward is that it is a "more" dedicated capability that balances creating units that do nothing but advisory work and hyper specialized with taskings that reach down in to MTO&E and TDA units where their primary missions are compromised. To me it asks the very important question of "How important is the training & use of host nation forces to reduce our global requirements in maintaining stability?" We need to decide that. Much like the Inter-Agency debate, and the debate over conventional war systems aquisitions, the problems we face now are going to influence how we spend our nickel. What is the best way to use the force structure increase? Is it just more BCTs which allow us to slow OPTEMPO for deploying BCTs in Iraq, or do we see the need for more BCTs to do more with in other places, and then we wind up with the same OPTEMPO? It becomes the proverbial self-licking ice cream cone.

The other side of the coin - that I think LTC Nagl is advocating is using those force structure gains as a more dedicated Combat Multiplier - both in the sense of developing Host Nation Security Forces, but also in the sense of what those soldiers bring to the MTO&E and TDA units when they return and are sent out into the Force. While LTC Nagle cites Iraq and Afghanistan for use of the Advisory course, but I think we need them beyond. This could become a core compentency and I don't know if adding it to the MTO&E units METL is a good idea. I'd have to go back, but what I'd like to see is a long enough tour in the advisory core to do perhaps a focused train up on the georgrpahical location they will be working before they deploy for a year. This might require a 2 year tour.

I understand that JIIM cooperation on any real scale is probably a ways out - I know you have been working it, but how much would it cost in reources to establish an HSOC (Home Station Operations Command) in say Riley or wherever home might be that is staffed by either Inter-Agency onesies and twosies or even contractors with Inter-Agency experience to work the connections back to OGAs, Regional CMDs and Embassies? How about some OGA experienced contractors who deploy with the HQs to work LNO issues on the ground? We're not talking about building Host Nation (DIE) capacity yet, we're talking about connectors and wheel grease.

For the Title 10 stuff - I thnk once they deploy they work for the Regional CDR or his designated CDR - you can't have unity of command any other way.

Hopefully will resolve the Inter-Agency piece fully without another 9/11, but I don't know. I guess you can tell what is really important to somebody based on how they spend their money. I guess that is what we're asking, what is really important?

Regards Rob

Ski

06-12-2007, 04:53 PM

Perhaps someone can chime in on why Special Forces units in the Gan were more concerned about direct action missions, and not these missions, which to me seem to fall under FID, which is a SF core competency...?

Rob Thornton

06-12-2007, 05:19 PM

Ski, I'd say its a question of having enough SOF, and how expensive it is to grow SOF capabilities that are more then just numbers. Our SOF are executing a growing number of DA missions that require time and effort to train and plan, but are also so important (HVT) that to increase the margin of success we have assigned them to a SOF unit. FID/Advisory missions also take resources and are also growing. We can't grow SOF fast enough or big enough with enough QA/QC to ensure we get relevant SOF capabilities so you are left with having conventional forces doing parts pieces to make up the delta, or not doing the missions at all - its a tough choice. A SOF soldier is a huge investment - a very worthwhile one, but a big investment if we are talking about people. Having said that, it would seem a lot more jobs feel more like "special" or "irregular" and less like "conventional".

On that note, I'd point out that serving as an advisor offers a pretty good investment strategy. All the qualities that are emphasized as leadership traits, and the skill sets we say we need such innovation, mental agility, flexibility, etc. are cultivated on advisory duty. It was on par with CMD as both the most professionally rewarding and professionally influencing assignment I've had. It fundamentally altered the way I view training, equipping, and fighting because it afforded me another perspective of the enemy I had not had. It also offered me immersion in another culture under fire - important I think since we fight mostly away games. The benefits of having as many soldiers afforded this opportunity I think cannot be overstated, as they rotate back into the force they will bring the experience of how indigenous security forces deal with problems from a long term perspective vs. a CF unit rotation. This is critical to understanding long term reasons for conflict and identifying and solving potential problems we might create prior to them having an adverse effect on operations. It also helps unit CDRs understand when something is really an operational problem vs. an operational condition. Further it forges ties at the grass roots which will pay off long after an advisor leaves for home.

John T. Fishel

06-12-2007, 07:16 PM

Hi Rob and Ski--

Rob certainly has a part of the story but there is more to it.

Part 1: SF, since its founding, has not less than 3 esthos, based on the dominant mission of particular groups. 10th SFG was founded to conduct UW behind Soviet lines in ways similar to the Jedburg and other OSS/SOE teams in WWII. Training partisans was their thing. 5th SFG made its name in Vietnam where it conducted mucho direct action (DA) missions. The high point of its history was the Son Tay Raid - DA all the way. 7th SFG focused largely on LATAM and the FID mission; it was highly successful in El Salvador. All the other groups fall somewhere in between dpending on their peacetime and wartime experience. My sense is that 3rd Group is pretty close to 7th based on discussions with them during Operation Uphold Democracy. In any event, SF reflects many of the divisions within the regular forces on the best way to fight COIN. Obviously, it is far more complex but I really suspect that Group ethos is reflected in the degree to which particular SF Groups are more enemy or population centric in Kilcullen's approach/

Part 2: During Vietnam the JFK Special Warfare Center (JFKSWC) ran a military advisors course called MATA. At the same time, MI had a well received program for Foreign Area Specialists (FAS). General Sam Wilson, an intel guy and SF who commanded JFKSWC noticed that FAS and MATA each had 3 components, two of which were common to both programs - language and in-country training. FAS had a masters degree as its third element while MATA had the advisors course. In Wilson's mind the masters program would be good for advisors and the advisors course would be good for the intel types. So he combined the programs as FAO with the important caveat that either the masters or advisors (now FAO) course could be waived without prejudice. This workded pretty well until 1986 when General Bill Odom (any relation Tom?) made a play to bring FAO under MI. He didn't get it but the enhanced FAO program dropped the FAO course making it practically the same as the old FAS program. The result - along with OPM 21 - was to take the non-SF community out of the advisor business almost completely.

And, then, along came Iraq and Afghanistan....

Cheers

JohnT

Rob Thornton

06-12-2007, 07:20 PM

Hey Ski,
I left something out in answering your question. The advisory mission in Iraq is a little different then the tradional FID mission assigned to ODAs. I think our idea of what FID is has morphed from say building an indigenous capability in say OEF 1 or maybe as a guerilla force that compliments U.S. forces operating in the area to one of building a force capable of functioning independently and indefinately to meet host nation security needs. Jedburgh could shed allot of light on the changing role of FID, if in fact there is one.

However, look at the advisory team composition changes as proposed by LTC Nagl:

Advisor Team Composition
Team Leader
Team NCOIC
Team Adjutant
S1 NCOIC
Team Intelligence Offi cer
Team Intel Sergeant
Team Intel Specialist
Team Ops Offi cer
Team Ops Sergeant
Team Logistics Offi cer
Team Logistics Sergeant
Team Medical Offi cer
Team Medical Sergeant
Team Light Wheel Mechanic
Infantry Squad (Personal Security
Detachment/Infantry Trainers)
Total Strength: 25

It is different from an ODA. This composition has a heavy influence on developing the staff capabilities that sustain, synchronize and focus combat operations.

Below is an excerpt from the JP on FID

From Joint Publication 3-07.1 (http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_07_1.pdf)
Joint Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures for
Foreign Internal Defense (FID)

Commensurate with US policy goals, the focus of all US foreign
internal defense (FID) efforts is to support the host nation’s
(HN’s) program of internal defense and development (IDAD).
These national programs are designed to free and protect a nation
from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency by emphasizing
the building of viable institutions that respond to the needs of
society. The most significant manifestation of these needs is likely
to be economic, social, informational, or political; therefore, these
needs should prescribe the principal focus of US efforts. The
United States will generally employ a mix of diplomatic,
economic, informational, and military instruments of national
power in support of these objectives. Military assistance is often
necessary in order to provide the secure environment for the
above efforts to become effective.

Regards, Rob

Rob Thornton

06-12-2007, 07:24 PM

Wow John, I just got smarter:) I was writing while you were posting. I did not know the history behind it - seems like we always manage to short sheet ourselves. Regards, Rob

Steve Blair

06-12-2007, 08:32 PM

Hi Rob and Ski--

Rob certainly has a part of the story but there is more to it.

Part 1: SF, since its founding, has not less than 3 esthos, based on the dominant mission of particular groups. 10th SFG was founded to conduct UW behind Soviet lines in ways similar to the Jedburg and other OSS/SOE teams in WWII. Training partisans was their thing. 5th SFG made its name in Vietnam where it conducted mucho direct action (DA) missions. The high point of its history was the Son Tay Raid - DA all the way. 7th SFG focused largely on LATAM and the FID mission; it was highly successful in El Salvador. All the other groups fall somewhere in between dpending on their peacetime and wartime experience. My sense is that 3rd Group is pretty close to 7th based on discussions with them during Operation Uphold Democracy. In any event, SF reflects many of the divisions within the regular forces on the best way to fight COIN. Obviously, it is far more complex but I really suspect that Group ethos is reflected in the degree to which particular SF Groups are more enemy or population centric in Kilcullen's approach/
The 5th started out doing quite a bit of advising work for the CIA (if memory serves) with the Montagnards in Vietnam and earlier in Laos with some of the elements there. It was after Operation Switchback in 1965 that they got more into DA, but that was due to pressure from the Army at large who saw the CIDG program (and others) as a quick source for light infantry and not a local defense force as originally envisioned by the CIA (and most likely the 5th Group as well). And, of course, once SOG got ramped up (and the Greek programs run directly by the 5th Group) they got hauled heavily into DA and never looked back.

John T. Fishel

06-12-2007, 09:10 PM

Steve and Rob--

As Rob says, "I've [just] learned something.":) Again, there is nearly always more to the story. That said, why do we keep having to learn the same lessons over and over?:mad:

Rob, look at John's proposal: it is an adaptation of an ODA (which in turn was an adaptation of an OSS/SOE concept. These things need to be adapted because one size does NOT fit all. Still, a good idea is one that can be modified to fit different circumstances.

Cheers

JohnT

hostagecow

06-13-2007, 12:17 AM

I was embedded as a journalist with a Marine MiTT advisor team near Habbaniyah, Iraq in 2006 and was shocked by the lack of logistical support for the team and the slapdash nature of their preparation. They were the best group of Marines I'd ever seen in operation but they were desperately short of gear and support. Nagl's concept should be adopted asap.

Ski

06-13-2007, 09:10 PM

Tom Odom

06-14-2007, 03:12 PM

Thanks for the info.

I still believe that SF - not SOF - but SF, should be used to train indiginous forces as a primary mission.

The DA stuff should be left to the Rangers, MARSOC and other black SOF elements. If we need more DA capabilities, it seems to this treadhead that it would be easier to grow them (what is the difference between these SOF elements and the Marine Raiders/Army Rangers of WWII?) then Special Forces capabilities, which are admittedly much more difficult to grow.

It's very interesting to see the history behind how DA has been incorporated into the SF Groups...but I wonder if it really the way it should be.

Then again, no one asked my opinion! LOL!

Just finished working a long project on advisors and thanks to guys on here it will soon be out. But in the course of that effort, I had an in-depth conversation with a senior officer who was a key player in the MiTT effort in Iraq. We agreed that yes this is an SF mission but SF is not built on the scale necessary to get the job done. As for RC components taking on the mission, they just do not have the correct tools for the job. They are structured to train conventional reserve units in conventional tactics and they share the same culture. And culture is bar none the key consideration in whether one of these advisory efforts works or fails. I see the need for an advisor functional area like FAO that adds a greater manpower pool to those available for such duties--AND THEN REWARDS THEM FOR IT. Forgive the caps but without rewards, this goes no where beyond the ever growing stack of good idea PPT presentations.

Best

Tom

Old Eagle

06-14-2007, 03:29 PM

Spot on. However, the effort has to be HUGE, based on the magnitude of the mission. Not just in Iraq and Afghanistan, but many other locations now and in the future.

Good luck.

I'd like to see what your presentation looks like. Maybe a PM?

MASON

06-15-2007, 02:07 PM

What will the umbrella organization look like?

This seems like a Dept of State mission in some ways and a military mission in others. ??? Civil affairs work with Agricultural, Police, engineering, educational, medical , business and financing etc expertise required depending upon situation faced locally. Long term 5-10 yr + assignments.

John T. Fishel

06-15-2007, 04:09 PM

I finally had a chance to read all of John's monograph. It is, as always, thought provoking and imaginative. As I noted in an earlier post, the advisor team is an adaptation of an SFODA, OSS?SOE Jedburghs and Ops Groups. I have no real quarrel with its size or general composition - I'd probably add a commo specialist in trade for something else. And, like SF, I'd work hard to see that team members were cross trained.

I do have several concerns at the higher levels of command. First, combat advisors are not solely and Army function. Marines, sailors, airmen all act as advisors. The guys from other services all made major contibutions to the MILGP El Salvador advisory effort and two of the three advisors who died in El Sal were from the Navy and the AF. So, perhaps, the advisor corps should be a joint activity.

I also think that much of the expertise - especially the institutionalized expertise - is found in the sOF community. FID is an SF mission but there are not enough SF to do it all, as John points out. Thus, I think that proponency for the advisor corps ought to be in USSOCOM - perhaps delegated to SF Command - and the organizational structure built around a sub-unified command concept. This would both give it joint capabilities and an education/training structure where the expertise - including basic language - resides.

For the army, then combat advisor would be a specialty with all the promotion opportunities that John recommends.

TROUFION

06-15-2007, 05:01 PM

Don't know if it has been mentioned before but inside MARSOC is the FMTU-foriegn military training unit. The structure is based on SF, the missions are designed for operating everywhere except Afghanistan and Iraq, I think they are conventionally minded currently but the structure and trainingcould be shifted. Unfortunately I don't know that much about them, it is too new to have any real history.

FascistLibertarian

06-15-2007, 05:10 PM

Hello
I have read the article. I personally think it is a good idea. I have a few questions (feel free ignore them if they are pointless).

1) Would the Corps deploy with all 3 divisions or would they have 1 division at a time deployed?
2) Where are the people who speak the native language going to come from and how would they fit into the structure? (ie this would vary depending one where the Corps was deployed)
3) Does anyone think if this works a reconstruction corps would be a good idea? (for winning hearts and minds and for construction).
4) Do you think a smaller model (brigade or battalion size) could work for smaller countries? (im thinking the Anglo-Sphere).

I really enjoyed the article!

Rob Thornton

06-15-2007, 05:19 PM

This seems like a Dept of State mission in some ways and a military mission in others. ??? Civil affairs work with Agricultural, Police, engineering, educational, medical , business and financing etc expertise required depending upon situation faced locally. Long term 5-10 yr + assignments.

I think what we are discussing is really just the Military or Security Force aspects of what might be a larger effort. In itself that is a very large question and a departure of magnitude. Consider that LTC Nagle is advocating using at least part of the force increase to sustain an Advisory Corps, while maintaining fill levels of the BCTs. This is a big idea in and of itself.

Security (derived from some flavor) is a pre-condition to stability, There is nothing to say that the Army Advisory Corps could not become a component of a DIME effort, but it does not have to fulfill (nor is it organized to) the other DIE advisory functions. Even if you assigned it to them it is unlikely they could meet the requirements of advising in areas they are untrained to, or un-trainable to - ex. agriculture engineering, etc. That does not mean you could plug those into the COCOM, or under the umbrella of the COCOM's designated hitter. I do think there are certain functions that can benefit from being Joint, and inter-agency, but to do so makes the manning issue harder since the other services and agencies may not be getting the backfills required to maintain the parent organizations needed to meet their other missions.

If we are talking outside of known points (Iraq and Afghanistan) I think the first thing might be to do a macro assessment on the state we are assisting to determine what needs work to bring about sustained stability and then tailor the advisory assistance package to meet those needs. The assessment could be done by the diplomatic mission since they have the on the ground long term relationship and the resident DIME expertise to do so (if lacking they could request augmentation to do the assessment), then sent up to have it approved. The parts of the package could then generated and sent out in an advisory TF sort of package with a clear CoC that kept it headed in the right direction.

Our (the Military's) first step should be in determining how we are going to meet the request. Will it be from an established organization with the capability to train, equip and organize for success? Or will it be on an ad-hoc basis that tasks and is seen as temporary? I think the difference is between swimming and treading water. I think it largely depends on if we believe that we are going to be advising the host nation forces of failed, failing or reborn states to help them regain or sustain security and stability in order to prevent groups like Hamas, Hezbollah and AQ from establishing sanctuaries and recruiting grounds for further terrorist activities, and subversion that leads to instability.

If we believe that this is as critical a mission as almost any other then we might expend the effort, if we believe that more BCTs can do the job as well by either tasking for personnel and equipment, or by adding to their METL, then we will probably go that way.

The level of importance we place on the means to achieve the ends will determine how we spend the money. We need to ensure that however the additonal troop increase is used, it helps the military (in this case largely the Army - within the context of the article) meet the strategic policy goals set forth by the U.S. Government

John T. Fishel

06-15-2007, 05:28 PM

There is another issue here and that is: would the Army really be willing to create an advisor corps on its own? The Army has gotten rid of Rangers and almost did SF in until El Sal came along and saved it. What would have happened without Cohen-Nunn, SO-LIC, and USSOCOM under GEN Jim Lindsey, I shudder to think about. And the costs of the "enhanced" FAO program have been significant resulting in less advisor capability than before "enhancement."

This is what brings me to the idea of SF proponency - JFKSWC has the training skills - and a sub-unified command of SOCOM. Many of the ideas John proposed derive from the old Security Assistance Force concept and its development as a FID Augmentation Force (FIDAF) concept. Putting this together with a PRT and a JFC with JTFs makes some sense to me.

Rob Thornton

06-15-2007, 06:28 PM

John,
Spot on. I thought about it, but decided I'd edge around it indirectly. Service cultures are not known to make big departures - it has to do with not getting it too far wrong, even if it means giving up something that might get it right. To get LTC Nagl's proposal (and the logical extensions of it) taken seriously, will require us to decide what is really important to us in terms of capabiliites that match not only existing requirements, but deciding on which future requirements are most likely. You have to measure what you get by investing in more of the known quantities, vs. the semi-experimental. A couple of bonuses to an organization such as an Advisory Corp would be its utility, Inter-Agency flexibility, potential as a combat multiplier, the rotational commitment (i.e. its not a either-or seperate branch, but rather a new skill set) and that the mission strengthens the skills of the individual in ways that will benefit MTO&E & TDA units - there are somethings you cannot build any other way in as condensed a period as when you immerse someone.

John T. Fishel

06-16-2007, 01:30 AM

Hi Rob--

I hope that nobody is mistaking my point - you certainly are not - for I do believe that John Nagl's proposal has merit. I just don't think that the Army as an institution will buy it and I believe that an advisor corps is inherently a joint organization. Moreover, USSOCOM, in its Title 10 institutional role, seems to be the ideal vehicle to raise, train, and equip the advsor corps force. SOCOM, in that role, also has the clout to force the services to support with manpower and common equipment. It was, in part, I believe the power that USSOCOM wielded that provided the impetus for the creation of SF branch. (I could be wrong on this but it seems a logical deduction for a partial explanation.)

The sub-unified command proposal that I made in the previous post would be crafted from Nagl's structure with modifications to fit both the joint nature of the beast and the input of both the SOF and conventional communities. It is a really interesting prospect and 20k is not all that many troops.

Cheers

JohnT

Rob Thornton

06-16-2007, 02:33 PM

Hey John,
yep, I knew where you were headed. The good thing about SOCOM is they seem more flexible in their mainstream thinking. However unless you are talking about ear-marking increases for an Advisory Corps you'd probably get resentment and foot dragging, especially if we're talking about putting them under a different service HQs (well in that they get their own budget anyway). That would really spark resistance and probably raise more civil-military tension.
I would like to see Joint, it would provide a base of skills sets that we cannot provide. I would like to see Inter-Agency for the same reason. I think that may have to be more of an external decision though, since its unlikely that any of the services are going to want to pony up (historically), particularly one that sees itself as giving up the lionshare of people. If the U.S. were to pursue that, then it might be a reasonable idea to just go ahead and look at Trufioun's proposal and make a new entity with all the capabilities we'd mentioned. The downside we'd mentioned before (starting from scratch can be awfully hard), but the up side would be allowing the services to preserve their lanes, and their people (right after a few had been lifted), and the new organization would have its own budget, you can design it from the ground up with civil-military functions, and it walks in with a semi-clean slate. Expensive up front though, very expensive - plus ugly $$$$ fights on the Hill - plus you would not gaurentee Joint, or Inter-Agency - just another 3 letter agency/organization.

I go back to the need to define the problem as one that is not going away, but will expand (?), gain consensus about a solution, and then provide some clear guidance about who provides what to whom for how long, etc. There needs to be (and there may already be) a dialogue between the ends, ways and means legs of the stool. It may be for the reasons that we discussed that SOCOM is the way to go, but it would be a big rock in their rucksack, and some of the other services would probably see themselves as losing needed resources to fulfill their missions.

For simplicity's sake, I can see an argument for LTC Nagl's pitch "as is" because there is not allot of wake to it since the Army gets its folks back and benefits. I'd also say they are currently fielding the bulk of the numbers (not proportionally, just sheer numbers) because they have the mass to absorb it (even though its a tasker to many units). It may also be easier given the exposure of senior leaders to OIF and OEF to understand and implement a big step like this, without requiring direction from the Hill, but rather an OK - in the Title 10 wiggle room. I don't think they'd get as much pushback from the other services since this is a resource intensive proposal. It also has what I see as a huge benefit of increasing the skill set and maturity of the individual soldiers as they rotate through. The loss however is the other BCTs form the increase.

If we start doing the math of how much it will take to form, equip, train & sustain the additional BCTs vs. the value raised by doing I think we'll have the stuff decisions are made from. I think there is a solid argument that an Army Advisory Corps would be a very efficient and effective way to meet important current and emerging needs, increase the proficiency of the force through individual experience and training, and be able to focus limited monies to reset the existing BCTs with their equipment. The mission benefits because it is institutionalized and becomes a part of professional development, the MTO&E & TDAs win because they have predictability and focus. In those regards it also sounds pretty safe as a way not to get our capabilities sturcture too far wrong.

John T. Fishel

06-16-2007, 04:31 PM

Rob--

I appreciate your argument and if the Army would buy in, I'd support it. My problem is that, without a major change in the players in key decision roles, I don't see it happening. Just too much for the institutional Army. The changes required to make it happen would be GEN Petraeus and those who think like him as CSA, VCSA, TRADOC Cdr, CAC Cdr, FORSCOM Cdr, etc and people who think like them succeeding them for at least a decade. Then, there are the legitimate claims of the conventional force Army that would have to be balanced.

For a start from scratch approach to work, I think that, like Goldwater-Nichols, it would have to be imposed on the military services by the Congress. And I don't see any Barry Goldwaters, Sam Nunns, Bill Cohens, et. al. in any positions of Congressional leadership. The current Democrats won't buy in because they suffer from the Vietnam/Iraq syndrome in spades as do the current Republicans to only a slightly lesser extent

So, where does that leave us? Looking for a home and incremental development of the advisor capability in ways that will institutionalize it.

On that cheery note....:cool:

JohnT

Rob Thornton

06-16-2007, 05:18 PM

Hey John,
I just wanted us to lay out all the challenges so it would not remain just a really cool theoretical "what if we" sort of idea. I think we have pretty well done that & thanks for taking us there.

I think you have raised the best question though - Do we have the strategic leadership required to be both diagnostic and prognositic in our approach to problem solving?

History would point out that without strategic leadership in our GOs/Flags, Congress and President we run the risk of passing on truly innovative thinking (designed to redirect resources in meaningful ways that solve the correct problems) whereas a lack of strategic leadership can often focus on the reasons why we should preserve the status quo (rice bowls, etc.) and continue to apply reources in the same ways toward the same ends. Strategic Leadership is the catalyst by which challenge our original assumptions, assessments and make course corrections to put us out in front.

Must be lunch:D

regards, Rob

Bill Moore

06-17-2007, 03:27 PM

I think Nagel is on the right track, but I for one have not been impressed with the Army’s and Marine’s approach to training and advising programs to date. For the most part, although there are exceptions, their performance has been substandard. Any approach we develop must be based on the force we have, not the force we which we had. For example:

1. We have very few strategic corporals (or equivalents) in our ranks.
2. Our soldiers/marines come from an technologically advanced society, that makes it much harder for the kids today to emphasize with their developing nation counterparts.
3. Our soldiers/marines today also come from such an extremely liberal society that we’re an aberration to much of the developing world, which is clinging hard to its traditional values (some argue the reason for the current fight), which makes it very difficult for our soldiers to understand cultural norms in developing nations.

I think the secret to making Nagel’s proposal work is selection and training. The only unit remaining that has the professional culture, doctrine, selection process, and training to support developing capable foreign trainers and advisors is the Army's Special Forces, but they have limitations based on their size and other missions, so it is necessary to assume that the conventional army should be able perform the training and advisory role.
I think that would be a fair assumption if:

1. Soldiers and Marines were specially selected for this mission.
2. Then they were trained and equipped to do the mission (not some shake and bake program)
3. They had a supporting chain of command focused on this mission (which we do)

I have seen it too many times where young conventional soldiers and marines working with foreign troops become quickly frustrated, because their training didn’t prepare them for what to expect, or simply they were the wrong person to put in that position. They end up accusing the local soldiers of being stupid because they don't speak English, can't shoot their weapons well, and they have no maintenance systems or skills, etc. Not only does the training fall way short of expectations, we end up creating a bad impression of Americans in the eyes of the soldiers being trained, yet these same American kids will perform adequately soldiers with their American peers, because they're a culturally integrated package operating trained to perform that role. It isn’t the kid that failed, rather we failed to prepare the kid to execute the mission.

Assuming the Army would support Nagel’s proposal I think the key to success is personnel selection. While the Special Forces assessment process works well, it is much too rigorous for what we're attempting to build (we need a lot of soldiers and marines not an elite few), because we would end up weeding out several potentially great advisors who may not have the athletic ability or mental/physical toughness to be an unconventional warrior behind enemy lines. The key is identifying what we’re looking for, and then determining how to assess for it. It will probably be based more personality based than physical skills.

Then we have to develop a training program. This sounds easy, but if you look at much our training has evolved in recent years, you’ll realize it is a big leap to all the sudden being placed in some north African nation with a battalion of poorly equipped troops, no designated training ranges, etc. You need guys and gals that can solve problems, and work in far less than ideal conditions.

I don’t think the Army will raise to the occasion, and they’ll fight hard to avoid forming an advisor unit, so we need an interim measure in the short run, and I think that answer may be providing a cadre of training and advisor leaders, who probably for the most part would hail from the senior ranks of Special Forces Officers, Warrant Officers and NCOs. They would work through, by, and with designated conventional forces as the leaders for their advisor units. For this to work, they would have to be placed in key leadership positions.

Another option, perhaps cheaper and more effective is going back to contractors. I worked with MPRI at my side more than once, and my experience was very positive. This gives our nation the capability to rapidly surge and contract the size of the advisory force as needed, based on the threat.

Just some thoughts on the way ahead.

Rob Thornton

06-17-2007, 04:19 PM

Bill, great points

Then we have to develop a training program. This sounds easy, but if you look at much our training has evolved in recent years, you’ll realize it is a big leap to all the sudden being placed in some north African nation with a battalion of poorly equipped troops, no designated training ranges, etc. You need guys and gals that can solve problems, and work in far less than ideal conditions.

There is also something said to providing these teams with the mechanisms for obtaining resources. This would be a much larger scale then the previous efforts. We're talking about both self sustaining resources, and resources provided to the HN rather for training or fighting.

One of the problems we had on the MiTT was the $$$ assigned to us by quantity and type were for conventional units living on a FOB (TIF and OMA), not a TT living on a remote site embedded with its HN unit. While we had access to PRC funds, the approval process was convoluted and as such untimely. TTs are not resourced the way ODAs were. We wound up having to either scavage through the CF FOB dump (you'd be surprised what you can find and carry out with a Kraz 7.5t), or going and making a case to the MSC who was forced to weigh those priorities against his units. The MSC often came through, but he had to make some hard choices and that ate up time.

Take that and consider how an effort that sends lots of teams to remote locations across the globe and you start to see the fiscal authority these teams are going to need. You could say we'll move stuff by TRANSCOM all the time, but that only gets you so far - probably not enough lift unless you constrain yourself to certain regions with the required infrastructure. You could go commercial, but even that is only going to get you so far in many cases. You can purchase locally, but that raises some interesting issues such as contracting and all the headaches that go with it. This also points to the need of a study that considers the logistical impacts of adopting this in the robust manner we are discussing - certainly the LOG & C2 makes it a Joint issue.

The organization is going to have to be built and resourced with that in mind. Part of it comes with selecting agile thinkers who can solve problems in ways that match their conditions. Part of it comes with the parent organization understanding that this is not a side show or distraction, but requires a great deal of authority commensurate to its responsibility.

The beauty in this from an operational perspective would be an in place organization to provide insights back to mainstream Army or the SOF community for related operations.

To set this up right requires acknowledgement that this is a critical part of GWOT and should be resourced in all areas accordingly. This requires a departure from the way we like to see ourselves and our role on the battlefield. Advisory work done right is hard and its requires as good as leadership and people as any other job on the battlefield. It also requires resourcing more in line with an ODA then a rifle company. Nobody should have any illusions, we'd be putting these teams into austere conditions where they will face disease, sub-standard living conditions, sub-standard (by FOB standards) Force Protection, threats & isolation, and a host of other threats main stream Army does not usually have to deal with as KBR usually either beats us there or arrives as soon as the $$$ is allocated. These teams will have to be comfortable living with each other and immersed in foreign cultures without either going crazy, jeopardizing the mission or both. They will have to be able to move between the conventional and the unconventional with relative ease.

The upside is we circulate through the force team members who are not only technically and tactically proficient, but emotionally tough problem solvers who can lead under the most challenging of conditions. To me this is more akin to a revolution then any NCW type application - we would be challenging the conventional mindset we have cherished as a model of success for so long.

Rob Thornton

06-17-2007, 04:52 PM

Also from Bill

I have seen it too many times where young conventional soldiers and marines working with foreign troops become quickly frustrated, because their training didn’t prepare them for what to expect, or simply they were the wrong person to put in that position. They end up accusing the local soldiers of being stupid because they don't speak English, can't shoot their weapons well, and they have no maintenance systems or skills, etc. Not only does the training fall way short of expectations, we end up creating a bad impression of Americans in the eyes of the soldiers being trained, yet these same American kids will perform adequately soldiers with their American peers, because they're a culturally integrated package operating trained to perform that role. It isn’t the kid that failed, rather we failed to prepare the kid to execute the mission.

We need to ask ourselves what type of training is required to ensure success for a mission like this with all of its austereness, and unpredictability. We need to ask how long it will take, and based on the demands for teams, how much throughput must we generate?

I think a good starting place is SFAS & Q-Course models vs. say a Ranger School approach. I'm not sure it needs to be an exact template, but it does need to consider the approach it uses to build moral strength and resolve in individuals while also building an understanding of what a small team is and how important each individual on that small team is. Then have a portion of the training that takes the skill set that individual already has and modifies it to working on a small team that is going out to build and advise larger HN organizations. No, we probably should not be trying to build SFers - if it were that easy to get that quality in the required quantity, we'd probably already done it. Its not. So what we need is something to transform mindsets of conventional soldiers used to operating in mainstream Army organizations into an unconventional mindset of the type required to succeed on a small team with little access to the things we take for granted in the conventional one. We're talking mental & spiritual over physical. We want guys who believe in their decisions and will take initiative on big issues, but are still well grounded enough to move back and forth. The benefit would be you only have to attend this part of the training once in your career, after that all you'd show up for is the team building events and the events which prepare you either for a new role on the team, or the focused training to prepare you for the area you will operate in.

I'd say a cadre at the course probably made up of PMCs with advisory or SF backgrounds would probably be the most cost effective way to do it with ARSOF so busy. The S3 of the school could be either a contractor or green suiter with the same background. The S3 would fall up under a BDE (Adv Training BDE) charged with a training, but the green suit BDE CDR would report to the green suit Advisory Corps CDR.

Bill Moore

06-17-2007, 05:13 PM

Rob,

Great points, and I didn't want to touch the systems yet, but you're absolutely correct. If we don't have pots of money and authorities for these guys, they won't be set up for success. Additionally they would have to get a priority mission status with TRANSCOM, or be given enough money to do it via contract air. Having worked a number of projects with the State Department, they have cracked the code for using contract air/sea to move military equipment. However, as we have all been stating, this is a complete break with the current Army culture. That is why I reluctantly think contractors might be the better option, at least in the short term. The Army will do studies on this for 10 years, then come up with a solution that would have worked 10 years ago:)

Rob Thornton

06-17-2007, 07:57 PM

Hey Bill, I hear you, but I think we'd be hurting ourselves

That is why I reluctantly think contractors might be the better option, at least in the short term. The Army will do studies on this for 10 years, then come up with a solution that would have worked 10 years ago

That is the appeal of using contractors in roles you might ought to be using green suiters - it makes it appear as though you don't have to make any tough choices or changes, just .ppt deep ones. In truth you cede a great deal of authority and preserve organizational aspects that probably need to change - and you become more resistant to change. With PMCs you also basically lease without an option to own - and before long you get physically and psychologically addicted to the PMC option.

In this case of going with PMCs there'd be a huge employment opportunity for green suiters - many of them would be the very talent you hoped to preserve in the uniformed services. I would not be surprised to see attractive presentations from the PMCs on how they can do this better for less, I only hope before we buy into a Vegas show, we consider that the price is much heftier then just the cover charge.

I'm OK for using PMCs for limited tasks that have either an expiration date until you can grow your own, or because the shelf life and scope of the task are limited, but if you have identified a mission that indicates a major change, you need to grow the capability to sustain it with outsourcing. Advisory functions could quickly become a core competency. It also provides the type of experiences we say are required in our uniformed soldiers for this long war no matter if we are talking on an advisory team or in a conventional unit, the soldiers, sailors and marines responsible for the tactical end of this war require these skills.

I was just going over the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism. Here is a fantastic quoute lifted from the Exec Summary on pg. 8

"It remains vital that the United States, our allies and partners face this enemy with a force of intelligent, and culturally attuned professionals. Now is the time to invest in the human capital needed to combat this enemy for the coming decades."

If that is not a mandate for change, then it should not have been included.

Regards, Rob

jonSlack

06-18-2007, 11:50 AM

Developing a professional national military capable of defending its borders and providing internal security is necessary in the development of a functional state. However, it is a long term program that will take a decade or more in each place it is started. What do you do in the near term to provide security and allow for a political system to development free from disruption from groups like the Taliban in Afghanistan and the former Baathists, AQI, and Shiite militias in Iraq? Relying solely on foreign troops to provide the security and combat the anti-government groups poses problems while employing the new military too quickly can have equally disasterous results such as mass desertions.

There needs to be another option, a way to quickly raise and employ domestic forces to combat insurgents and terrorists and provide security. My inspiration for this idea are the units created by the British such as Queen Victoria's Corps of Guides in India. Basically, these units would consist of local nationals who are NCO'd and officered by American or other coalition advisors and paid and equipped by the coalition nations and fall under the chain of command of coalition leadership. The forces would be raised and centered in the geographic area where each force is recruited from, similar to a militia or national guard. The long term end state of these units is to either integrate them into the host country's professional military or disband them once the new professional military and other security forces are fully functional. Also, there should be a mechanism for volunteers to move from the "intermediate" forces to the professional military if they desire.

I think we are already seeing this half happening now in Anbar and possibly other parts of Iraq where Iraqis are being supplied if they agree to go after AQI. But again, what is happening now appears to be only a 50% solution, there needs to exist an advisory organization for taking control and leading these "intermediate" forces.

If an Advisor Corps is created, it should have the mission of working to develop professional and lasting military organizations. However, the corps should also the ability to lead "intermediate" forces until the professional military of the host nation is ready and able to operate independently from its advisors.

John T. Fishel

06-18-2007, 12:07 PM

Hi Jon--

Take a look at the USMC Small Wars Manual of 1940 for an American approach to the problem. The difficulty is the disconnect between the trained military.constabulary/security force and the political/governmental capacity of the client state. In what became India, it worked pretty well, not so in what became Pakistan or (for the US, Central America and the Caribbean).

This does not negate the need nor the notion that the intervening power is responsible for developing local security forces. It simply highlights the fact that security is tied directly to governance.

Cheers

JohnT

Rob Thornton

06-18-2007, 06:33 PM

Hey all,
I wanted to return to the issue of more BCTs vs. an Advisory Corps because I think it is essential to developing force capabilities that meet our current and future needs. Keep in mind, I'm not advocating one over the other (yet), but I am acknowledging that the two take a different approach and offer advantages and disadvantages to addressing our current and future needs.

Attached is a JPG I adopted from a .ppt brief on Joint Systems from the AWC. It goes over the linkages from the NMS to capabilities. However I have deleted the capabilities and replaced it with a question mark to foster the discussion since the capabilities listed were constrained to current force structure. What is left is the NMS' military objectives linkage to the missions and tasks. I also placed Green/Yellow/Red Color Codes over the top reflecting Significant Increases/ Insignificant Increase or Loss/ Significant Loss respectively in terms of capabilities to start the discussion about advantages and disadvantages between BCTs and an Advisory Corps.

This is a first glance assessment of what an Advisory Corps over more BCTs would bring. It does not mean that one done on the BCTs would be exactly the inverse. The context of the missions should be somewhat universal - ex. in the Protect the U.S. its arguable that BCTs provide the structure and response to respond more quickly and effectively then a advisory BN or BDE, however, the TTs might be able to provide Staff liaison and planning functions to facilitate inter agency coord better then a BCT which must also C2 its own lower echelons. Under Prevent Conflict and Surprise attacks its yellow - an Advisory Corps would not be able to deter much - but might be able to improve HN deterrence, however by being on the ground can gather good HUMINT through the HN force lessening the chance of surprise. Some I think are clearly green (others may disagree) , such as eliminating safe havens since a long term persistent presence on the ground can better shape (more effective and efficient) the HN environment then say a BCT rotating through.

I think that if you compare this one with one done on the BCTs it might show that an Advisory Corps and the existing BCTs compliment each other. It might also allow supplementing the exisitng BCTs with SSTRO capabilities that are currently being taken out of hide - ex. more MPs, CA, PsyOps, Medical and other LOG.

What I'd say is any discussion that challenges accepted notions about how we spend our money (in this case - force structure increases) must show how those changes would provide advantages, and what disadvantages we'd gain/lose by doing so.

Thoughts?

Tom Odom

06-18-2007, 06:49 PM

Rob,

My thoughts are quite simple on this one.

the SF team was structured so that a 12 man team could put a battalion (or more) of local forces in the field. An advisory corps that has that mission and keeps it at center focus is more efficient in the COIN--stability realm than BCTs. In fact you cannot win a COIN effort without some kind of advisory effort; if you could, we would not need to be there in the first place.

The BCTs must be there for the rest.

That means we have to do both. Not pick one and wish the other away --which we have always done with the advisor corps or effort.

Best

Tom

Old Eagle

06-18-2007, 07:07 PM

Assuming that the personnel plus-up stays on track, the question is what ought those personnel be doing? I think that the answer is advising, whether or not a "corps" is the force structure answer.

Reasons:
1. Too many failed/failing/incompetent states that desperately need assistance bolstering their security capacity. This can be done after a MCO or even better, before and ILO.

2. Indiginous forces are the only ones that can truly be successful in small wars of the future. OBTW idig civil governance capabilities also need to be developed/improved, but let's stay focused on security forces.

3. U.S. and major allies have reduced ground forces end strength to the point where we are incapable of going it alone without coalition partners. These partners, whether host nation or allies, need to be capable, ergo need to be developed. After Vietnam, we pushed our advisory capacity into SOF. Now SOF is overwhelmed by the magnitude of the advisory mission AND busy performing the sexy, hi-pri SOF missions: DA, CT, SR, etc.

4. Current security assistance and FID restrictions limit our ability to do the advisory piece half vast worth a darn.

Mission is critical. Resources are scarce. Need to find a peace dividend. We're in trouble.

Tacitus

06-18-2007, 07:58 PM

Gentlemen,
Fascinating discussion going on here. So where do you find the men to make up this corps of advisors. Based on my own experience in the US Army, I really doubt they are going to just be able to find these people in the ranks. If an order to produce an advisor for some faroff country came down to the first sergeants I remember, they probably would have just grabbed an NCO that they didn't want in their unit, for some reason or another. I doubt there would have been many volunteers, since the kind of guy who'd be naturally interested in this kind of work would already be in, or have his sights set on Green Berets. I just don't think there are many T.E. Lawrences of Arabia in the ranks of conventional units waiting to excel in that kind of mission.

I'd suggest thinking about recruiting perhaps a different kind of soldier, if they are serious about this over the long term. How about immigrants, or sons of immigrants, from the nations they think this might be needed? Instead of beating the bushes for guys in small towns of east TN, for example, you might ought to look in these first generation immigrant neighborhoods and really explain what you are trying to do. This immediately helps you to deal with the language and cultural barriers that must be overcome, if you think that really matters (which I do).

We are a nation of immigrants, with people from everywhere on the globe. It is a great resource if used intelligently.

Rob Thornton

06-18-2007, 10:01 PM

Hey Tom, OE, Tacitus, John, Ski
Hope nobody thought I meant we could not have both, in fact I also think we need both. What I was driving at is the question of if we need more BCTs within the proposed force increases, or should invest differently to build more specialized capabilities into the force. Building BCTs with the increase gives us more generalized flexibility. Building something like and Advisory Corps, adding more CS & CSS structures, and increasing the numbers of professional functional area officers would provide more assets/flexibility for the SSTRO side of the house. To frame the question I think we have to ask what are the pros and cons as they pertain to Army & Military responsibilities. I think this ties in with the Military Support to SSTRO JOC (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=18903#post18903)thread as well.

I do think there are some Tenn. fellows who can do the advisory piece though - being one of them. Our team was a mix match of USAR, USARNG and AD. We had a variety of MOSs often doing jobs that were outside of their professional experience. It was mostly a question of attitude and team work. You'd be surprised what you can do if you just decide you are going to do it. Overcoming cultural barriers - yea it matters, but you can also find a great deal in common with the folks you are advising while you are learning abut your differences. The real payoff for the Army in this would be exposing soldiers to this job and then having them rotate back into the force. While volunteering is nice, its not really a pre-requisite. Many guys come down on recruiting duty for example that did not volunteer - in fact I just had a buddy opt for the PTT advisory gig vs. take a recruiting assignment in Compton, CA.
Many guys are not physically able to go for the green beret, or for the officers don't want to make the permanent transition to the 18 series side of the house, but many would like to have an SF like experience at least once in their career - ex. I had a buddy on our team who sales life insurance in his real world job, he has a wife and family and cannot return to AD, but jumped at the chance to do the MiTT gig - guy had a blast. Another thing I did not mention was that the diversity of our team enhanced its effectiveness, we were able to discuss issues we might have missed if we'd all been AD.

I saw Gen Casey on Fox this morning discussing the future of the Army. Gen Petreus was on Fox Sunday and mentioned stabilizing Iraq as an 8-10 year gig. Both the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism make state builiding up HN security force capacity as one of the keys to denying AQ and AQ like organizations sanctuaries to recruit, train and draw resources from states they wish to destabilize. FM 23-4 also lists US advisory functions as critical to establishing HN systems:
"“Key to all these tasks is developing an effective host-nation (HN) security force.”1 Indeed, it has been argued that foreign forces cannot defeat an insurgency; the best they can hope for is to create the conditions that will enable local forces to win for them"

I think if the Army says we are or are not going to do something like this, which requires a significant investment of resources from the Army and Joint community at a minimum, then everyone from OSD to Congress (including lobbyist who are protecting their interests) are going to want to compare what we get for it, or why we don't have this capability that we've said is so important in our strategy documents and doctrine. I think by discussing it on this forum we can help - because many of the participants here are going to be tasked with answering the tough questions from people who will be biased, short sighted, or unwilling to challenge the status quo for a host of reasons. If something like this evolves many of the folks on this site will be tasked to develop the doctrine (because they are already in those type jobs), work out the details, and make it work. These forums are kind of a work group of online collaborators in that regard - people dedicated to thinking about this stuff and engaging in discourse so that the thoughts get developed. We benefit from a very diverse audience that is candid and informed on a number of issues.

Ken White

06-18-2007, 10:13 PM

On the broadly irrelevant side; the then 77th and 1st SFGs did the Laos mssions, the 5th was pretty well restricted to SVN (and NVN, the edges of Cambodia and Laos only for some of the projects). Their direct action folks were by design the Mike Forces, not the CIDG who were pretty much local patrollers and defenders. While broadly irrelevant, I mention all that because those CIDG and other elements that got more involved in the direct action missions did so mostly because of their commanders at the time, not due to any Army policy. However, the fact that the Groups have distinct personalities is definitely correct and those personalities are as much or more due to the Commanders ideas and goals as they are to history.

Kicking in doors is more fun than local patrolling and training people. That's still true. So is the fact that a commanders personality and desires can influence missions.

The capability to train most infantrymen to do direct action missions well certainly exists and is proven -- but then consider that if the lowly grunt can do this, particularly on "high value" targets, it may adversely affect someone's budget and missions. The relevance of all that is that the roles and missions argument is not at all simple and the parameters change constantly...

Strategic vision and the power to provide definitive guidance and force compliance is the issue. The existence of USSOCOM, for all the good it does, effectively and very severely complicates that roles and missions effort. Unity of command, like initiative is a tenet of US doctrine. Both get squashed pretty heavily and routinely.

While I personally agree that internal defense and indigenous force training is a proper SF mission, it carries little glory, attracts little money and just isn't fun...

Tacitus has a point in that good working relationships with indigenous folks is not everyone's cup of tea; some people do it far more effectively than others and immigrants are a good pick. Not a little of the early success of SF was due to all the Lodge Act enlistees -- and Officers -- that populated the Groups in the early days.

Having said all that, I doubt you'll be able to get SF involved at this time in any serious way and I strongly doubt either the Army leadership or, more importantly, Congress, will buy the Advisory Corps idea, good as it is, for the Active Army -- the USAR is perhaps a possilbility.

Agree that the USAR Training Divisions as currently constructed and trained are not a good choice, the skills don't transfer well. There is the potential of restructuring and retraining one or more of them to do the Nagl suggested Advisory mission -- and the rank structure won't interfere with DOPMA and HRCs grand designs.

Too much rank in too small a package and the Congroids will ask "what if there's not another Iraq or 'Stan?" 'Course, I could be wrong, have been before -- I'd have sworn the Army would see the handwriting on the wall in the 70s and work hard at counterinsurgency...

In any event, it seems the realistic near term approach is to better train Joe and his leaders and prepare them to do the job on an ad-hoc basis. They really seem to be doing it reasonably well.

Ski

06-26-2007, 04:19 PM

Some additional thoughts:

I like the idea of putting the Advisory Corps under SOCOM, simply because it can draw personnel from all services. It does, however, highlight the need for a true umbrella organization, perhaps even a 6th service that can also draw required personnel from not only the differing military services, but also from other governmental agencies such as State, USAID, CIA, etc...

The problem I see with an advisory corps is similar to the dilemma that's faced SF. You can't cover down on everything, so you need to be able to forecast where the problem countries are and then tailor the force to meet the specific language, cultural, and societal issues. I remember the initial stages of OEF where Pashtu and Uzbek speakers were being drawn into SOCOM from all over the military because there weren't enough language experts. I see the same thing happening again in the future, perhaps it can be mitigated to a greater degree.

I still think that SF should be the base of the program, but with less emphasis placed on direct action. It's going to take a cultural change to be sure.

The bottom line to an Advisory Corps is gauging the legitimacy of the government that we are assisting. It doesn't matter what kind of organization we create (if it even gets that far) because if the populace of Country X doesn't think their government is worth a duck's ass, then we will have massive difficulties. That again requires good foresight and not necessarily American domestic political desire.

Finally, I'd avoid using the Reserve Components as currently constructed because the skill sets aren't there. The USAR suffers at the lower Officer level or NCO level because many of their trainers have not been in an AC or ARNG MTOE unit and simply don't have the credibility or expertise required. We asked them to do a extremely difficult mission - training Iraqi and Afghan troops to conduct counter-insurgency operations - when they themselves have not done so. Some can succeed, no doubt, but it is difficult at best.

Ken White

06-27-2007, 12:32 AM

First, Giving the mission to SF takes them away from their nominal current primary mission. While there is undoubtedly some benefit to obtaining their total capability in the advisory role, it is also probably significant over qualification at work. The average non-SF Army Officer or NCO can do a good job as an Adviser with a short language and advisory skills course. That can be done far more cheaply than using the rather expensively trained SF guys for something doesn't require most of their skills. No sense sending a Cadillac if a Ford will work. As an aside, it would likely have an adverse impact on retention in the Groups.

Secondly, I totally agree the USAR today does not have the skills required for the job, particularly if one is talking about the Training Divisions. One thing that has been consistently proven is that the average kid in the IRR who has been out two years or less knows more than most of the USAR Drill Sergeants who are supposed to re-blue him.

However, the USAR does some things very well indeed, better than the AC and the capability of selective recruiting to a notional "Advisory Division" and of training dedicated to the required skills, as cited above, is easily possible. Placing the effort in the RC eliminates many problems that trying to place a large organization so dedicated in the AC would engender. A small AC organization can be justified to DA and Congress, I strongly doubt a large one could be.

Iraq isn't going to be in the current state much longer, nor is Afghanistan. The potential for another commitment needing such capability in large numbers anywhere in the next few years is slight.

Old Eagle

06-27-2007, 01:06 PM

SteveMetz

06-27-2007, 01:23 PM

Steve Blair

06-27-2007, 01:32 PM

I agree, Steve. Too often we assume that our experience and expertise is somehow both needed and relevant to the situation at hand (Vietnam comes to mind in terms of the advisory effort, but that's more as an example than a direct parallel).

There are too many disconnects and divergences to make an advisory effort the centerpiece of every involvement we have (to include our current ones). There needs to be much more in terms of a cultural evaluation like the one you suggested before making an advisory program the main focus of effort.

Old Eagle

06-27-2007, 03:08 PM

SteveMetz

06-27-2007, 03:24 PM

I fully understand both of your concerns. However, I am at a loss as to what the alternative might be. Occupation comes to mind, but that can be long and messy and woefully unpopular both at home and in the HN.

Let's keep this discussion rolling.

In my Rethinking Insurgency (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=790)study, I argued that rather than viewing Foreign Internal Defense, with its emphasis on advice and assistance, as a one-size-fits all model, we only use it where it has a good chance of working--there is a reasonably effective security force and government willing to undertake serious reform, and which view the conflict the same way we do (e.g. El Salvador). When there is no functioning security force or government (e.g. Iraq), if there is mulitnational and U.N. support to create and sustain a trusteeship for a decade, we participate. If not, we simply work with neighboring states to contain the conflict and limit the humanitarian suffering through aid and the creation of safe zones (e.g. Somalia, initially).

On nations not yet facing conflict, advice and support can be positive but, again, it often will not work. Many African states, for instance, have what we consider to be ineffective security forces. So our instinct is to provide advice and support to make them more effective. But we forget that African governments often see their own military as a greater threat than insurgents, so they don't want them to be more effective. This sort of dissonance is a real problem for us.

Old Eagle

06-27-2007, 04:09 PM

Steve

Yep. I like your categories. BUT

Future efforts, as you imply, have to be across all elements of national power and aimed at broader HN targets -- gov't, economy, etc.

Means future efforts have to be interagency, and probably multinational, etc (JIIM).

Therefore, places where we were originally having success in Africa, or where we need to have success in the future, need to be engaged on a much broader scale than in the past. If the central government does not evolve, I truly doubt that we can be successful.

SteveMetz

06-27-2007, 04:12 PM

Old Eagle

06-27-2007, 04:15 PM

We may actually end up organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding and advising non-state security forces. SF mission in the past, but may need to migrate to GPF.

What think?

SteveMetz

06-27-2007, 04:32 PM

We may actually end up organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding and advising non-state security forces. SF mission in the past, but may need to migrate to GPF.

What think?

I don't know if GPF would be good at training militias and irregulars.

Ken White

06-27-2007, 05:08 PM

"Iraq isn't going to be in the current state much longer, nor is Afghanistan. The potential for another commitment needing such capability in large numbers anywhere in the next few years is slight."

Gotta disagree here. I see a very large requirement for continued advisory capacity among GPF.

First, I'm not convinced that the Iraq and Afghanistan missions are going to end any time soon, at least not the advisory portions.

Secondly, when I look across the horizon, I see numerous countries that are important to us, threatened by disruptive forces of various ilks. Developing their indiginous capability to protect themselves is the only long term solution to their stability. The requirements of the future outstrip the capacity of my friends with the funny green hats.

Thirdly, we don't have sufficient tools in the rucksack to perform the required advisory functions. Train and equip doesn't work unless you're working with a sophisticated, capable ally -- sellin F-16s to NATO partners, T&E works. Other traditional security assistance also falls short. Shortly after the Nixon Doctrine was announced, stating that we would in fact bolster host nation capabilities to look after themselves, congress placed heinous restrictions on the programs to ensure that they would not be effective (AECA 76 (as amended)).

We now have an opportunity to move forward and develop truly effective means of organizing, training, eqiupping, (re)building and advising foreign security forces. The requirement to do so will remain large for the forseeable future.

Re: my quoted statement, you'll note I said that the two nations were not going to be in their current state much longer. That doesn't say or imply that the missions will end soon; I believe we'll be in both for many years. It does mean that the types and numbers actions are changing daily and that the situation will differ in the near and distant future. Yes, there'll be an Advisory requirement but it can be met by the 1st ID model with a MAAG add-on.

So, first, we'll be there and the advisory effort will continue. The question is does that require a 'dedicated' advisory corps or such like. My answer would be no. The GPF are capable of doing the job in the ME with minimal extra training.

I've been a MAAG Adviser in the ME and in SEA and worked elsewhere with Advisers including some from other nations who have a far, far, smaller but more effective foot print than we do. I've been to Iraq and my guess is that the number of Americans that would gain real traction there as Advisers is microscopic. The capability to fully integrate and be effective in that job is a crap shoot; it's personality dependent and whether or not your counterpart likes and trusts you -- or to what extent he does those things. Culture, religion and traditions all have a very significant effect on the abiltiy to establish real rapport and lacking that, the Adviser is only marginally effective -- and may even do harm. In that light, the conventional wisdom says that long advisory tours are preferable. I disagree, short tours are better to offset the personality disconnects that are bound to occur -- that and the Stockholm syndrome effect...

Secondly, I agree with your view. The question is will Congress agree with it? Another question is how many of those nations are likely to invite us in any significant numbers? Some will take Advisers -- but only to insure the benefits and equipment with which we bribe them to take an Advisory Team (or for the money a MAAG will spend in country), such nations Armed Forces tend to be very polite to the advisers and yet change their processes only slightly. I think 1st SF Gps efforts in the Phillipines and elsewhere offer a far better model than the large Advisory Team effort.

Recall I said "for the next few years." That is, IMO, due to Congress and the fact that we're on the world's nasty list right now (not a problem, we have been before and I don't think it's as bad as it was during Viet Nam) and will be for a bit. We have to time to think and do something smart instead of just jumping into a large structure that will be underemployed for a while; say in the 2010-2015 period.

Thirdly, you're correct -- and I seriously doubt a large advisory effort will improve our ability in this regard. I also doubt Congress will relax those restrictions to any significant extent in the near future. A more important point is that other nations have seen that failure to implement the Nixon Doctrine, watch the current disconnect in Congress and have significant doubts about our ability to stay the course. Justifiably, I might add...

I submit the number of invitations to us for help (other than $$ and goodies) will be slim for a few years. A small footprint may be accepted; few will want a large one.

Don't misunderstand me; I agree we need to work on the Advisory bit, reinvent that wheel as it were and I agree that the effort is important. I am, however, saying that the "Advisory Corps" is massive overkill and is unlikely to be approved by either DA or Congress in any event. The 1st ID effort is a fair start and an adequate base and the SF model in Asia has more merit than it is given credit for, it's been successful and the Army cannot say that either the Afghan or Iraqi campaigns have been. Yes, that's partly due to some factors from outside the Army but we did not do it well. Thirty plus years of ignoring the developing nation issue were the Army's fault. That damage will not be repaired by over reacting in trying to jump back into the ball game willy nilly. My fear is that we will do the age-old American thing and swing too far as we oscillate from virtually no involvement with developing nations to attempting to overdo said involvement.

As to your conclusion, we can disagree on that

Old Eagle

06-28-2007, 12:54 PM

Ken,
Like you, I am examining John's proposal for an advisory corps, not buying it outright. The capacity to advise is still critical.

Rob's "nation-building" unit, or whatever he calls it blends with this concept because of the disconnects between security forces and some governments you point out.

If it is necessary, according to U.S. interests to bolster the security forces of a given country, then we need to find the $$$/equipment enticements you refer to to make it happen.

SF is still the weapon of choice. A coupla problems:
1. SF was built for an A-Team to train, equip and advise a light infantry battalion. That leaves a lot of area uncovered by their capability (other branches of military, other echelons above bn).

2. SF is too small to do it all, as we see in Iraq and Afghanistan where we are training/advising hundreds of thousands of HN forces.

3. SF's other missions in the Long War, DA, SR, CT, etc., have pulled them away from the train/advise mission.

Steve,
Even in your third case where we contain a smoldering insurgency by assisting neighboring countries, we may still need to develop their security forces.

And it's not just FID. We need the capacity to develop security forces capable of deterring/defending against conventional incursions from neighboring states. Kinda like KMAG after WWII.

Bottom line -- this is going to be a GPF mission over the next decades.

Sorry that was so disjointed, but I didn't want to write an epistle.

Rob Thornton

06-28-2007, 04:01 PM

OE,
I posted the HSC report link (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3287)under the FID category, but you can get some of their thought/recommendations in CH 7 which looks at the past/present/future of TTs.
Regards, Rob

Old Eagle

06-29-2007, 12:51 PM

Yeah, I saw that. Recommendation for a thousand more reports. Reminds me of the Wellington quote from Spain about defeating Napolean or accounting for jams and jellies.

Still, the issue has some visibility in DC.

Tom Odom

08-10-2007, 01:52 PM

Council members,

This is just to announce that the CALL Newsletter 07-28 Advisor Teams is on the CALL gateway for those with access.

I should also like to thank the Small Wars Journal community because that community played a large role in this effort.

Special thanks go to Council members:

Rob Thornton

RTK

Sullygoarmy

Finally I would again like to thank everyone who helped in anyway. Dave Dilegge and Bill Nagle are of course the real heros because they are SWJ.

Best

Tom Odom

jonSlack

09-19-2007, 10:11 AM

Max Boot - Rejecting Nagl (Commentary Blog) (http://www.commentarymagazine.com/contentions/index.php/boot/932)

I’ve blogged before about Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl’s idea to create an Advisor Corps within the army that would focus on producing training teams to work with foreign militaries.

I thought Nagl made a convincing case for such an unorthodox approach, and he certainly knows what he is talking about: He is in charge of a battalion at Fort Riley, Kansas, that trains advisors for Iraq and Afghanistan, and he has concluded, based on that experience, that the current training and manning system for advisory teams is too haphazard and too small to meet all of our national security needs.

Not surprisingly, the army doesn’t see it that way. The newsletter Inside the Pentagon reported on September 13th that the army has officially decided, in the words of a public affairs officer, “that is not the way to go.” The army would prefer building cookie-cutter Brigade Combat Teams and relying on a small number of Special Forces to specialize in the training mission. This decision comes, by the way, in the face of copious evidence that there are not nearly enough Green Berets to meet all the demands thrown their way.

There are certainly good arguments that can be made against Nagl’s proposal. But my suspicion is that the army’s view is simply the default position of a lumbering bureaucracy averse to new thinking—even when it comes from within its own ranks. (Perhaps especially when it comes from within its own ranks.)

The larger problem here is the difficulty that the armed services have in assimilating and rewarding brainy officers like Nagl (author of a much-cited book on counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam) who don’t fit the standard mold. Others in that category include a pair of Ph.D. colonels—H.R. McMaster and Peter Mansoor—who have both earned stellar reputations not only in the academy, but also on the battlefield. But they are both in danger of not being promoted to general. Mavericks like them deserve support from the outside—especially on Capitol Hill—to help transform the military in spite of itself.

Quoted the entire blog post because it was relatively short.

You can find the "Inside the Pentagon" story cited in the post by going to google and searching for: "Fawzia Sheikh" Nagl

You should get two results returned. The story is the first result and is visible through google's caching system.

Rob Thornton

09-19-2007, 11:24 AM

I think you really need concrete rationale for visible, large scale organizational change. As it considered how to use the increase, it probably scrutinizing what the nation is asking it to do, and has assigned it to do, and made some hard choices about organizations and force structures.

Maintaining an OPTEMPO of sustaining sufficient BCTs in OIF and OEF while allowing flexibility for other contingencies and resting and refitting those BCTs out of the rotation is a tall order. Add in attempting to keep the Reserve Component BCTs free to perform their Civil Support roles in their home states is also very challenging

There are no easy choices. I believe Army leadership strongly considered (and is still considering) all the options in meeting the needs of its commitments.

What can drive the major changes in the Armed Forces:

What are our foreign policy goals - and how do we provide means and describe the ways in which we will best achieve them?

The congressional involvement in the various HASC, SASC, Foreign/International Affairs committees that consider the roles/missions, authorities, etc.

The service involvment and obligation to provide our best military advice to civilians in helping make the above decisions - this last one is a bit subjective, because we may be culturally predisposed within our comfort zone - so while it takes the civilian side to provide the binding action - the uniformed side is expected to articulate why and to live with the consequences.

This is not to say that the civilian side does not have alternatives. If they feel that they are not getting the best advice, they can call pretty much anybody they want to testify. This also is not without consequence.

I think at this time the creation of a permanent advisory corps is part of a much larger question that involves all the instruments of national power - the Inter-Agency question and the threats/challenges of the post 9/11 world. Remember the sense of urgency where Congress asked GEN P/AMB C about the linkage between AQ and Iraq - they were not just sharpshooting the Executive - they were examining the relationship between foreign and domestic policy. Since their constituents are more concerned with domestic policies they must always consider that as the primary and the influence of foreign policy as the secondary - all politics are first local. However, 9/11 was a watershed event - it was a very terrible but visible event that stated that foreign policy "matters" (as in its damned important to domestic politics), national security matters, and that in this increasingly globalized world, the ties between domestic and foreign policy get stronger everyday. Congress must play an important role in the "debate" that shapes the policies/ends, has the legal responsibility for allocations/means & must remain informed and understand the implications of the strategies/ways - IMHO, to ignore it would be great domestic political risk.

My sense is we are just starting to sort things out. Leaders (inside and outside the military) are starting to ask the right, hard questions. I apologize for making the detour, but this is not just a simple Army decision, and we have to understand that. There are "Must Dos", "Have/Need to Dos", and there are "Would like to Dos". Its nice when they all three (or even two of them) coincide, but its not usually the case when you are talking about doing something as big as meeting the NSS. If the civilian side really wants something done, they make it a "Must Do" - but unless they provide the additional means to make it happen, they risk compromising a "Have/Need to Do".

So we'll see what happens.
Best regards, Rob

tequila

10-25-2007, 01:58 PM

Military Training Units seen as Career Detours (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/24/AR2007102402549_pf.html)- Washington Post, 24 Oct.

The United States' exit from Iraq (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/countries/iraq.html?nav=el) and Afghanistan (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/countries/afghanistan.html?nav=el) depends on stepping up U.S. advising of those nations' security forces, Adm. Michael Mullen (http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Michael+G.+Mullen?tid=informline), chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/U.S.+Joint+Chiefs+of+Staff?tid=informline), said Wednesday as he visited military training teams preparing to deploy.

"It's the way out, no question, in both countries," Mullen told Lt. Col. Geoffrey D. Ellerson, whose 11-man training team will leave in three weeks for a year-long tour in a volatile region of Iraq east of Baghdad (http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Baghdad?tid=informline). "I can't overstate the importance" of the teams, he said.

The military is planning to expand the advisory teams and expects to have a decision by spring on the numbers and composition of additional U.S. forces needed for the effort, said Maj. Gen. Robert Durbin, who oversees the training. Durbin said he could easily double the number of troops going through the 72-day training program. In all, about 4,800 team members have been trained over the past year.

The teams are critical to the U.S. military (http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/U.S.+Armed+Forces?tid=informline) strategy in Iraq, where they include about 1,500 military personnel, and in Afghanistan, where they have about 600 members. In Iraq, the teams live and work alongside Iraqi army and police units, teaching them basic tactics and planning, providing them with intelligence, air power and other support, as well as monitoring their operations for signs of sectarian activity and other abuses.
One challenge to expanding the advisory effort, however, is attracting highly qualified Army officers to leave traditional career paths to join the teams, which some see as hurting their chances for promotion, according to several officers interviewed this week ...

jcustis

10-25-2007, 06:21 PM

Is the negative impact just hype, or concrete and damning? I could esily grasp how a infantry major might assume that advisory duty isn't sexy, and thus not career-enhancing, but I wonder if the promotion board preceptss tell a different tale.

Many months ago I stated here that the services need to make a concerted effort to recognize the advisors for the sacrifices they make in this mission, as well as for the experiences that they gain while in the breech.

If Xenophon's recent update about his advisor team training cycle is any indication, we are still getting th pre-deploy training wrong. And why are we getting it wrong? Because someone senior enough doesn't care enough to devote the resources and time to doing it right.

I've long wanted to put my hat in the ring to go out on a team, but the more and more I think about it, it may just be a fool's errand akin to putting a bullet in a .38 and spinning the cylinder.

I suspect that we are drawing some talent to the effort, otherwise we wouldn't get the articles that pop up in the various professional journals, but we will need more of it if we are to break out of the cycle of pulling team structure out of units on the on deck circle to deploy.

Anyone here from either the Army of USMC who is involved in the advisory effort (from policy perspective) and is willing to dispell any myths?

All this tracks into another thought I had while listening to NPR on the way home from work recently. We (as a military establishment) had better get our act together real quick and decide if we subscribe to the "Long War" concept of 15-20 years of conflict. Then we need to decide if FID and advisory efforts are going to remain the province of SF and bodies like the Corps' MSOAG, or are we going to make a call and align resources to the mission at hand and deal with the reality that "conventional forces" need to do heavy lifting in this arena. Same holds true as to whether we are going to analyze the long-term impact of COIN operations, and start training our new warriors to be able to tread lightly as well as they can flip the kinetic switch.

Rob Thornton

10-25-2007, 07:19 PM

You know it is interesting though. The job has not shown up on my ORB as a position - instead its listed as incoming personnel to FT Knox - not exactly something that is going to express what we say you gain by going out on a TT, although its in the OER I got for the deployment. This goes back to LTC Nagl's comment about how do we show something is important? If its not on your ORB - the chances of the board even considering it are lessened. Its hard to make a case about professional enhancement in subjective terms for allot of folks if they can not correlate it to something - when you weight it with BQ jobs - it will take on different meaning.

For me, I got an experience out of it that really means something - but I'm getting older, my kids need roots and my wife has pretty much made clear her thoughts on staying in past 20, and like I told you at Quantico my interest in being an 06 or GO is fleeting (in regards to the former) if existent at all (in regards to the latter):D

Best, Rob

Old Eagle

10-25-2007, 08:17 PM

I have it on good authority that you can get the job title changed. Best COA is to get it to reflect whatever the duty title on your OER was. I am also told that "savior of the Iraqi Army" may meet some resistance.

Needless to say, this is one of the major issues we're trying to deal with under the "P" of DOTLMPF. Hopefully the personnel weanies will be cooperative.

Rob Thornton

10-25-2007, 09:09 PM

:DI was thinking more along the lines of "Chief Plate Spinner":D. I'll check on getting the title changed - my faith in the bureaucracy at this point has parity with DFAS:D

I look forward to getting out there and putting the family in a house.

Best, Rob

Rob Thornton

10-25-2007, 09:31 PM

I just got off the phone with my old BDE MiTT Chief - one thing you can put out that is positive is he got picked up for senior staff college on his 3rd look - he told me that the only thing that got special consideration was his time on the MiTT. Everybody may not see the significance of that, but very few folks get selected, and if it does happen its usually on the first or second look. He's a good officer, and the Army is well served sending him to the AWC.
Best Rob

Xenophon

11-21-2007, 04:58 AM

There's a lot of high echelon thinking in this thread, but this little point caught my eye:

There needs to be much more in terms of a cultural evaluation like the one you suggested before making an advisory program the main focus of effort.

Agreed. But, IF we decide that an advisory program should be the main effort, we don't have the capability to properly support that decision. Yes, we can produce ad hoc teams at the rapid rate and get advisers out there. But we're doing that now and we're doing it wrong. At the very least an advisory corps would provide a core, pardon the bad play on words, around which the US military can rapidly stand up more training teams with a standard, effective training program if needed (Hopefully completely unlike the one currently in place).

Xenophon

12-31-2007, 05:19 PM

Sully, I don't know of any consolidated handbook besides the CALL ones, but there definitely needs to be one. I've been at this MTT thing for a month now and so much of our training, way more than I thought, was pure BS. I'd definitely like to see a product if anything comes of it.

marct

12-31-2007, 08:00 PM

Hi Xenophon,

Sully, I don't know of any consolidated handbook besides the CALL ones, but there definitely needs to be one. I've been at this MTT thing for a month now and so much of our training, way more than I thought, was pure BS. I'd definitely like to see a product if anything comes of it.

"Pure BS"? Darn, that's harsh! What are the BS areas? Maybe we can look at trying to see if we can get a special issue of SWJ together to cover some of them.

Marc

Cavguy

01-02-2008, 08:48 AM

There's a semi-official/unofficial handbook on the way right now. LTC Nagl is heading up the effort using a bunch of former MiTT's here at Leavenworth to write the guide. First draft should be done this month with a goal to get it out this quarter.

Still in rough copy status right now.

Officially, there is a multiservice TTP manual being run by the USMC and JCISFA that will also be published this year (most likely)

Tom Odom

01-02-2008, 02:06 PM

JCiSFA has a handbook in print dated 1 August 2007; Old Eagle can help you get your hands on some.

Tom

Xenophon

01-03-2008, 12:41 PM

Pure BS"? Darn, that's harsh! What are the BS areas? Maybe we can look at trying to see if we can get a special issue of SWJ together to cover some of them.

Indeed, sir. Wrote a Gazette article and everything.

Jedburgh

01-07-2008, 11:20 PM

Special Warfare, Jan-Feb 08: The Advisory Challenge (http://www.scribd.com/doc/968940/The-Advisory-Challenge-SW-JanFeb-08)

.....Critical to an adviser’s success is his ability to achieve “an unnoticed influence” for the ultimate purposes of furthering the objectives of the adviser (which are the national-security objectives of the adviser’s government). The amount of influence an adviser attains will be directly proportional to the sum of three factors: the rapport between the adviser and the host-nation commander or counterpart; the credibility of the individual adviser; and the perception by host-nation forces of the continued value of the relationship.

The complexity of these tasks and the unique skill set required have historically been underestimated, possibly because of a lack of personal experience or familiarity on the part of most military leaders. This limited exposure and understanding has contributed to a long-standing bias that questions the value of advisory efforts or, at least, whether advisory efforts warrant the expenditure and diversion of limited resources, such as personnel, which are needed by the conventional fighting force. The intent of this article is to convey some of the critical aspects that enable advisers to be effective. Many of these aspects are intangible, are often not required of leaders of U.S. forces, and are therefore relatively unfamiliar.....

Jedburgh

09-09-2008, 02:07 PM

Study on Army Aspects of the Military Assistance Program in Vietnam (http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADB297539&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf), 10 June 1960

.....The vast differences in terms of reference and nature of the threat as applied to the many countries receiving aid make selection of a truly representative worldwide sample nation impractical. Many of the basic principles governing the establishment and maintenance of an effective military force structure in the Western European NATO nations are invalid for application in the slowly developing countries of SE Asia. Since the US Army has much actual experience data with respect to the type threat existent in Europe and Korea, the study should explore an area in which our experience is more limited. Thus the example selected would most profitably be a HAAG operation in an area where the primary threat is an irregular force employing unorthodox organization and tactics. South Vietnam appears most typically representative of such a situation; study findings in this area would have the broadest possible application and would be of value in a wide variety of similar cases. Vietnam was selected therefore to be the primary country of investigation.....

VMI_Marine

04-04-2009, 02:04 AM

I've recently been tagged for a year-long OIF MiTT. I'm pretty disappointed, as I was slated to command a company bound for OEF, but I'm studying up to make the best of this opportunity. I came across the following studies and articles which may be of interest to other advisors.

US Marine Advisor Publications (http://www.irism.com/pubs/)
Communion in Conflict: The Marine Advisor in the Middle East (http://www.irism.com/pubs/advstudy.htm)
Cross-Cultural Psychology: The Marine Advisor: Preparation for Duty Overseas (http://www.irism.com/pubs/insight.pdf)

For some historical perspective:
Communion in Conflict: The Marine Advisor, Volume II, 1975 (http://www.irism.com/pubs/coc.pdf)
Communion in Conflict: The Marine Advisor, Volume III, Vietnam 1954-1973 (http://www.irism.com/pubs/covanstudy.htm)
Analysis of a Culture in Conflict: Comparative Personality Determinants between U.S. Marine Advisors and Vietnamese Soldiers (http://www.irism.com/pubs/anocc.pdf)

jmm99

04-04-2009, 04:39 AM

Vietnam and Marine History buffs. Thanks. Hopefully, God (the Corps) will work in mysterious ways for you.

A friend (of my wife and me) was a USMC advisor in Nam in the early 60s - couple of tours. He loved it.

SWJED

04-04-2009, 11:41 AM

Thanks for the doc links VMI Marine and best to you on your OIF deployment. Understand the disappointment re company command... That said, good on you for making the best of your MiTT tour.

Jedburgh

01-10-2011, 03:49 PM

Marine Advisors with the Vietnamese Provincial Reconnaissance Units, 1966-1970 (http://www.tecom.usmc.mil/HD/PDF_Files/Pubs/VN%20Advisors%20Boards_Marine%20Advisors.pdf)

...Many historians consider the two most effective counterinsurgency organizations employed during the Vietnam War to have been the PRU and USMC Combined Action Platoons (CAP). In both cases, U.S.Marines played a significant role in the success of these innovative programs. It should be pointed out,however, that the number of U.S.Marines assigned to these programs was small and the bulk of the forces were locally recruited fighters. Both programs used a small cadre of Marines providing leadership, training, and combat support for large numbers of indigenous troops, and in so doing, capitalized on the inherent strengths of each.

The author believes that both of these programs have applicability in any counterinsurgency where U.S. forces are called upon to assist a host government. Obviously, adjustments to these programs would have to be made to take into account local conditions,but the core concept of providing U.S.Marines to command or advise local militia and special police units is one that has great promise for success. With a clear understanding of why the PRUs and CAPs worked, and with the necessary adjustments to take into account local conditions, similar units can be created to defeat future insurgencies.With this in mind, the author hopes that this work will provide U.S. military planners with insights into creating and managing units capable of defeating a well-organized and highly motivated insurgent political infrastructure....

slapout9

01-10-2011, 07:10 PM

Nice post Jed, really good paper.

Gator 2-6

05-09-2011, 10:17 PM

Gentlemen, posted this in FID forum but little to no activity there...wanted to know if anyone had some feedback for this program...

I am attempting to find any information concerning these newly formed FSF-TT (Foreign Security Force - Training Team). I've called random contacts down at the 162nd @ Polk to little / no avail. I have the option to stay at my current unit (Light Infantry) and deploy with them as a member of this team. What I don't want to be doing is staying in the rear strictly training / organizing forces, rather than training in addition to advising the ANA whilst on patrol, forward deployed. Any information would be greatly appreciated, thanks in advance.

Basically, my last tour we experienced both ends of the spectrum. First 6 months we had Marine ETT's...good dudes. We could go into the valley and do a clearance while the USMC/ANA conducted a KLE...two separate autonomous units that could successfully do two separate acitivties at the same time. Ganjagal happened, Marines peaced out and we were then "partnered". Combined patrols decreased to maybe one every two weeks (in part due to kinetcs / korengal closure), and when they did combine with us, they left when it was time to play and our combat power was halved. PVT Snuffy, who knows only call of duty and MTV, is buddied up with PVT Ahmed, who knows only hasheesh and war...sufficed to say not much progress was made. Anyone else have a similar experience? TIA

SFAT

02-12-2012, 03:51 PM

Gator,

As one of the first SFA Teams currently being used IAW the Army's vision, I have a wealth of knowledge for you and others that will be receiving orders soon.

Rather than vomit alot of information on this first reply, I'd rather you ask specific questions to ease my typing load...

So... with that being said, whatcha wanna know?

Bill Moore

02-12-2012, 05:33 PM

SFAT,

Please send a link to any papers or articles that accurately describe the current SFAT concept (to minimize your typing).

First set of questions:

- What is the selection and training process for the SFATs?

- What is the rank structure? If you do have E-3s and below, are they value added, or are both the E-3s and below and the partnered force being hurt? I am suggesting that perhaps E-3s and below in this role are missing key professional development opportunities as members of a squad or section. Hard to teach with confidence without personal experience.

- Are the SFATs meant to be enduring, or are they adhoc teams that form for one mission, and when the mission is complete do they disband and the soldiers return to the ranks?

- What did you see as the biggest success of the program? The biggest failure?

- If you were king for a day, what three changes (if any) would you impliment to improve SFAT concept?

SFAT

02-13-2012, 09:47 AM

Bill,

First, thanks for the questions. I truly want to help others understand the dynamic of this new concept. I was absolutely clueless when I was first informed of this mission and had to feel my way through- up until now.

Second, I’m sorry to say I’m nowhere close to an academic so my responses might not be as “scholarly” as a typical reader may be accustomed to.

Lastly, I’ll say this truly is a thankless job and has been by far my most challenging assignment, being the first one away from the troops that is. I will also add, the context of my writing is of my own opinion and does not reflect the opinions of other SFA-T members across the Army.

So let’s begin…

Q. What is the selection and training process for the SFATs?

A. Absolutely no process for selection-- to my knowledge there was or is no vetting of potential members of the SFA-T. I myself called branch toward the end of my first tenure as a First Sergeant. I ask specifically for an Airborne assignment and another First Sergeant Job. I was first informed I was "selected" for this SFA gig when I started calling CSMs for potential slots in their battalion. In other words, I was “hoodwinked” by Infantry branch.

The training process included training we conducted ourselves at home station and JRTC. While at JRTC we attended the Advisor Academy ran by the 162nd INF BDE. It was ten days in duration which was acceptable. My only issue with the AA was the generalities of Advising in Afghanistan. If I had it to do over again I would want region specific training.

Q. What is the rank structure? If you do have E-3s and below, are they value added, or are both the E-3s and below and the partnered force being hurt? I am suggesting that perhaps E-3s and below in this role are missing key professional development opportunities as members of a squad or section. Hard to teach with confidence without personal experience.

A. The Army’s TO&E calls for a 48 man SFA which consist of 24 two man teams; a Team Chief and a Deputy Team chief. The rank structure starts with two teams consisting of an O-6 and an E-9. The subsequent teams consist of 10 teams of an O-5 and an E-8; 12 teams of an O-4 and an E-7. I will attach the approved TO&E. The additional slots you will find on the TO&E were not filled. ---hope that made sense---

With all that being said, the two man team TO&E was not followed. Our BDE leadership broke us down into eight, six man teams. Two teams would be assigned to the OCC-P/Rs -- I’m not 100 percent sure what the OCC-P stands for but I’m inclined to believe it’s Operation Coordination Center-Provincial/Regional. The other four, six man teams were assigned to specific ANA/AUP/ABP units. I will attach the modified TO&E as well.

Q. Are the SFATs meant to be enduring, or are they adhoc teams that form for one mission, and when the mission is complete do they disband and the soldiers return to the ranks?

A. Easy answer no/yes/yes

With help from the big guy, I will assume a 1SG position when the deployment is over and all but a few Officers will move back to the units they came from or to a new unit. 98 percent of the Officers assigned for this mission are TDY. All of the NCO’s are PCS'd into our current unit and will fill PSG/1SG/SGM slots upon redeployment.

Q. What did you see as the biggest success of the program? The biggest failure?

A. Success: I can’t put into words how much I have learned. This assignment has opened my eyes to a lot of things E-8's don’t normally get the opportunity to see, hear, and do. I feel this assignment has broadened my horizons and better prepared me for future leadership positions and an overall understanding of strategic operations.

Before this mission, Counterinsurgency was a word I had heard from Field Grades and alike. Now I truly understand and practice it every single day.

Further, I can use my own team's success as an example. To make a long story short, you couldn't pry my boss and his counterpart Kandak CDR apart with a crow bar. Those two are inseparable. I can honestly say, that our team has made one hell of a lasting impact on at least one Infantry Kandak in the Region. And for lack of better terms, you can't buy that with any amount of Government funds.

Failures: I wouldn’t say there are any failures. There are many things we could do better but failure is a strong word.

In a few, blunt words:
The Selection Process must be improved; DA must narrow down the selection criteria in order to select the right Officers and NCOs for this challenging role.

Q. If you were king for a day, what three changes (if any) would you impliment to improve SFAT concept?

1. Start an incentive program for SFA: Promotions; assignment of choice; staying on track in your career field and remaining competitive. (shoot, after this job, line time will be easy) :)

2. I think SFA should be centrally controlled by USASOC or at least have oversight ; they are the experts in what we do here.

3. SFA should not be an adhoc organization every BCT should have a dedicated SFA company with its own METL, Property Book, and CoC—heck, maybe even its own branch.

I'll look through my collection unclassified write-ups on SFA to share with the group.

If you have other specific questions please send them my way. If I don't have the answer I'll ask someone smarter than me....there's plenty of those guys around.

Stan

02-13-2012, 02:47 PM

SFAT,
Welcome aboard and thanks for some great info !

Regards, Stan

Bill Moore

02-14-2012, 08:23 AM

SFA-T,

Thanks for your detailed and insightful response, I found it helpful in assessing how the GPF is approaching this. To be frank it is better than I suspected.

Your comment here speaks to your success in my opinion:

I can use my own team's success as an example. To make a long story short, you couldn't pry my boss and his counterpart Kandak CDR apart with a crow bar. Those two are inseparable. I can honestly say, that our team has made one hell of a lasting impact on at least one Infantry Kandak in the Region. And for lack of better terms, you can't buy that with any amount of Government funds.

Regarding your three recommendations:

1. Start an incentive program for SFA: Promotions; assignment of choice; staying on track in your career field and remaining competitive. (shoot, after this job, line time will be easy)

Agree, but the accelerated promotions since the war have made this more challenging. While not a popular opinion, I think they need to slow the promotions down so individuals can be developed professionally longer in each grade. Pay can be increased for time in service to address retention. Open to debate, but in the NCO ranks it seems appropriate that a future CSM should have 1st Sgt time, and it would be even better if he had 1st Sgt time and advisor time as a MSG. Same for officers, they still need key developmental positions to be better qualified to perform command positions, but they would likely be better leaders in IW situations if they also had advisor time under their belt.

2. I think SFA should be centrally controlled by USASOC or at least have oversight ; they are the experts in what we do here.

Agree, I think there would be some benefit to having Special Warfare Center run the program (that doesn't mean they mean to physically move the school), but simply based on the legacy knowledge for SFA in SWC since they have been training combat advisors for decades (IMA before it evolved into SWC). They also have cultural training to help advisors prepare for duty in their for their specific assignments (we need to start thinking about SFA beyond Afghanistan).

3. SFA should not be an adhoc organization every BCT should have a dedicated SFA company with its own METL, Property Book, and CoC—heck, maybe even its own branch.

I can see the value of a standing core organization (support staff) within a BDE, but advisors to be value added need to bring muddy boots experience from the ranks. Nothing quite as valuable as a SFC who has walked the talk as a platoon sgt when advising others in infantry tactics and leadership, same with a MAJ who served as a Plt Leader, XO, and Company Cdr, they bring a lot of experience (read value) to those they are advising. I think after a couple tours (6-8 months once we get back to a normal ops tempo) they should return to the ranks in most cases to stay current. What are the pro's and con's with that approach?

TAH

02-17-2012, 02:56 PM

The Army announced today a new mission to meet requirements in Afghanistan. Four brigade combat teams (BCTs), one separate brigade and an Army command, each in a modified configuration, will deploy between April and August 2012. Approximately 1,460 active component officers and senior non-commissioned officers along with approximately 300 DoD civilians will deploy in 18-person teams to provide training assistance to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

The majority of those BCT soldiers and leaders not deploying will be reassigned to other units, in most cases on their respective installations. The remainder will focus on schooling, training, gunnery, and equipment maintenance and accountability.

Beginning in the 3rd quarter of fiscal 2012, these security force assistance teams will help to further generate, employ, and sustain the ANSF during the transition of security responsibility to the Afghan government and its security forces.

The units ordered to deploy are:

2nd BCT, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Ky.
2nd BCT, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Ga.
3rd BCT, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colo.
4th BCT, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, Texas.
162nd Infantry Brigade, Fort Polk, La.
1st Army, Rock Island Arsenal, Ill. :eek:

SdunnyW506

02-01-2013, 03:43 AM

I have been reading the above and its great info. But does anyone have any more recent information or SFAT experience since?

I'm a young/new officer that's going to be on an SFAT heading over to Afghanistan April/May. I'm psyched to be dealing with a lot of FID, but I don't have the raw first-hand experience. Trying to read up and do as much hw as I can before I get over there.

Thanks!

Granite_State

02-01-2013, 04:43 PM

I haven't been on SFAT (yet), but worked with Border Advisory Teams on my deployment to southern Helmand last year. I've also got a pretty good short AAR from a buddy who was a kandak advisor further north. PM me with your .mil and I'll send it your way.

davidbfpo

08-04-2014, 10:19 PM

A short explanation of this part of preparing for a post-2014 role in Afghanistan:
SOAG’s mission is to train, advise, and mentor a senior staff headquarters within the Afghan security forces. Their creation and deployment signal a shift in strategy away from US and NATO leadership and toward developing senior Afghan planners and logisticians who can effectively manage the enormous security apparatus that the international community helped create over the last twelve years. NATO leadership believes that, at this stage in the conflict, it is best to develop the capacity of the senior headquarters to ensure that the lower level formations are employed properly

Link:http://foreign-intrigue.com/2014/08/special-operations-advisory-groups-a-case-study-in-cross-cultural-organizational-collaboration/

I am sure others will find it of value. apt phrases:
The important lesson that Commando-SOAG learnedfrom this is that outcomes are far more important than processes.

Morgan

08-06-2014, 01:35 AM

As I approach the end of my 18 months working with the Afghan Special Operations forces (both 1st and 2nd Special Operations Brigades, or SOBs) as a contractor, I, too, would like to comment on the SOAG and my perspective on the "way forward".

I agree with Mr Coughran that "selection" of personnel is extremely important. As he states that the SOAG is focused on developing the ANASOC staff, I strongly recommend that the wide net that any SOAG leader casts in search of advisors include those outside of the 18-series MOS', active and retired. Unless the 18-series is an E8 or higher, it is likely that individual has little to no time on a staff at any level. Not surprisingly, combat arms folks prefer to avoid staff assignments if possible. This makes such people less than suitable for mentoring staffs. Reach out to those with staff training (battle-staff, ILE, etc) and / or staff experience, preferably at brigade level or higher. Often times, this will be someone from the conventional side. I'm not knocking the SF bubbas but far too many of them make clear that they avoid (or avoided) staff assignment whenever they could.

Selection should also ensure that those placed in advisory roles have the experience necessary to advise at a particular level. If the advisor says to you "The (SOB) DCO and Chief of Staff do the same job!", that guy is probably not the right one to advise the DCO and Chief of Staff or even at the brigade level. Select someone with the requisite, or at least commensurate, level of experience

This leads next to the issue of "training" versus "mentoring / advising". As many have pointed out, particularly on the green-suit side, we are beyond training at this point and rightly so after almost 8 years with the ANASOF. The people needed here are "mentors / advisors", not trainers. Unlike some, I feel the two, while closely related and quite complementary, are different skill sets. A drill sergeant "trains" while an observer-controller at JRTC "mentors". SOAG needs mentors & advisors for the ANASOC staff. Effective trainers can be used at the School of Excellence (SOE), which is another critical part of ANASOF.

My next point has to do with tour length. Mr Coughran states that he worked at SOAG for 5 months (June - November 2013). Such short tour lengths seem to be the norm for the SOF community. While it may effective when working with platoon and company-level elements, it does not fit for advising staffs. As anyone knows who has been on a staff, things take time. This is greatly magnified when advising a foreign force, especially one like the ANA (even the ANASOF) whose processes are compartmentalized, & based on mistrust and avoidance of responsibility. These can be overcome (somewhat) if the same advisor remains in place for at least 12 months, preferably 18-24 months.

In many ways, the reason ANASOC has achieved its current level of effectiveness is due to the contractor force because many of these contractors have been here for three or four years, some going on eight years. The continuity that many of the contractors bring ensure that the ANASOC staff, whether they remain in Kabul or go out to the SOBs, have a known individual they can reach out to when they have questions or just want to share some thoughts. Green suiters rotating in and out every six to nine months undercut their ability to develop and capitalize on the relationships necessary in this culture to influence their Afghan counterparts to do the things needed to improve their systems.

Finally, we (Americans) must get away from giving ANASOC anything. While we certainly don't want to leave our Afghan counterparts hanging in the wind, we must avoid maintaining their dependence on us, whether it is money, printer cartridges, fuel, etc, etc. We don't like it but letting them fail may be the best way to assist them in identifying and correcting their faults.