FM 3-0 (Operations) Roll Out

[Dr Jack]

It looks like the updated FM 3-0, Operations, will be released at the end of February 2008. Some of the areas in the manual with major changes include:


Operational Concept
Stability Operations Construct
Information Operations Construct
Warfighting Functions
Spectrum of Conflict
Defeat and Stability Mechanisms
Joint Interdependence
The Operational Environment
Modular Forces

Chapter 3 of the new FM 3-0 describes the Operational Concept:


“The Army’s operational concept is the core of its doctrine. It must be uniformly known and understood within the Service...”


Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent Joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results.

They employ synchronized action – lethal and nonlethal – proportional to the mission, and informed by a thorough understanding of all variables of the operational environment.

Mission command that conveys intent and an appreciation of all aspects of the situation guides the adaptive use of Army forces.

The manual will have a combination of "evolutionary" and "revolutionary" concepts --


While this doctrine may be evolutionary, its impact on the force and the application of the doctrine will be revolutionary.

Some aspects are evolutionary (strategic context, operational environment, full spectrum operations, command and control, etc.).

Other aspects are revolutionary (stability operations co-equal with offense and defense, emphasis on information engagement, requirements for leaders to be competent with both lethal and non-lethal (soft power) applications of combat power).
It should be an interesting read...

[Ron Humphrey]

To read it

[Menning]

I'm working on a news story about the new FM's creation. When it is published, I'll post a link to it.

[Gian P Gentile]

I'm working on a news story about the new FM's creation. When it is published, I'll post a link to it.

Do you imagine that it will receive the same level of attention as FM 3-24 did when it was released?

[max161]

I'm working on a news story about the new FM's creation. When it is published, I'll post a link to it.

Suggestion: Look at the development of FM 100-5 (FM 3-0 predecessor in the old numbering system) since 1976 (and especially through the 1980's with the introduction of AirLand Battle and how it positively impacted on ODS/DS) and compare it to the manual today and ask if it will do the same for the Army as did the 1982 and 1986 versions of 100-5.

[William F. Owen]

:


Operational Concept
Stability Operations Construct
Information Operations Construct
Warfighting Functions
Spectrum of Conflict
Defeat and Stability Mechanisms
Joint Interdependence
The Operational Environment
Modular Forces

.

I'll confessed to being intrigued with how they will interrelate all these headings in a way that creates a coherent and useful doctrine. EG: What is the difference between a "Construct" and a "Mechanism". I understand the semantic difference, but am very curious to see how it pans out.

Sadly for my wife, I am quite excited about seeing this! :D

[Ken White]

I'll confessed to being intrigued with how they will interrelate all these headings in a way that creates a coherent and useful doctrine. EG: What is the difference between a "Construct" and a "Mechanism". I understand the semantic difference, but am very curious to see how it pans out.(and I mean a very dangerous in the true sense of the word) penchant for picking up jazzy and essentially meaningless terms from the MBA community -- to our lasting detriment. :D

We taught them most of what we knew and had learned from WW II and now we get to buy it back (literally through really expensive contracts and consultancies) from them. Embarrassing.

[carl]

(and I mean a very dangerous in the true sense of the word) penchant for picking up jazzy and essentially meaningless terms from the MBA community -- to our lasting detriment. :D


How true! I wish a rule would be made stating that if Grant, Churchill or Eisenhower didn't use a word of phrase, nobody in the current military could use it either.

[Team Infidel]

Not looking forward to the roll out. They have started to change the Information Operations construct from IO to IE... IE being Information Engagement. They want to take some of our toys away. We have been fighting with CAC on this issue, but it falls on deaf ears unfortunately.

[Dr Jack]

Not looking forward to the roll out. They have started to change the Information Operations construct from IO to IE... IE being Information Engagement. They want to take some of our toys away. We have been fighting with CAC on this issue, but it falls on deaf ears unfortunately.

I believe that the construct is changing, but not with the intent of "taking toys away" from IO... Chapter 7 (Information Superiority) received (and continues to receive) the most attention of all of the chapters from all the "stakeholders" and senior leadership. The discussion of Information, as an element of combat power, emphasizes the commander's role in being personally involved in the integration of all of the information tasks:


Because of its pervasive nature, commanders at every level integrate and synchronize the information element of combat power...

Because the modern operational environment yields such a high and often decisive impact to the side which best leverages information, commanders must provide personal direction and attention to it, fully integrating information into their exercise of battle command. They insure these information tasks are integrated into all operations and that their staffs include them into the operations process from its inception...
There are six information tasks (including Information Engagement) listed in Chapter 7. The six tasks are: Information Engagement; Public Affairs; Command and Control Warfare; Information Protection; Operations Security; and Military Deception.

Of course, regardless of all of the discussions about IO, not everyone is going to be fully happy with the final outcome. Having the commander as the focal point in personally ensuring all of the information tasks are intergrated and synchronized is, in my opinion, a step in the right direction.

[Menning]

I don't believe FM 3-0 will see the same media frenzy that accompanied FM 3-24. I haven't heard much outside military circles about 3-0. However, I can't wait to hear what CADD says about the piece.

Suggestion: Look at the development of FM 100-5 (FM 3-0 predecessor in the old numbering system) since 1976 (and especially through the 1980's with the introduction of AirLand Battle and how it positively impacted on ODS/DS) and compare it to the manual today and ask if it will do the same for the Army as did the 1982 and 1986 versions of 100-5.

Thanks Col. Maxwell for the suggestions regarding looking at the evolution of concepts from the old 100 manuals. I hadn't heard that yet. I have come across complaints regarding the IO section.

[Team Infidel]

One of the problems will be with Chpt 7 is that it will not synch with FM 3-13. It also doesn't allow us to be full spectrum IO Planners as previously taught. In fact, during the FA30 course, they teach both.

Just learned that Chpt 7 changed again this past week. A new drag is being sent to me today.

The Army will release FM 3-0 on 27 Feb at the Winter AUSA meeting.

[Team Infidel]

There was a rewrite of chpt 7. The following description was sent to me on v. 9.


Version 9 essentially relegates the G7 (FA 30) to message management focused on influencing local audiences (primarily
non-combatants). The primary focus of that being the "linking" of actions to messages, by means of COMCAM, DSPD and Strategic Communications themes, messages, products and activities in order to maintain consistency in both deeds and words. PSYOP, although an integrating responsibility of the G7 Information Engagement Section, is first and foremost focused on the enemy, adversary and other combatant forces in addition to foreign audiences and is conducted in order to "influence" select targets and audiences. The remainder of traditional IO is distributed across the staff with the majority of tasks assigned to the G-/S-3. Overall integration / synchronization responsibility remains the job of the chief of staff executed through the operations officer by means of other coordinating staff officers and functional cells. The processes and techniques that will be required to ensure IO is fully coordinated across the staff are in effect TBD as FM 3.0 defers the more detailed discussions as to exactly how IO is integrated, coordinated and executed to FM 3-13 to sort through.

If you are interested and work in the Puzzle Palace, I can show you a copy.

[J Wolfsberger]

Is the draft of FM 3.0 available, maybe through AKO? If so, could somebody post a link?

[Team Infidel]

I may be able to upload the chapter to my ako account then send you the link to it. I will try tomorrow.

[Dr Jack]

Suggestion: Look at the development of FM 100-5 (FM 3-0 predecessor in the old numbering system) since 1976 (and especially through the 1980's with the introduction of AirLand Battle and how it positively impacted on ODS/DS) and compare it to the manual today and ask if it will do the same for the Army as did the 1982 and 1986 versions of 100-5.

From the FM 3-0 overview briefing:


This version of Field Manual 3-0 represents the 15th edition of the Army’s capstone operations manual, a special commitment to America’s national security that traces its lineage to the first doctrine crafted for our forces, Baron von Steuben’s 1779 Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States. In 1905, Secretary of War Elihu Root published the Army’s first set of Field Service Regulations, institutionalizing the American way of war at a time in our history when the United States first expanded her influence beyond the borders of our nation. Those same field service regulations led our forces to the shores of France in 1918, and turned the tide of battle at a time when the entire world held it’s collective breath. They changed with America’s new role following the First World War, adapting to a remarkable new world order, and again in 1939 when new threats rose to challenge that order.

Under the guiding hand of Army Chief of Staff George Catlett Marshall, the Army’s capstone warfighting manual was revised three times during World War II, operationalizing the experiences and lessons drawn from the fields of battle in North Africa, Europe, and the Pacific Islands. It evolved again as a nuclear-capable Soviet Union raised the Iron Curtain between East and West. It captured the hard-earned lessons of conflict in Korea and Vietnam, and served as the seminal expression of American combat power during the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reshaping of world order reflected in the collapse of the Soviet Union. It carried American forces to victory in Panama in 1989 and again in Iraq in 1991. It evolved as the world entered a new era of peace operations, yet remained prescient enough to guide U.S. ground forces to decisive victory in the Thunder Run to Baghdad in 2003.
And, from the draft introduction:

This edition of FM 3-0 reflects Army thinking in a complex period of prolonged conflicts and opportunities. The doctrine recognizes that current conflicts defy solution by military means alone and that landpower, while critical, is only part of each campaign. Success in future conflicts will require the protracted application of all the instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. Because of this, Army doctrine now gives equal importance to tasks dealing with the population—stability or civil support—as to those related to offensive and defensive operations. This parity is critical; it recognizes that 21st Century conflict involves more than combat between armed opponents. While defeating the enemy with offensive and defensive operations, Army forces simultaneously shape the broader situation through nonlethal actions to restore security and normalcy to the local populace.

[Team Infidel]

I have it uploaded to AKO. Not sure how to have all you AKO/DKO users view it.

[Dr Jack]

From the New York Times, 8 Feb:


The Army has drafted a new operations manual that elevates the mission of stabilizing war-torn nations, making it equal in importance to defeating adversaries on the battlefield.

Military officials described the new document, the first new edition of the Army’s comprehensive doctrine since 2001, as a major development that draws on the hard-learned lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, where initial military successes gave way to long, grueling struggles to establish control.

It is also an illustration of how far the Pentagon has moved beyond the Bush administration’s initial reluctance to use the military to support “nation-building” efforts when it came into office.



Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell IV, the commander of the Army’s Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth in Kansas, began briefing lawmakers on the document on Thursday. In an interview, he called it a “blueprint to operate over the next 10 to 15 years.”

“Army doctrine now equally weights tasks dealing with the population — stability or civil support — with those related to offensive and defensive operations,” the manual states. “Winning battles and engagements is important but alone is not sufficient. Shaping the civil situation is just as important to success.”

In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the military is enmeshed in rebuilding local institutions, helping to restore essential services and safeguarding a vulnerable population. The new manual is an attempt to put these endeavors — along with counterinsurgency warfare — at the core of military training, planning and operations. That would require some important changes. “There is going to be some resistance,” General Caldwell said. “There will be people who will hear and understand what we are saying, but it is going to take some time to inculcate that into our culture.”

Much more at the link:

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/08/washington/08strategy.html?ref=world

[William F. Owen]

Interesting that FM 3-0 only uses the word "civilian" 7 times and in 4 of those cases refers to "civilian agencies."

[Ken White]

"General Caldwell said the manual would influence Army education and training by stressing the sort of skills that are needed to bring stability to conflict-ridden states with weak governments.

“There will be people who naturally will say, ‘If I can do high-end offense and defense, I can do any lesser kind of operations,’ ” he said. “What we have found through seven years is that is not the case.”

Seems to me that that's an incorrect statement. What I think we've found through seven years are two things that make that statement wrong.

- People will do what they're trained to do and if you deliberately leave something out of the training, it won't get done or at least, won't get done correctly.

- The senior folks may be slow to adapt to an unfamiliar environment but the kids down the chain were not. In fairness, some senior leaders got it and did it right early on but they were a minority.

The US Army and most units in it are quite capable of doing a lot more than too many senior people will give them credit for. I've long had a suspicion that the fear of lacking General Officer personal involvement it will not be done correctly is a contributor to that. Bad attitude; there will never be enough Generals. Captains have to be trusted; the vast majority prove daily that they can be ...

[Dr Jack]

Interesting that FM 3-0 only uses the word "civilian" 7 times and in 4 of those cases refers to "civilian agencies."

I did a quick search of the FM 3-0 final draft -- and the word "civilian" appears 90 times; "civilian agencies" represent 18 of those hits. "Civil authorities" appears 16 times...

[Dr Jack]

Seems to me that that's an incorrect statement. What I think we've found through seven years are two things that make that statement wrong.

- People will do what they're trained to do and if you deliberately leave something out of the training, it won't get done or at least, won't get done correctly.

- The senior folks may be slow to adapt to an unfamiliar environment but the kids down the chain were not. In fairness, some senior leaders got it and did it right early on but they were a minority.

The US Army and most units in it are quite capable of doing a lot more than too many senior people will give them credit for. I've long had a suspicion that the fear of lacking General Officer personal involvement it will not be done correctly is a contributor to that. Bad attitude; there will never be enough Generals. Captains have to be trusted; the vast majority prove daily that they can be ...

I believe this is addressed in the introduction to FM 3-0 -- that subordinates must be trusted to act flexibly and adapt to the situation on the ground. This is one of the lessons of the past seven years...


The high quality of Army leaders and Soldiers is best exploited by allowing subordinates maximum latitude to exercise individual and small-unit initiative. Tough, realistic training prepares leaders for this, and FM 3-0 prescribes giving them the maximum latitude to successfully accomplish the mission. This requires a climate of trust in the abilities of superior and subordinate alike. It also requires leaders at every level to think and act flexibly, constantly adapting to the situation. Subordinates’ actions are bounded by the higher commander’s intent but not circumscribed by excessive control. This is a continuing tension across the Army, aggravated by advanced information systems that can provide higher commanders the details of lower echelon operations. The temptation for senior leaders to micromanage subordinates is great, but it must be resisted.

[wm]

The US Army and most units in it are quite capable of doing a lot more than too many senior people will give them credit for. I've long had a suspicion that the fear of lacking General Officer personal involvement it will not be done correctly is a contributor to that. Bad attitude; there will never be enough Generals. Captains have to be trusted; the vast majority prove daily that they can be ...

Actually Ken, I think it is more correct to say there will always be too many generals because they are too interested in doing the work that should be left to their captains, lieutenants and senior NCOs.

When I was a new 2LT, a senior officer who was about to retire told me that the Army does things backwards. He thought the toughest job for an officer is to lead a platoon. He felt that leading a platooon ought to be the capstone of one's career, not its beginning. He went on to justify this claim by saying platoon leadership requires more specialized knowledge and skill than any newly-commissioned 20-something can possibly be expected to have. The most important part of that knowledge is not learned from books: it is knowing how to work with people, which can only be learned by working with people.

While I may not completely agree with all of this sentiment--I suspect company command may actually be the toughest job an officer every gets the privilege to hold--I do think it has a lot of truth to it. I guess that's why we are lucky enough to have those crusty E7 platoon sergeants around to make sure the LTs don't screw the pooch too badly. I know mine certainly saved the tails of me and the rest of my platoon more times than I care to recount.

I would gladly have fewer generals if it meant I could have more well-qualified E-6s,-7s, and -8s in the force.

[Rob Thornton]

“There will be people who naturally will say, ‘If I can do high-end offense and defense, I can do any lesser kind of operations,’ ” he said. “What we have found through seven years is that is not the case.”

I’m not sure that is strictly a face value observation – I think it goes deeper – it speaks to leader assessments of training and employment. What I mean is that if a unit leader believes that all he needs proficiency in is lethal operations – without ever doing an assessment of conditions he is going to operate in, then its going to take him longer to adapt to the conditions as they are vs. those the leader wanted them to be – regardless of what his subordinates may be telling him. NSPD 44, DoD Directive 3000.05 and the Army Campaign Plan for Stability Operations are all linked and directive – the doctrine now reflects the decisions about the role of military force in other then strictly offensive or strictly defensive operations. It does not divorce the former from stability operations, it marries them – it says that these are all components of full spectrum operations and only by being prepared physically and mentally to conduct all components of full spectrum operations, and transition between them smoothly will we achieve the political objective – be it the one we began with, or the one that got adjusted as the war evolved.

I certainly agree that we are capable of adapting and adjusting at every level. Some of the most astute observations and initiatives have come from junior leaders – look at the some of the newest articles in the SWJ – the subjects are often on politics, culture and economics – they are being written by company grade leadership! I think we also have to put LTG Cladwell's comments in the greater context of some of the stuff he’s recently said, written about (and we’ve discussed here) – things like ensuring our soldiers and leaders can be free to communicate and compete with our enemies in the areas of ideas, or the role and authorities given to junior leaders who actually can conduct on the ground assessments. Remember who the article says he is addressing – Law Makers – those inside 495 – and who largely are limited to what they know about current military affairs by what they are told – by think tanks, pundits, special interest folks, staffers who may have had military service some time ago, but maybe not within the last 8 years (althugh I've met some who have in the HASC).

So its not just the “If I can do” – it’s also the resources and training – and mental energy that are attributed to the belief that doing one set of tasks exclusively automatically prepares me to do the other things I may be asked to do, and then stifling subordinate initiative to do anything else. That I think is the concern reflected in the remark.

One thing I wholly believe in is the ability of empowered leaders at all levels to conduct a good assessment of what needs to be done, and when given the authority and resources, they will tackle it. What I think the new 3-0 does is give us the doctrine to accept risk and empower ourselves – we can say “look our capstone manual says these are equally important and we must be full spectrum”. Equally important is all the other things that will drive across the DOTMLPF spectrum – the doctrine is an enabler. It bears witness to what many of us already believe – we are capable at all levels to take on a greater width and depth of missions then we’ve given ourselves credit for in the past, and now we have the doctrinal authority to do it – which cannot be undersold since it drives so much of the OTMLPF.

Remember,

In an interview, he called it a “blueprint to operate over the next 10 to 15 years.”

By that statement we are looking beyond - at least as beyond as we can reasonable do. To me, this statement says - we're in this for the long haul - there is no going back to the luxury of focusing exclusively on single components – be they in peace time or other. This also is in line with our assessment that “persistent conflict” does not end with a change in Administrations. I like this because it speaks to the pitfalls of life – the old “you may not have an interest in War, but War has an interest in you!” We can be rolling along post OIF and OEF, happily back in our comfort zone where authority is restricted (or at least restrained to what it was) and free to focus on the ways we think policy should employ us and then the heavy shoe of something messy drops – and we are scratching our heads wondering why we chose to abandon all those things we learned how to do in OIF and OEF.

I’ve got a piece I’m reading right now entitled “Pacification” that was copied and distributed up here at the SFA conference – its a compilation of lessons from Vietnam by those involved in the SFA to the South Vietnamese. I’m not sure I could have read it prior to a couple of years ago and assessed its value – but it could have been written yesterday. Its been available I’m sure – just few people wanted to look for it, or would have understood its importance in say 2001. It is more then just our ability to forget, its our ability to forget coupled with our desire to make things easier on ourselves, and to emphasize what we believe we are best at – regardless if that is the reality we must live in. Injecting reality where it cannot be ignored is paramount to how we go forward – it should be injected into everything we do.
Best Rob

[Rob Thornton]

On the walk up this morning I got to thinking about the challenges associated with putting forward good doctrine. In this case 3-0s challenges are that it most be descriptive enough so that no one component of the full spectrum is emphasized to the point where it becomes prescriptive – it must allow the user to determine where he places emphasis based on the conditions in which he and his unit must operate.

This is no small challenge, particularly given the impact of doctrine across the DOTMLPF spectrum, and the timelines we associate with doctrine. Its worth while I think to talk about how we communicate doctrine and what its various uses are. Recently SWC member Mike Innes put up the “Chaoplectic” article on the “Hybrid Wars” thread. Within this piece it talked about the various modes we use to explain things. It discussed the clock as the Neo-Classical model whereby we decided that the nature of “whole” of something could be discovered by examining its various parts. Whole scientific treatises emerged on the nature of the Universe as a result (although certainly some folks had contemplated it prior to the 18th Century). Just as important as allowing us as individuals to think about things – it allowed us to communicate ideas, and that allowed us to leverage each other’s ideas to get further then any one person unto themselves would be able.

Doctrine serves some similar functions, but also suffers from some of the same limitations. I’ve mentioned before that I thought one of the functions of doctrine was to try and take what might be described as “art” – or the intuitive decisions of a commander or leader to gain an advantage and place his enemy at a disadvantage – and make it into science – something that can be explained so that all of us may benefit from it. This is not new – we do this in all our endeavors – Donald Trump writes books on “how to make millions”, but it doesn’t guarantee that by reading it you will become one – you still have to apply the ideas, be in the conditions to which they can be applied, have the resources to take advantage of opportunities or recover from missteps, recognize opportunities and risk, etc. Doctrine I think is very similar – it provides a framework for actions to solve problems within conditions – it is not a silver bullet unto itself – or there is no success through osmosis.

It also must account for its audience – the broader and varied the audience, the less precise it can be. For example – I used the word component to describe a mental model offered by one of the figures in 3-0 used to depict the range of full spectrum operations. There is a tough call to be made when using a figure to illustrate what is by nature complex and more or less vague depending upon the conditions – where does one component begin and the other leave off for example? One of the things I do like about 3-0 is the use of multiple types of figures to communicate that complexity – however, even this is no guarantee that it user will not home in one in particular and become wedded to it – human nature is to boil down and simplify. Sometimes I lament that not enough people read Clausewitz – or that they only look to one aspect of what he wrote, picking a particular quote and building independent context around it and divorcing it from the rest of the work. Much has been written about why many prefer Jomini to the dead Prussian – I think its because the dead Swiss tried to boil it down to a set of principles that said if you do these things – you’ll be a success like the Corsican Bonaparte. Jomini made something very complex, that is interactive, and has a non-linear nature into something that it is not – however, he did understand we’d like it to be that way, and the principles he offered are useful – but only when placed in the context of the conditions that are subject to the nature of war. There is probably a balance to be struck between teaching "how" to think - Clausewitz, and "what" to think - Jomini - they are often simbiotic - and different folks require different measures of each - it allows us to get over blocks and humps.

This I think is the fundamental challenge of Army & Joint doctrine – how do you develop doctrine that empowers both the individual and the system to make the changes that keep it relevant in changing conditions? How do you make it so the science can be taken and processed and provide the basis for art? While I think there is both good and bad doctrine – even the best doctrine is going to be limited to how it is employed. I think it is necessary and has helped us become the Army we are – it touches things in ways I think most do not consider – often the ideas that go into doctrine are those that are spread throughout the force by other means. I heard someone remark recently after being exposed to 3-24 for the first time that he was surprised – it was pretty much what they’d been doing, but he’d never seen it linked together so that he could see the whole idea in its entirety – that is a pretty powerful remark.

Doctrine, when combined with access to various information technologies allows us to communicate – not only a finished product, but the process which produces it, and the opportunity to influence it consciously and subconsciously with like and competing ideas. 3-0 I think reflects this – now that its core ideas are in a releasable format – the process of implementing it, and providing feedback can shape the direction it takes.

Finally, the last challenge I think doctrine must address is relevancy outside the classroom - there is a challenge - in a classroom at the schoolhouse - there is the opportunity to introduce, reflect, confer, etc. in comparably benign conditions. However, doctrine should also address the leader or staff guy who requires some help at 0200 in the morning in conditions that don't remotely resemble the school house. These also should ideally be seen as one or the other - we want to find ways and places to introduce ideas when they can take root, then we want to be able to refer to those ideas in a range of conditions and make use of the context that was formed when the stakes are not so high.

Best, Rob

[TROUFION]

DO any of you have a link to the new FM 3-0?

[Ken White]

Dr. Jack said:
"I believe this is addressed in the introduction to FM 3-0 -- that subordinates must be trusted to act flexibly and adapt to the situation on the ground. This is one of the lessons of the past seven years..."Good. However, that's been a tenet for the US Army for the over 50 years I've been intimately familiar with it -- correct me if I'm wrong but my impression is it's been ignored pretty much in the last 40 or so and that increasingly as time went on. Hopefully we'll reverse the trend.

Another question is why on earth is the idea that subordinates must be trusted to act flexibly and adapt to the situation on the ground can be touted as a lesson of the past seven years when we have over 200 years of US Army history that show that and far more knowledge of the issue on a worldwide and historical basis. I always found it interesting that I was more trusted as a young Marine Corporal responsible for 12 lives in Korea or as and Acting Sergeant at Fort Campbell in the mid 50s than I was years later as a fairly senior DAC responsible for an 80 plus bod staff section with no risk to life...

WM said several very correct things, one of which was this:
"Actually Ken, I think it is more correct to say there will always be too many generals because they are too interested in doing the work that should be left to their captains, lieutenants and senior NCOs."That is too true, numbers matter. The Army has essentially held on to the number of Generals with which it ended WW II for over 60 years. There are too many for the size of the force and that's what causes them to micromanage (along with a skewed philosophy). Smart aggressive guys will find something to do. Too many Sergeant Majors, too :D

[Eden]

Ken, truer words rarely spoken. At one point during my last combat tour in Afghanistan we had more general officers working in the country than we had infantry companies. It seems to me if you look at our most successful counterinsurgency campaigns of the last forty years, they have all had a flat, light command structure. Could it be true that success is inversely proportional to the number of senior leaders intimately involved?

[MattC86]

Is there a comparable revision of Marine Corps doctrine in the works?

Matt

[Rob Thornton]

Although this may fit better in other threads we've brought it up here - and I think we can make it fit – one of the best pieces of wisdom I’ve heard attributed to a senior leader – was that he only did those things which only he could do. I’ve made mention of that before, but I think it also has relevance here. If we expect our senior leaders – in this case GOs to take on responsibilities which have broad and deep requirements – then we need to put them in positions to where they are informed – preferably in a manner that allows them to verify by seeing. I’m not sure that you can do this out of theater – you can trust up to a point – but to get the type of context that allows you to testify before Congress and convince them of your argument – you need the type of context that they cannot get by reading the Post or through the many people who have access to them – to include those who for one reason or another fly over, make an assessment, and fly back to reinforce and argument they’d already decided on prior to departing CONUS – this requires a persistent presence. This is particularly important in small wars where there tends to be more influcence of domestic politics based on the perception of how that war impacts us - e.g. "is it important enough to sustain our will and why."

I’d also add that were they not there – we’d probably point to the lack of risk and hardship sharing – and that there was an obvious gap in understanding due to geography. There is also the leader development piece – what are the most relevant experiences a 1 star is going to carry forward into his follow on assignment? If we can get a 1 star into a job where he or she gains more experience that better prepares them to assume a 2 star command – we should do so – and so forth up the CoC.

Now – there is a balance to be struck – doing what only you can do – means allowing those under you to do what they can do without much oversight and guidance – trust. To tie it back to the discussion at hand – I think the doctrine emphasizes it well enough – but it can’t force a leader to follow it – a culture change along the lines the LTG Caldwell and others (leaders in general) have argued for can. The culture change can either foster the type of leader development we want, and / or winnow out those who don’t adapt. Lack of a culture change can show indecisiveness and lack of a commitment. Clearly doctrine has a role to play in this, but not by itself – the human factor requires implementation. In many ways I think the latter is harder then the former – everybody who reads it (because of its nature) will pick and choose based on how they perceive the world.

Best, Rob

[Ken White]

critical part...



. . .
...Lack of a culture change can show indecisiveness and lack of a commitment. Clearly doctrine has a role to play in this, but not by itself – the human factor requires implementation. In many ways I think the latter is harder then the former – everybody who reads it (because of its nature) will pick and choose based on how they perceive the world.

Best, Rob
(emphasis added / kw)

Does it not then become incumbent upon the system to pick and choose those who perceive the world in a way that will, instead of actively if in some cases unintentionally stifling initiative and trust, foster the attributes?

[Rob Thornton]

A couple of other thoughts ref. a leader’s role – I personally know at least 2 one star type GOs who have been, and currently are working real hard on flattening organizational communications by empowering tactical leaders with the tools and authorities needed to do so – I think there is also a organizational cultural aspect to that as well, because without one or the other it only works in a disjointed way. This meshes well with the doctrine you see in 3-24, 3-0 and will see in 3-07 Stability Ops – and it facilitates coordination not just laterally, but vertically and gets beyond service and even Joint uniformed – and speaks to Inter-Agency, HN, Coalition Partner, IOs, NGOs, private and public domains. The doctrine builds the framework – the leaders must do the empowering.

I was also thinking about my remark on who testifies before Congress, and who communicates in general. This is important – when I came back of a TT, I was asked to participate in a HASC survey ref. the broader Advisory Mission. Having EMs, NCOs, LTs, CPTs and FGs participate in this type of dialogue is important, as I believe is the importance of having them write articles, blog, be interviewed by the media – it provides a perspective that otherwise might not be represented. This is vital to our culture of “Checks & Balances”. On the other hand, the perspective offered up is predominantly “tactical”, although it could have much higher implications. So how do we offer Congress and the greater public the operational and strategic picture, the consequences of actions and inactions? How do we ensure legislators have the best information and opinion to make judgments on? Go back to GEN Petraeus’ and AMB Crocker’s testimonies before Congress – the testimonies were not simply informed by their time in Iraq, but by years of development and service – how do we build leaders who can do that – time and experience for certain, but there is also the pieces that come from the DOTMLPF.

Early on I’d mentioned that it was important to consider where LTG Caldwell made his remarks, and to who the various audiences were. Why would the CAC CDR offer up testimony to Congress on Army Doctrine? Because they need to know – they need to know what steps we are taking to better prepare ourselves, and they need to understand our capabilities.

Best, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Ken,


Does it not then become incumbent upon the system to pick and choose those who perceive the world in a way that will, instead of actively if in some cases unintentionally stifling initiative and trust, foster the attributes?

I think the first thing that must be emphasized is that the system - is a form of bureaucracy - if allowed to crank along by itself it will be left to operate a average performance - see a hole, fill a hole - miss a hole, miss the next hole, etc.

It is leadership that animates the machine in such a way that we improve ourselves vs. settling for mediocrity. You can't just build this machine and walk away - you have to constantly be engaged with it - because our machine is built out of real life people who have ups and downs, good days and bad ones, different levels of understanding, different capabilities, etc.

So while the doctrine can provide the framework and the justification - its application, implementation and success are commensurate to the quality of those who employ it. It takes me back to my personal preference for the descriptive aspects - but we can't afford a one size fits all approach.

Best, Rob

[Ken White]

I'll continue to await the awakening...:(

[Ken White]

...I personally know at least 2 one star type GOs who have been, and currently are working real hard on flattening organizational communications by empowering tactical leaders with the tools and authorities needed to do so – ... – the leaders must do the empowering.

and I mean that sincerely. My question is why do they have to work hard on what we SAY, doctrinally and Army mythically, we have been doing all along?

I don't question the need for Generals -- some of my best friends are Generals (honest) -- however, I do question the need for excessive numbers of them and their tendency to oversupervise. I've surfaced those issues to some of said GOs. friends, acquaintances and none of the foregoing included, over the years and most of 'em broadly agree. So why do we not do what we say we do and what most think we should do?

It all goes back to the USSR's highest placed Mole, Robert Strange MacNamara. He didn't trust anyone and he alone had all the answers. That attitude percolated into DoD and the Army and it hit at a bad time; the first big batches of WW II senior Officers were retiring and they knew peopl, knew their jobs and trusted people. They left and were replaced by clones of MacNamara's Whiz Kids, incredibly bright young things with no people skills. :rolleyes:

Those guys went to Viet Nam and commanded Battalions full of Instant Sergeants and Lieutenants who were dedicated, aggressive and who knew little; so the Bn Cdr had to micromanage. He came back and grew into a General in the 80s and 90s and he selected replacements in his own image... :(

The question is not where we are, I know where -- and I know why. The issue is not where Generals learn or need to be, that's obvious. The problem is one of selection and attitude. The question is the one I asked above; how do we turn around a system that has inadvertently grown to stifle imagination and innovation into one that fosters those traits...

Because that's what need to happen.

[Rob Thornton]

My question is why do they have to work hard on what we SAY, doctrinally and Army mythically, we have been doing all along?

Ken, I think that is a good question - but I don't think it is an easy one to answer. You have remarked before that some guys are clearly better commanders then others - I'd agree, but the number of commands are probably higher then the number of those with the “natural” talents which we attribute to the magic they bring. To account for those with less “magic” then others – we value certain experiences and education as pre-requisites, while having a system that is supposed to identify and develop potential. This is not easy – it is subjective, and it is prone to the types of biases we see in all our human actions. It has been said that there is usually at least a grain of truth in any stereo-type – otherwise it would not have been perpetuated – I’d concur, but I’d qualify it by saying no matter how you do a qualitative assessment on someone, the weight of that assessment is going to be ascribed a subjective value based on who is doing the follow on assessment, and what are the conditions in which it takes place – I’ve never sat on a promotion board, but I can only imagine the difficulty of trying to focus and scrutinize each write up as an individual vs. consciously or subconsciously looking for things that for whatever reason – you have ascribed disproportionate value to.

So why do they have to work so hard? Because if something, for whatever reason does not seem blatantly obvious to the audience, then it gets pushed the periphery as something extraneous to “glass ball of the hour”. This goes beyond Army culture – its human nature. I think another example is how people are often pre-disposed to take information at face value without conducting any analysis of what it might mean – the process of turning information into intelligence. We often throw terms de jour such as Situational Awareness and Situational Understanding as being interchangeable – hell, the very names imply different levels of thinking.

I think the doctrine can provide the means to be who we’d like to be, but leadership is the actual vehicle to get us there.

I’m here reading the articles penned by retired LTG Cushman ref. SFA – I swear, so much of what is there could have been written yesterday. Much of it is more accurate and applicable then what was actually written yesterday. It has a gritty language that can speak to PVTs or GOs. Its interesting that you should remark on McNamara – Old Eagle and I were just talking about this – Here is Cushman on Pacification:


“It was not clear to us how this process called “Pacification” would actually take place. We knew it was a subtle process of the mind – a psychological procedure not unlike the one experienced by a young man winning the heart of his lady.

We knew that as in courtship, indicators of success could not be tabulated precisely during the campaign. They could be subjectively judged, just as the young man does when he senses he is progressing. However the young man has an advantage; fruition arrives when his lady consents. The hamlet action could not be sure for months, probably years that the job of pacification was completed.”

Here is Cushman on his evaluation of Army company grade and young field grade leadership in the Army in about 1965. Sounds allot like conversations we've had:


“The U.S. Army lieutenant, captain or major is well equipped by background, training and heritage to assist his Vietnamese counterpart in developing these forces. Our young officers may not know much about Vietnam, but they do know how to organize, and they adapt fast. They can rapidly grasp the complex civil-military nature of pacification.”

Here is one from the Long Good-Bye on advising (and how poignant this one is)


“To assist somebody you have to understand what he is doing. And it may be that you are much smarter then the person you are advising, but you still can’t do it for him. Let’s say you are a duck hunting guide. The hunter has to rely on you to get him to the blind, get out the duck-calling whistle, make the ducks come in. He can’t do any of that. But when the time comes, he’s got to shoot the duck. Now if he works with you long enough, he might learn some tricks of the trade. It would have been wonderful if we had advisors at every level in Vietnam who were as qualified as the average northern Canadian duck-hunting guide. The trouble was they took these guys off the street – not off the street so much, but out of the Army – put’em on orders, and said, “Now you’re an advisor, go do your job.” Sometimes they got a little training,. And advisors turned over pretty fast, once a year.

So here’s this Vietnamese BN CDR. He’s been fighting the VC for ten years. Living in the rice paddies, living in the mountains. Fighting. Lucky to be alive, in his opinion. He’s got all these problems on his mind, all these troops he has to take care of. He’s not even sure he’s going to survive the next day. And here comes this new advisor, some captain fresh out of advisory school. Doesn’t know how to live in the rice paddies. Gets diarrhea the first week he’s there. Of curse he does know something about helicopters. He might know something about the theory of tactics, and he’s smart enough to know when the troops are dogging it. Nonetheless, what you have there is a very interesting situation: an advisor who has got to learn from his counterpart.

Its an art, an absolute art, to be a good advisor. The first thing you have to do is understand the situation. If you don’t you have to be smart enough not to act like you do. Don’t be popping off about it. Find out about your counterpart. See what your leverage is. You can’t be a non-entity. You can’t just come along with him to run the radio so he can get helicopters. You have to earn his respect. You come with a certain amount of respect attached, because you represent the United States of America, a powerful country with lots of resources and you represent the U.S. Armed forces”

How did we lose all of that? Why do we refer to T.E. Lawrence instead of Cushman? We made a choice to. Somewhere we decided that since we “lost Vietnam” (or did not win it), that we could not have done much right, and that whatever we did there could not be very applicable to winning this war. I’m flattened nobody has distributed Cushman mainstream – everything I’ve read so far either translates directly and clearly, or can be adapted – far easier then some of the other things I’ve been handed. Culture and Advising are not exclusive – i.e. you don’t have to learn how to advise Arab forces exclusively from someone who has advised Arabs – Arabs are people too – so depending on the who is giving the info and who the audience is - it might be more useful then someone who sort of seems more like the conditions you face, but whose message is a bit muddled. Cushman is not muddled – he talks (and writes) like one of us.

How does this relate to doctrine and why these 1 stars have to work hard – because in addition to the sender and the message, there is a receiver – and the receiver does not always want to listen for one reason or another – the sender must determine if it is either the message that needs to get restructured, or if it’s the receiver that just does not want to listen – that can be hard work – especially when it’s the same message, but multiple receivers.

Best, Rob

[Cavguy]

Great stuff Rob. I remember reading "Army in Vietnam” in 2004 and thinking the whole time I could scratch "Vietnam" and write "Iraq" in its place.

Talking to the Vietnam greybeards on Leavenworth confirmed this as well - most our "new" observations are old - adaptive junior leaders, working with HN, dealing with corruption, etc. all happened before.

I just finished a briefing with a senior officer of the Australian CGSC - The discussion waxed to Kilcullen (a friend of his) and I mentioned how reading his "28 Articles" was a eye-opening moment for me - where I went "aha!" and nothing was the same. He and the Aussie LNO here smiled and asked me did I know what Aussie company grade officers thought about it. They apparently thought it was a great document, but the collective reaction was something akin to "Duh". It was nothing new for them - that was their experience in the Malaya, Vietnam, Solomons and East Timor for the past fifty years.

That’s why for all the hyperventilating about COIN focus, my main effort is to do what I can to ensure that some measure of this learning is embedded for the future – that we don’t brain dump this again. I lost too many people I know partially because we did brain dump this following Vietnam. The challenge ahead is to codify this (re)learning and get it integrated into our institutions alongside the traditional maneuver competencies, so that in 20 years my son doesn’t re-learn everything again.

To wit, GEN Jack Keane,


“We put an army on the battlefield that I had been a part of for 37 years. The truth of the matter is: It doesn’t have any doctrine, nor was it educated and trained, to deal with an insurgency. …After the Vietnam War, we purged ourselves of everything that dealt with irregular warfare or insurgency, because it had to do with how we lost that war. In hindsight, that was a bad decision….We have responsibility. ”
– GEN Jack Keane, 18 April 2006


I don’t want to allow it to happen again.

[Ken White]

"...the number of commands are probably higher then the number of those with the “natural” talents which we attribute to the magic they bring. To account for those with less “magic” then others – we value certain experiences and education as pre-requisites, while having a system that is supposed to identify and develop potential."'Supposed to' being the operative words. That system also insists that all those elected are de jure and de facto equal -- an obvious impossibility. As I've said before, Congress and DOPMA have a lot to answer for...

Select talent -- subjectively, of course -- and let it do its job. That works. The criteria for selection is part of the problem. Aside from possibly not all the right criteria, our system selects potential (as you say -- and not talent) and moves it from job to job and place to place far too quickly and (this is the bad part) suppresses latent talent all too often. We do not select great Commanders; we select those who will be adequate Commanders. That worked with the mass armies of yesteryear. I simply suggest it is not desirable for the Army of today.

Smiling Jack Cushman was the Grand Guru of the IV Corps Tactical Zone in Viet Nam. I'm not a fan of him or his actions then but acknowledge he did turn into a reasonably decent writer later in life. Of the 'don't do as I do, do as I say' variety...

His statement you quote on the adaptability of "Our young officers" is correct but elides the point that some of those young officers did that job far better than did others -- as the quote from The Long Good-Bye shows. That, of course, is also my broad point on Commanders; some are far better than others and the Troops deserve better than 'acceptable.'

I think we quote T. E. Lawrence instead of Cushman for a variety of reasons, not least a bad tendency to ape the British in some areas and due to the fact -- and it is fact -- that the US Army for almost 30 years tried to bury its head in the sand about Viet Nam because any thinking soldier who was there knew that the Army -- not the media or the politicians; the Army -- had screwed the pooch there.

Fortunately we appear to have learned a little better and certainly more quickly this time around. That does not mean the underlying problem is fixed, it is not. We still subjectively select a 'type' with potential and rotate him through a series of jobs, rarely staying in one place long enough to make a difference -- and running him off if he's too good.
"How does this relate to doctrine and why these 1 stars have to work hard – because in addition to the sender and the message, there is a receiver – and the receiver does not always want to listen for one reason or another – the sender must determine if it is either the message that needs to get restructured, or if it’s the receiver that just does not want to listen – that can be hard work – especially when it’s the same message, but multiple receivers."Sorry, do not agree. Human nature as you said is important and a factor but the downstream receivers in this case are mostly willing to listen and willing to work. The ol' bottom line is that most people will try to do their job to the best of their ability. To enable them to do this, they must have the proper education and training (we aren't too bad at that and we're getting better, still more to be done) and then they must be turned loose to do their job (we may be getting better at this, my sensing is that we are. My sensing also is that many would like to roll back that freedom...).

Unless of course, you're talking about the message UPstream from your One Stars; then I can agree that some do not want to listen. And that, as they say, is precisely the problem.

[Ken White]

Great stuff Rob. I remember reading "Army in Vietnam” in 2004 and thinking the whole time I could scratch "Vietnam" and write "Iraq" in its place.
. . .
I don’t want to allow it to happen again.Great, even...

[William F. Owen]

I did a quick search of the FM 3-0 final draft -- and the word "civilian" appears 90 times; "civilian agencies" represent 18 of those hits. "Civil authorities" appears 16 times...

My mistake. Searched the wrong FM! Aplogies.

[Ken White]

and sleeve garters. :D

[Ski]

I think the biggest problem with the Army right now still is the ridiculous manning system that is in place.

It's the ultimate form of socialism. Everyone gets their shot at command. If you happen to be good at it, it doesn't matter, because there are holes in the system that need to be filled, and you're going to fill it or leave.

And once that company command is complete, you have about a 20% chance of getting a battalion. Basically, you're not going to lead troops anymore, and you have 10+ years left before you retire. If you're lucky, you'll have 5 years of troop leading time...even if you are the second coming of Rommel and Abrams combined.

So in that aspect, it doesn't matter what the doctrine is, because we have a system that makes almost impossible to create experts at any job.

On a good note, it only took 6 years for a new FM 3-0 to get published.

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Ken,


We do not select great Commanders; we select those who will be adequate Commanders. That worked with the mass armies of yesteryear. I simply suggest it is not desirable for the Army of today.

Ken, That reminds me of a discussion I was having a while back with a bud. When you have competing requirements - mass based and competency based - and I think we do - where do you draw the line? Since we don't get to say, well we can only produce enough of X so everything you might contemplate employing the military in, must not exceed our capacity, I'm not sure we can meet unknown requirements. This is and has been part of the rationale for development of specialized forces - you would incentivize (in one way or another), develop qualification criteria that excludes those not up to the task, and then find ways to keep them in the positions that we say are our combat multipliers. I've always thought there were several problems with that (along with several advantages). There is also no guarantee that those we "select" will stick around - this makes for a potential leadership vacuum. Again you are back to asking where to accept risk - depending on the conditions, the key commander might be that of a QM company. I'd also say there is the issue of development and when talent manifest itself - I think this is different depending on where the guy or gal is along the path - they might be a good PL - but never make a good CO CDR, BN CDR, or BDE CDR, or the same qualities that made them good at any of those jobs might limit them as a GO.

I guess what I'm getting at is that even identification is going to be subjective - particularly in the conditions associated when we have unpopular long wars and the volunteer force we decided to sustain prior to the war winds up smaller then the one we probably needed (although there may have been actions taken early in a war that would have impacted other things – but its OBE and that is why you want “more” vs. “less” to make up for Murphy and bad judgment. Could we do better – if it were just a matter of considering the actions we must take to do so, I’d say yes – however it would seem to be human nature to design systems and create conditions which cause us to work against ourselves to a degree. Why did it take till 1865 to end our Civil War – because that is how long it took. Given the scope of the problem, it may just be the best we can do – meaning applying leadership where it matters most because that is the best we can do. I heard an Ambassador at the RoL conference discussing the pragmatics of helping someone institute a different judicial system – the quote that stuck out was “justice for some”.


Smiling Jack Cushman was the Grand Guru of the IV Corps Tactical Zone in Viet Nam. I'm not a fan of him or his actions then but acknowledge he did turn into a reasonably decent writer later in life. Of the 'don't do as I do, do as I say' variety...

I figured you would have a different perspective on LTG Cushman – one that was, I don’t know deeper? I can only evaluate what I’ve seen – which would be his writings – which have a solid ring to them. What I can’t do is contrast them to his actions, or the intent of his actions when they occurred. However, sometimes the actions you do (or wish you’d done) don’t make sense until after the fact – if you can articulate them in a manner where others can benefit, I’m all for that too. Having your perspective though helps me place value a bit more though.


Sorry, do not agree. Human nature as you said is important and a factor but the downstream receivers in this case are mostly willing to listen and willing to work. The ol' bottom line is that most people will try to do their job to the best of their ability. To enable them to do this, they must have the proper education and training (we aren't too bad at that and we're getting better, still more to be done) and then they must be turned loose to do their job (we may be getting better at this, my sensing is that we are. My sensing also is that many would like to roll back that freedom...).


Unless of course, you're talking about the message UPstream from your One Stars; then I can agree that some do not want to listen. And that, as they say, is precisely the problem.

I think the biggest problem downstream is making sure the message means to the receiver what you intended it to mean – that it gets placed in the right context, and its importance is assigned. The intent to do right is usually there, but depending on the conditions, the message may not get there the right way – particularly once it goes through the vertical filters –this would go back to the value of flat communications in the first place – however I think there will still be vertical influencers – not everyone in between the sender and the various receivers is going to have the same authorities and responsibilities. As you say, this is where education, training and also doctrine come in – the latter being a kind of common language (or in some ways may the analogy of the “Rosetta Stone” is better?) through which we can communicate and operate – in its better form(s) it allows for initiative at all levels.

Ref. the up stream – maybe its less the message, and more the solidification of past cultures? They say many people get more conservative the longer they live. I don’t mean solely political philosophy, but I mean their likes and dislikes – they not only have a better understanding of what they like and don’t but a more solid belief in “why” they do or don’t. Some of this is good – its part of wisdom. Some is probably not so good because the conditions in which those beliefs were formed may not be as applicable as they were when they formed. I’d have to ask Marc, but I think this is how culture is formed – over time, and without enough outside influences or pressures to change. In this case we are trying to change the culture from both the inside (inside the Army), and by the changes in conditions on the outside – be it our civilian leadership, the wars we are waging, the greater American Society and Culture, and some of the independent with their own agendas – think tanks, etc. This is interesting because just because you have multiple “engines” for change – they can be (and I’d argue at least in some cases are – working against each other.

This gets you into the – “can’t overcome the inertia” to change direction, or to get the ball rolling. For whatever reason we seem to see this also reflected over the last few years in our greater culture – look at the primaries of both parties – and I imagine we’ll see this in the general election again as well. With the exception of 9/11 we have not really had a defining event that acts as a catalyst that gets the two sides of inertia to stop working against each other. Both within the military and within our society we are still trying to figure out what exactly changed, how it changed and what it means to us.

This gets us back to evaluating and assigning risk oddly enough – a NSS that either won’t or can’t assign vital interests, an Army that can’t decide where to accept risk across the DOTLMPF because the direction the policy may take it is very broad. Fortunately, I think we (the Army) are largely OK in many areas – but we need to acknowledge that at our core level we are capable of doing more then many (including ourselves) often give us credit for. While we must inform folks of our limitations, we must also do a better job of evaluating and articulating our real capabilities – the foundation of capabilities are people and leadership.

OK – did not mean to go on a Saturday morning stroll, but I think it is good to ponder some of this stuff here – helps me work through things and consider the angles and relationships without it feeling too much like work.

Best, Rob

[Ken White]

...
When you have competing requirements - mass based and competency based - and I think we do - where do you draw the line?For competency, every time. Given, say, a ~750 man Infantry Battalion, I'd rather be 300 people short with good ones than be 300 over with mediocre ones. No question.
Since we don't get to say...I don't and should not, I'm out of it. You aren't -- your say should be heard.
... There is also no guarantee that those we "select" will stick around - this makes for a potential leadership vacuum.... Vacuums get filled. I've seen more than one SSG run a platoon quite well, more than one new 2LT take over a Company and even a couple of CPTs run Bns. Best Div Cdr I ever saw was a BG
...they might be a good PL - but never make a good CO CDR, BN CDR, or BDE CDR, or the same qualities that made them good at any of those jobs might limit them as a GO.True but that's the case now and will always be a human factor.
I guess what I'm getting at is that even identification is going to be subjectiveTrue but that's the case now and will always be a human factor. :D
...particularly in the conditions associated when we have unpopular long warsI've never seen a popular war. We, as a nation, do not do long wars at all well and they should be rigorously avoided --and they can be...
However, sometimes the actions you do (or wish you’d done) don’t make sense until after the fact – if you can articulate them in a manner where others can benefit, I’m all for that too. Cushman did that. He never actually admitted an error -- Generals rarely do (which is a whole different thread...;) ) but his later writings were pretty good.
As you say, this is where education, training and also doctrine come in – the latter being a kind of common language (or in some ways may the analogy of the “Rosetta Stone” is better?) through which we can communicate and operate – in its better form(s) it allows for initiative at all levels.Therein lies the problem and, I think, our disconnect; no slam or snark at you or anyone, just a statement of fact as I see it: It allows for initiative at all levels. Most folks in the Army and Marines will agree with you however I submit that it should demand initiative at all levels. Initiative and competence can replace mass in far more situations than most realize.
Ref. the up stream – maybe its less the message, and more the solidification of past cultures?It is that, little question.
In this case we are trying to change the culture from both the inside (inside the Army), and by the changes in conditions on the outside – be it our civilian leadership, the wars we are waging, the greater American Society and Culture, and some of the independent with their own agendas – think tanks, etc. This is interesting because just because you have multiple “engines” for change – they can be (and I’d argue at least in some cases are – working against each other.Totally true. Unfortunately. The civil / military relationship is pretty much change resistant however, that civilian leadership is generally amenable to what the Armed forces agree they need to do so it is not necessarily and adverse factor. Congress is another and far more difficult issue and its ability to stifle change is immense. The Armed Forces have been, are now and probably always will be a reflection of society (and the Millenium generation is looking to be pretty intolerant of BS and incompetence. Oughta be interesting... :wry:); the attention paid the Think Tanks by the Armed Forces should be significantly diminished in my opinion. However, I acknowledge that's unlikely as long as we are as over cautious as we are.
Fortunately, I think we (the Army) are largely OK in many areas – but we need to acknowledge that at our core level we are capable of doing more then many (including ourselves) often give us credit for. While we must inform folks of our limitations, we must also do a better job of evaluating and articulating our real capabilities – the foundation of capabilities are people and leadership.Agreed -- totally.

[Rob Thornton]

he is us:eek:

Somebody reminded me of that recently when I was complaining about advocates on 2 opposing sides of an issue who wound up working together to try and get something going that really did not solve the problem, lays the ground work for more problems, and muddies the importance of the question we should be asking. Why do we do that I thought - why would we settle for something that not only is not what we were after, but complicates the problem we're trying to solve?

I think it has something to do with human nature - and probably biology. It goes back to the joke about the evolutionary process that has produced modern man - the ones who were too inquisitive got eaten! We are naturally suspicious of others and their ideas to a point where we often work to our own disadvantage. My son told me he wanted $30 for a video game - I told him he could earn it by doing 5 chores for a $1 a piece for 6 weeks. He told me that was too hard - he'd wait 6 months till his Birthday. This is kinda funny I thought, because I'm going to ave him do the chores anyway - the difference is he'd have gotten paid, and I would not have to tell him to do them - same amount of work - but somehow he thought it was easier to wait :confused:

We all point to institutions like HRC, DFAS, OSF, OTC, Congress, IRS etc. as if by abolishing the institutions and the bureaucracy we could solve our problems. We ascribe value to them that may be better ascribed to individual people who work there and the sub cultures that develop around the jobs and functions they do. People are pretty adept at changing hats – I knew a BN XO who could be the world’s most anal fellow in the office, but outside the role – he was not even close to the same person. He simply adopted the personage he needed to be the CDR’s hit man on accountability and maintenance issues – it was an enabler to fulfill his role.

Its also useful to consider why we build institutions, processes, and bureaucracy – there is either a real need, a perceived need, or a desire to attempt to make our lives easier. The last one is kind of interesting because it might mean the genesis of the idea was by someone who believed that regardless how the world really operates – their way is better. The former two though are reasonably altruistic – our desire to make something work better. Like many things though – the original function of the system, process, institution, etc. takes on a life of its own, far beyond the intended purpose. This could be good or bad, but we often take it for granted that it is still a good idea.

Now we may not be able to ascribe its worth in terms that let us consider if it should be abolished, or improved because we don’t really understand how it fits in, and probably don’t understand its original purpose in the first place. We could be talking about an Army system, or the Supreme Court. Even if there is written evidence, people will argue over the context and true intent of something to get their way – regardless of if the outcomes really benefits them or is harmful to them in the long run.

I’d say the tendency to try and create efficiencies is also human nature – it drives pursuit of technology and it is often the criteria by which we evaluate ourselves ad other cultures. The issue of efficiency vs. effectiveness is tough one to crack – even when we know from experience that there are some things that will not coincide – that somethings require blood and hard work to procure and secure, even when we know the sacrifice that was required to do so, even when we know there are people who want to take it way or advantage themselves – we still remain glued to the idea that we can have it both ways. This is why I believe you have to stay involved in these things – you can’t succumb to the delusion that you’ve fixed something – there is always somebody or something following you around unfixing it – or fixing it the way think it should be. If you abolished the Hoffman building, somebody come right behind you and build a new one and call it something else and hire all the same people back.

I think you can influence and inform the process though. We do that right here. The key is in communications that describe the risks and benefits so that we get closer to real solutions. There has to be tension and there must be some disagreements – or the truth gets muddled over and the important pieces don’t stick out – arguing (or even risking War over) should be a clear signal as to what is important.

We may not like the bureaucracy, but it provides a means to an end. Without it, lots of supporting things we take for granted would have to be recreated – and I think it would not be long before the same conditions occur – kinda like when I read the Cushman articles, or any personal accounts that recall events that have the “well, seen this one before” feel to them.

The difference I think is the role leadership plays. Leaders can animate the process, stave off the tide for awhile (or at least protect a few important things). Leaders can keep us from killing the things which are most important and can not be easily rebuilt. Leaders can convince folks with seemingly disparate interests to cooperate. I think I’ve acknowledged to myself that we’re going to go down this road again, its just a matter of time – there are just to many external factors, and as much as we’d like to believe it – events beyond our control will effect our decisions. This is another reason why I think its important to have the discussion about the changing role of the military – why its important that the CAC CDR informed Congress that we are placing importance on Stability Operations in our Capstone Doctrine – whatever else was said – part of the message is that we acknowledge that “you” the civilian control side have the better of the unequal dialogue and as such we must be prepared to do the things to support that – even if you the civilian side don’t know when or where that will be. Now getting our internal culture to acknowledge that is another matter.

Funny how a person can undervalue a well known statement like “we’ve met the enemy and he is us” – maybe it is because we hate to hear truths like that – it makes all we do seem less important – and makes us question the futility of some of our efforts. I hate that duality stuff – it makes my head hurt.

Best Rob

[Norfolk]

Since I have not read the new edition of FM 3-0, it it not possible for me to comment on it directly much more than to say that if SSO and the like are thoroughly and comprehensively covered by it, then that's good; but if SSO will subsequently receive the same priority for time and resources as MCO as a consequence, then that's bad. 1/4, at most 1/3rd, of all time and resources should normally be devoted to LIC/COIN/SSO/OOTW/Aid to the Civil Power combined. And that is including the same individual and sub-unit/minor-unit level skills and proficiencies that are needed for most MCO as well.

Since the publication of the 1993 edition of FM 100-5 (admittedly it featured the definitive and comprehensive inclusion of Operational Art in particular for the first time in US Army doctrine), the increasing doctrinal inclusion of OOTW into Capstone publications has tended to come at the expensive of MCO. Whatever criticisms may be made of the 1982 and 1982 editions of FM 100-5, there was no mistaking that ultimately, the Army lived or died by victory or defeat in the Big One. It is most unlikely that a Small One, or even several Small Ones, would threaten the survival of the nation as much as the loss of even a single Big One.

While there is a certain logical consistency to including OOTW in a major way (as opposed to more modest attention) into the capstone Operations pub, I do recall that when Commonwealth Armies were at their best in such LIC/OOTW ops as COIN and SSO, much of their doctrine for doing so was concentrated in a separate "Aid to the Civil Power" pub. In Canada, it consisted of three volumes; the Rhodesians admittedly created a separate COIN pub in two volumes, but much of its content was found in Canadian doctrine divided between the ACP pub and a few tactical pubs. That same doctrine has now been largely dispersed amongst both the keystone and capstone Operations pubs as well as to a series of separate subordinate pubs. I suspect that may not have been an improvement, however.

I have also noticed a slide in the British Army reflected in the 1996 edition of its top doctrinal pub, and that appears to have continued in the 2005 edition; Australia has similarly followed in its 2002 top doctrinal pub. There is a touch of unreality that may strike one in these pubs, especially with regards to MCO. Perhaps when FM 3-24 was published, it should have comprehensively covered all OOTW rather than just Counterinsurgency, and allowed for much more modest attention paid to it in both the first edition and especially the new edition of FM 3-0. Until I have read the new edition of FM 3-0, however, and especially how it approaches and deals with MCO, I can only speculate that its raising of OOTW to the same status as MCO may be the culmination of what I find to be an unsettling doctrinal trend.

As such, what (OOTW) for Commonwealth Armies has been up until very recent years a matter of almost routine consideration has, in the US, swung from a matter of near-indifference to one of near-obsession - and due to political, social, and institutional factors (and especially deterioration and decline) at home within Commonwealth societies and militaries, the increasing influence that US issues and concerns wield over Commonwealth polities and militaries exerts a dislocating and destabilizing influence in their own doctrine in some ways.

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Ken,

That got me thinking – about who we are. Avoidance of something is usually attributed to a couple of things – the desire to do so, and the means to do so. I think they go hand in hand in this case. When you consider how some of the various cultures consider time, and why they do, it seems to have something to do with how long they have considered their culture to have been around. I saw something in the paper today about an advocate in OSD for what we now popularly describe as the “Indirect Approach” – and to which we consider a key component of “by, with, through” – the article went on to lament the policy advisor was not sure if the American People had the political stomach for long commitments (I think we’re assuming here that events within the duration have drawn attention – its not under the radar).

I think it goes beyond that – American Culture seems to be allot more along the lines of instant (or relatively instant) gratification. We would seem to believe that if its worth doing, then we must be able to accomplish it in one fell swoop. The idea of investing heavily in the means to conduct a broad indirect approach to FP that might really help us avoid wars, while maintaining our other goals would seem to be in opposition (damn there is that duality crap again). Since producing FSOs and others types needed to go forward does not seem to correlate with production of stuff in congressional districts – there does not seem to be much of an appetite for such things up on the hill. We might also consider ourselves (the military) part of the means to affect such an indirect approach – and there is a rub in there too.

We may fear the way the Chinese wield “soft power” to achieve an indirect influence in a growing number of places – with their abundance of human capital and growing economy as the means to do so, but we’re not willing to break from our culture to contest it in a like manner either. We’re simply not Chinese.

While you’ve never seen a popular war – I think the term popular in itself invites all kinds of comparisons – more popular than X, popular among X, etc. Popular might not have been the most accurate word I could have used – but I suppose since the word is useful in describing its effects on domestic politics it is useful. I guess then a more popular war would be one where we win, where we did have to incur high cost to get it, and where the outcome remains uncontestable for a reasonably long period of time. The benefits of going to war must be more attractive then the risks of avoiding it. Those would seem to be more clear on the back end, then the front end – and are also probably subject to historical interpretation(s). Those wars we most identify as having been “worth” the sacrifice would be those that combined the latter with some kind of moral value – where clearly the enemy’s beliefs and values were in the wrong – almost inviting a justification of force – this can lead you into all kinds of good discussions from targeting dual use facilities-such as hospitals and communities that shield insurgents to fire bombing Japanese cottage industries.

I’d also add that we have a knack for getting ourselves into the deep end without realizing it – again possibly because we seem to be culturally opposed to building (and listening) the means that might warn us when we were adrift. Why do we have such a big Snap-On Hammer in the prize tool box and while we keep our other dinky no-name tools in the kitchen drawer – because that is the way we built it, why did we build it that way – because we chose to – we are at fault.

So while I do believe long wars could be avoided – I don’t think it is in our nature, and I don’t think we currently have the means or the will to do so. This is why I think we have to be pragmatic about this within the military – if we are not prepared for the inevitable policy misstep – we have nobody to blame but ourselves. Could be a big war, could be a small one – could be one that turns into the other, etc. We're going to be "Full SPectrum" because we have to be. Its back to the duality thing again – the “non-violent” right to life folks that advocate the destruction of the abortion clinics, the “non-violent” tree huggers who spike the trees and cause the injury of the blue collar cutter trying to feed his family, and all the other folks who claim advocacy for their peaceful causes until somebody challenges them on it – and then its game on. The Elizabethan playwright nailed it “man; what a piece of work he is”

Well, wife is back – enough musing, I’ve got to go refinish a table for the wife.
Best Rob

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Norfolk - FM 3-07 on stability Operations is pretty good and not far off (I've seen the draft). I think it will fill in the gaps between 3-24 and 3-0. As sson as there is a releasable copy I'll send it to you. As for that - it might be a good idea if we hung links to new doctrine (approved for public release) somewhere on SWJ so folks could review it and comment.
Best, Rob

[Rank amateur]

h

Funny how a person can undervalue a well known statement like “we’ve met the enemy and he is us” –


"Know your enemy and know yourself." The former requires information. The later requires self awareness and honesty. I often think that the later is more difficult.

[Norfolk]

Hey Norfolk - FM 3-07 on stability Operations is pretty good and not far off (I've seen the draft). I think it will fill in the gaps between 3-24 and 3-0. As sson as there is a releasable copy I'll send it to you. As for that - it might be a good idea if we hung links to new doctrine (approved for public release) somewhere on SWJ so folks could review it and comment.
Best, Rob

Much obliged Rob.:D I think I still have a copy of the 2003 FM 3-07.

[marct]

Hi Rob,


Hey Norfolk - FM 3-07 on stability Operations is pretty good and not far off (I've seen the draft). I think it will fill in the gaps between 3-24 and 3-0. As sson as there is a releasable copy I'll send it to you. As for that - it might be a good idea if we hung links to new doctrine (approved for public release) somewhere on SWJ so folks could review it and comment.
Best, Rob

That would be a great idea - I've only got an old copy of 3-0, so I'm sitting on the sidelines on this :wry:.

Marc

[Ken White]

That should be okay, it certainly is with me.
"Like many things though – the original function of the system, process, institution, etc. takes on a life of its own, far beyond the intended purpose. This could be good or bad, but we often take it for granted that it is still a good idea."True. I believe that's called inertia. In my experience, something best avoided in human affairs.
"This is why I believe you have to stay involved in these things – you can’t succumb to the delusion that you’ve fixed something – there is always somebody or something following you around unfixing it – or fixing it the way think it should be...True. I believe that opposes inertia...
...If you abolished the Hoffman building, somebody come right behind you and build a new one and call it something else and hire all the same people back."Some folks would certainly do that, they would be the cautious ones. Others would create a different organization that served as opposed to exercising more control than it should. Neither of those parties should be dumb enough to hire the same people back (No offense to the many folks there who work their buns off; it's the policies, not the people)
"The difference I think is the role leadership plays. Leaders can animate the process, stave off the tide for awhile (or at least protect a few important things). Leaders can keep us from killing the things which are most important and can not be easily rebuilt. Leaders can convince folks with seemingly disparate interests to cooperate."All very true. I've met a few great ones and many okay leaders and some sorry ones. Been my observation that the great and good tend to accept risk and are innovative. If a large organization is in danger of erring or has demonstrably erred on a critical task, seems to me the leadership needs to be questioned.
"We may fear the way the Chinese wield “soft power” to achieve an indirect influence in a growing number of places – with their abundance of human capital and growing economy as the means to do so, but we’re not willing to break from our culture to contest it in a like manner either. We’re simply not Chinese."Why would we fear that? I don't fear it. I've fought the Chinese; they're people, no more. Yes, we're different and that's not a problem. They play to their strengths, we should play to ours and avoid a Eurocentric solution to an American problem -- we aren't Chinese and we aren't Europeans.
"I’d also add that we have a knack for getting ourselves into the deep end without realizing it – again possibly because we seem to be culturally opposed to building (and listening) the means that might warn us when we were adrift. Why do we have such a big Snap-On Hammer in the prize tool box and while we keep our other dinky no-name tools in the kitchen drawer – because that is the way we built it, why did we build it that way – because we chose to – we are at fault." Again all true; it's the American way :D We don't do reconnaissance well, we're too impatient so we just send a bunch of folks out and they blunder around and start a fight so everyone else can pile on. Works more often than not. Not really the best way to do it but it is a way and it's very 'American.' We should do what we do well. As you said earlier:
"While we must inform folks of our limitations, we must also do a better job of evaluating and articulating our real capabilities – the foundation of capabilities are people and leadership."(emphasis added / kw) True dat.
"So while I do believe long wars could be avoided – I don’t think it is in our nature, and I don’t think we currently have the means or the will to do so. You may be correct but I believe that is more than arguable, albeit on a different thread.
This is why I think we have to be pragmatic about this within the military – if we are not prepared for the inevitable policy misstep – we have nobody to blame but ourselves. Could be a big war, could be a small one – could be one that turns into the other, etc. We're going to be "Full SPectrum" because we have to be. Totally agree. I'll also flatly say that we cannot do that without the Reserve Components. That bears considerable thought by the leadership of the Army -- and by Congress...

Consider the fact that after the stupidity of Viet Nam, the intransigence of the leadership of the Army caused the formation of USSOCOM (I know there were other factors but that was a big one); the Army's refusal to deploy ArNG Combat Units to DS/DS caused, over the objection of the leadership of the Army, a massive infusion of resources into the Reserve Components in the 90s -- and that allowed the RC to deploy very effectively to this one. No one is going to attack the Army while we're in Iraq but when it's over you can bet they'll come out of the woodwork and try to pin some blame for the massive expenditure of dollars and 'unnecessary' casualties. Either the Army fixes itself or someone will provide a 'fix' that we don't like...

After all that, I still say, with respect to our doctrine and our training:

It allows for initiative at all levels. Most folks in the Army and Marines will agree with you however I submit that it should demand initiative at all levels. Initiative and competence can replace mass in far more situations than most realize.

[slapout9]

Hey Norfolk - FM 3-07 on stability Operations is pretty good and not far off (I've seen the draft). I think it will fill in the gaps between 3-24 and 3-0. As sson as there is a releasable copy I'll send it to you. As for that - it might be a good idea if we hung links to new doctrine (approved for public release) somewhere on SWJ so folks could review it and comment.
Best, Rob


Very good idea Rob.

[Rob Thornton]

Dr. Jack,

Any chance as 3-0 goes up on digits you can emplace a hyper-hyper link for the SWC to pour over? Or - you could email it to Dave or Bill here at the SWJ and we could see about getting it on the library? I'd recommend the same with 3-07 as soon as it comes out - given the diversity of the SWC (to include the lurkers) there will be some genuine review.
Best, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Ken,
I agree - I think if people can disagree in a way that brings out things that would otherwise go unsaid, unwritten, and uncommunicated - but do it in away that leaves room for individual growth, then we benefit. I think its when there is no disagreement is when we are most apt to get ourselves into trouble.

Going back to the early ref. abut the Neo-Classical description about the clock - and then forward to the ref. to people who pick up things and make assumptions about how they work, or should work - I think its worthwhile to say that the natural state of things (at least as I've discerned them) is much closer to dis-harmony, then harmony. People pick up a watch and say "what a great thing - all the pieces working together - gears turning hands and so forth - but I think only the watchmaker probably can appreciate the imperfections, the fragility of the mechanisms, the caution required when winding the springs.

We've gone to self-winding, digital, atomic, etc. and spent allot of effort to get things perfect - easier, more maintenance free. We mass produce things and make them cheaper so that when the watch no longer works the way it is supposed to, we can go out and get a new one.

It seems we get frustrated when wars (and other people centric - activities) won't perform like watches. You can wind a spring till it pops, but there are no guarantees. That is one of our big problems I think - we want self-winding, maintenance free, low cost solutions that always give us the time we want it to be- we try and make our policies like that, we try and build our bureaucracies like that - we lose site of the need to maintain it, and to infuse it with leadership. Then we wonder how we've created "self-licking ice - cream cones” or things that are monuments unto themselves full of folks that don't help the people or the purpose they were designed for.

One of the things I like here on the SWC is "how" we disagree. I come here to challenge, and to be challenged - to inform and to be informed. I often leave here with a hurt head - growth is not painless.

One thing I want people who are lurking and who may not have served to understand is that there are real people (uniformed and non-uniformed) who are wound up, not gears and hands. While we do our best, we make some mistakes - we are not perfect - and that should not be forgotten – the recruitment, training, education, selection and retention of good people is part of this, and is also hard work that never stops. You could have the best doctrine in the world, but without good people to employ it, it remains inanimate. On the other hand, I think one of the reasons we have good doctrine is because of the people we have, and the ways we designed to inform the process – but even that requires vigilance!

Well time to make the doughnuts – Have a great Sunday,
Best, Rob

[Global Scout]

We will never have a perfect leadership culture, simply because we're human and subject to imperfection, but we can't even seem to get the basics right in most units, and one of those key basics is empowering those on the tip of the spear and having the moral courage to underwrite their mistakes (mistakes are part of the learning curve, but the majority of officers don't want toi endure risking thier OER by facilitating their subordinates' learning curves).

Personally I like the majority of officers I have worked with, but I have serious concerns about their values and their ability to lead. Many officers feel they are in an entitled position, thus they themselves are "entitled". I wish they had half the knowledge they tend to think they have when it comes to war fighting or conflict management. As for doctrine, most rarely seem to be able to apply it effectively. It took Abe Lincoln to get the Union Army on the right path during the Civil War, and if we left it up to the Army's officers the Union would have lost. It took civilian leadership to intervene and put the right Generals in place. Why couldn't the Army do it? The same can be said about Vietnam and Iraq to a large extent, though in both cases there was a substantial amount of civilian leadership incompetence also. Still, the the point is that once we are going down a path, our culture of "excessive" loyality to the rater (careerist versus professional) doesn't permit us to flex. Once we start going down that road we put blinders on and God help us if we're not on the right road. Voices of dissent from the tip of the spear are frequently silenced. Despite the fact that our doctrine emphasizes maximum flexibility at the tip of the spear with our junior leaders at the platoon, squads, and ODA level, the reality is our culture prohibits it.

I believe this is one reason many of our young officers are leaving the Army in large numbers. They understand the world has changed, they see the problems first hand, and they have some ideas for dealing with them, yet they are prohibited by an overly stifling chain of command.

Doctrine alone will not fix this, we have to change our officer culture, and I'm not sure a President can do that. We're talking more along the lines of a miracle like parting the Red Sea.

[Ken White]

Well said.

I agree on all counts though I do think the Red Sea might, just might, be able to be parted. I certainly hope so for the sake of the Army.

Boring history. After WW II, a war won by the Army (practically if not realistically speaking), the Army rested on its Laurels. With predictable effects seen in the first few months in Korea. Given the stalemate in Korea and the lesson on resting, after Korea, the Army set about fixing itself. It really worked pretty and among other things, it came up with the Pentomic concept.

The Pentomic concept worked better than many think; most of the denigration of the effort is retrospective justification by the Army personnel community for its failure to adapt its personnel policies to the new tactical environment that concept entailed (remember that). In the event, it was scrapped for a return to a triangular organization (which again had some personnel policy induced problems and again, remember that). Then we went to Viet Nam.

Another stalemate, to be polite. Contributed to, in part, by very flawed personnel policies (remember that). It also essentially introduced the risk aversion and career oriented attitudes which have done us no favors. After Viet Nam the Army went into denial and did little or nothing except foster the so-called Weinberger and / or Powell Doctrines to avoid similar future embarassments -- we've seen how really well that worked out for us...:rolleyes:

That failure to react by the Army was a part of the reason for the formation of USSOCOM. That was not a bad thing but it was partly a smack at the Army by Congress. Then came Desert Storm and Shield and the Army fought tooth and nail to avoid deploying ArNG combat units to Kuwait. Congress payback after the war for that stupidity was tons of money -- and other Army resources -- devoted in an attempt to make sure that failure to deploy the Guard did not again occur. Congress could've just passsed a law that said "The Army will deploy..." but Congress doesn't work that way, it attempted to box the Army in.

As an aside, all the RC folks have deployed this time and have generally done well. They deserve better care by and more respect from the Army than they get.

When Iraq settles down and there's no fear of being accused of "not supporting the Troops," the knives will come out simply due to the costs and the very obvious fact that the Army did poorly in Iraq early on. A contributor to that was the fatally flawed attempt to 'doctrinally' influence the Politicians in the late 70s, another was, wait for it -- flawed personnel policy (i.e. the all commanders are created equal and the 'it's your turn' processes among others).

Regardless, Henry Waxman will go on a quest for victims.

The Army can part the Red Sea itself by developing coherent (and concise) doctrine, fixing the personnel polices -- and getting a course correction on the officer and the senior NCO cultures, further improvement of the training processes and rationalizing its equipment and its procurement policies. It can do those things quickly or someone will come up with other solutions that do not address the problem and possibly do more harm than good. That's what happened the last two times and the Army suffered for its lapses...

[Ski]

Ken

I hate agreeing with you so much, I feel like a sycophant.

The Army is losing officers because of two things: culture and OPTEMPO.

I just met a guy last week out at Leavenworth who had done 8 deployments since 97 - thrice to Iraq, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, and two Central America fun rides. He asked for a job where his wife could stabilize since she has a brand new $100K law degree. The collective genii at the Hoffman Building told him that he has X Y and Z to choose from. He chose X and was then told he couldn't have that job, so he told his Commander that he was turning in his paperwork and went into the Guard full time. Good for the nation and the Guard, bad for the Army. I have a CPT working for me as a full timer Guardsman who was a Marshall ROTC grad, led an infantry platoon in Iraq with the 82nd for a year, and then joined the Guard. Of course, he's leaving for Iraq in a few months as a BN S3 (he'll pin on 04 by then), and again, bad for the Army, good for the nation and the Guard.

I've read a LOT about the debacle in 91 with the ARNG Brigades - more than what is available publically. The Army leadership should have been ashamed, but again, it's all about protecting the institution, force structure and resourcing.

As I much as I love the Army - and that includes all components despite the snipes I take on a daily basis from my AC brethren - I am firmly convinced that it is either going to take a 21st George Marshall to rise from the field grade positions, or it's going to get shoved down the Army's throat by Congress. It's become that bad in my limited opinion.

Rob touches on an interesting point - he mentions how the Army is expected to operate like a watch..and he's correct. We hear the word "synchronization" a trillion times by the time we make CPT. The Germans called it "harmonization" and I think that fits the situation much better than the "synchronization" path we've been led on. Synchronization kills initiative - simple as that. If one piece of the watch doesn't work, then the synchronization is off. Same goes for all the bazillion pieces running around while in training or in war...because that's the culture that was created in the 70's, and has only been enhanced with all the digital communication and positioning equipment weer festooned with now. You can track individual vehicles now from operational and higher level HQ's if you really wanted to. Why? Because of the overwhelming desire to be synchronized. Sorry for the rant.

GS - agree with you 100%. I always liked GEN Sullivans quote of "Discussion is not dissent" but the culture seems to overpower that.

[Ken White]

a greater impact than even the acknowledged OpTempo problem. True on the loss reasons.

Not to worry, my kids say I'm a psycho-phant... :D

On the 91 debacle, not only is there a lot more to that than has been made public (and as you say, it was literally shameful) but the Army, in its brilliance, took an AC guy who was solely responsible for the biggest screwup in the whole deal and, after DS/DS, put him nominally in charge of RC training -- and he was, aside from being stupidly arrogant, totally ignorant. The good news is that later, after he got a couple of stars, they bounced him for sexual harassment. :D
"You can track individual vehicles now from operational and higher level HQ's if you really wanted to. Why? Because of the overwhelming desire to be synchronized. Sorry for the rant."Don't be sorry. That's rant material and is, IMO, a criminal waste of money. The Germans in WW II -- no slouches at this military business by anyone's admission -- had radios that were allowed to talk only one echelon up , to peers and one echelon down. IOW, a Battlaion could not even talk to a Platoon; Division could not talk to a Battalion. Our fetish for over control has held us back since the end of WW II; I've got control stories out of Korea that are mind-numbing and Viet Nam was worse. My kids last trip to Afghanistan produced some hilarious stories about the number of General Officers involved in company level decisions there...

Stupid and scary.

[Tom Odom]

Don't be sorry. That's rant material and is, IMO, a criminal waste of money. The Germans in WW II -- no slouches at this military business by anyone's admission -- had radios that were allowed to talk only one echelon up , to peers and one echelon down. IOW, a Battlaion could not even talk to a Platoon; Division could not talk to a Battalion. Our fetish for over control has held us back since the end of WW II; I've got control stories out of Korea that are mind-numbing and Viet Nam was worse. My kids last trip to Afghanistan produced some hilarious stories about the number of General Officers involved in company level decisions there...

Ken

The more we automate, the more people we need to run/watch/interpret/manipulate the automated systems. The end result is that increased automation of C2 has only made staffs bigger and the things they control--the units fighting--smaller.

Best

Tom

[Bill Moore]

Maybe what we need is a Soldier friendly virus that shuts down our information architecture for an extended period. Of course we would initially be paralyzed, but out of desparation Commander's would contact their subordinates on radio and tell them to do the best they can without his micromanagement.

A whole generation of junior leaders who had the "Dad may I" way of doing business ground into them, would all the sudden be empowered. Sort of like releasing a wild beast into the wilderness after years of capitivity. It would be very uncomfortable for the beast at first, but after a few months he would never voluntarily go back into the cage.

Then we could do real network operations, with independent cells at the Platoon level operating on their own within the Commander's intent, getting to the point where they could actually out manuever our nimble enemy because they would be allowed to adjust to ground truth without asking higher.

Someone recently published a book on the end of man and what the world would be like without man, I would like to see a book on what the Army would look like without the excessive micromanagement we endure at the operational level. It might lead to a needed paradigm shift in our community, or as GS stated it might lead to parting the Red Sea.

There is a lot of good that comes out of our C4I architecture, so we need to take care not to throw the baby out with the bath water.

The reality is that leadership is decisive, and if we get leadership in place that encourages individual initiative and underwrites subordinate mistakes we could create a new cultural norm. Without leadership firmly directing the change it won't happen.

[Ken White]

(nothing to be added to that)

[Ski]

The only thing I'd add to Bill's comments is we always think more is better. It's not. Especially when it comes to the digital equipment revolution that has occured over the last 10 years.

[William F. Owen]

The more we automate, the more people we need to run/watch/interpret/manipulate the automated systems. The end result is that increased automation of C2 has only made staffs bigger and the things they control--the units fighting--smaller.


...and this has been a well known fact for over 20 years, yet we still sale off down this stream because no one calls halt.

I believe the reason is because you have officer corps who do not study their profession. Sorry to be harsh, but they are clearly doing something stupid. Still, I'm sure they'll all be better off with their MAs in anthropology.

[Ken White]

...I believe the reason is because you have officer corps who do not study their profession. Sorry to be harsh, but they are clearly doing something stupid...

Not an Officer Corps guilty of that, many study it and are quite competent. Unfortunately, far too few of that variety become Generals.

[William F. Owen]

Not an Officer Corps guilty of that, many study it and are quite competent. Unfortunately, far too few of that variety become Generals.

On reflection Ken, I have met few truly ignorant senior US and UK officers. I would admit, that many are skilled and competent practitioners -which is what we pay taxes for, but when it comes to force development and doctrine, the results are so variable as to indicate some degree of a serious problem. (I believe there is a really good case study to be had with the RAF.)

Where is the disconnect? Aren't generals a self selecting meritocracy? If so, then why do they select the men they do?

[Ken White]

On reflection Ken, I have met few truly ignorant senior US and UK officers. I would admit, that many are skilled and competent practitioners -which is what we pay taxes for, but when it comes to force development and doctrine, the results are so variable as to indicate some degree of a serious problem. (I believe there is a really good case study to be had with the RAF.)

Where is the disconnect? Aren't generals a self selecting meritocracy? If so, then why do they select the men they do?

However, having observed a number of them rather closely for a great many years, I'll quote one of the best I ever worked for; "All Generals are mediocre. I'm mediocre. If you aren't mediocre or don't act like you are, you'll never be a General. The competition is too stiff and your contemporaries will kill you if you're too good." That bit of introspection was brought on by the fact that his son had recently entered the Officer Basic course as a brand new 2LT and he had told the son "Be good but not too good. If you're too good, your peers will gang up on you." It bothered him a great deal. That, of course, is simplistic and there's more to it than that -- but, in my view, he had a very valid point. Competition for promotion above Major in this Army is brutal.

Edited to add: That quote of his words may not be verbatim but it's pretty close -- been a while. I don't agree with his self assessment, he was a good one, he'd just had a bad and frustrating day. Generals have those too; probably, due to the rank and the responsibility, more of them than most of us. And they aren't allowed to publicly bitch and snivel like the rest of us...

Another good one when I asked him why as a Major he and I had agreed on all the ills of the Army and now, in a position to change some of those things he was just shrugging his shoulders, told me that "You've got to stay in your lane. I can walk with the best of them but if I stick my elbows out too far, I'll get them cut off. If you make people uncomfortable they react defensively and irrationally so you comply with the norms. I don't like that but if I don't behave, they'll just get someone who does. At least I can stop some of the B.S as long as I'm here.."

It has been my observation that most of them change little from Colonel to One Star. The second Star seems to be the crossover point. I've known a few that got to that level and who were exceptionally good in my opinion. Not one of them got picked up for a third Star. I've known a few more that were pretty good and got that third Star but they were not the same persons I'd known at lesser rank. I've known and talked informally to only two four Stars. I thought both were good but the former wasn't a boat rocker. He was the Vice Chief for a while, the other was the Chief of Staff of the Army for a while -- and I'll give both credit, they tried to change things and the second one tried, literally, to shake up the entire Army. He was a boat rocker. He did some great things but much more he wanted to do got stalled and stymied by the bureaucracy, they just waited him out.

That is a debilitating factor in our case; the insistence on rotating as many people as possible through as many jobs as possible and the concomitant fable that any General can do any job. Possibly true but some people do some things better than others, if a guy is too good at a job, they'll move him. Sort of a cutting down the tall Poppy bit. I've had several make the statement to me that "...just about the time I really learned the job, they moved me..." or words to that effect.

Another factor is that while we give our Generals a lot of nice perks, we also really jerk them around. The US Army tries to give the troops at least 90 days warning before a move -- not so with General Officers, I've seen a number moved with literally a days notice. Also been my observation that they frequently do not treat each other well.

So I guess it is indeed a meritocracy -- but a part of that merit entails not trying to be an agent of major change. Sad.

The good news is that most of 'em are good guys and are competent and all of them are smart; they are constrained by a system that rates conformity over innovation and are firm believers that a big part of their job is as Stewards of the Institution; protecting it is seen as very important.

I'd also suggest that a big part of the force structure problem is the overweening bureaucracy that exists in both our armies that are devoted to that function. Having worked with our force Structure crowd on more occasions than I'd like I'm convinced that they have an Eight to Five mentality and are far more concerned with the minutia of the effort than with installing effectiveness. In fairness, they have to cope with a lot of Congressionally mandated rules and ideas (not all of which are law, merely desires expressed as "If you want $$, we think you should..."). Can't say for the UK but in the US Army, the Resource Managers have entirely too much sway; the budget rules -- way too much so...

[marct]

Hi Wilf,


I believe the reason is because you have officer corps who do not study their profession. Sorry to be harsh, but they are clearly doing something stupid. Still, I'm sure they'll all be better off with their MAs in anthropology.

That's the last thing we need :eek:! My God, man, can you imagine having to read Foucault (http://books.google.ca/books?id=_A5U9jyiQSAC&q=Foucault++%22history+of+sexuality%22&dq=Foucault++%22history+of+sexuality%22&ei=yqyxR77vH6K0iQGXjNnlDw&pgis=1)and Bourdieu (http://books.google.ca/books?id=WvhSEMrNWHAC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Bourdieu&ei=56yxR-OCCorMiQGktLzcDw&sig=bb3nPdVceDI_CL8ruZGY9N8AdYQ)in place of Clausewitz and Jomini? The mind boogles.....

Ken, you need a better word than "meritocracy" - how about "mediocracy"?

Marc

[Kreker]

Just received a copy of FM 3-0 (Final Approved Draft.) So guess folks were right about the unveiling at AUSA Winter Symposium, 27-29 Feb 08.
Best,
Kreker

[Ken White]

...
Ken, you need a better word than "meritocracy" - how about "mediocracy"?
Marc

Believe it or not, I thought about that, also toyed with conformocracy. ;)

Then after some thought, went with meritocracy -- because it really is. However, I think as do many others that they, themselves, might want to look at what constitutes their list of things meritous... :wry:

[taillat]

Just received a copy of FM 3-0 (Final Approved Draft.) So guess folks were right about the unveiling at AUSA Winter Symposium, 27-29 Feb 08.
Best,
Kreker

Kreker,
Do you think it will be available for public release after AUSA Symposium?
As a French Phd Student in Military History, the new FM 3-0 is critical to my research, :o
Cordialement
1/LT Stéphane TAILLAT

[Kreker]

Kreker,
Do you think it will be available for public release after AUSA Symposium?
As a French Phd Student in Military History, the new FM 3-0 is critical to my research, :o
Cordialement
1/LT Stéphane TAILLAT

Hi 1/LT TAILLAT,
The official release date is set for 28 Feb. The Army Home Page on that day will probably have a link to the new FM 3-0. Hope that helps.
Best,
Kreker

[taillat]

Merci, i note the date in my agenda....:)
ST

[Team Infidel]

I have a digital copy of FM 3-0. If you are DoD and have a DoD email addy, PM me and I will send it to you.

[marct]

Apparently, FMI 3-0.1 (January 2008) has been posted at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fmi3-0-1.pdf

Marc

[Norfolk]

Apparently, FM 3-0.1 (January 2008) has been posted at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fmi3-0-1.pdf

Marc

Well FAS, was not too slow on the draw this time, they're sometimes quicker than this. I only got it myself about a week ago or so. But when the new edition of FM 3-0 is released (presumably), there's not going to be a lot of open bandwidth left with all the folks trying to download it. A veritable (if accidental) Denial of Service Attack in the making.

[TROUFION]

Generals of the US Republic are in many ways similar to those of the Roman Republic. Roman Generals in the Republic age were well trained and capable; all had come up with experience through the ranks of Centurion etc. They lead arguably the finest, best equipped troops in the ancient world. But they were uninspired; they were checked and kept in check by bureaucracy. They were deliberately kept mediocre in order to not let them become a threat to the Republic or to the Senate from whence they came and received appointment. The enemies they faced could all be overcome through the superior organization and execution at the tactical and operational levels by the Legion itself. The General was ancillary. Until they met Hannibal.

Hannibal represents the dynamic, warrior general that cannot be replicated in our system. To defeat Hannibal the Republic eventually had to place more power, freedom of action and duration of Command into the Generals hands. Scipio Africanus became that type, a general who was developed in independent command and given the ability to have a true Commander-in Chief role. Ultimately, and I greatly oversimplify here, this would lead to the end of the Republic as Generals began to see greater and greater autonomy over time leading to the rise of the Caesars.

Ok not the likelihood in the US but the point is the system is designed to create managers. Managers who can and will follow prescriptive actions in order to employ great troops, incredible equipment and assets so as to formulaically defeat any standard adversary.

The problems arise when the Manager Generals face non-standard adversaries, the dynamic warriors those not tied to doctrines and dogmas. In the end victory can still be had but not until the reigns of control are loosened.

The FM’s we use to train ourselves are very good, but they are formulas. Unfortunately many beleive that if you read it and apply liberally to the situation success will occur. FM’s should always be read with a historical study lying right next to it and a working knowledge of practical combat behind. They like the principles of war and other formulas should be used as guidelines and nothing more.

I now step off the soapbox.

[marct]

Hi Norfolk,


Well FAS, was not too slow on the draw this time, they're sometimes quicker than this. I only got it myself about a week ago or so. But when the new edition of FM 3-0 is released (presumably), there's not going to be a lot of open bandwidth left with all the folks trying to download it. A veritable (if accidental) Denial of Service Attack in the making.

Too true! FAS is pushing an FOI case to get all of the material posted on their own site. They're using the FMI 3-0.1 as one of the leads given the buzz about it (at least from what I can see).

Marc

[Cavguy]

Hi Norfolk,



Too true! FAS is pushing an FOI case to get all of the material posted on their own site. They're using the FMI 3-0.1 as one of the leads given the buzz about it (at least from what I can see).

Marc

The main issue now isn't that it isn't ready or it's FOUO - the Army has set a "roll-out" at the AUSA meeting, and doesn't want it out before that because of the desire for a coordinated media blitz. Kind of like the Harry Potter book release. I can't believe I just compared an Army FM and Harry Potter. :eek:


That said, with Michael Gordon's article (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/08/washington/08strategy.html?scp=4&sq=michael+gordon&st=nyt) in the NYT yesterday, the ball is rolling.

[J Wolfsberger]

I can't believe I just compared an Army FM and Harry Potter. :eek:


Let's just hope the comparison ends at the marketing level. :wry:

[Tom Odom]

Let's just hope the comparison ends at the marketing level. :wry:

I dunno. those flying hockey pucks are kinda like UAS.

[CR6]

Let's just hope the comparison ends at the marketing level. :wry:

Why? You don't want to see a sub-title like "Major Potter and the Half-Baked Plan?"

[Cavguy]

Why? You don't want to see a sub-title like "Major Potter and the Half-Baked Plan?"

I have resembled that remark before .... :rolleyes:

[Tom Odom]

In 1990-1992, it was the "Jedi Knights" of Desert Storm fame

Now it's Harry Potter baking plans

One wonder's what or who will be the next icon

Tom

[slapout9]

In 1990-1992, it was the "Jedi Knights" of Desert Storm fame

Now it's Harry Potter baking plans

One wonder's what or who will be the next icon

Tom


Tom, it's going to be Chatty Cathy, with the first new COIN theory of "Can We Talk" :wry:

[Tom Odom]

Tom, it's going to be Chatty Cathy, with the first new COIN theory of "Can We Talk" :wry:

I guess that beats Larry the Cable Guy and "Gir 'R Done" :wry:

I must, however, confess I have watched his "Health Inspector" move 3 or 4 times on cable :o

Tom

[Cavguy]

I guess that beats Larry the Cable Guy and "Gir 'R Done" :wry:

Tom

I think Larry the Cable Guy's motto accurately describes the efforts of most units in Iraq, overcoming all the madness down there. In theater, it is probably the most often seen motto spray painted on trucks, guns, tanks, latrines, etc.

[Tom Odom]

I think Larry the Cable Guy's motto accurately describes the efforts of most units in Iraq, overcoming all the madness down there. In theater, it is probably the most often seen motto spray painted on trucks, guns, tanks, latrines, etc.


OK I am choking here from laughing too hard...

I can do this all night...

Tom

[Norfolk]

Hi Norfolk,

Too true! FAS is pushing an FOI case to get all of the material posted on their own site. They're using the FMI 3-0.1 as one of the leads given the buzz about it (at least from what I can see).

Marc

Hi Marc,

If as one may imply from Cavguy's point about keeping FM 3-0 under wraps until it's offically unveiled at AUSA at the end of the month, then it's perfectly understandable. Actually, having grown up (almost literally in some ways - and in others not at all, or even reverting;)) in an Army in which practically everything was at least Restricted (back then), I can live with US Army pubs being the same way. It's not like you didn't learn to work well in the dark in the Canadian Army anyway.:wry: As for FAS, well, I have to admit that I don't have much sympathy for them, and don't really care for some of the things that they do post.

slapout wrote:

Tom, it's going to be Chatty Cathy, with the first new COIN theory of "Can We Talk" :wry:

Enjoy the pitch-name while it lasts. When the new edition of FM 3-0 has to be replaced itself when FCS and "Transformation" are "complete" twenty years from now or so, we may end up with names like "Transformation Annie" - or some rather less dignified derivative thereof - to go with the revised doctrine. Given the social/cultural/political trends over the last few decades, something rather cruder may be considered publicly acceptable by then.

[slapout9]

Hi Norfolk, I don't think you were here when this first came up but Tom has a Chatty Cathy doll guarded by some Special Forces Pet Rocks:eek:

[Tom Odom]

But lest I be guilty of divergence, it was again refreshing to see Frontier 6 on the blog.

In the light, the most hopeful paragraph was in my opinion:


The 2001 edition didn’t address these realities; ground truth has forced these “revolutionary” changes. The 2008 edition of FM 3-0 will not only incorporate these changes, but also provide a blue print for the future. This impact will be revolutionary; FM 3-0 in the next year will provide the blueprint for a new training strategy, changes in organizational structure to respond to full spectrum operations, and change leader development and professional military education to focus on adaptive and innovative leadership.

Time will tell. We have always had the innate capability to foster adaptive leaders--if we just encourage it and then let it happen...

In that regard, maybe Larry the Cable Guy is our model :D

Tom

[Norfolk]

Hi Norfolk, I don't think you were here when this first came up but Tom has a Chatty Cathy doll guarded by some Special Forces Pet Rocks:eek:

I am rendered speechless...

[slapout9]

Of course there is SBW (Slapout Based Warfare) model.

[Tom Odom]

I am rendered speechless...

yep and I hang out at the local country club's golf course and blow up gophers....

[Ken White]

What did he ever do...

[Tom Odom]

What did he ever do...

he was a squid...

[Ken White]

a Congressman... :D

Keep on potting 'em... ;)

[marct]

Okay, so when do we see the Thomas the Train rollout? The Little Brigade that Could?!? Personally, I'd stick with Harry Potter :D.

[slapout9]

Hi marct, I don't know "The Little Brigade That Could" sounds pretty good.:wry:

[Tom Odom]

Hi marct, I don't know "The Little Brigade That Could" sounds pretty good.:wry:

Was that not the case at Balaclava?


Half a league, half a league,
Half a league onward,
All in the valley of Death
Rode the six hundred.
"Forward, the Light Brigade!
"Charge for the guns!" he said:
Into the valley of Death
Rode the six hundred.

[marct]

Wasn't it something like 23 survived out of 600? Hmmm. Okay, I can see taking the objective, but....

[CR6]

Wasn't it something like 23 survived out of 600? Hmmm. Okay, I can see taking the objective, but....

Out of 660-670 soldiers who participated, 118 KIA and 127 WIA. Approximately 36% casualties, all the result of misunderstood orders and no recon. Cardigan could of used one of RTK's classes on the 8 troop leading procedures.

[SWJED]

Revised Army Doctrine Elevates Stabilization (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/02/revised-army-doctrine-elevates/)


The Department of Defense Bloggers Roundtable featured Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV on the Army's new new operations manual (FM 3-0) that elevates the mission of stabilizing war-torn nations to make it as important as defeating adversaries on the battlefield.

LTG Caldwell currently serves as the commander of the Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, the command that oversees the Command and General Staff College and 17 other schools, centers, and training programs located throughout the United States. The Combined Arms Center is also responsible for: development of the Army’s doctrinal manuals, training of the Army’s commissioned and noncommissioned officers, oversight of major collective training exercises, integration of battle command systems and concepts, and supervision of the Army’s Center for the collection and dissemination of lessons learned.

[RTK]

Out of 660-670 soldiers who participated, 118 KIA and 127 WIA. Approximately 36% casualties, all the result of misunderstood orders and no recon. Cardigan could of used one of RTK's classes on the 8 troop leading procedures.

I could have made him somebody. I could have made him a contender.

[William F. Owen]

Out of 660-670 soldiers who participated, 118 KIA and 127 WIA. Approximately 36% casualties, all the result of misunderstood orders and no recon. Cardigan could of used one of RTK's classes on the 8 troop leading procedures.

Actually British Cavalry were always screwing up. This was just the best known, worst case.

His Grace, the Duke of Wellington was a Cavalry sceptic, and famously asked a young Cavalry liaison officer what role his unit should play in the forthcoming engagement. The young chap thought for a bit, and then said,
" If I may, your Grace, perhaps we might lend some tone to what would otherwise be a vulgar brawl."

Other Wellington classic was a hand written note passed to the Heavy Brigade, who were under long range cannon fire, during the action at Waterloo, that said.

"His Grace the Duke sends his regards and asks that the Gentleman of the Cavalry put away their umbrellas, now that they are engaged by the enemy."

Being mostly Americans, you probably won't get it, but it kills me! :D

[J Wolfsberger]

"His Grace the Duke sends his regards and asks that the Gentleman of the Cavalry put away their umbrellas, now that they are engaged by the enemy."

I get it. The Iron Duke did have way with words. My favorite is the letter requesting instructions during the Peninsular Campaign.

Regarding the Charge, and regardless of Lord Cardigan's abilities, I've always thought that the blunder was failing to support there Brigade.

[Tom Odom]

Actually British Cavalry were always screwing up. This was just the best known, worst case.

His Grace, the Duke of Wellington was a Cavalry sceptic, and famously asked a young Cavalry liaison officer what role his unit should play in the forthcoming engagement. The young chap thought for a bit, and then said,
" If I may, your Grace, perhaps we might lend some tone to what would otherwise be a vulgar brawl."

Other Wellington classic was a hand written note passed to the Heavy Brigade, who were under long range cannon fire, during the action at Waterloo, that said.

"His Grace the Duke sends his regards and asks that the Gentleman of the Cavalry put away their umbrellas, now that they are engaged by the enemy."

Being mostly Americans, you probably won't get it, but it kills me! :D


The 21st Lancers at Omdurman with Winston Churchill in attendance riding a white horse that drew special attention from Osman Digna's fuzzy wuzzies.



We've fought with many men acrost the seas,
An' some of 'em was brave an' some was not:
The Paythan an' the Zulu an' Burmese;
But the Fuzzy was the finest o' the lot.
We never got a ha'porth's change of 'im:
'E squatted in the scrub an' 'ocked our 'orses,
'E cut our sentries up at Suakim,
An' 'e played the cat an' banjo with our forces.
So 'ere's to you, Fuzzy-Wuzzy, at your 'ome in the Soudan;
You're a pore benighted 'eathen but a first-class fightin' man;
We gives you your certificate, an' if you want it signed
We'll come an' 'ave a romp with you whenever you're inclined.

[Tom Odom]

And relating to the new FM, I sent this out as a history lesson today:


"North Vietnam won the Vietnam War because it ruthlessly and systematically applied version of fortified compound warfare. South Vietnam and its ally, the United States, lost because they were unable or unwilling either to counter this effort or institute their own version. With support from both the Soviet Union and China and with sanctuaries from American military might, the North Vietnamese conducted a guerrilla campaign that culminated in the 1968 Tet Offensive. This campaign confused, distracted, and wore down the South Vietnamese and drove the United States from the war. Then, the North Vietnamese employed a massive conventional campaign that unified the two nations.

The United States found itself in the classic dilemma of the conventional operator in compound warfare; it faced an enemy that intelligently and ruthlessly combined main and guerrilla forces, utilized safe havens, and received support from powerful allies. The Americans and South Vietnamese, continually responding to the aspect of compound warfare that seemed predominant at any given time, tried a plethora of approaches until the American public lost its willingness to support the war. This “strategy of tactics” was ultimately a strategy for defeat."

This installment of the JRTC CALL BiWeekly History Lesson looks at Randall N. Briggs' chapter, Compound Warfare in the Vietnam War, in Dr. Thomas Huber's anthology, Compound Warfare, That Fatal Knot, published by the CGSC Press and the Combat Studies Institute. Compound warfare theory put forth by Dr. Huber examines the relationships and power amplification inherent when regular and irregular forces are used together under a coherent strategy. Dr. Brigg's study differs from most Vietnam histories in that it looks at the war as a compound war pitting North Vietnam's compound strategy against conventional forces of the US and South Vietnam and other allies.

As such, this chapter is not a case study of counterinsurgency, although COIN was very much part of the struggle. Rather it examines the play of regular and irregular forces in concert against a more conventional enemy. This close juxtaposition of regular and irregular warfare offers greater understanding of what those terms mean and do not mean. Neither the term "regular" nor its counterpart "irregular" have anything to do with normalcy or frequency. Indeed, "regular" warfare may be abnormal in the 21st Century. Rather regular and irregular warfare relate to the conventional and unconventional approaches to conflict and compound warfare theory offers a framework for their study.

It is in that light that I offer this chapter as a history lesson, one intended to broaden the reader's understanding of irregular warfare. Notably the new version of FM 3-0 makes critical changes in defining irregular warfare as it relates to stability operations. This single chapter from Tom Huber's anthology on compound warfare provides an excellent companion to the 2008 version of FM 3-0.

You may download the entire anthology at CSI Press (http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/compound_warfare.pdf).

[Jedburgh]

GEN Wallace in the Mar-Apr 08 Military Review:

FM 3-0 Operations: The Army's Blueprint (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/MarApr08/WallaceFm3EngMarApr08.pdf)

....The 2008 edition of FM 3-0, though shorter in length than its predecessors, presents the fundamental principles and concepts that guide the direction of Army operations rather than a checklist for success. Significant recent operational experience from the War on Terror, specifically the operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines, as well as urgent relief efforts following Hurricane Katrina and Rita, necessitated changes in doctrine. The development of this version of FM 3-0 traces back to 2005 with a series of issue papers covering unified action, the design of the war fighting functions, the continuum of operations, and the Army’s operational concept. The collective thoughts poured into and resulting from the issue papers served as a structural foundation for codifying the key concepts of the manual. The FM 3-0 issue papers were staffed to a broad audience of over 200 organizations, media groups, and individual recipients. The major organizations included the Army Staff; Army commands; Army service component commands; Army corps and division headquarters; training divisions; and TRADOC commands and centers, proponents, and staff, as well Air Force, Marine, and Navy doctrine centers. The discussion generated from the issue papers led to a draft of the content summary that served as guide for the overall layout of the themes, concepts, and chapter structure of the field manual.

The Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate hosted three action-officer-level councils of colonels in an effort to synthesize and integrate over 4,000 comments from various entities in the field at large across three drafts of the manual to coalesce as much expert knowledge, thought, and current operational experience as possible. The meetings provided a separate forum for fostering debate, gaining consensus, and resolving critical and major comments from respective reviewing agencies prior to a TRADOC commander-hosted doctrine and concepts conference.

The latest iteration of FM 3-0 is evolutionary in nature, incorporating ideas from new joint doctrine while retaining those valued pieces of Army doctrine that have stood the test of time. However, the doctrine is revolutionary with respect to its impetus and momentum to drive change. FM 3-0 provides purpose and direction to Army transformation and the application of force in complex operational environments. The current edition of FM 3-0 reflects Army thinking in a complex era of persistent conflict. The doctrine recognizes that military force alone will not resolve this type of conflict. Dominant landpower, while vital to operations, represents only one element of a broader campaign that requires the application of each element of national power. In line with this realization and reasoning, Army doctrine now elevates stability or civil-support operations to equal importance with offensive and defensive operations.....

[Cavguy]

Actually British Cavalry were always screwing up. This was just the best known, worst case.



I was having a conversation with the Canadian LNO here at Leavenworth. Being somewhat a fan of cavalry, we discussed approaches for awhile. One salient observation stuck with me:

"Cavalry's a great combat arm. But when cavalry guys screw up, they really screw up."

True. :D

[Jedburgh]

FM 3-O Operations (http://www.army.mil/fm3-0/FM3-0.pdf), 27 Feb 08

FM 3-0 is one of the Army’s two capstone doctrinal publications; the other is FM 1, The Army (http://www.army.mil/fm1/). FM 3-0 presents overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting operations. The eight chapters that make up this edition of Operations constitute the Army’s view of how it conducts prompt and sustained operations on land and sets the foundation for developing the other fundamentals and tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate field manuals. FM 3-0 also provides operational guidance for commanders and trainers at all echelons and forms the foundation for Army Education System curricula:

• Chapter 1 establishes the context of land operations in terms of a global environment of persistent conflict, the operational environment, and unified action. It discusses the Army’s expeditionary and campaign capabilities while emphasizing that it is Soldiers and leaders who remain the Army’s most important advantage.

• Chapter 2 describes a spectrum of conflict extending from stable peace to general war. From that spectrum, it establishes five operational themes into which various joint operations fit. This chapter helps Army leaders to understand and differentiate between the requirements of diverse joint operations such as peacekeeping and counterinsurgency. It shapes supporting doctrine for each operational theme.

• Chapter 3 is the most important chapter in the book; it describes the Army’s operational concept—full spectrum operations. Full spectrum operations seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and achieve decisive results through combinations of four elements: offense, defense, and stability or civil support operations. It establishes mission command as the preferred method of exercising battle command.

• Chapter 4 addresses combat power, the means by which Army forces conduct full spectrum operations. It replaces the older battlefield operating systems (“BOS”) with six warfighting functions, bound by leadership and employing information as the elements of combat power. Combined arms and mutual support are the payoff.

• Chapter 5 reviews the principles of command and control and how they affect the operations process—plan, prepare, execute, and assess. The emphasis is on commanders and the central role that they have in battle command. Commanders understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and continually assess.

• Chapter 6 discusses operational art, offering Army commanders a bridge between military theory and practice.

• Chapter 7 is about information superiority, particularly the five Army information tasks, purpose, and staff responsibility.

• Chapter 8 discusses the requirement for Army forces in joint campaigns conducted across intercontinental distances. It frames the challenges created by the requirement for Army forces in terms of strategic and operational reach.

Four appendixes complement the body of the manual. The principles of war and operations are in appendix A. Command and support relationships are in appendix B. A brief description of modular force is in appendix C. And a discussion of the purpose of doctrine in the Army is in appendix D.

This appendix includes a chapter-by-chapter summary of the important changes made in this edition of FM 3-0. It also includes tables listing new, modified, and rescinded terms for which this manual is the proponent.

Army doctrine is consistent and compatible with joint doctrine. FM 3-0 links landpower doctrine to joint operations doctrine as expressed in joint doctrinal publications, specifically, JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_0.pdf). FM 3-0 also uses text and concepts developed with North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners. When published, Allied Joint Publication 3.2, Doctrine for Land Operations, will contain this material.

[J Wolfsberger]

"Cavalry's a great combat arm. But when cavalry guys screw up, they really screw up."


But you have to admit, the opportunity for a stunning success is always accompanied by the opportunity for an equally stunning Charlie Foxtrot.

[SWJED]

The Army has announced that the updated Field Manual 3-0 (Operations) is now available online (http://www.army.mil/fm3-0/FM3-0.pdf) (non-AKO) - same version?

[Tom Odom]

The Army has announced that the updated Field Manual 3-0 (Operations) is now available online (http://www.army.mil/fm3-0/FM3-0.pdf) (non-AKO) - same version?

Surface look, yes. I would expect no less.

[Norfolk]

The updated version of JP 3-0 Joint Operations (with Change 1) (http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_0.pdf) has also been publicly released by JFCOM today.

[Jedburgh]

FM 3-0 Interactive Multimedia Guide (https://wkb.bcks.army.mil/fm3_0/start_web.html)

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