Suggestions for Small Wars Essay Contest?

[SWCAdmin]

It's quite possible that in the near future, Small Wars Journal will be in a position to sponsor a writing contest with a significant cash award.

We are looking for some good topics that strike to effectiveness across the community of Small Wars practitioners, don't re-hash ground that's been adequately covered, and ideally have a collateral benefit of raising interest and participation in our community from some of the important but under-represented groups.

At this point, we're thinking that we'll probably run 3 or 4 topics that complement each other somehow, probably concurrent, maybe time phased. We will publish special editions of SWJ Magazine with the entries, and maybe some additional publishing with select partners.

Seeking your suggestions here for essay topics, or a family of topics. Not the topic of YOUR paper, but the question(s) in the Call for Papers that we put out. +/- any suggestions on contest ROE, logistics, etc.

For now, I'll just sit back and listen. I don't want to over-influence the brainstorming in this thread. But believe me, I'll be watching intently.

[SteveMetz]

--Leadership in small wars
--Nontraditional partners in small wars
--Small wars after terrorism
--A strategy for hybrid enemies

[selil]

--technology in small wars
--ethics in small wars
--the constraints of logistics in small wars
--warrior and dove in small wars

[SWCAdmin]

Thanks. All good suggestions and adding to my mental short list.

Even just the bumper sticker subjects are helpful, and I realize for some topics less is more. But as folks begin to frame their ideas, it might be useful for some topics to use a couple of sentences or a paragraph to really frame the questions.

[Rex Brynen]

The role of neoconservative Zionist-Arabist leftist environmentalist dhimmie globalization free masons in small wars?

Sorry.. I think I'm channeling a couple of the dearly departed from the SWC graveyard...

[selil]

Papers detailing the concerns and issues with proposed solutions in the continuing and advancing fields technolog fascilitated communication

Papers discussing issues and solutions surrounding the Internet as a command, control, communication, coordination and force multiplier of indigenous and contemporary small warriors.

Papers discussing the impacts of social justice and moral perils when engaging in small wars.

Papers that examine the issues of fielding a cadre in foreign enviornments engaged in small wars without the associate big military build up.


Is that better? I'm just pulling things people have said were issues over the last year or so.

[zenpundit]

The Economics of Small Wars
History's greatest "Small Warrior"
Nation Building, State Failure and Small Wars
Preventing Small Wars
Where Does Political Conflict Stop and Small Warfare Begin?
Small CyberWars
Do Small Wars really exist in the Age of Globalization?
Small Wars and Sea Power
Small Wars and Superempowered Individuals
When Does a War Stop Being "Small"?

and my personal favorite:

"It's 10:00. Do you Know Where Your Small War Is ?":D

[Norfolk]

The effects of long-duration Small Wars upon troop retention and the subsequent knock-on consequences of that upon manning, leadership, doctrine, and professional competence, in volunteer armies.

...And the role of Rednecks in Small Wars - YYEEEHHAAAHHH!

[Ron Humphrey]

Which Wars aren't Small Wars?, or at least several small ones tied together?

Walking the line between career and mission

Defining accountability,rationality, and feasability in Foriegn intervention's

[Gian P Gentile]

The role of neoconservative Zionist-Arabist leftist environmentalist dhimmie globalization free masons in small wars?

or, how about the role of graudates from UC Berkeley in Small Wars?

Seriously here are a few humble suggestions from a student of history

--Historical uses of coersion and its effectiveness in Small Wars
--Historical view of underpinning theories of small wars: e.g., enemy centric, population centric
--A duPicq view of the moral domain of small wars

and of course i am in agreement with Norfolk's "role of rednecks in small wars."

[LawVol]

-What is the difference between counterinsurgency and counterterrorism? Can/should the military do both?

-The role of human security in preventing/winning small wars

-Is the law enforcement approach (i.e. knock and announce, constrained use of force) a better approach to the application of force in small wars? Why or why not?

-The Marine Corps has a mantra of "every Marine a rifleman." Can/should all branches of the military follow a similar training regimen to facilitate the augmentation of the Army when necessary to fight a small war? In other words, should non-combat career fields train to take up the slack given the Army's issues with continual deplyments?

-How can air and space power be more effective in small wars (you knew I'd add this:))?

[Ron Humphrey]

...And the role of Rednecks in Small Wars - YYEEEHHAAAHHH!

Although if I remember correctly once there's a large enough contingent of redneck's involved it's usually all about working out the terms of the enemies surrender:wry:

[Ken White]

...
...And the role of Rednecks in Small Wars - YYEEEHHAAAHHH!

has to clean up the messes that the librul elites foment for economic reasons. :D

(if we weren't fighting in them, we'd be fighting each other...)

[LawVol]

and these are just the guys to do it (http://www.grouchyoldcripple.com/archives/000332.html)

[Surferbeetle]

How about:

--Developing Metrics for Small Wars
--Security Forecasting Models for Small Wars
--Statistical Process Control for Infrastructure Development and Operation
--Statistical Process Control for Good Governance
--A Comparison of Select Small Wars Metrics to 20th and 21st Century Small Wars

Steve

[Uboat509]

What about an essay about the roles of SOF and conventional forces in COIN? Prior to OIF, the attitude in the big Army was that COIN was the realm of SOF and they wanted no part of it. That attitude has changed (though not gone away completely) but there is still a disconnect between SOF and the conventional forces. What should each one's role be? What responibilities should be shared and what ones kept sepparate?

Also I was reading one of Kissinger's books and he talked about how the concept of holding the state to the same moral standards as the individual is a relatively new one. At what point does the state's obligation to protect it's people outweigh moral considerations? The state must of needs do things that the individual would find unpleasant or even abhorent. How do we find and define the line that the state must not cross, even to defend its citizens?

SFC W

[Ron Humphrey]

Also I was reading one of Kissinger's books and he talked about how the concept of holding the state to the same moral standards as the individual is a relatively new one. At what point does the state's obligation to protect it's people outweigh moral considerations? The state must of needs do things that the individual would find unpleasant or even abhorent. How do we find and define the line that the state must not cross, even to defend its citizens?

SFC W

Good Topic

I would find my personal inclination in this to be that

When and if it becomes more about the security of the state then about the security of the people the line has probably been crossed.

Well intended powers for well intended leaders without taking into account future leadership possibilities can generally lead to this.

It would be a good study

[William F. Owen]

why not ask for paper that Usefully inform practitioners as to the conduct and understanding of modern conflict.

I am becoming more and more convinced, (by reading these forums) that trying to keep COIN in some box that is distinct from wider aspects of conflict is utterly counter-productive and even delusional. War is war. Conflict is conflict. Trying to create discrete groups of conflict does not help - witness the mess that gets made of it.

[JJackson]

I would like to read the thoughts of others on the responsibilities of States that embark on small wars - or as seems increasingly common - give the nod to others. How to keep a small war from becoming a long war, several related small wars or just a major conflict.
Looking at Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and Somalia my concern is differences between transient political regimes are leading to disproportionate humanitarian crisis for the largely innocent civilian population. Would Ethiopia have invaded Somalia if not given tacit permission by the US, and why would the US back such an adventure if not in the hope of recovering some embassy bombing suspects; was the predictable disaster justifiable given the potential gains? Were the UIC really that big a threat?

So in short ethical questions for nation states and I second,

Selil --ethics in small wars?

Uboat509 --At what point does the state's obligation to protect it's people outweigh moral considerations? [and I would add the state's obligation to protect other civilians from direct and indirect consequences of its actions]

JJ --Rednecks, should they be trusted with guns - discuss?

[Jedburgh]

Intelligence support to small units in urban operations.

Balancing killing and building when conducting SSTRO in a major urban center.

IDPs, refugees, ethnic/sectarian tension and terrorist infrastructure in an urban environment.

Interagency, coalition and host nation cooperation, collaboration and interoperability at the small unit level.

[Rank amateur]

Since war is politics by other means, and we're a democracy, what does the average voter need to know about small wars?

How do we finance small wars? How can we weight the costs versus the benefits?

[Rob Thornton]

Well - One term is now becoming solidified in my new lexicon - Security Sector Reform (SSR). The new FM on Stability Ops is not too far out - Security Force Assistance (SFA) will be a part of it (big hat tip to SWC member Old Eagle for some damned fine witting!).

I vote one of the topics incorporate the broader topic of SSR - this will allow potential authors to cover everything from Inter-Agency work in SSR to Rule of Law.

Under the broader topic we can also include sub and related topics of: advising, working with/in support of indigenous forces, FID, PRT, building partner capacity, etc. While these are often parts and pieces of the same things, or cross into multiple areas which together work toward stability - they fall under the SFA and SSR umbrellas.

I'll sign up to be on the review board.

It will also help our effort here at JCIFSA (https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/comments.asp)(Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance) by identifying folks interested in the topic, and by some possible ideas from those thinking or working in other areas. Some good threads might be spun off from the papers.

Best Rob

[davidbfpo]

1) How did civil & military institutions learn from small wars in the Imperial age (1860-1960)? How do those insititutions learn now in the Internet age? Are the obstacles similar?

2) Can we (the West?) identify a possible small war / insurgency before violence occurs? If identified what do we do first and what do we not do?

3) Fighting small wars a national or international responsibility?

4) The fast technological fix -v- the slow human fix for intelligence in small wars. Can we wait? I'm mindful of Northern Ireland and some CT lessons in Western Europe, e.g. ETA in Spain and the Italian Red Brigades.

davidbfpo

[Adam L]

why not ask for paper that Usefully inform practitioners as to the conduct and understanding of modern conflict.

I am becoming more and more convinced, (by reading these forums) that trying to keep COIN in some box that is distinct from wider aspects of conflict is utterly counter-productive and even delusional. War is war. Conflict is conflict. Trying to create discrete groups of conflict does not help - witness the mess that gets made of it.

Well said, I know exactly what you mean. In the past few years, I have found in almost every area I have studied this almost irrepressible movement to categorize and separate issues to death. In theory, everything can be separated, analyzed and turned black and white. In reality everything is one big greyish area. To try to "keep COIN in some box that is distinct from wider aspects of conflict" (William F Owen) is akin to not allowing surgeons to consult non-surgical specialties.

Adam L

[Bodhi]

---The Irony of "Small" Wars: They're Not Just for the Military to Execute
---Are Small Wars Any More "Political" Than Conventional Wars?
---AS/D SOLIC: The Case for a Similar Arm within Each Governmental Department
---Who Rightfully Defines the Term, "Small War," and Is There Really Such A Thing As a "Small War"?
---If Small Wars Are So "Small," Then Why Do Great Powers Struggle With Their Execution?

[slapout9]

1-SBW theory (Slapout Based Warfare) VS: Small Wars Theory:D

2-History of Law Enforcement influcene COIN TTP's.

3-Small Wars on $5.00 a day or less.

4-Economic Targets as The Key to Winning Small Wars.

5- How The Police Would Fight And Win Small Wars.

[Ken White]

"I am becoming more and more convinced, (by reading these forums) that trying to keep COIN in some box that is distinct from wider aspects of conflict is utterly counter-productive and even delusional. War is war. Conflict is conflict. Trying to create discrete groups of conflict does not help - witness the mess that gets made of it."and I think Bodhi summed up the question fairly well:
"--Who Rightfully Defines the Term, "Small War," and Is There Really Such A Thing As a "Small War"?"so I'll second the motion on that question.

I think Slapout has a valid point on costs (of all sorts) with his number 3 topic:
"3-Small Wars on $5.00 a day or less." and second it.

Also suggest:

-- Improving Officer and Enlisted accession training to better prepare for future threats.

And, channeling Steve Metz:

-- Will the American body politic support small wars that can be lengthy?

For JJackson, who above suggests:
"JJ --Rednecks, should they be trusted with guns - discuss?" That also is a good suggestion, seriously -- as it implies we Americans are not to be trusted with dangerous toys, a valid question.

While I'm sure many in the world would agree, I'm equally sure many more would not and would rather we, with all our faults, have them than some others. In any event, to reassure him, I can attest that this heir to all the Scotch Irish Presbyterian genetic flaws has six firearms in the house; that all three of my sons have about the same on average and none of us thus far have killed or wounded anyone we weren't supposed to; therefor he can sleep soundly. Unless he suffers a home invasion -- a phenomena which for some really strange reason seems to be a great deal more prevalent in his locale than it does in mine... :D

So, these four for consideration:

-- Who Rightfully Defines the Term, "Small War," and Is There Really Such A Thing As a "Small War?" (Seconded, from Bodhi)

-- Small Wars on $5.00 a day or less. (Seconded, from Slapout)

-- Improving Officer and Enlisted accession training to better prepare for future threats.

-- Will the American body politic support small wars that can be lengthy?

[Adam L]

-- Improving Officer and Enlisted accession training to better prepare for future threats.


I'll second that.



And, channeling Steve Metz:

-- Will the American body politic support small wars that can be lengthy?


I think this is a little too narrow and already answered (possibly.) How about expanding it to include possible methods to employ in order to increase understanding of small wars. Perhaps an essay about the best methods to depoliticize the discussion an analyis of Small Wars. Basically an essay about how to improve Small Wars PR.

Adam L

[jcustis]

-Organizing for small wars in a post 9/11, OIF, and OEF era. In the wake of the aformentioned events (assuming we get to the latter two), what should the formal organizational structures of the various services look like? Is there a requirement to establish formal changes to support future battles in the "Long War", or will ad hoc structures and organizations serve our military better, considering the current expenditure of funds to make technological changes and improvements in kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities?

Put another way, should coalitions of the "willing" invest more in training and COTS enabler technologies - with an eye towards increasing capabilities at COIN, or will the future require them to continue making capital investments in fighters, tanks, and ships to deter and defeat potential threats that also possess fighter, tanks, and ships (oh, and assymetric capabilities)?

[Adam L]

Good topic! I was working on something along similar lines, but I had not quite put it together yet. I think you hit it right on the head.

Adam L

[Surferbeetle]

What about an essay about the roles of SOF and conventional forces in COIN? Prior to OIF, the attitude in the big Army was that COIN was the realm of SOF and they wanted no part of it. That attitude has changed (though not gone away completely) but there is still a disconnect between SOF and the conventional forces. What should each one's role be? What responsibilities should be shared and what ones kept

Uboat509,

This quote of yours has been pinging around in my head today, that and the iPhone comment you lucky...

I would like to share an experience with you that changed my thinking about things SOF. "No ####, so there I was..."

The 2000 copy of FM 41-10 has figure 1-1 which provides a nice clean visual about the continuum of conflict and how we CA-bubbas try and drain the swamp throughout the full-spectrum of things. This is the picture that was in my mind when I hit the ground in Iraq in 2003.

Iraq covers about 167400 square miles / 433400 square kilometers depending upon which website you quote and in this large area I was very aware that SOF were in short supply and conventional forces were plentiful. My AO was too large for me to cover every day but the 101st did a damn fine job of it. When then MG Petraeus shifted the whole DIV from 'Cordon and Search' to 'Cordon and Knock' operations I realized that US conventional forces are capable of COIN op's. When MG Petraeus had his BCT commanders meet with the locals, id problems and work to resolve them I saw that with the right leader and given time and experience conventional forces can excel at COIN. Necessity is the mother of invention and with the current situation Big Army has no choice but to excel at COIN and to keep those skills sharp or risk losing this fight and future fights.

An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure and we have learned this lesson in spades. For SOF, I am of the opinion that we need to ensure that we are regularly inserted further upstream in the time continuum in AO's of concern to US interests to conduct our missions before things get to where they are today. SOF must also effectively educate, advise, and train with our conventional forces on our mission just as we do with host nations. Failure to effectively execute either of these missions is harmful to the nation. In the meantime we all need to play team and kick some ass.

My 0.02 cents,

Steve

[SteveO]

Not only private contractors, but all non-state armed groups. USG-contracted armed groups fighting ideological or criminal armed groups - sort of like what's happening in Colombia. Is that a small war?

Another idea for an essay prompt. Influence or information operations and strategic communication in small wars - winning minds and wills - both in the area of operations and in the global public square.

One last one, a couple of people have mentioned it. The interagency in small wars, but not just the Federal IA - public, private, nonprofit, and even super empowered individuals in coalitions of the willing. How could we attract all, or many, of the elements for good into a unified effort? should we?

You may want to include an option for people to write whatever they want to keep the new ideas flowing. You never know what you're gonna get.

[SWJED]

http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/images/figure1-1.gif

[Watcher In The Middle]

Originally posted by Slapout:

4-Economic Targets as The Key to Winning Small Wars.

Maybe as an offshoot of the above:

"Practical Economics For Small Wars" a/k/a "You Can't Live On A Steady Diet of Sand".

[William F. Owen]

http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/images/figure1-1.gif

This is, IMO, woeful. It is not a spectrum of conflict. It is also inaccurate. I think the old Three Block War is simplistic, but it's more useful than this. This actually implies that there are discreet areas of operation that are distinct and clearly identifiable. However, we know this not to be true, and thus it is misleading.

..and, how does it help to think like this? What use is this type of graphic?

[SteveMetz]

This is, IMO, woeful. It is not a spectrum of conflict. It is also inaccurate. I think the old Three Block War is simplistic, but it's more useful than this. This actually implies that there are discreet areas of operation that are distinct and clearly identifiable. However, we know this not to be true, and thus it is misleading.

..and, how does it help to think like this? What use is this type of graphic?

I'm not reading it that way at all. Seems to me that all it's attempting to point out is that CA is involved in military activity all the way from war to peace, but that it's specific functions vary.

[Mike Innes]

Hi folks, just getting started here at SWC after following it for quite some time. Bear with me, I've scanned over the previous 30-odd posts in this thread, and seen nothing explicitly related to the role of terrain, broadly speaking, in small wars.

I'm pandering to my own limited expertise here, but as an outgrowth of writing about sanctuary in insurgent and terrorist thought and practice, I've been building a conceptual suite that I've come to think of as "terrain complexity".

Right, the complexity part's not complicated, it means what it means, and gets into the role of networks, complex adaptive systems, and all the "unrecognizables" and incoherence of post-cold war low intensity crises. But the terrain angle is much more convoluted. Complex terrain might be just another word for "ecologies" or "environments", but I hesitate to go that route, thinking that it could be somewhat misleading to the lay, non-security types thinking more about maritime ecosystems and sustainable forests than the problems of CT/COIN battlespace and IPB, esp. in a global context.

Terrain, in this sense, is a weave of material/physical, human/demographic, and cognitive/social threads. It gets into rural vs. urban ops, hard vs. soft COIN, domestic vs. foreign theatres of operation, policing vs. military options, etc. Its ties into processes and conditions of radicalization (historically, not just in relation to today's Iraq and Afghanistan), cross-border migrations and transnational pipelines, etc. And, I think, the notion of terrain complexity underlies, so to speak, a great many of the suggestions that've already been put forward.

Anyway, just a thought.

[Surferbeetle]

William F. Owen,

FM's evolve and it is instructive to compare the current offering on civil affairs to the earlier versions. Distribution is limited so access may be an issue.

With regard to models which attempt to predict reality I am currently working on a trickling filter model in microsoft excel; eckenfelder, germain, velz, nrc and their derivations all attempt to provide guidance on how to ultimately, commit resources to improve things. After everything has been programed it is fun to change the variables and note the resulting ranges of predications. I am also a fan of Isaac Asimov's ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isaac_Asimov ) idea that one day we will have quantitative models with which to predict human behavior.

So, the three block war model is a good one in that is able to provide a general concept of what is happening on certain aspects of small wars.

What other models are you aware of and would you be willing to share with the forum?

My hope is that the essay solicitation will generate some type of working/quantitative model. Along these lines I ran across a blog that is attempting to generate analysis/recommendations on weapons proliferation using collaborative efforts by the blogs visitors...perhaps that is something we could look at here

Steve

[Ranger94]

[QUOTE=Surferbeetle;38187]How about:

--Developing Metrics for Small Wars


It would be very useful if it could be defined for Infantry Squad/Platoon leader.

[William F. Owen]

What other models are you aware of and would you be willing to share with the forum?


Well first I would ask, why do we need to model war/conflict. I submit so as we have something that allows us to conuct operations in a better/more effective fashion.

Thus I feel we need to model opponents/actors, not the conflicts themselves. If there are no bad guys, then what are we doing?

[Surferbeetle]

William,

I agree with your assessment of models and would add that models and simulations allow us to think about things ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model_%28macroeconomics%29 ) before committing resources.

Actors and opponents are certainly integral components of a conflict model. More comprehensive models involve more variables and things rapidly get painful when running these types of models. Computational Fluid Dynamics ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_fluid_dynamics ) is an example that I am aware of that takes a look at fiercely complex issues and makes fairly decent predictions about them.

I am looking for the range of conflict models from simple to complex in hopes of learning more and suggest that the SWJ essay incorporate some of these models when attempting to advance explanations and predictions.

Steve

[Surferbeetle]

It would be very useful if it could be defined for Infantry Squad/Platoon leader.

Ranger 94,

I carry a laminated copy of GTA 41-01-001 (http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/civil.pdf) with me when I head downrange. Pages 34 - 40 of this publication might have some of the focus that you seem to be looking for.

For those who do not have access to the GTA the portion I mentioned revisits the SPHERE and UNCHR standards and indicators for populations.

Steve

[J Wolfsberger]

Based on a lot of the discussion I've read since joining, how about:

The spectrum of war?
Does the nature representative government prevent winning small wars?

Whatever you do, require the entries be written in English, not techno- or acadamebabble.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

to Stop Worrying and Love Small Wars.

LIC and the Defense Acquisition Process

Small Wars in the Context of National Security Strategy

Airpower Application in Small Wars (A Charlie Dunlap fave!)

Are Small Wars the Future?

[SWCAdmin]

...who prefers to remain anonymous for some unknown reason. Author does credit the discussion here for some of the thought.

FYI, I got the dreaded SWJ Server Death Grip (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3457)when I tried to post this yesterday. Fortunately, I can recognize it and know who to call. Need to change our host, and apologies to all the people who aren't reading this now because they can't get through. :confused::mad::p

--------------
One characteristic of many small wars is that they are asymmetric: one actor possesses considerably more “hard” or military power than the other. Yet many ostensibly weaker powers seem able to negate this advantage through the use of information. Manipulation of existing news outlets (e.g., newspapers and magazines), and creation of new media outlets (e.g., blogs and websites), may permit weaker actors to achieve end states otherwise unattainable. Under what conditions are such information operations most likely to succeed (e.g, during more traditional military operations, such as the November 2004 assault on Fallujah, or during less traditional military operations, such as the pacification of Anbar)? What are the most efficient ways for weaker actors to use information operations to negate their opponents’ military advantages? Conversely, what are the most efficient ways for stronger actors to deny weaker actors such capabilities (e.g., embedding, foreign-language websites, etc.))? Which branch or branches of the US Government are best able to conduct such operations, and in what ways?

The US military has sought to learn counterinsurgency lessons from the experiences of other militaries as well its own. But to some extent, each military is unique. With respect to the US military, to what extent can lessons from other militaries be applied, to what extent are lessons from other militaries inapplicable, and why? What are the dimensions one should assess when importing lessons from other militaries? What makes such lessons applicable or inapplicable – the nature of the US political system (e.g., division of responsibility for prosecution of wars between Congress and the Executive), the nature of the US military (e.g, dissimilar from the British regimental system), the absence of unity of command within a theatre and separate lines of authority between DOD and State, etc.? For example, to what extent should one apply British COIN lessons from Malaya or Kenya, or Russian COIN lessons from Afghanistan, and what rationales dictate which lessons should be applied when (e.g., British lessons should be applied because the British political system is more similar to the US one, or Russian lessons should be applied because it too lacked a small wars tradition)?

The concepts of guerilla war, unconventional war, insurgency, low-intensity conflict, asymmetric conflict, and terrorism – to name a few – overlap to a considerable degree, but also diverge to a similar degree. Not all insurgencies take place within the context of unconventional wars (e.g., actions during the US Revolutionary and Civil Wars), nor do all asymmetric conflicts necessarily involve insurgencies (e.g., the Israel-Lebanon/Hezbollah 2006 war). Accordingly, distinctions between small wars and large wars may be considerably overstated: a war might be characterized as “primarily” “small” or “large,” but nevertheless contain large components of each. To aid to the complexity, militaries – and organizations more generally – can arguably change only slowly and painfully at best, and/or be capable of doing only one thing. Finally, while the United States is currently waging (at a minimum) two counterinsurgencies, the potential of major or large regional conflicts cannot be discounted entirely. Accordingly, to what extent – if at all – should the US military attempt to organize (or reorganize) itself for small wars? Or, conversely, should the US military be content with the progress it has made in drafting FM 3-24, and reorienting itself toward small wars, and decide its change has been sufficient? What tradeoffs, if any, should be made?

[Jedburgh]

I carry a laminated copy of GTA 41-01-001 (http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/civil.pdf) with me when I head downrange.....
The version of the Civil Afffairs Planning and Execution Guide linked above is dated Oct 02. It has just been superseded by a new version (https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/9890579), dated Jan 08. (AKO log-in required)

[William F. Owen]

One characteristic of many small wars is that they are asymmetric: one actor possesses considerably more “hard” or military power than the other. Yet many ostensibly weaker powers seem able to negate this advantage through the use of information. Manipulation of existing news outlets (e.g., newspapers and magazines), and creation of new media outlets (e.g., blogs and websites), may permit weaker actors to achieve end states otherwise unattainable. Under what conditions are such information operations most likely to succeed (e.g, during more traditional military operations, such as the November 2004 assault on Fallujah, or during less traditional military operations, such as the pacification of Anbar)? What are the most efficient ways for weaker actors to use information operations to negate their opponents’ military advantages? Conversely, what are the most efficient ways for stronger actors to deny weaker actors such capabilities (e.g., embedding, foreign-language websites, etc.))? Which branch or branches of the US Government are best able to conduct such operations, and in what ways?


I have fundamental problems with the language and logic in use here. "Asymmetric" is meaningless in terms of military thought. It does not usefully describe the phenomena that it claims to.

IMO, the use of the description "Small Wars" is also largely useless, in that it is not a useful description. How do you measure Small versus Large?

What all these bumper stickers manage to avoid is the admission that there are opponents against whom the use of conventional military force is not useful because they shelter and subsist within civilian populations. That's it! It's nothing to do with information or the media. Information and media are not and never can be military ends in themselves. They are activities that create a friction which may negatively impact on military action, because of the political/humanitarian dimension. EG: If military action remains unknown or unreported, (or no one cares) there can be no information dimension.

There are populations who are completely inoculated against information operations, EG - The militant and ultra-orthodox Jewish communities in Israel and the wider world or militant Islam and the Pro/Pan-Arabists anywhere, and people of any extreme position. They only accept information that supports their beliefs. Check out "cognitive dissonance" as a phenomena. These people are not swayed by information. - However a gun in the mouth does get them to take their fingers off the keyboard or stop the interview for the BBC.

To my mind the entire challenge is to make and retain the utility of military force, so that it achieves the decisions we need. You have guerillas and bad people because they believe that power comes from the barrel of a gun. The best and most effective solution is to make such men, fear for all they believe, should they wish to attempt gaining influence by such means.

[Ken White]

Agree totally that 'asymmetric' simply describes the way anyone should ALWAYS fight -- attack ones opponents weakest point(s).

If, for example, the opponent is not able to successfully attack us militarily and as a result turns to successfully using IO to weaken our national resolve for completion of a goal, then our effort should be directed toward undermining the opponents efforts in that regard and destroying his credibility. I do not believe that is a military function, it is a governmental function but the Armed Forces are the absolute wrong agency to prosecute the effort.

Other than to covertly remove some of his messengers and destroy some of his dissemination capability, of course...:D

Wilf is correct in that:
"...that there are opponents against whom the use of conventional military force is not useful because they shelter and subsist within civilian populations.. Yet there are also cases where conventional military force is required for one reason or another to open the window for non conventional force or effort to be applied. That effort will vary considerably dependent on the nation(s) involved and the general situation and success will depend on knowledge of the cultures and forces involved and on good intelligence. We do not do well at understanding the former and we have not done well at obtaining and / or promulgating the latter. Hopefully, both those conditions will see improvement in the future.

I do not as strongly agree about 'small wars.' It's a term, no more and some wars are in fact smaller than others. As it is generally applied today, it points toward COIN. I think that the Armed Forces don't “do” COIN, rather they act in support of US Government COIN, they don't conduct COIN but do -- and must be able to -- operate in a COIN environment. I believe that distinction is critical and is not being applied -- and that is why we've been floundering for a while. Volumes have been written about that and about the failure to involve the total government in this effort so there's little to be gained by flogging that stud here.

[Geoff]

What about the simple ones, I'm probably re-hashing some of the things that have been discussed, c'set la vie.

Reconstruction after conflict - an invaders responsibility?
The soldier of the future - a geek, sneak or killer?

I do like the idea about Rednecks and guns, does the use of Monster trucks in modern warfare follow on, or is it assumed?

Cheers

Geoff

[invictus0972]

Role of religion in conflict resolution
Role of religion in counterinsurgency

Some feel that the soft power of religion is often overlooked in the politics of societies. It would be interesting to see this issue explored.

[SethB]

Microfinance in counterinsurgency.

[wm]

I do like the idea about Rednecks and guns, does the use of Monster trucks in modern warfare follow on, or is it assumed?


At last the mysterious attraction for MRAPS is revealed--Is it the Monster of all Monster trucks? :D

[Ron Humphrey]

At last the mysterious attraction for MRAPS is revealed--Is it the Monster of all Monster trucks? :D

kinda leanin towards the latter. It only makes sense, not to mention the added benefit of bringing new mods for our current trucks more likely

Military advancements always fortell lots of neat toys for the rest of us :D

[Mike Innes]

Microfinance in counterinsurgency.

Intriguing. Gets into the soft side of COIN, development, etc. Question: licit or illicit microfinance? :)

[Mike Innes]

Role of religion in conflict resolution
Role of religion in counterinsurgency

Some feel that the soft power of religion is often overlooked in the politics of societies. It would be interesting to see this issue explored.

Also intriguing. But I'll bring it back to my earlier suggestion about terrain complexity. Religion is cognitive terrain, and if we're to follow Anthony Smith on the sacred sources of nationalism, it's a tight fight with material/physical terrain. And neither view exists in the absence of human terrain.

Sorry, yes: I'm a reductivist. ;0

[Cavguy]

I'd offer a contest for the tactical level.

I would like to see a contest focused to the tactical level - BN and below. We have a plethora of studies, think tank reports, op-eds, etc. on whole of government and larger issues.

What we are not seeing is a large density of high quality work on the small stuff that makes tactical level COIN successful or unsuccessful. For the most part the branch journals have a hard time attracting these sort of articles, and when they are published they don't hit the mainstream.

SWJ should encourage the works of the CPT/LT/SGT level, which aren't as common.

Just my thoughts.

[slapout9]

I'd offer a contest for the tactical level.

I would like to see a contest focused to the tactical level - BN and below. We have a plethora of studies, think tank reports, op-eds, etc. on whole of government and larger issues.

What we are not seeing is a large density of high quality work on the small stuff that makes tactical level COIN successful or unsuccessful. For the most part the branch journals have a hard time attracting these sort of articles, and when they are published they don't hit the mainstream.

SWJ should encourage the works of the CPT/LT/SGT level, which aren't as common.

Just my thoughts.


Ditto, all this Strategical Stuff tends to overshadow the fact that sooner or later it gets down to the tactical level of how are you going to do this.
;)

[William F. Owen]

IMO, the use of the description "Small Wars" is also largely useless, in that it is not a useful description. How do you measure Small versus Large?


Oh yeah? I was utterly wrong. Small War is a very useful description when applied within a context of Regular and Irregular threats. Live and learn!

[George L. Singleton]

People are in command to lead and they in turn implement broad strategy on the ground at the tactical level, having previously contributed to strategy development.

Thus I like the battle plan of Lt. General Nathan Bedford Forrest of CSA Civil War fame: "Get there firstest with the mostest."

I also like the hard reality which General Ulysses Grant (he had no middle name, the "s" was made up to create the image of a middle name) had of we will over time grind them down by the sheer force of men, material, supply and national productivity.

These days we still lack a more uniform individual participation, self sacrifice on the home front to back up "whatever it takes" in the field, "whatever it takes" having been defined by our most senior policy makers.

Tactical views/opinions/experiences of a pro-active, constructive, not backbiting nature, at the company grade officer and NCO level we need now as a part of the SWJ daily, on going dialogue on this good site, also my view.

A start on my two cents.

[jcustis]

I'm glad that it appears we will get some practical examples of both topics from the winners and honorable mentions. There has been a ton of theory running awry at times, and although it helps describe what we think we see, the guts of it all requires getting us towards endstates. I hope the articles are judged on how well the material can be applied to a tool box.

[SWCAdmin]

Lots of the suggestions here, including this last run on "the tactical level," run to the conceptual. What we can really use is some specific proposed questions, not general areas of interest. We've got enough ideas, need something that can cross the LD.

Like jcustis said, we think there is a strong element of the tactical level in both of the questions we asked. At least potentially.

[Cavguy]

Some starters: (some are interrelated)

1) Effective employment of Combat Outposts - when and where? When to handover? When to abandon?
2) Carrot and the Stick - how and when to use it?
3) Counterinsurgency strategies among "unwinnable" populations (i.e. hardcore against)
4) Full Spectrum Counterinsurgency (term from Kilcullen), how to get there?
5) Officer/NCO/Enlisted educational preparation for the "full spectrum" battlefield. What should it look like?
6) Working by/with/through - how can conventional forces empower host nation forces and governance?
7) Effective use of Human Terrain Analysis to achieve effects
8) Tactical Unit organization for COIN (dovetail role/mission of squad thread)
9) Effective intelligence operations at the company level

[William F. Owen]

8) Tactical Unit organization for COIN (dovetail role/mission of squad thread)


Damn! Just sent that article to Infantry Magazine at Ft Benning!

[davidbfpo]

From a non-military armchair:

1) What does my formation (specify below battallion) gain from fighting a Small War?
2) Small Wars: 'Fighting to learn' in pre-deployment training -v- 'Learning to fight' from experience in the field? Discuss.
3) If intelligence is the 'key' why is it in so many silos?
4) I'll tell you what I need to fight a (tactical level) Small War - bottom up!
5) A 'light touch' approach to COIN wins (historical examples), so how did we end up with "acronym soup" and B1 / B52 support? (Sheer prejudice that).

davidbfpo

[William F. Owen]

From a non-military armchair:

1) What does my formation (specify below battallion) gain from fighting a Small War?
2) Small Wars: 'Fighting to learn' in pre-deployment training -v- 'Learning to fight' from experience in the field? Discuss.
3) If intelligence is the 'key' why is it in so many silos?
4) I'll tell you what I need to fight a (tactical level) Small War - bottom up!
5) A 'light touch' approach to COIN wins (historical examples), so how did we end up with "acronym soup" and B1 / B52 support? (Sheer prejudice that).


For a non-military armchair, that's a pretty good understanding of the issues. Must be some chair you've got there!

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

The Role of Non-State Actors in Small Wars/COIN.

Preventing Big Wars from transitioning to Small Wars/Insurgencies.

The State Department Role in Small Wars/COIN.

Failed and Fragile States and Small Wars/Insurgencies.

Small Wars/Insurgencies and WMD.

Impact of Small Wars/Insurgencies on Neighboring Nations.

[Schmedlap]

9) Effective intelligence operations at the company level
I'd be happy to read some examples of both what was effective and what was ineffective, along with an overview of how most companies are attempting to do this. This is one area that I have been curious about for a while but it really seemed to come to life after I left the company level. Now, being out of the Army and having no AKO access, I just rely on open source, which is pretty thin on small-unit, practical information.

[slapout9]

I was in the Doctors office when I thought these up so they may be a little off;)

1-How to win friends and kill your enemies.
2-Population identification and census as primary intelligence,
3-Geography as intelligence.
4-What squad leaders need to know about COIN.
5-Language as critical infrastructure.
6-Law as critical infrastructure.
7-Why people get pissed off when you invade their country and what you can do about it.
8-How to talk to criminals,insurgents and other people who don't like you.
9-How America can make money doing COIN.
10-Killing the civilian support structure should you do it?
11-The right way to do ASCOPE.
12-Things the Air Force knows about COIN but never told you.
13-Everything you wanted to know about Warden's 5 rings of COIN but where afraid to ask.
14-Why the Army with the most college degrees will always lose.
15-Sting operations in COIN.
16-How to recruit and test CI's(confidential informants) for COIN.
17-Was Robin Hood the greatest COIN theorist of all time?
18-How do you secure a population against an idea?
19-How to make war using other people's stuff.
20-SBW vs. the dead Prussian guy...why you should care.
21-Nuclear weapons and COIN are they the final answer?
22-Why should we protect their population if it hurts out own?
23-The Declaration of War as a Strategic plan.

[Ron Humphrey]

I was in the Doctors office when I thought these up so they may be a little off;)

1-How to win friends and kill your enemies.
2-Population identification and census as primary intelligence,
3-Geography as intelligence.
4-What squad leaders need to know about COIN.
5-Language as critical infrastructure.
6-Law as critical infrastructure.
7-Why people get pissed off when you invade their country and what you can do about it.
8-How to talk to criminals,insurgents and other people who don't like you.
9-How America can make money doing COIN.
10-Killing the civilian support structure should you do it?
11-The right way to do ASCOPE.
12-Things the Air Force knows about COIN but never told you.
13-Everything you wanted to know about Warden's 5 rings of COIN but where afraid to ask.
14-Why the Army with the most college degrees will always lose.
15-Sting operations in COIN.
16-How to recruit and test CI's(confidential informants) for COIN.
17-Was Robin Hood the greatest COIN theorist of all time?
18-How do you secure a population against an idea?
19-How to make war using other people's stuff.
20-SBW vs. the dead Prussian guy...why you should care.
21-Nuclear weapons and COIN are they the final answer?
22-Why should we protect their population if it hurts out own?
23-The Declaration of War as a Strategic plan.
(Emphasis Ron Humphrey)

Those myself