For Martin Van Creveld Fans

[SteveMetz]

Just found out he has a new book entitled The Culture of War coming out later this year. I'm currently finishing his 2005 volume The Changing Face of War.

[Ski]

I know someone who has a draft copy, need to get that sooner rather than later.

[zenpundit]

Steve,

What do you think of The Changing Face of War so far ? I thought I detected a shift in tone, a bitter edge, compared to Transformation or Rise and Decline.

[SteveMetz]

Steve,

What do you think of The Changing Face of War so far ? I thought I detected a shift in tone, a bitter edge, compared to Transformation or Rise and Decline.


I haven't finished but at this point I'd have to say it's a readable summary, but I haven't come across any new ideas. Same old themes on women, superiority of irregular forces over a politically constrained conventional force, etc.

I'm amazed at how many factual errors I've found--talks of the 101st air dropping into Iraq, U.S. tactical nukes still in South Korea, and so forth. That makes me wonder how many other factual errors there are that I missed. (One of my colleagues said his book on the IDF also has a lot). While we political scientists often play fast and loose with facts, this is strange for a historian.

[William F. Owen]

I haven't finished but at this point I'd have to say it's a readable summary, but I haven't come across any new ideas. Same old themes on women, superiority of irregular forces over a politically constrained conventional force, etc.

I'm amazed at how many factual errors I've found--talks of the 101st air dropping into Iraq, U.S. tactical nukes still in South Korea, and so forth. That makes me wonder how many other factual errors there are that I missed. (One of my colleagues said his book on the IDF also has a lot). While we political scientists often play fast and loose with facts, this is strange for a historian.

I am reluctant to criticise Van C as he may end up teaching me one day, but I have to say I am not convince by any of his recent ideas, though the views he expressed about the "success" of the Lebanon War on Israeli TV two nights ago, were extremely interesting.

[SteveMetz]

Steve,

What do you think of The Changing Face of War so far ? I thought I detected a shift in tone, a bitter edge, compared to Transformation or Rise and Decline.

I just stumbled across a bit of silliness in the book. Martin is talking about the use of airpower in counterinsurgency and he writes, "..most of the 'precision guided' weapons...carry relatively small warheads and can do only limited damage on selected targets. For example, follow three months' continuous bombardment by a thousand NATO aircraft, 95 percent of Belgrade was still standing."

Well, DUH! That wasn't because we didn't have enough munitions to pulverize it had we so desired.

Then it gets worse. He argues that artillery should be the weapon of choice in counterinsurgency and uses Assad's destruction of the city of Hama as evidence.

His dicussion of the Iraq insurgency is down right surreal. Something about us assuming the Sunnis were going to be our best allies. When they turned us down, we went to the Shiites. When they turned us down, we attacked Karbala and Najaf but were beaten off by Sistani's militia.

He also repeats the old nonsense that Shinseki was forced to retire because of his congressional testimony.

Bottom line: no way I could recommend a book this full of factual errors.

[William F. Owen]

Then it gets worse. He argues that artillery should be the weapon of choice in counterinsurgency and uses Assad's destruction of the city of Hama as evidence.


One of the real problems I have with Van C is his use of Northern Ireland, compared with Assad and Hama to suggest that there are two valid models of COIN. This was swallowed whole by the 4GW folks, and then constantly cited as being empirical evidence, which it was not.

...and the the other issues\ this creates is how modern publishing corrupts military thought, but that, I suspect, is another thread.

[Granite_State]

I just stumbled across a bit of silliness in the book. Martin is talking about the use of airpower in counterinsurgency and he writes, "..most of the 'precision guided' weapons...carry relatively small warheads and can do only limited damage on selected targets. For example, follow three months' continuous bombardment by a thousand NATO aircraft, 95 percent of Belgrade was still standing."

Well, DUH! That wasn't because we didn't have enough munitions to pulverize it had we so desired.

Then it gets worse. He argues that artillery should be the weapon of choice in counterinsurgency and uses Assad's destruction of the city of Hama as evidence.

His dicussion of the Iraq insurgency is down right surreal. Something about us assuming the Sunnis were going to be our best allies. When they turned us down, we went to the Shiites. When they turned us down, we attacked Karbala and Najaf but were beaten off by Sistani's militia.

He also repeats the old nonsense that Shinseki was forced to retire because of his congressional testimony.

Bottom line: no way I could recommend a book this full of factual errors.

Odd, I've only read Defending Israel, been meaning to start a thread on it, and The Transformation of War, which I loved. What'd you think of that book, by comparison?

[SteveMetz]

Odd, I've only read Defending Israel, been meaning to start a thread on it, and The Transformation of War, which I loved. What'd you think of that book, by comparison?

I greatly enjoyed the Transformation of War. I don't remember the profusion of errors in it, but maybe I just didn't know as much then. Haven't read the other one.

[zenpundit]

Thanks for weighing in on Van Creveld, Steve.

Regarding Assad's decimation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Hama, this is sometimes mentioned as a spasm" option by 4GW thinkers that a state can ( possibly) get away with doing in political-moral terms if done in the wake of public outrage over some grevious atrocity committed by insurgents. In fairness though, William Lind has said/written many times that this really isn't going to be a viable option for democratic states on most occasions. Syria was ( and still is) a police state that at the time was sheltered by Soviet patronage. Damascus and Rangoon or Khartoum will be quick to take repressive measures that civilized states would shun except in the direst of circumstances

Even with Hama, it should be pointed out that Hafez Assad's regime later reached a modus vivendi with the Brotherhood, much like Egypt has done, rather than attempt to uproot and exterminate them.

[SteveMetz]

I can't believe I pressed all the way to the end of that. In the conclusion he wrote, "What can hardly be in dispute, though, is the fact that, from 1945 on, almost all attempts to deal with insurgencies have ended in failure."

That is simply, factually wrong. What happens is that when we think "insurgency," we automatically think of the very small number that have succeeded rather than the multitudes of others that did not.

Then he defines every use of organized violence that is not full scale conventional war as insurgency.

Then he advocates the Roman-Syrian-Russian "kill them all and let God sort them out" approach. I hate to say this, but it's pure nonsense.