The Importance and Role of Training in Creating/Sustaining the Best Possible Forces

[Rob Thornton]

Many times the subject of training has come up here on the SWJ – we’ve discussed it here in regards to COIN skill sets: such as those associated with operating in a COIN environment; the traits, skills and attributes needed to advise foreign forces; how SOF has benefited from DOTMLPF; retention of soldiers and leaders (to include the attraction to PMCs), and we’ve even shared some lessons about training and how to make units good. SWJ member Ken White has written on many occasions that our biggest deficit resides in the funding of, the planning of, the execution of, and the lack of respect for proper training. We have also had many serious and in depth discussions on organizational (ex. best squad configuration, mech vs.light), equipping (materiel –ex. MRAP, small arms), doctrinal (ex. 3-24, 3-0), leader (ex. Best generals, the Yingling article), etc. – but I don’t feel we’ve spent the same quality time on training. It could be because its not so sexy, hot button, or emotional as many others – but the truth is, you can have the best quality folks with the best gear, and with poor training, somebody else will come along and ruin your day. We’ve succeeded because we do have “better” training then most of our opponents, and that when you sum up our efforts across the DOTMLPF spectrum – we do reasonably well as an aggregate.

The genesis of this thread came out of the final chapter of Field Marshal Viscount Slim’s book: Defeat into Victory, his account of the Burma Campaign during WWII. In the chapter entitled “After Thoughts” Slim ponders a number of things that I believe are timeless and as relevant today as when they were penned. Within that chapter there is a section marked “Special Forces”, where Slim ponders their utility based on his own experiences. He certainly had an opportunity to consider them, as he saw various special formation in his AOR, and many times had them assigned to him as part of the campaign plan – most notably for many is probably Ord Wingate’s Chindits.

You have to keep in mind, Slim was a superb trainer - having taken over a Corps in the midst of withdrawal in contact with the Japanese Army back to India, Slim had to face some tough realities – lacking resources, facing tough political pressure, and in the face of a foe that had been attributed bogeyman proportion, Slim grew formations of general purpose forces that eventually became better then their mythical opponents and conducted daily operations of seemingly great complexity under conditions that we’d have to scratch our heads at and wonder how they pulled it off. The terrain and weather in Burma are some of the most inhospitable to large combat operations and the enemy held many advantages at the time – Slim had few resources being among the lesser important areas in comparison to North African and Europe, or even the Pacific theater of operations. Slim had a host of challenges to overcome – he waged Joint and Combined Warfare (working with the Chinese, and the Americans), he had to train and equip indigenous forces from as far away as Africa (a BN, Regiment or Division of this and one of that), he had to overcome politics and egos, he had to overcome insurgent forces that had been brought over to the Japanese side (some Indian and some Burmese), and he had a tenacious enemy who had a great deal of wind behind them – he was not exactly primed for success – certainly not if your in 1942/43 looking forward vs. 2008 looking back! But Slim new he had to start with training – he opened a Jungle School, worked Air Operations (air landings, resupply, parachute, air mechanization, close air support, etc.) - hard given the operational conditions, and he worked staff training – Slim new training was the only thing that would make up for deficiencies in other areas. Slim had a vision and new the path led through some tough training that would prepare the men of what would eventually become the 14th Army for operations that by today’s standards would be those of SOF.

My own experiences lead me to believe that Slims observations are largely correct (since I was not there I’m limited to what I know through command and staff and applying it to what I read). I was once given a largely blank check about training – for 1 year my team of my 1SG, my PLs, my PSGs, and their NCO leadership had a surplus of resources – time perhaps being the most critical followed closely by land and ammunition to take a 100 man light Infantry company and transform it to a 170 man Stryker equipped rifle company – this is not about the vehicle, but it adds a level of complexity to it that requires additional time (and other resources) to train. We had a great team behind us helping us out – the BN and BDE CDRs and their staffs – but largely the task fell on the soldiers and leaders of the company. The rational behind opening up the flood gates fro resources were that a/1-24th of the 1/25th SBCT would be one of two companies to conduct the IOT&E (Initial Operating Test and Evaluation) of the SBCT concept at Fort Knox in the Summer of 2003 and big Army and many others from DoD would be watching to examine the results – there was (and remains) a war on.

So from about August of 2002 following the MAV-CE (Medium Armored Vehicle –Comparison & Evaluation) test at FT LEWIS between a platoon of the improved M113A3 and the Stryker (I was one of the BN AS3s at the time and involved with the observations and AAR of the TTP used by the platoons) back in the South Rainier Training Area – then took A/1-24 to begin NET fielding) – we were off and running. For about 1 year we were given a lion’s share of resources to ensure that training deficit would not enter into the results of how the IOT&E played out. I had lots of ammunition, land and a long, long leash (then LTC Emmet Schaill and COL Bob Brown underwrote allot of mistakes and risk on my part - this is also a good place to mention 1SG Joe House, BN CSM Art McCann & BDE CSM Carlton Dietrich - all critical leaders in the endvour). We went about it I think in a smart manner that addressed the task and challenges associated with the scope of the mission. We were all over the place – all of FT Lewis and Yakima, the only folks we played second fiddle to were 3/2 SBCT preparing for their OIF deployment, 2/75th and occasionally the Washington ARNG as it prepped for its OIF deployment – but even then since time was provided, we found ways to train. We had shared vision from the BDE CDR down, and the resulting training of continuous distributed operations from squad through company (with BN and BDE attachments) was exactly what was needed.

The IOT&E turned out to be a great test – continuous operations across pretty much the entire training areas available (at the time most of it), some mounted, some dismounted, offense, defense, stability, security, etc – for three 14 day iterations with some smaller excursions in between we trained. It was fully resourced and some of the best training I’d ever seen – even when compared to my CTC experiences. We emerged a fantastic company, and I left command of Alpha shortly thereafter to take the BN HHC.

In the meantime LTC Schaill and COL Brown (COL Schaill now has the EBCT at Bliss and BG Brown is out at PACOM) had been refining their ideas about training to extend it to the rest of the BN and BDE. COL Brown and his staff came up with some great ideas and resources to extend the quality of training to the other BNs and special companies in 1/25th and fostered that kind of thinking in subordinate leaders all the way down to lowest PVT (if you Google COL Robert Brown, Lancer BDE, SBCT, Agility and Adaptive Leadership – you’ll probably find several great articles he penned). The 1/25th went on to have two great MRE/MRXs at the NTC and JRTC, then a deployment to Mosul that went up against a tough enemy – for some good reading take a look at Michael Yon’s blog as he covered it.

My point in writing about all this is to inform some of our non-uniformed folks in the SWC about the critical role good training (and there is such a bad thing as “not so good training”) and resourcing training play in creating good soldiers, leaders and formations that deploy and win in the adverse and challenging conditions in the places where we fight our wars. It is also to show what is possible in a relatively short time when “better then adequate” resources are combined with good leadership containing a vision about the challenges that will face that force when it goes from training to facing a cunning and creative enemy that wants to survive and win as much as you do.

I’d also like to ask if we think we could do better? Is the training and resourcing available to our SOF the best we can do, or could we extend that level of training and resourcing to the larger force like I had it extended to me and A/1-24th (and later the whole of 1/25th)? I think the regular forces can achieve a great deal more then given credit for (we certainly see it in Iraq and Afghanistan) on a consistent basis if given the resources and the responsibility/ authority to achieve those results. It’s a case of priorities and underwriting junior leaders so we grow (and sustain) a culture of innovation, adaptiveness and agility that flourishes not only in war, but in our peace time preparations for war – so regardless of where we go or when we go, we can seize and retain the initiative much faster. Some of it is culture, some of it is resources – but the consequences are of vital importance to the health of our armed forces.

[Rob Thornton]

Is the thinking that its too resource intensive to provide the quality of training available to SOF to the larger GPF/MPF force pool? Or is it the thinking the GPF/MPF formations can not achieve the same (or close to) standards of the smaller elite force populations? Or is it the idea that only SOF forces require that level of training as they are deployed on a smaller scale, in immature AORs and must be better trained to cope? I'd say with the current challenges ahead to the existing force structure if its the last on we can certainly justify the need.
Best, Rob

[selil]

In educational theory and higher education literature you can make pretty direct correlations between politics and restrictions on education. Basically any time you say training is to time/cost/physically/etc.. intensive there is some political force at work rather than good educational techniques. Basically what I get from the literature of education is there is no such thing as to intensive. The second thing is that cost is truly relative when dealing with education. Spend more now and save over the lifetime of the entities involved. The fastest way to efficiency is to train harder and faster and more realistically.

[jcustis]

I think much of the disconnect between the non-uniformed (not meaning uninformed in the least, though) out there who may postulate about the military, technologies, and strategic underpinnings, is the fact that it often takes a uniformed mind to appreciate the impact of training.

The realities of the training grind are often lost on those who would propose wholesale shifts in capabilities, mission, T/O&E, etc. Heck, it's even lost on the procurement folks who at times throw equipment at the troops when it has only been tested by Marines in their formal MOS school.

I concur wholeheartedly that main forces can do so much more (and probably have a baseline of training to do so well) than they currently have the authority for. It's that trust and confidence that's lacking. The opposite attitude rears its ugly head when SOF cannot accomplish some things (I'm currently reading Robert's Ridge) and the more conventional folks start to throw the Rambo moniker around.

When I was in Australia this summer, I had an interesting discussion with one of my counterpart umpires. He mentioned that among the Australian Army, the main forces are generally considered better prepared for COIN, humanitarian assistance, FID, and all-round small wars, while their SOF formations are better trained to execute conventional ops.

[Norfolk]

I concur wholeheartedly that main forces can do so much more (and probably have a baseline of training to do so well) than they currently have the authority for. It's that trust and confidence that's lacking. The opposite attitude rears its ugly head when SOF cannot accomplish some things (I'm currently reading Robert's Ridge) and the more conventional folks start to throw the Rambo moniker around.

When I was in Australia this summer, I had an interesting discussion with one of my counterpart umpires. He mentioned that among the Australian Army, the main forces are generally considered better prepared for COIN, humanitarian assistance, FID, and all-round small wars, while their SOF formations are better trained to execute conventional ops.

As jcustis pointed out, there is quite a difference of perspective between what Commonwealth Armies (and to a certain extent, the USMC as well) view as properly belonging to Main Forces and Special Forces, respectively, and what the US Army views in said matter. Most COIN and unconventional warfare that the Commonwealth (and for that matter, the USMC) has ever waged, has been done with Main Forces; Special Forces more often than not simply played a supporting role, and in some cases were not even present.

The US Army of course, takes a different view, and has two or three times as many Special Forces troopers as it does Rangers. While that certainly makes sense from the US Army's point of view, from a Commonwealth (and I suspect to a large extent, the USMC) point of view, it's just bizarre. Look at Commonwealth SF - even the UK has no more than a single Regular Army SF Battalion - 22 SAS, and only 2 Reserve Battalions and a Reserve Company (The HAC), plus the Royal Marines' Company-sized SBS. The only US SF of the same calibre - 1st SFOD-Delta (or whatever it's calling itself these days) and SEAL Team Six similarly amount to quite small proportions of the entire Army (or Navy's) force.

And like Commonwealth SF, they do guerrilla warfare very rarely, and only when necessary - if at all. So why all the other Army SF ("Green Berets")? The Commonwealth had its delusions of raising guerrilla armies dispelled over the course of WWII and the 15 years or so following its end; in the end, most of them tend to turn on their teachers. I would suggest that the US experience with the Montagnards/Hmong in Indochina was quite atypical and extraordinary.

So why have thousands of top-notch, highly-trained and experienced NCOs (I know the latter has changed recently) and officers separated from the rest of the Army and placed into Units that rarely get to perform their main mission, the raising of guerrilla armies - a mission with ultimately dubious consequences - and not in the regular infantry? The Commonwealth learned in the decades after WWII that the old way of giving someone 3 or 4 months of "training" (too much of it spent on nonsense and not real training) didn't cut it when you had to perform LIC and COIN in former colonies and still prepare to fight WWIII in Europe, all the while on very constrained budgets.

That's where the 6-month Infantry syllabus for Riflemen came from - necessity in the face of shrinking budgets with attendant lower manpower levels and cuts in equipment procurements. While SF became even more specialized, most of the roles previously reserved for Commando Forces were (sucessfully) taken over by Line Battalions (with vastly improved training), and the remaining Commando Forces concentrated on Mountain, Amphibious, and Airborne Operations (as the Royal Marines and the Rangers do). Fewer troops have to be able to do it all (or almost all), with less.

Rob's right; the SOF-type training that his CO was able to let him pursue in his old Unit was exactly the right thing to do. As the Marines say, a Rifleman can do anything - provided he is afforded and allowed the proper training, and sufficient of it. There certainly is a role for Special Forces - of the SAS/SBS kind, which is in line with what Lord Slim described as being the sort of unit that requires no more than a handful of men for its missions. But realistically speaking, I rather doubt there is a real justification for maintaining seven 1,200 or 1,500-man Groups of first-rate officers and NCOs for a (primary) role that has rarely panned out in practice. Much better to take Slim's advice and put these fine men into the Regular Army and to help assimilate the standards of the Main Forces much closer to that of the US Army Special Forces than those of a draftee mass-army.

The English-speaking Armies are only going to get smaller for the most part, and on even tighter budgets. There's only so many (or rather, so few) troops to go around, and funds to kit them out. One of the main antidotes to this problem is going down the road that Rob proposes: SOF-type training for all Infantry.

[Uboat509]

With all due respect, Norfolk, you clearly don't know what SF does. If "building guerilla armies" was all that we did then we might have ceased to exist a long time ago. We perform a whole series missions, many of which are not for public consumption. We do not simply duplicate what the big Army is already doing. On the contrary, we avoid certain missions because other units are already doing those missions and it would be a pointless duplication of effort and a waste of resources. Much of what we do, we do because no one else is trained or equiped to do it.

I fail to see how MAJ Thornton's training, awesome as it was, could be considered SOF training. SOF training is training for SOF missions it is not simply regular infantry training with more resources. Contrary to popular belief we do not have unlimited budget and resources either. Could regular forces be brought to a higher standard, given suficient budget and resources? Of course, but can they do do the same missions that SOF does as well as SOF? If they could then the conventional Army would have gotten rid of us long ago.

SFC W

[Norfolk]

Uboat, I am well aware that the US Army SF perform a very wide range of roles, from Strategic Reconnaissance to Mobile Training Teams to Humanitarian Assistance, et al. But their raison d'etre to begin with was guerrilla warfare, and they would not have been formed in the first place had that not been defined as their primary mission at the time; much of the rest has followed in subsequent years as guerrilla warfare receded into the background for being increasingly unlikely.

And if you had undergone a Commonwealth 6-month infantry syllabus followed by service in a Battalion, you might have found much of it to be suprisingly familiar, and strenuous - and not like what you would have experienced (or expected) in many a regular US Army battalion. One of my old Battalion's (a Reserve Bn) US Army training partners was a NG SF Bn - 3rd Bn, 20th SFG. Perhaps much of Rob's Unit's training was not SOF-type per se, but a lot of it was honing the basics to a much higher level of proficiency, which is essential for handling tasks that in the US Army are typically reserved to SOF. In the Commonwealth, things are mighty different. Get yourself attached to an RCR Battalion or a Royal Marine Commando for a year or two; it's not like the US Army.

[Surferbeetle]

Rob,

Good thread, as we all know education/training is the keystone of success in both the military and civilian world.

I have been lucky enough to serve in the AUS, ARNG, USAR, & civil service (Army & Navy) as well as having worked a few years in the private sector prior to joining the USG. This experience has shown me that trained individuals (completing training is a mark of the individuals motivation and suitability for the task) who are adequately resourced (and understand the difference between need and want) and who have good leadership are in general more successful at accomplishing the work mission than those who lack these things. Gear is good, but good people are better than good gear.

The US Military, in my opinion, does a good job of balancing societal needs and the requirements of necessary expertise to accomplish its mission of defending the Nation. Teams/Nations benefit from having members/inhabitants with shared experiences and shared education/training. One of the missions of the US military is to provide this training/education to our citizens. On the flip-side of training/educating all-comers our organization still needs experts who can guide the organization to success. To use the bell curve analogy the bulk of a population will always end up in the middle and those at the upper and lower ends of the bell curve are small in number. Adequately educating a population for a required task is a function of limited time and resources and always will be.

Conventional Forces need to accept that full-spectrum operations are the required skill set and ensure that their teams/units are continually and heavily trained. Since the bulk of the Conventional Force will not stay for more than 4 years training time and thus skill developing time is limited. Good NCOs, many CTC rotations, extensive military schooling which teaches full-spectrum operations, and of course operational experience are the keys to training success. The bulk of the US Military can accomplish this. Conventional Forces are more generalists than specialists and need to be assigned missions with this in mind.

SOF needs to accept that the population of participants is limited and true joint operations allow us to maximize our effectiveness. SOF work requires specialized professional civilian skills, advanced infantry skills, language capabilities, and extensive in-country experiences in order to accomplish specialized missions. To acquire these skills requires more time and resources in order to vet and educate appropriate people who are suited to the task. Limited time and resources mean that only a small population will be able to get this type of training and experience. SOF are more specialists than generalists and need to be assigned missions with this in mind.

'An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure' and 'Diplomacy is the art of gaining strategic advantage through negotiation' are two truisms that always apply and ones that we as a Nation need to revisit regularly. DOS/USAID/Peace Corps needs to be beefed up and placed upon an equal to or better resource footing than the US Military.

DOS/USAID/Peace Corps, SOF, and Conventional Forces all need to refocus and redouble their efforts on training the team/squad, since teams/squads are the building blocks of successful organizations. This means that team/squads must have extensive shared educational and 'real-world' experiences so that they can gel and excel. Both generalists and specialists are necessary to the Nations success. Bottom line? All of us need more training to excel and this requires steady resource streams, extensive planning, and most importantly good people.

[Uboat509]

Norfolk, I don't think that you are fully aware of what we do given that a good deal of what we do is classified. You seem to be assuming that SF are just extremely well trained infantry but that is simply not correct. Big Army does not, as a rule, like elite formations and would not tolarate any such organiztion that simply duplicates what conventional units already do. We are not simply an elite infantry formation, in fact, many SF soldiers have never served a day in their lives in the infantry. SF is drawn from all branches of the Army. The majority are former combat arms but that is not a prerequisite.

As for the likelihood of needing guerilla warfare skills, 5th Group's actions in the initial stages of Afghanistan are textbook UW. Since then, we have made great use of those skillsets (albeit on a smaller scale) in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

SFC W

[Norfolk]

I am aware that a great deal of what the SF do is indeed classified and for obviously very good reasons. And I am not saying that Line Battalions should fully replace SF, by no means, and certainly not that SF are just well-trained Light Infantry. But I am saying that much of the skills levels - though not all the specific skills, let alone all the roles performed by SF - should be integral to US Army infantry units. Your terms of reference seem to be framed by US Army practice; such practice is not universal by any means.

For example, in the US Army, the Scout Platoon of an Infantry Battalion performs conventional reconnaissance, surveillance, and screening/security tasks for its parent Battalion; a LRS Det or Company handles both the LRRP (to some degree anyway) and surveillance tasks for the Battalion's parent Formation. In The RCR, the Battalion Reconnaissance Platoon (including snipers) had to be, and was, trained and equipped for both roles - tactical and operational reconnaissance tasks of all manner - as well as HUMINT; and whether that meant operating strictly on foot, helicopter, using an assault boat from an O-Class sub (no longer in service - that was a while ago now), or from the back of a Lynx, or whatever, then that's what was done, mission-dependent.

An Infantry Battalion could perform a number of other unconventional tasks. Providing bodyguards for domestic and foreign VIPs, for one - done out of hide - training taken at either Chichester or the Secret Service course in Virginia (a buddy of mine was one of the guys who got the tap for that). A great deal of the Combat Swimmer role was performed either by Pathfinders (not quite the same as their US Army counterparts) or by Combat Engineers. For other, more "strategic" tasks, individuals or certain groups were likewise tapped on the shoulder and received the requisite training (if it was lacking) and detached out of the Battalion to attend to their duties. Since SF have been formally brought back (starting in '92) in the Canadian Army, some of this has since changed. An Infantry Battalion is not an SF Unit, nor am I arguing that it should be; but a well-trained Infantry Battalion is capable of a surprising range of SOF missions, and regular Infantrymen should be, and can be, trainend accordingly.

What I am trying to point out here is that outside of the US Army, there are several Armies where the distinction between Main Forces and SOF becomes decidely blurred. Which is one of the reason why Commonwealth forces prefer SAS and Delta-type SF to handle full-fledged SF missions and tasks, and let the regular battalions handle the stuff on the outer fringers (somewhat as the Rangers do in the US). Many SF units do not have the time to conduct all the myriad missions, some of which are at cross-purposes from a Unit-training standpoint. It's not unknown for one mission or task or set thereof to take up so much time that another becomes neglected, but that's sometimes because a Government sets policies and makes committments - especially to other Governments or actors - that strain available troops and resources.

As SF don't always have enough time to handle all the missions that their Governments thrust upon them, letting Line Battalions train to standards (though anything like the full skill sets) approaching that of SF makes for far more capable and flexible Line Infantry that may be able to relief SF of some of the "fuzzier" stuff on the blurry line that distinguishes between SF and Main Forces, while at the same time making for regular units that are genuinely capable in the "Full Spectrum" of Operations - not like what happened in 2003, when after crushing the Iraqi Armed Forces, the US Army had to re-learn COIN almost from scratch. It did not have to be that way.

If many people, even within the US Army, look down somewhat at regular US infantry and deride them in terms not far removed from the draftee armies of the past, it's not because the US Infantryman is not capable of being more or less of Ranger-quality. It's because the Army, for various reasons, won't let them.

And this is where the present structure of the US Army SF may in some ways be problematic. "Delta" or whatever it's called these days, represents one of the high-ends of US SOF - comparable to the SAS, etc. But the rest of the Army SF (I'm just talking about the SFGs, not CA, PsyOps, et al.) has no parallels in the English-speaking world at present, or even in much of the rest of the world. In the rest of the English-speaking world, the missions that the Green Berets (exclusive of Delta here) perform are divvied up between an SAS-type SF and the regular infantry, with perhaps a few Commando Forces units for more specialized roles (particularly parachuting and mountain warfare).

Strategic Reconnaissance - amongst other missions, is certainly best handled by a dedicated SF unit. No arguments there. But I suspect that Government policy drives a demand for SF aside from SAS-type units to an extent that may be unnecessary. And some other missions presently handled by SF may be handled quite well by highly-trained infantry battalions.

[William F. Owen]

Gentleman,

At the end of the day, US and UK Infantry training still resides in a WW2 paradigm. You all know my views on this from my Patrol Based Infantry paper. To date, no one has really pushed the envelop of what WELL TRAINED infantry can do, because the mind set is still incredibly limited. Assuming you have men with the intelligence to be a carpenter or plumber, then you have vast potential.

What holds the current debate back is culture and the need to protect the status quo. A very good infantry unit is easy and affordable to train. We just choose to things the way that we think they should be done, and not the ways that allow for a real increase in capability.

At the tactical sub-unit level there is vast commonality in so called COIN and Warfighting TTPs if they are rationally and objectively approached.

A. Infantry Battalion is capable of a surprising range of SOF missions, and regular Infantrymen should be, and can be, trainend accordingly.

B. And this is where the present structure of the US Army SF may in some ways be problematic.
A. Correct, and how the hell did these missions become associated with SF anyway? As Rob Thornton points out, Slim was pretty much correct.

B. More than you know. US SOCOM is a hostage to the institutions and events that created it. You always get back to the "I wouldn't start from there, if I were you." Look at all the mucking about in the re-creation of the 75th Ranger Regiment. If you started with a clean sheet of paper, things would look a whole lot different. - same for UK SF.

[selil]

Norfolk, I don't think that you are fully aware of what we do given that a good deal of what we do is classified. You seem to be assuming that SF are just extremely well trained infantry but that is simply not correct. Big Army does not, as a rule, like elite formations and would not tolarate any such organiztion that simply duplicates what conventional units already do. We are not simply an elite infantry formation, in fact, many SF soldiers have never served a day in their lives in the infantry. SF is drawn from all branches of the Army. The majority are former combat arms but that is not a prerequisite.

As for the likelihood of needing guerilla warfare skills, 5th Group's actions in the initial stages of Afghanistan are textbook UW. Since then, we have made great use of those skillsets (albeit on a smaller scale) in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

SFC W


My Dad was an early SF soldier in 1962 Vietnam... He was a nuclear power engineer for the Navy in the civilian world. I bet he was just a grunt too. ...

[Rob Thornton]

I think Surfer Beetle's post and U-boat's make a good point - we were not training to conduct a SOF mission, and I don't think Slim thought he was either. "Special" I think has a number of connotations - but to me it implies a specialized mission requiring specialized training.

The question that Slim asks I think is appropriate (although it was not really my question) - how much of a "specialized" force is required, and then he ponders the price of creating too many types and in too large numbers - but I think you have to consider his perspective looking back at WWII - what exactly were most "specialized" forces doing - particularly in the Burma and Pacific AORs?

I think his point is that most were operating much more closely to conventional Infantry missions - penetrations, infiltrations, raids, etc. then to some of the missions we now associate SOF with.

Clearly there is a high demand for SOF these days- there is also a mandate to grow (as there is a mandate to grow the regular Army and the Marines). There are a number of good reasons I think why we have made decisions to grow them all, clearly our potential commitments for employment have convinced us there is a need. I also think Surfer Beetle's IA growth comments have strong merit - if you recognize that your foreign policy appetite or inter-action is beyond your capabilities, then you better either take an appetite suppressant (unlikely - and maybe impossible given who we are and what we believe), or grow your capabilities to meet it. The state that only grows its military at the expense of its other elements of power is left with few options to resolve its policy issues. It goes to the ounce of prevention - hard for the bean-counter's to justify in quantitative fashion - but its the truth I think.

Its all inter-related. I also like SB's comment regarding rational for investment:


Conventional Forces need to accept that full-spectrum operations are the required skill set and ensure that their teams/units are continually and heavily trained. Since the bulk of the Conventional Force will not stay for more than 4 years training time and thus skill developing time is limited. Good NCOs, many CTC rotations, extensive military schooling which teaches full-spectrum operations, and of course operational experience are the keys to training success. The bulk of the US Military can accomplish this. Conventional Forces are more generalists than specialists and need to be assigned missions with this in mind.

I think William's point:


At the end of the day, US and UK Infantry training still resides in a WW2 paradigm. You all know my views on this from my Patrol Based Infantry paper. To date, no one has really pushed the envelop of what WELL TRAINED infantry can do, because the mind set is still incredibly limited. Assuming you have men with the intelligence to be a carpenter or plumber, then you have vast potential.

is really what I was getting at - I've seen what happens when a talented CDR like Brown (and I've met quite a few leaders like him) brings a vision and a commitment to a unit that gets beyond the "we can do only what is written from on high and anything beyond that is beyond us" - it goes to the art of the possible.

The catalyst seems to be either a need, or an opportunity - Slim had a need - get after and destroy the Japanese Army in Burma with what he had - out of this grew the "art of the possible" using the resources he had available - I think while Slim may have been largely convinced it could be done - it must have seemed almost counter-intuitive to many - can you imagine some of these guys scratching their heads at first when the word came down - "we're going to get rid of a great many of our trucks to achieve greater mobility" - anytime an Army re-invents itself there is probably going to be some skepticism. Look at how his Army innovated in its use of Air, and Armor.

I think we've gone through something along those lines recently - War requires the Art of the Possible in ways that Peace Time can never do - Peace Time training does not require that limits be strained, nor does it really encourage it - some of the stuff that Schaill and Brown underwrote for me I heard of CO CDR's getting relieved for under BN and BDE CDRs who were intolerant of risk or mistakes - it was as much a result of their tolerance and understanding our need to learn from our mistakes, as it was the type of training or resources required - the leader plays a huge role in achieving results.

War changes the level of tolerance for many I think - it more clearly identifies the needs and costs of failure - its not like going home from a CTC and saying - well at least we learned something. As such I think we are becoming better at identifying and managing risk, and as such we are becoming less risk averse - its just a condition we must negotiate in War.

I think if we can bring that forward to our training and apply resources against it we will come away with a much more capable force. Are there areas where GPF/MPF are now doing tasks and some missions that prior to 2001 would have been considered mostly SOF proprietary by the GPF/MPF community - I think so - the Advisory mission comes to mind - but a good deal of the COIN mission set as well. Ask many a GPF fellow who he'd have negotiate for his unit in pre OIF and he'd probably say that is what his CA attachment is for - who'd have thought the demand and operating conditions would require the scale of demand that out paced the traditional resources. Now - a well trained CA fellow with language skills is almost always better (but not always) - but the reality is we don't have enough, and in some cases we have guys with natural intuitive personal skill who are born negotiators and who have continuity in the area.

This did not happen overnight - but over the last 5 years. We now can look back and see more of what is possible. While I think that those missions and tasks that require the most specialization must remain largely the property of specialized forces (barring the demand continues to meet available resources), we have an opportunity to re-evaluate what the words "General" or "Multi-Purpose" really mean when it comes to skill sets. However - we will continue to have to put resources against it - ex. many conventional units have est. partnerships with Local LE and Emergency Services as part of their train up, many installations have hired native speakers to add realism to their training events (way beyond only the CTCs - who have done a fantastic job of making the right resources available and in good quantity - at a quick turn since the war began), many medics get to practice on more realistic GSWs in training, we shoot a good deal more in the post 9/11 world, and many other resources that have made the art of the possible possible.

I think we can still do even better - we must sustain what we've been doing, but because we've realized our potential, we should push the envelope a bit more - I believe there is room and I believe there is justification.

Best to all - Rob

[Rob Thornton]

Although not necessarily the subject of the thread - it leads into it. In the last chapter I mentioned Slim has a section on Special Forces - again, he is talking about forces grown, equipped and trained for a specialized purpose:


"There is however one type of special unit which should be retained - that designed to be employed in small parties, usually behind enemy lines, on tasks beyond the normal scope of warfare in the field. There will be an increasing need for highly qualified and individually trained men - and women - to sabotage vital installations, to spread rumors, to misdirect the enemy, to transmit intelligence, to kill or kidnap individuals, and to inspire resistance movements.They will be troops, though they will require many qualities and skills not to be expected of the ordinary soldier and they will use methods beyond his capacity (Rob's note - think about what Slim is implying when he says beyond capacity and link it back to some of the possible missions he's outlining). Each small party would study and train intensively for a particular exploit and should operate under the direct control of the Higher Command (Rob's note - we are still learning about this one - and it gets more to unity of effort and purpose then command I think). They should rarely work within our lines. Not costly in manpower, they may, if handled with imaginative ruthlessness, achieve strategic results. Such units based on the Army, but drawing on all Services and all races of the Commonwealth for specially qualified men and women, should be an essential component of our modern Armed forces." pg 548 of Slim's memoir.

I think Slim has it about right, and I think it is what we have endevoured to do with our own SOF - the mental mindset issue I've tried to address is not on the part of SOF by and large, but with our own (GPF/MPF) mind set - where we sometimes suffer from self-imposed constrained thinking (until War began to change it).

Slim goes on to address control of SOF, but then transitions to a new section on the future - contrast his thought on SOF to these:


In Burma we thus developed a form of warfare based more on human factors then on lavish equipment, which had certain characteristics. The chief of these were:
(i) The acceptance of normal of the regular movement and maintenance of standard formations by air (Rob's note - normal means just that - not specialized DIVs, etc.)
(ii) Great tactical freedom for subordinate commanders (Rob's note - emphasis on "what" not "how" and purpose over task)
(iii) The operation, over wide distances, in most difficult country, in tactical independence but strategic combination.
(iv) Reduced scales of transport and equipment, supplemented by ingenuity and improvisation from local resources (Rob's note - we might call this agile and adaptive mindsets- or the agility and innovation piece guys like SWC member TT spend allot of time thinking about)
(v) The high quality of of the individual soldier, his morale, toughness and discipline, his acceptance of hardship, and his ability to move on his own feet (Rob's note - given the conditions and the requirements. I'd also extend move on his feet - to being able to think on your feet - again the agility and adaptiveness issue) pg. 549

Slim goes on to expand on his chief characteristics as he considers the challenges in the post WWII environment - much in the same way we consider the Joint COE and in the way the Army considers the FOE (There is no FOE currently in Joint doctrine I think). Again I think he had it about right with regard to linking what is needed with what is possible - the interesting part for me is Slim was considering the post WWII commonwealth, and in many ways the U.S. may have inherited (or assumed) many of the roles in which he was considering.

Finally Slim tells a story about an encounter he had as a cadet. He was pouring over Jomini's "Principles" as describe by the Field Service Regulations when along came the SGM:


"Don't bother your head about all them thing's me lad, there is only one principle of war and that is this. Hit the other fellow, as quick as you can, and as hard as you can, where it hurts him the most, when he ain't lookin!"

Sound familiar - funny how other leaders in other wars from other countries often divine some of the bare bone truths - Slim's SGM's quote sounds allot like "get there first with the most" - what teacher experience is.

I like that, and also like his thoughts just prior to telling that story:


Until the very horror of mass destruction forces men to find more sensible ways to of settling national disputes, war will remain, and while it remains it will continually change. Yet, because it fought between men rather then between weapons, victory will still go, when armaments are relatively equal, to the side which is better trained and has higher morale - advantages- which are obtained neither easily, quickly, nor without the sacrifice of more then money in peace. War remains an art, and like all arts, whatever its variation, will have its enduring principles.

I like this for a number of reasons - Slim gets to the challenges of preparing for the unknown, and the hard choices that accompany those challenges. He also opens up the consideration of comparing different types of advantages - it might not just be in weaponry or technology! He also outlines why people are important - because men go to war to achieve political purposes as defined by other men -but once we begin waging war -the rational for achieving victory is apt to change.

Now I know that is a kind of round-about way to address the topic - but it gets to the value and rational for investing more resources into training the men (and women) who go forward to wage war.

Best, Rob

[Ken White]

Thanks, Rob. It preempts a blog article I was working on but that's good -- hopefully, it'll get more discussion here. Everyone above has some great points!

Rob asks:
"I’d also like to ask if we think we could do better? Is the training and resourcing available to our SOF the best we can do, or could we extend that level of training and resourcing to the larger force"That is an important question and it gets obscured here and elsewhere because, IMO, the issue becomes not one of roles, missions, capabilities and the attainment of the desired effects for the US but rather a battle of egos, turf, dollars and spaces. Having been on both sides of the Big Army and SOF curtain I have no doubt that BOTH sides are guilty of this.

There is no question of a need for SOF or for SF -- the two are not synonymous regardless of efforts to make them so -- but I believe there are roles and missions questions that will impact training. We are confronted with the fact that a Battalion from the 82d is doing Ranger like missions for a variety of reasons -- and doing them well. We are confronted with the fact that organizations designed for the UW mission (and some of its highly classified adjunct missions) are being employed on ID missions. There are certain skill sets form UW that translate very well to ID; there are also a number of UW skills (to include those adjunct missions) that are not needed for ID.

As Norfolk says, most Armies use their conventional forces for ID and do it well; thus we are confronted with SF being essentially over qualified for the ID mission. We're using Hummers to do pickup truck work. A further concern is the quantity of folks required for ID; the SOF community cannot and should not provide the quantities required, to even attempt to do so will cause a dilution of quality problem in the community. My question is that, accepting the need for a UW mission capable force for a large variety of missions in both peace and war, should that difficult to obtain capability be roled as a primary ID element to the detriment, however slight, of its primary mission?

The Groups are also used for DA missions -- that amounts to using those same Hummers for sports car work. Not that they cannot and do not do the missions well; just that it's misuse and has the potential to do damage as individuals switch between missions. The great guys will cope -- everyone isn't great. The question to me is should DA be a SF mission or are competing skill sets and perhaps a different mental attitude and full time focus required?

Look also at Strategic Recon, an openly known mission. Is SF best for that job? They certainly can do it but in some cases they are again overtrained with regard to total skill sets and perhaps not as well trained in some desired skills as they might be. That mission is so difficult and dangerous that we may be sending that Hummer to do a job better suited to a Motocross bike (IOW, are we spending a quarter mil to train folks for a 60 K job? Can we afford the loss of the hard and long time to develop UW skills to a mission a different training regimen can handle?). The question is should that mission devolve to a new and different sort of unit that is culturally tuned to use extreme stealth?

The issues then for UW versus ID are that the Groups are over qualified and their critical skills are degraded (and this is even more disadvantageous when the DA mission moves to the fore; in the current or most envisioned environments mentoring local Security Forces is perhaps more important than taking down HVTs even if it isn't as much fun), they do not and probably never will have the quantity of people needed for ID in a medium sized nation. Regardless of all that, the question that then arises is can they do it better than conventional forces which have been provided better training? I think not but that is certainly arguable. What is not arguable in that case is that best is the enemy of good enough...

None of that should be construed as SF/SOF bashing, it is not. Been there and done that -- I am merely asking questions that I think deserve honest consideration. This is not the place to answer them in any detail, certainly -- but thinking it through wouldn't hurt.

All that is way off the question that Rob raised; can we do a better job of training our conventional units. I submit that the answer is, emphatically, yes. That we do not is due to habit (we're still operating on WW I parameters), inertia (as Wilf said:
"More than you know. US SOCOM is a hostage to the institutions and events that created it. You always get back to the "I wouldn't start from there, if I were you." Look at all the mucking about in the re-creation of the 75th Ranger Regiment. If you started with a clean sheet of paper, things would look a whole lot different. - same for UK SF." (emphasis added / kw)
and parochialism. We really need to take an objective look at what we're doing, realize that the Army of today is not much like the Army of even 2000 -- much less 1918 -- and fix the problem.

Lieutenants today are routinely doing things that the LTs of 2000 in most units could not dream of doing and that's a good thing. Joe today has gear that only some SOCOM elements had in 2000 -- and generally, he uses it well. It's a different Army, it trains better than it ever has before and, IMO, that's still not good enough. It deserves better training, most particularly at the enlisted and officer entry levels.

Another part of the problem is that there are senior people who are not terribly enthusiastic about fighting wars, they'd prefer waxing and polishing combat vehicles, brassoing cartridges, fretting over uniforms and haircuts and worrying unduly about their and their units reputation or mystique -- and I have, unfortunately, worked for folks who did all those things -- instead of truly thinking about how to do the job better and doing what's best for the nation. Those kinds of folks have always been around and probably always will be. There are more of them in the big Army simply because it's bigger; they also exist in elsewhere. They just have to be bypassed.

Norfolk also mentioned the training and employment of Battalion Scout Platoons in Canada and here. I have to agree with him. I've watched Commonwealth Armies do Recon and they have us beaten across the board. Our so-called Recon elements are ideally structured and equipped for Flank Screens, Covering forces and Economy of Force employment and they do those things well -- they are not trained and equipped for reconnaissance and, mostly, do not train for it very well so they naturally don't do it well. That doesn't address the problem of Commanders who do not know how to use their recon elements -- or are afraid to 'risk' them doing their designed job...

I noted the organization for the HBCT Cav Squadron and was happy they had created a true Recon element (except for the M3s, don't get me started on that vehicle) -- until I found out that the new proposal is for three Brad plts and two Tank plts per troop. Great for the combat missions but they ain't gonna be Scouts. Regardless of the fact that both CTCs have nicked most units for poor to non-existent recon work for years and still do so...:mad:

Back to the north German plain...

Rob also posts some more of Slim's thoughts, all of which are still totally valid, all of which we also learned in WW II and all of which we too often ignore today. We need to take care of Joe -- and we are not doing that.

[Global Scout]

Norfolk you have presented some fair challenges regarding our Special Forces. After several years in SF I sometimes wonder how to describe our value, or return on investment without sounding condescending to our conventional force brothers. What makes us unique is not easy to quantify, because it largely based on our culture.

In some ways we’re not much more flexible than our conventional counterparts, for example consider our 12 man ODA concept. The only changes in recent years have been replacing the LT with a Warrant Officer (better for the force), and replacing the Assistant Operations Sergeant with an Intelligence Sergeant (worse for the force).

The ODA organization was designed to support unconventional warfare operation, especially guerrilla warfare which is one aspect of UW, and then under JFK we assumed a key role as advisors in counterinsurgencies, based on the assumption, since we knew how to support an insurgency, who better to fight them? Then seeing the emerging threat of terrorism certain SF units started focusing on the counterterrorism mission (specialized raids), such as Project Blue Light in 5th SFG(A) and some other initiatives throughout the force. However, starting the late 1970's the Department of Defense started forming units that were better equipped and trained to handle high risk CT than SF. UW still had its value, as demonstrated in Afghanistan against the USSR and in Nicaragua when we supported the Contras. It was assumed there was resistance support throughout Europe, should the USSR decide to invade Western Europe (much like the Resistance elements that fought the Nazi’s), so some SF units were hopefully prepared to support that potential. I would argue that a highly trained Infantry unit is not capable of infiltrating a denied environment and then combat advising a resistance force. A highly trained conventional force can and do support community watch organizations in Iraq, but there is a significance difference. True the Brits were not very good at this, and perhaps because they didn’t train for it? An officer who still has the red coat mentality shouldn’t sleep well in a patrol base that mostly composed of irregulars.

Unfortunately, to justify resourcing, especially before the formation of SOCOM we had to show value directly to the conventional fight (apparently the conventional army didn’t see the value of guerrilla type operations in the enemy’s rear, or didn’t think they were feasible), so we focused on special reconnaissance and limited direct action missions. What is interesting, at least to me, is that we didn't change our task organization significantly to adjust to each mission. We tried to make the 12 man ODA fight every mission, whether it called for four men or 20 men.

Since 9/11 and especially the perceived SF successes in Afghanistan and Northern Iraq SF is now growing again. The focus now is irregular warfare, and lucky for our old ODA task organization and training seems to be a near perfect fit for this type of war. Whether the rest of Europe, to include England or our friends down under see a need for this type of organization is irrelevant. It is a needed tool for our national strategy.

I could go on and on about what is broken about SF, but the important piece still remains in tact and that is our culture. Despite an occasional dogmatic officer, we still maintain a unique range of skills that can be applied creatively to solve complex problems. Those skills are implemented by our tools, which are our people. While you can give everyone in the Army better, more SF like, training you still can't make chicken salad out of chicken crap. While approximately 50-70% of a good combat unit could probably graduate the SF qualification course (there are two keys to success, first the ability and second the desire), you have the remainder who can't, and majority who don't want the challenge, so in SF you a unique group of Soldiers who are all mission focused. Does it hurt the conventional army to have our best NCOs in these units? Yes and no, I would argue that many of our talented NCOs wouldn't stay in the Army if they didn't have a place like SF to go where they can self actualize as warriors.

[Ken White]

"replacing the Assistant Operations Sergeant with an Intelligence Sergeant (worse for the force). "

As a former A team Intel Sgt, I resemble that remark!

Though I'm not sure I agree with it... ;)
"It was assumed there was resistance support throughout Europe, should the USSR decide to invade Western Europe (much like the Resistance elements that fought the Nazi’s), so some SF units were hopefully prepared to support that potential. I would argue that a highly trained Infantry unit is not capable of infiltrating a denied environment and then combat advising a resistance force."Unquestionably true.
"...Unfortunately, to justify resourcing, especially before the formation of SOCOM we had to show value directly to the conventional fight (apparently the conventional army didn’t see the value of guerrilla type operations in the enemy’s rear, or didn’t think they were feasible)..."Also true and almost entirely due to the latter; that and risk aversion in high places which was due to misreading the leasons of Viet Nam and attempting to go into the "Fight but no casualties" mode -- and much to the chagrin of Joe Cincotti...:wry:
"...I would argue that many of our talented NCOs wouldn't stay in the Army if they didn't have a place like SF to go where they can self actualize as warriors."True again and fortunately, the majority of them are good at what they do so everybody wins...

[Rob Thornton]

Ken - good point about reconnaissance and how we use it (or not). I think a case could be made that Divisions and Corps also had specialized units for reconnaissance and or enabling type functions - CORPS LRS-D and DIV Pathfinders come to mind. Having an actual person on the ground to assess the situation and feed back information in a manner that "paints the picture" so leaders can make critical decisions on is invaluable. Again, some have a more natural aptitude to not only be able to go forward and thrive, but to show discipline and restraint while being able to pick up on what is really important beyond a staff's standard PIR that sounded right back before anyone began movement. Two of the best guys I ever knew who had a knack for employment of reconnaissance were both OPFOR at the CTCs - one was LTC (R) Daryll Shoening (also the one who coined the phrase for me of "there are no lessons learned, only lessons available"), and the other is Dave Indermuhle (sp?) who is a CAV guy probably either a LTC or COL now) - both understood the value of being somewhere in force where the enemy did not expect, and the value of preventing him from doing likewise to you.

We were wrestling with the employment of plain clothes reconnaissance for our IA counterparts. We knew we wanted to do it - knew we needed more Sunni Arabs for the Scout platoon vs. the Yizidi Kurds who'd been there since its inception to pull it off. The Kurdish scouts were fantastic troops, and damned fine snipers to boot; they could even de-arm an IED (then they'd bring it back to your room and fish the various components out of their pockets:eek:), but they could not blend in with the local Arabs in Mosul. As such the BN came up with a good plan to get more Arabs in the reconnaissance business (see that article in VOL 8 of the SWJ on building indigenous forces with regards to METT-TC) - this I think is part of what Slim was advocating about the need for "locals" to conduct reconnaissance - there are few places where we are likely to fight where an Anglo is going to pass for local (I saw a few red-headed Macedonian descendants but they did not share much in common physically with me:D - lucky for them I suppose).

This is also what UBL and his organization have reportedly been trying to recruit for operations in the U.S. and Europe (or for that matter where ever they wish to conduct operations). I think they understand the need for good target reconnaissance given the resources they have to achieve their purpose - better to make sure something will work (SWC member Davidfbpro has some interesting thoughts on how the enemy is working in that regard).

I think that is an area where our ID and advisory training is going to have to improve. Its all that much tougher because we often don't understand the value of a good reconnaissance, how to go about getting it (other then IMINT,SIGINT or other tech type collection means) in our own "pure" training, or are willing to accept the risks involved with placing men (and could be indigenous women) in harms way without a surefire means to retrieve them, which might mean compromising the mission - it easier just to bring the whole crew (Brads, KWs, Shadows, 1151s, etc.) based off old or incomplete info with little to no analysis then to take the time to develop the networks required to put our enemies operating on home (or like home) turf at a disadvantage.

It took us awhile to figure out why the enemy was executing his IEDs at certain times and his complex ambushes in certain places on 8-10 day cycles - but then we did the reverse planning on how it might go down, and once you figure in the drive time, the planning, the recon, the refinement of the plan, the staging for the ambush - it all worked out - then we were able to adjust our own IA patrols to disrupt his operations and catch him with his pants down - how much more effective we could have been with a large number of plain clothes types collecting around likely sites from Opals, Bongo trucks, mopeds and maybe manning a kiosk that reported back to a good analysis cell that could inform operations and direct uniformed patrols or strike forces with better effect. Again I'm talking about training - because all of the things that go into effective operations require it.

As we wage war in these other places - across the spectrum of conflict - it will pay huge dividends to employ locals to enhance our collection and analysis capabilities (this is nothing new - when we've been smart and able we've (and every other good army operating abroad) has done so)- but we have to train to do so (along with the many other tasks we are going to be asked to do) - and the resources we put toward that training have to match.

Well enough for one day - time to call it a night.
Best, Rob

[William F. Owen]

K
We were wrestling with the employment of plain clothes reconnaissance for our IA counterparts. We knew we wanted to do it - knew we needed more Sunni Arabs for the Scout platoon vs. the Yizidi Kurds who'd been there since its inception to pull it off.

- how much more effective we could have been with a large number of plain clothes types collecting around likely sites from Opals, Bongo trucks, mopeds and maybe manning a kiosk that reported back to a good analysis cell that could inform operations and direct uniformed patrols or strike forces with better effect. Again I'm talking about training - because all of the things that go into effective operations require it.



The use of indigenous covert reconnaissance (ICR) goes back to biblical times, and recurs constantly throughout history, yet is constantly neglected. It is an essential element of modern operations and you ignore it at your peril.

I have to hand to Rob for starting this thread. It is, after all what I have spent the last 3-4 years working on, and I am still utterly amazed about how limited the Big Army's (US and UK) vision of this subject is.

[Ken White]

"I think a case could be made that Divisions and Corps also had specialized units for reconnaissance and or enabling type functions - CORPS LRS-D and DIV Pathfinders come to mind..."Yes, the Corps had and have LRS Companies but there are two constraints on their missions and one big impediment. The constraints are risk aversion on the part of Corps staffs and commanders -- that varies, of course but it is real sometimes. Another that is almost universally true is infiltration and exfiltration. Because they're 'Big Army' the 160th SOAR doesn't even want to talk to them; the USAF SOC types are much the same and conventional Army Aviation units aren't trained or equipped to get the LRS Dets where they need to go. That needs to be addressed.
"...Having an actual person on the ground to assess the situation and feed back information in a manner that "paints the picture" so leaders can make critical decisions on is invaluable. Again, some have a more natural aptitude to not only be able to go forward and thrive, but to show discipline and restraint while being able to pick up on what is really important beyond a staff's standard PIR that sounded right back before anyone began movement."That is, believe it or not, the impediment. For real and in training, I've seen people out miles, literally, in front of major units, rendering good reports -- which are ignored or disputed. I have seen MI types directly refute reports because they have no confirmation from their sources and methods; I have seen Commanders flatly state "Those kids can't see that, it isn't happening." or words to that effect. I think a big part of that is training related -- and about which more in a second.
"(I saw a few red-headed Macedonian descendants but they did not share much in common physically with me - lucky for them I suppose)."Heh. The standard answer in the ME for the Red Hair or blue Eyes is "Al Iskander was here..." :D
"As such the BN came up with a good plan to get more Arabs in the reconnaissance business (see that article in VOL 8 of the SWJ on building indigenous forces with regards to METT-TC) - this I think is part of what Slim was advocating about the need for "locals" to conduct reconnaissance - there are few places where we are likely to fight where an Anglo is going to pass for local."Too true and we, moving into a new AO with folks that haven't done this before are way too slow in picking up locals for Scouts; we're also too slow, sloppy and inadequate in the HumInt business (before Jedburgh attacks, that's addressed at command attitudes and the quantity of HumInt people, not the quality).

Back to the failure to use our recon assets -- or to put enough stock in what those who are used report, my contention is it's a training issue. We do not train them well; not nearly as well as the Brits do (they don't do a lot of things any better or sometimes as well as we do but they do a far better job on, among other things, recon and intel gathering, far better). Since people know the scouts and recon folks aren't all that well trained, the information they provide thus is automatically suspect.

That tumble down 'trust' -- or lack of it -- aspect plagues us in all spheres. Lieutenants aren't trusted because we all know they are not adequately trained and are still learning. It's pervasive and insdious and our lack of ability to trust subordinate due to perceived shortfall potential or lack of judgment leads to micromanagement, failure to delegate and over centralization. From being one of the most innovative Armies around we have descended into being one of the most hidebound. Fortunately, both Afghanistan and Iraq are changing that; commanders are being forced to delegate to the point of acute discomfort on the part of the commanders -- and it all works out... :cool:

[Global Scout]

Now, almost five years after we invaded Iraq conventional officers are now considering the obvious, which is clearly one of many examples of why we need Special Forces. The Marines, unlike the Army, embraced these types of activities early in the fight. Now the question is should conventional forces be controlling indigenous recon elements, especially those operating in civilian garb? If you are the only players in town, then by all means, but if you have specialized forces that are more capable of training, equiping, advising, and controlling these type of operations (which can go terribly wrong when poorly planned, especially the risk of blue on blue if if you have a bunch of nervous E2's controlled by a LT in the battlespace), why would you? Pardon my bitterness, but after seeing some clown operations downrange I have my doubts. You can't compare our Army to the Brits. Our conventional forces are not as well trained for these types of conflicts.

[William F. Owen]

Now, almost five years after we invaded Iraq conventional officers are now considering the obvious, which is clearly one of many examples of why we need Special Forces. The Marines, unlike the Army, embraced these types of activities early in the fight. Now the question is should conventional forces be controlling indigenous recon elements, especially those operating in civilian garb? If you are the only players in town, then by all means, but if you have specialized forces that are more capable of training, equiping, advising, and controlling these type of operations (which can go terribly wrong when poorly planned, especially the risk of blue on blue if if you have a bunch of nervous E2's controlled by a LT in the battlespace), why would you? Pardon my bitterness, but after seeing some clown operations downrange I have my doubts. You can't compare our Army to the Brits. Our conventional forces are not as well trained for these types of conflicts.

While being aware of OPSEC and the sensitivity of this subject, I think I can say quite a few problems go away if the Indig are un-armed, and if there is a particularly broad and lateral interpretation of constitutes reconnaissance as opposed to so called intelligence activity.

The capture of two UK SRSR operators is pretty indicative of the sort of problems Global Scout is talking about. - as it is of having more than one home team playing on the field!

[Rob Thornton]

In many cases its not "any" U.S. folks (conventional or SOF) who control the indigenous CTR plainclothes types - in our case the IA controlled their own - we advised. We advised on targeting, on operations, on intel, etc. The IA controlled their own. Took us awhile to help the partner unit understand that as well, but eventually they did - and we all got along.

We came up with good ways to help the two forces deconflict (OPSEC) and prevent fratricide, but I'd say we kept as close (or closer) relationship with our CF partner as the resident ODA that was at MAREZ, and we lived with our folks out in town so we provided a persistent 2 way link.

Were there incidents of potential frat - yes, but not exactly for the reasons you bring up - they were because of training issues in the BCT and TF staff as well as deficiencies in the IA DIV, BDE, BN, and deficiencies in the IP, and deficiencies in the MiTTs(i.e. training writ large) - and because in complex operations Murphy is going to have a say - ex. the locations (to include the grid, side od the street, type of structure, and story of house were provided to a night battle captain for the overwatches the IA were putting in - the word did not get out to all the CF traveling on TAMPA that evening, and the MPs initiated contact with one of the IA overwatches (the gunner said he saw an Iraqi in the window with a weapon by his side - which he probably did). The IA overwatch called his operations center, and they sent a runner downstairs to get me, and I came up on the CF net to deconflict - luckily nobody got hurt. This is a case of fog and friction as well as poor training -on a number of levels - and it happens not just between U.S. and HN forces, but between allies who speak the same language, and have interoperability on a number of levels. when you have multiple folks operating in the same space, each thinking they rightfully own it, there are going to be issues - I could go on and on about some of the SNAFUs - but looking back, there were no show stoppers (the show did go on) and over a relatively short period of time, both forces began to really understand how to work with each other well.

We did try to work with the local ODA to get more CTR training for the scouts - but they had a host of priorities - some from much higher up - then strictly ID. They also did not have the other resources needed. An argument could be made that says well we need more SF to do ID, or you could make the argument that we did pretty well by the IA, and after awhile, they found they too had a knack for such things and could be creative themselves - in fact pretty soon their success rivaled the CF partner.

I also think that while we were not as well trained going into it, we've made some undeniable progress. While I did see some SNAFUs by our folks (generally I've seen SNAFUs by almost everyone - including the occasional dumb enemy), what I most saw was a very professional Army that had adapted to the conditions and the mission at hand. No - they were not COIN gurus (meaning guys running around spouting theory, but were instead guys and gals articlute in executing COIN on the ground), or unconventional adaptees - nor do I think they should have been. They were soldiers who'd by and large adapted to their environment (within reason) and were carrying out the mission in a professional manner. For all the things that go on in a large battlespace such as a city, there are going to be somethings things that defy explanation -#### does happen - to everybody - in a complex and inter-active environment - the issue imo is how you handle it, and that is a training issue.

Best, Rob

[Ken White]

but see different solutions...


Now, almost five years after we invaded Iraq conventional officers are now considering the obvious, which is clearly one of many examples of why we need Special Forces. The Marines, unlike the Army, embraced these types of activities early in the fight...

Yes and no, some Army units defied the Sanchez 'wisdom' and did that. The bigger issue is why did not the initial Army units into Iraq know what to do in the situation in which they found themselves?

Simply because they hadn't trained for it. BCTP in those days; you won the war with a final attack, turned off the lights and the computers and left the room. Armies do what they're trained for; the US Army found itself in a situation it had not trained for and it floundered -- that's a lick on 20 plus years of very senior leadership and the then commanders in Iraq...

There will never be enough Special Forces to do a wholesale attack and occupation.

I'd also submit that if both SF and the rest of the Army would start talking to each other instead of acting like a pair of females who wore the same dress to a party, they both might learn something...

(and yes, I know SOCOM is part of the problem)

Maybe there's hope, I heard 3d Gp and the 82d pulled off a good op not long ago...:cool:


"...Now the question is should conventional forces be controlling indigenous recon elements, especially those operating in civilian garb? If you are the only players in town, then by all means, but if you have specialized forces that are more capable of training, equiping, advising, and controlling these type of operations (which can go terribly wrong when poorly planned, especially the risk of blue on blue if if you have a bunch of nervous E2's controlled by a LT in the battlespace), why would you? Pardon my bitterness, but after seeing some clown operations downrange I have my doubts."

Sort of sums up the problem, doesn't it? What if those specialized forces are not available in the quantities required due to either sheer numbers or diversion to other missions?

Why is that E2 nervous? Why are you not prepared to trust his LT? Because neither has been adequately trained and we know that.

The issue is not who does what, it's what forces we have and how well they're trained. On that score, even SOF can screw the pooch on occasion, foul ups are not confined to the big Army. There was this suburban full of interesting gear my son's rifle platoon from the 82d found in the street back on OIF2... :D

I've seen a lot of clown operations on both sides of the SOF / conventional fence. Combat'll do that. One of the worst firefights I saw in VN was between two Mike Force Companies...

I'll also mention that a recurring theme from both Afghanistan and Iraq in addition to the major point I cite below is that there is a lack of unity of command...

"...You can't compare our Army to the Brits. Our conventional forces are not as well trained for these types of conflicts.[/QUOTE]

I agree that our conventional forces are not as well trained for these types of conflicts. That's the real point here, is it not?

Given the absolute fact that the US Army recognized as far back as 1986 that these types of conflict would be the future norm, whose fault is that?

However, you can compare our Army to the Brits, I do it all the time. There's one massive difference -- the Brits train well on the basics; we ignore the basics. Every after action report I've seen, every CALL bulletin, everyone I've talked to (and that includes some SOF folks... ;) ) who's been in any of the three current theaters says the same thing -- we do not do the basics well.

The point is, as you so amply illustrate, we don't train well enough.

[davidbfpo]

I've been reading this thread as it has evolved and have no military experience. Sometimes the abbreviations elude me, but that aside it has been a great read. Nice to know the US military do see somethings the Commonwealth / British armies do well and can learn from. Perhaps we can get our Indian members to add their views, not only from their international experience, but the low intensity wars they have had and still have.

davidbfpo

[selil]

I've been reading this thread as it has evolved and have no military experience. Sometimes the abbreviations elude me, but that aside it has been a great read. Nice to know the US military do see somethings the Commonwealth / British armies do well and can learn from. Perhaps we can get our Indian members to add their views, not only from their international experience, but the low intensity wars they have had and still have.

davidbfpo

The Three Letter Acronym (TLA) soup is hilarious. What you need to do is write down all the BCT, TFF, LCS, SWC, DOS, BN, etc... on a card with a grid 5x5.. When you hit five across, on the diagonal, up-down shout bingo and take a drink of Scotch. It makes TLA's a lot more fun to read without a translator.

We have a few different countries represented but they aren't posting as much. It is interesting to read the different accounts of actions. I'd be interested in hearing more about Sri Lanka, and any of the Malaysian conflicts.

[William F. Owen]

However, you can compare our Army to the Brits, I do it all the time. There's one massive difference -- the Brits train well on the basics; we ignore the basics. Every after action report I've seen, every CALL bulletin, everyone I've talked to (and that includes some SOF folks... ;) ) who's been in any of the three current theaters says the same thing -- we do not do the basics well.

The point is, as you so amply illustrate, we don't train well enough.

Wow Ken! That's very forthright. Politeness prevents me from agreeing, but I have to say I am constantly amazed at some of the things that certain armies choose not to train to do. I am currently doing some real boot-lace level research on this, so opinions as to this matter would be very welcome.

[Ken White]

recognize them and know they need to be trained, it's a combination of philosophy, cost and human fallibility.

Most of our initial entry training, officer and enlisted is based on WW II models (which in turn was predicated on WW I models). Those techniques worked marginally for a large mass Army of draftees and by the end of WW II, were generally fair. However, given the fact that the US Army has been at peace since 1945 (I know parts of it have not been but the institution has been..) and given the general softening of society, the mothers of America are not willing to accept a significant number of injuries to their kids in training. Thus those items that can be injurious are softened or eliminated.

The broader problem is that the Army has not adapted to the fact that Joe Entrant, 2007 version, is far more mentally capable (and less emotionally and physically capable but not terribly so) of absorbing more and better training. We train a mile wide and an inch deep; many of the basics are taught but only superficially and they are not drilled in (a critical point). Initial entry training for combat arms enlisted folks should be around 32 weeks -- it's only a little over half that in many cases; Officer accession training should be about a year, it's less than half that. So the philosophy is bad.

In fairness, the Marines do better.

The Army believes it cannot afford to train an individual for more than his or her next job. This is obviously fallacious because at any institutional level, the trainees or students will almost invariably perform the duties of at least one more rank step and most likely two before they get additional training -- this is just dumb; by refusing to spend the money up front, we make subsequent training more expensive, shortchange those trained -- and we get people killed unnecessarily due to that. The Tillman case comes to mind. So the cost factor is very real and very false logic.

Then there's human fallibility. It's a big problem but I'll cite just two examples. Immediate action on an M16/M4 is simple but calls for drilling and muscle memory or it doesn't become the reflex action it should be. This may have changed but 30 years ago, the solution was not to drill it in but to extend the time allotted to perform the action to save training time (and go easy on the Drill Sergeants). Hopefully, they are no longer teaching any use of the forward assist assembly and I don't know what that time is today but if it's more than five seconds...

The second item is that those tasks which garner low pass rates in training are not trained in the schools and training centers in many cases, they are flagged out for "in unit training." Not because they're too difficult in all cases for the institution to train but because the low pass rate makes the school or center look bad. There's more but those are two examples.

Then there's the fact that units don't have time in too many cases to properly train because of the same three factors -- but that's another thread.

[Global Scout]

There will never be enough Special Forces to do a wholesale attack and occupation.
I'd also submit that if both SF and the rest of the Army would start talking to each other instead of acting like a pair of females who wore the same dress to a party, they both might learn something...
(and yes, I know SOCOM is part of the problem)
Maybe there's hope, I heard 3d Gp and the 82d pulled off a good op not long ago

Ken, all very good points. I must admit I was on the male version of the rag yesterday when I wrote my response. I have no issue with any unit doing what needs to be done. The problem is the Army has lost the art of training, though TRADOC fans would probably argue with me on that point, I would counter argue we pretend to train to standard. The numerous posts throughout this great site had support to my argument, whether it is a unit in pre-mission training or worse a MiTT element getting ready to deploy.

thank you for recognizing that SOCOM is part of the problem for SF, but the reality is they are not "the" problem. As for 3d Gp and the 82d working together, that happens plenty of times at the Co and below level, where there are no political agendas, only a desire to win. Too bad most of the times you do it, you have to hide the cooperation from higher.


Why is that E2 nervous? Why are you not prepared to trust his LT? Because neither has been adequately trained and we know that.

The issue is not who does what, it's what forces we have and how well they're trained. On that score, even SOF can screw the pooch on occasion, foul ups are not confined to the big Army. There was this suburban full of interesting gear my son's rifle platoon from the 82d found in the street back on OIF2...

Please tell your son to return my stuff! (only joking)

[Ken White]

. . .
thank you for recognizing that SOCOM is part of the problem for SF, but the reality is they are not "the" problem.

True and under some Commanders, they've been helpful at removing the bars. That will continue to vary. The big Army mindset on the part of some senior folks therein is also part of the problem. It's complex and not easily solved but it needs to be, I think...


... As for 3d Gp and the 82d working together, that happens plenty of times at the Co and below level, where there are no political agendas, only a desire to win. Too bad most of the times you do it, you have to hide the cooperation from higher.

True, yet I think this one was a top down effort in both chains; not there so can't say for sure. In any event, the guys on the ground do generally work it out; if we could fix the budget and spaces problem we could get rid of some of the feuding. :o


Please tell your son to return my stuff! (only joking)

I didn't know you were in the Navy! Quelle horreur... :D

[Eden]

It is interesting how, when these threads hit about #30, that you can't tell what the original subject was. Not to be rude, but to return to Rob's original question "Could we be training our infantry better and in a wider variety of tasks?", I would like to give my two cents worth.

The answer is that of course we could do better and, yes, there are 'special' tasks like FID, long-range reconnaissance, raids, direct action, etc., that garden-variety conventional untis could do if afforded the training time. Slim's point, as Rob clarified midway down the thread, was that he believed regular infantry could be used for deep raids, airborne drops, the primitive airmobile operations of the times, and other tasks that most believed could only be done by 'special' forces. Today's army faces a variety of tasks in Iraq and Afghanistan that were either outside the purview of 'regular' infantry training or were considered the province of SOF.

Defining these tasks and constructing a training program for them is something most competent mid-grade officers could do. I believe a random selection of officers and NCOs, plucked from any infantry battalion, could train a group of men to do virtually anything - advise a foreign battalion, run a PRT, interdict rat lines, screen a border, etc - that you need to do in COIN ops to an acceptable standard. They won't be able to do it as well as SF, because SF have the luxury of screening their personnel, possess language and other skills well beyond what you'll find in random conventional forces, and generally have years of operational experience conducting 'special' ops.

So the obvious (and facile) answer is, of course, more and better training is good and will produce more capable units.

The problem is, how do you afford your soldiers more and better training in our current Army? We would need to drop many of the useless things we force soldiers to do nowadays - mandatory training about equal opportunity, health, alcohol abuse, fire prevention, and the like - and better resource things like shoot houses, combat ranges, leadership courses, cultural awareness, and other small-unit training assets. Unfortunately, even these no-brainers will only free up a small sliver of time, and that is the hardest constraint we face.

I am a firm believer that US units can only do a handful of things well. If you concentrate your training on small-arms combat skills and squad/platoon maneuver, your ability to function smoothly as part of larger units will suffer. If you concentrate on the softer skills of unconventional warfare, your combat skills will degrade. The only way for units to acquire a wider range of skills is to keep them together for years and not disassemble them - as we do - after every combat tour. Yes, more and better training will produce more capable units, but our system of individual replacements ensures a hard ceiling beyond which only the most extraordinary commanders will be able to go.

Finally, some would argue that our current combat experience is in fact producing the kind of units Rob was hoping for. Iraq and Afghanistan are seen as the ultimate training ranges. I would argue that prolonged exposure to the combat zones is narrowing our expertise, because in combat you don't train, you rehearse. It is a subtle but important distinction that leads directly to the opposite effect that Rob was seeking. History, I believe, supports my thesis that nothing is more destructive to an Army's overall competency than small wars

[Ken White]

"It is interesting how, when these threads hit about #30, that you can't tell what the original subject was. Not to be rude..."One does have to pay attention, no question. Still, total adherence to orthodoxy is sort of stultifying... :D

Though it it does appear somewhat endemic today.
"...Today's army faces a variety of tasks in Iraq and Afghanistan that were either outside the purview of 'regular' infantry training or were considered the province of SOF."True and the Asymmetric Warfare Group deserves many kudos for helping units to train themselves in migrating some of those nominal SOF skills to ordinary units. Skills that in peacetime have migrated to SOF and not been trained in the rest of the Army but skills which any competent Infantryman in WW II, Korea or Viet Nam had and then some...
"...So the obvious (and facile) answer is, of course, more and better training is good and will produce more capable units."Sometimes an answer may be obvious and only be facile in the eye of some beholders. Regardless, you then say:
"I am a firm believer that US units can only do a handful of things well. If you concentrate your training on small-arms combat skills and squad/platoon maneuver, your ability to function smoothly as part of larger units will suffer. If you concentrate on the softer skills of unconventional warfare, your combat skills will degrade. The only way for units to acquire a wider range of skills is to keep them together for years and not disassemble them - as we do - after every combat tour. Yes, more and better training will produce more capable units, but our system of individual replacements ensures a hard ceiling beyond which only the most extraordinary commanders will be able to go."I strongly disagree on the first opinion, I've seen too many units over too many years that can do it all. I have seen a number of commanders who were not willing to trust units to do more than a few things. I've seen even more leaders who were afraid to take the risk to train their units to do more...

I do agree that the current system of 'personnel management' is inimical to that ability.

I would add that if your position on only handful of things were accurate, it would be an even more damaging indictment of our training process than my rather scathing comments on the subject. I'd also ask whose fault that shortfall in capability is...
"...I would argue that prolonged exposure to the combat zones is narrowing our expertise, because in combat you don't train, you rehearse. It is a subtle but important distinction that leads directly to the opposite effect that Rob was seeking. History, I believe, supports my thesis that nothing is more destructive to an Army's overall competency than small wars."

You CAN train in combat and good leaders do that. All day, every day -- if one does not derive training value from every action, one is not taking care of one's troops. Period. Good units force that to happen.

I disagree with your thesis and would suggest that history supports it only in part -- and that only because an Army allowed that to be true.

In the current situation, the reversion to MCO roles is difficult due to the rapid rotation from CONUS to the theaters and concern for morale and families but the concentrated training needed to effect a successful reversion is not a lengthy effort (unless we determine to cram 12 weeks training in to 26 as we are prone to do -- partly due to some of those training distractors you mention).

While I am firmly convinced that our institutional training should focus on major combat operations, the big war if you will, adapting downward to do COIN or a small war of another nature is -- or should be -- but a temporary refocus; the primary focus can be easily restored with minimal training. One does not 'do' a COIN fight, one engages in COIN operations and one adapts to the modified skills needed (it is easier to do that than to train for COIN and adapt to MCO). I'd also suggest that the deterioration of some MCO skills is offset by the gaining of other skills and that adds to the overall competence of the individual and may better prepare him for the shock of major combat -- and make no mistake, it is and will be a shock...

The ability to downshift from MCO to COIN is present today and has been done in the past. That however is is most true and most easily done when the initial training is thorough and concentrates on instilling the basics -- which we do not do...

Which your stated concerns amply illustrate.

[Norfolk]

As Eden points out, there is a whole lot of what GEN Marshall in his days at the Infantry School called "bunk". I have long sought to find a copy (preferably auf Englisch) of GEN Felix Steiner's Training System - the one that emphasized genuinely realistic tactical training at all times, use of live-fire whenever possible, emphasis on weapons-handling and rigorous but sensible PT, and almost no Drill! (I love that part:)).

But apart from some items like marching 2 miles in 20 minutes with full kit, little drill, lots of weapons training and live-fire training, lots of sports, and advanced training, and an emphasis on the WWI "Pepperpot" tactics of the Stormtroops, I haven't find too much more in the way of specifics (though I can't say that I fancy getting up at 06:00 for an hour's worth of PT regardless of what training regimen is being used;)).

If the US Army were ever to draw-down enough from Iraq and elsewhere in the future to allow for something like this, an 18-month Unit training cycle might be a useful way to go, broken into three 6-month blocks. Field exercises conducted during the first 5 months of each block would normally be conducted with some sort of MILES-type laser simulation equipment, along with plenty of blank ammo and pyrotechnics - sound and smoke are necessary too. The last month of each 6-month block would normally be dedicated to live-fire training and exercises. The first 6-month block would emphasize (but not exclusively) individual and small-unit training; the second block would likewise emphasize minor-unit training; and finally, the third block would emphasize major-unit level training. Formation-level training would have to be accomodated throughout, but with emphasis progressively increasing over the course of the 18-month training cycle.

Strip the ceremonial stuff to the barest of bare bones; rethink and rework the administrative system to reduce it to the minimum possible (this is a really big issue, especially for officers, and a really tough one to deal with); and of course - as Eden strongly pressed for - scrap the individual-based personnel system and replace it with a true Regimental- or Brigade-based personnel system. That would be the toughest thing of all to pull off, but it would be self-defeating to increase training time and resources only to lose most of those benefits to the rotating-door individual assignment process of the personnel system.

And all of this would best be served with initial-level training for soldiers lasting not less than six months, with high standards rigorously enforced in weapons handling and marksmanship, physical fitness, tactics and battlecraft, fieldcraft, and being trained to assume leadership two levels above one's own. Advanced training, such as 3 weeks for basic machine gunner to 6 weeks for basic reconnaissance patrolman, would follow after the soldier's first 18 months in his Unit. Battle fitness standards would include such as a 10-mile Battle March with full kit within 2 hours followed immediately by a 300-400m Assault Course, and then directly on to a live shoot (the "Shoot to Live" Program") starting at 400m and requiring everyone to achieve the minimum of Marksman (as the USMC does). Swim tests, Chins, Dips, Sit-Ups, Squat-Jumps, and the like, would also be tested. All of this would be tested every 90 Days. As "burnout" really is a problem at times for highly-trained units, every Sunday and Holiday - without exception - really would be a "day off".

Junior NCOs, with at least 6 years' service in the Army and a basic NCO course lasting at least 3-4 months (preferably six), and advanced NCO courses would follow after their first 18 months as an NCO in their Unit, such as 4 weeks for advanced machine gunner to 5 weeks for advanced reconnaissance patrolman. Senior NCOs, with at least 9 year's service in the Army and warrant officer's and sergeant-major's courses, plus additional specialized courses, would provide for the core professional development of the NCO Corps.

Officers would receive a full year's basic officer training, and after their first 18 months in their Unit, would be eligible for advanced training such as basic machine gunning to basic reconnaissance patrolman (although this would already have been taught to them in their officer course). Officers are often exempt from such basic courses in advanced training, as they must cover agood deal of its matter in officer training anyway; but this may be a disservice to them and to their soldiers, especially after their first time in a Platoon may have distracted them somewhat from some of the finer points of Heavy Weapons and the like as they concentrate on learning the basics of their craft.

After their first 36 months in their Unit, they attend the advanced course for their advanced specialty, and at some point (as Captains) duly take command of a Heavy Weapons or Combat Support Platoon in their advanced specialty (from Machine-Gunning to Reconnaissance). And on up the ladder to Battalion Staff, Company 2i/c, Company Command and Majority - and then off to CGSC, etc.

Long post, I know, and this is a very rough outline, which deliberately ignores some realities about resources, force structure, career progression, and a few other things. But I'm trying to set up an "ideal" here to describe some fundamental characteristics and requirements of and for the training necessary for a truly competent "Full-Spectrum" Unit.

[Ken White]

Why an 18 month cycle? The US Army operated for many years on an annual cycle and got all you suggest into that 12 months with time left over. What you suggest for six months was done in a quarter with the fourth quarter for major multi divisional combined arms exercises which actually occurred at various times due to conflicting schedules of participants; wouldn't be smart to have everyone on the same cycles...

That system culminated in a graded test. We don't do those any more as our dipwad Congress decided that such tests scores were subjective and this encouraged favoritism, probably racism and elitism and who knows what else, not the American way. They told the Marines to quit scoring also -- the Marines wisely ignored them. A recurring complaint was that cycle produced peaks and valleys so we introduced the ARTEP -- which produces peaks and valleys. :(

We don't do nearly as much ceremonial stuff as most armies. No way we're going to go to a Regimental system (which has its pluses and minuses), knock too many civilians in the DC area out of work. I know, I know -- but that's reality.

Agree on your individual training prescription; some of that is being done now, just not enough. Squat jumps went out before I retired in '77 -- you are OLD... :D

Best combat oriented physical training is a good obstacle course, run 2-3 times a week (even for Tankers ;) ), other days of the week, PT should be branch specific.

Your NCO courses are too long; we already shoehorn two hours into eight, don't encourage that! That'll just encourage the inclusion of training distractors in the POI. Short and intensive and mostly in a field environment is a much better combat trainer than long and leisurely which encourages in-garrison training and lectures...

The only thing one has to do to train for full spectrum is train to thoroughly train all the MCO tasks at the entry level and let the units do the COIN and other lesser included stuff for various different types of operations when and if it's needed, it's just not that hard.

I noticed a blurb over at Abu Muq that said the CGSC was still teaching MCO and that the COIN level content was low. Good (LINK) (http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com/2008/01/priceless-abu-muqawama-reader-comment.html). He apparently disagrees, I don't.

[William F. Owen]

I have to say, I have reigned back my thinking recently to where it seems apparent to me, that basic training should focus largely on individual skills. - Which would be a modified Scout/Sniper skills set, plus First Aid, CQB/Battle Shooting, platoon weapons, basic Comms skils.

Most of those skills are not hard to achieve. The application of those skills within a squad/section or fire team are, likewise, not hard to put across. It seems to me that the training of commanders and NCOs is far more critical.

BTW, I see the basic fitness standard as running 3,200m (2 miles) in running kit with a 22kg ruck in >16 minutes for basic and >15:30 for NCO/officers as a minimum, as well as being able to climb a 7m rope using arms only. I actually had two NCOs at the Defence Medical Centre test this and they thought it reasonable, as did some SIs (though not all) from the NCO School at Brecon. Not definitive but it's a start.

If you can get hits on 0.5 x 1m target exposed for 5 seconds at 100m, from the standing position, then that seems good enough for me. Prone at 300m.

[Rob Thornton]

A good chunk of exchanges in the last 4 or 5 posts. CAVGUY brought up a good point in a meeting we were both at yesterday – the training plate is really only so big, and attempts to just keep piling stuff on top of it means it does not really get absorbed, it gets finger drilled (could mean it gets done –but not to anyone’s real benefit), or everything loses its importance. So what does belong in the PME? What should be emphasized up front? I think you have to begin by looking at what we are expected to do, that no one else is – wage land war – conduct ground combat operations (I’m a ground guy, and as Joint as I am – people construct cities on land). The next step is to look at the wide ranging conditions and missions associated with that (incidentally there is a piece in today’s paper quoting Rep Skelton on pushing DoD to review service roles and missions).

This I think is where things start to get greyer – what a state requires its military to do – there are the enduring things – provide security for the state (don’t let the Huns into the gates), and there are the important, but “more” temporal interests – that while remaining vital – such as stability in a particualr region where we require ourselves and others to have access to secure strategic resources to fuel economies – are not “quite” the same as meeting an opposite's uniformed army upon which the outcome may likely decide the course of a declared war.

In 2005 DoD issued Directive 3000.5 that put stability operations on par with other types of operations. This also coincides with Army doctrine that now reflects “full spectrum” as description of what we do. For those unfamiliar with 3000.5 I think its purpose was to lay out a number of tasks that are to be accomplished (many are still in the process or may not have fulfilled the spirit of the directive) that would help us address our current shortfalls for the wars we are in, and what many say are more the norm then the exception (I hate to attempt to tell the future – it always surprises me some - warning BAITED AMBUSH here out in front of the FLOT and in a FFA :)). As far as I know there has been no report card on how we’ve done in implementing it. Why would that be? I have a theory – to direct a service or agency to become the executor raises the question of resources (time, people, focus and yes money – but more of the other 3 I think since money still only gets you some of the second, none of the first and the 3rd…) – so what falls off the plate? Who takes responsibility for saying – you no longer have to do this at all, do it well, or do it not so well – and what do the latter 2 mean when others start to apportion blame?

I think some of it comes back to the golden mean – you don’t make too many radical departures from the golden mean in what is inherently a conservative organization (we conserve/preserve the security of our state).

So I think this leads to a learning curve where we depart from the very basic and enduring responsibilities. What Ken has said and I agree with, is that maybe our perception of the need for a learning curve is at least parlty in our head (what I mean is the time required to address new and relative unfamiliar conditions -METT-TC) - and that we can do much better with the Army of 2008 then the one of 1917 and 1941. We do need to scrape some of the empty carbs, and over kill off the plate to make room for the things that matter, but to do so we are going to have to get comfortable with excepting risk, and the best way to mitigate that is to make a better investment in people – which ties us into a number of other threads like the ones on leadership and retention.

I think there is linkage between what our civilian leadership want us to do based on their short term perception, and the enduring roles that don’t always forward in their objectives because they don’t (all) understand what it takes to build and sustain a military and its competencies. There we have to temper their expectations.

I wrote all this because I’m thinking about the level where senior leaders who must interact with policy must articulate the risk to policy objectives (near and far) by pursuing a particular course of action that ripples across the Strategic to the Tactical.

Increasing the amount of time available to train officers and NCOs outside of their units has a proportionate effect on a number of areas. Other agencies don’t even have the luxury we do with regard to sending their folks to levels of education and training – their bench is not big enough. If DoS fills a ILE/CGSC seat with a butt, nobody backfills that guy or gal (however I think the CAC recently said he’d work with agencies willing to do so by backfilling the seat with a uniformed guy/gal of like specialty – good for them/good for us). We have that luxury – no BN CMD slot generally goes unfilled (for very long) when a LTC(P) goes to AWC (Army War College). OPTEMPO in the current war has made that harder to do, but we’re still managing to get guys education – and in many cases we’ve figured out ways to get them some advanced civil schooling (ACS) both as a benefit to the individual, the Army, and the nation. I’d also say that time away from a platoon or company to attend additional training is not always a good thing – the experience of leading, commanding and yes even doing staff work – is invaluable to leader development –given our broad requirements – to include those outline in the GN Act – you get barely enough of the first two – but given we spend a great deal of time on staff supporting other CDRs and units – the last is also critical.

I’m not trying to take senior leaders off the hook in making room for more and better training that will better prepare us for the variety of conditions we face in meeting our responsibilities to the men and women we lead. However, identifying the risks so that everybody goes in pretty much with eyes wide open is critical to making things work in a manner that won’t haunt us down the road – we don’t want to be playing Jenga and not know it. I believe we can and should do better – there is room to be doing things smarter – but I also believe things are not as simple as identifying which things to make longer, or do away with – goes back to understanding the complex nature of war and the men and women we send to wage it in the ends/ways/means equation.

Best, Rob

[Norfolk]

Agree on your individual training prescription; some of that is being done now, just not enough. Squat jumps went out before I retired in '77 -- you are OLD...

OLD!?:eek: I'm thunderstruck Ken. In fact I think that I'm experiencing chest pain and shortness of breath now - and my arthritis is preventing me from getting to my Nitro pills quick enough;). I mean, I didn't even include Squat-Thrusts (Donkey-Kicks) here!

As per usual, I shall defer to your superior wisdom on these matters; although I kind of thought that trying to include the bulk of the content of the Ranger Course into a Basic NCO Course might require a course of rather more than 3 months or so. I just didn't want the aspiring Corporals to emerge fat and lazy from their first 14 or 15 weeks of NCO training - so I put them on the 9-week Ranger Diet!:eek::D

[Rob Thornton]

A few other thoughts come to mind with regard to establishing, sustaining and changing a training base – the first is on self imposed requirements – who do we want teaching at our schools and courses, who do we want writing our doctrine, who do we want running our service academies? Why do we want folks with operational experience doing that, say turning it over completely to contractors – who regardless of their experience, might not either have the same vested interest, or the more recent ground truth? What does that do to the equation of managing the force?

How about considering something like forecasting requirements? It could be for CL V (ammunition) – a STRAC table is supposed to provide a unit an idea of what related training it does, and how often – but it also determines how much ammunition is to be ordered, how much space is required on the installation to hold it, how much the producer of that ammunition can expect to have to make the following year – etc.

The same can be said about levels of training – we were having a discussion the other day about levels of training for advisors. A sharp SNCO here said that what we might be wise to do is establish different levels of capability based on the amount of training or experiences an advisor had – and that by doing so we’d be capable of knowing what that guy could do. I thought it was a great idea – and its one we do in other areas. Another reason I thought it was great is I could see its utility to managing the training base and for planners trying to decide if a COA was feasible.

If we create requirements for example that certain types of units have the x- amount of capacity for various levels of proficiency in a skill set(s) (we already do this by MTO&E) then that establishes the training base requirements that must sustained in order to meet those needs – i.e. if you create the need for more snipers for example, then your capacity to train those new sniper requirements needs to grow in order to meet it (you could resource it internally, or you could outsource it). My point is that with an increased investment in training, there is an increased investment somewhere along the training and sustaining base – and also along the rest of the DOTMLPF – more of something in this case equates to more of something else as well – this is also true when we move things around – the consequences for moving the Armor School to Benning with its 400 tanks – more AHA space, more competition for ranges, more motor pools and maintenance bays, etc. If we want more training on tanks for example – its more of something else, risk associated with not doing so, or some substitute that while more efficient might not be more effective – we’re back to tough choices.

Anyway – as we go down the path – its worthwhile to consider the ripples.

Best, Rob

[selil]

Rob,

If you find the plate to small the time to finite look at the training from a new perspective. What you "train" may not be what you "teach". There is a lot of excess in most education and training programs (they are not the same by the way). You can rapidly evaluate and chip away at the excess by finding points of commonality, and where repetition is done only for time management. Physical fitness requires a defined number of minutes activity. Martial arts require a fixed number of repetitions. Increase the intensity of the martial arts training and decrease other physical fitness training. I'm sure similar examples exist both as simplistic and at higher levels. I'm not as aware of military training as maybe I should be, but the utilization of building block educations systems often are done in stove pipes. When they should be done in reversed hierarchies (upside down pyramids). What ever the most basic skill is taught first. Then multiple skills are taught on top of that base. The original not being addressed other than in utilization. So on, and upwards until you can apply it across multiple careers, or specialties. This educational philosophy isn't well loved by the military from what I understand as everybody wants to start out with breathe (breath control), and then work their way up to tactics. You should only have to teach the most basic skill once, and the reinforce rarely but use often.

[Ken White]

Sam's post is also great and he's correct in that the Army has a tendency to adhere to "crawl, walk, run" at all costs without considering the fact that some can walk when they get there and some can even run (and that is particularly true at levels above entry -- how many in your Advanced course had already commanded companies...).

Addressing your comments in order of your two latest posts:

Yes, the training plates (plural) are only so big. The question to me is what is allocated to which plate. I suggest, for Officers, that the Basic courses are far too short and the Advanced courses (and CGSC) are far too long *. The same applies to NCOES which is largely seen a as a joke by most NCOs (that may have changed recently, I know they're trying to change it); initial entry training is too short and the levels of NCOES are all too long (and too garrison oriented). So the total plate allocation doesn't need to increase, nor do we need to pile much else on -- rather, we need to take some esoterica off -- we just need to tune the allocation between the plates.

* Shy Meyer tried to fix thatin the late 70s, the bureaucracy won.

Stability operations may or may not need to be on a par with other operations (whatever that means) the fact remains that the Army's primary mission is land warfare and keeping said Huns away from the gate. If the Army can do that, it is more than capable of adapting to other minor missions. As you say, predicting the future is a virtual impossibility and we should not waste time and effort trying to do so.

You say -- and I totally agree -- that we need to get comfortable accepting risk. That is a profound and important statement and our failure in ever increasing amounts over the last 30 plus years to be willing to do that is a large part of the problem. We have become a comfortable bureaucracy and we like it. That needs to change.

You correctly illustrate the conflicting demands of time in the unit versus time spent away in education or training -- and that is a knotty problem. I think there is no one answer or 'typical' set of answers. People vary; all do not absorb knowledge or skills at the same rate and thus each individual's path must vary. That is very difficult to accommodate but we should at least try; good leaders and commanders do that for their people -- but the institution does not try. It should.

Allied to that though is another time impact -- length of tours. If I had a nickel for every senior Officer I've heard say "...just about the time I learned what the job entailed and became effective, I moved..." I'd send you a whopping check to take the entire Kansas chapter of SWJ to KC for steaks and buckets of beer...

That needs a hard look. I've often said DOPMA is dangerous and I really believe that. A lot of congressionally imposed stuff to achieve "fairness" in promotions is antithetical to best military practice.

That brings up an aside of our penchant for adopting civilian education, training and management practices which should be totally stopped...

You say:
"I believe we can and should do better – there is room to be doing things smarter – but I also believe things are not as simple as identifying which things to make longer, or do away with – goes back to understanding the complex nature of war and the men and women we send to wage it in the ends/ways/means equation."Couldn't agree more.

Going on to your next post, you suggest using contractors for training -- I agree that their use could and probably should be expanded but with the caveat that the majority need to be old retired heads and in uniform, ala Junior ROTC instructors.

Doctrine writers should be serving folks, period -- do not let a civilian, even one who's retired, anywhere near that. The folks that write it need to be the folks who are going to execute it, period. :eek:

You also said:
"The same can be said about levels of training – we were having a discussion the other day about levels of training for advisors. A sharp SNCO here said that what we might be wise to do is establish different levels of capability based on the amount of training or experiences an advisor had – and that by doing so we’d be capable of knowing what that guy could do. I thought it was a great idea – and its one we do in other areas. Another reason I thought it was great is I could see its utility to managing the training base and for planners trying to decide if a COA was feasible."I thought that's what we did? :confused:

and:
"we’re back to tough choices."Always been true and we have a bad tendency not to make those because we don't think it through and tend to take the easiest solutions. We like to avoid risk... :mad:

[Ski]

Superb thread, really making me think.

Training is really the tip of the pyramid - the force structure, resourcing, personnel policies and equipping capabilities all determine how well, how often and complex training can be. Seeing 5 HBCT's at Bliss and 4+ at Hood scare me - where are they going to find ranges for all these units....?

Also very interesting to hear that voice of experience known as Ken White chime in as per SOP.

[Ken White]

And that's all they are, opinions... ;)

Interesting you mention Bliss (where I think that along with Dona Ana and White Sands the Combined Arms Center should be) and Hood -- which I think can support the range requirements. Though admittedly the range training, firing and qualifications processes all need refinement. Hopefully, for small arms the Army will stop insisting on the helmet and go routinely to hot ranges, that would speed things up a great deal... :D

So would moving Tanks and other tracks without ground guides. Never ceases to amaze me that we can and do manage that in combat but cannot do so in training. Sort of makes "Train as you will fight" suspect... :wry:

'Safety' is vastly overdone in training, the excessive and poorly thought out training safety guidelines are a significant training distractor. Risk avoidance, like Scotch, is an acquired taste...

I say all that about Bliss and Hood because the move to Benning is going to create major problems in regard to ranges and training areas (benefit of a political rather than a practical decision) and barring a major war, I'll be surprised if anyone can fire a tank main gun east of the Mississippi in the next twenty to forty years due to 'environmental' constraints -- activism, actually...

[Hacksaw]

As the title indicates, I'm not a TRADOC apologist. Stove pipes abound and despite the efforts of several professionals they tend to remain in place regardless of how many times they reorganize the deck chairs. That said, much has been done in the past three years to address issues described throughout the thread....
1. Initial Entry Training has moved out of the classroom and into the field. Warrior Tasks are trained in conditions that replicate (as best they can) the operational environment. Whether to standard? That is a leader issue, but it is the TRADOC commander's explicit top priority. From time eternal everyone has lamented the Soldier that comes out of BCT as "not good enough" - but he's alot better today than in 2004.
2. All new 2LTs and WO1 (loggies, JAG, MC as well) go through the Basic Officer Leader Course (I believe 6 weeks) that is conducted almost entirely in the field. It is only after this that they go to branch specific training. Again, are they competent combat leaders as they exit - probably not, but the product is a heck of a lot better.
3. All NCO courses are less than 8 weeks (possibly two exceptions), Tasks formerly in ANCOC are now in BNCOC, ANCOC is mostly old 1SG Course, 1SG course is dead. Again, nearly all the "filler" is done upfront using dL. Mostly MOS specific field craft. Perfect - nah but better
4. CCC (formerly known as OAC) is in the midst of the same type of change (refrained from using transformation).

To be clear is all this good enough - nope and more can and should be done from a generating base perspective.

As for unit training, units are assembling and deploying on short time lines and I won't second guess commanders who are trying to prioritize what they train and do not. I do agree in the strongest terms that units/Soldiers rise (or not) to the level of their leader's expectations.

Live well and row

[Ken White]

even with Google, it's hard to track down. Lot of guys in green right now aren't aware of all that (including my kid the know it all -- though he did tell me some of the bit about OSUT). An ORF like me is way outa the loop... :o

Still, I know we do better now than we've ever done, far better that in my day and even better than in 2004 as you say. Thanks again.

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Ken,
I don't know. I'm not sure that CGSC/ILE is too long. It was a little different for us as functional area guys now go to the satellite campus before going or following their base line schools for their new area (ex. I did the 3+ month Basic Strategic Arts Program up at Carlisle - then did the 16 week Satellite Campus at Belvoir. Both courses had allot to offer, and I saw the POIs, instruction and discussion as complimentary, not as superfluous, or conflicting. We were told what the full ILE course POI looked like, and I think if the quality of instruction is as good (or close) as what we had at Belvoir, both the attendees and the folks they will go out and lead, or the staffs they will be part of, will benefit from the time they spent there.

Sam is probably a good guy to weigh in here (as is Marc - BTW - anybody seen him in awhile?), but more happens in the PME then just the teaching and inculcation of new knowledge I think - it is also presents the individual a chance to sort through their recent experiences and place them in the proper context - this for me is where I really learn what I just did - it gives me a chance to think about it, and apply it to the other things I'm learning. For me, its where that stuff stands a chance of becoming tacit knowledge, that I can draw on as a kind of intuition.

I also think that while the POIs are relevant, and need to be updated and pitched by good folks, the best learning for me comes in the discussion - which might start with something in the POI - but might wind up in a seeming unrelated place. There is also the benefit of the guest lecture series - etc.

As was also pointed out to me, for many - ILE may be the last time the Army invest in them on that scale - a relatively small portion will go to the SSCs (Senior Service Colleges) - which having had a chance to talk to some folks about those - I think they offer an educational experience that also benefits the individual and the Army.

I've know a few SAMS type folks, and have always been impressed with their contributions - the argument could be made I guess that those who'd attend would be so inclined anyway to "self-learn", but the ones I've asked have attributed their contributions to the opportunity afforded them - another good program we need to sustain.

One of the interesting things about DoD 3000.5, and also mentioned in the Army Campaign Plan for Stability Operations (that one is an FOUO doc released in August 2007), is the mention that military personnel will be expected to perform those duties/jobs (at least temporarily) - that while being better suited to a civilian from an OGA or from the HN, must be filled by us - until conditions (meaning security presumably - but could also mean OGA/HN capability or capacity) permit otherwise. Interesting how both documents really reflect the reality of ground truth - both now, historically (post hostilities in WWII) and at least likely actions following MCO in the future, if not before or during depending on when we put our foot in) vs. the way we'd really have liked to wage a war going into 2000.

Again, policy effects training - which makes sense seeing as how you "go" to war ideally to achieve some identified political purpose that could not (or was not as favorably decided through) be achieved through other means.

This trickles right on down the line in different ways and in different measures, and hopefully never impacts the basic things we need to do in order to meet the primary mission of defending the Constitution and the state from the Huns - but does get back to why you have a military - and what types of policies will require (or stand a chance of requiring) military power to achieve. At that point I think is where we get (or should get) rational we need for basing agreements, long term contracts, how many C-17s and TSVs we buy, etc. (with a healthy dose of domestic politics for good measure:mad:) - but our foreign policy often seems "jumpy", inconsitent, and sometimes vague about what is really important to us - which should drive all the DOTLMPF train - maybe that is the nature of who we are -but it makes focus not so easy.

Best, Rob

[Ken White]

However, three thoughts occur. I have three good friends, all retired COLs. the Tanker went to Leavenworth and later taught there. He agrees with you on all counts but even he admits that the length is nice to have as opposed to totally necessary. The FA guy went to the AFSC at Norlfolk, shorter and he later served on two Joint staffs and commanded twice as a LTC, one FA Bn and one more exotic outfit. He was quite comfortable with the AFSC as opposed to CGSC. The Infantry Aviator OTOH didjn't go to any comparable course and contends he never missed 'em. Different strokes...

In any event, that's above my pay grade; you Field grades can sort that out... :D

Second thought is that in seven years as a Civilian Instructor and Branch Chief at the Armor School, I noted that a surprising number of the Advanced course Classes adopted "Wasted Days and Wasted Nights" as the Class song. Sort of funny but that was actually the case, honest.

At the same time, the AOBC classes generally felt short changed on time. When Shy Meyer as CoS, Army tried to change TRADOC's approach, he didn't succeed in getting the OBCs to nine months to a year but he did get them all increased by a month or more. His attempts to get the Advanced Courses chopped to two to twelve week courses tailored specifically to the individuals next assignment flopped totally. Most cited the rationale you cite, the extended learning environment, for their resistance to his ideas. Unfortunately, the TRADOC Manpower audit process that determines School staffing on Instructor (to student) Contact Hours would have had a significant bearing on that proposal in the form of manpower cuts and thus made those arguments at least a little suspect...

Lastly, back then, when we at the Schools developed a new POI, we had to simultaneously develop a Mobilization POI for the course (or a replacement or similar course) to be taught in the event necessary. Those POIs were invariably more intense, covered more tasks and were much shorter in duration than the peacetime versions. I always wondered about the logic of that.

You also said:
"This trickles right on down the line in different ways and in different measures, and hopefully never impacts the basic things we need to do in order to meet the primary mission of defending the Constitution and the state from the Huns - but does get back to why you have a military - and what types of policies will require (or stand a chance of requiring) military power to achieve. At that point I think is where we get (or should get) rational we need for basing agreements, long term contracts, how many C-17s and TSVs we buy, etc. (with a healthy dose of domestic politics for good measure) - but our foreign policy often seems "jumpy", inconsitent, and sometimes vague about what is really important to us - which should drive all the DOTLMPF train - maybe that is the nature of who we are -but it makes focus not so easy. Boy, ain't that the truth...

[Rob Thornton]

Interesting & Good points, they get me thinking:). When I went through the Armor Captains Career Course back in 2000 (as a token Infantryman – but one whose wife is from Louisville, and it’d also been recommended to me as a way to get my map out of my cargo pocket), there was some complaining by some guys about why we spent so much time doing BN and BDE level operations vs. focusing in on being a CO CDR – which we all thought was the end all & be all (it was certainly a whole lot more fun and rewarding!). However, the truth was that out of the time between being a CPT and a MAJ – I only spent about 2 of those 6 years in command. I spent three of the remaining four on some kind of staff, and the last one as an advisor, which was also more like being staff then being a CDR, and one in which the analytical skills I’d developed helped me help those I advised and worked with. The multiple experiences were mutually reinforcing.

I’ve also ran into folks who attended CAS3 and thought it was a waste of their time. Now I agree that it went overboard on “tools” such as the DEC MAT (or decision matrix), however, it did show how to (or how not to) present information largely devoid of context to somebody who had to make a decision, and only had a short attention span for a number of reasons. It also illustrated the limitations of trying to do so, which taught me to always add some kind of short info paper, or where possible craft a good letter or email to accompany something if I could not be there myself. One other thing CAS3 did was introduce (or reintroduce) me to non-Infantry/non-Combat Arms peers for the first time in a non- work/I need this now environment – it broadened my appreciation for them, as well as understanding their capabilities and limitations in regard to staff work (as well as my own) – this also helped down the road as my post command jobs brought me closer to those folks in different capacities.

I think there are naturals – like the Aviator you mentioned – some guys and gals are just well suited – they will never know if what they missed could have enhanced them, because by the standard they are already exceptional – like some guy who already throws a 90 mph fastball, his attendance to a clinic might only get him a mph or two more – it might make him great, but he was already really good. However, I think there are allot of guys who attending the clinic would turn an average, or less then average pitcher into a good one. They might not understand why it was important, or even believe it helped until they could look back and see how it worked out. To take it back down to where the rubber meets the road – my PLs always wanted to work platoon ops (and I probably did too as a PL), but the truth was the quality of their platoons had as much or more to do with squad proficiency and below on battle drills and individual and leader tasks then solely on how well they did a platoon attack – it was building blocks. Its why we have focuses as well – my focus was on squads, my boss the BN CDR was on platoons, and the BCT CDR was on companies – both for resourcing and tracking. Once I cracked the code on running squad LFX and STX lanes the proficiency of my platoons shot way up, the same with the BN’s focus on platoons, and ultimately the BCTs focus on companies – makes sense given the decentralized nature of today’s conditions (METT-TC)

I think its pretty tough when thinking about leader development (particularly today when guys split off into different tracks at the 04 level) in today’s conditions to decide when to cut one thing and not another – it goes back to risk, but also to clarity of purpose. I also wonder about how the needs of the Army (and Joint and Inter-Agency community) might affect what we consider today’s truth. If for example we expand faster then we can fill certain positions – where do we get more 04s/05s and 06s to fill critical roles – probably from the same place we always do, out of hide – which could mean faster (or slower) promotions in certain grades, greater retention incentives, wider “Return to Active Duty” programs. Stop loss/stop move type initiatives, or that all these support areas we’ve identified as needing quality people might suddenly become less important then the Operations side – which is the core of what we do. All of these have some type of effect on the force and often put people (but not always) who are less ideally qualified then what we’ve previously identified as the having met the standard qualifications to do that job (could be educational or experience/assignment type qualifications).

Again it gets back to anticipating / forecasting needs and we do that better when we understand (better understand) what we are likely to be asked to do.

Best, Rob

[Eden]

Rob, we already have what you are asking for. There is a very precise system for determining exactly what we should train, how long it will take to train soldiers and units in those tasks, how we can evaluate their expertise, the resources it will require to execute the training, what should be taught in schools and in the field, how long courses should be, how many course should be run, etc ad nauseum. It is a logical system that begins with the publication of the National Security Strategy and ends with the publication of unit taining schedules - briefed in detail at the QTB, submitted in writing 7 weeks prior, approved six weeks prior, posted four weeks out, changes allowed no later than 72 hours before execution. There are provisions for exceptions, waivers, requests for changes, and the like. The manuals and instructions associated with it can be found in training rooms across the Army.

The problem is that to make any significant change to your training program, especially if you are in a schoolhouse, takes about two years, minimum. Commanders, obviously, are not going to wait that long, so changes are made that cannot be resourced - because you are bypassing the system that provides those resources. So, you rob resources from elsewhere. In the end, either other training is shortchanged or maintenance is deferred. It is a vicious cycle that leaves post roads full of potholes, ranges oversubscribed, and us still training recruits in "React to Nuclear Explosion" but not "React to an IED".

In other words, it is extremely difficult to significantly improve training quantity or quality, Army-wide, under the current system. It was designed when the mission was "Enter the continent of Europe..." or "Delay the 3rd Guards Shock Army..." and served its purpose well for four or five decades. Now it is a creaking bureaucratic collossus that, like its evil twin in Alexandria, is the greatest obstacle to improving the quality of our Army today.

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Eden,
Pretty much concur. The problem I think comes with the clarity which provides the linkages to make it all flow, as well as issues that come with trying to turn the super-tanker (some good things about it, some bad).

Given the nature of what I think you pretty accurately describe - it may be the best we can do. However, if it is possible to change it (or desirable) then I think it might have to begin with clarity of purpose - the NSS I think sets the tone - all the other documents get their bearing off of it (as it should be). Could it be more succinct? I'm not sure - even if I wish it were - it is after all the "National" Security Strategy, and sometimes being more concise means being more constrained. So the essential tasks in the NSS state:

- Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity
- Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends
-Work with others to defuse regional attacks
-Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies and our friends with WMD
-Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade
-Expand the Circle of Development by opening the societies and building the infrastructure of democracy
-Transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st Century
-Engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization

might be broad enough to encompass everything we might find ourselves doing, or required to do, but I'm not sure they do (or can) provide focus (they are not prioritized - nor does it say which ones might be more vital then others) - it kind of reminds me of writing your OER support form at the end of the rating period (I say sort of ;))

As they get translated along with other policy documents and speeches, etc. there are allot of disconnects that leave the pot holes you mentioned (or in some cases they might be broken bridges). Here is where leaders have to make decisions abut where to put the available resources (people, time, $$, land, etc.) Sometimes we get it right, sometimes not so much, and sometimes we get it wrong. There might be an element of risk at work here as well - it might be aversion or it might be mitigation - depends on how you look at it I guess. Could we do better - I guess that is the question on my mind at the moment, and if so how?

Best, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

that might be an intersting subject to spend some more time thinknig about - how what is decided on as policy from folks inside the beltway equates to purpose, and direction in terms of education, training and health out at the tactical level - the various linkages and breaks in contact, etc. You could also study how the advice from folks on the outside of the beltway gets interpreted to become policy - then compare what guys and gals wind up having to do vs. what they might have been trained to do. You always hear about the sausage grinders - and wonder how that happens. It takes you back to the relation between tactics and strategy - you go in looking one way and come out looking ... different maybe.
Best, Rob

[Ken White]

but I do think he gives the "very precise system" far more credit than it possibly deserves. In my observation it has never been that precise and every step he mentions:


Rob, we already have what you are asking for. There is a very precise system for determining exactly what we should train, how long it will take to train soldiers and units in those tasks, how we can evaluate their expertise, the resources it will require to execute the training, what should be taught in schools and in the field, how long courses should be, how many course should be run, etc ad nauseum...

has human fallibility problems. Take the issue of selecting what should be taught in schools versus what is to be taught in the field. I know from sad experience that a portion of that distribution is based on 'Go' rates (those with low rates are 'better taught in the unit...' Heh.) and instructor contact hours required (more is better). I have been on too many POI task selection boards and watched the input from Commanders in the field with respect to what is to be taught where get scant if any attention.


In other words, it is extremely difficult to significantly improve training quantity or quality, Army-wide, under the current system. It was designed when the mission was "Enter the continent of Europe..." or "Delay the 3rd Guards Shock Army..." and served its purpose well for four or five decades. Now it is a creaking bureaucratic collossus that, like its evil twin in Alexandria, is the greatest obstacle to improving the quality of our Army today.

Absolutely correct. The system tries, it really does -- and most people mean well and make it work in spite of the impediments. We just need to remove the impediments and get serious about training. Unfair statement; most of us ARE serious about it -- however, we need to give the problem more thought and do a better job of getting the basics down for new entrants of whatever rank.

[Ken White]

A few thoughts on them.

The Clinic metaphor is a good one and a "clinic" is needed for the average bear-- no question. I totally agree with the focus you and your Bn placed on the various echelons in todays world -- but would also submit that if the PLs were better trained, THEY could focus on th Squads while the Company Commander focused on them...

Looking down one echelon is far better than looking down two, precludes micro management, keeps the Co Cdr out of the PLs hair and the Bn Cdr (and Staff...) out of the Co Cdrs hair. :D

Yes, sorting out the mixes and tracks is difficult. I think, to an extent, we have made that so by having too many Officers (as a percentage of the force) and that many of them are in unnecessary positions. Most Staffs, in my experience are over large (and the higher one goes the overlarger they are...) and I'm still trying to figure out why the Artillery need Officers for FOs -- I know why they did in WW I and even in WW II -- I do not know why that's necessary today. Other than to populate the Branch... ;)

I know we do that for mobilization backup and other purposes, I simply question the efficiency and the dilution of leadership and the forays into strange jobs that add little value to either the Army or the Officer.

All small stuff. There are are two big things where I'd throw in a cynical old fogey whose seen it all (or most of it, anyway) caution:

One is forecasting -- we are unlikely to ever get that right and I'm unsure why we try to such an inordinate extent (other than that Congress and the MBA model expect us to do that, factors of which I'm well aware). The point being; yeah, we sort of have to do it but we should not hang our flop hats on the accuracy of those forecasts. Be very prepared for the unforeseen is what I think I'm saying...

The second is in putting too much stock in a top down approach. I think that's dangerous. Using the NSS is sensible and totally logical way to drive our train(s). Unfortunately, the US Government is not a totally logical beast and it can change complexions, appetites and colors -- much less directions -- on a two to four to eight year basis (and even more often, all on a plitical whim or two). The Army cannot adapt well to that speed of change, it needs to focus on its core missions, concentrate on doing the basics better than everyone else in the world and just be prepared.

Hewing to the 'guidance' or predilections of the government of the day is fraught with danger. Equally bad is attempting (as in the Weinberger or Powell 'Doctrines') to shape that guidance and those desires. The Army just needs to be prepared to do its job as a full spectrum armed force in the service of the nation and it must be prepared for political irrationality and abnormal missions in strange places that fly in the face of the 'strategy' du jour or even common sense.

And it should and must do that TOTALLY apolitically (in thought and word and deed).

[Rob Thornton]

Ken,
Good points - I will (and have) certainly profess that today's PLs are far sharper then I was as a PL - I think war has done that - on a number of levels some of which we've talked about here on this thread.

Part of it is in resources though - trying to do an independent PLT LFX is tricky to resource - not just in terms of CL V, but in terms of OCs, ammo handlers, RTO operators to keep in touch with RNG CNTRL, Road Guards, sychronization, etc. - when I did do it, I did not get as good of throughput - when I did SQD LFXs/STXs I was able to leverage more leadership and we got more training. Another thing I did often was a rifle squad LFX + the platoon weapons squad, and/or a vehicle in support (sometimes even hand held 60s (the mortar variety) - sort of a twofer that was easy to pull off and let me work SBF tasks in conjunction with squad battle drills. It depends on what we were after, and the 1SG along with the rest of my company leadership came together to discuss it.

Now I did allow the PLs and PSGs to take a portion of the white space available to ID, Plan and resource their own training plan - which usually gave them a 5 day period every QTR - I may have only had 5-10 days myself for stuff I felt was important - but I felt it very important that they had a chance to go out and learn resourcing and training in a way they could not when somebody else plans it - it was part of their leader development, and it built an element of autonomy and confidence into their decision making.


I'm not an artilleryman, but I was an 0861 my first 3 years in the FMF - there were no officers on my NGF spot team, however we did have a USN LT as the NGLO. As for FOs in the company - mine was a good one I got allot of leverage out of - in addition to heading up my ADHOC FS platoon (the mortars, the FSE and the Sniper section) he also served as my Intel Analyst. I think the principal value he may have gotten out of it - aside from the opportunity to be a leader - was understanding of how combined arms works from the rifle company perspective before going on to command a battery. For a LT with the last name Cody he might one day need a good understanding of more then just the Artillery Branch:D

I agree with you on the value of forecasting - its something we do, but if you pin your hopes on it you're likely to be disappointed. A rule of thumb I tried to follow was don't create training that is so contingent on a particular range or condition that you won't be able to execute it in some modified form if something changes. Its a rule that served me well.

I also agree on the issue of "top down" approach. I think at the BCT level and below things need to be generally nested in the METL or mission requirements for pretty easy reasons - its the bread and butter. But I think that folks also need to understand there are ripples with policy decisions - we've talked about those before - partly I write to work through problems with SWC members that I'm thinking about - and where possible I try to inform or get others to think - we've got a big audience.

I think you've summed it up well here:


Hewing to the 'guidance' or predilections of the government of the day is fraught with danger. Equally bad is attempting (as in the Weinberger or Powell 'Doctrines') to shape that guidance and those desires. The Army just needs to be prepared to do its job as a full spectrum armed force in the service of the nation and it must be prepared for political irrationality and abnormal missions in strange places that fly in the face of the 'strategy' du jour or even common sense

I don't think we should shape policy goals - but I do think we have a responsibility to inform about consequences and effects - particularly if a belief exists that a military COA to achieve a political end is feasible based on faulty assumptions for whatever reasons; or if the military analysis on what the consequences of doing something (or not doing something) are incongruent with the civilian side. Being prepared to do our job may require keeping those who appropriate and allocate resources in the loop about how things play out on the ground, or are likely to play out on the ground based on our best judgment - which is what GEN (R) Shinseki was asked by Congress to give ref. his estimates on the size of the force required to secure and stabilize post invasion Iraq. It is a curved and grey line at times I think.

Best, Rob

[Ken White]

Oh, the FOs are almost all great guys -- I never ran into a bad one; just think it's overkill for the job. We may move away from that, may not -- but in the interim, I understand the new Combined Arms or Maneuver Captains course at Benning post 2012 will also include Fires guys; that's good.


I don't think we should shape policy goals - but I do think we have a responsibility to inform about consequences and effects - particularly if a belief exists that a military COA to achieve a political end is feasible based on faulty assumptions for whatever reasons; or if the military analysis on what the consequences of doing something (or not doing something) are incongruent with the civilian side. Being prepared to do our job may require keeping those who appropriate and allocate resources in the loop about how things play out on the ground, or are likely to play out on the ground based on our best judgment - which is what GEN (R) Shinseki was asked by Congress to give ref. his estimates on the size of the force required to secure and stabilize post invasion Iraq. It is a curved and grey line at times I think.
Best, Rob

Emphatically agree. We have an obligation to inform as accurately as possible and take it to the mat. That means that it is incumbent upon both the administration of the day AND Congress to listen and assess. It also means we have to be absolutely honest and not play games with either of those two --a, ummm, minor shortfall on our part on occasion -- to keep credibility.

I think we need to do a better job of educating the American public about the Armed Forces, what we do, who we are and why we do some of the things we do. The loss of a lot of 'veterans' in our society has had an adverse impact (as has been discussed here and elsewhere).

Back on track, while I know Congress in particular causes some of those games and we're sort of forced to play, I personally believe that we're smart enough to outflank and out think Congress and we should do that rather than get annoyed at them and tend to blow them off (which we tend to do too often to the incompetents in media as well. Yeah, I know... ;) ). I also know that doing that is extremely tricky and it would be easy to slip into something akin to politicking.

Not only a curved and gray line, I think it's a snake that can pop up and bite if it's stepped on... :(

Guess that's why the gen-gens get the big bucks. Hmm. Given the sometimes awesome scope of responsibility versus the comparatively low pay, maybe I should say "very slightly bigger bucks." :wry:

[patmc]

We may move away from that, may not -- but in the interim, I understand the new Combined Arms or Maneuver Captains course at Benning post 2012 will also include Fires guys; that's good.:wry:

FA and ADA established the Fires Center of Excellence, or whatever it is called this week, at Fort Sill. Is this going away? Most of the FA Captains I know want the Maneuver Course, but are shot down because FACCC is not being filled. Fires officers can attend MCCC, just rare these days. My previous two FA BN CDRs attended both FA and IN or AR CCC. The BDE CDRS did as well. Those days are gone, but the attitude is still out there that MCCC is the better choice.