"It's a piece of ... " Soldiers pan Stryker MGS performance in Iraq

[Cavguy]

EDIT: Title should say "Performance"- didn't catch spelling and I can't edit it ....

http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,160981,00.html

Interesting Military.com article on the (lack of) success with the Stryker Mobile Gun System variant in Iraq. Interesting to assess how much is reporter spin of a few soldiers and how much is fact. Anyone been in an MGS?

"I wish [the enemy] would just blow mine up so I could be done with it," said Spec. Kyle Handrahan, 22, of Anaheim, Calif., a tanker assigned to Alpha Company, 4/9’s MGS platoon.

"It’s a piece," another MGS platoon member chimed in. "Nothing works on it."

The gripes stem from a litany of problems, including a computer system that constantly locks up, extremely high heat in the crew compartment and a shortage of spare parts. In one case, a key part was held up in customs on its way to Iraq, a problem one Soldier recognizes is a result of a new system being pushed into service before it’s ready.

"The concept is good, but they still have a lot of issues to work out on it," said Sgt. 1st Class Nathan Teimeier, Alpha, 4/9’s MGS platoon sergeant and a tanker by trade.

According to a Jan. 28 report by Bloomberg News, the 2008 Pentagon Authorization bill included language limiting funds for the MGS pending an Army report on fixes to the vehicle’s growing list of problems. The Pentagon’s director of Operational Test and Evaluation said in his annual report the vehicle was "not operationally effective," Bloomberg reported.

[Rob Thornton]

I was there when 1-24 did the FDE (Force Development Exercise) up in YTC (back in early 2004). The platoons that executed it did so in some adverse conditions - there was about 2 feet of snow on the MPRC (Multi-Purpose Range Complex). It was a LFX (Live Fire Excercise) done multiple times, and I thought it went pretty well. Part of my perspective may be biased as to having had to live with the ATGM (Anti-Tank Guided Missile which fired a TOW (Tube Launched, Optically tracked, Wire Guided) variant as the ILOV vs. having a 105mm main gun with a M240 (7.62mm) coaxial MG (the ATGM did not have a COAX - but had a M2 on a ring mount above the TC hatch. The MGS allowed for the tactics I wanted to employ.

Now the things I did not like about the MGS - I'm 76" tall - it, more so then any other variant was not built for me! I also did not like the auto loader - but I don't like auto loaders period - but the construct for the variant they chose had one - vs. having a loader. I also did not like the alternative if the auto loader ever went down - supposedly it had an extremely low MBTF (Mean Time Between Failure) - but its still an auto loader - oh well - you give up something to get something, and that was not my decision.

So - I can see where 19Ks would have real issue with the MGS when compared with a M1. That taken into account with the PSGs observations of the stuff that you'd think we'd have worked through already, and the introduction of an end item with limited CL IX would be grounds for some legitimate complaints. I'd also point out that the MGS was not designed to do the range of tasks that a M1 is - the MGS is an Infantry Support vehicle - not sure why we manned it with 19Ks - combined arms politics I suppose. I'll say I liked having 19Ks in the company, even if they were not totally happy with being Infantryman - but eventually they became some of the most valued soldiers in the company - and I used them in a variety of ways. The AT (Anti-Tank) capability in the Rifle Company comes from the 1 x Javelin per rifle squad (9 per company), and the AT capability in the SBCT comes from the AT company that is equipped with the ATGM variant (plus the total number of javelins through out the SBCT - I think the EN CO has some by MTO&E and maybe the RSTA sqdn too - not sure.

Its interesting thing about expectations - they at least partly determine how soldiers will take to something. The truth is probably somewhere in the middle - hopefully - within reason - the things that can be corrected will be, but I think the first time a rifle squad on the ground gets fixed and is able to call forward an MGS to put a 105mm into a hardened enemy position, and then put very accurate and sustained suppressive fire on enemy supporting positions, it will have lived up to its intent - you could not do that with the ATGM in the same manner.

As with all equipment and organizations - they are not going to be a total fit in all conditions - and that may be some of the frustration as well.

Best, Rob

[William F. Owen]

The biggest problem with MGS is the concept or the idea mated with some very marginal physics. It's not founded in any operational reality that I am aware of, and I guess came from sometime of "flow down" reasoning based on the idea that a SBCT had to have some type of "Big Gun", as an article of faith, rather than any OA that may have suggested otherwise.

The Aussies put a 76mm gun a an M-113 using the turret we had on the Saladin 6x6, and then there was the 90mm Cockerill eqipped CVR-T. Those worked, because they were comparatively simple and easy to do. MGS strikes me as the opposite.

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Will,

I think either of the two calibers you mentioned would have been adequate to provide me what I was after. When we had the ILOV ATGM I made a pitch to field us the CARL G as part of the package - based on what I'd seen it do it looked plenty adequate. I don't think it ever made it up too high:D

I've seen the MGS fire its 105 over the side (gun perpendicular to the hull) - there was no issue I could see. I'd heard there were issues prior to that, but when I saw it live fire - no issues. Maybe they'd fixed it by then - I don't know.

Ideally - what I'd like is a system that could be both mounted, fired and reloaded from inside, but.. could be dismounted when conditions made that more advantageous. I'd at least like a capability that I could dismount - there is just something about showing up somewhere with something the enemy did not anticipate and helped me achieve tactical surprise. While the AT-4 84mm is not a terrible thing, it does not have the variety of ammunition available to the Carl G, and as such is more limited. Having commonality in the CL V to be used in the vehicle mounted system and the one you could use on dismounted operations would be better. This is all pretty much OBE though - we got what we got, better to focus on the best ways to employ it.

best, Rob

[William F. Owen]

Hi Will,

I think either of the two calibers you mentioned would have been adequate to provide me what I was after. When we had the ILOV ATGM I made a pitch to field us the CARL G as part of the package - based on what I'd seen it do it looked plenty adequate. I don't think it ever made it up too high:D


It is extremely technically simple to fire Carl-Gustav 84mm from a remote weapons station, and to have an auto-slew that allows it to be re-loaded in the same way M2 reloads TOW.

What is more, thanks to the auto-stabilised fire control and range finder, the round can go 1,500m and even hit slow moving targets at 1,000m.

Javelin can be very easily fired from a remote weapons station, and would be cheap and easy to retro-fit on Stryker or similar vehicle.

This is why I believe MGS is a confusion of form over function.

[Van]

Rob,
Re: MGS fire its 105 over the side (gun perpendicular to the hull) - there was no issue I could see. I'd heard there were issues prior to that-
According to an eye witness, during the Saudi trials for LAV 105 system in the mid-90s, firing in this attitute caused the frame of the vehicle to warp.
As you say, they may have fixed the problem by now.

Doctrinally, the whole concept of 'tank destroyers', lighter armored vehicles with big guns, has always been problematic. The MGS was originally fielded in platoons of 3 vehicles, and an experienced armor NCO commented that all that arrangement was good for was TOC security, as the vehicles could not work in wing (two vehicle) teams. Given the intense 'infantry-centric" attitudes of the brains at work there at the IBCT (especially GEN Eaton), they may have envisioned tasking out single vehicles to support infantry companies or platoons, a concept that tankers choke on for good reason.

Actually, our language talking about this says a lot about the problem. The MGS is not a tank. But we don't have a clear designation for the folks who operate it. They'll either be disgruntled tankers who want a real tank or disgruntled infantry who want a real IFV (or to walk).

[MattC86]

Software bugs are seemingly universal in modern military equipment - the extreme example being the AMRAAM, whose software spent the better part of 15 years in development. Things like software bugs and logistical issues like spare parts don't seem to me to be that big of a deal - as long as they get sorted out ASAP, and aren't putting people's lives in undue risk in the meantime.

I don't understand a great deal about the thinking behind the MGS concept - as Van says, the tank destroyer concept has long been problematic. It's as if the Army is hybridizing a vehicle without a truly separate niche to fill. It's analogous - at least to me - to the battlecruiser concept of the early 20th century - cheaper, lighter, faster than a battleship, but more capable (in theory) than a cruiser. Of course, without a true combat niche, commanders used them like battleships, with disastrous results (Jutland, HMS Hood, etc, etc).

If the idea is to get tank-like gun firepower into an SBCT's TO&E, wouldn't it eventually end up like the battlecruiser? That is, when they really need an M1, an MGS just won't be up to the task? After all, the point of the ATGM was to enable a lighter vehicle (or infantry) to kill a hard target, correct?

One final question. What's the difference between the MGS and the canceled M8 'Buford' air-dropped light armor concept? I think a lighter vehicle could have real benefit in stability ops - firepower without the intimidation and nuisance factor of the 68-ton tank, and the airmobile idea would give airborne capabilities more like the old Soviet airborne had - some of which proved effective on occasion in Afghanistan.

But if the MGS's role is truly substituting for tanks in the SBCT, I think there exists the dangerous possibility of using them like tanks, which they are not.

Matt

[Tom Odom]

Van and Matt


Both good posts. Van you are at Leavenwoth and the US Army's historical expert on tank destroyers, Dr. Chris Gabel, is there with you.

Take a look at his LP if you have not already:

No. 12: Seek, Strike, and Destroy: U.S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War II, Dr. Christopher R. Gabel. (PDF)[/ (http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/gabel2.pdf)QUOTE]

Light armor (Stuart), tank destroyers (M18), or armored reconnaissance vehicles (Sheridan) are neither fish nor fowl. As soon as you hang a gun on an armored vehicle, it is inevitable someone is going to say it is a tank and try to use it as such. For that matter, I had a BC long ago who thought a TOW Jeep was a mobile gun platform.

There is an interesting parallel to this in the aerial community, fixed wing, rotary wing, manned and unmanned when it comes to the question of armed reconnaissance. When you arm a recce bird, the pilot starts acting like a fighter-bomber, regardless of true capabilities.

Tank destroyer doctrine hinged on this phenomenon. Consider these passages from Chris Gabel in LP

[QUOTE]FM 18-5 opened with a statement that established the specialist nature of the tank destroyer: “There is but one battle objective of tank destroyer units, this being plainly inferred by their designation. It is the destruction of hostile tanks. Throughout all phases of training and during preparation for combat, this objective will be kept in mind by all ranks."

FM 18-5: Tank destroyer units are employed offensively in large numbers, by rapid maneuver, and by surprise . . . . Offensive action allows the entire strength of a tank destroyer unit to be engaged against the enemy. For individual tank destroyers, offensive action consists of vigorous reconnaissance to locate hostile tanks and movement to advantageous positions from which to attack the enemy by fire. Tank destroyers avoid “slugging matches” with tanks, but compensate for their light armor and difficulty of concealment by exploitation of their mobility and superior observation.

Best

Tom

[Eden]

I was the Chief of Concepts at Knox when we were developing the Stryker MGS (along with some other variants for the armor community).

The MGS was not in any way supposed to be a tank destroyer. It was envisioned to be an infantry support vehicle capable of delivering high explosives and/or antipersonnel rounds to enable infantry maneuver. It could fire anti-armor rounds, but these were only for the odd BTR or T-55 that might pop up on the mid-to-low intensity battlefields we would fight on. It did not need much armor because our greatly improved situational awareness (ta-daa!) would allow us to keep it out of harm's way. Remember, the MGS - like the SBCT - is not designed for high intensity warfare. Nor was the Stryker - or the SBCT - seen as final solutions. They were placeholders while we awaited the arrival of the FCS.

We recognized that the ignorant and the unwashed might mistake the MGS for a tank, and went to great lengths in preparing requirement statements and draft doctrine to ensure that this message got across.

The interbranch arguments that raged at the time were interesting. We selected the name Mobile Gun System over Armored Gun System or Assault Gun System to avoid making it sound like a tank or (gasp) allowing the infantry to gain control of it. Parenthetically, the WWII equivalent of the MGS is not a tank destroyer but an assault gun like the SGIII. It was decided that 19Ks should man these to allow Knox to maintain control of system development and because infantrymen would not be capable of running the type of gunnery training required or of grasping the subtleties of their tactical employment. For the same reason, we wanted MGS companies within the Stryker battalion, so that an armor officer could oversee their training and the professional development of the platoon leaders. No, I'm not making any of this up.

Finally, this system and its parent organization were definitely supposed to be transportable by air - C-130 to be exact. Our vision was that the Stryker battalions and brigades would be capable of 'operational maneuver' by air. In an Iraqi context, you could fly them from Mosul to Basra and they could basically fight within minutes of rolling off the ramps. Again, a WWII paralell might be the Air Landing units that did so well in Holland and Crete.

This was, oh, five years ago, so much water has passed under the bridge. I don't know if the Stryker air-transport capability is getting much of a workout in the war.

[patmc]

I don't know if the Stryker air-transport capability is getting much of a workout in the war.

In 2006, my BN escorted Strykers from Mosul to the capital, on HETs, if I remember right. It would have been a whole lot of flights. We were a little annoyed that they didn'tjust drive down there themselves, but that was a little above our level.

[William F. Owen]

I was the Chief of Concepts at Knox when we were developing the Stryker MGS (along with some other variants for the armor community).

The MGS was not in any way supposed to be a tank destroyer. It was envisioned to be an infantry support vehicle capable of delivering high explosives and/or antipersonnel rounds to enable infantry maneuver. .


That is truly intriguing. So why was it given a 105mm gun? The 105 certainly implies the desire to have something much beyond a "just in case" anti-armour capability. 105mm requires a far larger danger close stand-off than say 76 or 90mm, which have historically proved more than adequate.

[Norfolk]

That is truly intriguing. So why was it given a 105mm gun? The 105 certainly implies the desire to have something much beyond a "just in case" anti-armour capability. 105mm requires a far larger danger close stand-off than say 76 or 90mm, which have historically proved more than adequate.

Yep, few things beat a HESH round for dealing with most targets short of an MBT, especially field fortifications. The infantry need an assault gun for Canister, Smoke, and HE-Frag - and especially a rifle at that, in order to make use of HESH. But a 105 (with a few Sabot and HEAT) is probably the way to go, even if bores in the 75-90 mm range have proved effective as assault guns, simply because they'll be used in an AT role anyway if Battalion and Company Commanders are given even a quarter of a chance to do so. But even the short 76 mm is probably sufficient for most assault gun tasks (the LAV-1 Cougar carried those).

As stated in other threads, I'm a LAV/Stryker skeptic, and was in an Army that has used three generations of the vehicle for some 30 years now. A few years of fighting in Afghanistan has led that same Army to try to wean itself off of it which, besides the modest fact that the Army had banked practically its entire future on the vehicle, is pretty hard to do when those same vehicles are built in the country's largest province and in a Parliamentary riding that has long been held by the "Natural Governing Party". Of course, it also helps that the Party in power at the moment does not hold said riding...

The Canadian Army cancelled the LAV-MGS program outright in 2006 in the wake of the Second Battle of Panjwai, and brought old Leopard 1 MBTs out of retirement (MBTs were completely removed from service by 2004) in order to provide close-support to Infantry; the Leopard 2 has now replaced the old Leo 1 in service (unfortunately resulting in the loss of HESH, though). The LAV-III with the 25 mm gun simply could not cross many obstacles (especially Soviet-style Taleban entrenchments), and was too vulnerable to AT fire (partly because someone in Canada decided not to fit them with slat armour:confused:). The LAV also proved very prone to getting stuck in mud during winter months, and hull cracks from cross-country ops also developed throughout the fleet. Rebuilt M-113 A3s (of all things:wry: - and a vehicle decidely inferior in most respects to the LAV/Stryker) are progessively replacing LAVs for cross-country ops.

That said, the LAV/Stryker is generally very good for COIN and internal security roles. A LAV-MGS with the 105 mm might be useful for an occasional and brief flare-up of heavy fighting, dealing efficiently with certain urban targets from a safer distance (and sparing the infantry the risk of having to assault in many cases) or with insurgent field fortifications, etc. But the sort of fighting that went on in many Iraqi cities required nothing less than the heavy stuff, not least MBTs. Even if any technical glitches in the LAV-MGs have been resolved, it is still lightly armoured (compared to an MBT), has a low main ammo load, and is not suitable for really rough cross-country ops. But the newer MBTs have the same complicated liquid-cooled suits that the LAV-MGS has, along with delicate and complex electronics (though so far the upgraded Leopard 2 doesn't have problems in particular there).

The MGS costs almost as much as an MBT; might as well put the money into the more capable vehicle, the MBT, except perhaps in limited quantities for certain units and formations.

[Distiller]

I see Stryker - as it is used - in conflict with MRAPs, a protected motorized infantry vehicle. And the home for the MGS more in a cavalry that infantry unit.

The gun - are these L7s from old Pattons or new ones? Was there ever a competition for the gun system? The CMI CT-CV 105mm seems to be a better system, can even double as artillery.


On the Gavins: I think if they'd invested as many ressources into M113 as they did to convert the Piranha into the Stryker, the M113, esp in version A4 would have been a quite suitable vehicle.

[William F. Owen]

But a 105 (with a few Sabot and HEAT) is probably the way to go, even if bores in the 75-90 mm range have proved effective as assault guns, simply because they'll be used in an AT role anyway if Battalion and Company Commanders are given even a quarter of a chance to do so. But even the short 76 mm is probably sufficient for most assault gun tasks

After I last posted I went off and did a bit of note checking, and the only real advantage of 105mm is that you can get effective "payload" like AP, Flare, and Smoke, but that's about it. Flare isn't much good unless you have high trajectory, so all in all a 120mm mortar turret system seems to be optimum choice if you want something heavier than 90mm. - but I see the doctrinal conflict of having mortars in DIRECT support.


a.) I see Stryker - as it is used - in conflict with MRAPs, a protected motorized infantry vehicle.

B.) On the Gavins: I think if they'd invested as many ressources into M113 as they did to convert the Piranha into the Stryker, the M113, esp in version A4 would have been a quite suitable vehicle.

a.) MRAPs are probably what Stryker should have been, given a bit of lateral thinking.

B.) Correct me if I am wrong, but there is no such vehicle as the Gavin.

[MattC86]

In response to:

(b) No, there is no vehicle ever officially christened the "Gavin," but it's been an off-and-on popular nickname for the M113 (which as far as I know has never had an official name) for some 40 years. . .

(a) Perhaps some wish the Stryker had become the MRAP, but I think a lot of the concerns voiced around here over the FOB-mentality in connection with the MRAP (all tied to the oft-stated COIN paradox about force protection not equaling security) are valid, and also if I'm not mistaken the MRAP is less deployable and multi-mission than the Stryker. Some may question the wisdom of basing several combat brigades around the Stryker - I'm sure a lot of people would be stunned if you were to outfit a few brigades entirely with MRAPs.

Matt

[Rank amateur]

Wikipedia: (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M113)The M113 has never received an official name, but has received a variety of nicknames over the years. The NLF called it the "Green Dragon"; the Swiss referred to it as the "Elefantenrollschuh" or elephants' roller-skate; the Germans called it the "Schweinewürfel" or pig cube.[7][8] U.S. troops tended to refer to the M113 simply as a "track". Some sources have referred to the M113 as the "Gavin" in an allusion to Gen. Gavin, but U.S. forces have never used the name.[7] The Israeli official name for the M113 is "Bardelas" (Cheetah) but the troops call it "Zelda" (another nickname is "Zippo" after the brand of lighters, as the M113 tends to combust when hit by anti-tank weapons). The Australian Army refers to its M113A1s as "Buckets", and the modified M113A1 fitted with 76mm turrets as "Beasts".

[Eden]

I wish I could say the decision to arm the Stryker with a 105mm was the result of the sort of close and careful analysis many on this site like to do in their spare time, but the fact is that the Army had a bunch of old 105 parts and 105mm ammo in warehouses, depots and industry were still tooled up for that caliber, etc. It was pretty much a question of cost and convenience. Also, to remind everyone, the Stryker was supposed to be an interim vehicle, off-the-shelf, to get us through to the FCS.

As for using variants of M113, the Army leadership early on - we're talking 1999 here - decided any new vehicle would be wheeled, not tracked.

[Shek]

a.) MRAPs are probably what Stryker should have been, given a bit of lateral thinking.

Some of the requirements for the primary IAV, the infantry carrier, were the ability to carry a fully equipped infantry squad, commonality of parts across the IAV variants as well as with other vehicles within the IBCT, some baseline survivability requirements, and the capability for intra-theater air transport via C130.

While there are many MRAP variants, I suspect that the ones that can carry a full infantry squad would start to bust your logistics/transportability constraints for the organization.

A Stryker vs. MRAP evaluation would need to be completed at the organizational and operational concept level.

[Cavguy]

I wish I could say the decision to arm the Stryker with a 105mm was the result of the sort of close and careful analysis many on this site like to do in their spare time, but the fact is that the Army had a bunch of old 105 parts and 105mm ammo in warehouses, depots and industry were still tooled up for that caliber, etc. It was pretty much a question of cost and convenience. Also, to remind everyone, the Stryker was supposed to be an interim vehicle, off-the-shelf, to get us through to the FCS.

As for using variants of M113, the Army leadership early on - we're talking 1999 here - decided any new vehicle would be wheeled, not tracked.


Okay, as someone who has had M113A3(+) in his MTOE (slat armor, cupolas, BFT, etc). They suck. They were okay in the 1960's. They're a pretty flexible vehicle. Spare parts are available.

But let's not overlook:

1) The ride absolutely sucks. The infantry hate it. The only thing I liked was the ability for the infantry to open the top hatches and scan.
2) The armor isn't that great, and the slat armor makes it just as unwieldly in urban terrain as the Stryker. Additionally, there's no top protection worth mentioning.
3) They're severely underpowered with all that armor added
4) They're slow, on a good day with all that armor you might reach a screaming 15-20 mph, if your engine doesn't overheat.
5) They break A LOT more than any other vehicle I had, including M1 tanks.
6) Funny thing happened on the way to the up-armoring plant. The ramp pump burned out on every one because it couldn't lift the troop door with that extra armor. so the soldiers had to often use the troop hatch to exit, not exactly rapid deployable infantry.

Now some of that could be resolved with R&D and upgrades, but the M113 is simply a product of the 1950's whose time is past.. Having had M113A3+'s in my MTOE and worked around Strykers, I'll take the stryker for the COIN/LIC mission. And a M2 Bradley was by far the most flexible and useful vehicle in my menu during OIF. Firepower, troop capacity (low, but enough), and armor.

I think there was a thread about the wingnut who was the M113 "Gavin" advocate and fanboy ....

[William F. Owen]

But let's not overlook:

1) The ride absolutely sucks. The infantry hate it. The only thing I liked was the ability for the infantry to open the top hatches and scan.
2) The armor isn't that great, and the slat armor makes it just as unwieldly in urban terrain as the Stryker. Additionally, there's no top protection worth mentioning.
3) They're severely underpowered with all that armor added
4) They're slow, on a good day with all that armor you might reach a screaming 15-20 mph, if your engine doesn't overheat.
5) They break A LOT more than any other vehicle I had, including M1 tanks.
6) Funny thing happened on the way to the up-armoring plant. The ramp pump burned out on every one because it couldn't lift the troop door with that extra armor. so the soldiers had to often use the troop hatch to exit, not exactly rapid deployable infantry.


I think there was a thread about the wingnut who was the M113 "Gavin" advocate and fanboy ....

...and everyone of those can be fixed. Not just a bit, but a lot. The Aussies, Canuks and Norgies have all done it to varying degrees and the Israelis and still tinkering with some stuff. By any analysis, M-113 can be upgraded into an extremely capable APC, with the same comms, optics and weapons as Stryker, or better.

Now I am not going to insult anyone's intelligence by getting into the track v wheels argument. "We is all adults here". M113 capability could be significantly extended, for a fractional cost. Do you want to is another question.

The Fan boy you speak of is Mike Sparks.

[Granite_State]

Remember, the MGS - like the SBCT - is not designed for high intensity warfare.

Isn't that a huge problem? Especially with the surviveability of the relatively lightly armored Stryker being predicated on situational awareness, which is far less likely in the current environment in Iraq and Afghanistan?

My understanding is that the Stryker was almost a political move by the Army to get in on the post-Cold War peacekeeping role in a big way, by getting this medium-weight, rapidly deployable platform.

But correct me if I'm wrong, while most variants can fit in a C-130 (can MGS?), they need to be fitted with screens to be able to handle RPGs. Doesn't that almost defeat the whole concept?

[Granite_State]

...and everyone of those can be fixed. Not just a bit, but a lot. The Aussies, Canuks and Norgies have all done it to varying degrees and the Israelis and still tinkering with some stuff. By any analysis, M-113 can be upgraded into an extremely capable APC, with the same comms, optics and weapons as Stryker, or better.

Now I am not going to insult anyone's intelligence by getting into the track v wheels argument. "We is all adults here". M113 capability could be significantly extended, for a fractional cost.

That's the argument made here:
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/pdf/stryker_reality_of_war.pdf

The writer is some author I've never heard of, writing for a Congressman a few years ago. But I'd be curious what more informed members thought of his main points.

[Cavguy]

I have posted here before on this, other than the MGS variant, every soldier I have talked to who has been on Strykers raves about their performance in Iraq.

I've directly worked with several Stryker companies and come away impressed as well. Sure, it has its limitations, but so does any platform.

The d-n-i stuff is mostly politically motivated diatribe.

[William F. Owen]

That's the argument made here:
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/pdf/stryker_reality_of_war.pdf


I know this item very well. There are so many things wrong with that document I don't know where to begin. It is not a work of serious military thought.

[Cavguy]

...and everyone of those can be fixed. Not just a bit, but a lot. The Aussies, Canuks and Norgies have all done it to varying degrees and the Israelis and still tinkering with some stuff. By any analysis, M-113 can be upgraded into an extremely capable APC, with the same comms, optics and weapons as Stryker, or better.

Now I am not going to insult anyone's intelligence by getting into the track v wheels argument. "We is all adults here". M113 capability could be significantly extended, for a fractional cost. Do you want to is another question.

The Fan boy you speak of is Mike Sparks.

No real issue here. No one seriously doubts the wheeled Stryker was chosen over the M8 AGS/M113 upgrade option mostly because of one word - transformation, or the need to create a perception of change in the Army. The Task Force Hawk debacle (Albania) forced the Army to get deployable or become irrelevant. It faced the perception that it was stodgy (maybe true) and not adapted to the future. That was beginning to impact funding in favor of the USAF and Navy, even before Rumsfeld. A new look was needed to sell congress on the new approach, and rebuilding/upgrading forty year old vehicles (M113's)and adding another tank (remember, tanks were the weapon of the past), even a light one, wasn't going to break the mold.

Hence, a wheeled, air-transportable, air supportable, mobile system that could be rapidly deployed using theater (C-130) only lift, at least on paper. Welcome the LAV-3, or Stryker. Add a fancy new beret and wham ... transformation you have.

I realize that's a little cynical, but there was as much an IO message in the Stryker as anything, for the Army, DoD, and Congress.

That's not to say it's a bad vehicle per se. The wheels/tracks argument was an uproar in Armor branch. As a reformed skeptic, I have walked away impressed (except for the MGS, I suppose).

[Distiller]

So the SBCTs are concepted as little more than protected and reinforced constabulary troops, but since they are here, they are or will be used in roles that are basically beyond their concept and capabilites. I see them always in danger of being employed in the wrong spot of the sequence of Armor - Cavalry - MechInf - MotInf. Basically for tasks like Irak cavalry would be right for the "heavy" part. Problem is they are equipped with 35 metric tons M2/M3. Should have bought the CV90 - are the same weight as Strykers and look much more real to me (I have no experience in either of those vehicles). Of course, if "wheeled" is the buzzword ...


But something else: Given the fact that the whole IBCT thing is just a placeholder for FCS, and the idea is having a protected/armored air portable system, maybe the answer does not lie in keeping things within C-130J limits, but in a new transport plane, like e.g. licence produce the Airbus A400M.

Now that the FCS looks more like 30 tons (and I think it will go to 35) the Hercules is out of the picture anyway (for the lower part of the C-130 mission the C-27J is the right thing). Or if somebody doesn't like Eurostuff, proceede with that Northrop ESTOL Stelath-BWB (Future Tactical Airlifter or something) concept.

And to turn one of the arguments here on its head - when not willing to use an APC stemming from the 1950's, why base whole formations like IBCT or FCS-UAs on the transport capabilities of the 1950's (C-130)? I think what we see here is the lack of coordination from the leadership, to force the USAF to create/buy the right sized tactical airlifter for Army requirements.

[William F. Owen]

So the SBCTs are concepted as little more than protected and reinforced constabulary troops, but since they are here, they are or will be used in roles that are basically beyond their concept and capabilites. I see them always in danger of being employed in the wrong spot of the sequence of Armor - Cavalry - MechInf - MotInf. Basically for tasks like Irak cavalry would be right for the "heavy" part. Problem is they are equipped with 35 metric tons M2/M3. Should have bought the CV90 - are the same weight as Strykers and look much more real to me (I have no experience in either of those vehicles).

Whoah there! The infantry man that falls out of the back of Stryker is most likely as capable as the man falling out of the back of a CV90, Bradley or Namera. - or an MRAP of X or Y capability.

When you boil SBCT concept down to its bare bones its about increasing the capability of Light Infantry, using protected mobility, and the huge range of pluses that gives you.
That's all.
IMO, a good the idea started to go badly wrong once it went beyond that, and then defending the decision was left to people who didn't understand the idea. - That's what I take away from Rob Thornton's experience.

Stryker really could have been one of those ideas that "changed infantry." Unfortunately it transformed itself into something different.

[Granite_State]

I have posted here before on this, other than the MGS variant, every soldier I have talked to who has been on Strykers raves about their performance in Iraq.


That was my understanding too. Col. Ralph Peters told me that in 2004, that the troops loved the Stryker, and the M113 was "a deathtrap."


The d-n-i stuff is mostly politically motivated diatribe.

It did strike me as a pretty questionable document. But you seem to agree with him on the political nature of the whole project from the outset. Is he way off base on the RPG issue?

[Cavguy]

That was my understanding too. Col. Ralph Peters told me that in 2004, that the troops loved the Stryker, and the M113 was "a deathtrap."



It did strike me as a pretty questionable document. But you seem to agree with him on the political nature of the whole project from the outset. Is he way off base on the RPG issue?

My understanding from the Company I worked with (part of 172d Stryker from Alaska), was that they had been attacked by RPG's in Mosul without major damage or casualties to the crew. I am sure there are some weak spots, but even the M1 tank has those.

What was convincing to me was the praise these infantrymen gave the Stryker in an IED-heavy area, with multiple threats. E-4's rarely fail to give you a blunt assessment (see the original thread article), and all the ones I talked to liked the vehicle and felt safe in it. If it was the deathtrap described, you wouldn't hear that from joe. Granted, they had bolt on armor and slat armor added from the original version as well.

One of the suppositions on why it does well is the "boat" hull - HMMWV's and M113's have right angles that absorb, rather than deflect blasts.

[Kreker]

No real issue here. No one seriously doubts the wheeled Stryker was chosen over the M8 AGS/M113 upgrade option mostly because of one word - transformation, or the need to create a perception of change in the Army. The Task Force Hawk debacle (Albania) forced the Army to get deployable or become irrelevant. It faced the perception that it was stodgy (maybe true) and not adapted to the future. That was beginning to impact funding in favor of the USAF and Navy, even before Rumsfeld. A new look was needed to sell congress on the new approach, and rebuilding/upgrading forty year old vehicles (M113's)and adding another tank (remember, tanks were the weapon of the past), even a light one, wasn't going to break the mold.

Hence, a wheeled, air-transportable, air supportable, mobile system that could be rapidly deployed using theater (C-130) only lift, at least on paper. Welcome the LAV-3, or Stryker. Add a fancy new beret and wham ... transformation you have.

I realize that's a little cynical, but there was as much an IO message in the Stryker as anything, for the Army, DoD, and Congress.

That's not to say it's a bad vehicle per se. The wheels/tracks argument was an uproar in Armor branch. As a reformed skeptic, I have walked away impressed (except for the MGS, I suppose).
Hi Cavguy,
Very succinct.
Let's not forget that there was a platform demonstration conducted for all off-the-shelf vehicles, be they wheel or track, at Ft Knox, as part of the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) modernization effort. The LAv variant won out over the 113 variant.
As Eden pointed out the Stryker was to be an interim stop-gap until FCS was fielded, thus only seven SBCT (believe the original total was six.) Eden is also right, in that SBCT were to be used in SSCs and LICs, and could be used in MICs by being augmented/reinforced.
Also remember that FCS is a track vehicle and not wheel. Good discussions.
Best
Kreker

[Cavguy]

Hi Cavguy,
Very succinct.
Let's not forget that there was a platform demonstration conducted for all off-the-shelf vehicles, be they wheel or track, at Ft Knox, as part of the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) modernization effort. The LAv variant won out over the 113 variant.
As Eden pointed out the Stryker was to be an interim stop-gap until FCS was fielded, thus only seven SBCT (believe the original total was six.) Eden is also right, in that SBCT were to be used in SSCs and LICs, and could be used in MICs by being augmented/reinforced.
Also remember that FCS is a track vehicle and not wheel. Good discussions.
Best
Kreker

Sir,

Glad to see you back! No disagreements with anything above. As I stated earlier, I'd pick the LAV over a M113. I would have liked the M8 AGS, but you can't have it all. I remember there was a lot of recrimination over the shoot-off, about the decision criteria. Didn't bother me much then or now, I simply was noting the "IO" effects of choosing the Stryker.

Is the FCS going to use banded or linked track? I've heard about them wanting banded track if the technology matured. Would take care of the most unpleasant part of tanking (breaking track). :D

[Kreker]

Cavguy,
Please don't call me sir...that day is long past. Hace bee on vacation and travel, thus the hiatius. To answer you question the FCS MGVs will be using banded track.
Cheers

[Yrkoon9]

To give you some perspective on the MGS from an MGS platoon leader I can tell you a few things.

First and foremost the MGS' biggest asset, as with all Strykers is speed. These suckers can do 70mph. They fly. With that comes stealth. They roll up quick and quiet in comparison to say....the Bradley.

How does that factor in todays conflicts? Simply put we always get beat to the punch. The insurgents and terrorists can hit us quick and get away. To counter that kind of speed and agility the MGS/Stryker is the best thing we have right now. Some would argue that humvees do that. But humvees die quick. The MGS and Stryker survive.

Huh?

Yeah. What most people don't want to let out is that Strykers are resilient as all hell. They don't just blow up when an IED hits them the way a Bradley will. The MGS & Stryker is light. It just gets knocked over. No kidding. People inside might be hurt - but they aren't killed nearly as often.

Okay. Speed. Resilience. What else?

Well the MGS is the quick firepower. Mainly we use it to breach buildings, hit vehicles, and create intimidation. Usually we roll with ICV's (infantry carrier vehicles), which are just Strykers rolling with a .50 and a squad of infantry. So you have a couple of ICV's and a big 105mm as backup. When the trunk monkeys jump out the back of ICV's the MGS is a helluva overwatch. With enhanced thermals and overkill firepower nobody really wants to keep fighting.

Insurgents see the MGS and they disappear. At first they were a novelty and these guys shoot at anything that is new. Like the ATGM system Stryker. But when the turret starts to rotate all hostile fire stops. They think we can see through walls and stuff. LOL!

The bad side is that the MGS is mechanically complex. The autoloading system is cumbersome. We can't carry organic infantry support. We can't self-recover.

But none of that matters after you see a cannister round hit a car!

[Cavguy]

To give you some perspective on the MGS from an MGS platoon leader I can tell you a few things.

First and foremost the MGS' biggest asset, as with all Strykers is speed. These suckers can do 70mph. They fly. With that comes stealth. They roll up quick and quiet in comparison to say....the Bradley.

How does that factor in todays conflicts? Simply put we always get beat to the punch. The insurgents and terrorists can hit us quick and get away. To counter that kind of speed and agility the MGS/Stryker is the best thing we have right now. Some would argue that humvees do that. But humvees die quick. The MGS and Stryker survive.

Huh?

Yeah. What most people don't want to let out is that Strykers are resilient as all hell. They don't just blow up when an IED hits them the way a Bradley will. The MGS & Stryker is light. It just gets knocked over. No kidding. People inside might be hurt - but they aren't killed nearly as often.

Okay. Speed. Resilience. What else?

Well the MGS is the quick firepower. Mainly we use it to breach buildings, hit vehicles, and create intimidation. Usually we roll with ICV's (infantry carrier vehicles), which are just Strykers rolling with a .50 and a squad of infantry. So you have a couple of ICV's and a big 105mm as backup. When the trunk monkeys jump out the back of ICV's the MGS is a helluva overwatch. With enhanced thermals and overkill firepower nobody really wants to keep fighting.

Insurgents see the MGS and they disappear. At first they were a novelty and these guys shoot at anything that is new. Like the ATGM system Stryker. But when the turret starts to rotate all hostile fire stops. They think we can see through walls and stuff. LOL!

The bad side is that the MGS is mechanically complex. The autoloading system is cumbersome. We can't carry organic infantry support. We can't self-recover.

But none of that matters after you see a cannister round hit a car!

Yrkoon9,

Thanks for posting. That tracks with most of what I have heard regarding survivability of the Stryker. I've only worked around, not on them. The unit I worked with didn't have the MGS yet, just the infantry variants.

Be sure to post a intro in the appropriate thread.

[Distiller]

Sounds like cavalry. I guess nobody doubts that as long as you stay off soft or wet grounds the wheeled approach is viable. And for colonial warfare without armored resp modern anti-armor-enabled opposition like Iraq the Stryker is sure quite suitable.

But I still see the danger of SBCTs being deployed outside their capabilities of, lets put it "protected infantry mobility". Versions like the TOW, the MGS, the 120mm Mortar (and the howitzer) make that quite tempting.

Question on the MGS: Is there a specific reason for the long barrel? Wouldn't a 105mm howitzer like, say, the L119 do? Is there a long-range fire requirement for the MGS?

[Rob Thornton]

Man - has this thread gone in some interesting directions. There was one post back aways that I do need to clear up - I think the folks above did listen to us - not on everything, but there are some things that just can't be changed for one reason or another - sometimes there are things that need to be the way they are for some other reason. By and large, the Army did a pretty good job I think in the bottom up refinement that came along with implementing the SBCTs - and I think they continue to do so through the mechanisms they've put in place down at Benning and at the locations where we've grown SBCTs, and from Iraq.

The discussion about where they are best suited only gets you so far though. There are just no panaceas for all the conditions which we might face. However, that has never stopped us from putting one type of force into conditions to which is what not ideally suited for before. I can tell you I had a heckuva lot more organic combat power in platoons, companies and BN in the SBCT then I had in 1/187th out the 101st AASLT. From the concepts of mobility, firepower, C2, survivability to the flat out 170 men within the company - it is an incredibly versatile formation. Combine that with modularity - i.e. you want to add AH-64s, or other capabilities, and the higher echelon CDRs can tailor the force to better suit its conditions - never probably a perfect fit, but closer then we've probably gotten before.

I'll tell you with the right terrain, and some good situational awareness I'd be comfortable employing the SBCT against most enemies (meaning in terms of not only composition, but size) I might envision having to fight - not to mention that we have a superb Air Force, and other capabilities that we can increasingly draw on - I don't have to meet somebody’s tank DIV head on to wreck it - I just have to get to a place where I have an advantage that I can exploit better then he can - being able to identify what the enemy is trying to do, and where he might be going, move faster then he can to the place so I grab the good ground, place allot of Infantry with sophisticated ATGMs like Javelin in places that he has to bring his armor in close to get at (with Javelin I already have good fire and forget, soft launch, good acquisition capabilities) - lay in a good fire plan with the 10 x 120mm per IN BN, andthe 18 x 155s in the Arty BN, lay out some good obstacles to include the advance mines we have, and tie it all together with allot of Infantry and I place him into a disadvantage our other asymmetric advantages can exploit - be they NLOS-LS, the USAF, Army ATK AVN, or a HBCT attacking from a flank. If its an away game that has limited the amount of heavy formations that we've been able to get in, then those formations can be used by the higher echelon CDR to exploit opportunities, and meet the enemy on our terms vs. his.

I'm not saying that the SBCT acn only be seen as a defensive force against armor either - I'm saying that you have to recongize what your strengths and weaknesses are, and employ them accordingly - I never, ever want a fair fight - I always want to catch the other guy while he's eating chow, refueling, unable to defend himself, screwing off in a place he thought he was safe, etc - with some good intelligence (meaning the type that comes from applying thought to information) I can get that - if I can then exploit in ways the enemy could not expect - I'll probably hand him his lunch - and everybody will be better off. Oh - and I always want more resources to do it with then I should legitmately expect - but with the caliber of men and women we have I'll probably find a way to make do with what I'm given.

I guess my point is, we have a pretty well rounded force which we should not and do not expect to employ divorced from our other capabilities. We also have a good menu of capabilities from which we can put a better package forward to provide an enemy who only has a limited suite of options at his disposal off balance. Our medium (SBCT), AASLT, Airborne, SOF, Mech/Armor, and light forces offer force planners and commander a host of capabilities that can compliment each other, and keep the enemy off balance. Add to that our incredible logistics capabilities, ATK and other Aviation, ENG and other Maneuver enhancement capabilities and our RSTA assets and the U.S. Army can put forward forces that campaign in most places where we have interests that will put us there. Further combine that with the Marines expeditionary amphibious warfare capability - that includes a fixed wing air force larger then most countries, and you further place adversaries at a disadvantage when trying to deny us entry, or meet us with a superior force. Without going into the detail of our Air and Naval capabilities, lets just limit it to saying that while we may not be able to control everything at once - we can dominate and pretty much control everything we need to in order to support our employment of land power.

We should not look at any of these capabilities in a vacuum - we must look at the way we wage war from a Joint perspective - be it fighting an insurgency, fighting a conventional force, or some hybrid (or blended or hwoever you choose your descriptive words). Further, we must leverage where possible the Inter-Agency. Regardless of the formation, or what equipment they carry into battle, winning the war begins in our minds - and is probably where it gets lost as well. I think SWC member Frank Hoffman's piece (on the SWJ Blog) is a good place to start when considering the range of conditions that will face us - while enemies have always sought to disadvantage their opponents a in time an space, the opportunites and possibilites to do so have perghaps gone up in a number of ways - we will have to massage the old grey matter real good to seize and retain the advantage - particularly given our LOCs and the domestic policy issues we confront in pursuit of our foreign policy objectives - without the equipment between the ears in good working order, it won't matter what the type of equipment we bring to the fight can do.

Best, Rob

[Tankguy]

I was an MGS Platoon Sergeant in 1-24 in the days prior to MGS fielding. During my tenure with the unit all MGS platoons were equipped with ATGM variants in-lieu of the MGS which was still in development. The MGS completed IOTE at Fort Hood late last year and I am anxious to see how the addition of the MGS influences the adaptation of the SBCT rifle company. We encountered a large amount of discovering learning as experienced tank crews jumping on to TOW equipped vehicles. The lack of fire on the move capability and the requirement to track with the TOW were very foreign to what we were aqauinted with. IMO the MGS will allow the SBCT to function more effectively and reach the full extent of it's potential.

Now, before any M-113 fans jump in, understanding the role of the Stryker is key. It is not meant to replace heavy armor, just bridge the capability gap between the heavy stuff and the light guys. With the addition of the 105mm direct fire capability and stabilized FCS the Stryker company should be able to expand offensive abilities not possible with the ATGM system.

For posterity, the M-113 is not, and has never been referred to as a "gavin". That is a one man crusade that I will not sully this forum with. Google the name and you will find ample propaganda. The U.S. DoD has never referred to the M-113 as gavin. No foreign military has referred to the M-113 as a gavin. I am an active duty armor soldier and I have only heard one person refer to the vehicle as such.

I look forward to more discussion on this board.

[Rob Thornton]

Tankguy is as solid an Armor SNCO (or any other branch) as any I know and better then many. I'd attribute our BN's success (and any other BN's for that matter) to the professionalism that he and those NCOs like him embody. This is a case where his company and our company had a healthy competitive realtionship which made us both better.

Glad your aboard, and hope you will weigh in on a variety of topics here.

Best, Rob

[William F. Owen]

With the addition of the 105mm direct fire capability and stabilized FCS the Stryker company should be able to expand offensive abilities not possible with the ATGM system.

Any chance of being more specific? What offensive abilities?

For posterity, the M-113 is not, and has never been referred to as a "gavin". That is a one man crusade that I will not sully this forum with. Google the name and you will find ample propaganda. The U.S. DoD has never referred to the M-113 as gavin. No foreign military has referred to the M-113 as a gavin. I am an active duty armor soldier and I have only heard one person refer to the vehicle as such.
.

I fear we are already sullied! :)

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2093

[Tankguy]

William,

The ATGM Stryker is based on a TOW ITAS system. The TOW is very different from the fire control system tank soldiers are familiar with. You cannot fire TOW on the move. Once you launch a TOW, you must track all the way to the target. With the MGS and it's tank FCS, you can fire on the move over rough terrain. Also, tank fire control systems are like bowling. Once you fire, you can lean all you want, but the round is going where you aimed. There is no need to stay exposed when you fire. Once the gun goes bang, you can displace. The FCS also means that the MGS identify and track targets while moving.

[William F. Owen]

William,

The ATGM Stryker is based on a TOW ITAS system. The TOW is very different from the fire control system tank soldiers are familiar with. You cannot fire TOW on the move. Once you launch a TOW, you must track all the way to the target. With the MGS and it's tank FCS, you can fire on the move over rough terrain. Also, tank fire control systems are like bowling. Once you fire, you can lean all you want, but the round is going where you aimed. There is no need to stay exposed when you fire. Once the gun goes bang, you can displace. The FCS also means that the MGS identify and track targets while moving.

Thanks for that and this is basically the reasons I guessed. This to my mind points out one of the problems with trying to flow the Stryker concept across a Formation. The M151 RWS on the ICV can be modified to take Javelin ATGM, so why have the TOW ITAS in the formation?

The calibre and FCS configuration on MGS strongly suggests an ANTI-Tank requirement. - that could be handled by a modified ICV.

The need for close fire support / HE Projection, is, IMO, not best served by a 105mm gun, unless the Anti-tanks requirement is what is driving the requirement.

[Rob Thornton]

Tankguy - I still tell the story of your use of the TOW thermals to get a very close look at some Lousiville wildlife on a hot FT Knox during a local media event - up until then I did not know the thermals were that good!
Best, Rob

[Tankguy]

Hell, I didn't know the ITAS was that good. (Or bad depending on what you were looking at...)

[Rob Thornton]

Obviously you don't remember what you called me over to look at! It was at the media event and the wildlife was a blonde reporter from a local news station. It was the same day the Ueoka got a little air on the practice run.

[Tankguy]

No, I remeber vividly. I am an old guy, memories like that are what get me through life.

The other incident involved one of the female data collectors out in the Zussman complex with a bad case of chiggers and a full bladder. My loader was on thermal watch and got the entire crew piled into the the TC and GNR's seat to watch that debacle.

[Shek]

Thanks for that and this is basically the reasons I guessed. This to my mind points out one of the problems with trying to flow the Stryker concept across a Formation. The M151 RWS on the ICV can be modified to take Javelin ATGM, so why have the TOW ITAS in the formation?

Range.

[Rob Thornton]

You know - by comparrison, things were considerably simpler then - too many good Deuce Four soldiers (and many others) that have moved on. Its good to think back to that Summer - I remember Bobby G telling one of your ICVs to move that OPFOR van out of the way when the guy told him he did not have the keys. OTC and those guys about had a cow. As BNs go, that was a damned fine one - lots of personality, and proficiency.
Best, Rob

[selil]

The ATGM Stryker is based on a TOW ITAS system. The TOW is very different from the fire control system tank soldiers are familiar with.

Ewwwwwww. You used the TOW word. My original USMC MOS was 2875 (no longer exists) as a Small Missile Technician. In 1985 I was at 3rd Tanks, Tow Co. at MCAGCC when we put TOW on the LAV's and started moving off Jeeps.

You wouldn't believe what we used to do with the optics.... :eek: :D

[Rob Thornton]

Sam - Tank and I were,... well talking about the optics in another regard, but - they are some outstanding optics. Being able to put a missile out to say 4(+) Kms then (who knows how far now) requires some really good optics.

Now these optics are also a superb surveillance device. Having the communcations between the MGS platoon and Infantry platoons allowed us some advantages in this respect. Soldiers, Marines, Airmen, and Sailors are all pretty good at figuring out how to get more out of their equipment - beyond its designed purpose. Thermal devices in general are now pretty prolific at the tactical level - the Javelin sights, the small arms TWS sights, etc. If you know the capabilities and limitations, and can combine them with higher's assets you can come up with a pretty good R&S plan that allows you to get out in front of the enemy - catch him when he thinks nobody is looking.

Retaining a TOW Company at the SBCT level also provides a good round out capability for the 06 CDR - and makes the SBCT a more capable force. TOW has come a long way (so has Javelin) - but TOW is still wire guided.

Best, Rob

[Tankguy]

A good case in point would be the early days of Stryker fielding. We were conducting company level training out on 13TH Div and Pacemaker DZ. When the attacking platoon came out of the woodline 4 kms away I was calling for fire. My company commander told me there was no way I could possibly see the enemy that far way. Once they were inside 3.5 kms, I was telling him who I was looking at specifically. He finally climbed in the back door of my Stryker for the next iteration and was amazed that we could see that far.

It was old hat for my platoon, we were used to that kind of thermal range. For the unit, most of which came from the light side, that capability was amazing.

[selil]

Sam - Tank and I were,... well talking about the optics in another regard, but - they are some outstanding optics.

Oh! I thought you were talking about the fact that the thermal optics could effectively remove the clothes of any BAM or Suzy secretary walking through the area.

[Rob Thornton]

Well .... there is a point Sam where this will devolve into something better discussed at our "non-virtual" events. BTW - it looks like there is enuogh folks at Hood to stand up a chpater (lot sof lurkers there too).
Best, Rob

[Tankguy]

How many folks from Hood are lurking on the board? I am realtivey new to this forum. I cannot believe I have not found this in the past. Quite a bit of intelligent discussion going. That is a refreshing change from the daily grind! Now, let's see how long I can last with people still thinking I know what I am talking about.

[Rob Thornton]

There are a couple of ways to get a feel for the SWC membership - you can check out the "Tell us about You" thread here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1441&page=23), which will give folks a feel for who you are and for you to get a feel for the greater audience - this may prove very useful in about month - when you are elsewhere and find yourself in need of reachback, or are in a position to inform others about reality on the ground (this is also an important function here - and gets to our use of the "Information" terrain to contribute, inform the community writ large and defeat our adversaries. I found this forum while deployed and was able to leverage lots of experience in areas I would not otherwise have had access to - it was a critical enabler!

You acn also get an idea through some of theo other tools - and can clik on a member to find out if they have listed any other info - or just to PM thme - like you did me. There are also allot of folks who "lurk" - meaning they either don't post, don't sign on, or both - I've run into several folks who have met me "virtually", but I have not met them.

Recruit and refer good people where you can - as you said, "you can't beleive it took you so long". There are several good folks at Hood, or enroute to Hood who are here, and might be open to strengthening this network of folks who come here to inter-act, participate, self-educate, share and contribute.

Best, Rob

[Tankguy]

I posted a quick, non-cheesy bio on the Intro thread. I am in the drinking from the firehose mode at the minute. There is a lot of good info here. I am still taking everything it, but I can see the reach back capabilities already for when I am vacationing on the banks of the scenic Tigris and Euphrates.

[CR6]

Recruit and refer good people where you can - as you said, "you can't beleive it took you so long". There are several good folks at Hood, or enroute to Hood who are here, and might be open to strengthening this network of folks who come here to inter-act, participate, self-educate, share and contribute.



I'm @ Hood.

[120mm]

And how, precisely, would you fix the M113's weakness against under-road IEDs and anti-tank mines?

The belly plate, as flat as it is, combined with the tracks, make it a deathtrap. You'd need to find someway to vent the explosion out the sides, probably a "V-shaped" hull or somesuch. That would probably mean redesigning the hull completely, and then you'd have some other vehicle, by the time you're done.

It's interesting to note that the Joseph Stalin series of heavy tank had pronounced "V-hulls", precisely in order to make them more resistent to mines.

Sorry, I didn't see page 3, when I was responding to William Owen's post vis-a-vis fixing the weaknesses of the M113.

[J Wolfsberger]

"V hull" doesn't do anything to protect against mines.

There are three things that can be done: increase standoff, reduce presented area, and increase armor at the bottom hull (belly armor).

The basic, so-called, "v hull" shape of the MRAPs actually looks like:
358

They work because of increased standoff and reduced presented area. The "V" shape is just incidental - it doesn't lead to any "blast deflection."

BTW, these worked well when originally designed by the South Africans because they were fighting LIC in the veldt. Who cares what the silhouette is if you can still be seen coming from 20 klicks out no matter what you're driving? They work well for us today, because we're travelling relatively predictable routes, so who cares if we can be easily seen? In a different type of conflict/mission, different terrain, different threat weapon system mix, etc., they could turn out to be unfixable death traps.

The relevant dimensions for design trades are: presented area vs. vehicle height; standoff vs. vehicle height, ride stability, mobility/agilty; belly armor vs. just about everything.

[Cavguy]

The Blog "DefenseTech" has a followup on the MGS Debate.

http://www.defensetech.org/archives/003995.html

Quote:

Some of you might remember my entry from Iraq a couple weeks ago criticizing the new Stryker vehicle version called the “mobile gun system,” or MGS. I spoke with three MGS crew, including an MGS platoon sergeant, who said the system was crap.

Well, in the interest of giving each side their due, I’m going post some comments sent to me this weekend from another MGS platoon sergeant who was quoted in the Bloomberg story I cited in my story.

At this time in my opinion am one of the most combat experienced MGS vehicle commanders in the army today. I have fired 58 rounds in a combat situation...none of them were just for fun rounds. I have used the MGS in every manner possible and used it for things it was not tatically supposed to be used for. It pisses me of that only 1 or 2 guys were asked about this vehicle in 4-9 INF, 4/2bde.

And later he wrote me...

I just want the vehicle to get a fair chance and for people who think it a waste of tax dollars to realize that we now control the battlefield both cross country and urban.

[Tom Odom]

"V hull" doesn't do anything to protect against mines.

There are three things that can be done: increase standoff, reduce presented area, and increase armor at the bottom hull (belly armor).

The basic, so-called, "v hull" shape of the MRAPs actually looks like:
358

They work because of increased standoff and reduced presented area. The "V" shape is just incidental - it doesn't lead to any "blast deflection."

BTW, these worked well when originally designed by the South Africans because they were fighting LIC in the veldt. Who cares what the silhouette is if you can still be seen coming from 20 klicks out no matter what you're driving? They work well for us today, because we're travelling relatively predictable routes, so who cares if we can be easily seen? In a different type of conflict/mission, different terrain, different threat weapon system mix, etc., they could turn out to be unfixable death traps.

The relevant dimensions for design trades are: presented area vs. vehicle height; standoff vs. vehicle height, ride stability, mobility/agilty; belly armor vs. just about everything.

John,

From METAR 3D Mine Resistan Ambush Protected (MRAP Entities) (http://www.metavr.com/products/3Dcontent/metavrMRAPvehicles.html)

MRAP systems are designed with a V-shaped hull that assists deflection of a mine or IED blast away from the vehicle’s interior. With their appropriate markings, accurate geometry, and damage states, MetaVR's 3D MRAP models can be used in counter-IED training scenarios. These models, which are in MetaVR’s model format, are included in the 3D content libraries that are delivered with the purchase of MetaVR products. Updates are available to current customers on Virtual Reality Scene Generator (VRSG) maintenance.

See also The protection of vehicles and plant equipment against mines and UXO (http://www.gichd.ch/fileadmin/pdf/publications/Mechanical_study/Mechanical_study_chapter5.pdf)

For example:
Principles for the protection against blast effect
The following principles can be incorporated into the design of vehicles and equipment
to render protection against the blast effect of mines:
�� absorption of energy,
�� deflection of blast effect away from the hull, and
�� distance from detonation point.

The V shape does play a role and so does standoff as well as presented area. To get the V-shape in a vehicle that could move cross country, increased stand-off, using a v-shaped hull to present less area, equated to increased height.

The heigth of the vehicles actually proved advantage in the areas where they were used. Namibia and Angola are desert like in many areas but with a heavy brush cover. The SADF vehicles were high enough that they were able to see over much of that brush, where a vehicle 50 to 100 yards is often invisible at ground level.

As for open ground making the height of a vehicle irrelevant, armored combat in Sinai, Iraq, and North Africa says otherwise (along of course with hundreds of rotations at the NTC). No ground aside perhaps from certain places like Bonneville, is that flat and even there the curvature of the earth means that taller vehicles are seen before shorter vehicles. The reason the South Africans did not care was the threat against those vehicles was not from direct fire anti-armor systems. When they had to deal with the Cubans, it was a new ball game.

I agree fully that while MRAP is a good thing in a COIN fight, it would be meat on the table in more conventional setting.

Best

Tom

[J Wolfsberger]

I didn't express myself very well in my post.

The point I was trying to make is that it isn't the "V." There are some problems now with people demanding designers try using a "shallow V."

What does buy something is standoff (i.e. ground clearance), reduced presented area, and stiffening the hull to involve as much of the structure in vehicle response as possible (the only way to accomplish absorption of energy). All that has to be balanced against impulsive load imparted to the crew, and what kind of "stroke" can be built into the seats to reduce impulsive injuries (such as ruptured disks). And that doesn't get into reliability issues of a dynamic suspension (to give a variable standoff), or vehicle mobility/agility issues associated with a higher center of gravity.

As to the tactical considerations, I think we're in agreement. I was trying to point out that in some tactical circumstances, a large silhouette is irrelevant.

When the SADF went into Angola against the Cubans, the vehicles had vulnerabilities that didn't appear in SW Africa or the COIN ops in South Africa itself. Vehicle silhouette is one of the first things designers try to reduce - smaller means lower probability of hit, which equates to better survivability. It's a lot harder to see and hit a HMMV than an MRAP at any sort of distance.

[Ken White]

are important for under vehicle explosions, no question -- but the V shape is also important as it allows the explosive force easy exit as opposed to being trapped by a flat hull -- particularly a flat hull bottom with tracks or closely spaced wheels serving as side walls which traps the force and exacerbates the intensity by reverbration as opposed to simply deflecting (or absorbing) only the initial force.

If that under vehicle explosion rises against a flat bottom, is is simply reflected right back the way it came (even if it does rip through all or part of the bottom, there's still excess force to be reflected). Vehicles can be flipped by the force as well as having bottoms penetrated. that is common with flat bottom hulls and very rare with V-bottoms.

The best V-hull designs have a minimum number of wheels and those are at extreme ands and designed to be sacrificed to aid in hull and thus crew survival.

While the V-hull and high ground clearance are beneficial in lessening the effect of buried mines or IEDs, Neither offers any protection from side or angle mounted IEDs.

It's hard to dispute that anything that keeps the troops alive is not beneficial but my sensing is that once again we have tried for a technological solution to a training and operating problem. Some were necessary and beneficial but the sheer number we're buying is probably excessive and was driven by Congressional reaction to incompetent media noise. I suspect that most will be transferred to the Iraqis. Some day... :cool:

[William F. Owen]

And how, precisely, would you fix the M113's weakness against under-road IEDs and anti-tank mines?

Sorry, I didn't see page 3, when I was responding to William Owen's post vis-a-vis fixing the weaknesses of the M113.

..and that's one think you can't fix, so you don't. You apply the means and technology within a field of doctrine and teaching.

As a by-stander the level of Stryker v M-113 debate had been just embarrassing. Wheels versus tracks is a false argument, unless couched in precisely defined operational context. A combined MRAP & Modernised M-113 Brigade of even Combat Team would be a step up in capability

The M-113 design of 2008 bears no resemblance to anything currently in US Army service. The UK fluffed the FV-432 upgraded for Iraq to save money, but what we got was 100% increase in capability.

[120mm]

In addition to the above-stated benefits of "V" hulls, is the increased armor thickness afforded by any angled surface. For example, a 1" plate of steel, canted at 45 degrees, provides the equivalent of approximately 1.5" of steel armor, as the projectile (if any) has to travel 1.5 times as far due to the angle involved.

[Tom Odom]

I didn't express myself very well in my post.

The point I was trying to make is that it isn't the "V." There are some problems now with people demanding designers try using a "shallow V."

What does buy something is standoff (i.e. ground clearance), reduced presented area, and stiffening the hull to involve as much of the structure in vehicle response as possible (the only way to accomplish absorption of energy). All that has to be balanced against impulsive load imparted to the crew, and what kind of "stroke" can be built into the seats to reduce impulsive injuries (such as ruptured disks). And that doesn't get into reliability issues of a dynamic suspension (to give a variable standoff), or vehicle mobility/agility issues associated with a higher center of gravity.

As to the tactical considerations, I think we're in agreement. I was trying to point out that in some tactical circumstances, a large silhouette is irrelevant.

When the SADF went into Angola against the Cubans, the vehicles had vulnerabilities that didn't appear in SW Africa or the COIN ops in South Africa itself. Vehicle silhouette is one of the first things designers try to reduce - smaller means lower probability of hit, which equates to better survivability. It's a lot harder to see and hit a HMMV than an MRAP at any sort of distance.


John

Thanks for that. I agree we are really saying the same things. We had issues with HMMWVs being too wide in Africa for the streets. I wonder how MRAP "fits in" under simlar circumstances.

Best

Tom

[mgscommander14]

EDIT: Title should say "Performance"- didn't catch spelling and I can't edit it ....

http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,160981,00.html

Interesting Military.com article on the (lack of) success with the Stryker Mobile Gun System variant in Iraq. Interesting to assess how much is reporter spin of a few soldiers and how much is fact. Anyone been in an MGS?

I am a MGS Platoon Sergeant in 1-38 INF 4/2 BDE. I have fielded the MGS in combat in both Baghdad and Baqubah Iraq. The vehicle is designed to breach walls, clear obstacles, engage threats with any of the 3 weapons systems (105mm main gun, 7.62 machinegun, or .50 cal machinegun).

It has been used in all types of operations since in theater. I am a fan of the vehicle because it’s fast, quiet, highly mobile in tight environments, and provides a sense of fear in insurgents that may prevent them from conducting attacks on my unit.

I have bashed, beaten, and abused this vehicle and she's still going strong. Some vehicles have those gremlins that keep causing problems for some MGS's and there are a few mods that need to be made such as the design of the 7.62 coax mount. Some MGS's such as mine have no stoppages and some have a lot. These kinks will be worked out.

The vehicle will not replace the M1 series. (But) I think that we now have the ability to control the battlefield both open terrain and urban with the addition of this vehicle.

I have combat proven this vehicle on everything from RPG teams to HBIED’s (house borne improvised explosive devices). I have breached walls and houses, engaged multiple snipers with machinegun, destroyed VBIEDs, destroyed IEDs, you name it we have done it. It is a great platform for Iraq urban environment. It will not replace tanks but has tank defeating capability. Some vehicles have issues and some don't …..nothing new to the army. I find my platoon’s vehicle reliable. It has 4 sights, day and thermal capability with 360 degree viewing.

The articles on military.com (anti-MGS) came from a young soldier in another battalion of 4/2 bde who has not given the public the whole story. I have contacted him and what he says is not really vehicle related but chain of command related. I can answer any questions you may have. Want to see it in action!!! www.youtube.com/tankcommander33

SFC Collum

smash1

[Cavguy]

SFC Collum,

Thanks for the on the ground perspective. Part of what makes this site great. If you haven't already, put a comment in the introduction thread with your background.

Thanks again for contributing, and keep your head down!

[KenWats]

Okay, as someone who has had M113A3(+) in his MTOE (slat armor, cupolas, BFT, etc). They suck. They were okay in the 1960's. They're a pretty flexible vehicle. Spare parts are available.

But let's not overlook:
5) They break A LOT more than any other vehicle I had, including M1 tanks.

I followed Cavguy's link from another thread and am responding here because it seemed more appropriate.

I agree with all of your points except 5. My M113A3s were never uparmored, but they broke down significantly less than our M60 class bridge carriers, ACEs, or CEVs (my experience is late 90s, fwiw). I know that's not saying much, but of the vehicles I had in my various platoons (M113, Humvee, M548, ACE, CEV, AVLB/AVLM, SEE, HEMMT), the 113 was definitely on the "more reliable" side. Maybe my view is skewed from what I had to work with.

I never really had (many) problems keeping up with Brad/M1 equipped company teams when it was just my organic combat engineer platoon (probably a function of mine not being uparmored with slat armor, etc- I know towing the MICLIC trailer made a difference, so I can imagine that the extra armor would be just as bad). Attach the CEV or an AVLB/AVLM and I had a bear of a time keeping track of the lumbering behemoths behind me, and the tank/bradley platoons speeding ahead.

[Cavguy]

I followed Cavguy's link from another thread and am responding here because it seemed more appropriate.

I agree with all of your points except 5. My M113A3s were never uparmored, but they broke down significantly less than our M60 class bridge carriers, ACEs, or CEVs (my experience is late 90s, fwiw). I know that's not saying much, but of the vehicles I had in my various platoons (M113, Humvee, M548, ACE, CEV, AVLB/AVLM, SEE, HEMMT), the 113 was definitely on the "more reliable" side. Maybe my view is skewed from what I had to work with.

I never really had (many) problems keeping up with Brad/M1 equipped company teams when it was just my organic combat engineer platoon (probably a function of mine not being uparmored with slat armor, etc- I know towing the MICLIC trailer made a difference, so I can imagine that the extra armor would be just as bad). Attach the CEV or an AVLB/AVLM and I had a bear of a time keeping track of the lumbering behemoths behind me, and the tank/bradley platoons speeding ahead.

Good point. My FIST-V always had problems keeping up b/c it was still an A2 version with the smaller engine. The 1SG's 113 was fine until we added all the extra stuff. My cross-attached combat engineer platoon had all the same problems.

Best use of a 113 I saw was as a tricked out "bass boat"/mini 577 for the BCT commander (basically a 113 with extra radios) - difference being he could ride around hatch open with his FSO in tow on the battlefieldof Hohenfels - since it was a light track it could get up high where the M1/M2's couldn't b/c of the goat trail conditions.