Practical Solutions for NATO in Southern Afghanistan

[DGreen]

I'm looking for practical solutions to help NATO in southern Afghanistan with the planning assumption that we will not get any significant infusion of troops outside the currently planned Marine deployment. Initial thoughts:

1. Move SEALs from Iraq to the south.
2. Embed civil-affairs teams with NATO units to provide on-the-ground CERP capability, advice, limited fighting capacity
3. Provide military liaisons who would be embedded with the Dutch, the British, the Canadians to improve coordination among the provinces and pass on accumulated expertise from U.S. forces with respect to fighting insurgencies.
4. Approach "moderate" Muslim countries such as Turkey, UAE. Jordan, etc to provide troops, development and reconstruction capabilities, aid, etc...
5. Undertake a determined training program among the NATO forces on basics of counter-insurgency with a particular focus on population protection approaches, civil-affairs, information operations, etc.
6. Eliminate physical safehavens. Use as a planning assumption that each district needs one forward operating base or, at minimum, a reinforced rifle platoon house.
7. Create robust civil affairs deliverables for each population center: power generation, agricultural programs, health, education, etc.
8. Eliminate tribal safe havens by bolstering the Provincial Council, District Councils, and members of Parliament and working to make sure they are representative and efficacious.
9. Hire civilians with key skills sets (e.g. water engineers, agricultural specialists, etc.) for each province (although my preference is each district) and give them a career path. Tactically harden them and ensure they have the same benefits as a person in uniform.
10. Deploy and embed Human Terrain Team members with NATO forces.

Some initial thoughts....I look forward to seeing your ideas.

[Progressive Ranger]

The southern area is a disaster. When I was in A-stan (Afg-Pak) border, Paktika had just cooled off as the hot zone. A year before we got there it was "the most dangerous place on earth" according to the conventional guys that were there. US moved forces in, bad guys moved out and went south. Same thing will happen again as the #s just aren't there to maintain sustained presence in all of the hot spots across the problem areas (Kunar, border region and Helmand - let's not even mention Kabul).

The CERP piece is interesting. Problem is there are not enough teams to implement CERP. My team had an AID guy attached to us with MUCH greater funding pools that helped us do some serious infrasturcture development - thereby helping to reduce the underlying causes of extremism and violent groups - poverty, education, unemployment, etc. We were able to build the trust of the locals, the shuras, the district, etc, plus we were teamed with Afg Army (ANA) to increase gov't provided security and ultimately provide some much needed legitimacy to GoA since not a single rep of GoA had been to the area in over 56 years!

However, I think an even better tool would be for AID to bring in Development Contractors (not the big aerospace guys or security contractors that think they can run development work just because DOD is throwing money there) but actual devlopment companies, to run the CERP piece. They can respond much quicker, have a history of doing small grant programs as part of AID's OTI program in Iraq (managed ~ $500m over 3 years) and can implement much faster. The company can have numerous reps to allow AID to focus its people elsewhere (we all know how limited they are) and work directly with MNF, as well as US ODAs and CAT-A (CA teams).

We are already doing this in a couple of areas in A-stan and it has been incredibly successful with big down turns in violence.

Just my $.02.

[Ken White]

...
1. Move SEALs from Iraq to the south.
2. Embed civil-affairs teams with NATO units to provide on-the-ground CERP capability, advice, limited fighting capacity
3. Provide military liaisons who would be embedded with the Dutch, the British, the Canadians to improve coordination among the provinces and pass on accumulated expertise from U.S. forces with respect to fighting insurgencies.
4. Approach "moderate" Muslim countries such as Turkey, UAE. Jordan, etc to provide troops, development and reconstruction capabilities, aid, etc...
5. Undertake a determined training program among the NATO forces on basics of counter-insurgency with a particular focus on population protection approaches, civil-affairs, information operations, etc.
6. Eliminate physical safehavens. Use as a planning assumption that each district needs one forward operating base or, at minimum, a reinforced rifle platoon house.
7. Create robust civil affairs deliverables for each population center: power generation, agricultural programs, health, education, etc.
8. Eliminate tribal safe havens by bolstering the Provincial Council, District Councils, and members of Parliament and working to make sure they are representative and efficacious.
9. Hire civilians with key skills sets (e.g. water engineers, agricultural specialists, etc.) for each province (although my preference is each district) and give them a career path. Tactically harden them and ensure they have the same benefits as a person in uniform.
10. Deploy and embed Human Terrain Team members with NATO forces.

Some initial thoughts....I look forward to seeing your ideas.
The "S" is SEAL stands for Sea. Afghanistan is far from it and people work best in a familiar environment. Putting SEAL Teams in the 'Stan never made a whole lot of sense. They've been there and done some great things but Afghan conditions are not their bag.

Your offers of 'help' to other Nations are unlikely to be well received and could be taken as Yankee arrogance. The Brits think they do COIN better than we do. They don't but perception is reality and most of NATO would, properly, tell us to butt out. We, after all, invited and cajoled NATO to go in there...

There are between 350 and 400 Districts there. They range in population from a few hundred to well over 100K. The terrain varies widely as does the geographic area. Thus it seems that more than a Platoon would be required in some districts. Accepting your Platoon/District fit and the common figure of 366 Districts, you need 366 Platoons -- that equates to roughly 14 Brigades. With the support slice that's about 140,000 troops -- about double the number now present . Where would those additional troops come from?

Aside from that number -- which posits no reserve -- you're confronted with the fact that a Platoon base is a target for 300-400 bad guys and if all your Platoons are farmed out, they won't be able to help each other.

Good luck with getting any Muslim nation other than Turkey to assist. Consider also that Afghans really do NOT like Arabs.

Your last three suggestions are obviously ideal but it does not appear that the Afghans are quite there yet and may be dome time in getting there. It's rather difficult to turn around 3,000 plus years in just a few. Then there's the problem of getting that batch of civilian expertise to go to a combat zone...

[DGreen]

How many districts are there in Uruzgan, Helmand, and Kandahar?

I know Uruzgan has six and I think Kandahar has sixteen and Helmand has thirteen for a total of thirty-five.

I believe the SEALs (Sea, Air, and Land, can't forget the "Land" part) are pretty bored in Anbar so sending them to Afghanistan would at least have them focused on fighting.

At this point in their deployments I think many of the NATO countries have had to alter their strategies and realize their own unique approaches may not be working that well.

My sense is that the UAE and Jordan have pretty good reputations in that part of the world due to their humanitarian and development assistance. It's certainly worth a try.

[Progressive Ranger]

We worked with Arab allies on the Afg-Pak border and were very effective with the partnership.

[Ken White]

How many districts are there in Uruzgan, Helmand, and Kandahar?

I know Uruzgan has six and I think Kandahar has sixteen and Helmand has thirteen for a total of thirty-five.You want to ignore the rest of the country and concentrate on the south? Cool. Mullah Omar will say "Go west and north, Young Man...

However, covering only 35 Districts of different sizes with varying terrain and populations cuts the troop requirement -- it does not obviate your tactical problem.I believe the SEALs (Sea, Air, and Land, can't forget the "Land" part) are pretty bored in Anbar so sending them to Afghanistan would at least have them focused on fighting.Is the object to focus the SEAL Teams on fighting or to achieve an acceptable outcome in the 'Stan?At this point in their deployments I think many of the NATO countries have had to alter their strategies and realize their own unique approaches may not be working that well.I don't think any of them have altered their strategy at all -- that would entail leaving the country, they may have tried different TTP -- as have we. Doesn't affect the fact that you're suggesting trampling on National pride and can expect rejection -- or them leaving the country, a move most of those nations voters would support.My sense is that the UAE and Jordan have pretty good reputations in that part of the world due to their humanitarian and development assistance. It's certainly worth a try.They do indeed have such a reputation in the ME, less so in south Asia where the mores and attitudes differ a bit. However, that's not the issue -- Bismallah the average Afghans reaction to Arabs is the issue. Plus the fact that most Muslims are still not at all sure what we're up to and and are reluctant to interfere in other Muslim nations. You are certainly welcome to try.

Oh, and while looking for all those civilians that would be nice to have there, ponder the thought of our Congress, already upset with many NATO nations (relative) lack of effort in Afghanistan, agreeing to allow us to expend CERP funds for some of those nations...

I'm not trying to rain on your parade, honest. You asked for thoughts and I gave you some. No question what you suggest would be beneficial, the questions I raise are solely addressed not at how good or bad the ideas are but at some considerations and what might be realistically achievable.

[Eden]

Making the assumption that resources are not constrained - which they most definitely are - and evaluating each point on its own merits:

1. Why not? SF were the most effective combat multipliers we had. The SEALs are not ideally fitted for the environment or the overall mission, but they would be a useful asset.
2. Absolutely. CA teams with money are highly useful, and our NATO allies do not have the deep pockets or the flexibility that CERP affords their US counterparts. Would be a great help.
3. There is already a southern regional headquarters, essentially a brigade(+) hq, that should be coordinating provincial activities. The lack of coordination is not due to a spare command structure or lack of communications, it is caused by competing military and politcal agendas. More liaison officers would not help and could possibly harm what cooperation and coordination already exists.
4. This has already happened and is happening. There were Turks, Kuwaitis, Egyptians, and Jordanians in Afghanistan when I was there, and a UAE SF unit. You are unlikely to get much additional help from that quarter.
5. With limited exceptions, NATO does not train national forces, so any effort like this would have to be US acting more or less unilaterally. Assuming that we have our own act together on the subject, which is debatable, your suggestion implies that there is a "right" way to do COIN in Afghanistan. There is not. Afghanistan is not one war, it is multiple conflicts with many actors with shifting loyalties, objectives, and tactics. The fact that we in Paktia and the Dutch in Uruzgan take different approaches is not (necessarily) a bad thing. The idea that we all need to operate in a common way is, if not bad, an unnecessary constraint on local commanders.
6. All for eliminating safe havens. However, it cannot be done by establishing platoon houses, multiple FOBs, or any other form of blockhouses. The terrain is too rough and the area too large for that. Plus there is that pesky Pakistan...
7. Right on. Repairing the irrigation system would do more for the country than any thing else I can think of.
8. Ummm, who do you think sits on those councils? The weakening of tribal influences brought on by three decades of continuous war is one of the things that has contributed to higer levels of violence in Afghanistan. This suggestion indicates a lack of understanding on how the society you want to help actually operates.
9. These are called contractors. If you meant indigenous engineers, etc., you'll have to bring them back from wherever they fled years ago.
10. I don't know what a Human Terrain Team is, but they sound awfully effective. I would guess they are experts at discovering the mechanisms that drive society, linking important players, and analyzing the needs of specific localities, and not a bunch of soldiers who have read three books on Afghanistan. I'll defer judgment on this one.

Good luck

[DGreen]

I'm not ignoring the rest of the country at all. I'm focused on trying to fix a particular problem in the south. That is where most of NATO's forces are fighting right now. I'm quite aware that we need a national counter-insurgency strategy for Afghanistan that is well resourced and comprehensive.

[davidbfpo]

1. Buy the heroin crop
2. Build tarmac'd roads - using local labour
3. Pay the Afghan Army (ANA) & Afghan Police (ANP) on time
4. Pay the ANA & ANP if necessary direct and 50% to family if not living local
5. Forget about new NATO or other forces arriving
6. Expect the Canadians and Dutch to leave in 2009

davidbfpo

[kehenry1]

Actually, skip buying the poppy crop and start buying other crops at higher rates. They need competing markets for space and fertile land, not a re-enforcement of bad behavior that, if I read the reports correctly, result in an inability to provide food for their internal needs, much less external markets.

In fact, the government could constitute a "grain reserve" program by building up effective storage areas in the districts and building capacity that would stabilize the price of wheat and other necessary food stuffs, provide a stable, comparative income and facilitate government control and good will as a provider to the people as opposed to USAID or other outside sources. Not to mention, stave off the possibility of starving millions of Afghanis.

Of course, that would require building up the irrigation and road systems, along with grain storage, much faster than is happening now. I keep thinking about the seabees of WWII and how fast they could throw up a base or air port or road and wonder at how long it takes us today.

Tie that in with local governance and tribal allegiances as a coop with some sort of plan for security from the tribes,makes their survivability and relationship with their own and the government a little more imperative.

There is a double edged sword to providing food aid to people who are more interested in growing poppies than in growing food. Money cannot buy what is not available and the income simply means imports are more expensive.

I think the tribal elders would gain back some additional control from the Islamists if they had a sustained capacity for providing for their people. We're not talking necessarily western standards, but the basics with the potential for additional development.

Of course, there is the issue of what agricultural basins exist, what crops they suited for and whether anyone could compete with the poppy trade. And the issue of protected government insiders and parliamentarians who traffic in it without any retribution from state for fear of "pashtunwali". there has to be an effective deterence AND replacement system. We're just to afraid to do it or push for it (so is the Afghan government) since we fear the rear guard action in the middle of trying to fight of the Taliban.

Still, start small enough. There has got to be some concept of self sufficiency built into the program or they will never leave the poppies.

[Ron Humphrey]

Actually, skip buying the poppy crop and start buying other crops at higher rates. They need competing markets for space and fertile land, not a re-enforcement of bad behavior that, if I read the reports correctly, result in an inability to provide food for their internal needs, much less external markets.



I think the assertion that they will not give it up until there is not only a viable but a much more attractive alternative is probably widely accepted. Doesn't that fact in and of itself speak to the possible necessity of outbidding the current clientel for the product and creating a dependancy on the governmental structure for sustained purchase and approval for what is grown. Once this is done it drys up much of the extra funding the Taliban and AQ are able to subvert from this trade and would make them have to seek alternative forms or other locals within which to work it.

It also places the Govt in a positin to give the growers a directive a little further on which products to grow and over time to transition to a more supply and demand both internally and internationally in a different competetive market. This is would seem counter intuitive to US thought but for a country in which the market is as it is , the only way to trasition it to a more free market reflective agriculture base may be to first bring it into the government owned type but all the while watching for opportunity to push it back out into the private sector with a different focus.

It makes me uncomfortable to consider it such as state owned anything so often tends to lead into marxist, leninist type societies but as with anything what the goal is and what it will take to get it there has to be considered.

Thought's:confused:

[DGreen]

NATO Confronts Surprisingly Fierce Taliban
Militia Undermines Rebuilding Efforts in Southern Province of Uruzgan

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/25/AR2008022503089_pf.html

By Molly Moore
Washington Post Foreign Service
Tuesday, February 26, 2008; A01

TARIN KOT, Afghanistan -- Lt. Col. Wilfred Rietdijk, a 6-foot-7 blond Dutchman, took command of his military's reconstruction team in the southern Afghan district of Deh Rawood in September. Tranquil and welcoming, it seemed like the perfect place for the Netherlands' mission to help rebuild this country.

Intelligence reports indicated that the district was free of the Taliban, allowing the soldiers greater freedom of movement than elsewhere in Uruzgan province.

"We could go out on foot," Rietdijk said.

Reconstruction teams, escorted by a platoon of soldiers, fanned across the fertile countryside, building bridges over streams and canals, repairing irrigation systems, and distributing books and pens to local schools.

But the day after Rietdijk arrived in Afghanistan, his field officers reported hundreds of villagers suddenly fleeing parts of Deh Rawood. "Within a few weeks, everybody was gone," Rietdijk said. "We didn't understand why."

Now the Dutch say they realize what happened. Even as the soldiers believed they had won the support of the local population, the Taliban had secretly returned to reclaim Deh Rawood, home district of the group's revered leader, Mohammad Omar. It took only a few months for the Taliban to undermine nearly six years of intelligence work by U.S. forces and almost two years of goodwill efforts by Dutch soldiers.

See the rest of the article at the link...

[AdamG]

In 1919, a young British army officer, Francis Stockdale, was deployed to the Waziristan area of British India.

The title of his book, "Walk Warily in Waziristan" seems no less appropriate now than it did 90 years ago, because today the autonomous Pakistani tribal region of North and South Waziristan is the centre of militancy orchestrated by pro-Taleban and al-Qaeda militants.

It is also an area where many believe the al-Qaeda leader, Osama Bin Laden, may be hiding after the September 2001 World Trade Centre attacks.

It wasn't until the 1980s that Capt Stockdale's family published a handful of copies of the book, only a few of which survive. But because or renewed interest in the region, the family in the English county of Norfolk are considering reprinting it.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7325117.stm

Summon the publishers!