UK military problems & policies

[SWJED]

5 August London Times - 'Dogs of War' Ban Will Rob British Army of Vital Frontline Soldiers (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-2299853,00.html) by Fred Bridgland and Michael Evans.


Seven Hundred South Africans serving in Britain’s Armed Forces will have to abandon their careers or surrender their citizenship under draconian new anti-mercenary legislation being enacted by South Africa’s Parliament.

The new Bill, designed to scotch South Africa’s reputation as a rich recruiting ground for “dogs of war”, was approved by 11 votes to one by the Parliament’s defence committee this week despite an impassioned appeal from Paul Boateng, the British High Commissioner.

If the Bill is approved by the full assembly, as now seems probable, it will end a tradition of South Africans serving with the British military that goes back to the First World War, and leave Britain’s Armed Forces overstretched.

Many of the 700 are serving with British forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Second Lieutenant Ralph Johnson, 24, one of the three British soldiers killed in Afghanistan this week, was born in South Africa. Sholto Hedenskog, 25, a Marine killed in Iraq in 2003, was also South African. It was the activities of a former British soldier, Simon Mann, that inspired the Bill. In 2004 Mann, a former SAS officer, began an unsuccessful coup against President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasago of Equatorial Guinea using 70 mercenaries recruited in South Africa. He is now in prison and Sir Mark Thatcher, the son of the former British Prime Minister, was fined £265,000 for helping to finance the attempted coup.

The legislation, which will greatly strengthen South Africa’s previous anti-mercenary laws, is driven by politics as much as security.

The ruling African National Congress, which came to power in 1994 after decades of apartheid rule, fought in exile alongside Angola’s former Marxist army against such apartheid-era forces as the Buffalo Battalion, the Reconnaissance Commandos and the Parachute Brigade...

[davidbfpo]

The Daily Telegraph (London) has published extracts from General Sir Michael Jackson's autobiography, he retired as Chief of General Staff (CGS), the UK's most senior soldier and was badged to the Parachute Regiment. He comments on a number of issues: Iraq, Kosovo, the Balkans and Northern Ireland.

I suspect only his much reported refusal in Kosovo to follow General Wesley Clark's orders was covered in the US press.

General Sir Mike Jackson speaks out

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/09/01/wmike101.xml

Gen Sir Mike Jackson accuses MoD of waste

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/09/03/wbasra203.xml

Gen Sir Mike Jackson condemns 'war on terror'

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/09/03/wjackson103.xml

Gen Sir Mike Jackson: Crossing Clare Short

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/09/04/wjackson204.xml

Gen Sir Mike Jackson: My clash with Nato chief

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/09/04/wjackson104.xml

Gen Sir Mike Jackson relives IRA Paras bombs

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/09/05/wjacko105.xml

[Jedburgh]

28 Jan 08: MoD performance against key targets grows worse says Defence Committee (http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/defence_committee/def080128.cfm)

The House of Commons Defence Committee today reveals that the continuing high level of deployment of UK Armed Forces is leading to worsening performance by the MoD against its key Public Service Agreement targets. "We are deeply concerned that the Armed Forces have been operating at or above the level of concurrent operations they are resourced and structured to deliver for seven of the last eight years, and for every year since 2002" says the Committee in its report published today (Fifth Report of Session 2007-08, Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2006-07, HC 61 (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmdfence/61/61.pdf)).

The MoD's assessment of its expected achievements against its six Public Service Agreement (PSA) targets, which run until the end of March 2008, has deteriorated. At the end of 2007 the MoD did not expect to meet the target for generating forces and expected "only partly" to meet targets relating to defence equipment procurement, and recruitment and retention. For the latter target, manning balance in the Royal Navy and the Army is not expected to be achieved by April 2008 and the Committee says it is very disappointed with the failure to meet harmony guidelines in the Army and the RAF. The Committee considers this to be another clear indicator of the pressure on UK Armed Forces. The Committee calls upon the MoD to set out what impact this is having, particularly on the retention of Service personnel.....

[Jedburgh]

SSI, 30 Jan 08: Transformating to Effects-Based Operations: Lessons from the United Kingdom Experience (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB831.pdf)

This monograph has been subdivided into four parts. Section 1 undertakes a review of the evolution of British defense policy since the end of the Cold War and evaluates the degree to which it has adopted an effects-based approach. Section 2 examines the British operational experience since the end of the Cold War, including an analysis of the lessons learned and its experiences of working with allies. Section 3 analyses the UK’s capability development through its doctrine and acquisition strategies. Finally, section 4 evaluates the implications of these findings for the U.S. Army and makes a number of recommendations....
Complete 71 page paper at the link.

[William F. Owen]

This is what passes for military thought now in the UK. :mad:

I would like to make it clear that there are many good military men, in the UK and other places who utterly reject the intellectual fraud of EBO and the comprehensive approach.

Personally I find it an object of some shame to be associated with a nation that has so profoundly lost its way, in the respect of doctrine and strategy.

[William F. Owen]

Gentelman,

See the links. A very sad situation indeed. I was prompted to post this by a Sgt Major friend of mine who reads these boards. He says the situation is worse than the papers make out.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml;jsessionid=Y2WDPCU3535LLQFIQMFCFF4AVCBQ YIV0?xml=/opinion/2008/02/01/do0106.xml

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml;jsessionid=Y2WDPCU3535LLQFIQMFCFF4AVCBQ YIV0?xml=/news/2008/01/31/narmy331.xml

[Coldstreamer]

Yup.

We're falling apart in slow motion, and you can see it in everything we do. The last thing to fail will be the blokes in the sections, but that will happen eventually when the C2 and decisionmaking supports crap plans that put people in the wrong place at the wrong time, have treated them like serfs for too long. No one is biting the bullet:
Double the size of the infantry
Double their wages
Enforce the training standards; sack anyone who doesn't pass muster

Thus creating a large enough force to do all that is required of it, attractive to join for the calibre we need.

This could be funded by sacking pointless procurement projects (FRES - it'll never be what we want it to be, because its an ill conceived idea).

If they can find the entire annual defence budget to bail out a crap bank, then they can certainly manage this...

Won't happen until its too late, though. The human/British condition.

[Stan]

Although the articles portray the situation to be nearly ghastly, I have a few points regarding both the human rights abuses and current state of the British Army. No one has specifically prepared common Infantrymen to work as prison guards, nor was anyone prepared for the immense civilian element.

To now conclude that reducing the Army’s standards with accelerated (reduced) training, appears the government hasn’t a clue. If anything, the training cycle should have been increased permitting COIN and ‘Prison Keeper’ specific training.

Estonia’s December 2007 rotations and visit by the Chief of Staff to the Helmand Province indicated that their 3,000 plus British counterparts were very professional and excellent warriors and instructors. Our COS is a former Russian tank commander, and rarely finds time for compliments !

It appears that BG Aitken spelled it out plainly for his government and has taken the necessary steps and the issue was under wraps quickly.


But he warned the military "must not be complacent".
Brig Aitken said it was not enough for troops to learn rules "parrot fashion" but the service needed to "embed in people a better understanding between right and wrong". Those involved in abuse were a "tiny number".
"We can never say never again, but I am about as certain as anyone can be that the Army has minimized the risk of similar instances occurring again."

[davidbfpo]

I agree with Wilf's despair at this writing, albeit from a very different viewpoint. As a concerned taxpayer the author neither describes what has happened nor what is necessary. It is also slightly jarring to read the same sentence or information time after time. As for the lessons UK experience can offer the USA not very persausive.

Finally I suggest SWJ members don't bother reading it!

davidbfpo

[gh_uk]

Sadly I did not heed the sage advice above.

A very strange document. Did I miss the section on moving to EBO or had I just fallen asleep? It struck me as a rambling and quite poorly informed account of the evolution of the UK's approach to operations. The author apparently believes everything he reads.

I would not judge the standard of military thought in the UK based on this example. Though it doesn't say much about SSI's baseline for publication.

The author's bio:

http://www.umds.ac.uk/schools/sspp/defence/staff/acad/adorman.html

[Danny]

This should not be seen in the abstract, divorced from the larger, more systemic problem with leadership. This yank is sad to watch this happen. Britain is suffering from a leadership problem at the highest levels, and she should demand better of her leaders.

More complete response:

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2008/02/01/uk-army-problems/

[Norfolk]

This has been a deacade and a half in the making, and the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars have provided the tipping point. The British Armed Forces in general, and the Army in particular, have almost completely burned out: too many committments, too few resources, and weak military leadership. Not to mention Government policies. There is a real danger of an institutional breakdown in the not-so distant future.

14 weeks of initial training? That's only enough to cover Recruit training; there's no time for real Infantry training, and that takes at least 3 more months on top of that 14 weeks to get right. This is very disturbing, sending partially-trained troops to war.

[Granite_State]

Anyone here (particularly British servicemen) read this? Are his horror stories about procurement and the basics of his argument right on? Sure seems that way just from reading the Telegraph every couple of days.

[Geoff]

What can I say, this has been going on since Options for Change, an amazing programme where we reduced the armed forces, so that the MOD could take on more civil servants - to er manage the change?

As always the soldiers are the political football, all parties mouth their support then turn around and shaft them. Unfortunately I beleive that GB has an over inflated opinion of its ability to influence world affairs - too many FCO Civil Servants who haven't got round to updating their maps, since the Raj. As a consequence we (GB) believe that we can "punch above our weight". The Armed Forces are used as a projection of this "punch" and inevitably suffer the consequences from muddled foreign poilcy thinking and a genuine desire to show that Britain is still no 1.

What we need is a genuine leader who can accept the reality, state the desired goal, plot the steps to reach that goal and then actually do something about it, this includes what the Armed Forces are going to do for GB, and what they will be used for.

Sorry for the rant - feeling a bit hot under the collar

Geoff

[William F. Owen]

My take on this is that UK forces suffer from serious insecurities, in that we are always trying to be clever and complex, when our great strength was being obvious and simple. The IDF is currently making the same serious mistake, by trying to ape the US.

The UK always talks a good game, but real analysis of actual operational achievement never matches the pre-game hype. We are unnecessarily emotional about our armed forces and still have way too many technical and intellectual delusions (FRES being a great example) which let us down badly when we start trying to be too clever.

...and money isn't the problem. The people are the problem. There is enough money in the system. We just have very bad decisions being made by people unwilling to change - but they're all frightfully nice chaps! :mad:

[Ken White]

"...and money isn't the problem. The people are the problem. There is enough money in the system. We just have very bad decisions being made by people unwilling to change - but they're all frightfully nice chaps! :mad:"

:wry:

[JJackson]

Although I am British I am a complete outsider, militarily, and do not even know anyone who has served. From this vantage point the problems seems to be confusion over what is expected from the armed force by the public, politicians and - to a lesser extent - the military. This is aggravated by the radically different time scales that politicians and military procurement operate on. As alluded to earlier some sections of the public, and some politicians, seem to be confused about our military capabilities expecting us to be able to project force unrealistically. The politicians try to buy a seat at the big table by volunteering our armed forces' services in all corners of the globe but historically have not funded for that. Due to the very long lead times involved in any major weapons system the politicians need to decide what they expect the forces to be able to do, set long term guaranteed funding to match that goal, with agreed periodic reviews for course adjustments, and then leave well alone. At the moment it seems each government thinks it wise to campaign on 'a new vision for the Army', to differentiate it to the electorate, leading to frequent reviews of the role of the military, with commensurate changes to their budgets, manpower levels and raison d'etre. The result of all this tinkering is vast amounts of wasted money, a military with some bits of good kit but not to the same level in all areas and a compromised ability to operate effectively outside of a coalition. In the military's defence I am generally impressed by how well they seem to manage the tasks they are given - considering how small they are.

[Coldstreamer]

...and money isn't the problem. The people are the problem. There is enough money in the system. We just have very bad decisions being made by people unwilling to change - but they're all frightfully nice chaps! :mad:

They're not nice chaps...they're pr!icks, yes men and amateurs. The Canucks and Yanks have cut to the chase. Weak military leadership. UK has traditionally suffered from crap Generalship in peacetime, with Marlboroughs, Wellingtons,Slims and Thompsons being forged from the opportunities of war. The US model of Generalship based on Character has a lot to offer. To progress in the UK system one must deliver 1) perception of intellect 2) work ethic to support ambition and drive subordinates 3) delivery of the answers the chain of command wishes to hear.

Actions or discussions which go Off-piste will result in being marginalised and quietly filed to the sideline as a 'maverick' or 'unsuitable'. And its certainly not class related. Some of the most ambitious grey men are the most shocking oiks and nouveaus...probably because they know if they stay the course and keep their heads down all the good blokes will get hacked off and self select and make money/see their families/work in the commercial sector where risk taking and success is rewarded.

Apart from that, I think we're doing OK.

[Tankguy]

From my three years of exchange duty with the British Army, I think the largest frustration among my coworkers was the length of time required for new equipment to be fielded. I was the subject of good natured geering or taking the p*ss as far as the "Yanks, and all their Gucci kit". There were some exceptions. The Puma and Panther showed up rather suddenly. The various programs to replace CVR(T) and associated simulation kit is one area that received some heated debate.

[120mm]

They're not nice chaps...they're pr!icks, yes men and amateurs. The Canucks and Yanks have cut to the chase. Weak military leadership. UK has traditionally suffered from crap Generalship in peacetime, with Marlboroughs, Wellingtons,Slims and Thompsons being forged from the opportunities of war. The US model of Generalship based on Character has a lot to offer. To progress in the UK system one must deliver 1) perception of intellect 2) work ethic to support ambition and drive subordinates 3) delivery of the answers the chain of command wishes to hear.

Actions or discussions which go Off-piste will result in being marginalised and quietly filed to the sideline as a 'maverick' or 'unsuitable'. And its certainly not class related. Some of the most ambitious grey men are the most shocking oiks and nouveaus...probably because they know if they stay the course and keep their heads down all the good blokes will get hacked off and self select and make money/see their families/work in the commercial sector where risk taking and success is rewarded.

Apart from that, I think we're doing OK.

The US Army's reserve forces are still very much like you describe.

[William F. Owen]

They're not nice chaps...they're pr!icks, yes men and amateurs. The Canucks and Yanks have cut to the chase. Weak military leadership. UK has traditionally suffered from crap Generalship in peacetime, with Marlboroughs, Wellingtons,Slims and Thompsons being forged from the opportunities of war. The US model of Generalship based on Character has a lot to offer. To progress in the UK system one must deliver 1) perception of intellect 2) work ethic to support ambition and drive subordinates 3) delivery of the answers the chain of command wishes to hear.

Actions or discussions which go Off-piste will result in being marginalised and quietly filed to the sideline as a 'maverick' or 'unsuitable'. And its certainly not class related. Some of the most ambitious grey men are the most shocking oiks and nouveaus...probably because they know if they stay the course and keep their heads down all the good blokes will get hacked off and self select and make money/see their families/work in the commercial sector where risk taking and success is rewarded.

Apart from that, I think we're doing OK.

I am hugely impressed with you Coldstreamer! I have a feeling that your post may have been the product of a long lonely night in the mess doing orderly officer, but I cannot argue or improve on one word you say.

[Paul Smyth]

They're not nice chaps...they're pr!icks, yes men and amateurs. The Canucks and Yanks have cut to the chase. Weak military leadership. UK has traditionally suffered from crap Generalship in peacetime, with Marlboroughs, Wellingtons,Slims and Thompsons being forged from the opportunities of war. The US model of Generalship based on Character has a lot to offer. To progress in the UK system one must deliver 1) perception of intellect 2) work ethic to support ambition and drive subordinates 3) delivery of the answers the chain of command wishes to hear.

Actions or discussions which go Off-piste will result in being marginalised and quietly filed to the sideline as a 'maverick' or 'unsuitable'. And its certainly not class related. Some of the most ambitious grey men are the most shocking oiks and nouveaus...probably because they know if they stay the course and keep their heads down all the good blokes will get hacked off and self select and make money/see their families/work in the commercial sector where risk taking and success is rewarded.

At the risk of swimming against the tide I feel I should point out that many (and an increasing number) of the serving officers in the UK's MOD do not fit the described charicature. Instead, they have accrued a significant amount of operational experience and it is that (especially commendations and combat awards), not their academic aspirations, face-time and sycophancy which is propelling them through the command chain. I would agree that in peacetime mavericks can be sidelined, but the enduring ops in Iraq and Afghanistan are providing an opportunity for people of real talent to shine. Naturally, a number of 'grey men' continue to occupy desks but in a bureaucratic system it pays to have bureaucrats in your team. 'Whitehall warriors' might not be considered to have much value outside of the M25, but to reject their utility within a government department (which the Ministry is) is to lose sight of the landscape. For what its worth, I think the underlying problem is that the substantial mismatch between the MOD Equipment Programme and the available Defence budget has persisted for too long. For years, perhaps hope, smoke, and mirrors have been allowed to sustain an unrealistic expectation. The imminent Planning Round 08 may be extremely painful, but it might bring a healthy dose of reality to a situation where there is a dangerous disconnect between Ends and Means.

[Coldstreamer]

Naaah. A cock's still a cock, whether he's on operations or not. Individual's who are gallant in the field suddenly lose their backbones when they get back to staff. Gallantry awards will always occur, because the clarity of combat can bring the best - and worst - but usually the best out of people.

I'm being too blunt. It is indeed late (but piquet officer was many years ago). We breed and train superb combat leaders, but dreadful managers. Look at our personnel and pay systems. If Accenture buggered up its peoples wages on the daily basis that the army does, its HR people and accountants would be hanged, sacked industrial trialled etc. Meanwhile, we still pay full whack income tax despite being out of the country for over half the year (don't anyone dare say the operational allowance is a tax break - weighted at the bottom rate of a private soldier's pay regardless of how much one earns....). My Guardsmen on operations don't even clear £1000 a month ($2000). We can't field anything swiftly unless the minister says 'effing do this now' because our bureaucracy is dreadful. I've worked in the Centre, and can play management speak bull#### bingo with the best of them - but this is not the place for that. Our % GDP is at an all time low - comparable with the interwar years when we hedged our bets until it was too late to catch up with German rearmament, or a similar period under a Whig government during the Crimea. Senior Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen have to take the rap for how the money we get is spent - we can't hide behind Ministers' skirts once we get the slice of the pie. And still we piddle it all away on legacy clumsy expensive kit, when what we need are well trained and treated (thus recruited and retained and at the right quality) people - and enough of them. Not 232 uber-interceptors, or a make believe medium-weight euro trash capabilty that fits in a C130 but has the protection of a Warrior.

Nah....I got it right first time. Pricks.

[Paul Smyth]

mmm... you obviously didn't enjoy yourself in Main Building, which I can understand. Personally, I was very happy to get no closer to MOD than the PJHQ, but I don't share your disdain for those who worjk there, especially when the single-services sometimes hide their own inadequacies behind the centre. For instance, Army retention over the past few years might have improved if it had spent more of its budget on the quality of accommodation for its people. That is an historic issue and blaming awful housing/barracks on the centre is a touch hypercritical. I agree that the EP is a goat. Apart from obvious major programmes that require a decade or more to complete other projects should be excluded if they cannot be in-service within 3 years. We can't live on UORs.

PS

[Coldstreamer]

Paul,

I'm not laying our problems entirely at the Centre by any means; as you say, there is ownership everywhere. I think the problem runs deeper and wider, insofar as heresy held anywhere against shibboleths like DSG05, FRES, FIS, FAS etc is met with isolation, and the path to advancement is to deliver savings. We have a frightened chain of command who in the absence of a national strategy err toward caution or familiar pain. Genuinely creative thought is not encouraged, and the culture of the Yes Man thrives.
Of course its not everybody. But there are enough damaged goods in sufficiently senior positions to prevent the confident functional approach to problem solving that we need in todays world.
When was the last time you ever saw a C2 Estimate conducted before an operation was launched from PJHQ?

[William F. Owen]

@ I think the problem runs deeper and wider, insofar as heresy held anywhere against shibboleths like DSG05, FRES, FIS, FAS etc is met with isolation, and the path to advancement is to deliver savings.

@ We have a frightened chain of command who in the absence of a national strategy err toward caution or familiar pain. Genuinely creative thought is not encouraged, and the culture of the Yes Man thrives.


Coldstreamer is utterly correct, and in my personal experience things are very much worse than he suggests.

Just for the Infantry alone, the litany of unbelievable errors, and bizarre data free decisions, like the 60/51mm mortar issue, the 40mm GMG, BOWMAN PRC-354, the FIST fiasco, and even the PAM 45 re-write, suggests some things are dreadfully wrong. I even understand the D-INF is looking to "Develop Light Forces Doctrine," -which suggests that we currently don't have any!

[Coldstreamer]

On the up side, our uniforms are pretty snazzy, our banter first rate, and even though Selly Oak is full of amputees, everybody know...Chicks dig scars.

Also, it would seem the biggest contributors to the Help for Heroes fund are....individual members of the armed forces doing charity events. Er....I thought it was meant to be the general public helping us out...not us helping us out....?

The sooner I'm CGS the better, I say.

[William F. Owen]

The sooner I'm CGS the better, I say.

...so here are some tips.

a.) You belong to proper Regiment, full of "good chaps," married to "nice gals", so you have an excellent start.

b.) Get a tour in Special Forces under your belt, or even better, fail selection with an injury. "Frightfully bad luck" goes a long way.

c.) Lace your conversation with words like "Effect" and "capability." Mimic the vocabulary of SO-2s in the DECs, and arms directors.

d.) Be involved in some frightful disaster, that no one knows about - it's "frightfully bad luck."

e.) Write supportive articles in "Battle Notes" and the British Army Review.

f.) Stay "on message."

Hope this helps :D

[Paul Smyth]

Sadly, there is no sense that things at MOD will improve. The headline '1.5% per annum increase' in defence spending over the next 3 years is misleading and Staff levels there are being 'streamlined' (i.e. further reduced by 25% - yes 1 in 4). Staff reductions will effect both civilian and uniformed posts (where a number are gapped already), which might be good news for those officers hoping to avoid a stint in Main Building, but a major concern for defence policy as over time the withering military footprint in Whitehall will lose influence. It may be apocryphal, but if the Dept of Health is being steered without doctors at the helm, the spectre of an MOD being run without sailors, marines, soldiers and airmen would make current problems 'the good old days'. Anecdotally, if I ever have doubts about my decision to jump ship, I can walk into MOD...

PS

[Coldstreamer]

BillF - gleaming advice....

a-e....all done already (noble injury rather than gucci pistol scenario, sadly)

f....sorry....all bull####ted out!

Paul - unsurprising. We remain a profession in perpetual decline - back to the watery backbones of our lords and masters. Not irreversible. Remedial action:

- All Military Staff in MOD posts to wear uniform at work starting next week, and remember who they are (I used to do that from time to time...it was as though I'd run into the building with a blood-dripping axe).

- Remember how to say 'no' when something makes no sense.

- Make output not savings based plans and decisions. Ensure logic trail is understood as to why infantry can't be trained in 14 weeks (I know your Patrol Based Infantry model sees efficiencies Wilf, but remember the start state of today's yoof).

- Only agree to do things 'properly', based on sound judgement and terms

Much of this is highly subjective - but that is the basis of professional knowlege, from Law to Medicine. For example, when the Govt forbade us to force generate for TELIC 1 because 'the decision for war had not yet been taken', resulting in numerous casualties from ill prepared troops, the Chiefs should have refused to soldier until we were adequatelly prepared, because the decision was bollocks. The difference lying between mobilising a force and using it. A ready force could have been stood down had Iraq complied...etc. But one example.

Too much hubris, too many fools, too many idiots masquerading as brains, too many ambitions overwhelming consciences...

[slapout9]

I like the way Ya"ll talk...Ya'll must be from Southern England.:wry:

[Ken White]

about another country and defense department... :D

[Granite_State]

Naaah. A cock's still a cock, whether he's on operations or not. Individual's who are gallant in the field suddenly lose their backbones when they get back to staff. Gallantry awards will always occur, because the clarity of combat can bring the best - and worst - but usually the best out of people.

I'm being too blunt. It is indeed late (but piquet officer was many years ago). We breed and train superb combat leaders, but dreadful managers. Look at our personnel and pay systems. If Accenture buggered up its peoples wages on the daily basis that the army does, its HR people and accountants would be hanged, sacked industrial trialled etc. Meanwhile, we still pay full whack income tax despite being out of the country for over half the year (don't anyone dare say the operational allowance is a tax break - weighted at the bottom rate of a private soldier's pay regardless of how much one earns....). My Guardsmen on operations don't even clear £1000 a month ($2000). We can't field anything swiftly unless the minister says 'effing do this now' because our bureaucracy is dreadful. I've worked in the Centre, and can play management speak bull#### bingo with the best of them - but this is not the place for that. Our % GDP is at an all time low - comparable with the interwar years when we hedged our bets until it was too late to catch up with German rearmament, or a similar period under a Whig government during the Crimea. Senior Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen have to take the rap for how the money we get is spent - we can't hide behind Ministers' skirts once we get the slice of the pie. And still we piddle it all away on legacy clumsy expensive kit, when what we need are well trained and treated (thus recruited and retained and at the right quality) people - and enough of them. Not 232 uber-interceptors, or a make believe medium-weight euro trash capabilty that fits in a C130 but has the protection of a Warrior.

Nah....I got it right first time. Pricks.

I may have posted on this before, curious if you've read Lewis Page's Lions, Donkeys, and Dinosaurs, polemic from a former RN officer about BAE, the MOD, and the many disasters of British defense procurement. The handful of British officers I've talked to in my three years in the UK say many of the same things you do.

[Coldstreamer]

Good book less one disappointing strand whereby he repeatedly attacks the Household Division from a position of conjecture rather than experience.

[Paul Smyth]

I would be more careful. Do check his logic. He gave an interview in 2007 on TV where he said Typhoon is responsible for casualties in Afghanistan. His logic trail ran something like this:

we're taking casualties because troops are having to move by road - because there aren't enough helos - because the RAF hasn't funded its SH Force - because its spent its money on Typhoon. 2+2=5.

PS

[William F. Owen]

I would be more careful. Do check his logic. He gave an interview in 2007 on TV where he said Typhoon is responsible for casualties in Afghanistan. His logic trail ran something like this:

we're taking casualties because troops are having to move by road - because there aren't enough helos - because the RAF hasn't funded its SH Force - because its spent its money on Typhoon. 2+2=5.

PS

I know Lewis Page quite well, and have talked to him a fair deal. I agree his logic is not sometimes what it could be, but the fact that the RAF has consistently under-funded and under-developed its SH fleet is pretty well proven in my eyes.

The initial buy of only 22 Merlin was woeful, and done in spite of the evidence we needed 32+, and the failure to create a 1:1 replacement to the Puma fleet is almost unforgivable.

[Norfolk]

Found this interesting a little while back:

It Just Can't Get Any Worse: The British Army as Seen from Russia, by Keir Giles (CSRC, April 2006) (http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/csrc/document-listings/russian/06%2816%29KG.pdf)

Oh, but it can, and has...:wry:

[Paul Smyth]

Agreed, the SHF is suffering. A situation not helped by the period when 8 SF-bound Chinooks were left sitting in hangars (now being modified for 'normal' use). I suspect that if two enduring COIN campaigns in arduous regions had been part of the 1990s calculations on future Force requirements (Cf SDR Planning Assumptions!) the 'answer' might have looked different. We perhaps shouldn't be surprised that a cab with substantially greater performance (e.g. 24 vice 16 tps) wasn't procured on a one-to-one replacement basis.

P

[William F. Owen]

@ A situation not helped by the period when 8 SF-bound Chinooks were left sitting in hangars (now being modified for 'normal' use).

@ I suspect that if two enduring COIN campaigns in arduous regions had been part of the 1990s calculations on future Force requirements (Cf SDR Planning Assumptions!) the 'answer' might have looked different.

@ We perhaps shouldn't be surprised that a cab with substantially greater performance (e.g. 24 vice 16 tps) wasn't procured on a one-to-one replacement basis.



@ Unbelievable stupidity. Agreed!

@ Any campaign. The numbers don't differ that much. Look at the sortie rate on Corporate. Look at the sortie rate in NI. The RAF does not and never did want the SH role, yet wanted to deny the Army the same. Remember the Chinooks were procured to support the deployed Harrier Force. The OA of the day said we should get CH-53.

@ Ah yes, the old 528 troop force lift. I wish life were that simple or there was any compelling evidence to suggest this was the case.

[Coldstreamer]

These people responsible for poor decisionmaking.....I think some of them may be gay as well. I'm sure one of them followed me into a lavatory once, and hung around hopefully. I just handed him a point brief and said I wasn't that kind of staff officer, but I felt used and dirty nonetheless. Then, our pay rise turned out to be less than the rate of inflation. How does that equate to a rise?

I'm off to get TRIM'd. I am clearly riddled with PTSD.

[120mm]

We're currently training a UK unit, and I have to tell you, my eyes have been truly opened. Lots of really, really dumb accidents, including one KIA and dehabiliting WIAs (as in over 10 in a couple of days. An accidental shooting and rounds out of impact top off the list.

An old and wizened mentor of mind once told me that two things will show morale and leadership: Accidents and what the unit looks like during a roadmarch. And, frankly, the column I followed last night blew as much oily smoke as an 1968 Volkswagen needing a ring job, and even at 30 kph, they looked a little ragged, especially going up hills.

I cannot speak as to the entire UK Army, but the piece that I'm privy to where I work doesn't look good, at all.

[Ski]

Was sent this article today:

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/exclusive-report-soldiers-need-loans-to-eat-report-reveals-825928.html

[Norfolk]

Sickening. The Government simply has got to go.:mad:

[Stevely]

It seems the Labour gang's contempt for the British soldier is so complete they don't even feel the need to respond to serious charges like these and others I have heard like this.

As much as I dislike our political culture, at least the public and media can be counted on for outrage when tales get out like the scandal at Walter Reed or the barracks at Ft. Bragg, and the Congress can be counted on to lead a witchhunt for the guilty, even if not always for the right reasons. Surely Labour will pay a political price for this?

[MattC86]

Surely Labour will pay a political price for this?

In just my 4 months here, I have seen at least a dozen stories in the various papers describing numerous military issues all related to funding. BA enlisted living at the poverty level, equipment shortages, vacillation on whether to kill the new aircraft carrier (the first real one the RN would have since the 1960s) and a host of other programs. The budget shortfalls seem to get worse with each passing week.

Yet aside from the smoke being blown at Westminster by Tory MPs, the amount of outrage is miniscule. I don't know what it would take to mobilise either political or public anger about this issue, but it does not seem to have taken hold to date.

This coming from a foreign observer, of course.

Regards,

Matt

[Norfolk]

...the amount of outrage is miniscule. I don't know what it would take to mobilise either political or public anger about this issue, but it does not seem to have taken hold to date.

This coming from a foreign observer, of course.

Regards,

Matt

It's pretty accurate, though. In Commonwealth countries, the military is generally an object of an indifference even greater than in much of the U.S. And the hostile elements are at least as, well, hostile - and with more access to power. Just as the more or less public indifference served those with the political will to use military force rather more freely in the past, much the same public indifference conversely serves those with the political will to do a hatchet job on the military - even whilst increasing operational taskings to ridiculous levels. See the near-breakdown of the Canadian Armed Forces in the 1990's for clues as to what the Brits are possibly in for in the next few years.

If Labour gets the heave, it will not be because the electorate was enraged by its treatment of the soldiery.

[JJackson]

they disagree with the deployments, which were contrary to public opinion, and want the commitments reduced to match the forces rather than the forces increased to match the commitments.

[Granite_State]

In just my 4 months here, I have seen at least a dozen stories in the various papers describing numerous military issues all related to funding. BA enlisted living at the poverty level, equipment shortages, vacillation on whether to kill the new aircraft carrier (the first real one the RN would have since the 1960s) and a host of other programs. The budget shortfalls seem to get worse with each passing week.

Yet aside from the smoke being blown at Westminster by Tory MPs, the amount of outrage is miniscule. I don't know what it would take to mobilise either political or public anger about this issue, but it does not seem to have taken hold to date.

This coming from a foreign observer, of course.

Regards,

Matt

I've been here a bit longer, but see things the same way. Hard to have a day go by without seeing a story about slashed military funding or overstretch in the Telegraph. If Brown goes, I think that'll be pretty far down the lists of reasons why. But I also suspect the Tories wouldn't be much better, because they're just basically New Labour Lite now anyway.

Part of the issue may be that, at least as far as I've seen, ordinary squaddies aren't too well regarded. The usual stuff about drinking too much, starting fights, etc. Maybe things are the same if you live in a military town in the States like Fayetteville, I don't know, we don't have too many of those in New England. But then, there was also that story in the papers recently about RAF men in Peterborough (not far from me) being told not to wear their uniforms out in public.

[Jedburgh]

Chatham House, 27 May 08: UK Security and Defence:
More 'Muddling Through' or Time for a Requirements-Led Strategic Defence Review? (http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/media/comment/uk_security/)

With Britain's Armed Forces stretched to breaking point in Afghanistan and Iraq, calls for a review of defence strategy and commitments are being heard more often. And if British troops become embroiled in conflict in Kosovo after the new constitution comes into force there on 15 June, the government will come under still more pressure to set out its strategic priorities and to ensure that sufficient resources are allocated to defence.

While UK Armed Forces are over-stretched, the UK defence sector is having precisely the opposite experience - a sense of under-employment while government spending plans are confused and important equipment programmes remain on the drawing board.

Armed Forces stretched to the point of exhaustion, and defence industry panicking about their order book: hardly a strong, balanced relationship between government, industry and Armed Forces. Would a review of UK defence sort things out, or are Britain's defence planners rediscovering the merits of 'muddling through'?....

....The UK has tried most conceivable types of defence review; threat-oriented, capabilities-driven, effects-based and foreign policy-led. On the assumption that commitments will not be reduced in the near term, perhaps the moment has arrived for a new style of review, one focused on military requirements. The Armed Forces would be provided with what they manifestly need to meet their commitments, from medical treatment and rehabilitation, to housing and salaries, to the best equipment that British defence industry can provide. Everybody would then be happy. Except the Treasury.

[SWJED]

SAS Chief Resigns Over Lack of Kit (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article4087644.ece) - Michael Smith, Times of London


A former head of the SAS has quit the army after criticising the government for risking soldiers’ lives by failing to fund troops and equipment.

Brigadier Ed Butler, one of Britain’s most experienced and decorated special forces soldiers, is the most senior of three key commanders to have resigned in the past year amid widespread anger over lack of funding.

News of his resignation comes in the same week that General Sir Richard Dannatt, head of the army, called for better treatment for the forces and more money to be spent on defence. In a statement issued through the Ministry of Defence (MoD), Butler said he was leaving for “a number of factors and reasons” and singled out difficulties faced by service personnel...

We Owe Our Soldiers (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2008/06/08/do0807.xml) - Jenny McCartney, Daily Telegraph of London opinion


There was, I thought, a detectable whiff of desperation in the plea from General Sir Richard Dannatt, the head of the Army, last week for better treatment of our armed forces. It is highly unusual for an Army leader to speak out publicly on such matters, which suggests that Gen Dannatt's concerns have become so fierce that protocol is increasingly irrelevant.

He requested that a "slightly increased share" of the national wealth should be spent on the armed forces, to include a pay rise above inflation, and an improvement of the frequently appalling Ministry of Defence accommodation in which military personnel are housed. To illustrate his point, he highlighted the fact that the lowest-paid soldiers in the British Army are on an annual salary of £12,572, while a traffic warden's basic pay is £17,000.

The MoD has protested that if a private is serving on the front line in Afghanistan or Iraq, associated bonuses can push his or her salary up to £22,000 a year. I take the point. It must be quite heart-warming to know that in exchange for risking your life in the heat of battle at the behest of our Government, you can claw your way up to a salary that hovers just below the national average...

[Stan]

Almost half of UK military personnel (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7498904.stm) are ready to leave the forces, a Ministry of Defence survey suggests.


More than half of those who responded to the survey were not satisfied with standards of military equipment and resources given to them to do their jobs, while some 40% were unhappy with service accommodation, and 55% were dissatisfied with the standards of maintenance of their service housing.

Yet the survey also showed that despite all the difficulties, especially the lengthy separations from friends and family, pride in serving within the Armed Forces remained high, with 93% of Army officers and 76% of soldiers saying they were proud to be in the Army.

[davidbfpo]

The publication of this internal survey led to a junior MoD minister being questioned on BBC Radio Today programme this morning. The interviewer asked how long the UK could keep its military forces intact, with two large commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq? The minister squiirmed on that one.

The "quick fix" is to withdraw the brigade in Iraq. The rationale for remaining is lost on most British people and this week the BBC TV News have reported on how better Basra is under Iraqi control.

The reason we have remained is our "special relationship" with the USA and an abrupt departure a year ago, when Gordon Brown became Prime Minister, would have exposed the LoC.

I have no objection to a far smaller UK presence in Basra, training etc. A brigade is not required.

The latest announcement of the next UK brigade bound for Afghanistan, illustrates the stretch - a Royal Marine core, but with two Army infantry battallions added.

davidbfpo

[William F. Owen]

The latest announcement of the next UK brigade bound for Afghanistan, illustrates the stretch - a Royal Marine core, but with two Army infantry battallions added.


40 Commando is not deploying. 1 Rifles is actually part of 3 Commando Brigade and 2 RGR is replacing 40 Commando and have been notified of the task for over a year.

The real concern is the lack of helicopters and the need for another brigade.

[Norfolk]

"UK forces oppose Niger Delta plan (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/90f1d6ee-4f7a-11dd-b050-000077b07658.html?nclick_check=1)", by James Blitz and William Wallis, Financial Times.com, 11 July, 2008.

I will not dispute the strategic necessity of ridding the Niger Delta of MEND; with its rapidly expanding capabilities (courtesy at least in part of the provider of its armaments), the group has to be stamped out, literally. However, if a mobile training team proves inadequate to help Nigerian security forces eradicate MEND, then nothing short of British troops may be necessary to do the job. Given that this may be
developing into a sort of proxy war (still ambiguous, but ambiguity is a calling card of one of the possible belligerants) over resources between great powers, and that MEND may be able to rely upon substantial assistance, this could turn into yet another constant drain on the Army's dwindling strength and resources.

No wonder the Army is reacting with some hostility to this new mission.

[Fuchs]

"UK forces oppose Niger Delta plan (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/90f1d6ee-4f7a-11dd-b050-000077b07658.html?nclick_check=1)", by James Blitz and William Wallis, Financial Times.com, 11 July, 2008.

I will not dispute the strategic necessity of ridding the Niger Delta of MEND; with its rapidly expanding capabilities (courtesy at least in part of the provider of its armaments), the group has to be stamped out, literally.

Why?
It's an internal struggle of Nigeria, a civil war. I see absolutely no reason why other countries should get involved.
For what? For oil? Oil supply would not be driven up to maximum capacity or anywhere close by an intervention. Last I heard is that this doesn't even work under much more favourable conditions in Iraq.

Those people have their disputes about sovereignty. It's their affair. We don't need to intervene until they attempt a genocide or invade adjacent countries.

Back2topic; I think it's justifiable to be 'hostile' to certain missions even if they would not strain the forces and would be easily done.
Germany has introduced the "citizen in uniform", a soldier who's supposed to think independently about right or wrong in the context of the legal system. We didn't want another generation of officers who'd serve a tyrant just because they once swore an oath to him.
The "citizen in uniform" deserves to be applied in more minor troubles as well (it actually seemed to have failed a bit in 1999, but ironically it seems to have worked better in the KSK).

I can't see how an involvement in that conflict would be a good idea, and to involve a military in it would certainly do some harm, albeit probably only below the surface.

[SWJED]

Recent News from Across the Pond (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/07/recent-news-from-across-the-po/) - SWJ Blog - recent news concerning the British Army and General Sir Richard Dannatt, Chief of the General Staff.

[davidbfpo]

I don't know if the USA has a similar "season", but when the UK parliament adjourns for it's summer holiday, a "silly season" starts with all manner of press reports occupying the space created.

General Dannat's views have been reported before in several newspapers, notably The Times and the Daily Telegraph. It will be interesting if they are picked up by the tabloids and those papers which generally support the government.

Yes, the plight of the UK forces now has a higher public profile, so far expressed mainly in more sympathy, rather then a vocal demand for rectifying many of the weaknesses. Any "fixing" will take a long time, like better vehicles and more helicopters for two well known examples. To date there is no sign of the UK government making policy changes or allocating extra spending.

Anti-war sentiments I would suggest have not changed; the vast majority of the UK public oppose our involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq. Those opposed to the wars have singularly failed to mobilise support.

davidbfpo

[Ken White]

I don't know if the USA has a similar "season", but when the UK parliament adjourns for it's summer holiday, a "silly season" starts with all manner of press reports occupying the space created.Though it does speed up a bit when congress is not in session...
General Dannat's views have been reported before in several newspapers, notably The Times and Daily Telegraph. It will be interesting if they are picked up by the tabloids and those papers which generally support the government.As long as Page 3 is not displaced... :D

From my possibly ill informed perspective, Dannat seems to make more sense than did Mike Jackson in the job...

[davidbfpo]

This blog provides an excellent commentary on Sir Richard's views and plans for military stabilisation teams: http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/2008/07/ahead-of-game.html

The author is Richard North, who I've read elsewhere on his better known views opposing the European Union.

davidbfpo

[William F. Owen]

General Sir Richard Dannatt, Chief of the General Staff, will say that the Army should consider creating “permanent cadres of stabilisation specialists” so that soldiers can deliver “civil as well as military effects within areas as diverse as governance, town administration, finance and banking, law and order and sanitation”.

I respectfully and strongly disagree with the General. This is not the Army's job and never should be (and never was! Generally we had civil servants to do this). The Army creates a security environment where others, with the appropriate, mandate, resources and expertise, can function.

The Army is not there to deliver "civil effect" - what ever that is :confused: ?

In "extremis", the Army should be able to deliver very basic humanitarian services. What the General is talking about should be done by another Government Agency. Army can barely do it's own job well. Why do we want to take on others?

[Ken White]

With three caveats:

1. The Geographic Commands were not designed to be the point men in US foreign relations but fell into that mode by default. That needs to be rectified, probably by adequate funding of State, the establishment of Ambassadors Plenipotentiary, aligned with the GeoComs, who take back that responsibility. Revitalization of USIA and USAID are also required.

2. Someone has to do it -- and here in the US, the Army has gotten into the business as a result of WW II experience (Again... :mad:) AND the default of the US government and Congress in particular to prepare for contingency operations. I suspect the same problem exists in the UK and the legislators are unwilling to pay the bill for what's needed in order to avoid having to tell voters their votes will no longer be bought. What's required is an assessment of what may occur and adequate funding for the foreign policy establishment and those government agencies that should be doing this kind of work.

2. In the US, we have tabbed FID and allied efforts to USSOCOM -- who'd really rather not (in the case of some) be involved -- recall that initially, SOCOM had the whole ball of wax, SF, JSOC, PsyOps and ALL Civil Affairs. While there were and are problems with that organizational concept as illustrated by the current situation, what's now required is a multi-agency assessment and review to establish a new model.

But the bottom line is that it is not really an Army or Marine mission other than in the first 30 days or so after major combat. Not least because in an era of highly paid and exorbitantly equipped volunteer forces in a healthy global economy, the cost in spaces is too high for the services. You can have war fighters or nation builders but not both in adequate numbers for the long missions.

[gh_uk]

As I understand it, Dannatt's comments arise from the British Army's experiences in southern Iraq, starting from April 2003. They had taken control of Basra and were trying to fill in the gaps caused by the collapse of Iraqi government structures. I remember the CO of 7 Armd Brigade sitting in his office in the palace, describing how he was running the local main bank out of an ISO container in the grounds, administered by TA soldiers with a finance background.

I believe the Army has formed the view that it cannot rely on the UK civilian agencies and ministries to stand up when they are needed, especially in non-permissive environments in Iraq and southern Afghanistan. This has been particularly notable in the MoD's (and again the Army, via 52 Brigade) development of new SSR doctrine. They have come to the view that in order to successfully exit from operations such as those in Iraq, they will need to have organic stablisation assets and capabilities, because their civil counterparts can not or will not fill the gap.

[SWJED]

... we have a winner. Yep, it ain't our job but somehow we always seem to be required to fill the vaccuum when our Phase IV buds are UA / AWOL from the game.

[Ken White]

SWJ ED:

We did in WW II because that was the nature of that war; everyone that could be put in a uniform donned one and the Armed Forces did virtually all of it -- to include the OSS mission. That was by design and made sense at the time due to the total mobilization.

The only time between now and then that such effort has been required was in Viet Nam. There was no total mobilization and there were plenty of civilian agency folks involved to include such minor exotics as Agriculture, Commerce and Labor; Sate was heavy in it, USAID was was literally everywhere and into everything and the CIA was a civilian agency. I don't know the numbers, I do know there were a slew of civilian employees of the US Government all over SEA.

We let all that lapse because we were going to eschew nation building and COIN. Add to that the movement of the GeoComs into the foreign policy arena by default -- someone had to do it and they were there -- and the result was the chaos of mid 2003 and 2004. Yes, the Armed Forces filled the gap again by default because someone had to do it. That they have generally done it well is a tribute to all involved.

There is no question that in any entry operation, a degree of Armed Forces involvement in the Phase IV process is required for a period of time and that complete interface with that process will be needed as long as the US is in that nation. There's also no question that a capability to do that is required. Nor should there be any question that units and people can be trained to fight a war, enforce a peace and pass out food and blankets. That can and should be done.

That does not however address the problem. That problem is, simply, numbers. Force levels are finite. Every uniformed person devoted to post conflict duties is one less available for other missions. Therefor, it only seems sensible that a reinvention of a wheel is required and more robust civilian structure to cope with the long term FID / nationbuilding / restoration must be developed and sustained. It seems likely that similar requirements may crop up in the near future and that if they do, a full mobilization is unlikely. I submit that to take the attitude that we, the Armed Forces, "Can Do" it is to invite and allow others who'd rather not be involved to escape their responsibilities.

Far worse and more dangerous, it will also adversely impact, possibly far more significantly than today given another situation, the ability of the Services to fulfill their responsibilities.

The issue is not "can we do it" or "we have to, there is no one else" -- the issue is who should do it. The Armed forces, if given the mission will do it, no question -- but is it really their job? Should it be their reponsibility? Been my observation that if one is willing to accept a responsibility, even if it is not rightly theirs, the world will readily accede to that and walk away. I think that's probably the genesis of the phrase 'mission creep' and the word 'overcommitment.' Just because it can work doesn't mean it's right -- or should remain that way...

This is one of those 'be careful what you want, you may get it' issues.

[Ron Humphrey]

As I understand it, Dannatt's comments arise from the British Army's experiences in southern Iraq, starting from April 2003. They had taken control of Basra and were trying to fill in the gaps caused by the collapse of Iraqi government structures. I remember the CO of 7 Armd Brigade sitting in his office in the palace, describing how he was running the local main bank out of an ISO container in the grounds, administered by TA soldiers with a finance background.

I believe the Army has formed the view that it cannot rely on the UK civilian agencies and ministries to stand up when they are needed, especially in non-permissive environments in Iraq and southern Afghanistan. This has been particularly notable in the MoD's (and again the Army, via 52 Brigade) development of new SSR doctrine. They have come to the view that in order to successfully exit from operations such as those in Iraq, they will need to have organic stablisation assets and capabilities, because their civil counterparts can not or will not fill the gap.

Yep::wry:


... we have a winner. Yep, it ain't our job but somehow we always seem to be required to fill the vaccuum when our Phase IV buds are UA / AWOL from the game.

:eek:


SWJ ED:

The issue is not "can we do it" or "we have to, there is no one else" -- the issue is who should do it. The Armed forces, if given the mission will do it, no question -- but is it really their job? Should it be their reponsibility? Been my observation that if one is willing to accept a responsibility, even if it is not rightly theirs, the world will readily accede to that and walk away. I think that's probably the genesis of the phrase 'mission creep' and the word 'overcommitment.' Just because it can work doesn't mean it's right -- or should remain that way...

This is one of those 'be careful what you want, you may get it' issues.

(emphasis Ronexcept for the first should ,that was ken)


Do you think those who need to are going to get that or not?:confused:

[Ken White]

Do you think those who need to are going to get that or not?:confused:in Viet Nam to get enough Civilians there, in Iraq it took about four (acknowledging there's still a shortfall), so we're getting better. As this LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=52424#post52424) shows, this administration is at least trying to get on the stick. We'll see what the next few years bring.

One minor worry, to me, is the folks within DoD who will want to keep the job as military as they can for control (and comfort) purposes. That was a part of the problem in Viet Nam. In my view, that would be very short sighted; the Armed Forces must be able to handle the short term effort, no doubt -- but the long term will be better if mostly civilian. Seems a shame to train troops to fight wars and put them on non-warfighting tasks when it can be avoided. Fortunately, this time nothing else requiring Troop presence elsewhere intruded; I'm unsure that can be relied upon in the future.

[William F. Owen]

I believe the Army has formed the view that it cannot rely on the UK civilian agencies and ministries to stand up when they are needed, especially in non-permissive environments in Iraq and southern Afghanistan.

The Army can't rely on the civilians for a lot, and the Army doing it, reduces the abilities of the army instead of demanding the civilians get up to speed. Servants of the Crown can demand and force the other servants to pull their weight!


They have come to the view that in order to successfully exit from operations such as those in Iraq, they will need to have organic stablisation assets and capabilities, because their civil counterparts can not or will not fill the gap.

...and this view is in error. The Army must create a "permissive" environment for the other agencies to work in. Someone needs to risk their career (more dear than life to senior UK officers) and tell the FO, DIFD and all the other work shy clowns that they need to go buy some 511 pants and get their flabby backsides out into the bundu.

[gh_uk]

The Army must create a "permissive" environment for the other agencies to work in.

Isn't this the nub of the problem? The British (and the Coalition more widely) failed to create a sufficiently permissive environment in Iraq (and subsequently in parts of Afghanistan) for the civilian agencies to operate (though admittedly other factors like a lack of planning and buy-in from other departments also had an impact).

I think its a real Catch 22 - you can't undertake civil-led reconstruction without making it safe enough for non-military operations, but you can't, apparently, create that environment without reconstruction. Witness the sending of a Royal Engineer detachment with 3 Commando Brigade to Helmand - it was recognised that is was too dangerous for civilian engineers to operate there and the military engineers were sent in their stead to try and make initial progress.

Maybe the creation of a military capability which can, in the short to medium term undertake 'nation-building' (or whichever term you wish to choose), to the point where the situation is stable enough for the deployment of civilian agencies and contractors is the only way it might work (though I acknowledge that the military may then be left with the problem in the long term anyway). Sadly, if this does occur, I doubt any new resources will made available to create and maintain such forces.

[davidbfpo]

An excellent, long article based on an interview with a just resigned UK Para Lieut.Col.: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article4364115.ece#cid=OTC-RSS&attr=797093

Lots of uncomfortable details, notably the lack of Chinook helicopters which force movement onto the ground (nearly useed roads) and IEDs.

davidbfpo

[William F. Owen]

, but you can't, apparently, create that environment without reconstruction.

I can't see that line of reasoning. "Security" is not dependant on infrastructure. You may have to address basic needs, - food, water, power - but education and the banking system are not priorities if people are dying.

Now Northern Ireland, Malaya, Yemen, Kenya and Cyprus all had functioning civil services (best in the world!- Colonial British) so we never needed to do this before, but we may need to do it in the future. The idea that we can't send civilians to dangerous places is just rubbish. Pay them well, and give them clear and achievable goals.

[Fuchs]

The idea that we can't send civilians to dangerous places is just rubbish. Pay them well, and give them clear and achievable goals.

Casualties - especially POWs - might be a problem. The problem also applies to soldiers, but to send unarmed personnel into hot zones is even more difficulty. The political responsibility is the key problem, not the non-political feasibility.

[William F. Owen]

Casualties - especially POWs - might be a problem. The problem also applies to soldiers, but to send unarmed personnel into hot zones is even more difficulty. The political responsibility is the key problem, not the non-political feasibility.

All good points but none of them are unthinkable or not doable. - and they do not have to be un-armed. There are well understood conditions for arming civilians in conflict zones, if done for self-protection. - and they are not really civilians. They are Government contractors. We've been here before many times.

...and If the Political will does not exist, then we shouldn't be there.

[davidbfpo]

According to a British Army contact one of the infantry battalions scheduled to go to Afghanistan next Spring is currently only able to deploy two, not three rifle companies, plus a support company and HQ (minus one rifle company).

I suspect a third rifle company will be grafted on, from other units; I recall - without details - a Para unit deployed with a Ghurkha company added for example

There is no sign of recruiting picking up, although there are too many junior officers to go around (odd I thought and confirmed by Wilf as affecting the Royal Marines too).

What caused this recruiting problem, no - a crisis? Multiple factors and IMHO includes the recent regimental reforms which reduced local links in favour of bigger is better (one reason ostensibly was to improve recruiting across a wider area).

Now the Army faces increasing demands, notably in Afghanistan, with a second brigade to be deployed. Part of the Army's response has been to post recruits to where they are needed most, i.e. for impending operational tours and not the regiment they choose to hoin or have an affinity to - for all manner of reasons, e.g. brother serving in. Understandable? Yes, appears to have short-term gains outbalanced by long-term losses IMHO.

Apparently news of this response has spread outside the army and recruiting has gone down.

There appears to be no political will to allow the British Army to recruit, even reform, to fill the gap.

davidbfpo

[Tankguy]

At the risk of sticking out my neck for a piss take.....

One thing that is predictable in America is grass roots patriotism. Not to say that it isn't alive and well else where. I do not want to cast Americans as war mongering or violent at all, it is just when something like 9/11 happens, you see a huge upswing in recruiting. It is hard to explain. The same thing happened in 90-91 with Desert Storm. It is not that Americans love a good fight, it is just the inbuilt desire to serve.

I know this spirit is alive and well in the British Army. I worked with as fine a group of lads at the Gunnery School as any I have encountered. I would serve on operations with any of them, without question. I think it is, as previously stated, an issue of political will.

[Granite_State]

At the risk of sticking out my neck for a piss take.....

One thing that is predictable in America is grass roots patriotism. Not to say that it isn't alive and well else where. I do not want to cast Americans as war mongering or violent at all, it is just when something like 9/11 happens, you see a huge upswing in recruiting. It is hard to explain. The same thing happened in 90-91 with Desert Storm. It is not that Americans love a good fight, it is just the inbuilt desire to serve.

I know this spirit is alive and well in the British Army. I worked with as fine a group of lads at the Gunnery School as any I have encountered. I would serve on operations with any of them, without question. I think it is, as previously stated, an issue of political will.

You were at Lulworth? I was in Bovington two weeks ago doing research, went for a run and went out on the range at Arish Mell Gap. You probably blew up old Chieftains around there. Pretty place.

[Tankguy]

Ahhh, there are some of my fondest memories. Not blowing up Chieftans, but the view of Arish Mell Gap from St. Andrew's and Bindon ranges. Absolutely beautiful. I lived on Bindon Close just south of the main camp and the views walking up the hill to work in the morning were spectacular. The sun rising and lighting up the cliffs on St. Aldam's Head were impressive.

[davidbfpo]

Under the full headline 'British Army has too many officers and not enough rank-and-file soldiers', see the Daily Telegraph story: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/2638067/British-Army-has-too-many-officers-and-not-enough-rank-and-file-soldiers.html

In summary: There are almost 1,000 more trained officers on the Army payroll than the force needs to do its work. But among the ranks, there is a shortfall of 4,400 - the equivalent of around seven infantry battalions.

My emphasis added.

davidbfpo

[Tom Odom]

Under the full headline 'British Army has too many officers and not enough rank-and-file soldiers', see the Daily Telegraph story: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/2638067/British-Army-has-too-many-officers-and-not-enough-rank-and-file-soldiers.html

In summary: There are almost 1,000 more trained officers on the Army payroll than the force needs to do its work. But among the ranks, there is a shortfall of 4,400 - the equivalent of around seven infantry battalions.

My emphasis added.

davidbfpo


OK

Let's get 'em seconded to the US Army to fill our needs for officers....a reverse lend lease :wry:

[Tankguy]

I can relate to that story. It seemed that of all the courses I taught during my three years in sunny Lulworth, all the officer courses were full to capacity. The enlisted courses were usually short.

[Cavguy]

Apparently the UK Army's problems relate to hotel stays as well.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wales/7596798.stm


A soldier home on leave after being injured in Afghanistan was refused a room by a hotel when he showed his military ID card at reception.

Corporal Tomos Stringer, 23, from Gwynedd, was visiting a wounded colleague in Surrey when he was turned away from the Metro Hotel in Woking.

He spent the night in his car after being told it was management policy not to accept military personnel.


The hotel has apologized, but really, that is low. :mad:

[SWJED]

US Accuses Britain Over Military Failings in Afghanistan (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article5349036.ece) - Tom Baldwin and Michael Evans, The Times


The performance of Britain’s overstretched military in Afghanistan is coming under sustained criticism from the Pentagon and US analysts even as Gordon Brown ponders whether to send in further reinforcements.

Robert Gates, the US Defence Secretary who has been asked to remain in his job under Barack Obama, is understood to have expressed strong reservations about counterinsurgency operations in British-controlled Helmand province.

He has already announced plans for a surge of 20,000 US troops into Afghanistan but Mr Brown, who was given a bleak progress report when he visited Afghanistan at the weekend, is said to be reluctant about committing another 2,000 British troops on top of the 8,400 already there...

More at The Times (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/12/us-accuses-britain-over-milita/).

[SWJED]

Letter to Tom Baldwin (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/12/letter-to-tom-baldwin-the-time/), The Times

Dear Mr. Baldwin

I was sent an email by Dr. Carter Malkasian stating that you wished to speak to me. I then quickly was informed that an article was published with a quote from this summer's CNA/Press Club book launch.

I wished you had waited to speak to me, since I would have put the quote in context. There are many positive developments within the British Army at the moment.

British officers and soldiers were embarrassed since they felt they could not complete their COIN mission in Iraq, due to issues outside their remit.

There is recognition that the Americans have reformed beyond all expectations. The British Army has recognised the need to reform as well.

The British Army and HMG had many issues in MND SE due to a variety of decisions, one being the US approach to the campaign from 2003-06, which was not appropriate. However, the British Army recognised that the war had changed dramatically in 2007 and many commanders, officers, NCOs and soldiers wished there had been a shift of strategy from Whitehall for MND SE.

The shift finally occurred with the Charge of the Knights and the British were able to support the Iraqi 14 DIV in its efforts to clear and now hold the city of BASRA, through proper embedding into MITTs. The British Army in their time honoured tradition of learning and adapting, was able to restore honour to their mission in MND SE. Many lessons are being learned from the campaign in Iraq that have had a positive impact on British operations in Helmand and RC South.

The British campaign in RC South and Helmand has been difficult but not due to the efforts of the officers, NCOs and soldiers of the British Army. Their preparation for Helmand has been stronger with each HERRICK due to lessons from the past as well as Iraq. There are issues for the Army that are outside their control but rest with Whitehall that need to be addressed.

All armies need to learn and adapt. The Americans have done so and now the British are doing it as well.

I feel that I should write a letter to the editor or an op-ed to put these 'quotes' in their proper context. Do you have any ideas how best to do this?

Best
Daniel Marston

[SWJED]

US Opens Fire on Brown’s ‘War Fatigue’ (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article5375352.ece) - Sarah Baxter and Nicola Smith, The Sunday Times


As the United States prepares for a troop “surge” in Afghanistan in the new year, Robert Gates, the defence secretary, and senior commanders are concerned that the British government lacks the “political will” for the fight.
General John Craddock, the Nato commander, said last week that Britain must put more troops into Helmand province to defeat the Taliban insurgency.

In an interview with The Sunday Times at Nato’s supreme headquarters in Mons, Belgium, he said Gordon Brown’s announcement last Monday that more troops would bolster Britain’s 8,100-strong force in Afghanistan by March was not enough. Although planning is under way to send up to 3,000 extra troops to Afghanistan next summer if required, Brown committed only 300 in his Commons statement.

“I don’t think 300 more, if you are talking about Helmand province, will do the trick. We’ve got to hold down there until we’ve got some Afghan street forces who can take over,” Craddock said.

[davidbfpo]

This open US military criticism is not un-expected, whether it helps is a moot point. I doubt if the UK or US public accept what is currently an open-ended military commitment to Afghanistan (73% oppose the UK role there). No-one can assure the UK public that more UK troops will make a difference.

As other threads have asked what is our strategic aim in Afghanistan?

PE Obama may need some diplomatic effort with Gordon Brown, if this row escalates.

There's also a commentary in The Sunday Times, by Michael Portillo, on the UK's lack of will: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article5375770.ece

davidbfpo

[Icebreaker]

One of the first lessons that I was taught, that I actually used was the policy of "praise in public, and cricize in private". If a smuck like me knows that then I am sure that Secretary Gates and the various generals and admirals do to.

It makes me wonder what undercurrents are going on?

I have always been glad to have Great Britain as our best friend and ally, and hope that these issues will pass, if only for personal reasons. For years I have been tormenting my friends of Irissh descent with the question - "When was the last time the Irish Army won a war, and when was the last time the British Army lost one." I love watching their faces turn even redder;)

[Ken White]

One of the first lessons that I was taught, that I actually used was the policy of "praise in public, and cricize in private"...For some introspective types, public praise is embarrassing and makes them acutely uncomfortable, they'd much rather hear a quiet word of praise away from the crowd.

OTOH, for others, who can lie about anything, private criticism will get turned into "He tried to chew me out and did I ever back him down..." when it's told to others later and they'll rationalize it away. Worst thing you can do to those types is criticize them publicly, that hurts worse than a whopping fine. Of course, they'll hate you but who cares. Tough munchies.
It makes me wonder what undercurrents are going on?True.
I have always been glad to have Great Britain as our best friend and ally, and hope that these issues will pass, if only for personal reasons. For years I have been tormenting my friends of Irissh descent with the question - "When was the last time the Irish Army won a war, and when was the last time the British Army lost one." I love watching their faces turn even redder;)"Ah, sure and if the Irish didn't have the whisky, they'd rule the world..." :D

Being Scotch Irish, I defend nor attack either the British or the Irish. ;) -- but I do agree with you that the UK is our best friend and ally in Europe and hope that any bumps in the road are small and insignificant. They have, unfortunately, had to put up with far worse than that from us in the last 90 years or so.

[SWJED]

Britain Has Lost the Stomach For a Fight (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article5375770.ece) - Michael Portillo, The Sunday Times opinion


Last week Gordon Brown announced a date for Britain’s withdrawal from Iraq. Most troops will be back in time for a spring general election. The prime minister posed with soldiers and expressed his sorrow over yet more fatal casualties in Afghanistan. He did not dwell on Britain’s humiliation in Basra, nor mention that this is the most inglorious withdrawal since Sir Anthony Eden ordered the boys back from Suez.

The fundamental cause of the British failure was political. Tony Blair wanted to join the United States in its toppling of Saddam Hussein because if Britain does not back America it is hard to know what our role in the world is: certainly not a seat at the top table. But, for all his persuasiveness, Blair could not hold public opinion over the medium term and so he cut troop numbers fast and sought to avoid casualties. As a result, British forces lost control of Basra and left the population at the mercy of fundamentalist thugs and warring militias, in particular Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army.

The secondary cause of failure was a misplaced British disdain for America, shared by our politicians and senior military. In the early days in Iraq we bragged that our forces could deploy in berets and soft-sided vehicles while US forces roared through Baghdad in heavily armoured convoys. British leaders sneered at the Americans’ failure to win hearts and minds because of their lack of experience in counterinsurgency.

Pride has certainly come before a fall. British commanders underestimated both the enemy’s effectiveness and the Americans’ ability to adapt. Some apparently failed even to observe how much had changed. At a meeting in August 2007 an American described Major-General Jonathan Shaw, then British commander, as “insufferable”, lecturing everyone in the room about lessons learnt in Northern Ireland, which apparently set eyeballs rolling: “It would be okay if he was best in class, but now he’s worst in class.” ...

SWJ Editor’s Note: From the small corner of the world of counterinsurgency I occupy my observation is that our (the US) adjustment to face COIN realities, produce a new doctrine for the same and execute that doctrine were well informed by the British Army, Royal Marines and Air Force participants in a program I was associated with (and am) from 2003 to the present. That program – Joint Urban Warrior – cosponsored by the USMC and USJFCOM – specifically looked at insurgent threats and counterinsurgency strategies as well as tactics, techniques and procedures - in five annual wargames and dozens of seminars, workshops and planning events. The UK delegation; along with the Australians, Canadians and others; contributed first-class lessons learned, theory and practice - we owe them quite a bit for that. - Dave Dilegge

[davidbfpo]

It must be the weekend and the furore continues: an article in The Sunday Telegraph, by General Mike Jackson - http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3869106/Britains-Armed-Forces-will-leave-Iraq-with-heads-held-high.html

Which has a critique follow-up: http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/

Note there is a widely held public view that our servicemen and women have done us proud, so should have a heroes welcome back to the UK. The mainstream panel on the weekly BBC Radio 4 'Any Questions' programme all said this. I've not looked at a wider range of websites.

[William F. Owen]

http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/People/Speeches/ChiefStaff/20090119AddressToTheInstituteForPublicPolicyResear chLondon.htm

[kaur]

Britain's armed forces

Losing their way?
Jan 29th 2009
From The Economist print edition

The British army suffers from lack of soldiers, lack of money and lack of conviction

http://www.economist.com/world/britain/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13022177

[PJW]

http://www.economist.com/world/britain/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13022177

If we accept, in more than just an abstract sense, that the deployment, strictures and funding of our armed forces stem from political decisions, I feel the questioning of the commitment of the British Army astonishing and remarkably small minded.

The perceived lack of British Military's commitment in Afghanistan, for example, has basis in the refusal of the British Government to commit additional funding and troops. Lest we forget we live not in a military dictatorship but a liberal democracy.

For those in the U.S. military it is worth remembering the damage that was done to your armed forces by the Clinton administration. Surely, these shortcomings were not blamed on the armed forces themselves?

This is more than just another 'rearguard' defence of the British Army by one of its own. In my own experience, I have had nothing but support from my U.S. counterparts, in turn I have nothing but admiration for them. Let's not get confused between the arguments of political expediency and a the need to maintain a meaningful relationship between the armed forces of two countries, a bond formed, at some of our worst moments in history, in bloodshed.

[Ken White]

one of sympathy. Your comments on the US Armed force during the Clinton years are on target; we've been there. So have the Canadians. You've been around longer than the rest of us so there's more to lose.

Sad.

[ODB]

Will we actually learn from history or do as we usually do and let history repeat itself yet again?

[davidbfpo]

The Economist (London-based) has for a long time taken a mid-Atlantic viewpoint and this article is a curious mixture of insider views alongside a review of where the UK Army is. Nothing startling, indeed nothing new and much pasting of old stories.

The article asks two questions: Should the British continue to aspire to a global military role? And what sort of wars is the future likely to bring?

The first question has been repeatedly answered by successive UK governments, before and after the Cold War ended. The UK does not aspire to a global military role, it will act in concert with allies in many places (Former Yugoslavia, Iraq and Afghanistan) and alone in very few places (Falklands and Sierra Leone). We will support the USA, but not always (our absence from Vietnam).

The second question has been discussed here before and no answer given has certainity.

I do find the closing paragraph of US concerns tiresome and is so typical of The Economist. Whatever the global outlook of the UK government there is no political will to spend larger amounts of treasure, nor accept a higher blood loss and public admiration aside - why are we in Afghanistan is the usual refrain in public and private discussions.

I understand the Royal Marine brigade in Helmand now have had a dozen dead (Wilf, apologies if wrong) and seven times that number disabled / unfit for further duty. That scale of loss is increasingly difficult to absorb, not my words, but an insider's.

My armchair comments

davidbfpo

[William F. Owen]

I understand the Royal Marine brigade in Helmand now have had a dozen dead (Wilf, apologies if wrong) and seven times that number disabled / unfit for further duty. That scale of loss is increasingly difficult to absorb, not my words, but an insider's.



Actually I think it's about 14, so near spot on, sadly - and you would never owe me an apology!;)

[Meh]

New Statesman article (http://www.newstatesman.com/uk-politics/2009/02/snatch-soldiers-vehicle)

Love the nutty comment at the bottom.

[Ken White]

due to the fact that we -- in all western societies -- have become unduly coddled and protected from risks of all sorts by the proverbial Nanny State?

I do not denigrate the loss of a single soldier from any nation but I do believe risk goes with the job. This furor in all western nations involved in current fights about troop protection or force protection is truly getting out of hand. All us old guys who wandered about Europe in WW II and Korea in unarmored gun Jeeps and Viet Nam in unarmored M151s with pedestal mounts and and M2 or M60 can only shake our heads in wonder... :wry:

Many say that the risk of HIC is remote. One would hope so. Given current trends and desires, no one will be able to afford the equipment costs...

[davidbfpo]

On the Kings of War website: http://kingsofwar.wordpress.com/

A comment on The Economist article: 'the root cause, given that a fish rots from the head, is that the British Government, in part as a reflection of British public opinion, is lukewarm in its commitment to Afghanistan, mutedly hostile to the Iraq war at the highest levels and fears (probably correctly) that operations in both countries are undermining its domestic counter-radicalization programme. The confluence of these factors has created a strategic void into which the Army has fallen'.

If interested in the anger over the use of poor wheeled transport by UK Army, browse through: http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/ which has many articles, photos and links.

[davidbfpo]

A more balanced review (11th Jan '09) by the UK think tank RUSI of the Afghan dilemma, than the Economist cited previously: http://www.rusi.org/research/militarysciences/operationalstudies/commentary/ref:C496A10B7D39F6/

davidbfpo

[Ken White]

From the RUSI article linked:
"It is not that strategic thinking is absent: if anything there is too much of it going on in too many different places."That about sums it up... :wry:

Thanks for posting that.

[davidbfpo]

A story I'd been waiting for: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article5721192.ece

Which raises the question of command arrangements in Afghanistan, between the USA and the UK. Secondly the apparent deployment of a large US helicopter capability to the region.

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

A roundtable discussion on wider UK defence policy, entitled 'Force for Good', with "think tank" experts, analysts, a couple of civil servants and the current Defence Secretary: http://www.newstatesman.com/pdf/defence09.pdf

Note this appeared in the traditionally left-leaning News Statesman weekly magazine and the event's co-sponsor is a private defence contractor; how times change.

The second link: http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/ is an update on issues of defence equipment decision-making and waste of money. Note this useful UK commentary's author is writing a book on Iraq and the website is not being regularly updated.

davidbfpo

[William F. Owen]

A roundtable discussion on wider UK defence policy, entitled 'Force for Good', with "think tank" experts, analysts, a couple of civil servants and the current Defence Secretary: http://www.newstatesman.com/pdf/defence09.pdf


Without going into superfluous detail I know two of those men, extremely well, and they are good solid lads. I also know a respect another man at that meeting but it's far more telling as to who was not there, and should have been!

[davidbfpo]

The ex-SAS major who resigned after completing a tour in Afghanistan has spoken before and was interviewed in The Daily Telegraph, the link is: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/4951560/SAS-chief-says-MoD-has-blood-on-its-hands.html

I select one passage: "The operations that we are conducting are so worthless. It's just crazy to think we hold that ground or have any influence on what goes on beyond the bases."

The interview appears, with an official response, on the BBC link: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7929785.stm

Note the UK blogsite http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/ is active once more and makes scathing comments on UK defence policy, notably over equipment.

davidbfpo

[Jedburgh]

International Affairs, Mar 09: Blair's Wars and Brown’s Budgets: From Strategic Defence Review to Strategic Decay in Less Than a Decade (http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/13546_85_2cornish_dorman.pdf)

...The current state of Britain’s defence stands in marked contrast to the situation just a decade ago. In July 1998 George Robertson, Labour’s first Secretary of State for Defence in 18 years, presented the government’s Strategic Defence Review (SDR (http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/65F3D7AC-4340-4119-93A2-20825848E50E/0/sdr1998_complete.pdf)) to parliament for approval. The SDR represented 14 months of work and enjoyed widespread support within the MoD and parliament, among the various London-based think-tanks and policy research institutes, and within the defence industry and academia. The strategy was praised for bringing foreign and defence policy together in a clear, coherent and affordable fashion. For several years the SDR was regarded as a model for defence planning, so much so that current Conservative defence policy looks set unimaginatively to replicate the SDR process.

Why is it that the government’s past performance in this field, so widely regarded as admirable in principle, has nevertheless proved so difficult to sustain in practice? To put the question another way, why is it that strategy and reality have apparently parted company so dramatically? To answer these questions it must first be understood that UK defence policy—at best a complex and uncertain process, as the next section explains—has always been a compromise of sorts between three policy imperatives: declaratory policy; military strategy; and the defence budget. These imperatives, each of which we discuss in turn below, have been the three main ingredients in the UK defence policy debate particularly the last.....

[davidbfpo]

A shortage of Apache pilots means nine helicopters available in Afghanistan:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/4980541/Apache-pilot-shortfall-threatens-frontline.html

davidbfpo

[Jedburgh]

UK National Audit Office Report, 14 May 09: Support to High Intensity Operations (http://www.nao.org.uk//idoc.ashx?docId=1027a7f8-df3f-496b-a3f1-c868d43e45b2&version=-1)

This report looks at the Ministry of Defence’s (the Department’s) arrangements for supporting high intensity operations and focuses on four key areas: equipment, logistics, pre-deployment training and support to personnel. The intention of this report is not to examine military judgement or the outcomes of operations, nor does it look at the support provided to the many smaller operations in which the Department is engaged. Following on from the National Audit Office’s previous work on operations, the aim of this report is to examine the Department’s support to high intensity operations, since it is on this kind of operation that support arrangements are most stress-tested. For each key area of support, the report sets out the Department’s generic arrangements before examining how well these arrangements have been working on Operation TELIC in Iraq and Operation HERRICK in Afghanistan, primarily over the last two years.

[Coldstreamer]

...you shouldn't have joined! Think of it this way..

Within 12 months there will be a General Election, and assuredly a change of government - even if not a change of party.

Within 18 months there will be a Defence Review...not least as part of a post-election Comprehensive Spending Review.

And if past form is anything to go by, we'll hold onto the ludicrously outdated legacy capital projects, that guarantee the industrial base of perhaps 700 employees in margninal constituencies, and elicit saving by cutting...more infantry battalions!

So if you think its depressing now, just WAIT to see what's coming. God bless the baby boomers (honourable exceptions of those in or have worn uniform!). Bottom line - when we were flush, we were neglected. Now the West is Broke, wait and see. It'll be like the Crimea again.

[Ken White]

...God bless the baby boomers (honourable exceptions of those in or have worn uniform!)...Though I have to say some of those exceptions, honorable as they may be, were / are not helpful to the forces... :(

I'm old and they just disappointed me -- my Gen X kids, OTOH, can get quite livid on the topic of Baby Boomers... :eek:

[davidbfpo]

Some of the recent posts here have moved onto a new thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=75347#post75347
on the UK failing strategy.

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

An interesting comment on the UK defence crossroads, brought to the fore by a think tank report (IPPR: http://www.ippr.org.uk/publicationsandreports/publication.asp?id=676) and comments that hard choices were needed on what to spend on: http://kingsofwar.wordpress.com/2009/06/29/her-majestys-wasting-assets/

Be interesting to see if this elite muttering will be picked up by the wider public.

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

This time an article in the RUSI Journal, by an ex-UK Army officer: http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Journal_Little.pdf (complete with photos of Kilcullen and Nagl). The last paragraph is worth reading, citing continuous re-invention, reflection and listening to outsiders.

I suspect the article may get some media coverage - as there is some attention to the issues.

RUSI is a Whitehall "think tank", traditionally conservative and in the past due to close links with the Ministry of Defence not exactly open to criticism of policies. Often used as a platform by officials and senior officers to make statements, where General Dannatt has spoken and the incoming CGS General Richards recently: http://www.rusi.org/events/ref:E496B737B57852/info:public/infoID:E4A4253226F582/ (Must declare an interest, I've been a RUSI member for over thirty years).

Commentary on (as ever): http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/

davidbfpo

[William F. Owen]

This time an article in the RUSI Journal, by an ex-UK Army officer: http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Journal_Little.pdf (complete with photos of Kilcullen and Nagl). The last paragraph is worth reading, citing continuous re-invention, reflection and listening to outsiders.
Interesting. Mentions an article of mine!

[davidbfpo]

This week has seen a series of developments:

a) The valedictory (final) speech by General Dannatt, the UK's top soldier: http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/DefencePolicyAndBusiness/GeneralDannattGivesLastSpeechAsCgs.htm

I draw attention to (summarised): What leaps out though is something about which we have been vaguely aware..this comes early in the speech ....There was a belief that this could be conducted on the basis of "Go Fast, Go First, Go Home"...Having been locked into a flawed "mantra"..the armed forces geared to be able to deliver on this basis, now to find that they are faced with "long wars” for which they are neither equipped nor trained – nor fully understand. And I quote
"We should be under no illusion: we are at war and if we want to succeed, which we must, we must get onto a war-like footing - and as I said to the Officer Cadets being commissioned from Sandhurst last Christmas 'you enter an Army that is at war - even if not everyone in our nation realises that'".

As ever see the commentary on: http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/2009/08/nation-at-war.html

b) An article 'National defence in the age of austerity' by two defence academics (hat tip Kings of War): http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/14304_85_4cornish_dorman.pdf and an earlier paper 'Blair’s wars and Brown’s budgets, 'From Strategic Defence Review to strategic decay in less than a decade' : http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/13546_85_2cornish_dorman.pdf

Remembering David Kilcullen's remarks on more bandsmen in the USA than 'X' check in the first article Pg. 15 Tables One & Two for the incredible manpower structure the UK forces have.

c) The much-hyped report by the House of Commons Foriegn Affairs Committee (with a Labour chairman), that we are doing too much in Afghanistan and note released when parliament is on it's long vacation: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/5956503/Britains-drug-fighting-role-in-Afghanistan-a-poisoned-chalice-say-MPs.html and slightly longer: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/uk-in-afghanistan-for-decades-says-our-man-in-washington-1766248.html

The report is the top headline on Drudge; UK parliamentary committees have negligible power and governments can easily ignore them. By time Parliament returns who will remember this? Very few.

Other articles refer to an extra 2,000 troops going to Afghanistan, at the US's urging and allegedly vetoed by Prime Minister Gordon Brown. If they go to Helmand Province, with three extra helicopters (Merlins), this is crazy IMHO.

Previously commented upon in http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7848&highlight=british+army and other threads, notably in the Afghan context: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7644 and http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4819&highlight=british

[George L. Singleton]

Provided a crash program is up and running to train up Afghan soldiers and security forces (para-military and police), extra UK troops in Helmud Prov. is a sound idea and exactly where those extra soldiers are needed right now.

[Teen_Virtuoso]

Provided a crash program is up and running to train up Afghan soldiers and security forces (para-military and police), extra UK troops in Helmud Prov. is a sound idea and exactly where those extra soldiers are needed right now.

Do they have any personnel to spare though?

[davidbfpo]

Do they have any personnel to spare though?

From an outsider's "armchair" yes there is capacity, in manpower, whether there are the right people for a training and mentoring role is a moot point. As others within have commented somethings are broken. I fear the UK has not thought about sending 2,000 trainers, which is clearly indicated elsewhere as necessary.

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

Bill Rammell, Armed Forces Minister, spoke at RUSI on the role of defence in CT; a very broad brush and nothing startling. There is a part about HMG explaining policy on Afghanistan better: http://www.rusi.org/events/ref:E4A6F3C9D55E2D/

The speech was picked up by the main media, but I missed it. A speech at RUSI is hardly public engagement, although the Q&A session featured critical, polite questions (mainly from the press).

davidbfpo

[JMA]

Almost half of UK military personnel (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7498904.stm) are ready to leave the forces, a Ministry of Defence survey suggests.

Quote from BBC article: "Among the concerns raised by the 9,000 servicemen and women surveyed were the frequency of tours, levels of pay and the quality of equipment and housing."

I suggest that one needs to separate these factors into two groups. One is for those who appear to resist doing what they were employed to do in the first place and that is to act as a soldier on a op 'tour'. Sooner these go the better.

One would then be left with addressing the other major concerns which unless addressed could denude the military of those with the necessary military skills and who are willing and able to use those skills.

[JMA]

There is no sign of recruiting picking up, although there are too many junior officers to go around (odd I thought and confirmed by Wilf as affecting the Royal Marines too).

What caused this recruiting problem, no - a crisis? Multiple factors and IMHO includes the recent regimental reforms which reduced local links in favour of bigger is better (one reason ostensibly was to improve recruiting across a wider area).

Increased and more dangerous 'tours' should not be ruled out as a cause of the drop off in recruiting.

[davidbfpo]

JMA,

The cited post above is quite dated - it was from August 2008. After a recent encounter I was told the Army is finding recruitment far easier, so much so there are waiting lists and the ability to recruit has enabled units to get rid of those they no longer need. Secondly, there appear to be a waiting list for entry to parts of the RN; a friend's son has been waiting for two years and still no date in sight. I accept the 'waiting' maybe impacted by an expectation of further manpower reductions.

In my limited encounters with the Army the refrain is that Afghanistan is a positive factor in recruitment; I suspect it is retention that is affected far more, especially for those who are married, with children and a trade that will get a job outside.

[JMA]

JMA,

The cited post above is quite dated - it was from August 2008. After a recent encounter I was told the Army is finding recruitment far easier, so much so there are waiting lists and the ability to recruit has enabled units to get rid of those they no longer need. Secondly, there appear to be a waiting list for entry to parts of the RN; a friend's son has been waiting for two years and still no date in sight. I accept the 'waiting' maybe impacted by an expectation of further manpower reductions.

In my limited encounters with the Army the refrain is that Afghanistan is a positive factor in recruitment; I suspect it is retention that is affected far more, especially for those who are married, with children and a trade that will get a job outside.

Ok, lets keen the eyes on that trend then. I too have heard that the married members are also more likely to want to move on due to domestic pressure. I recently met a major who had left the service because the 6 months every two years 'tours' were getting to be a bit much. You go figure.

[William F. Owen]

In my limited encounters with the Army the refrain is that Afghanistan is a positive factor in recruitment; I suspect it is retention that is affected far more, especially for those who are married, with children and a trade that will get a job outside.
I would concur. The problem is retention. Guys join, "fight their war," and depart. Been there, done it, got the t-shirt.

Clearly A'Stan is not critical to the security of the UK, so the wife usually has a point to make, especially if the man that went is not quite the same man that came back, in some cases.

[baboon6]

JMA,

The cited post above is quite dated - it was from August 2008. After a recent encounter I was told the Army is finding recruitment far easier, so much so there are waiting lists and the ability to recruit has enabled units to get rid of those they no longer need. Secondly, there appear to be a waiting list for entry to parts of the RN; a friend's son has been waiting for two years and still no date in sight. I accept the 'waiting' maybe impacted by an expectation of further manpower reductions.

In my limited encounters with the Army the refrain is that Afghanistan is a positive factor in recruitment; I suspect it is retention that is affected far more, especially for those who are married, with children and a trade that will get a job outside.

The economic downturn may have also played a part in the upturn in recruitment in the last year or two.

[Red Rat]

Currently we are as near to full manning as we are ever likely to get. The problem is that full manning is not necessarily 'right' manning as current ops demand more of some trades (MOS) then others and it takes time to grow specialists, adjust manning structures etc.
Afghanistan is recruitment positive and the current economic downturn is retention positive. What we find difficult to quantify is how many joined us because of the downturn and are staying on purely because of the downturn. We expect that once the business sector picks up we will see a sharp uptake across the rank spectrum of people getting out.

Within the officer corps I have detected an increasing degree of cynicism and disillusionment with our senior leadership as a result of experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan (more so); an echoing of Coldstreamer's comments on toxic leadership. This may just be the jaundiced and cynical company that I keep ;) - or it may point to an increasing number of career officers leaving in the future.

And of course the whispers of cutbacks (probable) and redundancies (wishful) have already started!

RR

[JMA]

Currently we are as near to full manning as we are ever likely to get. The problem is that full manning is not necessarily 'right' manning as current ops demand more of some trades (MOS) then others and it takes time to grow specialists, adjust manning structures etc.
Afghanistan is recruitment positive and the current economic downturn is retention positive. What we find difficult to quantify is how many joined us because of the downturn and are staying on purely because of the downturn. We expect that once the business sector picks up we will see a sharp uptake across the rank spectrum of people getting out.

Within the officer corps I have detected an increasing degree of cynicism and disillusionment with our senior leadership as a result of experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan (more so); an echoing of Coldstreamer's comments on toxic leadership. This may just be the jaundiced and cynical company that I keep ;) - or it may point to an increasing number of career officers leaving in the future.

And of course the whispers of cutbacks (probable) and redundancies (wishful) have already started!

RR

Thanks for that. Of the specialists surely the training which takes months rather than years is not really that much of a problem? What % of these specialists need training which would last more than a year?

Then of course the liberal rotation system (6 months : 18 months) places a higher demand for such people. The problem to some extent at least is self inflicted?

I suppose there is little or no chance that the Brits would consider raising a Brigade specially for Afghan ops which can be disbanded once the war is over?

[JMA]

The economic downturn may have also played a part in the upturn in recruitment in the last year or two.

Here then is an opportunity to get a couple of thousand soldiers for a specially raised Afghan regiment or two?

[Red Rat]

KEY POINTS:

• The UK Government today, 18 October 2010, published Britain's National Security Strategy (NSS). Together with the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) it sets out the UK's strategic choices on how to ensure the security of the UK.

• The National Security Strategy and SDSR together provide direction for national security policy, capabilities and resources for the next 5 years. The NSS allows UK Government Departments to prioritise their resources according to the risks set out in the document published today.

• The NSS sets out two high-level objectives which will guide the UK's strategic approach overall:

- To ensure a secure and resilient UK by protecting its people, economy, infrastructure, territory and ways of life from all major risks that can affect it directly; and

- To shape a stable world, by acting to reduce the likelihood of risks affecting the UK or British interests overseas, and applying its instruments of power and influence to shape the global environment.

• The NSS decides the UK's priorities for action, and identifies 15 priority security risks to the UK. The following Tier 1 risks are judged to be the UK's highest priorities for UK national security:

- Terrorism
- Cyber attack
- Major natural hazards and accidents
- International Military Crisis

• Afghanistan will remain the UK's top priority while British troops are deployed there.

• The details of the capability and resource decisions, the 'ways' and 'means' of achieving the National Security priorities are in the SDSR which will be published on 19 Oct 10. The National Security Strategy has informed the policy, resource and capability choices that will be set out in the SDSR.

DETAIL:

Context and Foreign Policy Baseline

1. Through a globalised 'networked' world the risk picture is likely to become increasingly diverse with no single risk dominating. This means achieving security will become more complex.

2. The UK's ability to remain adaptable for the future will be essential, as will be the ability to identify risks and opportunities at the earliest possible stage and maintaining highly capable and flexible armed forces.

3. Through NATO, the EU and other alliances the UK will share its security needs and gain collective benefits. As a result, the UK faces no major state threat at present.

4. We will continue to play a major role in shaping the international architecture - reinforcing the UN, NATO, G20 and EU and building bilateral ties with rising economic powers such as China and India.

The National Interest and British Values

5. The National Security Strategy explains that the UK's national interest comprises its security, prosperity and freedom and that these are interconnected and mutually supportive.

6. National Security is about protecting the UK's people, including their rights and liberties.

7. Promoting civil liberties and upholding the rule of law are fundamental principles which underpin the UK's approach to national security.

8. Security and Liberty are complementary and mutually supportive. The UK needs security to protect the liberties it holds dear.

National Security Priorities (Risk Management – Tiers 1, 2 and 3)

9. For the first time, the UK Government has assessed and prioritised all the major national security risks that the UK faces to ensure that it has the right means to address them.

10. The 15 priority risks to UK national security, split into three tiers are:

Tier 1 Priorities (the most pressing risks to the UK over the next five years)

• Terrorism
• Cyber attack
• Major natural hazards and accidents
• International Military Crisis

Tier 2 Priorities (the next highest priorities)

• State-led Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) attacks
• Instability And Conflict Overseas
• Organised Crime
• Space security

Tier 3 Priorities (The next highest priorities after Tier 1 & 2)

• Conventional military attack on UK
• Significant increase in flows of terrorsits, organised criminals, illegal migrants etc across our border
• Energy Security and Resources
• Accidental Release Radioactive Material
• Article 5 - Attack by a State on another NATO or EU Member
• An attack on a UK overseas territory as the result of a sovereignty dispute or a wider regional conflict.
• Short to medium term disruption to international supplies of resources (for example, food, water) essential to the UK

Terrorism

11. The risk to the UK from terrorism continues to be one of the highest priority national security risks.

12. The UK has therefore decided to give a high priority to counter terrorism compared to other areas of national security.

Cyber Attack

13. Cyberspace is now vital for the UK's prosperity and way of life.

14. The rapid growth of cyberspace means that the UK must act now to ensure its cyber security.

15. Some states continue to try to gain advantage over the UK through hostile intelligence activity and cyber attack, and the UK must do all that it can to protect the valuable government and commercial information we possess.

Hazards and Accidents

16. Certain civil emergencies are among the most severe of all threats to UK national security.

17. In a more resource constrained environment, the UK will act in a more targeted way in the future, which means, among other things, focusing relatively more on the highest priority civil emergency risks;

18. The top three civil emergency risks to the UK for continued action to improve preparedness: (i) terrorist attacks using unconventional materials (ii) major tidal or coastal flooding; (iii) severe influenza pandemic.

International Military Crises and Instability

19. An international military crisis involving multiple states in a region which drew in the UK or its Allies would have a major impact on global stability.

20. The UK will continue to work internationally to address such risks before they develop, but must ensure that it is prepared to act should diplomatic solutions fail.

Alliance and Partnerships

21. The UK will intensify its bilateral defence and security relationships with a wide range of partners, working more effectively together to tackle threats and exploit opportunities where interests coincide.

22. The UK will be active in the multilateral organisations central to its national security: committed to a reformed UN Security Council, a robust and credible NATO, and an EU that uses its collective weight to promote shared interests and values.

Full details can be found at: UK Cabinet Office (http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/intelligence-security-resilience/national-security/national-security-strategy.aspx)

[davidbfpo]

IISS has quickly published a viewpoint:
Like many such documents from NATO members over the past decade, it tries to set a framework for dealing with an 'age of uncertainty' – a world in which there is a wide range of possible threats to security and a lack of clarity about which might be the most serious....

Several points are noteworthy about this ranking: first, the threat from cyber attacks has been upgraded, in line with the remarks made by Iain Lobban, head of the government listening post GCHQ, at the IISS last week. Secondly, there is relatively little emphasis in the document on two elements which have tended to loom large in such threat assessments: nuclear proliferation and the dangers from fragile and failing states. Iran's possible acquisition of nuclear weapons is included in a paragraph that also mentions organised crime, and is not mentioned again. Thirdly, by referring specifically to a military crisis 'between states', the strategy appears to downgrade the risks from the kind of regional instability that has prompted UK military action on several occasions since the mid-1990s.

This is a document explicitly predicated on the need to deal with a fiscal deficit, with defence cuts to be announced tomorrow.....

Link:http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-voices/?blogpost=69

[davidbfpo]

A scathing, indirect comment on the UK decision-making:
One of the Navy’s new £3 billion aircraft carriers will never carry aircraft and will sail for only three years before being mothballed and possibly sold, ministers will announce on Tuesday....(much later)

Scrapping the Harriers will create a “capability gap” of nine years, with Britain unable to fly fast jets from an aircraft carrier until 2020, when the new JSF enters service.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/8072041/Navy-aircraft-carrier-will-be-sold-after-three-years-and-never-carry-jets.html

Now to another London "think tank" RUSI:
The problem with it, as it presently exists, is that it is not really a strategy as such, but a methodology for a strategy. It does not make hard choices between real things - which is what strategists have to do. It creates all the right boxes and describes how we should fit them together - who should lead in this or that area, who else should be involved, and so on - but it doesn't put anything specific enough into the boxes.

(Near the end)But it is hard to avoid the feeling that the reason the story and the numbers are being kept apart is that they don't fit together as well as ministers and officials hoped they would.

Link:http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4CBC6D8637AB7/

Now my own viewpoint. The carrier aircraft "gap" has been clear for months and we must realise UK policy today is now far more dictated by public / state financial position. We have been through this before, notably with the East of Suez withdrawal, IIRC in 1968, after a "run" on the UK Pound.

This is "spin" and "smoke" creating a structure to show decisions are strategic and fit together. Remaining with the example of the two aircraft carriers, where do they fit in the priorities of the national security strategy?

[davidbfpo]

Moderator's Note

This thread until today (30th April 2013) was entitled 'UK Army 2020' and was merged with a smaller thread on Sir David Richards 2010 speech (below). It was re-titled 'UK Defence Policy' (catch all) to enable wider use (ends).


On Monday General Sir David Richards, now the UK Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), gave the annual Colin Cramphorn Lecture, in London, organised by the "think tank" Policy Exchange and last year it was a General Petraeus.

Link to website, with very short bio:http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/events/event.cgi?id=278

The talk is on Youtube and included. It is just over an hour, with a lengthy Q&A session; most of the questions were by journalists and listen carefully for one. A couple of interesting points made, notably on cyber warfare, the purchase of two aircraft carriers and of course Afghanistan.

It was well reported, but many other more newsworthy items pushed it to the "inside pages".

[JMA]

On Monday General Sir David Richards, now the UK Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), gave the annual Colin Cramphorn Lecture, in London, organised by the "think tank" Policy Exchange and last year it was a General Petraeus.

Link to website, with very short bio:http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/events/event.cgi?id=278

The talk is on Youtube and included. It is just over an hour, with a lengthy Q&A session; most of the questions were by journalists and listen carefully for one. A couple of interesting points made, notably on cyber warfare, the purchase of two aircraft carriers and of course Afghanistan.

It was well reported, but many other more newsworthy items pushed it to the "inside pages".

Listened to it. Picked up nothing earth shattering did you?

[AdamG]

A critical assessment of the Army’s readiness for the next decade of military operations also found that its frontline units lack the right vehicles and precision weapons that will be needed.

The Army’s current shortcomings are highlighted in a report drawn up following an eight-month planning and assessment exercise named Agile Warrior.

The exercise was carried out by the Force Development and Training Command, a team of senior officers that attempts to prepare the Army for the operations it is likely to face in the years ahead.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/8548637/British-Army-not-ready-for-urban-warfare.html

[Fuchs]

Oh, 2nd half of 90's all over again.

I wonder why quantity isn't the primary concern for such environments because of the short lines of sight and fire.

[AdamG]

You'd think someone in Whitehall would have watched The Children of Men. :confused:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1vQAJ1q4z4A

[Red Rat]

The British Army is currently a one trick pony. Resources are devoted almost entirely to training for Afghanistan leaving little to devote elsewhere.

Some of the TTPs from Afghanistan will be transferrable and there is still some residual knowledge from Basra (Iraq). However operations in large urban areas will prove challenging on many fronts. Use of PGMs will probably broadly follow Afghanistan TTPs, as will use of ISTAR. We have very limited main battle tank currency currently and developing expertise in use of armoured vehicles in urban environments could stretch our limited training resources.

Already (and rightly) general's efforts are looking ahead to the armed forces post-Afghanistan; structures and capabilities. Fuchs raises a good point in that the UK Army is envisaged as being so small (6 deployable brigades but not 6 at the same time) that the fact that mass has a quality all of its own and is essential for some operational environments appears to have been downplayed.

[JMA]

The British Army is currently a one trick pony. Resources are devoted almost entirely to training for Afghanistan leaving little to devote elsewhere.

Some of the TTPs from Afghanistan will be transferrable and there is still some residual knowledge from Basra (Iraq). However operations in large urban areas will prove challenging on many fronts. Use of PGMs will probably broadly follow Afghanistan TTPs, as will use of ISTAR. We have very limited main battle tank currency currently and developing expertise in use of armoured vehicles in urban environments could stretch our limited training resources.

Already (and rightly) general's efforts are looking ahead to the armed forces post-Afghanistan; structures and capabilities. Fuchs raises a good point in that the UK Army is envisaged as being so small (6 deployable brigades but not 6 at the same time) that the fact that mass has a quality all of its own and is essential for some operational environments appears to have been downplayed.

Sad too to note that with the air effort committed to Afghanistan the Brits were hard pressed to cobble together 12 aircraft for ops in Libya. Then there were of those that were grounded due to lack of spares and then a reported shortage of munitions. What a long way down for a nation which was once able to put hundreds of bombers into action on raids.

[Orlando1234]

Its takes a lot of resources to fight many fronts....

[SWJ Blog]

The Future of the British Army (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-future-of-the-british-army)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-future-of-the-british-army) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[gute]

The MOD came out with the official release of the UK Army restructuring called Army 2020. Below is a link to the brochure - it's worth a look:

http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/Army2020_brochure.pdf

[davidbfpo]

I will let another speak as to the effectiveness of these changes:
Lord Dannatt, former head of the Army, says 20 per cent defence cuts mean Britain will not be able to fight wars such as Iraq and Afghanistan at the same time in future.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9377776/Defence-cuts-are-risky-says-former-Army-chief.html

[davidbfpo]

More commentary today, some good, some expected, you decide which they are.

Ex-Para officer, now a Labour MP:http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/jul/05/cameron-defence-security-cheap-britain

An ex-brigadier, now at IISS:http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/jul/05/army-2020-fighting-future

More a strategic comment by an academic:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2012/07/no-longer-trimming-the-fat-more-hacking-out-vital-organs/

Finally try this cartoon:http://www.guardian.co.uk/global/cartoon/2012/jul/05/steve-bell-defence-cuts

Apologies my IT skills are not enough to cut & paste this into a post.

[Tukhachevskii]

This may have flown under the radar but I have seen that the British army has adopted a completely different future organisation (http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/Army2020_brochure.pdf) than that which has been announced previously. Army 2020 remedies a number of problems I have personally had with the Bde based army (notably permanent Div HQ). It also innovates by providing three different organisations inc. a specialised logistics (or force troops) entity. It maintains a "heavy" div for high intensity ops well as keeping the stabilisation ops option with a several Bde div. My main issue is the reduction of armour from 5 reg/Bns under the previous proposal to just three in the current one (I would have thought that the adaptable forces would have at least two independentt Armoured reg/bn). But alas that is not so. I think, personally, that its a much better structure than the previous proposal of five Bdes with a hodge-podge of capabilites and units. The creation of permanet div HQ also facilitates so called stabilisation ops esp. when one considers that in Afghanistan Bdes were largely left to their own divices in theatre with regards COIN ops. Now a permanet Div can help smooth the transition during roulement and allow startegic objectives to be translated into tactial missions without distrupting operations because of redeployments (however, the LACK of a strategy was probably the real problem in Afghanistan (http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/ia/archive/view/164295)).


What do the honourable members of this here council think? Your comments and observations would be much appreciated.

[Fuchs]

Germany did split its army (and to some degree also its air force) into crisis reaction and other forces. It sucked.

Budget was tight, so crisis reaction forces got adequate personnel and almost adequate material funds, but the rest was neglected and atrophied.
NEVER establish a two-class military under the umbrella of the same GHQ. Separate active and reserve forces, united only at the level of ministry - acceptable. Divided army - not acceptable.


2nd; why bother with a single Div HQ if so many brigades are in the army? The would all be deployed in a big war, so simply call it a Corps HQ and design it as such.


3rd; looks like only three tank battalions for the entire UK army to me - that's approx. 200 Chally2 including driving training tanks and tanks in major repairs etc. That is hardly enough; the UK army would not be capable of mobile warfare against a real, capable army.


4th; helicopters overrated, as usual.

[Red Rat]

A lot of the detail about how this structure will be resourced and trained is still to appear, in particular how the Reserve element will be integrated.

What is very apparent is that the UK will almost certainly never deploy a division in the field again. Despite UK protestations to the contrary this capability is paper thin - literally.

The structure makes the best of a bad deal. The structures were entirely driven by the requirement to reduce the UK military size due to financial imperatives. That is a reasonable enough course of action, but there was no corresponding change in UK national security ambitions so effectively the structural changes have happened in something of a strategic vacuum. I am also lead to understand that the initial reforms presented by the 'Carter team' which led the process for the army were viewed as too radical and rejected by the government.

When the UK stated it could put a division in the field it struggled to put a brigade. By stating that it will aim to put a Bde in the field I suspect that increasingly even this level will be hollowed out.

The loss of heavy armour is not for me as much of an issue as the lack of RAF capability. The bdes are Armoured Infantry and not Armoured brigades. The role of armour is increasingly seen as enabling decisive infantry ops. This is predicated on the fact that it is regarded as highly unlikely that we will fight a parity or near parity opponent in the near to medium future. But this assumption is based on the assumption that the UK and it's Allies will retain technological dominance resulting in air and PGM dominance. I think this is a dangerous assumption based on both the shift in economic power away from the West and the increasing rate of technological diffusion.

My personal view is that the UK defence review should have reduced the UK army much more significantly in order to maintain viable Air and Maritime capabilities.

[Red Rat]

The creation of permanet div HQ also facilitates so called stabilisation ops esp. when one considers that in Afghanistan Bdes were largely left to their own divices in theatre with regards COIN ops. Now a permanet Div can help smooth the transition during roulement and allow startegic objectives to be translated into tactial missions without distrupting operations because of redeployments (however, the LACK of a strategy was probably the real problem in Afghanistan (http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/ia/archive/view/164295)).
.

The fact that UK bdes operated in effect autonomously for too long in Afghanistan is a failure of the ISAF and UK chain of commands. In theory the structures were in place to enable operational oversight. The lack of strategy didn't help either...:rolleyes:

The problem with the A2020 structures is that there are two divisional HQs, but no divisional enablers (arty, sigs, ISTAR, logistics).

[Tukhachevskii]

The fact that UK bdes operated in effect autonomously for too long in Afghanistan is a failure of the ISAF and UK chain of commands. In theory the structures were in place to enable operational oversight. The lack of strategy didn't help either...:rolleyes:

The problem with the A2020 structures is that there are two divisional HQs, but no divisional enablers (arty, sigs, ISTAR, logistics).

Good points all round. Personally I would have liked to see the expansion of the Royal Marines to two bdes with associated naval assets and the army reduced to three large(ish) bdes (each about three inf, one-two tank and two arty bns) but I doubt the regimental ethos and traditions of our armies would permit it (and let's not even get started with the Scots regts!). What really galled me was that the SDSR mentions UK commitments to allies yet our commitments to pacific nations doesnt even get a mention. To boot the SDSR outlines a REDUCTION in royal marine strength by 1,800! Definitely a document written by a committee if ever I saw one.

[Fuchs]

The Royal Marines have somewhat elevated quality ambitions, comparable to the army's paras. It is often advisable to keep the authorised personnel of such quality units few in order to
(1) maintain the quality and
(2) not leech very many promising men from the regular combat troops.

[gute]

This could be the future for the U.S. but about 5x bigger. I don't have inside information nor a crystal ball - just the winds of change.

[JMA]

Frank Ledwidge's latest offering puts his finger on where (he believes) the real problem lies:

Punching Below Our Weight: How Inter-Service Rivalry has Damaged the British Armed Forces (http://www.amazon.com/Punching-Below-Weight-Inter-Service-ebook/dp/B008BHR962/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1347673866&sr=8-1&keywords=Punching+Below+Our+Weight%3A+How+Inter-Service+Rivalry+has+Damaged+the+British+Armed+Forc es)

The blurb is:


In this 5,000-word e-book, the author of the bestselling Losing Small Wars looks at the problem of rivalry between the top ranks of the Army, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force. He argues that senior generals, admirals and air marshals have focused more on empire-building within their own services rather than on the needs of the UK armed forces as a whole, with enormously damaging results. In particular, the UK involvement in Libya was hampered by a total lack of aircraft carriers - sacrificed to preserve the Typhoon, a fighter jet designed for Cold War combat that never happened.

Written with Ledwidge's trademark insight and panache, this is an incisive condemnation of the British armed forces at the very top, and ending with some pertinent suggestions for how the UK could reorient its military priorities.

Ledwidge's first offering was:

Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan (http://www.amazon.com/Losing-Small-Wars-Afghanistan-ebook/dp/B005G5W4XK/ref=sr_1_1?s=digital-text&ie=UTF8&qid=1347674107&sr=1-1)

[davidbfpo]

Read or watch the RUSI's Director giving his assessment (I'm catching up both made in July):http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4FFA86E865E07/ and six mins podcast:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nBfk3KLYXxQ&feature=youtu.be&goback=%252Egde_2042416_member_132352243

I picked out the:
The Reactive force was 10% reservist, the Adaptive was 30% and this meant growing from 16k to 30k reserves....after a six month active operation the Army will have problems....Will this give the young soldier and officer a career that they expected?

Particularly interesting on the reserves role after the discussion on another thread about this regarding active and reservist in the USA:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5136

[Fuchs]

Germany attempted a two-speed military in the 90's until recently.
In the end, the higher readiness, deployable part of the military got about what it needed (normal business) and the rest was starved of resources, usually operating old crap equipment.

I was amazed the Brits could be stupid enough to follow a path proved to be stupid (with the benefit of hindsight !) when I saw those plans for the first time.

[davidbfpo]

A scathing article by Max Hastings on the UK's defence policy; a taster:
David Cameron’s Government is cutting the regular Army to its lowest manpower strength for centuries: 82,000. When the downsizing is complete, more than 20 per cent of our soldiers will have gone. I must confess that I am profoundly sceptical whether it will prove possible to recruit the 30,000 reservists the Defence Secretary promised this week.

Soon, we shall be capable of deploying only a single battlegroup of 7,000–8,000 men for sustained operations overseas. Compare this tiny force to the 35,000 troops deployed in Northern Ireland at the height of the Troubles in the 1970s, or the 30,000 military personnel sent to the First Gulf War in 1991.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9667102/Max-Hastings-Farewell-to-our-warrior-nation.html

[Bill Moore]

Thanks for sharing David, and while I can emphasize with UK's concerns about whether this is enough capacity based on the current and projected security environment, in my opinion this has significant implications on US strategy also. We have been endeavoring more to pursue "shared" security responsibility with our allies and partners, but the reality is most of our allies and partners have very little capacity to share, and the trend in most cases is downsizing, while potential adversaries such as China and Russia are significantly increasing the size of their militaries, not to mention the continued instability throughout much of the world that we will feel compelled to stick our noses into.

[Fuchs]

Thanks for sharing David, and while I can emphasize with UK's concerns about whether this is enough capacity based on the current and projected security environment, in my opinion this has significant implications on US strategy also. We have been endeavoring more to pursue "shared" security responsibility with our allies and partners, but the reality is most of our allies and partners have very little capacity to share, and the trend in most cases is downsizing, while potential adversaries such as China and Russia are significantly increasing the size of their militaries, not to mention the continued instability throughout much of the world that we will feel compelled to stick our noses into.

This sounds confused.

The U.S.'s allies have plenty to fill up a sizeable share of "security responsibility".
OK; Luxembourg has only a battalion and some AWACS and Iceland only has bases and a coast guard, but all others have real military forces.


Now what exactly don't they have, what exactly are the Brits going to have less than many are used to?
Ready-to-go land forces for great power gaming in distant places.
Why won't they have them any more in large numbers?
Because they're not worth the expense.


Furthermore; which treaty other than the Charter of the United Nations says that China is relevant to UK security policy? I suppose they don't need to care about East Asia, just as the U.S. could stay at Hawaii and not care about East Asia any more. That's a sovereign option.

Russia "significantly increasing the size of" its military is news to me. Their army converts to a border region crisis quick reaction force, their navy is replacing ships at a rate sufficient only for a coastal navy and their air force will probably need a decade to get substantial numbers of new generation combat aircraft operational.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Fuchs


This sounds confused.
The U.S.'s allies have plenty to fill up a sizeable share of "security responsibility".

I won't debate your point on China primarily because I agree with you. Nations have enduring interests and not all of them are common with their allies, but we do have many shared security interests and NATO's shortfalls that were demonstrated in Libya in my view effectively counter your argument that NATO countries have real militaries. Furthermore, if the US is going to shift more effort to the Asia-Pacific (agree, disagree, or indifferent doesn't matter), then there will be less US capacity and capability in Europe. Capacities and capabilities that the EU and NATO militaries are dependent upon. It is one thing to claim to have a real military and another to actually have that one that can independently conduct combat operations because it has invested in all needed support and enabling systems in addition to the shooters.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/30/opinion/natos-teachable-moment.html


President Obama, who pressed hard for NATO involvement, rightly insisted that Europe, along with Canada, take the lead. It is reasonable to expect the wealthy nations of Europe to easily handle a limited mission in their own backyard that involved no commitment of ground troops. Reasonable, but, as it turned out, not realistic.

For decades, European nations have counted on a free-spending Pentagon to provide the needed capabilities they failed to provide themselves. The Pentagon is now under intense and legitimate pressure to meet America’s security needs more economically. It can no longer afford to provide affluent allies with a free ride.

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2206860/A-gross-dereliction-duty-How-Coalition-defence-cuts-left-Britain-terrifyingly-vulnerable.html


And with the U.S. increasingly looking across the Pacific as it reshapes its defence policy to counter China, we may find we have to be more reliant on ourselves — but with very little to rely on. A Labour government defence review in 1998 — before the threat of Muslim extremism was exposed by 9/11, and when Chinese power was far less than it is today — concluded we needed a minimum of 32 destroyers and frigates to be equal to our responsibilities.

We now have just 19.

The Army’s manpower is being cut from 102,000 to 82,000, with the MoD claiming that a boost in the reserves to 30,000 will cover the shortfall. However, it is feared that these part-timers would provide no more than the equivalent of 2,000 full-time soldiers, and that an unsustainable strain would be put on them and their employers.

[Fuchs]

Concerning "Libya":

I suppose we have a different idea of what a military force is supposed to be capable of.

Extended cruise missile diplomacy does not rank high on my list.


There's something about military power that got lost by small wars-minded people: If you go to war, you mobilise it.
We (Europeans) could have swamped Libya with three million soldiers IF we had been serious about fighting Ghadafi. We were not serious. We pushed him a bit with the left-hand small finger, and this was a political choice - not a limit of our military capability.

As far as I can tell, insufficient mid-air refuelling and guided munition stocks were among the main criticisms during and after the Libya thing. I would be most surprised if such things were taken seriously as sufficient indicators for having a "real" military.
Guess what? The German general staff panicked after the 1939/-9 Poland invasion because ammunition stocks were badly depleted. Three or four weeks of intense military action with France and the Heer would have folded by 1939-11.
Range of German fighters back then? About 500 km.
I have yet to see anyone who asserts that Germany had no "real military" by fall 1939.

[Bill Moore]

Fuchs,

I don't think you're accounting for political reality today, even if you and I don't agree with the general trend of political decisions to get involved in so called small wars, they are a fact of life. Maybe the economic crisis will bring us all to our senses, but in the mean time the challenge is having armed forces sufficiently large enough to support the current enduring occupation and peace keeping missions around the world, and in addition have enough strike capacity to conduct offensive/coercive military operations on short notice. I think you over estimate Europe's capacity to do so.

Of course a nation can attempt to mobilize to go to war, though I wonder how effectively modern, liberal democracies could actually do so if a real mobilization was actually required? Could Britian have sufficiently mobilized its industry to support and sustain major combat operations during WWII without extensive US support? Our industrial mobilization to support the UK and others at that time lifted us out of depression and perhaps enabled the allies to win.

[Fuchs]

That's what people in government pay are supposed to do; work to make stupid policies work.

It's not a "reality" outsiders need to face. To them, stupid policy is just that and may deserve to be fought against.
_______________

The Western economies have some issues, but even in "old" industries such as steel production we have usually multiple times the output of the 30's.
I suppose a mobilised Western country will rather have training issues and worries about protecting its economy against warfare than actual output issues.
That is, unless you're in the U.S., want to repeat the naval bvuildup of 1942-1945 and face the fact that your shipbuilding industry ranks behind Poland's.

[davidbfpo]

Thanks for sharing David, and while I can emphasize with UK's concerns about whether this is enough capacity based on the current and projected security environment, in my opinion this has significant implications on US strategy also. We have been endeavoring more to pursue "shared" security responsibility with our allies and partners, but the reality is most of our allies and partners have very little capacity to share, and the trend in most cases is downsizing, while potential adversaries such as China and Russia are significantly increasing the size of their militaries, not to mention the continued instability throughout much of the world that we will feel compelled to stick our noses into.

For too long both the UK & USA have leaned on each other; with one major exception when each has used large-scale military force, respectively Suez and Vietnam. Often the UK has made strategic choices to act and since the end of 'The Cold War' intervene simply as the 'Special Relationship' was seen to be at risk if we didn't.

The USA, especially with the historically close military to military relationship, has looked for support from the UK - from the low profile to the high profile, mass support seen in Afghanistan and Iraq. In Westminster-Whitehall-Cheltenham circles the 'special relationship' is seen as (pause) embedded for ever.

As an aside the differences between the DoD and State Dept in the Falklands War are a good illustration of how this can alter the situation.

In a curious way the UK's downsizing of military capability could enhance 'smart power' and doing more with less for the USA. This I suspect explains why UK SOF and intelligence escaping downsizing (and a few other capabilities).

Politics though come first.

It is easy to see US officials and politicians asking if the UK and others will not share the burden, do we need to engage with them? Engagement of course takes many forms, two examples: intelligence sharing and sales of equipment.

This has happened before: with New Zealand after its stance on nuclear weapons (which has just ended), Canada when its military capability and will evaporated in the 1970's and there's France - with whom the USA has well, a different relationship.

The significant implication for US strategy? Shared and shallow relationships with new partners for the USA, rather than the in-depth embedded 'special relationship' with the UK.

In the interests of contrary views try this:http://thinpinstripedline.blogspot.co.uk/2012/11/the-united-kingdom-is-still-warrior.html

[Firn]

Fuchs,

I don't think you're accounting for political reality today, even if you and I don't agree with the general trend of political decisions to get involved in so called small wars, they are a fact of life. Maybe the economic crisis will bring us all to our senses, but in the mean time the challenge is having armed forces sufficiently large enough to support the current enduring occupation and peace keeping missions around the world, and in addition have enough strike capacity to conduct offensive/coercive military operations on short notice. I think you over estimate Europe's capacity to do so.

Of course a nation can attempt to mobilize to go to war, though I wonder how effectively modern, liberal democracies could actually do so if a real mobilization was actually required? Could Britian have sufficiently mobilized its industry to support and sustain major combat operations during WWII without extensive US support? Our industrial mobilization to support the UK and others at that time lifted us out of depression and perhaps enabled the allies to win.

The Wages of Destruction (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Wages_of_Destruction) should deal nicely with the historic part. It is a complex topic but a highly interesting one. Needless to say that the effort of the US did play a huge huge part directly and indirectly.

Arguably today it would be much easier to mass produce the means to wage war then back in WWII at least as long the necessary ressources (raw materials!) pour in, enough time is available and the necessary willpower is there at all levels.

[Bill Moore]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kedBlURaRaE

These interviews impressed me as being balanced. Those interviewed realize that Afghanistan isn't a template for future conflict, and logically state the requirement for having a full range of military capabilities.

[davidbfpo]

Bill,

I have now watched and listened to the film clip twice. It raises a number of issues succinctly, although some of the footage was odd - the Russians in Kosovo and the IDF. Being an official product, when the MoD prefers to be in hibernation from public comment, it is a shame alternative voices do not feature. The speakers, with one exception, being MoD employees or contractors.

After a recent, speculative press report 'British Army's fleet of Apache helicopters 'could be scrapped' it was almost amusing to hear the remarks on "heavy" assets versus Apaches:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9722347/British-Armys-fleet-of-Apache-helicopters-could-be-scrapped.html

What was more valuable was the very careful skirting round the issue of, from various voices:
an ability to go with them (USA)...making a strategic difference to the USA....an ability to do a task alone..

There are dissenting voices that think the shrunken UK military have - now and will clearly do so soon - fallen below the US minimum level for a contribution.

Reductions in public spending are driving this process, not a change in strategic direction nor a change in public opinion - which gives defence a low priority. I suspect that politically no-one wants to ask, let alone hear either the British professionals or US politicians answer the question is the UK a meaningful ally when it comes to a fight? A fight not for national survival, hard to conceive of today, more likely an intervention with the USA somewhere.

Hypothetically had the UK not pushed others in NATO in 2005 over "making a difference" in Afghanistan; the decision for ISAF to go south, would the USA have done so alone? You can argue that the minimal campaigning by the USA in Afghanistan better suited your national purpose.

[Fuchs]

Some governments pay too much attention to maintaining relationships and cooperations of nebulous value.

It's as if they knew from an inexplicable source that a certain cooperation makes sense, and don't even bother to think about the "why" or even "if".
The result are expensive policies for the sake of maintaining said cooperation/prestige/relationship.

Germany had and has its strange fixation on keeping NATO and transatlantic cooperation strong, even though the value is probably zero (to cooperate prevents overt rivalry, but the latter doesn't need to happen without said cooperation anyway).
There were also expensive policies done in order to support the bid for a permanent UNSC seat (for which we have little actual use).

Same with the EU; European unification has become an ideology which tolerates no even only small step backwards. Officials rarely discuss the actual utility of additional European cooperation.

The fixation on maintaining big brother's good will is particularly strong in NZ, Australia and the UK. Maybe it's the common language which support this fixation?
Maybe it wouldbe wise to look at more relaxed, non-Anglophone countries and thier alliance policies?

[davidbfpo]

An IISS Strategic Comment 'Redesigned British Army: smaller, with more reserves':http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-19-2013/january/redesigned-british-army-smaller-with-more-reserves/

It concludes:
..the reforms have the potential to transform the army's capability and to incorporate the lessons of recent operations. Success depends on the programme being properly led, managed, resourced and politically supported.

[davidbfpo]

I can recall the British decision to end its defence role 'East of Suez' in 1968, mainly due to economic factors and to cut defence spending - much to the dismay of a few partners and before Gulf War One only a smaller presence was left in Oman, the Gulf and (with the USA) on Diego Garcia.

Two Gulf Wars later, the interventions in Iraq and - still - Afghanistan the UK is there in force in the midst of an economic recession, with substantial cuts in defence spending. You might think now was not the time to expand the British role in the Persian Gulf, wrong!

RUSI, a Whitehall "think tank", has published a paper; in summary:
The UK is approaching a decision point where a significant strategic reorientation of its defence and security towards the Gulf is both plausible and logical; and, for the first time since the UK unceremoniously left the Gulf in 1971, a coherent strategy for a ‘return to east of Suez’ is emerging.

There is a useful short podcast and a paper on:http://www.rusi.org/publications/other/ref:N517AA8D59D1B3/

A BBC report notes:
We are already committed to the Gulf. But we are just not doing it very well. There are 160,000 British citizens living there so if there is a crisis we will be involved, so we need to be better positioned to mitigate the threat.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-22333555

[Red Rat]

The US strategic situation is very similar to what it was in the run up to WW2, especially in terms of force projection. Then the US could cover either the Pacific or the Atlantic, but not both concurrently. The fleet simply was not big enough.

With the US pivoting towards a Pacific/Asia focus it would make sense for a degree of rationalisation. In the same way that during a large part of the Cold war and in particular during the height of the Vietnam conflict the UK took on the burden of the North Sea and Atlantic Gap so today a UK/European towards the Middle East and Africa would make sense. The UK could not do what the US does (the UK does not have an effective global reach anymore (we now tread softly and carry a very small stick)) but by focusing efforts we can take a degree of the burden from the US.

[jmm99]

... and the UK-EU would assume responsibility in the Med as well - a return to origins so to speak (in Corbettese).

Regards

Mike

[Red Rat]

Churchill on the bank notes and the White Ensign all over the Med - what's not to like? :D

[davidbfpo]

A short commentary by a British historian 'Britain's '9/11 Wars' in historical perspective: why change and continuity matter' :http://www.historyandpolicy.org/papers/policy-paper-143.html

[davidbfpo]

... and the UK-EU would assume responsibility in the Med as well - a return to origins so to speak (in Corbettese).

JMM,

I see little reason why the UK should return to a military role in the Mediterranean, let alone try to assume some responsibility in other spheres. After all there are three albeit rather lame - in economic conditions - nations, France, Italy and Spain.

After the lessons seen over the Libyan intervention, the EU has yet to emerge as a truly capable, independent military partner.

[davidbfpo]

Yes the UK has a number of strategic, national interests across the world, but IMHO a return to the Gulf, Med, Africa and other places ignores our much reduced military capabilities - not exclusively due to economics - and far more significant issues at home.

What is proposed is not smarter.

[jmm99]

My point re: the Med was simply and solely a necessary corollary of Red Rat's proposition re: the Middle East and North Africa ("Muslim Africa").

As a sidebar, "control" of the western littorals of Africa is tied to control of the Middle Passage and the South Atlantic (the US and Brazil seem the futuristic likely partners). "Control" of the eastern littorals of Africa is tied to control of the Indian Ocean (the "power points" are "South Africa", India and a "Greater Indonesia"). Those littorals are separate issues from North Africa (and from the African interior; exemplified by the Congo).

As to "control" of the Middle East and North Africa, a "Sixth Fleet" in the Med is a necessity. To be complete, one would also have to have (at least) localized control in the Indian Ocean (Arabian Peninsula and its Gulfs). Otherwise, one is dealing in a "pipe dream". One has to ask some basic questions before "Marching on Moscow" (or Beijing - I confess to both Montgomery and MacArthur sitting on my primary bookshelves).

As to methodology on the "basic questions", I liked this from Red Rat in the "5 Lessons from Astan (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=146223&postcount=6)" thread":


1) An insurgency is a political problem with a military dimension, treat it as such; understand the politics of the problem in order to understand the politics of the solution.

2) Set domestic conditions early for a long commitment. COIN takes time, nation building takes longer.

3) Build the police and judicial system first or at least concurrent with indigenous military capacity.

4) In a failed state establishing a government with no capacity to govern is not necessarily a good idea. A government with no civil service and no educated middle class to become a civil service is a government in name only, then giving it autonomy but no capacity is inviting failure.

5) Controlling [emphasis JMM] the population is as important as securing the population.

All of these principles are applicable in spades to "control" of regions - i.e., the Middle East, North Africa, etc.

Now, both of you know that I'm not an interventionalist where the US is concerned (and. rarely, a "nation builder"). As an example, the Med, Middle East and North Africa would be to me off-limits for the US, except for exigent circumstances (e.g., something akin to 9/11). A corollary of that is that I can't be an advocate for interventions by others - I don't believe in "war by proxy", absent "exigent circumstances".

That being said, vacuums in the Med, Middle East and North Africa will be filled by "someone" - not by the US as I see it. Thus, a good discussion point for you all UK-EUians. :D

Regards

Mike

[Red Rat]

The UK military referees to MENA - Middle East and North Africa which encompasses both the Middle East and North Africa (the Maghreb) and takes in most of the Mediterranean littoral.

I was struck by this Economist article on the French defence review (http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21577122-defence-review-cuts-less-steeply-many-had-feared-ships-and-sealing-wax). Three things struck me:

1) The defence review commission included senior British representation.
2) The article posits a pivot to MENA.
3) Growing talk of a US pivot to Asia causing the Europeans (probably under NATO and not the EU) to step up independent intervention efforts.

[jmm99]

in English (48 pp.), can be downloaded here (http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Dossier_de_presse_LBlanc_DSN_en_anglais.pdf) (HT CFR).

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

the 2013 White Paper, in French, is here (http://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/fichiers_joints/livre-blanc-sur-la-defense-et-la-securite-nationale_2013.pdf) (160 pp.). Not yet in English that I found.

Regards

Mike

[Bill Moore]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TQmJwqRwFYs

While this video comparing U.S. Marine to Royal Marine training is obviously skewed and a bit comical, I still think it is relevant. It points to the direction our military may end up going in if the politically correct get their way. It definitely helps explain their relative poor performance in recent years.

[jmm99]

Female Special Forces (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R6A_eaP_k14); and at 2:21:


Soldiers from 1st SF call them "Killer Barbie Dolls".

:)

Regards

Mike

[Bill Moore]

The big differences between these female warriors and our female activists are they're actually patriotic and serving for a higher cause (not media recognition), they're very fit and capable, and understand they may be employed into a very tough fight. I would be happy to serve with these ladies any day. Note they are training harder than the Royal Marines depicted in the film.

[davidbfpo]

The title is taken from testimony by Lord Hennessey, a journalist-cum-historian, who with two others gave evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence on:
a strategic inquiry, Towards the Next Defence and Security Review.

Not an exciting matter for the great British public and I expect many others. Within the testimony are many gems on how the UK does and doesn't do defence policy:http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmdfence/uc1090-i/uc109001.htm

Here is one passage, Quinlan's law (named after a MoD civil servant of note):
A theorem: In matters of military contingency, the expected, precisely because it is expected, is not to be expected. Rationale: What we expect, we plan and provide for; what we plan and provide for, we thereby deter; what we deter does not happen. What does happen is what we did not deter, because we did not plan and provide for it, because we did not expect it.

Another witness, an academic strategist, Professor Julian Lindley-French, who is British and currently based in The Netherlands, has some enlightening remarks, especially on alliance matters. His blog is:http://lindleyfrench.blogspot.co.uk/

In one post the Professor is straight-talking:
The Royal Navy’s motto is; if you want peace, prepare for war. Thankfully, Britain today does not have to prepare for war. However, in a world full of friction if Britain is to help prevent conflict injurious to its national interests it must think and act strategically. Therefore, SDSR 2015 must finally look beyond Afghanistan and not simply re-fight it better. Indeed, the switch from so-called campaigning to contingency operations will make the 2015 review as close to a grand strategic year zero as Britain has known for a century. It is an opportunity to be seized not squandered.

Link:http://lindleyfrench.blogspot.co.uk/2013/04/at-tip-of-spear.html

No wonder Whitehall-Westminster prefer to make grand statements, but as our American allies know capability is needed with will. Just whether the UK has a strategy today is a moot point, plenty of policy or is it called retrenchment?

Hat tip to 'Red Rat' for the pointer to the testimony.

[davidbfpo]

A "lurker" responded:
The conclusion that it is about retrenchment is true. We have been spending beyond our means in defence. The most important part of our Critical National Infrastructure now is our economy. Once that recovers, our priorities will change again. Strategy is the ability to adapt and recalibrate our ways as much as it is an expression of will and capability.

[Red Rat]

Although not exactly 'small wars' the testimony does give a seldom seen and very candid insight into both UK Whitehall machinations (think Pentagon 'E-ring') and some of the dynamics of NATO and defence spending. I would be interested in an informed US perspective as to how familiar this is to the far side of 'the pond' and whether our machinations are much like theirs, I suspect that our Whitehall Warriors are much like Pentagon Warriors.

The document is worth a read in its entirety, there are plenty of gems and it is very witty in places :D

[Red Rat]

While "a lurker" may well be correct, history shows that priorities do not change in favour of defence and security unless there is a clear and present danger.

The problem is that modern equipment has such a long lead time that there is a complete mis-match between equipment build timelines and the political decision making timelines. Unlike the UK's build to war in 1938 where equipment could come off the production line that year (aircraft, tanks) and the subsequent year (ships), any capital platforms would take years to complete.

[davidbfpo]

The UK's top soldier, General Peter Wall, has been interviewed:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/10146393/Wars-of-the-future-will-be-short-sharp-and-bloody-says-Army-chief.html

Of note are his remarks on recruiting for military cyber warriors:
The education and personal qualities of our cyber warriors are likely to be a challenge to more linear military behaviour and we therefore need to consider how we recruit.

[Fuchs]

The British military problems and resulting inadequacy of British military policy can be summarised quite concisely in my opinion:

Their willingness to tax the rich's incomes is not sufficient to fund a military which meets the military-related grand strategic ambitions.

They want to be a great naval power, but can only afford a small fleet with tiny numbers of nuclear submarines and medium-sized carriers. They want to be able to bully, invade & occupy in U.S: style with minimised KIA and degree of improvisation, but cannot afford an army or air force (including support assets such as plenty tankers and heavylift aircraft) to do it on their own.
Meanwhile, playing lap dog and following the Americans everywhere has been understood to be superfluous.

[davidbfpo]

A rather good blogger's explanation why the UK has shrunk it's military, in particular the army and the expectation that is enough for UK national interests:http://thinpinstripedline.blogspot.co.uk/2013/07/what-exactly-is-real-army.html

From the conclusion:
Given the lack of existential threats, and the reality that there is no real desire for sustained overseas operations for at least the next few years, it is hard to escape the view that the UK not only possesses a reasonably sized army proportionate to its current strategic position, but that by keeping it relatively small, it retains the funds to keep it well trained and well equipped, and in turn enabling it to punch above its weight as a partner of choice for other nations.

[davidbfpo]

The highly respected British military historian, Hew Strachan, has edited this small volume, thinner as officialdom prevented six serving officers contributions appearing and makes some pithy comments:
Like many armies in the past, the British army struggles to foster effective debate within a hierarchical command chain.....for fear of reputational damage and political controversy....The MoD has got to get real … Differences and debates need to be properly gone over. Otherwise we are none the wiser

If this is what retired officers are writing, as this review puts it I am not surprised controversy results:
An underlying theme in the essays by former generals and senior British staff officers is the almost complete lack of preparedness and failure to provide enough resources, in terms of both money and men, in Iraq. The failures, the authors write, were not learned and were repeated in Afghanistan.

Link to review:http://m.guardian.co.uk/uk-news/2013/jul/19/mod-risking-soldiers-iraq-afghanistan-generals?CMP=twt_gu

Link to publisher's website, where John Nagl comments:http://www.ashgate.com/isbn/9781409437369

Found elsewhere a review by Sir Michael Howard, a historian who in his senior years remains sensible:
This collection must be almost unique in military history. Seldom if ever have senior military commanders discussed so frankly the difficulties they have faced in translating the strategic demands made by their political masters into operational realities. The problems posed by their enemies were minor compared with those presented by corrupt local auxiliaries, remote bureaucratic masters, and civilian colleagues pursuing their own agendas. Our political leaders should study it very carefully before they ever make such demands on our armed forces again.

From:http://ccw.history.ox.ac.uk/2013/05/09/british-generals-in-blairs-wars/

Amazon.com, with no reviews:http://www.amazon.com/British-Generals-Military-Strategy-Operational/dp/1409437353/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1374356457&sr=1-1&keywords=British+Generals+in+Blair%27s+Wars

Amazon.co.uk: not available yet (ho-hum).

[SJPONeill]

This should be a damn good read but two questions...

Why, oh why will they not let serving officers contribute? This is so short-sighted and having followed a number of senior British officers' public comments over the last 4-5 years, I can not imagine that the blocked contributions to this book could be that damaging to the Blair or the current administration.

Why not release this as a Kindle version as well? The cost of shipping books internationally continues to climb and a large (and growing) proportion of audiences are switching to e-books, including oldies like myself...

[davidbfpo]

I overlooked adding to my post that this week IISS hosted an hour long panel discussion on the book:http://www.iiss.org/en/events/events/archive/2013-5126/july-bdc1/british-generals-5a6c

Note I have yet to watch this.

[davidbfpo]

SJPONeill asked two questions, I can only offer an explanation for the first:
This should be a damn good read but two questions...

Why, oh why will they not let serving officers contribute? This is so short-sighted and having followed a number of senior British officers' public comments over the last 4-5 years, I can not imagine that the blocked contributions to this book could be that damaging to the Blair or the current administration.

British officialdom is rarely open to public servants, at all levels, contributing on contemporary public issues - I exclude "whistle-blowing". This policy has been reinforced by politicians reluctance to have informed "insider" contributions, which often are contrary to the "spin" the public and media are fed with.

The UK Secretary of Defence, Philip Hammond, made it very clear from taking office that public comments had to be approved and "on message".

What happened to two 'lessons learned' internal unclassified reviews of British military performance provide some insight. The 'Operation Banner' review on Northern Ireland appeared in public via a Republican-leaning group (IIRC it is linked here) and that on Iraq remains an official document - partly I suspect as the Official Iraq Inquiry (known as the Chilcot Report) has yet to be published.

Historians often attest to the value of combing US National Archives for UK documents.

[Fuchs]

the British army struggles to foster effective debate within a hierarchical command chain

A German general, Uhle-Wettler (one of the few notable German military theory authors since the 60's) has recounted meetings at SHAPE in one of his books.

He depicted German officers as openly disagreeing and ready to criticize superior's opinions. meanwhile, British officers displayed themselves a a solid bloc.

H also pointed out that the British officers knew exactly how many and which personnel slots for generals exist in the UK's army, while German officers weren't even aware of the quantity in the Heer.


Maybe such organisation culture differences may be important to such issues.


There is a simple fix: Some roleplaying games and wargames are being done without uniforms and ranks, with all participants in civilian clothes. This removes hierarchies if the people don't know (recognize) each other.

Why not simply establish a forum with anonymised accounts (and moderators who ban or rename members which gave away too much info about their rank) to discuss such internal affairs?
The elder officers are often less tech-savvy and would probably be underrepresented, which would reduce the role of conservatism and inertia in the discussion.

[SJPONeill]

Spot on, Fuchs!!!

Any organisation that finds itself full of yes-men and followers in in trouble. When I teach lessons learned material as part of organisational learning, I use the example of the US forces that went into Iraq, which on D Day were (in my external perception) very much conformist, 'no black or even grey marks on my unit', etc because that is how one advances in a peacetime force. However, within a year of the insurgency erupting across Iraq, there was clearly a fundamental change where the philosophy became driven by the need to share (certainly at the tactical level) cock-ups and screw-ups so that others might learn and avoid the same errors. For a ling time, I think that the UK MOD was happy to sit back on its imaginary laurels from Malaya, Kenya and Northern Ireland and snipe at US COIN efforts when it should have been taking notes and getting with the programme for contemporary operations...

Those senior officers have a duty to speak out, just the same as they do if the issue was a simple criminal matter, and to not do so so that they might continue to enjoy the Queen's coin is a betrayal of the ethos and culture of service...

[davidbfpo]

Thomas Ricks has read the book; in what appears to be the start of a review he says:
I've just finished reading most of British Generals in Blair's Wars, a fascinating volume, one of the most interesting I've read this year.

Link:http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/09/27/the_british_generals_talk_candidly_about_their_rol e_in_the_wars_of_the_last_10_year

[davidbfpo]

A very short Chatham House briefing paper (less than 30 pgs) and IMHO sits here: Depending on the Right People: British Political-Military Relations, 2001–10. The summary starts with:
There is a widespread view that Britain’s politicians should bear the main blame for the country’s military difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan. In particular, they are accused of failing to heed professional military advice and of launching over-ambitious missions with insufficient resources. Recent evidence, including from the Iraq Inquiry, shows that this view is too simplistic.
Instead, Britain seems to have suffered a wider failure of the government system, with politicians, senior military officers and civil servants all playing their part.

Link:http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International%20Security/chr_deWaal1113.pdf

For reasons lost on me the author, a UK diplomat on study leave, remarks:
Britain must learn from US experience and from its own mistakes.

Another article to read one day.

[SWJ Blog]

Gates: British Military Cuts Limit Scope for US Partnership (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/gates-british-military-cuts-limit-scope-for-us-partnership)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/gates-british-military-cuts-limit-scope-for-us-partnership) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[davidbfpo]

Catching up with my reading backlog I have finally read Hew Strachan's Parameters article. It is an easy read, ten pages long:http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/issues/Summer_2013/5_Strachan_Article.pdf

Apologies if posted before, not sure where and when I found it!:wry:

[davidbfpo]

Philip Hammond, the UK Defence Secretary, has warned short conflicts are the only way to win over 'war weary' public, at the Munich Security Conference.

Within his reported speech are some very odd phrases and words which hardly endear him to the listening public, probably some fellow MPs too. In particular that:
..in Syria that we are creating a new hotbed of international terrorism....public opinion in Western countries is not yet persuaded that military intervention will be justified or in their own self interest.

No, Mr Hammond, 'we' are not creating this hotbed, nor have you persuaded me that military intervention - which was over CW use by the regime - not international terrorism was justified and practical.


There is a climate of skepticism about engagement in failed or failing countries, a fear of getting entrapped in longer term, deeper forms of engagement....Increasingly we need to present intervention as time limited and with strictly defined ambitions. We are at a point in the public opinion cycle in the UK where there is a war weariness after ten years of engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan. There is definitely a fear, quite irrational in some cases, that any engagement anywhere will somehow lead to an uncontrollable commitment to large numbers of troops, a large amount of resources and a long term intervention.

We are finding not always as persuasive as we would like it to be...It is very clear to those of us looking in horror at this emerging situation in Syria that we are creating a new hotbed of international terrorism, a new base from which international terrorism will operate that will probably rival any of those we have seen in the last decade or so.

We are allowing this to happen and yet public opinion in Western countries is not yet persuaded that military intervention will be justified or in their own self interest.

It will be a long time before anyone forgets the mistakes of Iraq. Dismantling a security infrastructure when there is nothing to put in its place is clearly a mistake and short term compromises are inevitable if we are going to maintain something of a secure environment.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/10612944/Short-conflicts-only-way-to-win-over-war-weary-public-warns-Defence-Secretary.html

The strategy of external Western intervention appears alive and well in the UK Ministry of Defence.

[Red Rat]

War weariness? I simply don't see it. The so called war has not touched society in any significant way.

What I do see is a great deal of public cynicism about the use of military force after two significant campaigns which do not appear to have resulted in any tangible benefit to the country.

Not war weary, the British public is cynical.

[Firn]

War weariness? I simply don't see it. The so called war has not touched society in any significant way.

What I do see is a great deal of public cynicism about the use of military force after two significant campaigns which do not appear to have resulted in any tangible benefit to the country.

Not war weary, the British public is cynical.

I think your arguments have considerable merit, certainly more then the ones made by Mr. Hammond.

[Steve Blair]

Yet in the language of politics his wording does make a twisted sense. Saying the public is "war-weary" implies that they might otherwise be behind the policy were they not "fatigued" in some way. Admitting that they're cynical might reflect badly on the political decisions that led to that cynicism.

Far better to make it sound like the public is loyal but weary rather than disenchanted and distrustful of political decisions. IMO, anyhow.

[davidbfpo]

From a November 2012 post: A recent piece of research, based on opinion polling:
The research found that nine out of ten people respected the UK Armed Forces and eight out of ten had a high or very high opinion of the Services. The UK Armed Forces was also more respected as a profession than doctors, lawyers or the police. It seems that support for the UK Armed Forces is significantly higher among men, older people, those with lower educational qualifications and people who align with parties on the political right, as found in overseas studies.

The study also showed that 58% of the UK public were opposed to Iraq and 46% disapproved of operations in Afghanistan, with women, older people and people supporting minor political parties significantly more opposed to the missions. Despite this, more than 90% supported military personnel returning from Iraq and Afghanistan, regardless of their agreement or disagreement with these missions.

The British public's stance reflects several factors, which includes an element of war weariness - even if the military is shrinking - over two failed wars and the apparent wish of this government to be ready to intervene again. The grim Syrian civil war has strengthened this; in marked contrast to the Bosnian conflict where public opinion favoured intervention before the politicians.

Then there is the 'trust & confidence' the public have in politicians which has shrunk steadily in the last decade, if not longer.


Do you trust your local MP? In 2003 44%; in 2012 37%.
Do you trust national politicians? In 2003 27%; in 2012 19%.

Adapted from:http://cdn.yougov.com/cumulus_uploads/document/syrhatyofp/Trust_trends_Nov_2012.pdf

[davidbfpo]

The House of Commons Select Committee on Defence has published a report on 'Army 2020', it is pgs long, so I have cited the conclusion only and in part. Paragraph 6:
We remain to be convinced that the Army 2020 plan represents a fully thought-through and tested concept which will allow the Army to counter emerging and uncertain threats and develop a contingent capability to deal with unforeseen circumstances. The MoD needs to justify how the conclusion was reached that the Army 2020 plan of 82,000 Regulars and 30,000 Reserves represented the best way of countering these threats.

Link:http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmdfence/576/57603.htm

Curiously the committee used an unofficial website ARSSE for:
During the course of our inquiry, the Army Rumour Service hosted a web forum to enable us to hear the views of interested parties on the Army 2020 plan which we used to inform our questioning of witnesses. The forum received 494 comments from 171 contributors.

From the final conclusion:
143. Army 2020 represents a radical vision for the future role and structure of the British Army. It departs significantly from the announcements made in SDSR 2010 and we have considerable doubts about how the plan was developed and tested, and whether it will meet the needs of the UK's national security. The evidence presented to date has been far from convincing. Our principal concerns are twofold:

· First, the MoD has failed to communicate the rationale and strategy behind the plan to the Army, the wider Armed Forces, Parliament or the public.

· Second, we remain concerned that the financially driven reduction in the numbers of Regulars has the potential to leave the Army short of personnel particularly in key supporting capabilities until sufficient additional Reserves are recruited and trained.

144. The Government has said Army 2020 has to work and that there is no Plan B.

Link:http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmdfence/576/57607.htm

[mirhond]

The latest entry from abovesaid blog: Wednesday, 14 May 2014


GLOBSEC: The Road to Bratislava
...
History is only senseless and cruel if the politics and strategy that make history are driven by short-term prescriptions in which the easy politics of the moment trumps strategy and security. In standing up to Greater Russia it is time for all Europeans as Europe to stand tall and resist the precedents of macho power Moscow is seeking to re-establish in Europe. Fail and it will not simply be the poor people of Ukraine who suffer the consequences. The very idea of ‘Europe’ will have been demonstrated a hollow, empty lie – a good-time gamble unable and unwilling to stand up for the very values and interests it claims as its heritage.

It reminds me the lamentations of one European author from 16th cent. about the moral superiority and military prowess of Ottoman Turks, while Europeans are divided, depressed and apathetic. Where is Europe and where is Ottoman Empire now?

[davidbfpo]

From an observer:
Royal Tank Regiment (RTR) is now down to just one Regiment with 56 Main Battle Tanks. For the first time since WWII we have more horses than tanks.
There are two other tank equipped regiments in the British Army, but they are called cavalry regiments and do not have horses for operational use:http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/british-army-reduced-to-one-single-tank-regiment-9644238.html

I leave aside the Blues & Royals, the mounted cavalry of the Household Division:
https://encrypted-tbn3.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcTVrSWp98bC6pqfCnvuNuqYmISVyCf7B FCPCL_FmXG2-r2Q6rwmAw

Well I suppose they could give some Cossacks a surpise if they reach London.:wry:

[davidbfpo]

Ex-SAS commanders are not known for taking a high profile on current events, so this article deserves reading. It does refer to the UK decision to become involved last week. It is a moot point whether it also applies to the USA and others outside the region.

The title 'Get the politics right, then the plan for the military might work' and sub-titled 'Bombing IS jihadists provides a 'sugar rush', but the Government has been silent on what it knows is needed'.

Link:http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/iraq-crisis-get-the-politics-right-then-the-plan-for-the-military-might-work-9759924.html

Here is one key paragraph:
But to those of us that know Iraq, terrorists and extremism, and have fought organisations such as Isis within that country, Afghanistan and elsewhere, the situation does not look as positive, or the plan as robust, as that presented on Friday in Parliament. Projected by the theatre of Parliament, the deployment of six RAF bombers has taken on a military and political significance out of all proportion to their real military value. They provide us and our leaders, desperate to do something, with a military sugar rush, to be followed inevitably in six months’ time with the “war-downer” reality that things are not going as we wish them to, and that the long-term costs of our involvement are escalating, in ways that will need to be explained, or hidden, during a general election.Then shorter passages:
Bombing that is not geared to an Iraqi political purpose will only create propaganda opportunities for Isis, as it seeks to legitimise its hold over western Iraq.....Bombing alone will not break the will of Isis to hold its ground in Iraq, and it must be joined on the ground by the Iraqi military if it is to be decisive. What, then, of this essential task?.....Bombing and killing Isis and Iraqis without a political solution for the Iraqi Sunni is to risk strategic failure – to risk making the Iraqi Sunni see Baghdad as oppressors and not liberators. Bombing without an effective Iraqi army is to risk operational stalemate on the ground and a fixing of the front lines, both of which appear to define the course that we have set ourselves.Personally I am deeply pessimistic from the comfort of my armchair about the UK resuming a military role in Iraq, for our national interests bar one which I will end with later. Secondly the Iraqi state shows no sign of changing and as Joel Wing reports on the main Iraq-Syria thread the state armed forces remain, well a mess. I fear we have done what ISIS wanted, as western powers return to the region with just bombs.

What is the UK national interest bar one? Joining in a coalition which the USA has advocated, so once again we stand beside you.

[Bill Moore]

David,

All good points, and I think I can argue we already failed strategically when we failed to find WMD, and changed the balance of power in the region in a way that favored both Iran and sunni extremists. The current approach may have been well intended, but the underlying assumption or hope that Iraq would step up politically and militarily hasn't happened.

Can we recover from failure? England did during WWII, as have others throughout history. My question for you is should the West fight IS regardless based on the threat the pose to us?

[davidbfpo]

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/ByyDPfhIUAASNRX.jpg

[davidbfpo]

Bill asked me:
My question for you is should the West fight IS regardless based on the threat the(y) pose to us?From my armchair faraway Bill my response is political not military.

I am unconvinced that we, the UK, should join this alliance and take military action in Iraq, maybe with Syria being added.

First and foremost we do not understand the region well enough to navigate our way around and achieve the goal of a united, coherent Iraqi state. This weakness is partly historical and reflects the lack of information, let alone intelligence on what is happening now.

This academic piece has value 'With bad intelligence on Islamic State, West is flying in the dark':https://theconversation.com/with-bad-intelligence-on-islamic-state-west-is-flying-in-the-dark-32247 This analyst takes a more strategic viewpoint - what can intervention achieve:http://leftfootforward.org/2014/09/5-questions-every-supporter-of-intervention-in-the-middle-east-should-ask/ and from ICSR:https://newhumanist.org.uk/articles/4749/will-us-airstrikes-stop-isis

Secondly I am not convinced ISIS poses such a threat to the UK and allied national security now or in the near future, that it demands military action. In the debate here last week a number of MPs referred to the threat to Turkey, which is a very weak argument given Turkey's own stance to date. Yes like all jihadists they hate the 'far enemy'. Have they the motivation and capability to attack us now? It seems to me they are busy enough carving out their emirate and contemplating how to attack Baghdad.

The allied military action taken so far has been criticised in many quarters; reflected in the other SWC thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=21196

I support giving aid to the enemies of ISIS such as the Kurds in both countries, although their objectives are quite limited and they are unlikely to want to attack traditionally Sunni Arab areas. As for the Iraqi state I see little action of consequence.

In Syria it is harder to decide on how to fight ISIS. I would oppose a "deal" with Bashir Assad and his rivals the jihadist-inclined groups. As many have noted a number of those groups may ally themselves with ISIS now. If that happens the non-jihadist groups are doomed. Assad rarely attacks ISIS, as Crowbat reminds us.

Containment of ISIS is achievable:

1) Reduce its newly acquired heavy weapons capability (artillery, tanks etc)
2) Support the Kurdish enclaves in Syria
3) Support rival groups overtly and covertly to attack / resist ISIS
4) Enforce a 'no fly zone' over Syria (build up to this)
5) Weaken its message, finances and flow of personnel

[davidbfpo]

A review of Taking Command, by General David Richards, with a foreword by Max Hastings. A model four-star general takes us through his 40 years in the British army
Link:http://www.spectator.co.uk/books/9366182/taking-command-by-general-david-richards-review/#comments

A book I might ask for Xmas.:D

I know he has his admirers - in some strange places - and critics. He can be remarkably direct sometimes.

[davidbfpo]

The British government acknowledged today that a submarine periscope had been sighted in waters near a main U.K. base, (off west Scotland), touching off a massive NATO hunt (http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/video/search-expands-submarine-lurking-swedens-capital-26339873) in November.....A pair of U.S. Navy P-3 Orions, as well as Canadian and French planes and two British warships, scoured the waters for days when the periscope was seen in November.
Link:http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2014/12/britain-admits-to-hunt-for-suspected-russian-sub-in-uk-waters/
More detail:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11283926/Britain-forced-to-ask-Nato-to-track-Russian-submarine-in-Scottish-waters.html

Embarassing as the UK has no maritime patrol aircraft. Even more as the only 'main' UK base in western Scotland are the Trident SSBN facilities in the Clyde. Taken alongside the current higher level of Russian flights and probing it is to say the least interesting.

[davidbfpo]

A rather clear, pointed commentary by a respected military correspondent that the planned budget cuts - across most government departments - will make the British Army and others almost irrelevent:
The UK now becomes the unreliable ally that probably won’t be able to protect its own vital maritime interests.
Link:http://www.theweek.co.uk/uk-news/61710/osborne-s-cuts-could-reduce-army-to-virtually-useless#ixzz3Lb8psgAH

[davidbfpo]

Oh dear, once again a suspected Russian submarine periscope appears near the transit route for the UK's nuclear missile submarines, based in the Firth of Clyde. This time a RN frigate was on station and needed two USN maritime patrol aircraft's help:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11334836/MoD-forced-to-ask-US-for-help-in-tracking-Russian-submarine.html

[davidbfpo]

Prompted by creating a new thread for the UK's top soldier, General Nick Carter, giving a speech, I have combined approx. nine threads here. The title remains unchanged, although the emphasis here is on the Army.

[davidbfpo]

General Nick Carter, the UK's top soldier, spoke on February 17th, on the theme of 'The Future of the British Army: How the Army must change to serve Britain in a Volatile World' and a 24 min podcast is here:http://www.chathamhouse.org/event/future-british-army-how-army-must-change-serve-britain-volatile-world

The UK continues to see itself as the USA's leading ally and as readers will know some in the USA have expressed their doubts, both in terms of capability and political will. So there is value in listening to the intention, it is a moot point if it will be funded.

He does rather pack a lot in, in fact the speech sounds almost hurried. Following 'Chatham House Rules' the Q&A are not available. It is interesting that the venue is Chatham House, aka Royal Insititute for International Affairs, not RUSI or IISS.

There is a main thread 'UK military: problems & policies' into which this may be merged:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4819

[Red Rat]

The new doctrine of "Integrated Action" will be of considerable interest to the COIN community. It is influenced heavily (from what I can see) from Emile Simpson's book "War From The Ground Up" and to my mind seems to be most suitable for stability operations. I will be curious to see how the operational use the doctrine as the character of conflict assumed by the doctrine demands a whole of government response, and a response that is both swift and agile. To date Whitehall has proved quite incapable of this.

As for the UK's position with the US. The UK remains the only ally who can put a division in the field with the Americans and is technically more integrated than the other "Five Eyes" partners. On the political front the relationship seems firm, although Scottish Independence (they haven't gone away and the politics remains fevered and volatile north of the border, with increasing sectarian undertones) or continued strategic myopia by the UK Government (further defence cuts and absence from Europe) would undoubtedly relegate us.

[davidbfpo]

Citing Red Rat in part:
The UK remains the only ally who can put a division in the field with the Americans and is technically more integrated than the other "Five Eyes" partners.

Chatting with a "lurker" with military expertise they remarked the current emphasis on the UK contributing at divisional level meant the one UK division that can be deployed MUST be when an overwhelmingly national interest is at stake. Plus there isno follow-on division.

Secondly I do wonder if NATO decides it must have forces deployed forward in Eastern Europe, Poland notably, will the UK actually totally exit from Germany? Rotating from established bases in Germany is far better than other options.

[Red Rat]

I would be surprised if there were not steps to address the lack of a follow-on division. Certainly the troops are there in number, although not currently in configuration. What would be needed would be a deployable divisional HQ (I don't see why HQ 1 (UK) Division or HQ Force Troops Command could not meet this requirement). More difficult would be sufficient enablers (logistics, CIS, aviation, artillery etc).

A division would operate as part of a corps construct,which could only be fielded by either the US or NATO. One would hope that in both cases national interests would be both aligned and significant. Your lurker is correct in that as the UK's military strength dwindles, commitment of smaller elements constitute greter effort and greater risk. Much like the 20th century Home Fleet much of the strategic value remains in being a "force in being", would the UK really risk the tactical defeat in detail of 3 (UK) Division or the loss of HMS Queen Elizabeth?

I am slightly nonplussed by the UK focus on operating at the divisional level. It seems at variance with the general thrust of what passes for UK defence strategy.

I cannot see the UK not withdrawing completely from Germany, that train appears to have left the station.

[davidbfpo]

General Odierno has publicly voiced his concern over future working with the UK, an issue that Westminster-Whitehall would prefer not be asked, as it undermines the 'Special Relationship'.


I would be lying to you if I did not say that I am very concerned about the GDP investment in the UK. In the past we would have a British army division working alongside an American division. Now it might be a British brigade inside an American division, or even a British battalion inside an American brigade. We have to adjust our programme to make sure we are all able to see that we can still work together.....(He described Britain's role as a key US ally as) about having a partner that has very close values and the same goals as we do. As we look at threats around the world, these are global issues and we need to have multinational solutions. They are concerning to everyone. We all need to be able to invest and work together to solve these problems.
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-31688929

The BBC cites the original story elsewhere:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11443204/Britain-is-becoming-a-friend-who-cant-be-trusted-says-top-US-general.html?

There are several issues here, notably UK military capability as it shrinks and how much is spent on defence (2% GDP being an agreed NATO level).

http://news.bbcimg.co.uk/media/images/71831000/gif/_71831007_army_cuts_464.gif

Avid SWC readers will know UK military reform and the politics are debated in the main thread 'UK military problems & policies', with 85k views and 200 posts:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4819

For at least two years now I have encountered mutterings about the UK's declining capability and perceived lack of political (and public) will to remain the US's willing partner. It is the irony of following the US into the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as an ally, that the US military first began to ask were we a capable and willing partner. Diplomacy aside I do wonder if American politicians have asked such questions.

I expect if UK (and NATO) defence spending dips below 2% of GDP that the criticism of Europe relying on the USA for it's defence to become louder.

[davidbfpo]

I missed PM David Cameron's response. Rather oddly amidst a wider article, ah well here it is!

Britain is still:
a very strong partner for the USEconomy of effort there!

From the article:
But that is a long way short of saying he will commit to maintaining defence spending at 2% of GDPLink:http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/mar/02/us-comments-british-army-raise-questions-defence-spending

Then I found a longer story, apparently given in Colchester as part of election campaign (the town is the ome of an army brigade) and apart from the laudatory list of projects is this:
And as for working with the Americans, I know because I spend time with President Obama and others, how much they appreciate the fact that Britain is a very strong and capable partner and able to fight with them, when it's in our national interest, anywhere in the world.Now I expect a few people would be puzzled at this claim:
You can see that very specifically today in Iraq, where the second largest contributor in terms of air strikes and air patrols is Britain by a very large margin. You have to add up several other countries to get to the scale of what we are doing, second after the Americans.The RAF have six Tornados in Cyprus, so old it has been widely reported only two are available at one time. As the House of Commons Defence Committee reported last week the UK's on the ground presence in Iraq is three people (I assume that excludes SOF) and for example the Australians have many more. See:http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/05/britain-greater-role-fighting-islamic-state-iraq-mps

This report refers to the UK undertaking:
6% of the air strikes against Isis.....British drones used in Iraq and of those flying over Syria – from October, when they were introduced, through to December. Over that period the UK flew 100 armed Reaper missions, launching 38 Hellfire missiles.Manpower in Iraq (not Kurdistan):
in December, found at that time there were only three UK military personnel outside the Kurdish regions of Iraq compared with 400 Australians, 280 Italians and 300 Spanish.

[davidbfpo]

A Kings of War blog article laments the political attention given to foreign and security policy in the General Election campaign so far:
Whilst some people might look at the treatment of foreign policy, defence and security issues during the 2015 UK General Election campaign as a farce, is it not now becoming something much more akin to a tragedy?

Link:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2015/04/cclkow-the-2-doctrine/

Sometimes the leaders refer to their opponents stance on the Trident dettterent, without mentioning the Scottish Nationalist's adamant opposition to its basing in Scotland. Fewer wonder as defence is not "ring-fenced" from spending cuts how much post-election defence will be cut.

I expect that the UK will end up spending less than 2% even after fudging the figures. What the UK spends does not IMHO affect other European nations; it may annoy the USA though.

[davidbfpo]

With two momentary exceptions the British General Election did not feature foreign policy or defence matters and now we await a new 'emergency' budget statement in July, which is widely reported as announcing further budget cuts.

Oxford Research Group has a paper on the options, from a different perspective - which I would call retrenchment away from the UK pursuing intervention as an option:http://oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefing_papers_and_reports/cutting_cloth_ambition_austerity

[davidbfpo]

Each year there is an official survey of attitudes within the armed forces, called The 2015 Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/429271/AFCAS_2015_Main_Report_Revised.pdf) and the BBC in a very slim report:
The rate of personnel planning to leave, or who have given their notice, increased from 16% in 2011 to 25% now. Those planning to stay in the service for as long as they could also fell from 41% in 2011 to 34% now.
However, the survey of 11,877 personnel also found there had been an increase in morale, with 45% rating their morale as high, compared with 41% in 2014
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-32851668

[Bill Moore]

More on UK's military downsizing and just as important in my view, their reduced funding of BBC.

Video at the following link is Fareed's take:

http://www.cnn.com/videos/tv/2015/05/22/exp-gps-0524-take.cnn

His article on the same topic in the Washington Post


Okay, that’s a bit unfair. Leaders everywhere, including in the United States, understand that “all politics is local.” But spending a few days recently in Britain, I was struck by just how parochial it has become. After an extraordinary 300-year run, Britain has essentially resigned as a global power.

[Bob's World]

The UK has always possessed a much more realistic appreciation of geo-strategy than the US. I suspect they are also a bit weary of being dragged into an endless string of US-led foreign misadventures defined by our oddly emotional perspective on interests, and our overly "if it's made in the US, the local will like it" approach to foisting ourselves onto others.

As our opponents continue to rise, and our allies and partners continue to distance themselves to avoid being sucked into the messes we either create or are too stiff-necked to avoid, at some point we will begin to step back and reassess what being the US in a globalized, post Cold War world really means. And how to truly "lead" in such an environment.

[Bill Moore]

The UK has always possessed a much more realistic appreciation of geo-strategy than the US. I suspect they are also a bit weary of being dragged into an endless string of US-led foreign misadventures defined by our oddly emotional perspective on interests, and our overly "if it's made in the US, the local will like it" approach to foisting ourselves onto others.

As our opponents continue to rise, and our allies and partners continue to distance themselves to avoid being sucked into the messes we either create or are too stiff-necked to avoid, at some point we will begin to step back and reassess what being the US in a globalized, post Cold War world really means. And how to truly "lead" in such an environment.

I think your confusing issues here. I agree the British have generally had greater strategic insight than the U.S. for a lot of reasons (history, empire, think in longer time lines, etc.). However, to equate their military downsizing to American foreign policy folly is hubris in its own right. They're making those decisions based upon internal political issues, and I suspect their true strategic thinkers are actually quite concerned about their dependence on others for their defense. Furthermore, the reduction of spending on BBC World has nothing to do with U.S. foreign policy, and everything to do with what Fareed more accurately referred to as Great Britain stepping away from their status as great power. OIF may still be the biggest strategic mistake we ever made, and it certainly tainted UK's government when they went along for the roller coaster ride, and they were left holding the bag when the roller coaster derailed, BUT that one event is not what drove the UK to the decisions they recently made. As you pointed out, they're more strategic than that, and a decision to step away from their world power status based on our hubris would have been short sighted.

[Invictus_88]

There seems to be a rolling back in the UK of the government's willingness to involve itself in foreign affairs in general, and 'kinetic' military intervention in particular, and this is acknowledged by government ministers.

As has already been said, it could be traced back to OIF and the impact that has had on public opinion, and it is excused at times under the guise of "achieving more with less" or "getting value for money" (i.e. "doing less" and "spending less"), but there isn't yet a public discussion of the risks of such a course.

It is one thing to the UK to decide to interfere less in the world, but quite another to hope that the world will not still interfere with the UK. A reduced capacity for defence might then become a destabilising factor, and in the long run potentially even more expensive than the money saved in the first place.

[davidbfpo]

There seems to be a rolling back in the UK of the government's willingness to involve itself in foreign affairs in general, and 'kinetic' military intervention in particular, and this is acknowledged by government ministers.

As has already been said, it could be traced back to OIF and the impact that has had on public opinion, and it is excused at times under the guise of "achieving more with less" or "getting value for money" (i.e. "doing less" and "spending less"), but there isn't yet a public discussion of the risks of such a course.

It is one thing to the UK to decide to interfere less in the world, but quite another to hope that the world will not still interfere with the UK. A reduced capacity for defence might then become a destabilising factor, and in the long run potentially even more expensive than the money saved in the first place.

Invictus,

Yes there is a general "rolling bacK" by this government and to be fair by the opposition too on some foreign affairs. 'Kinetic' military intervention is certainly one area, rightly so IMHO and the low-level military response to ISIS is a good illustration.

Other areas of foreign policy remain very active, on a daily basis and in the long-term - notably over Europe, with a looming referendum. Add in the migrant issue, primarily seen @ Calais and less directly in the Mediterranean. Do not overlook the substantial amount of national 'aid' for development, of around US$21b per year.

Far higher on the UK government's agenda is the economy - which may be better than others, but has persistent problems and more public spending cuts to come. Then there is the question of a political agreement over Scotland. It would be ironic if this Conservative government for whom 'the Union' was once so central oversaw its demise.

It is rare for foreign affairs and national security to occupy the political and media foreground for long. There are substantial public minorities who would prefer a different approach, mainly seen in 'single issue' campaigns. The current Russian war in Ukraine hardly arouses public interest.

There are many who consider some of the defence cuts made, now a few years ago, were wrong, such as the scrapping all maritime patrol aircraft and the construction of two aircraft carriers.

[Red Rat]

The UK has always possessed a much more realistic appreciation of geo-strategy than the US. I suspect they are also a bit weary of being dragged into an endless string of US-led foreign misadventures defined by our oddly emotional perspective on interests, and our overly "if it's made in the US, the local will like it" approach to foisting ourselves onto others.



I am not convinced that the UK now retains a realistic appreciation of geo-strategy outside of academia. Certainly it has been widely noted by many ( House of Commons Defence Committee (http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/defence-committee/publications/?type=&session=26&sort=false&inquiry=all), Chris Elliott (http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/high-command/) and more) the absence of strategic thinking from recent (2005 onwards) decisionmaking. Current UK strategy seems to be based around being seen to do something as opposed to achieving anything.

Current UK politics is exclusively focused on three things:

The UK in Europe
Scottish Separation
Reducing the Deficit


Until these are resolved I suspect that UK foreign entanglements will be seen as unwelcome and UK strategic retrenchment will continue.

This "Yes Prime Minister (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HSD1d-6P6qI)" scene sums up beautifully UK strategy ;)

[davidbfpo]

General,

Yes the UK-US can still work together, provided that the relationship is out of public view - except for diplomacy - and "boots on the ground" whether a division or smaller is not sought.

I am sure this quieter 'special relationship' will suit the "suits" in our military, the agencies and maybe the politicians. The UK has disappointed the USA many times since 1945, for example PM Harold Wilson turning down President Johnson's request for British troops in Vietnam - even a store clerk please IIRC being the phrase.

Two big problems exist in this quieter relationship. First and foremost is how the US Congress will react if the UK "defaults" on the NATO goal of spending 2% GDP on defence and oh-so overtly says why should we pay to defend Europe? Second and not so predictable as it was till the May 2015 General Election, would Congress agree to selling the UK the next generation of SSBN missiles?

[davidbfpo]

An alternative viewpoint from the Oxford Research Group:http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/articles_multimedia/britain_neednt_withdraw_world_stage_we_need_vision


The UK has much to offer in today’s world: a first-class diplomatic service, a legendary intelligence service and a highly effective army. Despite our austerity economics, we still have the second-largest development aid budget in the world. There is much to be applauded.

(Two ideas) We could commit ourselves to become the world’s leading specialist in conflict prevention and resolution. Teams of highly trained mediators could work quietly behind the scenes talking to “terrorists”, exploring opportunities for ceasefires and potential peace negotiations.

.....the armed forces could be restructured from offensive fighting to a force for protection. It would work with local communities in parts of the world where violence looms and protect the people where possible, to ensure their security and thus create political space for early mediation.

Not exactly options General Odierno may relish, but in combination with willing mainly European partners this could have an impact. Biggest snag is this vision appears to depend on not replacing Trident, which currently is hardly unlikely - for the moment leaving aside the SNP's input.

[davidbfpo]

A letter from a ret'd RN Admiral, who in 2002 retired as the UK's most senior RN officer, appeared today's in the Telegraph:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11673337/Our-defence-cuts-leave-us-looking-feeble-in-the-eyes-of-the-world.html

Two sentences give you a flavour:
There are disquieting parallels between the situation that confronted our country some 90 years ago and that which now prevails...Today, although in very different circumstances, there are some uncomfortable similarities.

[davidbfpo]

Two short comments on a newly found website on the UK's defence dilemmas, which are primarily financial and not strategic. The UK government currently is conducting, yet again, a Strategic Defence & Security Review (SDSR).

There is a longstanding thread on the UK's military problems:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4819

The website being:http://projects21.com/

Which states it is:
PS21 is a non-national, non-ideological, non-partisan organizationThe two articles then. The first written by a serving, so anonymous NATO military officer:http://projects21.com/2015/09/08/not-with-a-bang-but-a-white-paper-how-british-power-could-fall-apart-this-autumn/

SDSR means:
Britain’s status as a global military power, which is part of the bedrock of its place in the world, is rapidly diminishing. This is not because Britain has chosen to decline—Albion is simply stumbling into irrelevance.

Here are three reasons why:
The British government doesn’t do strategy.

Britain’s huge defence budget has a huge ‘value-for-money’ problem which puts Britain’s military capabilities at risk.

Britain’s leaders remain reluctant to provide significant forces to support globally important missions, putting Britain’s leadership role in NATO at risk.The second article is shorter and reports a discussion meeting with several ex-officers:http://projects21.com/2015/09/09/ps21-report-beyond-the-sdsr/

(http://projects21.com/2015/09/09/ps21-report-beyond-the-sdsr/)

[davidbfpo]

The response on this UK defence blog is interesting; the author is scathing, as are some of the comments and some agree:http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2015/09/not-with-a-bang/

[davidbfpo]

There is no longer a simple distinction between war and peace. We are in a state of permanent engagement in a global competition....all the instruments of national power need constantly to be in play.. to re-imagine the utility of the armed forces beyond the simple construct of fighting wars or preparing for the next one

(Later referring to constraints on the use of force lay in the areas of societal support, parliamentary consent and ever greater legal challenge). Such constraints are particularly significant when the desire to commit to the use of force is in support of operations which some may consider discretionary to the national interest.Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-34265850

Remarks made in a speech yesterday by General Sir Nicholas Houghton, UK Chief of the Defence Staff.

[davidbfpo]

The long awaited UK Strategic Defence & Security Review was published yesterday, getting mixed reviews and some plaudits. From my "armchair" there are the curious: two new 'strike' brigades to be formed by 2025 and largely with the same helicopters we have today.

Reviews:


Rather long and detailed:http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2015/11/sdsr-2015-what-does-it-mean/
The BBC's Mark Urban:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-34901846
RUSI's initial short assessment:https://rusi.org/SDSR2015
In The Guardian a RUSI SME adds:http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/nov/23/defence-security-review-britain
The UK Staff College (Kings War Studies outpost) has three responses:http://defenceindepth.co/

Will our allies, principally the USA 'first & foremost' be convinced the UK is a capable and willing ally?

Yes there is a long running thread on UK Defence into which this maybe merged one day, but as many readers are Americans and we so like the 'Special Relationship' I expecta few here will be interested!

[davidbfpo]

The votes have been cast by 397 to 223, so by a large majority the UK is now committed to bombing Syria - targeting Daesh / ISIS. Just what that means is rather unclear for the UK. Our immediate RAF contribution is small, eight Tornados, plus support aircraft and limited reinforcements - flying from Cyprus.

Amongst the deluge of coverage yesterday I found these contributions helpful.

First in a surprisingly good speech in the House of Commons the Shadow (Opposition) foreign secretary Hilary Benn supported air strikes and was applauded - very unusual, if not unique in our parliament:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-34991402

Tim Collins of Gulf War speech fame has a comment:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/labour/12031057/Hilary-Benns-speech-was-the-speech-of-a-true-leader.html

Adam Holloway, a Conservative MP, an ex-soldier and reporter, wrote and citing one passage:
...for the last 15 years I have watched British governments join or create international "coalitions" that have used military force without understanding what drives each conflict on the ground. This ignorance has had disastrous consequences for tens of millions of people in the Middle East and North Africa. So last week, on the plane back from a visit to Iraq and Turkey, I knew that in (the debate) I would have stand up and say that I simply do not know enough about the big plan to fix the broken politics.
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/12028072/In-Syria-Britain-is-about-to-make-the-same-mistakes-all-over-again.html

Shashank Joshi, of RUSI, asks how robust are David Cameron's arguments:https://rusi.org/commentary/sound-strategy-or-dodgy-dossier-cameron%E2%80%99s-case-syria-strikes

My title derives from the 'alliance' against Daesh involving sixty nations, although to be fair very few contribute militarily, with some leaving for the Yemen and hence the UK being one more involved.

[davidbfpo]

Two pre-decision articles found today. One by Tony Blair's former chief of staff, Jonathan Powell, widely credited as a key figure in the Northern Ireland peace talks, who argues and I quote the title & sub-title
Bombing Isis is not enough – we’ll need to talk to them too; To dismiss Islamic State as merely a mad death cult is to deceive ourselves – they are highly rational and shrewd

His last two paragraphs:
I am not arguing that talking is an alternative to fighting. Unless there is military pressure the armed group will never be prepared to talk. But judging by history, fighting is unlikely to provide an answer by itself. If I were an MP I would vote for bombing in Syria as in Iraq. But I would also want to know who is really going to provide the boots on the ground to fight Isis; and be assured of a serious political strategy to address Sunni grievances in Iraq and Syria. If we learn the lessons of the past and combine all these tools – military pressure, addressing grievances and offering a political way out – and do it soon rather than trying everything else first, we may be able to spare a great many lives in the Middle East and in Europe.


Link:http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/dec/01/talk-to-isis-jihadis-ira-negotiate-military-political-solution

Then MG Robert Fry, ex-Royal Marine, asks how moral is this decision? Here is a sample paragraph:
So, taken against this background, let’s return to the likely impact of a marginal increase in one dimension of the military element of the overall campaign to defeat IS. It doesn’t take long to conclude that the cloak of moral certainty the Prime Minister has chosen to wear more closely resembles the emperor’s new clothes.

Finally, again from RUSI, this time by Rafaello Pantucci, asks:
Will bombing ever get rid of Islamic State?

His last paragraph:
The final key point is that the true longer term success of these campaigns can only be secured if an equal soft power campaign is launched to win over the populations in the affected territories. Ultimately a terrorist group will only be removed from an environment if they are unable to have a supportive population to operate within. In all of the aforementioned cases, subsequent to the hard power responses, a concerted effort was made to win over populations and this helped reduce the permissive environment for the group. This is the key to long-term victory over IS—and in the Levant this means making Sunni populations currently living under the group’s thumb feel as though the alternative governments they have on offer are ones that represent them. A bombing campaign will help start to dislodge the group’s mystique and power, but a long-term strategy also needs to win over the population.
Link:http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/world/will-bombing-ever-get-rid-of-islamic-state

[Red Rat]

I am Rip Van Winkle.

I return to the wider world after some time away to discover that the UK has declared war. At least one would think so judging by both the debate in parliament and the media coverage. The UK has not declared war, it has merely extended the geographic parameters of an already extant campaign. The UK has had a national debate over a tactical decision. This does not bode well over the future ability of the UK to apply force in support of national security, let alone national interests.

As for the overall strategy - the military strategy to defeat ISIL seems to be to be in place and working, albeit at a slower pace then most Western governments would like. The military strategy is however occurring in the absence of a broader grand strategic effort for stabilization, and as many have pointed out:
What is needed is not a counter-ISIL narrative but an ISIL competing narrative.

[Red Rat]

Well they should not be profound. Countries are always in a state of permanent competition, to think otherwise is dangerously nave.

I echo General Houghton's comments on constraints as to the use of force. The trajectory of UK debates and decision making on the use of force are remarkably uninformed in every respect. The rhetoric used is increasingly hyperbolic, it all seems unsustainable without a reset.

[Bill Moore]

In general I agree with the GEN's assertions, and they differ little from LTG Rupert's assertions in his classic "The Utility of Force."

Rupert argues that our militaries, government institutions, and multinational organizations are still largely designed to facilitate industrial era war, not war amongst the people (or what I prefer to call new wars). They also are increasingly less capable of dealing adversarial state actors like Russia that operate in what is now commonly referred to as the gray zone.

A couple of key points from Rupert's book and subsequent presentations I have heard.

During industrial era wars, military force achieved our strategic objectives directly (WWI, WWI), but now the utility of force is to set conditions that enable other elements of power to achieve the decisive result.

Wars now endure because we attempt to achieve the decisive result with military force, when there is no military solution. This points back to the claim (fact IMO) that our governments are not properly structured to fight and win modern war.

Rupert uses the terms confrontation and conflict to provide a useful model. Confrontation is the war, and conflicts are battles within the context of the confrontation. We are still stuck in the win all the battles and lose the war, because we don't how to use force to set conditions for other element of power to achieve the decisive result.

I like Rupert's theory, but one thing I question is our ability to achieve decisive results with economic aid, government assistance, etc. even if the military, the interagency partners, and multinational partners could work together. This reminds me of a clear eyed view of China's civil war presented the book Wars for Asia (1911-1949), where the author pointed out that our State Department vigorously sought a political agreement (power sharing) between the Chinese nationalists and communists. Both Mao and Chiang knew this was a pipe dream, their political systems were not compatible. Someone had to win and someone had to lose. I think we tend to assume that there is political settlement short of total victory for many of these wars, while the opponents laugh at our naivety. In "some" cases we either need to pick a side, or stay out altogether.

[davidbfpo]

A simple explanation why the RAF's contribution is practically valuable and here is a single passage:
....the most significant British contribution to the campaign may not be in the form of armed jets. The Royal Air Force has been using its considerable surveillance capabilities against IS since the beginning of the campaign, and while a few more bomber planes may look flashy on newscasts, they may not make a huge difference in practical terms. Airplanes devoted to electronic listening, on the other hand, do add a hugely important capability to the international coalition rallied against the Islamic State.
Link:https://news.vice.com/article/a-little-bombing-a-lot-of-surveillance-what-britain-brings-to-the-syria-air-war?

IIRC Vice News is an international agency and I have yet to see any decent MSM reporting here.

[davidbfpo]

Interesting to see that the BBC and Daily Telegraph both have articles today asking this question, albeit with different headlines:

1) The BBC:
Are UK bombs making a difference in Syria?
Later rather pointedly:
It is of course still early days. But given the limited number of UK air strikes it begs the questions: why was the government so keen to expand the air strikes to Syria, and why the agonising over a vote that appears to have changed relatively little?
Link:http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-35166971

2) DTelegraph:
RAF bomb raids in Syria dismissed as 'non-event'
Since MPs voted for war over Syria RAF Tornados and Typhoons have mounted only three strike missions
Later citing a regional SME, Jon Lake:
Britain’s air campaign in Syria so far is basically a non-event which can have had little, if any, impact on the balance of power on the ground.
Perhaps the RAF has a far better role to play, the MoD says so:
The Ministry of Defence said that the RAF’s contribution to reconnaissance over Syria is more significant, with some reports that it is providing up to 60 per cent of the coalition’s entire tactical reconnaissance capability. It declined to specify the number of reconnaissance missions flown, however.

Having merged in a thread which asked 'Can the UK-US still work together' to this main UK defence thread, it is a coincidence the question is being asked again.

[davidbfpo]

Devastating analysis of the Royal Navy's aircraft carrier programme; yes the one where the ships float minus any aircraft (F-35 Lightening). A few things I'd quibble with:http://cimsec.org/21192-2/21192

There was gossip that their building was 100% political as Scottish shipyards were involved and the builder, British Aerospace, had "stitched up" the contract so tight cancellation would be more expensive than building them.

[Granite_State]

If you haven't read that pretty devastating polemic on British defense procurement and BAE, I urge you to do so.

[davidbfpo]

Granite State,

Thanks I missed that book! Amazon UK shows it was published in 2007, with good reviews:http://www.amazon.co.uk/Lions-Donkeys-Dinosaurs-Blundering-Military/dp/0099484420/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1453655674&sr=1-1&keywords=Lions%2C+Donkeys%2C+and+Dinosaurs

For USA readers:http://www.amazon.com/Lions-Donkeys-Dinosaurs-Blundering-Military/dp/0099484420/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1453655900&sr=1-1&keywords=Lions%2C+Donkeys%2C+and+Dinosaurs

[Granite_State]

Trident may seem to David Cameron to be a very useful weapon for attacking Jeremy Corbyn. But does it keep Britain safe?

Actually, no. There is a good, hard, patriotic argument for getting rid of this unusable, American-controlled monstrosity before it bankrupts us and destroys our real defences. And lazy, cheap politics shouldn’t blind us to these facts.
************************************************** ***********
WE do not even control Trident, relying on the USA for so much of its technology and maintenance that we could never use it without American approval. How independent is that?
Meanwhile the Army is visibly shrivelling, demoralised, ill-equipped, historic regiments hollowed out and merged, experienced officers and NCOs leaving. Something similar is happening to the Navy, saddled with two vast joke aircraft carriers whose purpose is uncertain, even if they ever get any aircraft to carry. The RAF is a little better off, but not much.
This is caused mainly by the giant bill for renewing Trident, which will probably end up more than £100 billion, at a time when we are heavily in debt already. If there were any obvious or even remote use for it, then maybe this could be justified. But there isn’t. We could easily maintain a small arsenal of H-bombs or nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, just in case, for far less.

http://hitchensblog.mailonsunday.co.uk/2016/01/the-bearded-pacifists-are-righttrident-is-a-waste-of-money.html

Pretty persuasive to this Yank.

[Red Rat]

Of course it is recent accounting innovation to bring Trident into the core defence budget. Previous nuclear programmes were kept separate simply because while their strategic utility was not questioned, neither was their lack of tactical utility.

The problem with Hitchen's analysis is that he is basing the utility of Trident on the world now, not the world in 20 years time. Having started my erstwhile military career facing 3rd Shock Army on the Inner German Border and then less than 15 years later finding myself with German Fallschirmjaeger on the Tajikistan border operating alongside Uzbeks against the Taleban, I am not sure I would want to make that prediction. :rolleyes:

[Firn]

Of course it is recent accounting innovation to bring Trident into the core defence budget. Previous nuclear programmes were kept separate simply because while their strategic utility was not questioned, neither was their lack of tactical utility.


Certainly any such drastic change in budgeting raised eyebrows, as consistency is for very good reasons a key principle in accounting. Such a shift should have a much better arguments on it's side as the previous stance supposedly also had its pros.

There is no doubt that facilitating the ill-conceived and poorly executed austerity policy of the recent government was a major factor in this decision. Maybe supported by the ability to show 'strong British commitment' to it's Nato partners by puffing up the percentage of British military spending by subtracting x on one side and adding x on the other.

Even if it's sounds ridiculous this shift pretty likely had already on impact on British defence spending. The specific accounting logic certainly influences more or less the way countries and companies operate. In this case the rest of the defence budget should be under heavier pressure then with the former accounting policy.

[davidbfpo]

A short interview with the British Army's top soldier (CGS), the headline is focused on legal actions against soldiers, but I thought this was of note:
One of the challenges I face as CGS is that, paradoxically, we’ve never been more popular, with 91 percent approval rating. But I also think that I cannot remember a time when we were less well understood.
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/12130929/Legal-action-against-soldiers-could-undermine-Britain-on-the-battlefield-warns-chief-of-general-staff.html

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to WoTR for this superb critique of UK national security policy as it tries again to decide what it needs to do and then do it:http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/the-weight-of-the-punch-british-ambition-and-power/

He starts with:
In the winter of 2015, as Britain released its latest statement of its national orientation (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478933/52309_Cm_9161_NSS_SD_Review_web_only.pdf), there was every sign that the wishes that had underpinned its statecraft were being blown away.