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Strickland
02-02-2006, 10:17 PM
Many planners and commanders have reached the conclusion that our planning processes need to be modified in order to incorporate lines of operations. While not a new concept, articles written by individuals such as LTG Chiarelli about their use of Lines of Operation in Iraq have renewed the debate. LTG Chiarelli used the following Lines of Operation: Combat Operations, Train & Employ Security Forces, Essential Services, Promote Governace, and Economic Pluralism. Others have suggested Rule of Law and Information Operations as appropriate LOOs. While working to assist the Sri Lankan Gov't against insurgents in the 1980s, Dr. Tom Marks developed a campaign based on the following LOOs: Elimination of Grievances, Population and Resource Control, and Military/Operational Measures. I would like to hear what others think of the utility of using the LOOs approach, as well as what they believe to be the most useful/appropriate LOOs for SASO/SROs. In addition, any discussion of what implied tasks fall under each line would be helpful.

Strickland
02-03-2006, 02:07 PM
Additionally, if anyone has any recent material concerning the application of Warden's 5 rings to Lines of Operation planning, please pass it along.

Merv Benson
02-03-2006, 02:22 PM
What is the difference between "lines of operation" and a "To do" list?

Strickland
02-03-2006, 04:39 PM
Instead of using sequentially phases or staged operations (ie - Phase IV operations), the utilization of lines of operations allows for simultaneous actions throughout both shaping and decisive actions/phases/stages, etc. Instead of having Phase IV (SASO/SRO) tasks, you would have implied tasks associated with a Rule of Law Line of Operation that was in effect throughout the operation. Therefore, during initial operations, the military could be eliminating threat competitors or establishing basic security, and then as the operation progressed, focus on recruiting and training security forces, establishing courts, etc. While the tasks would change, they would all enable or affect rule of law. The to-do-list portion of this is in the implied tasks.

NDD
02-21-2006, 10:32 PM
Same guy?
LINK (http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/battle/chp4.html)

As you said, nothing new. Galula, Clausewitz, O'Neill, Callwell all wrote about it. Magsaysay and others did it. Rings, tables, to do lists. Same requirements in a different wrapping. We seem to be following the lead of the business world with all these "new" concepts, but most of the time we end up right back where we started, just like the business world.

We know what has to be done, we need to quit re-wrapping the package and get on with it.

I thought this was interesting:
Contrary to Clausewitz, destruction of the enemy military is not the essence of war; the essence of war is convincing the enemy to accept your position, and fighting his military forces is at best a means to an end and at worst a total waste of time and energy.
Does anybody here believe this will really work with the enemy we face now? Or any other True Believers?

Looks like a "more sensitive approach" with a group that saws heads to me.

He also needs to study Clausewitz more. He is making the same mistake many do. Clausewitz goes on to address less than total war, even admitting it will be the case most often. Destruction of the enemy is indeed the essence of war - whether or not it reaches that point is a conscience decision depending on the circumstances. But the essence of war does not change.

To go into a war with anything less as mindset is to go in half-assed and asking for defeat.

Martin
02-22-2006, 07:09 PM
Contrary to Clausewitz, destruction of the enemy military is not the essence of war; the essence of war is convincing the enemy to accept your position, and fighting his military forces is at best a means to an end and at worst a total waste of time and energy.

Does anybody here believe this will really work with the enemy we face now? Or any other True Believers? I think that a true believer would not give up.

I think one can go about destroying an enemy in many creative ways. What is needed is partly determined by those involved in the fight and what the desired end state is. For example, if your enemy want to annhilate all infidels, that makes your desire to bring them into society less appealing. On the other hand, everyone may not be hard core, so perhaps you could use PSYOPs on some parts of society or the organization, etc, etc.

The author in that quote makes a mistake in differentiating between tools and cause.

People fight for reasons. Clausewitz said that "War therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will." If we rewrite what Col Warden said, if the enemy has fulfilled our will, there is no need for war. But we cannot rewrite what he said so easily, because to "accept your position" entails a hint of self-destruction or drastic social re-orientation if, for instance, your demand on the enemy is to die because they do not have the same skin color, or do not believe in democracy and in the rule of law by a just justice system. Culture, too, may not allow this to happen.

On the other hand, de-escalation can work to allow negotiations to solve an issue - depends on the issue and those involved. One of the building blocks for democracy.

Then, war is a tool. You have to choose it at the right time, and know how to bend it to your needs. It still work towards that goal of getting your enemy to acknowledge and accept your position.

I think that it being a "total waste of time and energy" either suggest that you have chosen the wrong tool for the task at hand, or have mis-identified the scope. Which brings us back to the beginning: Who is the enemy, and why?

Martin

GorTex6
02-22-2006, 11:09 PM
Looks like a "more sensitive approach" with a group that saws heads to me.

Our enemy wants to instigate hatred in us; they want us to overreact. We in turn act with a vengence, only to stigmatize ourselves as bullies; it is meant to divide. When this ruse finally comes to fruition, islamic insurgents reffer to it as a "harvest" (http://siteinstitute.org/bin/articles.cgi?ID=publications95605&Category=publications&Subcategory=0).

Go here (http://www.siteinstitute.org/bin/search/search.cgi) and search "harvest".

NDD
02-23-2006, 12:46 AM
Forcing a reaction, or over reaction, is a tactic not an objective. It is not what they want, it is one of the means they will use to get what they want.


Well said Martin, I agree.

Merv Benson
02-23-2006, 01:10 AM
Clauswitz point on winning was making the enemy feel defenseless. Of course destruction of the enemy army was one way to achieve that objective. But he also talks about focusing on the enemy's "center of gravity." That may or may not be his army. One of the classic ways this was done in his era was by manuevering forces to get between the enemy and their "lines of communication" i.e. their supply lines and lines of retreat.

One of the reasons why it is important for the US to defeat the insurgency is to make that form of warfare less attractive and less likely to be used against our interest. If the insurgency can be defeated, the enemy will have to resort to political means to achieve its objectives and in doing so he will find it difficult to persuade most people to live under a Taliban type society. There is some recognition of the mistakes of the Taliban in Zawahiri's letter to Zarqawi.

While this insurgency has its true believers, it is doing a very poor job of making the people think they would be better off under their trule. In fact there is substantial evidence that it is alienating the Iraq population and things like the bombing of a Shia holy site is not calculate to endear them to their cause. Zarqawi seeks to persuade through abuse like a sadistic parent.

When this thread started there was an issue of organizing certain events in connection with achieving an objective. While my question about a to do list, may have understated the complexity, it does sound like a situation that used to be addressed by project management software in the early 90's. I have not looked at that type of software in several years but it might be a solution to managing several different events in connection with achieving the objective.

Bill Moore
02-23-2006, 05:55 AM
Lines of operation, much like effects based operations, is largely a conceptual means to help military planners structure and explain their thoughts. It can also be used to simply present a smoke and mirrors brief that says absolutely nothing if we don’t put in the appropriate intellectual effort to make it mean something. For example, what is a Civil Affairs (CA) line of operation really mean?

In my opinion a line should represent a path to an objective or a subordinate effect to an objective and depending on the situation there could be numerous lines. A path is perhaps to close a parallel to the original use of LOOs, which was to describe maneuver, but it is useful in that we should be on a line to make progress towards achieving our effect or objective(s). Going back to the CA line of operation (if it is applicable), I think we need to identify markers on the trail, sort of navigation check points that need to be some sort of prioritized order. For example, if your unit is trying to establish security and stability in an AO, you may want your CA line markers to look something like this: 1. provide baseline security 2. Establish emergency services (law, fire, medical) 3. Open the banks. 4. Provide trash pick up 5. Open local businesses 6. Open schools, etc. I put no thought in this, so don’t waste time tearing up my priorities, they are simply meant to illustrate a point on a way we can make a line of operation useful. If you have enough resources you may be able to address several markers on this line simultaneously. Of course you’ll be working along several lines of operation simultaneously such as conduct security operations, build HN security force capacity, establish local government, etc….

It would seem the art is finding a method to ensure these lines have a synergistic effect, or at least are not at odds with one another. Obviously all the markers on the CA line will be tied to some extent to the provide security LOO. Synching the lines is partly intuitive, and partly the process of detailed analysis that takes place in your Effects Targeting Coordination meetings.

Clausewitz was a genius in his time and much of what he wrote still has some relevance, but we cannot afford to take every new (or old) idea we have and then reshape it so it fits within a Clausewitzian construct. We’ll fail to evolve if we do.

GorTex6
02-23-2006, 05:23 PM
Forcing a reaction, or over reaction, is a tactic not an objective. It is not what they want, it is one of the means they will use to get what they want.

Harvesting a community to uprise against us is their objective.


Clauswitz point on winning was making the enemy feel defenseless. Of course destruction of the enemy army was one way to achieve that objective. But he also talks about focusing on the enemy's "center of gravity." That may or may not be his army. One of the classic ways this was done in his era was by manuevering forces to get between the enemy and their "lines of communication" i.e. their supply lines and lines of retreat.

How do you physically strike an opponents center of mass when it's their family ties, tribal loyalties, a koranic code, or faith in god? Although not impossible, it is very counterproductive.


Clausewitz was a genius in his time and much of what he wrote still has some relevance, but we cannot afford to take every new (or old) idea we have and then reshape it so it fits within a Clausewitzian construct. We’ll fail to evolve if we do.

Ahmen

Reid Bessenger
03-17-2006, 01:56 PM
I see utility in the LOO construct for planning and assessing operations.

Some citations:

• Joint Pub (JP) 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, defines LOOs as the directional orientation of the force in time & space in relation to the enemy.
• JP 3-0 states LOOs attain a three-dimensional aspect and enable commanders to visualize the application of combat power throughout space and time in a logical design that integrates the capabilities of the force to converge on and defeat adversary centers of gravity (COGs).
• FM 3-0 puts LOOs in context of stability operations & support operations where positional reference to an adversary is less relevant. Commanders visualize the operation along logical lines which link multiple objectives & actions with the logic of purpose – cause & effect.

The identified desired endstate can suggest a set of conditions that, when achieved, combine to bring about the endstate. The degree of contribution in time and total may vary owing to the situation confronted in the operating environment including the interaction of diverse group actions and the cumulative impact on perceptions. The calibrating role of this set of conditions is to focus thinking and discussion in planning, and eventually the execution of operations.

The conditions suggest an objective for an associated line of operation. Decisive points along this LOO are geographic places, specific key events, or enabling systems that allow commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy (JP 3-0 and FM 3-0). These DP are often the focal points of connection between multiple LOO.

I think that when employed, LOO can speed the process of appreciating the situation confronted, and lend efficiency to identifying tasks that contribute to the end state.

I share concerns voiced by others about claims of a "new" answer or solution to situations confronted. This approach can be helpful.

Bill Moore
03-20-2006, 12:35 AM
I won't argue the point that LOO "can" can be useful, but I will stand on my original criticism that I have seldom seen it used in a constructive matter. Vice grips are useful to turn nuts, but not drive nails, paint, or assorted other uses. LOOs are useful for maneuver, but don't necessarily add anything but confusion to operations that don't involve maneuvering to achieve an objective. I don't know how many times I have seen the following in briefs: Our lines of operation are security, civil affairs and information operations. At first glance you might think that sounds appropriate in a stability operation, but the substance to this part of the brief never follows, it just doesn't come. Obviously you think you missed something, so you have side bar discussions with the briefers so they can explain how they use their lines of operations to achieve their objectives, what the mile stones are along the lines, and how they synergistically contribute to an end state. You'll get a bunch of blank stares, and sometimes you'll get the truth, well the boss wants to see LOOs in the brief, they don't really add any value or mean anything. If we don't get back to hard core, no nonsense commanders, that demand that plans and words mean something we'll be spinning our wheels for years to come.

GatorLHA2
03-20-2006, 05:11 PM
Just because someone has missused LOO's as a window dressing in a brief does not prove that it is a flawed concept.

In Small Wars, combat operations are not always the primary focus of effort. There are many non-combat types of operations that need to be undertaken to achieve success in unconventional operations. How many and what are the LOO's depend entirely on the existing situation and the conditions that must be met to achive the desired endstate.

LOO's are not new. What is new, is that LOO's in this context does not describle physical maneuver over the landscape, but rather key problems that must be addressed in a coordinated fashion simultaneously rather than sequentially. Furthermore, the lead agency in some of the LOO's will not be the military.

Reid Bessenger
03-20-2006, 08:15 PM
As Bill Moore posted above, LOO and many other constructs used to visualize, describe and direct actions to achieve an objective can be misused. It seems self-evident that logic is a necessary element in any operational design. If someone can't explain their logic, generally I think we can agree that the design warrants another look. The application of LOO outside maneuver can be valuable, since it can focus discussion on endstate, conditions to contribute to endstate, and DPs that enable or facilitate achieving these conditions. These points should have a defined relationship (logic), though. Like Bill states, if it's power point deep it won't be part of the solution.

Jones_RE
03-21-2006, 11:06 PM
Some of the criticisms of lines of operation strike me as misplaced. If, in fact, a military planner can't tell you anything more about the "public opinion" line of operation than "we have one" then there is indeed a problem - that planner clearly does not understand how public opinion affects his forces in a small war. If our hypothetical planner couldn't tell you the real substance behind his air support line of operations in a maneuver battle, we wouldn't be so quick to criticize the planning technique - it would be obvious that the planner wasn't prepared.

These "non traditional" lines of operation and centers of gravity associated with small wars are a hallmark of small wars and not so much a problem with the military theory, in my opinion. The central characteristic of a small war/low intensity conflict/insurgency/stability operation, etc. is that it is not a normal war. Unusual obstacles, goals and operations are the norm. If you could identify the insurgent center of gravity as something so prosaic as a headquarters or main line unit then we'd just be in a really easy maneuver war.

Perhaps it's true that "Lines of Operation" are not a useful tool for analyzing the planning challenges of a small war - however I don't think it's fair to compare the two based on their application by the United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom. We run the risk of concluding that wrenches are no good for solving plumbing problems because none of the electricians we called could fix our leaky faucet with one . . . .

jcustis
03-07-2008, 06:01 PM
I am bringing this post from the dead instead of open a new one because I need to know (from a USMC perspective hopefully) what the current nomenclature is out there for Lines of Operation in Iraq.

I've recently read a unit AAR about its last rotation, and LOOs are mentioned in loose terms. The overall number of LOOs and area concerned within each LOO are not addressed, so I have no frame of reference (and I'm headed to the unit in question :D).

I shouldn't have been surprised, but when I ran a google string on "lines of operation", this SWC thread was the very first hit. Amazing...

Tom Odom
03-07-2008, 06:13 PM
I shouldn't have been surprised, but when I ran a google string on "lines of operation", this SWC thread was the very first hit. Amazing...


Yes we are aren't we? :D

Seriously I believe the term remains the same for us Army types

Best

Tom

jcustis
03-07-2008, 09:24 PM
I guess that was a poorly written RFI. I was looking for the various LOOs that are out there. If Army LOOs and Marine Corps' LOOs (that sound silly:rolleyes:) are the same, should I refer to the pubs referenced above?

Surferbeetle
03-08-2008, 01:32 PM
Jcustis,

FM 3-0 has 26 listings for 'lines of operation'

F 3-24 has 41 listings for 'lines of operation'

FM 3-05-40 has 1 listing for 'lines of operation'

FM 3-05-401 has 2 listings for 'lines of operation'

My copy of JP 3-57 is corrupted, so I can't do a search at the moment, but it's worth rummaging through.

FM 5-0 has 1 listing for 'lines of operation'

FM 6-0 (I have the 03 version looks like I need to update my pubs library) has 0 listings for 'lines of operation'

***TC 25-20 AAR's

Anything you can share on the USMC side would be appreciated

PhilR
03-08-2008, 01:39 PM
Someone with an Army (SAMS?) background can better recount the development of the LOO concept, but it preceded the present conflicts and, I think, has its origins in the complex contingencies of the 1990s. In looking at older briefs and documents, there was a very rigorous and thoughtful way for planners to look at the problem and see if LOOs were necessary, and if so, what the LOOs should be. I think it had to do with complex problems not having single identifiable COGs, but possibly multiple COGs--each requiring actions along a seperate "Logical Line of Operation" (the conceptual equivalent of Jomini's physical line of operation--we dropped the "logical" piece to the title as no one remembers the physical origin and no one wants to associate our current COIN doctrine with a guy named Jomini). The commander had to arrange and coordinate all his actions across the LOOs to achieve his objective.
The Marine Corps never really embraced this doctrine until the early Irregular Warfare pubs--which to me looked largely like expansions of Chiarelli's article on LOOs in Baghdad in Military Review--a seminal piece, to my mind. From having no doctrinal background on LOOs, all of a sudden Marines were identifiying specific LOOs for COIN. Now LOOs pop up everywhere. The Marine Corps has still failed to grapple with them in any of our base doctrinal pub (the MCDPs). I look forward to that happening someday, because I think for LOOs to be useful, they can't be some template that commanders/planners just fill in the blank and start executing. Not every conflict porblem requires LOOs.
In many cases, even in complex scenarios like COIN, I see LOOs used as the equivalent of expanding the warfighting functions (maneuver, fires, logistics, etc.) into the "non-lethal" sphere. This tends to drive units to assign different parts of their forces to the various LOOs and they become almost separate commands at the higher echelons. I thought that the utility of the orginal way of thinking about LOOs was that it forced more synergy--a "kinetic action" was not relegated to a "combat action" LOO, but could affect multiple LOOs (information, enemy destruction, etc.). For the Marine Corps, its well worth looking hard at the LOO (and tell me, what is our 1-2 sentence definition of a generic LOO and what USMC or joint pub we use for it?).

Spud
03-17-2008, 06:26 AM
We've gone with five interdependent LOOs as part of our Adaptive Campaigning concept.

Joint Land Combat
Population Protection
Public Information
Population Support
Indigenous Capacity Building

http://www.complex07.org/online-edition/files/426.pdf

While at the moment they're words we are starting to use them in synching our IO effects. Of course the hardest bit has been to teach everyone that information effects occur in each LOO ... not just the Public Information one.

jcustis
03-17-2008, 02:24 PM
Phil,

Your reference to the Chiarelli article pulled it al together. I found a copy on .pdf and have added it to the queue.

ChrisPaparone
06-30-2010, 01:12 PM
Yesterday my faculty partners and I had a seminar session with Army staff college students and found ourselves still (after 5 years of "settled joint doctrine") struggling with the new, more abstract idea: logical lines of operations.

Here is a slightly edited version what I wrote the students this morning -- and would appreciate your comments (I invited them to engage here and take a look at SWJ blogger comments as a follow-on).

In a conventional, force-on-force fight, operational art involves examining the integration of physical lines of communication (LOCs—the “pipeline” where forces and sustainment move from one base to another base) and physical lines of operations (LOOs—the line of maneuver between the force’s base and its objective). During WW II, the U.S.’s Pacific theater provides a superb example of the “island hopping campaign” where LOOs established new LOCs and LOCs enabled new LOOs (involving physical orientations on THE ENEMY FORCE).

Several years into the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which are characterized more by FID- and COIN-oriented activities and goals, doctrinaires searched for a way to define the metaphysical (“logical”) links between military activities as they relate to more nebulous goals like “population security,” “support to insurgents,” and “increasing legitimacy of the host government.” These writers searched for the additional abstraction to describe how to intertwine activities of other agencies and organizations that are nonmilitary in nature (and may constitute the main effort with the military-in-support). Army doctrinaires called these “lines of effort” while joint doctrinaires labeled them “logical lines of operations.”

Keep in mind that these efforts are geared to desirable social and psychological change; hence, are not clearly tied to the physical world. Logical lines of operation are more existential (subjective, interpretive, infused with human-created meaning, etc.) in that they address PEOPLE -- changing minds, social norms, ideas about legitimacy, and so on. In essence, you are orienting military activities and nonmilitary activities on the opinions, values, and attitudes of a POPULATION (be they good guys, bad guys, &/or “fence sitters”).

In short, the joint doctrinaires used the old reliable operational art concept of LOO and metaphorically extended the "physical meaning" in it into a new, much more abstract meaning, i.e. "logical" (the reasoned way of expressing intentional causality). Both kinds of LOOs (physical and logical) serve to reasonably link actions toward a purpose. The former is more easily measured (because it has a physically identifiable “end state” like “we secured objective bravo at map grid so and so”). The latter desired condition is much more difficult to measure because it is so open to subjective interpretation even if we try and operationalize (objectify) it (e.g., “on average, the local population has improved its trustworthy feeling toward the central government;” “the enemy’s morale is deteriorating;” or, “on average, US citizens support the war effort.”). Such reifications of subjective reality are what makes logical lines so difficult to apprehend (as social scientist researchers have found, our "operationalized variables" are, at the end of the day, quite ambiguous; albeit, they sure seemed reasonable when invented).

slapout9
06-30-2010, 02:50 PM
This may be a little of course but based upon my experience in"The One Minute Guerrilla Warfare Course" an LLO is finding the cause (usually viewed through a Marxist Contradiction) that people will fight for. A Guerrilla force needs a cause in their head and a rifle in their arms. When you have that the Physical Lines of Operation will almost begin to appear by themselves because you will know the physical things the enemy needs and what you need to destroy in order to win.

As we do it now it is almost a build it and they will come around to our way of thinking, which is dangerous in my opinion because what may happen is we will build it and the enemy with a cause will take it over and use it against us.
My 2 cents anyway.

Hacksaw
06-30-2010, 05:33 PM
While I don't have much issue with the method you use to characterize the nature of Logical lines of Operation... your sequencing of how they emerged and why are a bit askew (I think :eek:)...

I'm near certain that logical lines of operation were a part of Army Doctrine (FM 3-0) before our immersion in these population-centric full spectrum operations...

If my memory serves me correctly, not a given, I think they emerged more in response to a shift towards effects-based approach to operations. Not necessarily the system-centric models, but rather the intuitive extension that all combat operations O/D/S are conducted for a purpose linked to a change in the relationship of the friendly force to the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations... as such is often more coherent to establish logical lines of operation with regard to processes/aspects of the environment as opposed to just physical manifestations of the terrain...

To wit, as we wrote the Long-Range Plan for the Stabilization & Reconstruction of Northern Iraq (Mar-Apr 2003), our LLO were Security, Civil Services, etc... with essentially only one oriented on the "enemy" ... all of which pre-dates FM 3-24 or the subsequent re-writes of FM 3-0, 5-0 and 3-07

Live well and row

ChrisPaparone
06-30-2010, 07:10 PM
Hacksaw,

You have a good point -- I'd have to substitute "originators" for "doctrinaires" in my text. Yet the argument is the same -- it is still metaphoric.

Seahorse
06-30-2010, 07:16 PM
EBO - or as I refer to it 'Effects Blurred Operations' encapsulates the arguments I believe you are making. I was engaged in the campaign assessment process and found it extremely difficult to define effects within the OPP process that a)could be achieved, b)could be measured effectively, and c) whose assessment could inform the larger strategies. Instead, I saw what I refer to as OPP with an effects based language. No one seemed capable of creating an effects based campaign plan (and NATO had 5 LOOs - Security, Governance, Security Sector Reform, Reconstruction and Development, and finally Coordination).

Typically the OPP failed to produce definable, realizable and measureable end-states, effects, or measures of effectiveness. Almost all the measures were in fact measures of performance, quantifiable measures which did little to advance the mission objectives and nothing to assess strategies and priorities. Secondly, even when adopting qualitative measures, these were typically utilised at higher HQ levels to report on mission achievements and progress rather than sorting out weather we were doing the right things. Finally, the measures utilised had littel to no ownership and therefore no stakeholder had accountability for problmes, errors, missteps etc. It seemed, only successes were applauded and promoted. I even witnessed senior effects planners advocating that where Afghan polling results agreed with their opinions, they were useful, however when they disagreed with perceptions, they could be completely ignored.

Such are my experiences.

Cheers,

David

Presley Cannady
07-01-2010, 03:30 AM
Just so I'm clear, we're promoting a stencil for use in Powerpoint presentations to a concept?

ChrisPaparone
07-01-2010, 02:21 PM
Presley, not sure what you are asking. Please rephrase.

Seahorse,

Whilst EBO seems to be dying a slow death, I think logical lines are still going to hang around; albeit, they seem to encourage linear thinking (one-direction causality) and fail to appreciate sufficiently the interactive complexity at hand.

My opinion is that LLOOs are rather arrogant (right word?) attempts toward "social engineering" change in groups/societies/political-economic systems abroad. The idea that US interagency operations and advisory methods can be deterministic in changing complex social systems is highly questionable -- there is no "science" and these LLOOs suggest a false sense of scientific-like causality (and lead to setting expectations that are unfortunately as illusory as a shaman rain dance).

I think the efficacy of a more philosophical approach to complexity (found in the "DESIGN MOVEMENT" led primarily by the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies) may offer some better hope. Yet joint doctrine has not yet insitutionalized these alternatives that (in my opinion) consitute a worldview shift. I wrote on this in SWJ a few weeks ago: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/429-paparone.pdf. I also know there is a group at JFCOM J7 working on a design handbook and that SAMS has published a student text: http://www.cgsc.edu/events/sams/ArtofDesign_v2.pdf.

Presley Cannady
07-01-2010, 04:49 PM
Presley, not sure what you are asking. Please rephrase.

Literally that. It's an arrow (or arrows) through things you intend to do to achieve something, an arrow that invariably pops up in diagrams. Represent it with different stencils and you've got a flowchart. With none at all, you've got a to do list. Draw it on a map you've got your old-school LOO. Use a string and post it notes...well, you get the picture.

Just seems like it's little more than synonym proliferation is all.

The Pap
07-02-2010, 02:25 PM
Presley, (this is me, ChrisPaparone talking from my home account)

Ohhhhhhhhhh,:D Yes, yes indeed! Some writers have called this metaphorical reasoning (Lakoff and Johnson).

Many (if not all) of our military concepts were "displaced" from physical root meanings. For example "leadership" originated from a physical arrangement (e.g., a line with a lead person who is showing the way to others from one point to another). Clausewitz's "schwerpunkt" (center of gravity/focal point) was analogically based in the physics of his time. Over the long haul, we abstract root metaphors (extending and eventually displacing them -- resulting in a "dead metaphor"). Some would argue this is the essence of creativity.

See a piece that was published a while back in MILREV on the subject as it pertains to military lingo: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/paparone_metaphors.pdf

Are you a believer in (or at least support) this explanation?
Best,
Chris

MAJ Shane Sims
07-06-2010, 03:20 PM
Sir,

Disagree. By stating logical lines of operations are existential in nature, you are limiting the scope to things which are hard, if not impossible, to influence at a military level and perhaps best left to the diplomats, local political and tribal leaders, market economies, etc. Logical lines of operations are existential in part, but there are very real, physical elements, which will have an impact on overall objectives. For instance, securing a Sunni/Shia mosque can be a logical line of operation. It becomes logical because if a Sunni element blows up a Shia mosque, it will move an area closer to sectarian violence/war. Force protection is another logical line of operation. It is logical because we know if we lose political will (massive loss of lives = loss of political will), we will lose a critical resource (time) and jeopardize our ability to complete mission. Point being is that even in conventional wars we have similar logical lines of operations. We decided to drop the A-bomb on Japan to break the will of the Japanese government and end the war sooner rather than later. This got directly at the heart of the population (ours and theirs). This was a logical line of operation for us during World War II.
I also disagree with your assessment that population security is a nebulous term. Just because securing the population is untraditional compared to destroying it does not mean it is nebulous for the military. Tell a police officer his job of protecting/securing a city is nebulous, and I bet he could provide you with several non-nebulous ways to do his duties. We can, as a military, secure areas. It is a common military task. The question is not whether we can secure an area (which I believe is the overarching military objective we have been called upon to do in Iraq and Afghanistan in order to support the whole of government approach to building an effective capacity in the local governments to eventually secure it on their own), the question is how do we secure (which is answered by identifying logical lines of operations) and how many resources (including Soldiers, equipment, and time) will our government provide the military to do it.
v/r
MAJ Shane Sims
Student, Command and General Staff College
Satellite Location: Fort Lee, Virginia

The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

The Pap
07-10-2010, 04:56 PM
Your points are very thoughtful. I agree that there are objective aspects of "logical" lines of operation and your argument is very strong.

My point was more ontological in that we have taken a more concrete (objective dominance) view of the military concept of LOO and extended it to include existential or metaphysical aspects (more dominated by a subjective view of reality).

This is likely why we are having this conversation -- because LOOs are now more subjectively produced (based on judgment calls rather than a scheme of physical maneuver). In other words, why there is ambiguity in the extended meaning of LOO in joint doctrine. This requires "interpretive" skills, and much less "concrete" skills.

This also calls into question the use of the word "line" that is explicitly creates an implicit "false concreteness" as we borrowed from linear, Jominian-rational theories of warfare.

Metaphoric extension of the idea of LOOs from more physical to the more metaphysical should cause us to be critically mindful of the shortfalls of analogically-based abstract reasoning.

For example, the physical linearity of maneuver-to-objective may confuse us to believe (through uncritical use of analogy) that this cause-and-effect relationship applies to attempts to change social-psychological conditions, say, in counterinsurgency operations.

I would prefer to highlight the DIFFERENCE (not the analogical overlap) Social-psychological manipulations are so inherently complex as to defy one-way causality (the prospect of mutual causality borrowed from complexity science) may better help us frame the situation. Perhaps we'll be less surprised by dynamic side effects (unintended consequences) of those manipulations. Recognizing these sorts of LOOs as an "unknowable science" may be a source of wisdom (and not a source of prescription indicated by borrowing meaning mindlessly from physical LOOs),

Thanks!

slapout9
07-11-2010, 05:04 AM
This also calls into question the use of the word "line" that is explicitly creates an implicit "false concreteness" as we borrowed from linear, Jominian-rational theories of warfare.



Perhaps if it was taught as a "line of questioning" or "line of reasoning" as it is in the LE/Legal profession. In that manner you are taught not to forget that you are dealing with a live opponent who is going to try and outwit you and you learn to expect and be prepared for surprises. Instead of expecting it to be some type of a straight trajectory.

Navy Dave
07-11-2010, 09:58 PM
As I follow this thread, it seems to me the term “logical lines of operation” is a misleading metaphor and directs us toward a relatively narrow mode of linear thought. General Chiarelli’s article in Military Review suggests that the term “logical lines of operation” is useful because it moves us away from the phased approach to warfare, allowing for simultaneous action toward a final goal rather than discreet, albeit blurred transitional phases of action. However both concepts harken us back to traditional “lines of communication and maneuver”, and are still distinctly linear in nature. Indeed the term itself, “lines of operation” borrows from “lines of communication” and (as The Pap likes to remind us) originates from a time when communication relied on linear physical infrastructure, delivered via roads, rail, or telegraph lines.

General Chiarelli reminds us in his article that “Task Force Baghdad’s campaign to “win the peace” in Iraq has forced us, as an instrument of national power, to change the very nature of what it means to fight... We witnessed in Baghdad that it was no longer adequate as a military force to accept classic military modes of thought.”

But doesn’t thinking in terms of “Logical lines of Operations” simply borrow a linear metaphor from classic military modes of thought? Speaking from my perspective as a Navy officer with admittedly limited experiences operating with the Army, I have often thought and remarked on what occurs to me as a distinctly linear approach that the Army takes toward problem solving. And though I admit this tendency of linear thought undoubtedly pervades all of our military services (a fact which perhaps lends even more credence to these suggestions), it is perhaps more so with the Army.

In an earlier post Shane Sims makes a great point that “Logical lines of operations are existential in part, but there are very real, physical elements, which will have an impact on overall objectives.” I suggest that those physical elements are indeed lines of operation, but that what we think of in a broader sense as “logical lines of operation” should be thought of as something quite different. A design approach might help us break from this classic military linear thinking.

As The Pap notes in his article Design and the Prospects of a US Military Renaissance, “With a more open search strategy, we may collaborate with others with varying views, call upon the unfamiliar arts and sciences, merge heuristics, and, extend and displace concepts until we discover new meaning in the situation.”

I suggest we search for our own “Eureka” moment in our effort to make sense of what “winning the peace” means today. Defining logical lines of operation with a new design way of thinking might help us to break out of our linear mental mold. Though NDD points out that none of this is really new, and “We know what has to be done, we need to quit re-wrapping the package and get on with it.” I propose that words and concepts really do matter, that there is a time and place for critical thinking, and that thinking should shape our action.

V/r
LCDR Dave Purkiss
Student, Command and General Staff College
Satellite Location: Fort Lee, Virginia

The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

ChrisPaparone
07-14-2010, 06:51 PM
Slapout. Good comments :eek:-- reinforces insight!

Dave--good comments. I plan a follow on to that article for SWJ to discuss how our construct of leadership has to change as we bring design into fruition.

Step one is to differentiate leadership from management and command per the writings of Keith Grint (an educator at the one-star development program at UK's Defence Academy). His nontraditional ideas about leadership are spot on. But will the US military change its arguably patriarchical view of leadership (that some like Grint argue may lead to inappropriate dependencies)?