Nagl and Yingling: Restructuring the U.S. Military

[SWJED]

Nagl and Yingling: Restructuring the U.S. Military (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/02/nagl-and-yingling-restructurin/) - Council on Foreign Relations podcast interview (http://www.cfr.org/publication/15487/) with Greg Burno, 13 February 2008.


Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/authors/john-nagl/bio/), Commander, 1st Battalion, 34th Armor Regiment at Fort Riley, Kansas and Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/authors/paul-yingling/bio/), Commander, 1st Battalion, 21st Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Hood, Texas.

With the U.S. military engaged in what experts consider a state of “persistent conflict,” the long-term stability and structure of the armed forces has become a topic of intense debate. While some see a need to keep an eye on conventional threats, others have pushed more radical ideas—like retooling the military to specialize on stabilization and training of foreign security forces.

LTC John Nagl and LTC Paul Yingling are among those advocating change. Both men have served with distinction in Iraq, and both currently command an army battalion. But they’ve also gone somewhere most uniformed officers seldom tread: They’ve taken their gripes with army doctrine public. In this podcast interview with CFR.org, Nagl argues the U.S. military must shift from a traditional combat force to one focused on advisory and stability missions. Yingling says a greater burden for war fighting and reconstruction must be carried by others branches of the U.S. government.

Their observations, which have won both supporters and detractors, were first raised in their professional writings. Nagl, who recently announced his retirement from the army (Washington Post (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/15/AR2008011503359.html)), explored lessons from past counterinsurgencies in his acclaimed 2002 book, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0226567702?ie=UTF8&tag=smallwarsjour-20&linkCode=as2&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=0226567702). Yingling made waves in May 2007 when he directly challenged the army’s officer corps with an Armed Forces Journal article (http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/05/2635198) blaming the failings in Iraq, like Vietnam, on the shortsightedness of a generation of generals.

[Rob Thornton]

I think fundamentally war has changed us – and moreover in a good way. War has offered a means for us to challenge ourselves, our leadership and our profession in ways that do not fit into the context of a largely peacetime Army. In this case the proportion of those effected by the war has grown to a point whereas to provide a bow wave upon which to consider our core beliefs.

I remember reading MG Bolger’s books on the CTCs as a Platoon Leader, then rereading them as a CO CDR – there was not much out there like that at the time – the kind of introspection that challenged the conventional wisdom about our profession. Few were the leaders who either had the means, or felt compelled to explore not only for themselves, but to write it down for others in such a way that it allowed them to challenge things. War has changed that.

How much traction and reflection would a LTC’s thoughts on generalship have generated in 2000, even 2002 when only a small percentage of units had gone to war? How much of what we have experienced now has empowered us up to this point to challenge the status quo? War changes us – it makes us more pragmatic, and it compels us to ask why? LTC Yingling’s article is now part of the CGSC/ILE POI – it gets introduced and discussed in small group forums – would that have happened in 2001? I raise that question because its reflects to me that not only are CO grade and FG officers challenging the status quo, but even some 06s and above are. I was talking with a buddy last night about his first week in the ILE course here – he said their first GO speaker came and the audience wasted no time in asking him about COL McMasters, and why LTC Nagl is leaving.

I guess my point is that while you have some very visible guys they are the well knowns – the top of the iceberg. The reality I feel is that there is a great deal of mass below the water that many on the outside don’t see. It manifests itself in different ways – but the compelling need to question conventional wisdom is there – consider SWC member Gian Gentile, who is an active duty officer, prior BN CDR. He raises some valid questions about the dangers of accepting new ideas on their face value alone – he disagrees – and this is healthy – it provides tension – that tension produces further dialogue which teases out the underpinnings of arguments and often forces us to look in uncomfortable directions. It helps us understand our need to produce “a solution” and move on to other things vs. understanding that some things are not simple mathematical equations that can be added or subtracted to produce a definitive answer – some things must be continuously interacted with, treated, stayed on top of, inter-acted with, managed or what have you, or they will revert to the path of least resistance and cause far more trouble down the road.

Its undeniable in my mind that we benefit from the Nagls, the Yinglings, the Gentiles, and some of the other well knowns who overtly challenge the system. However, I think it would also be wise not to see them as an oddity, or to try and divorce them from the conditions which allowed their arguments to gain traction and spark reaction. These conditions have created an Army that thinks of itself differently. You could be talking about the way some cringe when they see a soldier on a cold day wearing a black fleece jacket and a fleece cap inside the garrison area as part of an authorized duty uniform (the pragmatic reaction to protecting oneself from the cold), or you could be talking about a LTG who writes and encourages others to blog. Hats off to the those above the water – the public needs to see it, and I think those below the water do too, however, don’t discount the mass of the iceberg below the water – it lasts longer, and it provides the real inertia.

Best, Rob

[John T. Fishel]

with you, I think you may be too hard on the Army of an earlier period. Dan Bolger was writing and challenging the conventional wisdom as a LTC, Bob Leonhardt and H. R. McMaster wrote as Majors back when I was teaching at CGSC. As a general rule, our Marine brothers beat themselves up in lively debate on the pages of the Marine Corps Gazette - it is a hallowed tradition in the Corps. For example, see Evans Carlson and Sam Griffith's early writing.
So, I would modify your argument to read that the tradition of debate engendered by junior and Field Grade officers should be nourished and encouraged by the institutional services and DOD.Despite some backsliding on occasion we have a pretty good record over the years.

Cheers

JohnT

[Eden]

Rob, your excellent post touches on the old philosophical question - do ideas matter? Are all the Leonhards, Linds, McMasters, Nagls, Yinglings, MacGregors, et al, out there making a difference, or do they merely reflect a groundswell that would be taking place without them. In other words, are they leading us or simply hurrying to get in front of the mob? My own opinion is that they are the articulators of attitudes and ideas that the more incoherent of us have been struggling to crystallize. That's why our reaction to their writings is less "Golly, I never thought of that" and more along the lines of "That's right! That's what I've been trying to say!", or "I thought I was the only one who felt that way."

This is why I agree with you that the Army is now in the middle of a sea change in the way it operates and what it values, brought on more by our daily experiences than by articles and books - but I think that today's captains will be colonels before that change reaches fruition. By which time, probably, it will be taking us in the wrong direction.

All of this is natural and inevitable. What bothers me is why we don't value our intellectuals more than we do, and why they tend to leave the service prematurely. You mentioned Dan Bolger; correct me if I am wrong, but I believe that he is the only field grade officer in the past twenty years to have a book published and subsequently make it to general. Can that be an accident? And so many of our intellectual officers - and I include those who are not stricly theorists, like Mansoor and Echevarria - retire before they have to. Is it because they are tired of struggling within an institution they perceive to be fundamentally anti-intellectual, and feel they can better serve outside the service?

There are generals out there who are intellectuals, but that seems to be mostly a happy accident. And some are merely considered intellectuals because they have several sheepskins, or because they have a prodigious memory and a penchant for sharpshooting briefers. I am afraid that will hold true well into the future, because there is no reward for those who publish, and consequently scant incentive to articulate deep thoughts.

[Rob Thornton]

Hi John - you are probably right - there are several others who I probably should have mentioned - the reason MG Bolger sticks out to me is because he's still in uniform - which is kind of what Eden gets at. Some of it also junior perspective on my part - my career as an officer did not begin until YG 96 - so some things take awhile to click to point where I can establish relationships with other things.

What I've been really thinking about lately is how war changes us - in a very fundamental sense - and the opportunities and pitfalls associated with it. Our tendency to accept a solution without considering if something is a problem or a condition, or considering if the price of the "solution" or how it may compromise other things we'd taken for granted, or had not considered. For example - much attention is paid to organizational fixes - they are easy to wrap our minds around and dig in - its akin to engineering our way out of the problem. However, we don't like to think about the hard stuff so much - the subjective - the qualitative relation to the quantitative, the effectiveness to the efficiency - these things are tough to assign values to - when we challenge them (and we should) they make us uncomfortable. When we say we are going to stay away from lists, and develop menus of options, within days, we begin to refer to it as a "list" - we are predisposed to do so and must guard against it vigorously. So while war seems to present us with the conditions congruent to change - we need to scrutinize the rationale for doing so, because we may have to live with it for awhile. We also need to ensure that if change is something we are really after - and that we need to do- then the changes need to occur where they really matter -not just a surface change, but a deep core one.

On Eden's note - its worthwhile to relate a conversation I had last night:

I'd mentioned a buddy who'd just started his CGSC course - he told me they'd been visited by their branch reps as well. The branch rep told them that in order to command they all needed ACOMs - straight ACOMs (Above Center of Mass on their efficiency reports) - what kind of message does this send? Where is the foundation for risk being built? Where is the incentive to be different and to make us stronger. The branch rep also told them that SAMS might not be such a hot idea, for while they were learning to think more broadly - preparing them to serve on critical staffs and develop campaign plans, their peers would be doing the right jobs that would ensure them a place at the CMD table. What is the message here?

I told my buddy that I thought it was HRC BS - and that given the expansion of the Army and the fact that we knew many a SAMS BN and BDE CDR whom for various reasons we had great respect for, he should follow his heart and do what he wanted - HRC was just interested in how much filler they'd have for their holes. He lamented that he was a little envious of me - with 17.5 years in and no longer worrying about some things as a 59, I'd made my bones and could better influence my own destiny. Hard to argue his point.

I guess - it still asses me up that we're reinforcing molds and stereo-types - again we are often our own worst enemy.

Best Regards, Rob

[Tom Odom]

There was a period in the 1980s that scholarship, research, and publication were valued. Dan Bolger was part of that as were others. Notably Bill Stofft and others with the backing of GEN Richardson established CSI as a research and teaching institution and challenged the founders to make history real to the officer corps. Bill Stofft made MG finishing as I recall as Director of the Army Staff after he was Commandant of the War College (or vice versa).

Bob Scales emerged as a writer and historian in his on right. He finished as a MG Commandant of the War College.

At the same time, intellectual effort was equally stimulated as the Army wrote and promulgated several editions of 100-5. Hubba Wasa de Czege was at the fore front of that effort. He made BG.

Yet even in this period I would call rennaissance-like, none of these guys went higher.

As the 80s ended and the 90s progressed, my friends who remained at Leavenworth talked of an inability/unwillingness to think outside the box among students and among leadership.

Several trends seemed to merge. First we went from seeing doctrine as a guide to more of a rigid framework. Our adherence to set TTPs under that doctrine became almost cult-like. Secondly the proliferation of computer/GPS based C2 systems consistently renforced control of higher commanders over the command of lower echelon commanders. Those C2 systems have turned command and control into control through centralized command. Third we have institutionalized and enshrined the power of PPT bullets versus communicating in a meaningful manner. What passes for conversation is often an exchange of "bullet-like" thoughts; since everyine tries to communicate in that manner, most don't know how to listen nor do they even try. Those who step outside that mold are indeed looked at with scepticism, if not outsight suspicion.

Lest that all sound too negative, there are indeed some hopeful signs emerging. One thing that seems to be occuring as we move further down the road is a new awakening much like that of the 1980s that this profession of arms is a thinking first then doing business, rather than a macro battle drill.

Best

Tom

[Cavguy]

Interesting interview. I especially liked hearing LTC Yingling discuss his view. He was dead on that the operational force has changed, learned, and adapted to the realities in OIF, but the institution has not. It's not even so much out of any malicious intent but bureaucratic inertia of a TRADOC so dispersed and split into fiefdoms that any change is a hurculean effort even for the most energetic general. The vast majority of civilians who run TRADOC are very jaded and turf-conscious, and simply wait the current CG's pet rock out over the next 2-3 years until he is replaced, and another pet rock is born. Very few truly seem to change the culture long term. I don't agree with Rumsfeld on much, but I think his observation that senior leaders need to stay longer in their positions was a correct observation - none stay long enough to effect anything other than transitory change.

I have been rereading "Thunderbolt: Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times" (http://www.amazon.com/Thunderbolt-General-Creighton-Abrams-Army/dp/0671701150/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1203013095&sr=8-1) By Lewis Sorley. In the last chapter it details Abrams' struggles as Army Chief of Staff to rebuild an Army torn in form and spirit by Vietnam. It details an especially hostile field grade and junior officer corps, who endured Vietnam and were angry at a senior leadership they thought failed them. Abrams didn't try to shoot them down, but listened, and tried to address their concerns before his untimely death. Chapter 26 is eerily similar to today's challenges. Let's hope our leadership can address them.

[John T. Fishel]

Hi Tom--

After Wass de Czege Don Holder ran SAMS. He returned to Leavenworth as the 3 star CAC commander/CGSC Cmdt/DEPTRADOC Cdr. Don was the guy responsible for FM 100-5 (1986 version). So, we did get an army intellectual to the higher echelons. Of course, there was also Jack Galvin (3 books) with 4 stars as CINCSO and SACEUR.

Rob, your story about the flesh peddlers reminds me of all the tales I heard at Leavenworth during my tenure on the faculty. That said, I kept noting all the "good guys' who were being promoted to BG who should never have made it if the flesh peddlers were right. (Most of them made 2 star, of course.)

Cheers

JohnT

[Tom Odom]

After Wass de Czege Don Holder ran SAMS. He returned to Leavenworth as the 3 star CAC commander/CGSC Cmdt/DEPTRADOC Cdr. Don was the guy responsible for FM 100-5 (1986 version). So, we did get an army intellectual to the higher echelons. Of course, there was also Jack Galvin (3 books) with 4 stars as CINCSO and SACEUR.

John,

He was here a few months ago as a retired BG. Here is what SSI (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/people.cfm?q=64) has on him:


HUBA WASS DE CZEGE is a retired U.S. Army brigadier general. During his career as an infantry officer, he served two tours in Vietnam and gained staff experience at all levels up to assistant division commander. General Wass De Czege was a principal designer of the operational concept known as AirLand Battle. He also was the founder and first director of the Army’s School for Advanced Military Studies where he also taught applied military strategy. After retiring in 1993, General Wass De Czege became heavily involved in the Army After Next Project and served on several Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency v advisory panels. He is a 1964 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and holds an MPA from Harvard University.

Galvin I forgot about. Good catch.

Tom

[Rob Thornton]

Hi John,

It just takes me back to the question – are we changing the paradigm, or just massaging it? Will there be a few good ones who get up the dam and make it upstream to spawn – I think so, but aren’t we saying we want to build better swimmers early on – so that we can change our organizational culture? I guess there is also the argument of how much leadership is inherent in an individual and how much it can be infused, but I still feel like we can do better then we are in the shaping process.

Best, Rob

[Ken White]

"So, I would modify your argument to read that the tradition of debate engendered by junior and Field Grade officers should be nourished and encouraged by the institutional services and DOD.Despite some backsliding on occasion we have a pretty good record over the years."I think I've seen five separate periods of major introspection and intellectual foment over the last 60 year -- each had a beneficial if limited effect. There's nothing new here, just new people doing it. And good for them for doing it (even if I do strongly disagree with Nagl ;) ).

Rob said:
"However, we don't like to think about the hard stuff so much - the subjective - the qualitative relation to the quantitative, the effectiveness to the efficiency - these things are tough to assign values to - when we challenge them (and we should) they make us uncomfortable."I'm uncomfortable with his uncomfortable -- why should challenging processes that are obviously not efficient and / or not effective be uncomfortable. Sometimes, rather than cautiously weighing all sides, one has to rely on instinct and make a determination. Anyone who does that is going to err occasionally and that has to be okay. The good news is that most people have good instincts -- they should trust them more...

If something's wrong, something isn't working right, we have an obligation to speak up. I spent 45 years challenging a lot of things, sometimes I didn't succeed, sometimes I got chewed out for even thinking about it but I did succeed more often that not. That includes some things, minor though they be, that are doctrine or that have affected the Army in small ways. Good leadership -- and good followership -- includes challenging the status quo to make things better...

I told one boss that he was determined to do what his boss wanted and I was determined to do what I thought was right regardless of the desires of the big boss and we'd have conflict over that. We had an a mildly uneasy relationship but it worked out okay; both of us compromised on occasion and things got done.

Cavguy makes some very cogent points:
"The vast majority of civilians who run TRADOC are very jaded and turf-conscious, and simply wait the current CG's pet rock out over the next 2-3 years until he is replaced, and another pet rock is born."Too true; turf becomes the bed rock belief. Fortunately, there are some exceptions but far too many are as he says. We all know rocks can be difficult to remove, even if they're no more than a pebble in the boot...
"Abrams didn't try to shoot them down, but listened, and tried to address their concerns before his untimely death..."He did and being in DC at the time, I know he had even greater plans; his death was extremely unfortunate and the fact that his immediate replacement was in position to be that replacement only because of the "it was his turn" syndrome of 'all pegs are round' made that death even more unfortunate for the Army. The subsequent wholesale firings of Major Generals -- who, of course, retired to 'spend more time with their families' -- sent a lot of combat experienced and smart guys out of the system. Notably including a good many who were opposed to the Heavy Division Euro-centric tilt and strong anti-COIN focus that was becoming evident in the building. I think there's a very important message in that.
"...Chapter 26 is eerily similar to today's challenges. Let's hope our leadership can address them."Yea, verily...

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Ken,
We might be talking about two different things - or it could be I used an inadequte word. What I was trying to get at was our cultural aversion to looking beyond the low hanging fruit, the aversion to considering things beyond their immediate value - either their past in terms of considering "why" they might be that way, or their future, in terms of "what" it might mean. Its our attention deficit, and inability to recognize that somethings can't just be switched on and off, or that they require continued interaction in order to perform the way we want them. Earlier I'd mentioned our reaching fo rthe "O" in DOTMLPF, our other quick reach is the "M" - although the "M" is something we've now become conscious of - so we reach for the "O" - we need much more attention on the "L" and the "P" - and those are harder - but are just as, if not more important.

Then again, we might have been talking about the same thing, but from different angles - hard to tell sometimes.

Earlier I mentioned the "branch rep". I thought about this - worth considering how that discussion between him and his audience might have occurred. It could be that they all wanted to know "How do you get an MTO&E BN CMD? Could be he just told them what he'd seen go down on the most recent board - he just told the truth. There are (at least) three points to this - the first is that the truth is what it is, and reflects some of the same problems we've brought up before. The second is that we have created and fostered the "asking of the question". The last is that we have guys who accept it.


If something's wrong, something isn't working right, we have an obligation to speak up. I spent 45 years challenging a lot of things, sometimes I didn't succeed, sometimes I got chewed out for even thinking about it but I did succeed more often that not. That includes some things, minor though they be, that are doctrine or that have affected the Army in small ways. Good leadership -- and good followership -- includes challenging the status quo to make things better...

100% agree!

Best, Rob

[Ken White]

Hi Ken,
We might be talking about two different things
Then again, we might have been talking about the same thing, but from different angles.
:wry:

What I was trying to get at was our cultural aversion to looking beyond the low hanging fruit, the aversion to considering things beyond their immediate value - either their past in terms of considering "why" they might be that way, or their future, in terms of "what" it might mean. Its our attention deficit, and inability to recognize that somethings can't just be switched on and off, or that they require continued interaction in order to perform the way we want them. Earlier I'd mentioned our reaching fo rthe "O" in DOTMLPF, our other quick reach is the "M" - although the "M" is something we've now become conscious of - so we reach for the "O" - we need much more attention on the "L" and the "P" - and those are harder - but are just as, if not more important.That is true, no question. I understand the rationale for placement of the items in the list but always thought it should be in the order; Leadership and Education, Doctrine, Training, Organization, Materiel, Personnel, Facilities. Simply because that first item in my list really drives the train for Doctrine -- and Training will provide clues for the rest...

I think we pay a fair amount of attention to the 'P' but I also think our priorities in that regard are highly skewed -- as the comments on the branch rep show.


- hard to tell sometimes.That too -- it isn't a great communication medium in all respects...:(


Earlier I mentioned the "branch rep". I thought about this - worth considering how that discussion between him and his audience might have occurred. It could be that they all wanted to know "How do you get an MTO&E BN CMD? Could be he just told them what he'd seen go down on the most recent board - he just told the truth. There are (at least) three points to this - the first is that the truth is what it is, and reflects some of the same problems we've brought up before. The second is that we have created and fostered the "asking of the question". The last is that we have guys who accept it.

We are again penalized by a WW II personnel system that has not adapted to reality. I recall in the early 90s that Inf Branch sent out a questionnaire to all CPT and MAJ that asked them to check the appropriate box "particiapted in: 'Urgent fury,' 'Just cause,' 'Desert Shield/Desert Storm.' " What a pathetic message to send to people who were not at the 'right place at the right time' due to simple luck of the draw.

We're still trying to select the DSC winners from WW II as GOs -- and there ain't too many Field Grade DSC holders out there nowadays. Talk about failure to adapt and NOT consider the aspects of DOT or even reality in the 'P' business...

Interesting point of perhaps some minor relevance. My green suit time is too long past to be relevant, totally different Army. However, my DAC time flows into this one. In 18 years as a mid or senior level DAC, I worked directly for 14 Colonels. The first seven were all Year Groups in the 50s. They paid lip service, more or less to what their Boss wanted but essentially did their own thing and were willing to challenge anything including that boss (needless to say I got along great with all of 'em :D ).

The next four were early 60s guys. They tended to try to do what the boss wanted but were willing in the face of hard evidence to mount a reclama or just cheat and do it their way. The next to last last one did, IMO, overuse the word 'prudent' overmuch but he was absolutely NOT a sycophant (and effectively got fired -- lateral transfer, no relief OER -- because he was not. :mad: Sorry way to do business...).

The last three were all very late 60s or 70s Year Group -- all put the Boss's desires at the top of their to-do list and got very nervous at some of my antics and bluntness (though I owe them all thanks for putting up with me and I think they'll agree we done pretty good).

In fairness to all of them, the respective Generals of the time showed a decreasing LACK of willingness to tolerate selective compliance and / or initiative. The last two were pretty much bad micromanagers.

We have a far better Army now than in my day. However, some of the improvements have come at the cost of trust, initiative and innovation -- and those things win wars. Being excessively hidebound, particularly at the top -- does not win them. Au contraire...

[Tom Odom]

In fairness to all of them, the respective Generals of the time showed a decreasing LACK of willingness to tolerate selective compliance and / or initiative. The last two were pretty much bad micromanagers.

We have a far better Army now than in my day. However, some of the improvements have come at the cost of trust, initiative and innovation -- and those things win wars. Being excessively hidebound, particularly at the top -- does not win them. Au contraire...

In that regard, ABCS have not served us well. The digital display of the battlefield puts a premium on dosplaying information, not communicating. Senior leaders mistake looking at those displays for understanding what subordinates are doing. It makes us uncomfortable so we add greater staffs to interpret that information. Meanwhile to succeed, the subordinate units (ones with habitual relationships) have to put liaison officers in their next higher headquarters to make sure that the interpretation of said digital displays is reasonably correct. Intent and adherence to intent is more like digital mind reading.

Best

Tom

[Ken White]

That worked up until the late 80s. However, even with hi tech stuff, the troops will always find a way. My serving kid was in an LRS Company when they got issued digital cameras and modems in the mid 90s, the idea being to send pictures back so the Elephants could determine that what the Scouts reported was actually true *. Like many 'good' ideas, that foundered on the shoals of hard headed Troop reality -- in the form of 'damage to the equipment on the jump' that rendered it inoperable. Pity... :D

Not that I approve of such subterfuge or would ever encourage such actions. ;)


* That became an issue because many on the ground reports were being denied by the MI Bdes as their 'technical means' couldn't validate it; since they were briefing the CGs, their version won but the CGs knew the kids wouldn't make up everything they reported...

The two most annoying and stupid radio calls in the world are "What is your present location?" That's just dumb. Either you know where I am; I can't tell you because something else happened and I'm busy and will get back to you when I can; or I'm on the way to somewhere you told me to go and haven't arrived yet. Sheesh. That and the famous "Are you sure?" Nah, I'm not sure, I'm just making this up from a place I could get killed to see if you're paying attention... :mad:

[Norfolk]

Presumably then, there will be some variance on this board with the views of one Air Marshal Subhash Bhojwani (http://www.newswiretoday.com/news/29297/), IAF:


Network Enabled Capability and Network Centric Warfare in India – Informa Announces the Launch of NECE 2008

NewswireToday - /newswire/ - Mumbai, Maharashtra, India, 02/01/2008,via Informa India -



...network-enabled capabilities allow true unity of command where macro-control is essential for achieving mission success.


Don't bother with the rest of the article at the link.
--------------------------------------------------
One "good" thing so far with Transformation and NCW is its vulnerability to EMP. Since much of the Network-Centric hardware has foregone EMP-hardening in order to "reduce" costs:wry:, the ground-pounder's best friend in the future may actually be the enemy's E-bomb. Makes you wonder whose side some people are really on.

As Ken has already mentioned, in spite of the rise and apparent crystallization of a movement amongst the subalterns and even field grade officers towards seeking fundamental changes and reforms within the institution itself, the "Army" as a whole has more or less successfully resisted much of the change or reform sought by previous generations of Young Turks. Given that over half of the officer class of 2002 has already voted with its feet, and that the conditions that led them and their immediate predecessors to likewise migrate to other pastures more or less remain, there may not be too terribly many reformers who have remained within the institution a decade and more from now to accomplish much more than minor and transitory changes.

The passing-over of Colonel McMaster for promotion, the retirement of LtCol Nagl, and similar "events", whether they are in fact reflective of institutional resistance to reform or simply that they were genuinely unsuited to higher command, are nevertheless unambiguous in feeding the perception that the Army just does not want to reform, or even to tolerate those who seek it within its highest echelons. The "Corporation", for all its public pronouncements that it seeks precisely the qualities that officers like Col. McMaster are publicly known to possess, still cannot, and will not, in fact practice more or less what it preaches. And both the officers who are leaving, as well as those who are trying to stay in and to make a difference, are in no way deluded about that.

[John T. Fishel]

what happens to artillery support and/or land nav - among other things - if the GPS and computers go down due to EMP or for other reasons? Can anybody still read a map or plot artillery by hand?

[Ken White]

land nav are still taught according to folks I know, albeit in reduced form. They are cognitive skills and once decently absorbed will return for most recipients fairly quickly if needed.

The bad news is that both are cognitive skills -- so it'll take a few hours practice to get them back up to speed. Can't speak to the fire direction side but the land nav side is generally marginally taught.

The worse news is that black boxes tend to fail at inopportune times and practice time may not be available... :o

The most important thing one can do with a map (and that GPS cannot do or even aid too much); conduct a map reconnaissance for purposes of terrain appreciation and tactical decision was not taught in BNCOC, ANCOC, OBC or OAC last time I checked. Hopefully, that has changed. Mayhap someone more current can tell us.

[Cavguy]

land nav are still taught according to folks I know, albeit in reduced form. They are cognitive skills and once decently absorbed will return for most recipients fairly quickly if needed.

The bad news is that both are cognitive skills -- so it'll take a few hours practice to get them back up to speed. Can't speak to the fire direction side but the land nav side is generally marginally taught.

The worse news is that black boxes tend to fail at inopportune times and practice time may not be available... :o

The most important thing one can do with a map (and that GPS cannot do or even aid too much); conduct a map reconnaissance for purposes of terrain appreciation and tactical decision was not taught in BNCOC, ANCOC, OBC or OAC last time I checked. Hopefully, that has changed. Mayhap someone more current can tell us.

I'm pretty sure it's covered in both in BOLIC and Maneuver Captain's Career course, since it's a pretty crucial IPB step.

[Cavguy]

The two most annoying and stupid radio calls in the world are "What is your present location?" That's just dumb. Either you know where I am; I can't tell you because something else happened and I'm busy and will get back to you when I can; or I'm on the way to somewhere you told me to go and haven't arrived yet. Sheesh. That and the famous "Are you sure?" Nah, I'm not sure, I'm just making this up from a place I could get killed to see if you're paying attention... :mad:


I straddled the pre-digital and digital age in my PL and CO CDR time. Maybe it's the chains of command I served in, but I never had a problem with micromanagement of my fights or ones I observed from above due to digital tools. It wasn't that they couldn't, my commanders let the guy on the ground call it. Overall, I much prefer having the digital tools available. Part of that may be generational comfort with technology.

I watched this throughout my time in Ramadi in the BDE TOC as the Battle Major. Sometimes we'd actually have better SA than the troops on the ground. While we would inform the lower units of what we saw, as a rule we didn't jump in on a tactical net in a fight. I won't say it never happened, but once experienced TOC crews were trained we learned to gather/pull the info through analog and digital systems without intruding on the sub unit in the fight. A 1990's internet tool known as MIRC chat was extremely useful in communicating between TOC's without using the net, and with precision. Above BN level, radio reports are seldom used now.

I was on the other end of the spectrum during a fight in Tal Afar as a commander that everyone watched on UAV - the only person I talked was the BN CDR, and no one tried to fight my fight.

I will also say in defense of BFT and other tools - It cuts down radio traffic because I don't have to ask the questions quoted above. I have each unit's approximate position within 5 minutes update. I also can email back and forth between units on the ground and the TOC. Useful for conveying information that gets misinterpreted on the radio - "We have the target, Ahmed Youssif Hussein Al Masri - I need a background check - I spell - Alpha Hotel ...."

Works much better on a text (FIPR) message. Trust me. The email also allows conversations between two stations that can't be monitored by the whole world - useful when discussing casualty status.

Just my recent experience. Some commanders can use the tools to micromanage, but it hasn't been my experience.

[Ken White]

in fact. My comments was directed at the mentality, not the tools but I did fail to clearly state that. Sorry...

Not least am I a digital fan because it eliminates the need for at least one of my two cited pet peeve radio calls. Which were mostly tongue in cheek in any event... :D

Realize also that my DAC experience was at USAARMS (6 yrs) and a couple of GO Hq (possibly 12 years too many :wry: ) and I know that micromanagement in units is less (thank Mars!). Both TRADOC Schools and big, upper level staffs have their own set of problems.

I can't recall back in my unigram days ever having a real micromanagement problem. I was attempting to point out that in my perception the Army has over the last 45 years or so generally drifted ever further into a mildly pernicious lack of trust of subordinates due mostly to centralization and over control which IMO is not a good thing. Hopefully, the current experience will reverse that trend -- and it seems to be doing just that.

Thanks for the insights. All good to hear. Thanks also for the info on Map use, really glad to hear that as well. Problem with being old and outa date is one says dumb things now and then. Neat thing about this place is I can get a lot of my minor concerns eliminated while getting less dumb.

[John T. Fishel]

I'm really glad you guys answered a question that had been bugging me for a long time and that the answer was not nearly as bad as I feared.:D

Cheers

JohnT

[Norfolk]

Digital is great as long as it doesn't get jammed or is in the hands of a a control freak; if either is present - especially the latter, it becomes a drag. Both can be mitigated, though, the latter through proper selection.

[Cliff]

Hi John,

It just takes me back to the question – are we changing the paradigm, or just massaging it? Will there be a few good ones who get up the dam and make it upstream to spawn – I think so, but aren’t we saying we want to build better swimmers early on – so that we can change our organizational culture? I guess there is also the argument of how much leadership is inherent in an individual and how much it can be infused, but I still feel like we can do better then we are in the shaping process.

Best, Rob

Pardon me for asking, but how does the Army debrief operations? In the AF at the tactical/operational levels, there is a "no rank" mentality... because your mission commander is usually a young Capt/Maj, occasionally a LtCol, you "leave rank at the door" when debriefing... This tends to get used even in non-tactical debriefs as well - the culture of the debrief is something that has been propogated, mostly as a result of the USAF Weapons School being the tactical/operational center of excellence, which allowed the Weapons Officers (Captains who are the chief instructors at the Squadron level) to propogate the debrief mentality to the rest of the AF... You learn very early how to tactfully tell the O-6 or General that he screwed the pooch and help him not screw it up next time... the good ones want to not look like clowns, the bad ones are just plain scared and usually avoid flying the hard missions. The system has disadvantages too though - sometimes you end up debriefing things to nitnoid detail and wasting time. It's a fine line. Also, the Weapons School standardization between units at times results in a dogmatic approach to things.

Is the Army system similar? IE, how are missions reviewed/debriefed at the tactical/operational level? Who is responsible for taking the debrief/lessons learned and instructing the folks present in what to do better next time? And can a junior person debrief/instruct his/her seniors? Are these processes used in non-operational settings (IE let's debrief how that meeting with the General went good/bad and why...?)

Is it the ability to think critically or the ability to criticise superiors that you are talking about when you refer to swimming skills, Rob?

Like I mentioned before I haven't worked with Army ground forces much... thanks for humoring me!

V/R,

Cliff

[Tom Odom]

I'm really glad you guys answered a question that had been bugging me for a long time and that the answer was not nearly as bad as I feared.:D

Cheers

JohnT


From my perch, the digital issues I see as strongest lay between the division, the BCT, and the battalions, especially the latter given the plus up of the BCT staff and the corresponding vacum of talent fromn the battalions.

I have tended to see the company as a much more independent as a result of the changes in the operational environment and the inherent self-centric focus at the BCT level. Hence the issue of battalions needing a liaison officer within the BCT staff to "monitor and develop the situation".

As for the company, that has been a plus and a negative. Plus in that in operations like Iraq and Afghanistan, the company, platoon, and squad win the fight--the battalions and the BCTs shape the conditions. One benefit of the BCT-centric trend is the BCTs are so busy with themselves and their battalions, the companies can exercise that independence.

The negative is that with all that BCT focus, getting improvements at the company-level is a dogass, bone-garing fight. But we have started to see some shifts--notably in improving a company's ability to run ops 24/7 in a non-linear environment. All of of or force structure from battalion to squad is based on a linear model with carefully echeloned C2 and log support. Transformation essentially ignored that reality but reality has been catching up. And that is a good thing.

Tom

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Cliff - what I was referring to is really about how the events, jobs, education, experiences, assignments, etc. that a leader can or might have put before him or take advantage of helps to shape him so that as he or she advances and is placed in greater positions to influence other leaders, they increase the number who reflect the types of values and traits we claim we want.

While the tactical debrief is important - or what we refer to as an AAR (After Action Review) - which is not to be confused with a Patrol Debrief (where questions pertaining to the patrol are asked and answered). In an AAR either a second party, or a member of the unit (usually a leader) can take the unit through a kind of peer review process where questions to understand how the unit did, where it could have done better and where it did well are asked. This is a time process where the unit gets stronger by understanding itself in relation to its environment - and the conditions that it faced there.

What I'm talking about is broader. It not only the collective development, but the individual development - because sometimes the decisions the leader has to make are his or hers alone.

So its neither just thinking critically, or teaching someone how to be critical (in this case going from the passive to the active). I don't think this is relative to ground forces leadership only - its leadership in general. An organization should ask itself who it thinks it is, who it thinks it needs to be, and in our case what does our civilian leadership think we need to be - the goal I think is to get those 3 things in line. Its my thought that its leaders that you leverage to do that. Here we may have a disconnect - on the one hand we say we need more leaders who are more multi-dimensional - who can adapt faster and can innovate - the new 3-0 has a whole chapter on what our leadership requirements are and how critical they are to the tasks we expect them to negotiate and lead others through - on the other hand our actions (not the topical, interval or sporadic ones - but the ones we do in small groups when nobody is listening or when we can justify backsliding by saying "hey, here is the real deal!") - those core actions - that really define who we are don't match the narrative of who we say we need to be publicly.

The only means we have to change that is through demonstrated leadership - the kind that shows and encourages what we say we believe in, and points the way toward where we say we need to be. Animate leadership that reaches down when they find out something like that a branch rep came forward with some tripe like that, and then takes action to prove its fallacy. That leadership has to be backed up by the leadership at the follow on boards that really looks at the person (deeper then the ORB and SR block) - and in a very transparent manner shows the judged what the criteria was for selection to command or promotion was, and that the things we are saying publicly are important really counted - so that its clear that our actions match the narrative.

If you don't take steps to get more people like that up stream - then the ones who do are only going to perpetuate the actions by which we govern ourselves right now - because they will be mostly copy cat products - minted in our self image.

Hoped that helped answer your question.
Best, Rob

[patmc]

land nav are still taught according to folks I know, albeit in reduced form. They are cognitive skills and once decently absorbed will return for most recipients fairly quickly if needed.

The bad news is that both are cognitive skills -- so it'll take a few hours practice to get them back up to speed. Can't speak to the fire direction side but the land nav side is generally marginally taught.

The worse news is that black boxes tend to fail at inopportune times and practice time may not be available... :o

In an Airborne Field Artillery Battalion, out of necessity, we keep manual plotting and gunnery alive (charts and darts), but digital has even moved into that (ie Centaur, a hand-held Fire Data computer). Our sister BN has fielded the new cannon system, with all its digital features, and from what I'm told, is giving up on manual gunnery. They teach both digital and manual at OBC, but manual is definately a dying skill. I have no experience with Paladins or MLRS, but from what I know, they are digital or nothing. When the digital goes down, the cannons check fire.

[Ken White]

In an Airborne Field Artillery Battalion, out of necessity, we keep manual plotting and gunnery alive (charts and darts), but digital has even moved into that (ie Centaur, a hand-held Fire Data computer). Our sister BN has fielded the new cannon system, with all its digital features, and from what I'm told, is giving up on manual gunnery. They teach both digital and manual at OBC, but manual is definately a dying skill. I have no experience with Paladins or MLRS, but from what I know, they are digital or nothing. When the digital goes down, the cannons check fire.

a backup capability; hopefully we won't let it die totally... :(

I know that Paladins used to digital or nothing and that makes sense with MLRS but the 119s and the 777s having at least a rudimentary emergency backup (even if its a battery operated hand held unconnected FD calculator) would seem to be a good idea.

Have had most Bns of the 319, 320, 321 put 'em where I wanted 'em at one time or other. You guys do good work. :cool:

Thanks for the update.

[Cliff]

Hi Cliff - what I was referring to is really about how the events, jobs, education, experiences, assignments, etc. that a leader can or might have put before him or take advantage of helps to shape him so that as he or she advances and is placed in greater positions to influence other leaders, they increase the number who reflect the types of values and traits we claim we want.

Got it. You're talking about not just building a way of thinking but molding the entire leader.


While the tactical debrief is important - or what we refer to as an AAR (After Action Review) - which is not to be confused with a Patrol Debrief (where questions pertaining to the patrol are asked and answered). In an AAR either a second party, or a member of the unit (usually a leader) can take the unit through a kind of peer review process where questions to understand how the unit did, where it could have done better and where it did well are asked. This is a time process where the unit gets stronger by understanding itself in relation to its environment - and the conditions that it faced there.

Is this a formalized process? I'd like to learn more, is there somewhere (FM or otherwise) I can read up on this?


An organization should ask itself who it thinks it is, who it thinks it needs to be, and in our case what does our civilian leadership think we need to be - the goal I think is to get those 3 things in line. Its my thought that its leaders that you leverage to do that.

Definitely agree - that is critical, especially when you are in a world like today's where things are constantly changing. The only constant is that there is no constant! Although at the same time it seems like you have to beware of change just for change's sake - in the AF the problem is often that the perception is that each senior leader has to "change" things to get promoted...


The only means we have to change that is through demonstrated leadership - the kind that shows and encourages what we say we believe in, and points the way toward where we say we need to be. Animate leadership that reaches down when they find out something like that a branch rep came forward with some tripe like that, and then takes action to prove its fallacy. That leadership has to be backed up by the leadership at the follow on boards that really looks at the person (deeper then the ORB and SR block) - and in a very transparent manner shows the judged what the criteria was for selection to command or promotion was, and that the things we are saying publicly are important really counted - so that its clear that our actions match the narrative.

Not sure what a branch rep is. I understand the last part I think - tough to do. I guess that is part of why I was asking about the AAR and such. Our promotion process isn't much more transparent than yours (feedback depends solely on the O-5/O-6/O-7+ giving his subordinates at the Wing/Group/Squadron feedback on where they stand (after the ratings are in) and why), but we do get a lot of operational/tactical level feedback, in extremely public forums. The public airing of your dirty laundry results in a fairly decent level of public understanding of where folks stand... at least on the operational/tactical side of things. You know who is a good leader in the air and who is not, and there is a sort of informal pecking order. We're different than the Army in that in the AF your leadership role on the ground is somewhat more divorced from your leadership role in the air... not always a good thing, as you end up with awesome pilots/instructor pilots who could lead the first push of the next big war, but couldn't lead a bunch of folks on the ground out of a paper bag... interesting dichotomy!

Anyway thanks for the answer to my questions! Appreciate you taking time to educate the ignorant!

V/R,

Cliff