IW and Stability Operations - in your own words - what is the difference?

[Rob Thornton]

Lots of terms moving about these days. Two of them that have some weight are "Irregular Warfare" and "Stability Operations". At the SWC we have a pretty good group that is confident, well read, inter-active and interested to expend grey matter in pursuit of getting it right. So lets open up a discussion on the matter. I suspect that if this thread does take off, it will go in some unexpected directions. No need to limit yourself to IW and SO - there seem to be many other terms out there that conflict, parallel or intersect at points. I'd also say it is worthwhile to consider what the implications are for favoring one term over another.

Another good reason to do it here is our diversity - as definitions build, they may use other terms or contain ideas which seem out of context to particular disciplines or cultures - this is one of those cases where the discussion is probably worth more then the definition itself.

Not to avoid initiating the discussion while avoiding any “published” doctrinal definitions in order to consider the nature of the words:

For myself, I'm suffering from the component of the terms themselves - IW contains the term "warfare", which to me means a "way" or manner of waging war. E.G. – “irregular” could mean something out of character to the norm - which could mean everything from the type of means used to wage the war that then drive irregular tactics, operations and strategy, or just an "irregular" use of the "regular" means to wage war.

Stability Operations sort of hits me the same way - the key word being "operations" which to me indicate a type of undertaking to achieve an objective - in this case "stability" of something - a state, an area, a group, a problem, etc.


I recently read a definition of a "term" that because it used other like terms in its definition limited the utility of the term it was defining to a point that put the original term at odds where it has been used elsewhere in the greater lexicon.

While there is goodness in defining things, I think the real value in this case is probably the discussion about how they are perceived. Its not too hard to find out discussions or speeches where the multiple terms are used to describe the same things, and others where the same terms are used in ways that put them outside the context of an accepted definition.

Best, Rob

[Ken White]

noting that all my stabs are simplistic... :wry:

I think when the 1 MarDiv was tracing down the remnants of the fleeing North Korean Army north of Wonsan in 1950, we were engaged in IW. We were again in early '51 when we and the 5th RCT [1] hunted down the remnants of the same Army left behind in far south near Pusan due to the US / ROK push northward in the fall of '50. They had reverted to using guerrilla TTP [2] and were not attempting to move north [3].

When I went to Laos in 1960, I was engaged in a Stability Operation (which entailed a very minimal amount of IW). In Viet Nam in early '66, prior to the bulk of the buildup, same situation. Later in that year, it morphed for several reasons into more IW and less SO. When I returned in 1968, we had CW (generally less Tanks), pure and simple and little concern in units for SO. That, after Tet, pulled down rapidly to IW as opposed to CW -- and SO was ramped up [4].

To me, the 'classic' definitions are appropriate, simple and not ambiguous. CW is major military force using current technology in moderately to highly intensive combat. IW is characterized by one or both opposing sides using what are conventionally called guerrilla TTP. Stability Operations are as you described and may also involve a spectrum of force through none to simple Police or constabulary effort through Paramilitary Constabulary effort to IW in varying intensity and, rarely, up to CW. That said, it must be acknowledged that variances in that are, IMO, of small concern. Most words in the English dictionaries have multiple definitions and that seems to be acceptable [5].

NOTES:

[1] The 5th RCT in 1950-51 contained then CPT Hank Emerson, who from that experience probably developed his Checkerboard Theory of COIN Warfare. IIRC, he refined that theory and published it while at Leavenworth in 1963-64. It should be in the Archives there.

[2] I use the phrase 'guerrilla TTP' as shorthand for any combat effort by a force (organized, uniformed or not) that uses stealth, evasion, clandestine operations and short sharp actions while avoiding decisive commitment against superior force as a combat norm. Their actions may include infrastructure destruction (human and machine), attacks solely on opposing military forces, attacks on any opponents to include civilians, terror, intimidation and other tactics short of fully engaging major forces in combat.

[3] Sort of an aside to your question but somewhat appropos, I think. With 1 MarDiv and with the US Army in Korea, note the changes in a short period from full bore conventional warfare involving defense against Armored attack to a major offensive operation entailing full bore urban warfare to IW to CW against a different enemy with very different TTP to IW and back to CW. This is why I contend that the Armed Forces of the US are completely capable of conducting full spectrum warfare. If a marginally trained crowd could do it reasonably well in 1950, with todays training we should be able to do it very well at a high performance level.

[4] Again, note the sliding between categories of combat. US units translated between the various forms of combat and other operations relatively painlessly and generally fairly effectively. Most failures I observed were not at the unit level but were command failures at Division and above. Something to ponder is that most Bdes did well; most Divisions did not.

[5] Reasonable people could disagree with me on some of that transitioning between forms of warfare -- and warfare itself is constant evolution. For those two reasons, I think that a quest for excessive accuracy in terminology is probably not possible. That does not mean we should not try to be more precise, simply that accord may be difficult.

[selil]

I hadn't answered because I was thinking "cyber wafare" is a form of irregular warfare. Conflict through other means than normal warfare. But, then I was thinking maybe I'm missing the point since that has nothing to do with stability operations.

[Ken White]

Sam. Seems to me that cyber warfare is, in most senses IW -- though it could be a technique or line of operation in a conventional war as well.

By the same token it doesn't need to involved in Stability operations -- though it could be and is possibly today in Afghanistan and /or Iraq to one degree or another. I can envision a SO wherein the only warfare component is cyber war.

That's why I say that trying to be very specific in definition will difficult

[William F. Owen]

Lots of terms moving about these days. Two of them that have some weight are "Irregular Warfare" and "Stability Operations".

Not with me, they don't!

Warfare is defined by the aims sought and means employed to achieve the aim.

To sound like a stuck record, "Why are we seeking to define conflict?" "So that we may better understand it?"

So here is the question. "What do we not understand about conflict that causes us so much angst?"

Conflict is conflict. War is War. What's the problem? To be a proper army, you have to be able to fight any sort of conflict. Otherwise you're just a one trick pony.

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Sam - I think you are on track. I did not really bring it up looking for a "right" answer - I brought it up to discuss it. Its really the discussion that matters. Lots of things going on out there that don't fit neatly in a box - not that they should necessarily, just that we often seem intent on putting them there. If "cyber-war" for example is used in conjunction with other means and ways, or maybe even used on its own because that is the best means and ways available to the belligerent, maybe we need to consider it.

If we get too wedded to defining something as it currently is, do we miss the shift in conditions which change the nature of it. Ken had went through the events in the 60s in SE Asia and discussed how it changed from one thing to another - the ability to perceive not only that the nature of a change but why and "so what" are important.

Hi William,

Certainly dissent is encouraged here:D The reason I picked up on those two terms is because they are featured in some policy debate about where effort is placed. This should be no secret, lots of ongoing publications in the journals and MSM - and maybe for the reason you state,
"What do we not understand about conflict that causes us so much angst?" and since it was never the intention of this thread to limit discussion, be it conflicting terms, or broader questions - I hope folks will wade in and we'll see where it goes.

Its an important and related question, and I think it gets beyond just military power, so its not just a one trick pony military, it may be national power geared toward confronting one thing, vs. being adaptive. Since we employ military power (and other forms of national power) ideally to achieve a political objective, then the lateral discussion with other JIIM folks, and the vertical discussion with Legislative and Executive folks matters. The discussion is going to take place via multiple means and is going to be influenced not just by the direct participant, but by external folks from the media, think tanks, other governments, the public and constituents just to name a few. So I think terms, and their definitions do matter, as do the means by which participants in the discussion receive the definition, the means will place context around the content.

For a variety of reasons not everyone seems to be comfortable with
Conflict is conflict. War is War.. Some are political reasons, some are cultural, some are probably just the almost universal human desire to name things (Marc - you symbology work got me thinking about that), and organize them.

If you buy into Clausewitz, and I do - you are probably prepared to live with ambiguity, and understand that by doing so you are offered a certain latitude and freedom in how you view things - it helps you consider the nature of things in a different light. However, there are plenty of folks that don't seem to want that freedom, they come from backgrounds where that level of freedom has been viewed as counter productive, or an impediment to progress on an issue, etc. For them, often everything is a "problem" with a solution, and the conditions don't matter. Many of these folks are in government, and they were elected on the basis of promises, and they picked people to serve in important positions based on their support of a specific view - to get their policies and promises fulfilled. Example - few people are comfortable with the idea that "drawdown" or "gradual withdrawal" from Iraq is contingent on anything other then our domestic will to make it so - so while the commander on the ground may be acutely aware of the effects of the conditions there in accomplishing the mission, he is also aware of the political pressure to demonstrate progress that can be measured and publicized - either to discuss it with the political leadership, or for the political leader to discuss with the public in order to manage expectations.

Which sort of brings me back to why I started the thread in the first place - it was to begin a discussion on what terms mean, and hopefully get to why their meaning matters.

Best, Rob

[Eden]

Interesting topic, though dangerous to deal with without sufficient caffeine in the system.

To my mind, there is a fundamental divide in ways of applying organized violence - though actually it's not so much a divide as a fuzzy grey area.

Conventional (or regular) war is an artificial construct in which force is directed at the avatar of an opposing body politic. In its purest form, 'civilians' and their works are not affected except incidentally, mostly among those unfortunate enough to be located on or near the battlefield. Both sides have essentially abandoned rationality and entrusted the issue to brute strength. The two avatars contend until one side is either completely destroyed or concludes that it can no longer shield the body politic. Since this construct is completely artificial (and in many ways counter-intuitive), it has to be hedged about by the many laws and rules of war to ensure that it remains a non-rational contest of intellectual, spiritual, and material strength, unrelated to the actual issues at stake.

Unconventional (or irregular) war, on the other hand, is the application of organized violence directly to the body politic - or attempts to shield the body politic from such violence. In other words, at least one side is purposefully evading the opponent's avatar to starve, kill, rob, persuade, energize, terrorize, liberate, etc, the 'civilian' sector. Attacks on the opposing avatar are limited to what is necessary to allow access to the body politic.

No war is an unalloyed example of one or the other, of course.

Victor Davis Hanson alert: I will now use questionable and simplistic historical examples to illustrate.

The Hundred Year's War was largely irregular. It consisted mostly of raids, pillaging expeditions, massacres, and the like, designed to enrich one side directly at the expense of the other. On the flip side, each side was also trying to prevent the enemy from inflicting such harm. The key was that any fighting was directly aimed at gaining access to the body politic. Both sides were manned, trained, and equipped for this type of war - the medieval army was a supremely fit tool for irregular warfare in every sense. From time to time, conventional war was resorted to in the form of pitched battles (Agincourt et al), but this was the rare exception.

The American Civil War was originally purely and consciously conventional, but it was won by the north when they began to employ irregular warfare directly against the body politic of the south - and it was the vulnerability of the south to direct attacks on its body politic that in the end ensured there would be an actual surrender rather than a resort to a continuing guerilla campaign.

World War II had aspects of irregular war in ways obvious (partisans, saboteurs) and less obvious (terror bombing) I say less obvious because terror bombing employed the same tools used in regular warfare (bombers, fighters) in very similar ways as those used to attack the opponents avatar. The difference is that it was aimed directly at the body politic, rather than the material strength of the enemy.

[wm]

Which sort of brings me back to why I started the thread in the first place - it was to begin a discussion on what terms mean, and hopefully get to why their meaning matters.

Rob,

In order to decide what terms mean, we need to set a context in which they are being used. As you noted in the post from which I lifted the above quotation, folks engage in discussion across multiple contexts. Until one sets the context, one probably cannot be sure which definition is most apropros to the discussion. This is not to say that terms have no fixed meanings, that everything is relative. What I am trying to say is that I suspect the best we can hope for as an end result of the discussion will be a list of possible components that apply when one is taking about IW or SO, depending on the context.

I doubt seriuously that these lists will be mutually exclusive nor that we will be able to identify much, if anything that is either necessary or sufficient to be able to point out when we are faced with IW versus CW or SO. It will be like the old saying about pornography, " I know it when I see it." Ken's post to this thread exemplifies my belief.) When someone says that they see an IW event, discussion will allow others to unpack what in that event justifies calling it IW. I do not see this discussion producing a "bright line test" for discriminating between appropriate uses of the terms. By the way, I also would prefer not to have such a bright line test. I suspect that would cause pigeonholing and stultify creative thought at a time when that is what we really need.

However, I do think the exercise will be worth it. It should have a liberating effect, provided the interlocutors are open-minded and there is a sufficiently broad involvement in terms of the participants' background and experience. Without policy wonks from State who have never seen a day in uniform, legal beagles from the world of Constitutional and Federal administrative law freshly admitted to the bar after their three years at Georgetown, Harvard or Dickinson Law, and even a bunch of knuckle-dragging old military guys like many of us who contribute already, the debate will not have a broad enough basis of discussion to bring out as many of the ways that we can see what Wittgenstein called family resemblances in the various language games we play using the two terms. (I can't believe I wrote a sentence that long! Sorry, I must be channeling for Joyce or Becket.)

[Steve Blair]

Unlike some, I do see a certain utility in "naming" various levels of conflict...if for no other reason than to restrain the instincts of some to run right for the big red button every time something untoward happens.

To me, the difference between IW and SO lies in the amount of open conflict. For example, I'd label the Indian Wars as IW, and an operation like the occupation of Germany after Word War II (or even the limited occupation of regions after World War I) as SO. Note that there is a certain amount of SO carry-over into IW (for example, the Army often performed what might be considered law enforcement-type missions during the Indian Wars, although the main focus remained on combat). Resource allocation also comes into play, although the Indian Wars sucked up almost all the active Army component at the time. Still...there was no extra mobilization (except in very limited circumstances) and no real testing of the national will or motivation (again, with a handful of very specific incidents running counter to this trend).

These are all somewhat general concepts, but again for me they serve more as a basic framework. War is war is war at the sharp end of the stick, but once you get past that I do strongly feel that there are levels of conflict and that having an understanding of them can prevent slides into a "massive retaliation" mindset.

Warfare is always in flux, and what we consider IW now might have actually been an all-out conflict by the standards of previous systems. Personally I think stability operations have the best chance to remain consistent, since they tend by nature to be more limited involvements (at least on the part of an outside power...assuming that an IW scenario isn't running at the same time - Iraq is a good example of this).

IW does not tend to be a conventional force-on-force engagement, either. There will be more limits (resources, political restrictions, weapons systems deployed or usable, etc.) and (in my mind) less tolerance for error. It's also more prone to "sliding" from one end of the scale to the other (from what seems to be SO, for example, into a larger theater-based conflict like Vietnam became) with little or no warning and possibly no action by one (or more) of the major players in the conflict.

Terms are important not just for the military, but for the people who commit that military to action. There is always flux in them (and there should be), but it's still useful to have a scale of reference.

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Wayne,


What I am trying to say is that I suspect the best we can hope for as an end result of the discussion will be a list of possible components that apply when one is taking about IW or SO, depending on the context.

and that is really all I was hoping to do - to get people engaged, and thinking, and hopefully discussing it. Context does matter, sometimes more, sometimes less - probably more when the application results in real decisions about ends, ways means (as an ex.), and maybe less when it is just theory - but I think it always matters.

Even here - the discussion goes beyond the people we respond to, who challenge us and get us to question a particular definition or belief - so there is a two part audience - the intended recipient and th unintended recipient - again the context of which the response is made matters.

Lots of other terms that often get used in an almost ubiquitous manners - COIN, UW, CW (incidentally I recently saw a piece that substituted the word traditional for conventional - which changes the context), asymmetric, symmetric, etc.

Steve, great points, but I have to head to work now (which in its own way, this is also kind of like work - it just doesn't always feel that way:))
Best, Rob

[wm]

I've attached a quick analysis that may be a start to a methodology for analysis. Comments are greatly appreciated.

[marct]

Hi Rob,


So I think terms, and their definitions do matter, as do the means by which participants in the discussion receive the definition, the means will place context around the content.

For a variety of reasons not everyone seems to be comfortable with . Some are political reasons, some are cultural, some are probably just the almost universal human desire to name things (Marc - you symbology work got me thinking about that), and organize them.

You know, I've been toying with the idea of trying to put something together on the Symbology of Conflict and its ties into neurophysiology. Personally, I think that definitions matter especially shared definitions (aka inter-subjective).

I think the issue of "naming" is, strangely enough, absolutely crucial. First off, Judaism, Christianity and Islam all recognize the act of naming to have powerful implications for control over that which is named (cf Gen 2:19). Second, "naming" is an act of discriminating in the sense that it defines X, Y, and Z as members of that named and excludes others. Not surprising, it's how our brain neurology works and all of our social and cultural institutions reflect that.


Which sort of brings me back to why I started the thread in the first place - it was to begin a discussion on what terms mean, and hopefully get to why their meaning matters.

Well, terms have no inherent meaning in and of themselves (although some magicians and theologians would disagree with me, but that's for another thread ;)). "Meaning" is arbitrary, but with fuzzy limits (as opposed to crisp limits) and subject to change in relation to "experience" (cultural, social, historical, linguistic and personal).

One of the better ways to arrive at fuzzy definitions is to create what Max Weber called "ideal types" and use those, and other data, to construct a series of "dimensions" with the ideal types as the end points. (If anyone is into the math, the dimensions define the specific space of a particular cluster of topological manifolds; cf General Topology (http://www.amazon.com/General-Topology-Graduate-Texts-Mathematics/dp/0387901256/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1204643240&sr=8-1) by John Kelley.)

If we take this approach, the first thing we see is that while the term "conventional warfare" can easily be made into an ideal type based on the agreement of combatants to follow an agreed upon convention, unconventional, irregular, etc. are useless as ideal types since they are defined solely by one negative dimension, i.e. not following a convention. While useless as ideal types, they do help to establish one dimension: the degree to which a given conflict follows an agreed upon convention (aka the presence or absence of actions which meet that convention).

So, we have one ideal type and one dimension. Let's try for another dimension: TTPs. Let us assume, for the moment, that TTPs fall into broad categories. TTPs, as a class, will cross with conventional warfare - indeed we could argue that any given "convention" will be defined by which TTPs are included and excluded from the convention. What other "clusters" of TTPs do we find, since the clustering of them appears to be one of the prime definitions of he one ideal type we have? Well, we have one cluster that seems to be defined as a "classic Maoist insurgency". As a note, if you look at the Peasant Wars in Europe of the 15th - 17th centuries, you will note that they also use very similar TTPs, so this ideal type is not "new" or "oriental". I would suggest that we could call this ideal type by Mao's original name for it: a People's War. One of the key dimensions is that this is an intra-culture war based on the violent "re-negotiation" of social system(s).

I'm going to leave it at that for the nonce ;).

Marc

[marct]

Hey Wayne,


I've attached a quick analysis that may be a start to a methodology for analysis. Comments are greatly appreciated.

Looks like we're thinking along similar lines ;).

Marc

[Eden]

I think any attempt to define the terms we are dealing with by examining the tools used, or how the opposing forces organize, train, and support themselves, or the tactics they use, is doomed to failure.

I think the only useful way to differentiate kinds or styles of war is by looking at the targets of force and the desired proximate outcome of the use of force.

Conventional armies can fight across the spectrum of war, to include employing terrorism. Insurgents can employ terrorist tactics, or traditional "Maoist" insurgency tactics, or they can fight conventionally. Both sculptors and demolition teams use hammers and chisels. So defining the type of war by looking at who shows up to fight it, or by the weapons employed, seems to me to be an exercise in futility.

[marct]

Hi Eden,


Conventional armies can fight across the spectrum of war, to include employing terrorism. Insurgents can employ terrorist tactics, or traditional "Maoist" insurgency tactics, or they can fight conventionally. Both sculptors and demolition teams use hammers and chisels. So defining the type of war by looking at who shows up to fight it, or by the weapons employed, seems to me to be an exercise in futility.

It strikes me that you are confusing the event - "war" - with the players ;). I was trying to define types of "war" (events) rather than types of players. Iraq is a good example of a situation where types have segued into each other, so being able to name and recognize the different types allows for the employment of a segued doctrine and actions based on what is actually happening.

Marc

[Rank amateur]

Stability ops are when no one is shooting at you but violence may increase if you leave.

I'm not sure that I can say that in lingo, but I'll try. "Insurgent activity has been neutralized but the threat of future insurgent activity must be deterred with the threat of kinetic operations so that the political process can produce a political agreement that leads to long term stability. Cooperation with other operational and institutional JIIM community members is necessary to further support economic/societal rebuilding and the political process."

[Ron Humphrey]

Conventional wars general equate to when there is a set or known outcome with fair certainty as to what should be accomplished. Straight shootin so to speak.

Anything else immediately starts filtering into other forms from irregular all the way to unrestricted warfare.

It really seems to be about what you seek to accomplish and then varies in how it gets done. Aside from that I really tend to agree with WILF.

A fight's a fight. What the opponents are willing to do to win it is defined almost in a progressively downward trend.

1- Conventional - stand and fight

2- Irregular- What? he ducked, then swing lower this time rather than straight at him.

2- IW2- What? He moved out of the way then swing where he's going to move to next time

3- UW- What? he didn't show up on time for the fight- Then kill the %$##% in his sleep.

SO- fix up the house, pay the family for their food, and call for a ticket home
(Human Decency Standards) even in kinetic operations this still should be being considered)

[Ken White]

Stability ops are when no one is shooting at you but violence may increase if you leave.is designed to assist a State (generally) in achieving stability. Such ops include all forms of support and that may or may not include combat operations of various types conducted concurrently. A decent example is Viet Nam post 1968 when the stability operation was paramount but there were still requirments for combat (albeit at an ever declining level). Whether violence would increase or not due to your departure is irrelevant to the description (though not to the outcome).
I'm not sure that I can say that in lingo, but I'll try. "Insurgent activity has been neutralized but the threat of future insurgent activity must be deterred with the threat of kinetic operations so that the political process can produce a political agreement that leads to long term stability. Cooperation with other operational and institutional JIIM community members is necessary to further support economic/societal rebuilding and the political process."Weird... but maybe so. if so, that's just one example. it may be pertinent to current situations but it will not always apply.

[Rank amateur]

A decent example is Viet Nam post 1968 when the stability operation was paramount but there were still requirements for combat

You were there, so I'll defer to your experience, but I'd call that a war: a big messy complicate one with all types of combat.

I say if you're using kinetic weapons "breaking stuff," then it can't be a "stability operation" because by definition when you break stuff it becomes more unstable: albeit the instability is often temporary.

So I still think that the time between when you stop breaking stuff and stability is a good definition and your objective is to get to stability as fast as possible. Intuitively, that definition explains why during stability ops you often need to spend time rebuilding what you broke.

Building some stuff, while breaking other stuff happens all the time, but I'd call the building "getting a head start on stability operations" not stability operations per say. (If the shooting in the AO around the school you built never stops is that because your COIN efforts failed or your stability ops failed? To me, it sounds more like the former.)

[Eden]

Hi Eden,



It strikes me that you are confusing the event - "war" - with the players ;). I was trying to define types of "war" (events) rather than types of players.

Marc

Actually, I think we were saying the same thing. A 'conventional' army - such as the US Army - can fight a conventional war, or it can take the part of an insurgent, or it can employ terror. The Viet Cong could fight a conventional war; the NVA could act as an insurgent. Thus, while certain armies are better suited to certain types of war, you cannot define a 'type' of war by, as you say, who the players are.

Instead, you must examine the targets selected by the opposing force. As you slide down the spectrum from conventional war to whatever we call the other end, the opposing force expends progressively less energy on attacking the enemy's military shield and progressively more on trying to influence/kill/terrorize/rob the society itself. Thus, tactics do not define the 'type' of war - rather the 'type' of war dictates what tactics are likely to be effective.

The implications of this is that the weaker force is able to dictate what 'type' of war will be fought - with the very important caveat that at lower intensities it becomes progressively more difficult to defend one's culture, infrastructure, material wealth, national territory, or way of life.

[Ron Humphrey]

You were there, so I'll defer to your experience, but I'd call that a war: a big messy complicate one with all types of combat.

I say if you're using kinetic weapons "breaking stuff," then it can't be a "stability operation" because by definition when you break stuff it becomes more unstable: albeit the instability is often temporary.

So I still think that the time between when you stop breaking stuff and stability is a good definition and your objective is to get to stability as fast as possible. Intuitively, that definition explains why during stability ops you often need to spend time rebuilding what you broke.

Building some stuff, while breaking other stuff happens all the time, but I'd call the building "getting a head start on stability operations" not stability operations per say. (If the shooting in the AO around the school you built never stops is that because your COIN efforts failed or your stability ops failed? To me, it sounds more like the former.)

But what if the what you are breaking is the what that is currently de-stabilizing the situation

[Ken White]

You were there, so I'll defer to your experience, but I'd call that a war: a big messy complicate one with all types of combat.fact that there was an ongoing stability operation (pursued over the years with greater or lesser effort and ability -- as was the combat portion) at the same time. That is absolute fact.
I say if you're using kinetic weapons "breaking stuff," then it can't be a "stability operation" because by definition when you break stuff it becomes more unstable: albeit the instability is often temporary.You can say that and we can disagree on it. My guess is that most people involved in either type of operation would like to have it your way but realize that's not always possible. If it was, why would there be a need for any stability operation?
So I still think that the time between when you stop breaking stuff and stability is a good definition and your objective is to get to stability as fast as possible. Intuitively, that definition explains why during stability ops you often need to spend time rebuilding what you broke.How then do you account for the times when you're in full, non combat stability enhancing mode and some churlish demagogue stirs up a minor or major bit of combat? Do you stop the stabilization effort? That doesn't seem very smart...

No reason in the world that both states cannot exist concurrently; they did in Viet Nam, they did in Malaya, they did in Greece and in the Phillipines from 1900-1913.
Building some stuff, while breaking other stuff happens all the time, but I'd call the building "getting a head start on stability operations" not stability operations per say...Again, we can disagree. While that would be an ideal state, life isn't that neat.
(If the shooting in the AO around the school you built never stops is that because your COIN efforts failed or your stability ops failed? To me, it sounds more like the former.)Could be both. Accepting that it is more likely the former what you suggest is abandoning an attempt to improve the stability until combat ceases. Ain't gonna happen and should not.

[Rank amateur]

But what if the what you are breaking is the what that is currently de-stabilizing the situation

Then you are fighting with the objective of getting to your stability phase. (Which makes sense, because you can not create stability until the destabilizers are gone.)

Ken, you make many good points, but I'd say that just because somebody tried to both at the same time - and it didn't work - doesn't prove that they can successfully happen at the same.

The actual process is relatively straight forward. Control the population. That takes away the bad guys "cover." You kill some of the bad guys. Some put their guns away and pretend to be civilians. You make sure the bad guys can't pick up the guns they've hidden, while easing up on the population. (You don't need to control them anymore.) Sooner or later everyone figures out some way they can live together.

I've seen no evidence that trying to stabilize a population, before you control it - before it has been cleansed of insurgents - can be successful. (But I am sure that if such evidence exists, someone will bring it to my attention and it won't be the first time that I've been wrong.)



what you suggest is abandoning an attempt to improve the stability until combat ceases. Ain't gonna happen and should not.

I suggest that you're confusing population control with stability. I suggest that the reason for similar confusion here is because you guys are too darn nice. You want to liberate and stabilize. You don't want to control. But that's the way it works. The iron fist comes first, then you can wrap a velvet glove around it. (If you wrap the velvet glove around it too soon, the iron fist becomes less effective.)

[Rank amateur]

If it was, why would there be a need for any stability operation?

To make sure that the violence doesn't come back. (While my definition may be wrong, it is logical consistent.) First you stop the violence. Then you use different TTPs to make sure it doesn't come back.



minor or major bit of combat? Do you stop the stabilization effort? That doesn't seem very smart...

Yes, but only in the area where the violence breaks out. (The population has proven that they can't be trusted with their new freedom, so you reestablish control.)

It's just like retreat/advance. Some troops can be advancing, others retreating. That doesn't mean a single soldier/unit/platoon can do both at the same time.

[Ken White]

Then you are fighting with the objective of getting to your stability phase. (Which makes sense, because you can not create stability until the destabilizers are gone.) Not so. Depends on the geographical size of the nation involved, demographics and a host of other factors. Again, look at the Philippines and Malaya. Look at Iraq -- parts of it are now stable, others are not.
Ken, you make many good points, but I'd say that just because somebody tried to both at the same time - and it didn't work - doesn't prove that they can successfully happen at the same.Where did it not work? The three I cited are places where a degree of combat and stability operations occurred concurrently and all were nominally successful -- and before you say Viet Nam was not, I'd urge you to consider it in some detail and not resort to the distorted US media version of what happened.
The actual process is relatively straight forward. Control the population. That takes away the bad guys "cover." You kill some of the bad guys. Some put their guns away and pretend to be civilians. You make sure the bad guys can't pick up the guns they've hidden, while easing up on the population. (You don't need to control them anymore.) Sooner or later everyone figures out some way they can live together.In an ideal situation, that would happen -- what do you do if, as in both the Philippines and Malaya, the bad guys are sort of 'on again - off again?' Do you start 'stabilizing' when they slack off --and then stop when a few of them stir up hate and discontent in one small area of the country? How long does that 'figuring out' take? Do you do nothing until there's tranquility to get a functioning government and services during that time?
I've seen no evidence that trying to stabilize a population, before you control it - before it has been cleansed of insurgents - can be successful. (But I am sure that if such evidence exists, someone will bring it to my attention and it won't be the first time that I've been wrong.) I gave you three -- four counting Greece -- and there are others.
I suggest that you're confusing population control with stability. I suggest that the reason for similar confusion here is because you guys are too darn nice. You want to liberate and stabilize. You don't want to control. But that's the way it works. The iron fist comes first, then you can wrap a velvet glove around it. (If you wrap the velvet glove around it too soon, the iron fist becomes less effective.)I suggest that you just proved you don't know what you're talking about. ;)

You've just gotten it totally backwards -- you're the one advocating population control. As you said above and I again quote:
"The actual process is relatively straight forward. Control the population. That takes away the bad guys "cover." You kill some of the bad guys. Some put their guns away and pretend to be civilians. You make sure the bad guys can't pick up the guns they've hidden, while easing up on the population. (You don't need to control them anymore.)"You said that, I didn't. :wry:

Stability negates the need for control.

I'm saying you cannot do what you suggest. First, you can't control all of anyone's population, absolutely impossible to do. Second, in a large nation, no other nation is likely to have the available manpower to even attempt control the population (how many people would it take to control 25M Iraqis in an area the size of California?). Thirdly, if you go into full combat only mode -- as we did in Iraq early on -- all you'll do is antagonize the relatives of those you kill -- and you will kill people that do not need to be killed with that approach. Lastly, to provide stability and ongoing effort is generally required and you cannot start it when it's peaceful and stop it at a hint of violence; it has to be an ongoing effort.

I have no problem using force, not a bit -- but promiscuous use of excessive force does more harm than good. I think you might want to do a little more research, perhaps...

You are correct on one thing in that last paragraph. "...You want to liberate and stabilize. You don't want to control." Not due to being too nice, that's a really, really bad misapprehension. The Armed forces don't want to 'control' (though that's a bad word if you'll give it some thought) or do stability ops because they're tedious, thankless and an absolute pain to do. Not to mention they take a long time (waiting for everyone else to "...figure (sic) out some way they can live together.")

Then this:
To make sure that the violence doesn't come back. (While my definition may be wrong, it is logical consistent.) First you stop the violence. Then you use different TTPs to make sure it doesn't come back.Logical? If you say so...

I'd be really interested to know what you propose to do to make sure the violence doesn't come back. Seriously.

Your plan is excellent -- what, precisely do you call what you're doing with those different TTPs? ;)
Yes, but only in the area where the violence breaks out. (The population has proven that they can't be trusted with their new freedom, so you reestablish control.)There you go again with that control you say I'm advocating. Heh.
It's just like retreat/advance. Some troops can be advancing, others retreating. That doesn't mean a single soldier/unit/platoon can do both at the same time.I'm sorry but I truly do not understand what you're trying to say here. Could you amplify that a bit?

[Rob Thornton]

What about “stabilization” as a political objective to which military means independent of, or along with other elements of national power are applied? The resulting “stability operation” might have components of offense & defense, lethal and non-lethal in support of “stability” as an objective. The environmental conditions (METT-TC) within which the operation takes place drives the use of force.

It gets beck to my hangup on the word “operation” which means it is not just a set of tasks within a mission statement, but is term used to define the nature of an operation that may include the full spectrum of operations.

I’d also bring up that we use the word “stability” allot with regards to bilateral, and regional objectives. We say we want “regional stability in the ME” and that drives strategy and operations. The idea of “stability” I think fits how we see ourselves in the world from a strategic perspective (others may not) in that it creates conditions for potential political redress at a number of levels - and take some of the tension out of the bow string.

Marc, I enjoyed the post on “regular” and “traditional” – what are your thoughts on the word “stability” as to how it fits in western sense of culture?

Best, Rob

[Rank amateur]

You've just gotten it totally backwards -- you're the one advocating population control. As you said above and I again quote:You said that, I didn't. :wry:

Stability negates the need for control.


I don't. Kilcullen does.
(http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/06/understanding-current-operatio/)

The key activity is to stand up viable local security forces in partnership with Iraqi Army and Police, as well as political and economic programs, to permanently secure them.

them = the population in an area.

Stability is not the key activity. Again, according to Kilcullen. Of course, I'm just a amateur theorist, talking about COIN theory. That's all I can do. But if you want to convince me personally that the theory doesn't work in reality, you'll need to come up with a better example than the successes of Vietnam. (I could be wrong, but I'm not accepting anything there as successful.) Besides I seem to remember you saying that Vietnam was fought as a land battle not a counter insurgency.


In an ideal situation, that would happen -- what do you do if, as in both the Philippines and Malaya, the bad guys are sort of 'on again - off again?' Do you start 'stabilizing' when they slack off --and then stop when a few of them stir up hate and discontent in one small area of the country?

Works for me. (You only stop in that one small area. Just like a platoon can temporarily retreat while the brigade is advancing.) It doesn't mean that my definition is wrong - or that Kilcullen is wrong - it just means that COIN is a lot harder in practice than theory.



The Armed forces don't want to 'control' (though that's a bad word if you'll give it some thought)

I agree but that's what the experts say is necessary. (According to Google the word Kilcullen and population control is on the net 281 times) (http://www.google.ca/search?hl=en&client=firefox-a&rls=org.mozilla%3Aen-US%3Aofficial&hs=rg1&q=Kilcullen+%22population+control%22&btnG=Search&meta=)


I'm saying you cannot do what you suggest.

That why I am highly skeptical of our ability to win in Iraq, even if we adopt a new field manual and a new strategy.


I'm sorry but I truly do not understand what you're trying to say here. Could you amplify that a bit?

Just because some people are sleeping and some are awake, doesn't mean they're the same thing. Just because some are doing stability and some are fighting doesn't mean they're the same thing. (Which goes back to the original argument - way back when - that my definition must be wrong becaise I define them as two separate things, but they can't be people are doing them at the same time.) So, my definition could be wrong, but if it is it's not because they are both happening at the same time.

Thirdly, if you go into full combat only mode -- as we did in Iraq early on -- all you'll do is antagonize the relatives of those you kill

Right, but according to the theory, if you control the population the relatives can't pick up arms, or at least the ones that do end up dead.

Stability negates the need for control.

I believe this is what we tried in Iraq for the first few years. Rebuild the economy, turn the lights on, everything will stabilize, people will stop shooting at us because they're happy. Didn't work.

Maybe Dr. Metz can jump in, but I believe this is more or less the belief that he felt needed to be changed when he started writing about COIN in 2004. (Don't worry steve. I'll still buy your book if you tell me am completely out to lunch:D.)


I'd be really interested to know what you propose to do to make sure the violence doesn't come back. Seriously.

When I was in grade 7, I bloodied a kid's nose. No one bothered me again. Once people know they can't hide in the population they are easily deterews by "the visible presence of kinetic weapons and a demonstration of the will to use them if necessary."

[Ron Humphrey]

If we step back from the context of operations in another place and simply use somewhere close to heart like home.

1- Do you suppose that government entities provide safety, security, empowerment, assistance, enhanced stability, and Kinetic operations against elements who choose to threaten that stability, safety, etc at the same time.

As this is a somewhat rhetorical question I have but one more

Why would it be any less important , let alone possible for the military to do the same in counter insurgency ?

[Ken White]

I don't. Kilcullen does.Then either he's wrong or it's taken out of context. As I said, it is not possible to control the population in any mid size nation. Over 1.5M allied troops in Viet Nam, a population of 15M in an area the fourth of the size of Iraq and the population was never controlled.

In both nations -- most nations -- all most people want it to be left alone to get on with their lives. Only a small percent will engage in an insurgency; they need controlling or killing -- every one else needs to be left alone within reason.
Stability is not the key activity...Over course it's not. it's not even an activity -- it's a goal. operations of VARIOUS types are conducted to attain that goal.
...Again, according to Kilcullen. Of course, I'm just a amateur theorist, talking about COIN theory. That's all I can do. But if you want to convince me personally that the theory doesn't work in reality, you'll need to come up with a better example than the successes of Vietnam. (I could be wrong, but I'm not accepting anything there as successful.) Besides I seem to remember you saying that Vietnam was fought as a land battle not a counter insurgency.I don't really care if you're convinced or not, I'm merely pointing out that your theory is mssing a couple of points.

As to Viet Nam, you'd be wrong. you've been reading to much left wing scholarship and revisionist history (in fairness, there's a lot of bogus right wing stuff out there as well). For a pretty balanced account of what happened after the media lost interest in Viet Nam, check this out LINK (http://www.amazon.com/Better-War-Unexamined-Victories-Americas/dp/0156013096/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1204682042&sr=1-1). It tells of the success of the effort after we stopped fighting a land war in Europe. The land war phase was 1962-68, seven long years of doing the wrong thing by the command and many -- not all --units. The book at the link portrays the last three years when the right things were done, when it was a COIN operation fighting an insurgency and working to attain stability at the same time. That stability was achieved and it lasted for two more years before the North launched a major conventional attack on the South.
Works for me. (You only stop in that one small area. Just like a platoon can temporarily retreat while the brigade is advancing.) It doesn't mean that my definition is wrong - or that Kilcullen is wrong - it just means that COIN is a lot harder in practice than theory.It is far harder in practice than in theory -- as are most things. I said you were wrong in my previous comment but I was not clear that referred only to your comment on my being confused. The rest of your stuff wasn't right or wrong, it was your opinion. You and Kilcullen are entitled to your opinions and they are no more right or wrong than are my opinions. Though mine are backed with more than theorizing... :D
I agree but that's what the experts say is necessary. (According to Google the word Kilcullen and population control is on the net 281 times)Typical metric, proves nothing. The key is in what sense or context does he use that phrase. I don't know and don't really care. I know what I've done and I have a broad idea of what he's done. He's a smart guy. so am I. We can differ. I'm not an expert and I'm broadly distrustful of those that are purported to be... :wry:

That why I am highly skeptical of our ability to win in Iraq, even if we adopt a new field manual and a new strategy.We were never going to 'win' in Iraq. Never were and never will. All we could -- and can -- hope for is an acceptable conclusion. That's all anyone can hope for in any insurgency (and Saddam told us before we went that's what we would face). Nobody wins or loses, they just get a decent ending. That's all the Brits got in Malaya, an acceptable conclusion. That's all we got in the Philippines.
Just because some people are sleeping and some are awake, doesn't mean they're the same thing. Just because some are doing stability and some are fighting doesn't mean they're the same thing. (Which goes back to the original argument - way back when - that my definition must be wrong becaise I define them as two separate things, but they can't be people are doing them at the same time.) So, my definition could be wrong, but if it is it's not because they are both happening at the same time.Well, you got there, part way, anyhow. To get all the way there, just realize they are both happening at the same times, with different people doing different things. Something like the Venn diagram below.
Right, but according to the theory, if you control the population the relatives can't pick up arms, or at least the ones that do end up dead.How did that theory work out in Iraq -- or Afghanistan? Both places where it's being applied. As I said, it is impossible to control an entire population. also recall that in both cultures, we very wisely allowed folks to keep weapons for self defense.
I believe this is what we tried in Iraq for the first few years. Rebuild the economy, turn the lights on, everything will stabilize, people will stop shooting at us because they're happy. Didn't work.Yes and no. You have a point but that's where another theory met reality. Don't you hate it when that happens? ;)
Maybe Dr. Metz can jump in, but I believe this is more or less the belief that he felt needed to be changed when he started writing about COIN in 2004. (Don't worry steve. I'll still buy your book if you tell me am completely out to lunch:D.) ...When I was in grade 7, I bloodied a kid's nose. No one bothered me again. Once people know they can't hide in the population they are easily deterews by "the visible presence of kinetic weapons and a demonstration of the will to use them if necessary."Hate to tell you this nut there's a difference between the 7th grade and people with guns; particularly when they're 18 or 19 and immortal.

How do you keep the bad guys from hiding in the population? Really. That's the question.

[Rank amateur]

Ron, apparently we rounded up a bunch of Arabs after 911 without warrants, so I guess you can say that domestically we have perceived the need to control certain elements of the population and have done so.

[Rank amateur]

I don't know and don't really care.

I guessed as much. (That's why I didn't dig up the precise quote.);)


portrays the last three years when the right things were done, when it was a COIN operation fighting an insurgency and working to attain stability at the same time. That stability was achieved and it lasted for two more years before the North launched a major conventional attack on the South.

I have a theory as to why that is strategically irrelevant. If I'm ever able to articulate it, I'd be honored if you would attack it.

Hate to tell you this nut there's a difference between the 7th grade and people with guns; particularly when they're 18 or 19 and immortal.

People are people. You can make people put their guns down. It happens all the time. The crazy ones might not, but we have more bullets than they have crazy people. The trick is to make sure that the angry people don't follow the crazy ones. Making them put down their guns is the first step. Then you give them a decade or three to work out their anger because like you said before, as long as there is shooting, the number of angry people is going to grow.


We were never going to 'win' in Iraq. Never were and never will. All we could -- and can -- hope for is an acceptable conclusion. That's all anyone can hope for in any insurgency (and Saddam told us before we went that's what we would face). Nobody wins or loses, they just get a decent ending. That's all the Brits got in Malaya, an acceptable conclusion. That's all we got in the Philippines.

In a nutshell, I think that if you map out what we consider acceptable and what all the various parties in Iraq consider acceptable there is no place where all the parties overlap: no solution that is acceptable to everyone.

Again, I hope to articulate this more coherently in the future.




How do you keep the bad guys from hiding in the population? Really. That's the question.

As I understand the theory, you force the population to choose sides. What happens if they choose the bad guys is left unsaid, but fairly obvious.

Also, unless I completely missed the boat, I believe that is one of the questions that Rob and his new team are supposed to answer, so maybe I should defer to him.

[selil]

Ron, apparently we rounded up a bunch of Arabs after 911 without warrants, so I guess you can say that domestically we have perceived the need to control certain elements of the population and have done so.

There is so much wrong with this statement from false conclusions to gross inaccuracy it is surreal.

[Ken White]

I guessed as much. (That's why I didn't dig up the precise quote.);)Prescient ;) .

However, in getting to that, you forgot this exchange:
Stability is not the key activity..."Of (sic) course it's not. It's not even an activity -- it's a goal. operations of VARIOUS types are conducted to attain that goal."

That's really the issue, is it not?
I have a theory as to why that is strategically irrelevant. If I'm ever able to articulate it, I'd be honored if you would attack it.The whole Viet Nam war was strategically irrelevant so I'm likely to agree with you rather than attack your theory.
People are people. You can make people put their guns down...No you can't -- you can make them hide them and use them rarely but enough will cheat that you'll always have a problem.
... It happens all the time.It does? Name me a place where it's been truly successful.
The crazy ones might not, but we have more bullets than they have crazy people. The trick is to make sure that the angry people don't follow the crazy ones.Shoot too many crazy ones who are cousins of angry ones in the ME and wathc what happens.
Making them put down their guns is the first step. Then you give them a decade or three to work out their anger because like you said before, as long as there is shooting, the number of angry people is going to grow.What if you do not have three decades or even one? :wry:
In a nutshell, I think that if you map out what we consider acceptable and what all the various parties in Iraq consider acceptable there is no place where all the parties overlap: no solution that is acceptable to everyone.Well, of course not. That's always true of any situation from Iraq to social security to where my wife and I went for dinner to who the nominees for Prez will be. The key point is that the solution is acceptable to most and is flexible enough to minimally irk those who object. Will we get there? Don't know, I think probably so but it isn't over yet.
Again, I hope to articulate this more coherently in the future.Looking forward to it.
As I understand the theory, you force the population to choose sides. What happens if they choose the bad guys is left unsaid, but fairly obvious.That's the trouble with theories. It never seems to occur to the theorists that people have choices and may not adhere to either side. I'd submit they generally will not. It is absolutely stupid to force people to 'be with us or against us.' That's true internationally and locally. If it was wrong for W. to say that to the world, why would it be right to say it a nation full of people? Dumbb -- with two 'b's.

It's wrong in an insurgency -- as I said, most of the population will just want both sides to go away and leave them alone. The goal should be to make the other side go away so you can go away and leave the folks happily alone. Any other course is doomed to failure at worst and to have massive problems at best.

As an aside, re: your other comment:
"Ron, apparently we rounded up a bunch of Arabs after 911 without warrants, so I guess you can say that domestically we have perceived the need to control certain elements of the population and have done so."You do realize we and most of the world have locked people up under those circumstances for centuries -- and will almost certainly continue to do so. I think it's a human, protect the organism thing...

I'd also suggest that, per your weapon and population control idea -- we probably got a few that needed getting, almost certainly got a bunch that did not need to be gotten -- and missed a bunch we should have gotten. :D

Theories and Gurus sorta stumble when reality crunches.

[Surferbeetle]

Rob,

Interesting topic. You have been on a roll that last few days.

Here is my stab:

Warfare is attempting to impose one's will upon another who opposes it.

The term Irregular Warfare, betrays a western bias in that attempts to define a 'regular' and 'irregular' way to wage warfare. The Geneva Conventions link (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geneva_Conventions) and the Law of Land Warfare link (http://faculty.ed.umuc.edu/~nstanton/FM27-10.htm) were part of my, and many others, western training in how to wage 'regular' war.

My observation of diplomatic operations, information/media operations, military operations, economics/business ops, and just plain old biology (viruses, fungi, bacteria, plants, reptiles, animals, and people) shows me that living things rarely limit themselves to 'regular' warfare as defined by the Geneva Conventions and the Law of Land Warfare.

The term Stability Operations implies operations undertaken in a fluid environment to provide stability. The assumption based upon my training and experience (WM you express it well when you describe definitions for this discussion as relative) is that they are population focused. Rank Amateur, Ken White, and Ron Humphrey all touch on points that I would like to expound upon with regards to Stability Ops.

1) Rank Amateur takes the high/optimistic road, and if I may paraphrase, suggests Stability Ops during wartime need to take into account that given enough time people will work through their anger. This is a flawed analysis. In both literature and historical works 'man's inhumanity to man' has been well documented. On a personal level Rank Amateur, war changes people permanently, some parts for the better and some for the worse. The literature and history are true, however even though the language/reference points of these mediums attempt to accurately describe the process they are unable to fully convey living through it.

2) Ken, if I may paraphrase again, suggests that the USMC three-block war is relevant for Stability Ops. Since he is a fan of metrics:D, lets briefly touch on calculus, with which newton showed us how to quantitatively measure things/life as they change. This is a long way of saying that although we try and freeze time to understand and describe things, many things are in fact occurring simultaneously. The three-block war is an applicable way to describe the simultaneously occurring things that happen in war.

3) Ron Humphrey touches upon the ability/or lack of ability of the state to provide Stability Ops. I would suggest that this is a daily concern of any state in peacetime, low intensity conflict, or war (ie the full spectrum of the human condition). I would also suggest that this discussion is of particular relevance for the states of Iraq and Afghanistan as realtime case studies of states involved in Irregular Warfare.

In short, the three block war concept describes Stability Operations and Irregular Warfare, both of which are normal parts of the human condition.

Regards,

Steve

[wm]

I doubt that there is a linear progression between combat operations and stablization ops, which is what Rank Amateur(RA) seems to be advocating, and what Ken White (KW) seems to be denying. However, I also think KW's assertion that both are occurring simultaneously is not completely accurate. Rob's point about stability seems very much on the mark. It is probably more correct to say that combat ops and stablilzation ops are two sides of the same coin (no pun intended here), which have a goal of maintaining or restoring stability (also known as peace in some circles).

For some reason, I seem to be infected with medical metaphors at present. I am not a doctor nor have I played one on TV. But I have stayed in Holiday Inns. :)
Doctors both stabilize patients and treat patients, often, but not always, simultaneously, and often, but not always, using different procedures. One goal of patient stablization is to try to ensure that they don't die on the table while the docs are trying to treat the cause of the problem--for example, they keep pumping blood into the patient (stablization) while they are figuring out which artery has been cut and then suture it back together (kinetic intervention or treatment). Sometimes however, I suspect that stablizaing the patient is also treatment--as when aspirin is administered to a person with a fever. Maybe I'm applying the wrong analogy, but it sure seems to me that peace is the political analogue to biological health.

By the way, for those who hold to the linear process model, stablilization need not be the last step in the process. I suspect it also applies in Phase 0 of any operation as a means of trying to avoid have to make a major commitment to kinetic operations (AKA putting a lot of boots on the ground/aircraft in the sky and having them release a lot of metal from their various bullet throwers, bomb bays, and wing pylons at what are probably poorly discriminable targets). Also, I suspect that you can do stablization at home as well as in foreign countries--Guard missions that include post hurricane relief ops to New Orleans, guarding civil rights marchers on their way to Selma, and patrolling the streets of Watts after "race riots" come to mind as examples.

[slapout9]

This thread is close to one we had awhile back about declared and undeclared warfare. Relative to Systems Thinking you should start with the highest organiztion and work down. In this case it is the US government and the Constitution. In our system their are 2 types of Wars declared and undeclared. Declared War by it's very nature is defined..it has a limit...usually based upon conventions,treaties,laws,etc. Undeclared war by it's very nature is not well defined. Based upon this, Irregular Warfare belongs underneath undeclared War and Stablilty ops would be underneath that in the sense that stableizing something does not automatically mean killing or destroying but by the very nature of it being a subset of Irreagular warfare it could include that as part of the operation.

[marct]

Hi Rob,


I’d also bring up that we use the word “stability” allot with regards to bilateral, and regional objectives. We say we want “regional stability in the ME” and that drives strategy and operations. The idea of “stability” I think fits how we see ourselves in the world from a strategic perspective (others may not) in that it creates conditions for potential political redress at a number of levels - and take some of the tension out of the bow string.

Marc, I enjoyed the post on “regular” and “traditional” – what are your thoughts on the word “stability” as to how it fits in western sense of culture?

Well, quote he looking up from his Oxford Etymological Dictionary, the word derives from Latin stabilis - "standing firmly" - and remains pretty much with the same meaning through Old French and Middle English. What is interesting is that it has shifted somewhat over the past 100 or so years from standing firm to something closer to "unchanging". I suspect that part of the shift came about as a reaction to both the sweeping effects of nationalism and the encroaching discussions on evolutionary theory, but that's just a guess.

If we look at some of the sideband connotations, there are some really weird ones. First, it is associated with a firmly fixed social pattern - a "stable system" as it were - rather than either a homeostatic or adaptive one. While here are associations with fixed social systems, there's nothing about the content of those systems except for a long temporal depth to them; I'd toss it out as about 500+ years for an oral culture and longer for a literate culture.

Remember in that 10 questions (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4827) paper when I was talking about the difference between a required institution and a desired one (aka function vs. form)? There has to be some way for a group to achieve certain basic needs but how they do it may be radically different. So, I would argue that a "stability operation" may be viewed as a way of tinkering with social and cultural institutions.

The second weird sideband connotation is when the term gets applied to a linear process. First off, there will probably be a lot of disagreement as to what the end state should be. Most democracies have handled that by having a fairly stable (constant) method of deciding desired end states while keeping the discussion of what is and is not an acceptable end state somewhat fluid or dynamic. Then again, most tribal societies have also developed "stable" institutions at that level; they're called feuds and they all include ways to end feuds.

Shifting out of theory and into reality, there are some other questions about "stability" and "stability operations" that are, I think, important to ask. What is the required end state of the people conducting those operations? Will "imposing" that end state lead to greater or lesser social stability? Given that we operate in a globally interconnected system, what are the states "at home" that contribute to the "instability" abroad that the operation is supposed to "fix"?

[Rob Thornton]

Marc - Thanks! That provides perspective to ask another question - albeit a broader one.


Shifting out of theory and into reality, there are some other questions about "stability" and "stability operations" that are, I think, important to ask. What is the required end state of the people conducting those operations? Will "imposing" that end state lead to greater or lesser social stability? Given that we operate in a globally interconnected system, what are the states "at home" that contribute to the "instability" abroad that the operation is supposed to "fix"? (bold added by me)

Aside from the excellent piece of advice "first do no harm" (which could be viewed from a first, second or third person perspective with regard to the consequences of interaction, what are the thoughts about countering agents of "instability" which are not normal, or routine parts of an organic system or culture? Consider for example, the introduction of kudzu, scotch broom or Japanese beetles to consider it as part of a biological, eco-system type intrusion? (don't we have a new SWC member scientist type named Margaret from Georgia? Don't be bashful, here is something you can help with:D)

What happens once that "intruder" plugs into the system - how does its presence change it? We might also could consider "resettlement" and "human migration" to fall into this, as well as transnational crime, and pandemics. What about when multiple agents of "instability" converge, or gain synergy from each other, or create new conditions from which change the environment to be attractive and accommodating to other agents of instability, what about their effect as accelerants?

Dave Kilcullen raised an interesting point about war and counter-war which relates.

I think there is also a relation between how these agents of instability change the nature of "regular" and "irregular"

Slap's points about systems, is also relative (and nobody probably needed me to point that out), but I'd like to take a slightly different tack on that as well and think about how agents of instability move between systems - be they closed or open - maybe consider the actual means they use to do so, and the ways they take advantage of the means (again - all disciplines welcome to chime in - biological, economic competition, computer viruses, people, crime, politics, etc.)

Best, Rob

[slapout9]

Hi Rob, that is why I think the paper that Tom Odom talks about on "Compund Warfare" is so important. IMHO it is one of the most important papers ever written because it shows you how to win by combining regular and irregular organizations based upon the situation. Whole lot of systems theory in that paper as to how an organization should adapt in order to survive.

[marct]

Hey Rob,

Sorry about the rather rambling reply - I hadn't had enough coffee yet :wry:. Last night I hosted the monthly get together of the Carleton U. Counter-Terrorism Discussion Group. Outside of the great wide-ranging discussions, we have this tradition of trying out new red wine....


What happens once that "intruder" plugs into the system - how does its presence change it? We might also could consider "resettlement" and "human migration" to fall into this, as well as transnational crime, and pandemics. What about when multiple agents of "instability" converge, or gain synergy from each other, or create new conditions from which change the environment to be attractive and accommodating to other agents of instability, what about their effect as accelerants?

Funny you should mention resettlement and human migration :D. That was one of our discussion topics last night, and it's also an area I've been working in for 7-8 years now. I'm actually writing a white paper right now on immigrant integration that is using a lot of ideas that I worked out when thinking about COIN.

How a system is changed depends on a number of factors, but the modeling of such system changes, at least in terms of biological populations, has been worked out for quite a while (see, for example, Lotka's Elements of Mathematical Biology (http://www.amazon.com/Elements-Mathematical-Biology-Alfred-Lotka/dp/0486603466)). It becomes a question of competition within a specific environmental niche, and it can be theoretically modeled using evolutionary theory (Wm. Calvin's 6 Essentials (http://williamcalvin.com/1990s/1997JMemetics.htm) gives a really nice model).


I think there is also a relation between how these agents of instability change the nature of "regular" and "irregular"

Yupper, 'cause they change the competitive pressures within any particular resource niche. "Regular" is really shorthand for "what we have always done and tends to be homeostatic and based on perceptions, while "irregular" is shorthand for "what we are forced to do even though we don't like it - it ain't natural!" :wry:. In a non-combat example, we can see a lot of this being discussed in Ohio surrounding the economy and, specifically, jobs.

Marc

[Ken White]

I also think KW's assertion that both are occurring simultaneously is not completely accurate.is ever completely accurate. War is too chaotic to codify and define precisely. We can have fun trying but we will not succeed.
Doctors both stabilize patients and treat patients, often, but not always, simultaneously, and often, but not always, using different procedures. One goal of patient stablization is to try to ensure that they don't die on the table while the docs are trying to treat the cause of the problem--for example, they keep pumping blood into the patient (stablization) while they are figuring out which artery has been cut and then suture it back together (kinetic intervention or treatment). Sometimes however, I suspect that stablizaing the patient is also treatment--as when aspirin is administered to a person with a fever. Maybe I'm applying the wrong analogy, but it sure seems to me that peace is the political analogue to biological health.Good analogy. Simultaneous efforts in different directions by the same actors (Doctors) and / or others on the team...:wry:

Sort of like pursuing an irregular or other war while attempting to stabilize the nation through various means. Frequently including Band aids... :D

I'd add that the hippocratic oath model, 'first do no harm,' is at best extremely difficult to accomplish and at worst a wishful dream if war of any type at any level is involved. War is by nature harmful and you absolutely cannot clean it up. The worst mistake we, the US have made in recent years (1950 forward) is to try to fight wars and do minimal harm in the process. Going light inevitably, without fail, always (I'm into triple redundancy...) increases own and other casualties and lengthens combat time. Always.

Rank amatuer said above we were too nice -- I disagreed on the premise that he was talking about the Armed Forces. We aren't nice, we do what our civilian masters say. They are too nice (left handed compliment), seriously. Unfortunately, that attempt to be nice sends a message. To the western mind, it's that we're really basically nice guys who want to be loved -- to everyone else in the world, it's a sign of major weakness. The unnecessary debacles of the handling of Viet Nam, Tehran, Beirut and such sent a message that we did not intend -- that we're not up to the tough stuff. We are now paying for that utter stupidity.

There's always a time to play nice -- unless force is involved; then to play nice or attempt to is to invite a disaster. Fortunately, we're pretty good at cobbling together band aids and fixes to prevent total melt down -- but we lose too many good kids in the process...

I digress...

Irregular Warfare is indeed a western construct and is not an applicable term to either the Asian or Middle Eastern forms of warfare and those forms do differ in considerable detail. Still it is a handy term and there's no reason not to use it to describe, to western minds, a form of conflict.

Irregular Warfare (and / or other types of warfare) and Stability Operations may be simultaneously conducted. Or they may not be. Or there may be a time phased melding. I believe that METT-TC applies in that determination...

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Ken,


I'd add that the Hippocratic oath model, 'first do no harm,' is at best extremely difficult to accomplish and at worst a wishful dream if war of any type at any level is involved. War is by nature harmful and you absolutely cannot clean it up.

I should have qualified it a bit, I was thinking about the decision to commit military force in the first place - provided somebody has left you an option, which may not always be so. I think once you cross that line, be prepared for all that comes with it - doesn't mean you have to go there, but you don't want to be unprepared to if the enemy does. We should not try and change the nature of something to suit our objective - we've suffered from that one before.

With regard to the other elements of power in more benign conditions, the operations to encourage, facilitate, or reinforce stability might be pure DIE with no apparent M, the state in question may just not be at that point where using "M" is reasonable, required, or for some other reason, palatable (lots of room under that one). Or maybe the M piece is limited to the indirect - such as facilitating/encouraging regional alliances or collective security, providing intelligence, etc.

I need to think on it some more, but every policy action I think needs to be weighed not only for its immediate value, or value in providing what looks like a painless solution (at least for the politics of the day), but it also needs to be weighed against our long term objectives and beyond a bilateral perspective. I know, hard to do, not really in our strategic culture, not aligned with our political process of reinventing the wheel every 4-8 years, but it might be a good way to work toward increased stability and developing options, as opposed to having to respond in a strategic knee jerk fashion.


Best, Rob

[Ken White]

I should have given your earlier comment more thought, then I might have realized that your meaning was in whether to commit or not.

You said two things (among many over the days...) that I think bear repetition:

"...I was thinking about the decision to commit military force in the first place - provided somebody has left you an option, which may not always be so. I think once you cross that line, be prepared for all that comes with it - doesn't mean you have to go there, but you don't want to be unprepared to if the enemy does. We should not try and change the nature of something to suit our objective - we've suffered from that one before."Amen. We really need adherance to that sage advice and to this:
...every policy action I think needs to be weighed not only for its immediate value, or value in providing what looks like a painless solution (at least for the politics of the day), but it also needs to be weighed against our long term objectives and beyond a bilateral perspective.Now, if we can just get the politicians to pay attention...:mad:

[marct]

Now, if we can just get the politicians to pay attention...:mad:

And Stan calls ME a hopeless romantic :eek::D! Unfortunately, I doubt that any politician will think beyond their next election and, in the US, the ones who don't have to think about the next election (aka year 6+ presidents) are, for all intents and purposes, isolated from having much real effect.

[Ken White]

1. Stop raining on my parade! (the truth hurts...) ;)

2. Keep your Alberta Clippers up there in the Great White North -- it's 60 degrees Fahrenheit down here and we're cold! (Payback!!!) :D

(Unfortunately, I'm afraid you're correct...)

[Rank amateur]

As an aside, re: your other comment:You do realize we and most of the world have locked people up under those circumstances for centuries -- and will almost certainly continue to do so. I think it's a human, protect the organism thing...

I certainly didn't mean to imply that we were worse than anyone else.

Anyway, here is how msNBC described it. (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15264274/)

"His name is Ali Partovi. And according to the Department of Homeland Security, he is the last to be held of about 1,200 Arab and Muslim men swept up by authorities in the United States after the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks."

I agree with you that war is chaotic and destructive (which is why it shouldn't be entered into lightly, and if you do it, you need to win.) Other than crimes against humanity - which can happen without a war - nothing that happens during a war really bothers me. Not even friendly fire: fog of war etc. Except for one thing, when one of our guys is killed building a school, paving a road or handing out candy. To me, that is avoidable and means someone has screwed up somewhere.

As always, you earned your right to disagree. I, on the other hand, just happened to be born in a country with free speech.


"...I was thinking about the decision to commit military force in the first place - provided somebody has left you an option, which may not always be so. I think once you cross that line, be prepared for all that comes with it - doesn't mean you have to go there, but you don't want to be unprepared to if the enemy does. We should not try and change the nature of something to suit our objective - we've suffered from that one before."

I think you need to hold the people who screwed it up accountable: even if you voted for them. (If you give a politicain a free pass, you know that the next one in line is going to feel entitled to another free pass in the same situation.)


Name me a place where it's been truly successful.

Right here. The Brits left and we only use them for peaceful purposes. Except for the criminals, but there are criminals everywhere: always will be.


What if you do not have three decades or even one?

If you can't do the time, don't do the crime.


I'm likely to agree with you rather than attack your theory.

Just wanted to save that for future reference. ;)


that given enough time people will work through their anger. This is a flawed analysis.

All wars come to an end. We eventually decided that a Communist Vietnam wasn't the end of the world. Although, I will admit to poor word choice. "Anger" wasn't the right term. Sooner or later everyone eventually agrees that negotiation is better than war. (Even when we nuked Japan, we still had to negotiate with them.) I'm not a biblical scholar but I know that even though Pilate could have anyone he wanted crucified, he still needed to negotiate with the locals.)

Warfare is attempting to impose one's will upon another who opposes it.


I don't think I'd agree. If you accept "politics by other means" then the objective is to get a better political settlement. As per above, you never get 100% of what you want. Even if you drop a nuke, your auto workers can end up getting laid off because of Japanese car companies.

[Ken White]

I certainly didn't mean to imply that we were worse than anyone else.Didn't think or mean to impute that you did so imply. My point was that is not an aberration or a new, specific to the 'GWOT' thing; here or any where else in the world.


I agree with you that war is chaotic and destructive (which is why it shouldn't be entered into lightly, and if you do it, you need to win.)... I agree with you. Now which of us is going to get the Politicians to wake up and get real? :wry:
...Except for one thing, when one of our guys is killed building a school, paving a road or handing out candy. To me, that is avoidable and means someone has screwed up somewhere.Not sure how you avoid that. Roads need to be built; having Schools is a good thing -- somebody's gotta do it. If the bad guys appear while either of those things is being done, a fight is likely -- no different from a fight started by an attack on a resupply convoy or an attack on a combat outpost...

Candy handout by American troops has a long and mostly honorable history; the Troops do it on their own -- even when they're ordered not to do it. Thus, I'm not sure why those three things (or somewhat similar things) being done and resulting in a death are any worse than any other reason...


I think you need to hold the people who screwed it up accountable: even if you voted for them. (If you give a politicain a free pass, you know that the next one in line is going to feel entitled to another free pass in the same situation.)I agree with that but I'd strongly suggest they be held accountable for what they screwed up and not for the screwups of others or their subordinates who screwed up. That only seems fair. For example, the invasion of Iraq was done fairly well; the subsequent 'occupation' and the unnecessary insurgency were the fault of, respectively, unelected Generals and to a lesser extent, equally unelected Intell Community types. If you have a way to "hold them accountable" let me know what it is and I'll jump on that bandwagon.

[Rank amateur]

Ken

RE: where the buck stops.

I agree with Truman.

[Ken White]

They're all pathetic and say stuff like that but rarely follow through. He wasn't much better than any of the others.

Still, accept that the premise is valid. That means you vote against Bush. Wait, he's not running. What to do...:D

Seriously; you can obviously believe that and act on it. Fine with me (my general rule is to vote for the least bad candidate and to vote out incumbents, all party immaterial) -- however, you do realize that if I'm correct and the Intel Community and the Generals bear considerable responsibility for their errors, your solution does not fix that problem and it will just recur...

Edited to add:

Some how I missed part of your response above; three items:

Re: "Right here. The Brits left and we only use them for peaceful purposes. Except for the criminals, but there are criminals everywhere: always will be." Obviously you missed the period 1861-65 or had no history classes and are unaware that there are probably more firearms than there are people in this country. We're a lot of things, disarmed is not one of them. So, that won't work. Find me another nation that has effectively totally disarmed the populace -- and Criminals count, the tool is the object, not the user.

Re: "If you can't do the time, don't do the crime" -- nice juvenile and facile answer but sometimes things happen due to gross miscalculations. One can play 'Who's to blame for this?' all day long; doesn't change reality

Re: "Just wanted to save that for future reference ;)" Your preorgative -- one would hope you would use it in context...

[Rank amateur]

Your preorgative -- one would hope you would use it in context...

I've learned you that you do whatever you can to get a tactical advantage: especially when you're outgunned.;)

Re: the president. About 80 percent of the stuff he - or she - does is BS but the other 20% is really important. I don't care what party the president is in, just whether that 20% works or not.

Re: juvenile: Other than Afghanistan, all our COIN missions are optional and retreat isn't the same as defeat. If success requires at least a decade, and we're not prepared to stay a decade than engaging means almost certain failure.

[Ken White]

I've learned you that you do whatever you can to get a tactical advantage: especially when you're outgunned.;)

it's always a prob... :D


Re: juvenile: Other than Afghanistan, all our COIN missions are optional and retreat isn't the same as defeat. If success requires at least a decade, and we're not prepared to stay a decade than engaging means almost certain failure.

Afghanistan is optional, totally, as well. Iraq was not intended to be a COIN job; something changed in May 2003 and we turned from an imminent departure to staying. Thus far, I haven't been able to find out what that was. Could speculate but not here.

That decade bit is Kilcullen and Co. blather -- it's not written in stone, the length can vary depending on many parameters; Kenya only took a nominal seven years, 1952-59 but most of the the actual fighting was confined to 1954-57. Greece also took only three -- conversely, the Philippines took over 15 in total; ten is just an average. Nothing in war is ever certain and the unexpected is always right around the corner...:eek:

No, retreat is not the same as defeat -- yet, it can send a message that is better not sent. For example we retreated in front of ME attacks from 1979 until 2001, over 20 of them with the Tehran Embassy seizure and the several messes in Beirut simply encouraging them to keep at it. We weren't defeated but we were embarrassed and looked weak. To the ME, that is an open invitation to attack. They do not fight like we do and they do not think like we do -- they aren't wrong, just different.

Each successive turning of the other cheek only emboldens them. Carter, Reagan, Bush 41 and Clinton all erred significantly in that regard -- you don't like where we are; they're the folks you really need to be upset with. They are the reason we're in the ME (Afghanistan is NOT in the ME), the current Admin is merely the reason the place in the ME is Iraq. I'd submit that if one has to be there in a combat mode, Iraq is easily the easiest and best place to be...

You have to tailor your tactics and your parameters to your enemy. You do not need to fight the way he fights but you have to know how he fights and you should be very careful not to send the wrong signals. We did that for almost 30 years and are paying the price for doing so. We could leave Iraq and do it fairly quickly. I'll flat guarantee you that if we do it too quickly we'll have to go back and it will be far worse.

[Presley Cannady]

Iraq was not intended to be a COIN job; something changed in May 2003 and we turned from an imminent departure to staying. Thus far, I haven't been able to find out what that was. Could speculate but not here.

Would certain resignation threats be part of that story?

[Ken White]

speculation... :D

[Global Scout]

Marc sort of mentioned it in one of his posts here, but words not only have meaning, they shape the way we perceive and explain the world. Imagine a doctor from the 16th century and a doctor from the 21st century explaining the life cycle of a disease. The doctor from the 16th century would not only be limited by available knowledge, but by his vocabulary. Not only do we have more knowledge, we have developed additional terms that explain certain phenomena that simply were inconceivable previously. More to the point, words shape the way we define problems (whether simple or complex), to include the nature of war and how we should respond to it.

After several false starts, under GEN Abrams the Army seemed to have finally relearned that war is not simply war, but that the nature of war varies greatly, as does the way we should wage it. If the book, “Army at Dawn” is considered credible, than at the start of WWII we had officers who didn’t see the value of armor, and sincerely believed they could defeat Rommel’s armor with horse Calvary. This further illustrates our reluctance to change, thus true leaders are those who have the ability to push past these self imposed cultural constraints that limit how and what we think (we’re more like Mao’s communist puppets than we want to admit).

Whether or not irregular warfare is old term in a new dress is not important, what is important is that our Army as a whole didn’t understand the underlying concepts of IW, so therefore resurfacing the term was critical in facilitating a needed cultural change within the Army to enable it to adapt to the type of war it is fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Terms can help facilitate a more accurate understanding of the problem, which is the first step to effectively solving any problem. Is the term IW needed? Definitely!

I’ll take a stab at further mudding the waters by attempting to explain away the apparent conflict between irregular warfare and stability operations.

In short irregular and conventional warfare are broad strategic approaches to solving a problem with armed force. In conventional warfare the objective is defeating the enemy’s fielding armed forces and/or forcing their leaders (usually state leaders) to capitulate by targeting their national infrastructure. In irregular warfare the objective is controlling (which means influencing) the populace. There is a gray area in the middle where there is some overlap, but if one attempts to control the populace with conventional warfare they will fail unless they identify the entire populace as hostile and target them for genocide or dislocation.

To further complicate the matter, unconventional warfare tactics such as guerrilla warfare and sabotage can be used to support conventional warfare. If the focus is on defeating fielding enemy forces or coercing/killing their leadership versus controlling the population, then it is still conventional warfare. An interesting note is that the first Special Forces qualification course was called the PSYWAR course for psychological warfare (or political warfare). At least at one time we understood the true nature of this type of warfare.

Moving on to stability operations, FM 3-0 states we do offensive, defensive, and stability operations in both conventional warfare and IW. This is overly simplistic, but it does clarify that stability operations are an operation, not a strategic approach in itself. It further states there must be a degree of peace (stable to unstable peace) before we can conduct stability operations, which may mean we need to first conduct offensive operations to clear an area, then defensive operations to provide security for the populace while concurrently conducting stability operations in the areas secured.

Stability operations can be conducted in numerous situations, including counterinsurgency operations, peace enforcement operations, humanitarian assistance operations, etc. The objective is to establish, or re-establish a safe and secure environment and facilitate “essential” services. The military’s role can range from providing logistics to security to actually providing the services as a stop gap measure.
Stability operations, if successful, create a window of opportunity for effective political intervention. They are not an end in themselves.

Since most of us are focused on COIN currently (a mission within the scope of IW), stability operations are a supporting operation to help establish conditions to effect government control of an area. As stated earlier there are two types of control, coercive and legitimate. If the situation warrants the government conducts defensive operations (coercive control of the populace), then they strive to achieve legitimate control as quickly as possible with stability operations and other political activities.

[William F. Owen]

For myself, I'm suffering from the component of the terms themselves - IW contains the term "warfare", which to me means a "way" or manner of waging war. E.G. – “irregular” could mean something out of character to the norm - which could mean everything from the type of means used to wage the war that then drive irregular tactics, operations and strategy, or just an "irregular" use of the "regular" means to wage war.

Stability Operations sort of hits me the same way - the key word being "operations" which to me indicate a type of undertaking to achieve an objective - in this case "stability" of something - a state, an area, a group, a problem, etc.


Sorry to CPR this thread this far back, but this really bugs me. Forgive me for repeating what others may have said, and I may have missed.

a.) Irregular warfare is so named because one party to the conflict is "irregular" in nature. The Colonial Revolt against the Crown was partly "Irregular", and fought by Irregulars. -and some of them were very annoying types as well! The oppsite of Irregular is not Conventional. It is Regular. The opposite of Conventional is.... UNconventional.

b.) IMO, Conflicts can only usefully be defined by Aims and Means. COIN is actually an accurate term -Countering Insurgents-. If you can usefully and accurately define an "insurgency" then we are on our way.

c.) A Stability Operation is about creating Stability, but so is every legitimate conflict. Conflict must create a better peace. Even when groups aim at creating "instability" they do so to create circumstances under which they can prosper and gain eventual stability.

d.) Stability is relative, not absolute. Stability will mean different thinks to different folks. Providing security creates a degree of stability.

The problem is that military thought (as I have said many times before) is discussed as though spoken by Avril Levene, by randomly using nonsensical, definition free words, phrases and aphorisms like, 4GW, OOTW, Asymmetric (which is really stupid) and now Hybrid Wars.

Rant complete. Guns to rest. Secure from action stations. Systems to stand-by. Listening out. :wry:

[Ron Humphrey]

c.) A Stability Operation is about creating Stability, but so is every legitimate conflict. Conflict must create a better peace. Even when groups aim at creating "instability" they do so to create circumstances under which they can prosper and gain eventual stability.

d.) Stability is relative, not absolute. Stability will mean different thinks to different folks. Providing security creates a degree of stability.



Does conflict necessarily have to result in a "better" peace or can it result in a simple lack of further conflict do to one parties inability to continue effectively (at that time)?

Furthermore would this then lend to the transition to different types of conflict and thus the necessity to study and understand each in and of itself?

Finally isn't it human nature that we require definitive separation of styles of warfare in order to understand how to prosecute them effectively. in other words whether they are truly different or not matters not so much as how we approach them differently.

[Steve Blair]

Does conflict necessarily have to result in a "better" peace or can it result in a simple lack of further conflict do to one parties inability to continue effectively (at that time)?

Furthermore would this then lend to the transition to different types of conflict and thus the necessity to study and understand each in and of itself?

Finally isn't it human nature that we require definitive separation of styles of warfare in order to understand how to prosecute them effectively. in other words whether they are truly different or not matters not so much as how we approach them differently.

To me, the answer is "of course" to both questions. There are many historical examples of a conflict not resulting in a "better" peace (World War I springs immediately to mind, but there are many other examples as well). The question of a "better" peace also raises the complementary question: better for whom?

And I agree that it is part of human nature to want to "label" things to aid in discrete study and (possibly) understanding. It also allows us to select the proper tools for an undertaking. Assuming that we would do this for all activities other than war doesn't really get us anywhere. The trick is to determine when labeling (or anti-labeling) has gotten in the way of actual understanding. I mention anti-labeling specifically, because I think over-simplification can be as big a problem as over-detailing.

[William F. Owen]

The trick is to determine when labeling (or anti-labeling) has gotten in the way of actual understanding. I mention anti-labeling specifically, because I think over-simplification can be as big a problem as over-detailing.

I concur. Taxonomies are extremely powerful and useful, but I don't think the "conflict" is the problem. I believe what we need to "label/define/quantify" is the enemy and how and why he fights.

[Ron Humphrey]

I concur. Taxonomies are extremely powerful and useful, but I don't think the "conflict" is the problem. I believe what we need to "label/define/quantify" is the enemy and how and why he fights.

Thats awful close to saying one requires Cutural Empathy in order to effecctively fight a war:eek:

[Rob Thornton]

Now that I've had a few weeks to think on it, I'm pretty comfortable with a kind of Vin Diagram that works for me (attached) The article Slap ref. that Tom pointed out was a good read (on Compound Warfare), and it just helped me frame it.

You (or your enemy) may begin by waging IW as your campaign because its all you can manage, or you might include it as part of a broader campaign if you can, or if called for - meaning you have the resources and believe that regular warfare by itself will not accomplish the objective, or will not accomplish it in the time or manner you desire. Additionally - along the lines of Mao - you might envision phases to your campaign that begin on the IW side using guerrilla tactics, but eventually take you to the regular side - there is probably a transition in there where you are doing both, or it could be that you have to take a step back. fig. 1 in the attachment

If you consider that there is an existing criminal element in every society that the irregular force can advantage them self to, or may have to contest with, or that can be seen as another complex actor - that becomes another bubble that I think deserves consideration - this may be a conglomerate, or it may represent the major criminal players, but more often they represent some level of influence and power, even if its unofficial. Some where in that model there is overlap to a degree - that probably has allot to do with the society in question, its norms, and the level of authority in which the criminal element must compete - e.g. how strong is the rule of law in populace in question and how far does it extend. fig. 2 in the attachment

I think the day to day actions of the population, particularly if there is a significant cultural gap we are operating in, adds to the complexity - even if its insignificant white noise, the effect obscures the activities of those elements conducting IW and the criminal elements pursuing their own goals, or goals in tandem with IW types. Regular forces (aligned with the irregular ones), while potentially standing out, can still benefit from confusion and discord where IW, Criminal activity and civilian activities coincide. fig. 3

For us, full spectrum operations - to include stability operations, cut across the Vin diagram. This is one of the primary reasons I think the Army non-concurred with the draft DoD dir 3000.08 on IW which would have supplanted DoD dir 3000.05 on Stab Ops. The two are different, and trying place Stability Ops in the IW bucket vs. acknowledging that it cuts across the full spectrum and must be considered and planned as such would constrain our thinking and lead to bad DOTMLPF outputs.

Again, nothing new here, just my way of framing it. Sometime I just need to work through things before I'm satisfied with an answer.

Thanks all, Best Rob

[Global Scout]

This particular thread amused and disappointed me, and I don't want you to pardon my rant, if the shoe fits, then it yours to wear. Based on some of the comments, you should be wearing it proudly.

I'll only point out one my name, since he has a habit of frequently calling those who disagree with him stupid throughout the council. It would be nice to see some credential beyond studies military history if you're going to call those who do this for a living stupid. I really don't mind it when the shoe fits, as my wife calls me stupid at least once a week, so the term is no longer overly offensive. On with the rant,

William Owen thinks he has an accurate grasp of history; therefore, he apparently "thinks" he has the credentials to call anyone who doesn't agree with his dumbed down version of "war is war" explanation.

Others who have been brain washed by simplistic concepts at CGSC seem to have lost the ability to think critically and challenge their own ideas.

I think I just read that irregular warfare will morph into conventional warfare? This was outdated thinking when Special Forces doctrine first developed the seven phases of unconventional warfare. The seven phases continue to be interpreted as some sort of doctrinal history, but it completely fails to identify how to utilize irregular forces effectively, instead it focuses on developing a large guerrilla force into 5th column to support conventional maneuver forces with their "decisive' battle. It is clear the communists (both the Maoists and Leninists and those inbetween) had a much clearer grasp on to achieve victory utilizing full spectrum unconventional warfare that had little to do with conventional warfare. They focused on the populace and established control over them (making the government irrelevant in those areas) through infiltration, subversion, conversion (mobilization), select terrorist and other psychological means to gradually bring the government to a culminating point.

You can't defeat this type of strategy with a conventional warfare strategy, because the enemy is effectively blended into the masses. Unless you're fighting a fool you will largely be punching into the air when you attack with overwhelming force. So you kill 20 here, and 20 there, or on a good day maybe a few hundred. If the insurgents still hold sway over the populace you still have gained no additional legitimacy for the government, and you simply further eroded your nation's will to continue on with the fight.

I misspoke when I said you couldn't win with a conventional strategy, because that is not the whole story. If you simply declare the populace as a whole hostile and declare war on them, you can engage in operations that border genocide or at least forcably dislocate whole population groups from an area, then you win with conventional tactics. Needless to say American Soldiers wouldn't do that even if the ROE permitted such a strategy, so we're back to square one where you can't win with conventional tactics.

The opposite of irregular warfare in our lexicon is not regular warfare it is conventional warfare, and I explained that in my previous post. If you want to develop your own terms that is fine, but unless you define them they don't have any meaning. What the hell is regular warfare?

It would seem to be that the correct definition of stupid would be repeating the same behavior after it has demonstratedly failed. At least it has clearly failed for those who are capable are perceiving the world as it instead of the way they desire it to be.

Fortunately we have some great officers in our ranks in the Army, and I guess a few in the Marine Corp who clearly understand that IW is very much different than conventional warfare. Yes it is still warfare, but that is like stating farming is farming, but I think an argument may be able to be made that growing corn and growing rice are just a wee bit different? Maybe not, maybe farming is just farming. However, we tried the conventional warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan (after phase III where conventional warfare tactics were needed and appropriate), and for some reason our "drive by" COIN operations didn't facilitate anything resembling success. After several months/years of failing to make any headway with missions simply focused on finding and killing insurgents (of course everyone is a high value target today, it is the new version of the Vietnam body count) some officers were "finally" able to move into position who effectively learned the lessons of the past, and then adapted those lessons appropriately to the realities of today. These officers focused on controlling and securing the populace, which greatly reduced or denied insurgent influence on these protected souls. The military effectively created a window of opportunity for a political victory. The military can't win this alone, the political leaders have to skillfully and courgeously exploit temporary military successes, if that doesn't happen (or won't happen), then we are pee'ing in the wind, and we all know it. However, that is the only effective strategy and it is not conventional warfare. That doesn't mean conventional forces don't do it, it is a matter of who does it, but rather what they do.

My rant deals with my frustration of our failure to consistently fail to apply the lessons of history when we go to war. Why do we have to relearn the basics each time? This is a failure of our officer corp, not just our politicians. Politicians are elected, they may or may not be wise, but our officers are developed over a period of years through experience and education, and yet that professional development system seems to be failing our nation.

Now that we live in an information age unlike any other in our past, though I'm sure Clausewitz somehow addressed this also according to some of you, the key take away is that public perceptions are shaped by multiple media venues and speakers, and failures we could have overcome in the past with time, we cannot overcome now, because we deal with a better informed (probably not the right choice of words) and less patient public. Our mistakes erode public will quicker than they have in the past. They can see when we're making progress and when we're not (what they see is reality to them, so there is no use arguing they don't get it). If we're not they wonder why we're wasting precious resources on a fight we're not going to win. The insurgent can survive forever if we use conventional warfare tactics, we can't. Adapting a proper irregular warfare strategy where we live in the streets face to face with our invisible foe is tougher, more demanding, and more dangerous (unless you're fighting a peer competitor in conventional warfare) than drive by COIN, but at least there is some benefit in the cost:benefits ratio when we lose our brothers. I'm not sure that is the case when we lose them to IEDs when we're simply driving by, our massing forces to hit some mystical center of gravity.

Failure to understand the difference the between IW and conventional warfare in my mind borders on incompetence and treason if you're a professional officer. Many get it, and don't realize they get it, because they don't understand the differences. That doesn't bother me so much, as the definitions are broad and sufficient gray areas for broad interpretation. However, not getting it bothers me, because next up in the arena is our kids, and I know that is the case for many of you already. We have every right to demand the best from our leaders.

[William F. Owen]

I'll only point out one my name, since he has a habit of frequently calling those who disagree with him stupid throughout the council. It would be nice to see some credential beyond studies military history if you're going to call those who do this for a living stupid. I really don't mind it when the shoe fits, as my wife calls me stupid at least once a week, so the term is no longer overly offensive. On with the rant,

William Owen thinks he has an accurate grasp of history; therefore, he apparently "thinks" he has the credentials to call anyone who doesn't agree with his dumbed down version of "war is war" explanation.


Global Scout,

a.) I am not aware of ever having called anyone on this board stupid. If I had, I would be rightly banned. If you think my behaviour (rather than my argument) is unacceptable, then I suggest you report that behaviour. Yes, I strongly disagree with some of views posted here, but I do not post here because I assume it is a comfort zone for "bumper sticker group think" ideas.

b.) I am here to learn. That I seek to do so, by asking provocative and even uncomfortable questions, I assumed would be welcome. If not, please explain. I don't have a problem telling a 2 or even 3 star General he is wrong, or a highly respected academic. It also goes that I am happy to post in an open forum and have my arguments ripped to shreds by those more knowledgeable than I am - of which there are many.

c.) I am not aware of any reason, why I should present my credentials. My ability to think and argue in this domain has nothing to with my published articles in peer reviewed military journals, my time spent in the British Army, or my extensive correspondence with those currently involved with military thought, speaking at the RUIS and other military thought forums or having a full time job that requires to me write and talk about current military issues. As I understand your beef is with my understanding of military history, I am not sure why being a graduate of the LRRP School, or Support Weapons Wing would be relevant.

d.) I am not, and never have promoted a "dumbed down" version of "War is War" - nor have I ever called anyone stupid. I passionately believe that modern (and post modern) military thought has left us with a poison chalice that continues to misguide and mislead current military practitioners.


My rant deals with my frustration of our failure to consistently fail to apply the lessons of history when we go to war. Why do we have to relearn the basics each time? This is a failure of our officer corp, not just our politicians. Politicians are elected, they may or may not be wise, but our officers are developed over a period of years through experience and education, and yet that professional development system seems to be failing our nation.

So do my "rants". Well this is exactly what I feel, and I feel it is important enough to state my view plainly and as powerfully as I can. I believe I do so in a respectful, polite and humorous when appropriate fashion.

[William F. Owen]

The problem is that military thought (as I have said many times before) is discussed as though spoken by Avril Levene, by randomly using nonsensical, definition free words, phrases and aphorisms like, 4GW, OOTW, Asymmetric (which is really stupid) and now Hybrid Wars.

Rant complete. Guns to rest. Secure from action stations. Systems to stand-by. Listening out. :wry:

Cognoscente of Global Scouts assertion that I call people stupid, I feel it only right that I draw attention to my actual use of that word.

Based on the quote above, I did say, and also implied that the use of phrases and ideas such as 4GW, OOTW, Asymmetric and Hybrid Wars, was stupid.

Let me clarify and apologise (if required). I do NOT consider anyone here stupid. I do consider the use of such phrases and ideas as "Not Useful" and that they may even harm understanding. (and I submit that 4GW has done harm) - but the use of language is critical in military thought, and I sometime use it as stupidly as everyone else.

I understand that Frank Hoffman coined "Hybrid Wars" and Frank is a good friend, whom I very much respect, so I would never call him stupid - but I don't agree with him on many things. The use of this terminology is one.

[Rob Thornton]

Gents,
Does not matter to me how it got started - it does neither the topic, nor the SWC any good to stray off topic and get personal. I don't usually intervene as a mod, but since I kicked off the thread, I will this time. Stick to the topic and your arguments as to why you think what you think. Your both assets to the SWC, and have made some great posts in the past. For the most part we police ourselves here, please demonstrate the professional maturity to do so as well. Its not bad right now, just be a pro and drop the personal side of it - lots of opinions here and diversity and open discourse is our strength - if new members see a pattern of behavior that sets the wrong standard for them, and then we have to police them as well.
Rob

[Rob Thornton]

GS,
Its worth talking about - I'm not sure if the comment was raised off my post, but it should be brought up:


I think I just read that irregular warfare will morph into conventional warfare?

I think its a question of the political objective of the various combatants, what means they have access to over time, and how conditions change. So I'd agree with "can" or "may", but I'd not commit to "will", that leads to deterministic thinking and can get you into trouble when making decisions e.g. you look for what you think you should see vs. evaluating what you do see.

Time is a funny thing, and different cultures have different takes on it. For some 400 yrs ago is like last week, for others yesterday is like last week. Some see a struggle as lasting generations and anticipate a time when things will return to as they believe it once was and by Law, should be. I think AQ senior leadership (and the truly committed) share a sort of quasi belief that although they themselves would like to preside over a greater caliphate, they can content themselves with moving that goal forward a yard at a time if need be - the commitment to struggle is a large part of how they define themselves, and thy believe that as long as they do so, they will eventually prevail as God has promised. T

Having said that, I think we must consider that there is both an IW component to their strategy and the desire to obtain regular means by which to preserve their eventual gains and move into legitimacy - no matter if that be infesting a destabilized state and then rebuilding from the inside out, or if that means co-opting or allying themselves with some govt. that shares their interpretation and goals. For my part I think AQ (and like organizations) must retain an IW capability as long as it benefits them to do so. This could mean retaining an advantage against its enemies, or to shape conditions for future military actions.

Best, Rob

[Bill Moore]

You (or your enemy) may begin by waging IW as your campaign because its all you can manage, or you might include it as part of a broader campaign if you can, or if called for - meaning you have the resources and believe that regular warfare by itself will not accomplish the objective, or will not accomplish it in the time or manner you desire. Additionally - along the lines of Mao - you might envision phases to your campaign that begin on the IW side using guerrilla tactics, but eventually take you to the regular side -

Rob, I don't disagree, but I think the above statement is misleading and "big Army" centric. Pardon us SF guys, but we get a little agitated when folks try to evolve IW into conventional warfare (CW for this post). Throughout history there are examples where insurgents massed into larger elements in engaged in set piece battles, but that is not always required or desired. When insurgents present themselves as cannon fodder, we generally have what "seems" like a good news story on the 6 o'clock news, where coalition forces killed 70 or more insurgents.

Please consider for a few moments the following:

The insurgents knew they were going to get their butts handed to them, but they attacked anyway.
The insurgents, despite our claims to the contrary, are not stupid.
What the heck did they do this for?
Where are they getting the volunteers?

I would offer that this is part of the overall theater affect to create perceptions with select audiences. One, we're still in the fight. Two, we're brave (where are you). Three, America how can you win against warriors like this? Four, this is the overt war that everyone sees, but you don't see what I'm doing behind the scenes gradually re-establishing control over the populace by infiltrating their ranks and threatening or killing those who don't cooperate with me. I would argue that the major insurgent attacks are a secondary effort, while their primary effort subversion largely remains unchallenged.

The bottom line is that an insurgency can survive for ever without evolving into conventional warfare. Sometimes all they want is the ability to control a certain area or certain ethnic group, and the cost for the government to reestablish control is too high, so they acquiese. More thoughts on this later, again I agree that many insurgent groups like the FARC, LTTE, have developed impressive conventional force like capabilities, but other groups have survived simply using irregular strategy.


If you consider that there is an existing criminal element in every society that the irregular force can advantage them self to, or may have to contest with, or that can be seen as another complex actor -

Yes and no, it might be more accurate to state that many insurgent groups morph into criminal organizations like the FARC, MS13, the Taliban, Burmese drug lords, Khmer Rouge, etc. They start a life of crime to sustain their organization, then the business model tends to trump their ideological cause and now you have a very dangerous organized criminal group. The thesis on 3d generation gangs was superb and I agree it needs more study, but I'm not sure it is a separate bubble.


Stability Ops in the IW bucket vs. acknowledging that it cuts across the full spectrum and must be considered and planned as such would constrain our thinking and lead to bad DOTMLPF outputs.

When I read FM 3-0 I thought it did list stability operations as part of conventional warfare, not just a component of IW? There were three major types of operations: offense, defense, and stability, but the percentage of the force/effort dedicated to a particular operation would vary depending on a number of factors and where you were on the continuum. I think stability operations is now a phase in the joint pub after achieving dominance? It also realizes that the battlespace is not contiguous, so like the three block war (at a much larger level) it anticipates doing all operations simultaneously. Not sure that makes teh DOTMLPF outputs any easier though.

[Ken White]

with life and war today and wish -- quite wrongly, IMO -- to return to the 1988 version of the Army... ;)
...I think stability operations is now a phase in the joint pub after achieving dominance? It also realizes that the battlespace is not contiguous, so like the three block war (at a much larger level) it anticipates doing all operations simultaneously. Not sure that makes teh DOTMLPF outputs any easier though.It makes them a lot more difficult -- and makes training more difficult -- and expensive. That means fewer toys...

It means more work...

It means changing the way one thinks...

Thank you and GS for adding some good and thoughtful comments to an odd thread. :wry:

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Bill,
Thanks for bringing up some great points on what Ken rightly termed "an odd thread".


The bottom line is that an insurgency can survive for ever without evolving into conventional warfare. Sometimes all they want is the ability to control a certain area or certain ethnic group, and the cost for the government to reestablish control is too high, so they acquiesce.

I'd agree. Vin diagrams (or any model) are limited in their ability to establishing proportionality - people have to do that based on assessment of the conditions. I think it (the proportionality of one over the other) could stay anywhere within those circles for a number of reasons. I now understand where GS was going when he voiced his concern about one evolving or devolving into another.

I think that is one of the reasons its critical to evaluate the conditions and look at the context in which the fighting is taking place.


They start a life of crime to sustain their organization, then the business model tends to trump their ideological cause and now you have a very dangerous organized criminal group. The thesis on 3d generation gangs was superb and I agree it needs more study, but I'm not sure it is a separate bubble.

I'd agree - I'm not sure it does either, but then again I'm not convinced it doesn't - from what I've seen within the same AO you can have some groups that remain pure, some groups that dabble in the criminal end, and some that are purely criminal - this makes for a very messy center- particularly for us when we're trying to sort out responsibility and causality so we can allocate the right efforts and resources - no easy answers there. You could reserve the space for anything that represents a third part (outside of the populace) that wiled influence and adds complexity - if its useful in working through framing.


When I read FM 3-0 I thought it did list stability operations as part of conventional warfare, not just a component of IW? There were three major types of operations: offense, defense, and stability, but the percentage of the force/effort dedicated to a particular operation would vary depending on a number of factors and where you were on the continuum. I think stability operations is now a phase in the joint pub after achieving dominance? It also realizes that the battlespace is not contiguous, so like the three block war (at a much larger level) it anticipates doing all operations simultaneously. Not sure that makes teh DOTMLPF outputs any easier though.

I think that is where Army may differ from others- Army sees SO as broader then IW - as being something you may be called to do regardless of the type of warfare (or the dominance of one over the other) being conducted. However, if you take the tack that there will always be some form of IW being conducted then you might fit SO within IW. Allot I think depends on what lens you look through - that is why I think a linear or phased perspective is more constraining then a perspective that should lead you to considering the conditions at hand and trying to work out what is actually going on. Diagrams are only useful in getting you the first look or maybe to help initially frame the conditions, after that its grey matter. As Ken pointed out - almost any diagram can be used to justify a position for various reasons.

As Ken noted its an odd thread, but its representative of the type of discussion that are being worked through as the IA comes to a "more" common understanding of security challenges and how to address them.

Best, Rob

[Ken White]

sense that it somehow got politicized (military and other) or off track in several directions on occasion. The basic premise was a good and fair question and there are some good comments. I contributed mightily to oddness by getting in off thread jabber answering Rank Amateur's ad copy political interjections, a failing of mine I should resist but alas, cannot... :wry:

After re-reading the whole thread, I get back to two things I said earlier:

"No statement pertaining to warfare is ever completely accurate. War is too chaotic to codify and define precisely. We can have fun trying but we will not succeed."

"Irregular Warfare (and / or other types of warfare) and Stability Operations may be simultaneously conducted. Or they may not be. Or there may be a time phased melding. I believe that METT-TC applies in that determination..."

[wm]

Hi Bill,
Thanks for bringing up some great points on what Ken rightly termed "an odd thread".

I'd agree. Vin diagrams (or any model) are limited in their ability to establishing proportionality - people have to do that based on assessment of the conditions. I think it (the proportionality of one over the other) could stay anywhere within those circles for a number of reasons. I now understand where GS was going when he voiced his concern about one evolving or devolving into another.

I think that is one of the reasons its critical to evaluate the conditions and look at the context in which the fighting is taking place.


Rob,
The real problem I see with using Venn diagrams in this analysis has to do with the fact that you do not get all the dimensionality you need. For example, you cannot use them to measure how intensely a given member of the IW group is committed to the cause. The Venn diagram is also, at best, only a momentary snapshot in time which cannot show the status of events which may, or may not, be in a stasis of time.

Here's a little explanation of this last. The American Revolution did not start with Lexington and Concord; there were "closet" rebels in place for quite some time before that happened. Things like the Connecticut Charter Oak Incident of 1687 and the 1773 Boston Tea Party, IMO, are examples. And the "conventional phase" of the Revolution may have been delayed much longer had the British not really preciptated actions at Bunker/Breed's Hill. I submit that a large portion of the campaigns around NYC (Battle of Long Island or the Battle of Stony Point for example) were much more examples of irregular than regular war (at least from the British point of view of how the battles played out)--even Trenton strikes me as a guerrilla raid, not a conventional pitched battle. 1st/2d Saratoga (Freeman's Farm and Bemis Heights) and some of the later (1780s) battles in the Carolinas (Cowpens particularly) were more like 18th C. conventional war. Interestingly enough, I think conventional war came in the Revolution largely after the French ( a regular force) allied with the rebels (largely an irregular force despite von Steuben's hard work) .

Back to the main point--to do an adequate modeling of the interrelationships, I suspect we need something like at least 3 or 4 dimensional Cartesian coordinate axes--not only an X and a Y axis, but also a Z and a Z' axis too.

But, mathematical models are probably the wrong way to go entirely for explaining this very human activity called conflict.

[Rob Thornton]

Wayne,
I could not agree more!:D We can use straight text to discuss things, but that I think limits the discussion some. Using a diagram (of any type) sometimes offers content, but often no context. So I try and use both. I believe you are absolutely correct to say the human behavior can't be accurately modeled - its too complex, to inter-active and offers too many non-linear outputs - and that is on a fairly simple day.

That I think is why when we try and boil art into science, it often loses some of its flavor - doctrine (or any efforts to tame art in order to make it ubiquitous and digestible) should be thought of as descriptive vs. prescriptive. There is a reason why most FMs & JPs that while they will lift a quote from Clausewitz or Sun-Tzu, etc. will not default to whole chapters - there would be a tendency to keep going back and rereading it to determine its specific applicability, where because it tackles the complex subject of human interaction in war, it does not lend itself well to digestible chunks - its more of a revolving narrative - that does not fit our notion of useful doctrine well. So we seek a balance - we introduce and idea, lift a portion of a greater idea to emphasize it, then get on with the business of laying out the concept with in a ablanced manner that can be useful to the broader, targeted audience.

From a admin thread starter/moderator/facilitator point of view:

When I do throw in a diagram to go with a discussion, I'm generally using it to facilitate the conversation - to give participants a visual to debate and question, or as an object to build context around. Its the product of that discussion we should be most interested in, not really the base idea. Most of our threads start in one place and evolve - sometimes they come back to the original idea, sometimes they take on new, and more useful meaning and direction. In my view that is how we leverage the broader CoP we are fortunate enough to have resident here in our virtual SWC.

I try never to get wedded to an original idea or thread topic, because I often find the direction it takes offers more benefit then the one it started with. However, the arguments presented here often require us to go back and consider alternative perspectives, reframe our arguments, clarify our language, etc. this can make for a better argument, a better communicator, a more informed CoP – or all.


Best, Rob

[Surferbeetle]

All,

IMO it is beneficial to regularly discuss and examine terminology and concepts if for no other reason than it furthers the education of those involved. I note that Clausewitz was said to have characterized Jomini as 'narrow, simplistic, and superficial' yet I have learned a thing of two from both of them despite (or because of) their different styles and focuses. Liddell Hart has some interesting points as well on this subject of conventional/regular warfare (steady G.S., steady) and irregular/civil/religious warfare that all of us here study and participate in to one extent or another.

With regard to mathematics and associated models, I must respectfully dissent as to some previously made statements about their applicability to the study of warfare. There are things that cannot be adequately described without the use of mathematics and at a certain point mathematical models are simply the most accurate and appropriate way to describe things....the problem, I find, is often found in the initial assumptions made and then later in attempting to translate back and forth between the world of deeds, words, and math. Operations research (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operations_research) is an interesting discipline which militaries seem to devote resources to.

This is not to say that such models are a cure-all and the only way to 'truth'. For those of you interested in a non-mathematical book on quantitative financial models and their limitations I just finished off Fooled by Randomness by Nassim Nicholas Taleb (ISBN 978-0-8129-7521-5) and found it to be a fun and fast read and a reminder about the limits of what we think that we know.

So back to definitions. I would like to solicit opinion as to whether the following (Bloomberg on the US Economy and its current potential for crisis given the actions of the Federal Reserve with regards to Bear Stearns) link (http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&sid=ar1N2Y0Yaog8&refer=columnist_berry) describes the effects/responses of/to irregular/economic warfare or is this just a self inflicted wound?