War on the cheap?

[Ken White]

Interesting Op-Ed at the LINK (http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-op-scheuer9mar09,0,3189542.story).

Michael Scheuer may be a little extreme for the tastes of some but he has been there and, I think, makes a statement that bears some thought. My purpose in posting this article is to highlight these items from it:
"Unwilling to apply full conventional military power against our enemies, American officials instead hope that light forces, counterinsurgency tactics and precision weapons will beat our foes with few casualties, little or no collateral damage -- and no bad publicity.

Well, bunk. Victory is not possible if only covert forces are employed, and presidents from both parties have lied about their effectiveness because they will not tell Americans the politically incorrect truth. The fact is that in this global war against non-uniformed, religiously motivated foes who live with and are supported by their civilian brethren, and who are perfectly willing to use a nuclear device against the U.S., victory is only possible through the use of massive, largely indiscriminate military force. (emphasis added / kw)

[William F. Owen]

I have to say, I am in broad agreement. The Language and detail are problematic, but I am becoming more convinced about the efficacy of Classical Military Power. If Clausewitz didn't say it, don't do it. Victory is when you are standing on the other guys neck, using his bathroom when you feel like it, and his wife and kids are cleaning your vehicles.

[Granite_State]

Seems like this is the overriding strategic question of the "GWOT"/Long War: massive conventional warfare or special forces, intelligence, and a law enforcement approach to terrorism? Obviously it's not entirely either/or, but I think we do have to make a decision about what our military is going to be used for. Personally, I'm far more persuaded by Mike Vickers and the "indirect approach" than I am by Scheurer and the folks calling for World War III (or IV, per lunatic Podhoretz).

Massive U.S./coalition ground campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have been tremendously expensive, politically contentious, and are still years if not decades from achieving success. Given how much it costs us, economically and, maybe more importantly, in the state of our military, I don't see how this kind of model is sustainable.

I suppose Scheurer would argue that we need to take the gloves off and employ Roman methods of pacification, but in a post-Enlightenment, modern media age, I don't think people would go for that, absent maybe a nuked New York. And, at the risk of dragging this thread in another direction, I can't be the only Christian in America who finds "make a desert and call it peace" morally questionable.

[William F. Owen]

I suppose Scheurer would argue that we need to take the gloves off and employ Roman methods of pacification, but in a post-Enlightenment, modern media age, I don't think people would go for that, absent maybe a nuked New York. And, at the risk of dragging this thread in another direction, I can't be the only Christian in America who finds "make a desert and call it peace" morally questionable.

I don't think anyone would argue that. Unless there is a sound moral justification for using violence then you are just cruel and un-just, so I for one am not a fan of the ROMAN Way of War.

...but I think military force has to be applied in an unambiguous way that most effectively achieves the desired aim. The only time military force is useful is when the will of an opponent needs to be broken. To paraphrase Delbruk that breaking should be "annihilation and/or exhaustion."

[Ken White]

and I'm not totally sure that they're in much disagreement. Scheuer, in particular, has seen the specific threat up close and realizes that the probability of dissipating that threat to an acceptable degree is going to take more than law enforcement, more than covert action and that there will be some military involvement. I don't see him as rejecting an indirect appraoch, merely as -- hyperbolically, to be sure -- saying that it isn't going to be cheap or easy.

Granite State says:
Massive U.S./coalition ground campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have been tremendously expensive, politically contentious, and are still years if not decades from achieving success. Given how much it costs us, economically and, maybe more importantly, in the state of our military, I don't see how this kind of model is sustainable.There's some truth in that on several levels but I think the reasons we are where we are should be considered. Mostly with an goal of avoiding the three major mistakes we made.

Essentially there are two major factors. The first is that a lack of knowledge of the Middle East and the ME way of war deluded four successive Presidents into attempting to be nice guys when confronted with challenges from the area. Carter, Reagan, Bush 41 and Clinton all erred in that way and the Fly-in at the WTC and the Pentagon resulted. So, one factor and reason for our present situation is that we've hopefully learned that appeasement or whatever one wishes to call it -- in any event a sensible western reaction to a non-western insensible series of actions in western terms -- wil not work with some of those folks. Scheuer has pointed out elsewhere that sweetness and light allied with a hopo of moderate Islam reining in the bad guys is doomed to fail. I strongly agree with that.

The second factor is that in an ideal world or nation, the civilian leadership would select the best people to run their Armed Forces and would then provide control for their employment. The Armed forces (and, here, I'll also include the Non-defense Intelligence Community) are or should be proficient in the precise as possible management of violence to achieve national aims. As Wilf says:
"...but I think military force has to be applied in an unambiguous way that most effectively achieves the desired aim."Thus, the civilian leadership, if it determines violence is required should tell those Forces and the IC what the desired end state is and let them do the job in their own way. Regrettably, the tendency is for the civilian master to tell the Forces and the IC what to do instead of what is desired as an end state. Obviously in the current situation, we can look at Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Feith as examples of just that failure. Congress also has a very bad problem with telling people how to suck eggs without knowing much about the things whereof they speak.

Lest I be accused of picking on the current crew; I've been around through 12 Presidents and the concomitant number of Congresses -- all have erred in the same way (all also "lied to the American people," generally about national security matters as well; but that's another thread) to one degree or another. Not likely to change, either.

Thus the system has built in inefficiencies. Add to that the third failure, the Army's intransigence in ignoring COIN work against all indications of the probability and we had a problem waiting to happen. It happened. I think Scheuer is -- again hyperbolically -- trying to get people to wake up, no more. I do not see him advocating the Roman method; merely pointing out that it's going to take a national commitment to turn around what we invited by being unprepared and not responding properly to a number of indications...

And by trying to play nice. In a world that just is not nice, no matter how much we want it to be...

[Rank amateur]

Victory is when you are standing on the other guys neck, using his bathroom when you feel like it, and his wife and kids are cleaning your vehicles.

Serious question. Has anyone ever done that without deliberately attacking and terrorizing civilians? I can't think of any examples, but there certainly could be examples that I don't know about.

[Ron Humphrey]

I think the public awareness and acceptance of the facts about what it takes to really win wars is valid. One need only look as far as any example of someone being shot and killed by police for walking around pointing a real looking gun at night in a dangerous part of town.

We are not wrong for wanting to do anything we can to keep this to a minimum but it is important that the public responsibilities and thus expectations be relatively closer to reality than they are right now.

One would think if those small lessons were learned the larger ones pretty much follow accordingly.

[Ski]

Some problems here:

1. Is the threat existential or not? Have to answer that question first.
2. What is the real definition of victory and what is the endstate? The National Security Strategies of 04-06 do not list out credible and acheivable goals.
3. The current admin has zero credibility. Have to wait until after the next admin for any real change and that's up in the air...

[Ken White]

1. In whose definition or opinion? Our system, probably mostly correctly, allows one person to make that determination. It does require a simple majority of 535 not terribly learned folks to agree or not to one extent or another but by and large your opinion and mine count for little.

2. Generally undefinable -- or indefinite. No enunciated strategy will ever be credible in any sense, the statement of it removes the uncertainty and thus starts the ebb of credibility The Powell / Weinberger doctrines (and the Monroe doctrine, among others, for that matter...) weren't credible either. An endstate in any war will always be unknown to at least some extent. See Korea or Kosovo...

3. May I say again: ""Lest I be accused of picking on the current crew; I've been around through 12 Presidents and the concomitant number of Congresses -- all have erred in the same way (all also "lied to the American people," generally about national security matters as well; but that's another thread) to one degree or another. Not likely to change, either."" (Emphasis added / kw)

No intent to be snarky, Ski, just an old cynics take on your reasonable and intelligent questions / statements -- and that last item, BTW, is also applicable to the other two items. :wry:

Oh, and R.A.:

Next to none if any -- wars are messy like that. That's why they're all dumb and immoral. Even if some are necessary.

Which ones are necessary? See Ski's problems and my responses... :wry:

Ron: I agree but reality is offensive to some. ;)

Ain't life grand, Guys? People have more fun than monkeys... :D

[William F. Owen]

Serious question. Has anyone ever done that without deliberately attacking and terrorizing civilians? I can't think of any examples, but there certainly could be examples that I don't know about.

Can't think of any good examples, but I was trying to make another point. The Enemy has to fear loss, and harm. The problem with many avant-garde concepts like EBO and MW is that then denigrate the actual and symbolic need to take and hold, as in conflict in a physical dimension. While my example may have been clumsy and even crass, it would stand by it, in that it clearly demonstrates unambiguous victory.

[Rex Brynen]

..I'm at a loss to know who such overwhelming conventional force would be applied, to deliver this hypothetical victory.


The fact is that in this global war against non-uniformed, religiously motivated foes who live with and are supported by their civilian brethren, and who are perfectly willing to use a nuclear device against the U.S., victory is only possible through the use of massive, largely indiscriminate military force.

Occupy Iran? Or perhaps Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco too, since much (or more) of the threat emanates from non-state groups there? And then there is Iraq, where large-scale application of military force (albeit, now with COIN discrimination) has succeeded in creating a radical Islamist threat where one did not previously exist.

Did overwhelming Soviet force--which left one million or more dead, far more injured, and 7 million refugees and IDPs (one third of the population)--intimidate the Afghans into submission? Of course, Pakistani/Saudi/US/UK/etc material support to the mujahiddin helped a great deal, but the essential point was that it was an enabler in the context of a population whose will was unbroken despite quasi-Roman pacification methods.

There really aren't a lot of useful "get tougher/kill more people" counter-terrorism strategies. There are rather more "get smarter" ones (which involve as much issues of politics, diplomacy, and development), although they're complex, difficult, and don't always produce immediate results.

[Tom Odom]

..I'm at a loss to know who such overwhelming conventional force would be applied, to deliver this hypothetical victory.

...There really aren't a lot of useful "get tougher/kill more people" counter-terrorism strategies. There are rather more "get smarter" ones (which involve as much issues of politics, diplomacy, and development), although they're complex, difficult, and don't always produce immediate results.

Ken, I interpreted your posting this as an indicator that you see war as less elegant tham some would wish it to be. I completely agree with that assessment. For that I would offer the Doug Feith school of thought as an example.

My problem with Scheuer's essay is that he offers no clear line of thought on the piece. Yes war is not a neat chess game. Yes we need capacity to wage war in a way that makes our enemies hesitant. No he does not identify or even hint against whom such a force could be applied to fight.

Part of the issue is that Scheuer was a manager not an operator and he certainly has little if any meaningful military experience. What is therefore clear to him (at least I hope it was clear to him when he wrote this) is not clear to me.

Best

Tom

[Tacitus]

Victory is when you are standing on the other guys neck, using his bathroom when you feel like it, and his wife and kids are cleaning your vehicles.

If we want to task them to dig some ditches after they’ve finished washing the vehicles, then this is heading towards the Henrich Himmler way of war. Now there was a guy who knew how to make the tough decisions that weaker men shrank from. :eek:For posterity’s sake, he elaborated on this approach in a speech to SS officers in Posen on October 6, 1943.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posen_speech

"Most of you know what it means when a hundred corpses are lying side by side, or five hundred, or a thousand. To have stuck it out, and at the same time to have remained decent fellows, that is what has made us hard. This is a page of glory in our history, which has never been written and is never to be written. We had the moral right, we had the duty to our people, to destroy this people which wanted to destroy us

One basic principle must be the absolute rule for the S.S. men. We must be honest, decent, loyal, and comradely to members of our own blood and nobody else. What happens to a Russian and a Czech does not interest me in the least. What the nations can offer in the way of good blood of our type we will take, if necessary by kidnapping their children and raising them here with us. Whether nations live in prosperity or starve to death interests me only in so far as we need them as slaves for our culture: otherwise it is of no interest to me. Whether ten thousand Russian females fall down from exhaustion while digging an anti-tank ditch interests me only in so far as the anti-tank ditch for Germany is finished.

We, Germans, who are the only people in the world who have a decent attitude towards animals, will also assume a decent attitude towards these human animals. But it is a crime against our blood to worry about them and give them ideals, thus causing our sons and grandsons to have a more difficult time with them. When somebody comes up to me and says: 'I cannot dig the anti-tank ditch with women and children, it is inhuman, for it would kill them,' then I have to say: 'You are the murderer of your own blood, because if the anti-tank ditch is not dug German soldiers will die, and they are the sons of German mothers. They are our own blood....' Our concern, our duty, is our people and our blood. We can be indifferent to everything else. I wish the S.S. to adopt this attitude towards the problem of all foreign, non-Germanic peoples, especially Russians.... "

As Rex Byrnen already posted, just who are we supposed to unleash this overwhelming military force against? Since there isn't an army in the field opposing us, that seems to leave the civilian population. Doesn't sound much different than what Himmler was saying. Old wine in a new bottle.

[Ski]

Ken

No offense taken.

For some strange reason, I am starting to see historical trends emerging again. Great tactics, decent operational art, piss poor strategy. I'd say you have to get all three right if you want to win a COIN fight, but that's one mans opinion.

Otherwise, we're just shadow boxing.

[Ken White]

Ken, I interpreted your posting this as an indicator that you see war as less elegant tham some would wish it to be. I completely agree with that assessment. For that I would offer the Doug Feith school of thought as an example.True. The fact that it is less elegant (Great phrase!) means that one should be judicious in applying it as a solution -- a factor Scheuer seems to miss as you note:
My problem with Scheuer's essay is that he offers no clear line of thought on the piece. Yes war is not a neat chess game. Yes we need capacity to wage war in a way that makes our enemies hesitant. No he does not identify or even hint against whom such a force could be applied to fight.

Part of the issue is that Scheuer was a manager not an operator and he certainly has little if any meaningful military experience...Which I suspect is part of his problem.
What is therefore clear to him (at least I hope it was clear to him when he wrote this) is not clear to me.Nor to me, I just put it down to a Ralph Peters-like hyperbolic wake up call.

Rex said:
There really aren't a lot of useful "get tougher/kill more people" counter-terrorism strategies. There are rather more "get smarter" ones (which involve as much issues of politics, diplomacy, and development), although they're complex, difficult, and don't always produce immediate results.Quite true and I totally agree. Regrettably, the US psyche is strongly attuned to immediate results; thus I think that the judicious application of force when required should always be an option but have to acknowledge that we won't always do it wisely. Rex also said:
"Occupy Iran? Or perhaps Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco too, since much (or more) of the threat emanates from non-state groups there?... I disagree with that aspect. Notably with "occupy" -- we shouldn't do that, we're not attuned to the requirements. The British do that sort of stuff fairly well but even they are not great at the job because it is quite difficult. Not to mention that occupying other nations is really dumb and to be avoided if at all possible. That is not a wise application of force.

I'm in agreement with Steve Metz -- it's not our thing; we need to apply force massively, we're good at that; do a lot of damage and not plan on a long term presence. That would annoy our 'friends' (but then we don't really have any of those in any event :cool:) but it would certainly serve as a cautionary to others who might want to trifle with us. That's the epitome of the old 'walk softly and carry a big stick' and the new 'you're either with us or against us.' ;)

I also disagree with this:
And then there is Iraq, where large-scale application of military force (albeit, now with COIN discrimination) has succeeded in creating a radical Islamist threat where one did not previously exist.The threat, as you sort of note, was endemic to the area and that was true before we invaded. Thus, we did not create one; it existed and we simply bought some of it to a head or out in the open. Deliberately.

Iraq was just militarily and politically the best target in an attempt to short circuit that ideal you cited: "There are rather more "get smarter" ones (which involve as much issues of politics, diplomacy, and development), although they're complex, difficult, and don't always produce immediate results." and change the dwell time for change from three to five generations doing it your ideal way to just one or two of them doing it our abrupt way. We'll see how it works out. :wry:

[Rex Brynen]

I also disagree with this:The threat, as you sort of note, was endemic to the area and that was true before we invaded. Thus, we did not create one; it existed and we simply bought some of it to a head or out in the open. Deliberately.

Iraq was just militarily and politically the best target in an attempt to short circuit that ideal you cited: "There are rather more "get smarter" ones (which involve as much issues of politics, diplomacy, and development), although they're complex, difficult, and don't always produce immediate results." and change the dwell time for change from three to five generations doing it your ideal way to just one or two of them doing it our abrupt way. We'll see how it works out. :wry:

I don't think this was a primary intent of intervention in Iraq (unless one argues that Iraqi democratization was supposed to have a domino effect of regional regime changes that would result in a raft of new, secular-ish pro-Western governments.. which was never likely).

Moreover, I think it is demonstrable that the war in Iraq has radicalized a great many Middle Eastern youths who otherwise would not have been mobilized into militant groups, and helped train them for a fight they now pursue in other places (as evidenced, for example, by the arrival of so many Iraq veterans, and Iraqi-insurgent-wannabes, in Nahr al-Barid refugee camp in Lebanon, resulting in the confrontation there last year).

Be that as it may, you're there now, and the better it ends for Iraq the better it ends for all of us.

[Rank amateur]

For some strange reason, I am starting to see historical trends emerging again. Great tactics, decent operational art, piss poor strategy.

Agreed, although I'm not sure that "good" strategies are available: maybe only "less bad" ones.

[Ken White]

I don't think this was a primary intent of intervention in Iraq (unless one argues that Iraqi democratization was supposed to have a domino effect of regional regime changes that would result in a raft of new, secular-ish pro-Western governments.. which was never likely).Notably this. I believe it was the principal of well over a dozen (or slightly more) lesser but synergistic reasons. The 'domino effect' being a far lesser one of those.
Moreover, I think it is demonstrable that the war in Iraq has radicalized a great many Middle Eastern youths who otherwise would not have been mobilized into militant groups, and helped train them for a fight they now pursue in other places (as evidenced, for example, by the arrival of so many Iraq veterans, and Iraqi-insurgent-wannabes, in Nahr al-Barid refugee camp in Lebanon, resulting in the confrontation there last year).I agree. We probably differ in that I see that as a non-problematical, natural and to be expected result of the intervention that will ultimately be to their disadvantage even though in the near term it does not appear to be so. Such confrontations in the near term as opposed to festering for a few years only to later erupt are advantageous to the west even if they are unpleasant.
Be that as it may, you're there now, and the better it ends for Iraq the better it ends for all of us.True.

[Ken White]

Ken

No offense taken.

For some strange reason, I am starting to see historical trends emerging again. Great tactics, decent operational art, piss poor strategy. I'd say you have to get all three right if you want to win a COIN fight, but that's one mans opinion.

Otherwise, we're just shadow boxing.

Thanks.

Not sure I totally agree on either the operational or strategy parts, though. IMO, COIN efforts become the Operational level when instituted and we took almost three years to get there. Way too long. Strategy wise, if you accept that Iraq is only the tip of the iceberg as I believe, I think it's too early to make that judgment. Based on what is now known, seems to me it has at least a 60:40 chance of being good as opposed to poor...

I don't think it's possible to 'win' a COIN fight. I cannot think of an instance since G. Khan where one has been one. Certainly in the last century all that's been able to be achieved is an acceptable outcome (and that includes the oft touted Malaya) and thus far, I think, an acceptable outcome in both Afghanistan and Iraq is achievable.

Rank Amateur has a good point -- in the case of the Islamists, there aren't any great strategies I can see, only less bad ones and this one, while not one I would have chosen is, I think, no worse than mine, far better than many (including the diplomacy / hearts and minds foolishness) and has a decent chance of success. We'll see.

[William F. Owen]

If we want to task them to dig some ditches after they’ve finished washing the vehicles, then this is heading towards the Henrich Himmler way of war.

As I explained, I am not advocating this is in literal terms. What I am saying is that when military force is legitimately, discriminatingly and proportionally applied it should be done so in a way that confirms an unambiguous decision on the enemy. That means creating a reality of defeat that the enemy understands and fears.

[Rank amateur]

That means creating a reality of defeat that the enemy understands and fears.

The problem is that no one likes to be defeated, and they're not defeated unless they quit, so if you don't offer an opportunity to save face, they don't quit.

The Sunnis in Iraq are a good example. They never surrendered. They forced us to offer them a deal. Which goes back to my original point. Unless you start killing women and children in retaliation for not surrendering, ""legitimate, discriminate, poportional force doesn't produce unambigious results.

(As before, I'm open to counter examples that prove I'm wrong.) Actually, I guess I should add "without the support of the population." If you accept that the objective of the first gulf war was to remove the Iraqis from Kuwait, we had Kuwaiti support and a definitive victory. If you had broader objectives, the results were more ambiguous.

[William F. Owen]

The problem is that no one likes to be defeated, and they're not defeated unless they quit, so if you don't offer an opportunity to save face, they don't quit.

The Sunnis in Iraq are a good example. They never surrendered. They forced us to offer them a deal. Which goes back to my original point. Unless you start killing women and children in retaliation for not surrendering, ""legitimate, discriminate, poportional force doesn't produce unambigious results.


If someone has an option not to quit, then they are clearly not defeated. Defeat means "choosing not to continue." Any situation that allows options, other than quitting, is not a defeat. If they choose to continue, then no decision.

The IRA never surrendered, but they gave up the armed struggle. Communists in Malaya are also an example.

[Rank amateur]

The IRA never surrendered, but they gave up the armed struggle.

Correct, but not because of force, because of a political settlement. (The use of force may have made them willing to accept a settlement, but force didn't produce an unambiguous victory by the unionists.)

[Ron Humphrey]

Correct, but not because of force, because of a political settlement. (The use of force may have made them willing to accept a settlement, but force didn't produce an unambiguous victory by the unionists.)

One would think that physically turning your guns the other way and actively working towards the coalitions goals of reconciliation with opposition groups entails a little more than just political change.

If someone is going north and you require them to go south then you could:

1- Force them to turn around or else
2- Require them to turn around by blocking all other directions with immovable barriers
3- Ask them and do so in such a way as to show that it is truly in their best interest to do so

No one is the final answer nor do any guarantee success in that; one leaves no one to turn around, another requires resources to build the barriers, and the third requires skill sets which may not be inherent within ones force. That however doesn't change the fact that all are options.

[William F. Owen]

The use of force may have made them willing to accept a settlement, but force didn't produce an unambiguous victory by the unionists

Well that's all the use of force you require. Force is never an ends in itself. It's a tool. Fail to use it properly and you don't get the results you want.

....and it denied the (P)IRA the victory they had been seeking.

[clayton]

The security studies community has also been looking at the issue of the effects of the amount of force used in counterinsurgencies and stability operations. In the Summer 2004 edition of International Security, a Georgetown University professor examined the likelihood of military occupations succeeding based on an analysis of twenty-four historical cases. In the article, he touches upon some of the points made by people like William Owen and Ken White in this thread. Here is an example:

Occupations are more likely to succeed when they follow a destructive military victory that has eviscerated prewar political, economic, and social institutions. Such a victory increases the likelihood of success for two reasons. First, destructive military victory demonstrates that the pre-occupation regime can no longer deliver vital needs to the population, and thereby reduces the number of loyalists to that regime. Starting from a clean slate with no lingering elements of the pre-occupation regime, the occupying power is more likely to be able to convince the occupied population that the future under and after an occupation will be better than the bitter wartime past.Once the occupation begins strategies to eliminate the influence of the pre-occupation regime, such as denazification in post–World War II Germany, can clear the way for a successful occupation.
Second, if an occupied territory has been destroyed by war, then the population is more likely to accept the occupation as a necessary evil. Without the occupying power’s help, the country may never be able to rebuild....

The author does go on to list several important qualifiers to this statement. You do have to sort through the rather longish and dense article to get to some of the nuggets. Here is the link: http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/dme7/documents/occupational%20hazards.pdf