Gates silent on report Fallon may be replaced

[oblong]

From the AFP (http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5h2LLnVFOCU7pjVj5LhSi-g6RQ3vg):


US Defense Secretary Robert Gates chose not to comment Monday on a magazine article that says the commander of US forces in the Middle East may soon be replaced because of his opposition to war with Iran.

"He's read the article in question and will not be commenting on it," said Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell, referring to Gates.



I have no idea how bureaucracies work at that level. Is Gates not dignifying a silly claim by responding to it? Or is he pointedly not supporting a subordinate publicly?

[Ron Humphrey]

From the AFP (http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5h2LLnVFOCU7pjVj5LhSi-g6RQ3vg):



I have no idea how bureaucracies work at that level. Is Gates not dignifying a silly claim by responding to it? Or is he pointedly not supporting a subordinate publicly?

Considering that this is the Military we are speaking about it might be that such things as who, what ,when ,and where's of change within overall assignments might just be something meant for eyes and ears of those within their scope and not for all the rest of us. Sometimes looking to politicize something doesn't always make it political. Certain things should be handled within the scope of their general practices.

I wouldn't be too concerned about not finding out what goes on, because there are those who will make sure things come out whether they should or not. Not sure it's reasonable to expect the SECDEF to fill in the blanks just for our satisfaction.

Just a thought---

[RTK]

If you're going to eat sausage, it's best not to see how it's made first....

[Tom Odom]

Sec Def just made the announcement. More to follow I am sure...


Fallon resigns as Mideast military chief (http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/national/1152ap_fallon_resigns.html)

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

WASHINGTON -- Adm. William Fallon, the top U.S. military commander for the Middle East, is resigning, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Tuesday.

Gates said that Fallon had asked him for permission to retire and that Gates agreed.

"I believe he has made the right decision," Gates told reporters at the Pentagon. He called Fallon a very able military strategist and said he will be missed.

[RTK]

Sec Def just made the announcement. More to follow I am sure...

So the next question is: Who will replace him? Gen Petraeus?

[marden]

So the next question is: Who will replace him? Gen Petraeus?


Admiral Fallon Resigns as Head of Centcom

Tuesday , March 11, 2008
[...]

Centcom's second-in-command Gen. Martin Dempsey will now take over Fallon's post.

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,336849,00.html

Here's the Esquire article which may have contributed to the "misperceptions about differences between his ideas and U.S. policy."


March 5, 2008, 5:02 PM
The Man Between War and Peace

As head of U. S. Central Command, Admiral William "Fox" Fallon is in charge of American military strategy for the most troubled parts of the world. Now, as the White House has been escalating the war of words with Iran, and seeming ever more determined to strike militarily before the end of this presidency, the admiral has urged restraint and diplomacy. Who will prevail, the president or the admiral? http://www.esquire.com/features/fox-fallon#

[zenpundit]

That Fallon will be replaced by General Odierno and Petraeus is kicked upstairs to NATO.

[ipopescu]

Now that's interesting...

AP - The top U.S. military commander for the Middle East resigned Tuesday amid speculation about a rift over U.S. policy in Iran. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said that Adm. William J. Fallon had asked for permission to retire and that Gates agreed. Gates said the decision, effective March 31, was entirely Fallon's and that Gates believed it was "the right thing to do."

Fallon was the subject of an article published last week in Esquire magazine that portrayed him as opposed to President Bush's Iran policy. It described Fallon as a lone voice against taking military action to stop the Iranian nuclear program.

Fallon, who is traveling in Iraq, issued a statement through his U.S. headquarters in Tampa, Fla.

"Recent press reports suggesting a disconnect between my views and the president's policy objectives have become a distraction at a critical time and hamper efforts in the Centcom region," Fallon said.

"And although I don't believe there have ever been any differences about the objectives of our policy in the Central Command area of responsibility, the simple perception that there is makes it difficult for me to effectively serve America's interests there," Fallon added.

Gates described as "ridiculous" any notion that Fallon's departure signals the United States is planning to go to war with Iran. And he said "there is a misperception" that Fallon disagrees with the administration's approach to Iran.

"I don't think there were differences at all," Gates added.

Fallon has had a 41-year Navy career. He took the Central Command post on March 16, 2007, succeeding Army Gen. John Abizaid, who retired. Fallon previously served as commander of U.S. Pacific Command.

President Bush issued a statement saying that Fallon "has served our Nation with great distinction for forty years. He is an outstanding sailor -- and he made history as the first naval officer to serve as commander of Central Command. "

Gates said that until a permanent replacement is nominated and confirmed by the Senate, Fallon's place will be taken by his top deputy, Army Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey.

The secretary called Fallon a very able military strategist and said his advice will be missed at the Pentagon.

"I think this is a cumulative kind of thing," said Gates, speaking of the circumstances leading up to Fallon's decision. "It isn't the result of any one article or any one issue."

"As I say, the notion that this decision portends anything in terms of change in Iran policy is, to quote myself, 'ridiculous,' " he said.

[Ron Humphrey]

Now that's interesting...



Sooner or later there may come a greater awareness that Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marine's really believe in what they do. They serve to protect and defend and acheive the mission. It's unfortunate when politics, or media fall into the trap of playing one side against the other in order to get their way; regardless the long term consequences. It is even more sad when this results in hampering a given individuals ability to perform that mission.

The part that really bothers me about this is the undercurrent of trying to use it to cast a shadow over any actions which might eventually take place concerning Iran.

They are training people to kill our soldiers and do their best to DE stabilize Iraq. Regardless of what many would like at some point you have to stop this in one fashion or another otherwise it is guaranteed to continue.

I also find myself wondering who actually thinks they've accomplished something good here in trying to tie the hands of those charged with protecting their freedoms.

This whole things just SAD:(

[Rex Brynen]

They are training people to kill our soldiers and do their best to DE stabilizeDE stabilize Iraq.

Actually, I don't think the Iranians want a destabilized Iraq at all--they want a stable, pro-Iranian one without US combat troops in it.

Of course, they throw weapons and money at their Shi'ite allies, and sometimes some of those weapons are used against US forces (for example, by JAM). Their major allies, however, comprise the people and parties (notably, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and the Islamic Dawa Party) that form the current Iraqi government--that is, the same government that Washington also supports.

I had a conversation with several senior Iranian security analysts yesterday (academics and foreign ministry researchers). They were pretty clear on these points, and went so far as to note that--for all the rhetoric--Tehran did not want an overly-hasty US withdrawal from Iraq that would seriously weakened the Baghdad government and allow a resurgence of AQI. This isn't to say they were happy about the US military presence there, or in Afghanistan. They wanted it gone. But they were quite realistic about when and how.

[Ron Humphrey]

Actually, I don't think the Iranians want a destabilized Iraq at all--they want a stable, pro-Iranian one without US combat troops in it.

Of course, they throw weapons and money at their Shi'ite allies, and sometimes some of those weapons are used against US forces (for example, by JAM). Their major allies, however, comprise the people and parties (notably, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and the Islamic Dawa Party) that form the current Iraqi government--that is, the same government that Washington also supports.

I had a conversation with several senior Iranian security analysts yesterday (academics and foreign ministry researchers). They were pretty clear on these points, and went so far as to note that--for all the rhetoric--Tehran did not want an overly-hasty US withdrawal from Iraq that would seriously weakened the Baghdad government and allow a resurgence of AQI. This isn't to say they were happy about the US military presence there, or in Afghanistan. They wanted it gone. But they were quite realistic about when and how.

If this was truly the larger case then where would anything but an Iraq in which Iran has great sway and a like minded leadership configuration be viewed as an acceptable thing.

If the Iraqi's actually take control of their own future, resources, religious standing etc. where would that leave Iran.

This is the part which seems somewhat offline with the idea that they'll play nice if they don't get their way. An Iraq stable and strong on its own would not seem to be their way.

[Rex Brynen]

If the Iraqi's actually take control of their own future, resources, religious standing etc. where would that leave Iran.

In the long term there will certainly be divergences of Iraqi and Iranian national interests--just as there will be in Iraqi and US national interests.

In the short term, two of the the three major Shi'ite parties see Iran as just as much of an ally as they do the US, and the third sees Iran as more of an ally. Certainly the Iranians were very, very pleased by the reception that Ahmadinejad got on his recent visit to Baghdad.

[Rank amateur]

Fred Kaplan has a slightly different take. (http://www.slate.com/id/2186456/)


Contrary to the charges of some Democratic lawmakers, this is not another case of an officer's dissent being stifled. Nor does Fallon's departure herald a tilt in U.S. policy toward war with Iran.

To the extent that policy disputes are behind the move, they are much more about Iraq.

[John T. Fishel]

Goldwater-Nichols rationalized the C2 structure in mostly positive ways, especially, in giving regional commanders significantly more control over their service components and subordinate JFCs. One problem that is highlighted by Adm Fallon's retirement is what one does about a subordinate JFC that is commanded by another 4 star, whose theater has the eye and ear of the President (the CINC), and who, properly, sees himself and his AOR as the supported commander and theater. Although GEN Petraeus technically is subordinate to COMCENT, the reality is that he is supported by COMCENT. That reality, which G-N does not anticipate, clearly contributed to the discordant notes in the Fallon-Petraeus dialogue.

I would argue against any legislative fix. It isn't necessary. The SECDEF has the authority to make the fix by dsignating command relationships as in, "He doesn't work for you; you support him."

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

He's correct in that this no big deal, not what some in Congress are trying to say and that Fallon did have a tendency to speak out of turn. He's incorrect in that Fallon is not one of our finest strategic minds (whatever that is...). He's also incorrect in asserting that Shinseki's career was cut short. While his treatment by Rumsfeld was unarguably poor, there was no cutting short, Shinseki retired on his long programmed retirement date.

John, I agree with you on Goldwater-Nichols doing more good than harm though it did both and I also agree that no legislative fix is required. The further one can keep Congress away from the services, the better off we all are. I am, however bemused by the thought of a political appointee taking a sensible and principled stand and defying Congress and the FlagOs. ;)

Further, the thought of massive four button egos having to agree on command versus supporting...

Those guys are worse than Corporals about time in grade. :D

[J Wolfsberger]

"He demonstrated his independence from the White House when he refused in February to go along with a proposal to send a third aircraft-carrier task force to the Persian Gulf. Fallon questioned the military necessity for the move, which would have signaled to Iran a readiness to go to war. Fallon also privately vowed that there would be no war against Iran on his watch, implying that he would quit rather than accept such a policy."Petraeus out of step with US top brass (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/II14Ak02.html)

Sounds like he was, in fact, part of the problem. The job of someone in his position is to execute policy, not make it.

[John T. Fishel]

I really am a fan of G-N.:D I served on the Southcom staff for the first 4 years of its implementation and was very pleased with the changes it made especially with respect to service components. It was nice to see the DCINC - then a USAF slot - go from obstructing everything the CINC wanted to do to supporting him (and, incidentally, to cease being dual hatted as commander of Southaf).

As for supported and supporting relationships, they are common in all OPLANS and CONPLANS. For example, in DS/DS CINCCENT (Schwartzkopf) was the supported CINC while CINCEUR (Galvin) was the supporting CINC. No problemo there. That command relationship was intrinsic to 1002-90, the CENTCOM OPLAN. So, I don't see an ego problem getting in the way so long as the SECDEF does his job, in the same way that Max Thurman as CINC did his when he pointed his finger at Carl Steiner and told him he was to be the operational commender if Blue Spoon was executed.

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

acknowledge it did more good than harm. The really good news to me is that practice and time are erasing some of the minor glitches.


...As for supported and supporting relationships, they are common in all OPLANS and CONPLANS. For example, in DS/DS CINCCENT (Schwartzkopf) was the supported CINC while CINCEUR (Galvin) was the supporting CINC. No problemo there. That command relationship was intrinsic to 1002-90, the CENTCOM OPLAN. So, I don't see an ego problem getting in the way so long as the SECDEF does his job, in the same way that Max Thurman as CINC did his when he pointed his finger at Carl Steiner and told him he was to be the operational commender if Blue Spoon was executed.True on supported and supporting being common and it usually works out roughly as planned. Having worked under all SecDefs except the very first and the last three, they're a mixed bag at best. I, with tongue only partly in cheek, suggest that John Galvin happily supported Norm because he recognized the greater ego (Norm and I served part of an Advisory tour together when he was a CPT...). :D

Max, was, of course, Max. Thus, I suggest it's at least partly personality dependent. For example, Abizaid left Sanchez and Casey almost totally alone -- probably wrongly -- but that's the way it goes...

[John T. Fishel]

was the most complete General I ever met. He had a total situational awareness in both the bureaucratic and real wars he fought as well as being a gentleman and an intellect. I don't think that great egos impressed him much but that didn't keep him from being effective in dealing with them.

I didn't know that about how Abizaid dealt with either Sanchez or Casey. Since he was a Mideast FAO (or should have been because of his qualifications - don't know if he actually carried a 48 designator) this was a shame because he had tremendous insight to contribute. Still, I was disappointed in his performance and with Casey's because they seemed to lack situational awareness in the narrow sense and failed to really adapt to the changing situation in Iraq after the bombing of the Golden Mosque.

As far as Sxhwartzkopf is concerned, all I have to say is that it was a good thing you were both CPTs at the time!:D

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

on Abizaid, I really expected better -- but do not know how much political pressure was put on him from the funny farm...


As far as Sxhwartzkopf is concerned, all I have to say is that it was a good thing you were both CPTs at the time!:D

Norm was a Captain, left to go work on one of the projects -- probably where he got his distaste for SOF. ;)

I was an SFC at the time; thus able to ride him for being a BS artist. :D

[CR6]

He had a total situational awareness in both the bureaucratic and real wars he fought

I gotta get me some of that! I don't even know when my kids are sneaking cookies between meals...

Concur on GEN Galvin. I never met the man, but I am impressed both by what I've read about him and what I've read BY him.

[John T. Fishel]

I hadn't rmembered that you actually worked for a living!:cool:

[John T. Fishel]

I had the chance to work for, talk with, or at least meet all the Southcom CINCs from Dennis P. McAuliffe through Peter Pace. I was fortunate to become friends with Fred Woerner later when I was writing about Panama. I generally found them to be a relatively impressive group. Each had his strengths and his faults. Among the more intriguing from my perspective were Paul Gorman who could be a bit of a bully but was good to work with if you stood up to him; Jack Galvin who, in addition to what I said about him in previous posts, groomed officers like David Petraeus who, as Major in 1986, spent the summer break from West Point where he was teaching, in Southcom watching Galvin's approach to COIN in El Sal. Among his other talents, Galvin was a superb linguist and spoke beautiful Spanish and fluent German. Fred Woerner was a great teacher and strategist in the region but he didn't cover his bureaucratic rear. Max Thurman was a big enough man to admit that he should have paid more attention earlier to HIS post-conflict plan (which his and Worner's staff had developed). If anything, he was too hard on himself since he made it his own and executed it extremely well. George Joulwon was very insightful as was Chuck Wilhelm. As for Wes Clark, I sat next to him at a dinner for the Board Of Visitors of the School of the Americas and attempted to engage him in substantive conversation - I have NO memory of anything he said.:rolleyes: Peter Pace has my deepest respect as I said in some posts after he was forced to retire at the end of one tour as CJCS. McCauliffe and Nutting I really didn't know and I merely shook McCaffery's hand once.

[Ken White]

I hadn't rmembered that you actually worked for a living!:cool:

that far... :D

I met Fred, briefly when he was CG Sixth Army, seemed like one of the better ones. Guy I have a lot of respect for knew him and worked with him and thought much as you do, he was too honest for the system. Wasn't he one of those rare former FAOs who got to GO level?

I did deal with Wesley on a couple of occasions back when he was COL and later as a BG at NTC. As good Queen Vicky said, "we are not amused." I'm sure that what he said at your dinner was noteworthy for its absence of meaningful content or even logic -- and he has apparently not improved with age; micromanaging message manipulators rarely do...


Another good friend of mine said of McCaffery "Anyone with two DSCs is either nuts or a liar." ;)