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SteveMetz
03-16-2008, 11:29 AM
I'm surprised it's taken this long, but the "neocon" architects of the Iraq disaster seemed to have agreed on an alibi and it is---drum roll--the "stab in the back."

Last week was the Post's story (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/08/AR2008030802724.html)of Douglas Feith's forthcoming book; today the Times includes an essay (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/opinion/16perle.html) by one of the movement's other ideologues-in-chief, Richard Perle, which lays it at the feet of, "Secretary of State Colin Powell; the national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice; and the director of central intelligence, George Tenet."

This whole process is both nauseating--it sickens me that people like Perle and Feith without the slightest shred of honor or integrity shape our nation's policy--and almost humorous as both spin like dervishes to absolve the people who most shaped the decision: the President, the Vice President, and the Secretary of Defense.

Feith's "stab in the back" theory has evolved. I heard him give a talk at AEI a few years ago where he trial ballooned the idea of blaming the military. I guess once he figured that wouldn't fly, he had to settle on the State Department and CIA. Anything, of course, but placing the responsibility where it belongs--on his desk, that of the Deputy SECDEF, the SECDEF, the VP, and POTUS.

Tom Odom
03-16-2008, 12:52 PM
This whole process is both nauseating--it sickens me that people like Perle and Feith without the slightest shred of honor or integrity shape our nation's policy--and almost humorous as both spin like dervishes to absolve the people who most shaped the decision: the President, the Vice President, and the Secretary of Defense.

Funny Gian G and I talked about this several months ago on here in a thread I could not find :eek:

It is much like being a sociopath, Steve, as they define anything they do as good for the country because they are the country--at least what is important in the country.

Best

Tom

marct
03-16-2008, 01:05 PM
I'm surprised it's taken this long, but the "neocon" architects of the Iraq disaster seemed to have agreed on an alibi and it is---drum roll--the "stab in the back."

Back when I was studying politics, I came across a tactic labeled "The Big Lie". This involves putting out a Bravo Sierra story and then having it spun out via as many media streams as possible. It relies on the "if there's smoke, there's fire" meme that operates in most cultures, and takes advantage of the joy most humans get out of feeling they lie in a world governed by conspiracies. I can't remember where I heard the corollary, but it goes something like "we all love conspiracies because to wake up and realize that our governments are full of bunglers and twits who we elected" :wry:.

Needless to say, most politicians are well aware of this and know how to take advantage of it :cool:.

Van
03-16-2008, 01:05 PM
One of the underlying problems in the Middle East is a culture that has no innate grasp of cause and effect.
As in- "I was smoking a cigarette and pumping gas, the Allah (pbuh) caused an explosion".

Here, we take it the to the step after intellectual enlightenment and rationalize cause and effect, multiplying causes to match our world view.
As in- "The big tobacco industry has pressured me into smoking while the medical establishment failed to educate me adequately on the risks. The Oil corporations have simultaneously monopolized our automotive industry and destroyed our public transportation system, while allowing the retail gas industry to transition to fundamentally unsafe 'Self-Serve' gas pumps."

It doesn't change the fact that the guy who blew himself up at the gas pump was so self-serving and self-absorbed that he couldn't be bothered to put out the cigarette first.

And both of them were unwilling to accept personal responsibility for their actions.

John T. Fishel
03-16-2008, 01:11 PM
Van--

That is one of the funniest things I have ever read!!!!!:D

JohnT

SteveMetz
03-16-2008, 01:21 PM
I'm a bit peeved that this whole thing spewed out after my book went to press. Otherwise I would, in my own insignificant little way, have called out these slime pits for what they are.

What's really tragic is that this won't affect their income flows one whit. In fact, I suspect that the stab-in-the-back alibis would do exactly as intended and preserve their income flows.

Having gotten this spun up so early in the morning, I suspect my adrenaline will be depleted and I'll be ready for a nap by late morning.

Tom Odom
03-16-2008, 02:27 PM
Instead, we blundered into an ill-conceived occupation that would facilitate a deadly insurgency from which we, and the Iraqis, are only now emerging. With misplaced confidence that we knew better than the Iraqis, we sent an American to govern Iraq. L. Paul Bremer underestimated the task, but did his best to make a foolish policy work. I had badly underestimated the administration’s capacity to mess things up.

From Richard Perle whom I respect less than the gun toting Mall Ninja. Mr. Perle in contrast to the Mall Minja has never carried a gun and has seen less action than our wannabe warrior mall security guard.

To the Ninja's credit, he does not use the term "we" when he really means "you" as Mssr Perle does here as a ploy to avoid personal responsibility by sharing blame. In contrast, Mr. Perle has never had a problem using "I" when things go right. In using it in the above paragraph, he patronizingly glib in dismissing his own role as if he had merely suggested a bad play for a local softball team.

What an ass..

Tom

SteveMetz
03-16-2008, 03:18 PM
From Richard Perle whom I respect less than the gun toting Mall Ninja. Mr. Perle in contrast to the Mall Minja has never carried a gun and has seen less action than our wannabe warrior mall security guard.

To the Ninja's credit, he does not use the term "we" when he really means "you" as Mssr Perle does here as a ploy to avoid personal responsibility by sharing blame. In contrast, Mr. Perle has never had a problem using "I" when things go right. In using it in the above paragraph, he patronizingly glib in dismissing his own role as if he had merely suggested a bad play for a local softball team.

What an ass..

Tom

I find Perle less nauseating than Feith. Perle advocated just throwing the keys to Iraq to Chalabi and beating feet. I think that would have been immoral and a disaster, but at least he can credibly make a case that the Bush administration did not follow his advice. Feith, on the other hand, is trying to foist off responsibility for actions he DID have a hand in on other organizations and individuals. If by some miracle things work out in Iraq, I can easily imagine Feith then taking credit for the decisions.

davidbfpo
03-16-2008, 06:41 PM
Rewriting history this side of the Atlantic has yet to appear, largely as Gordon Brown's government is trying to ignore Tony Blair's leadership. Few I think here will be brave enough to publically say "We were right to invade". Many of the politicians involved have left the limelight.

The impact of how intelligence is used to persaude the public may have a longer shelf life; many commentators here say the legacy of the Iraq invasion means the public will remain sceptical, if not hostile to intelligence.

Side issues, like the mysterious death or suicide of Dr David Kelly, a government scientist deeply involved in disarming Iraq, who spoke out of turn to the BBC, arouse some attention and a book on the subject is in it's fourth impression (since late 2007).

davidbfpo

SteveMetz
03-16-2008, 09:49 PM
Rewriting history this side of the Atlantic has yet to appear, largely as Gordon Brown's government is trying to ignore Tony Blair's leadership. Few I think here will be brave enough to publically say "We were right to invade". Many of the politicians involved have left the limelight.

The impact of how intelligence is used to persaude the public may have a longer shelf life; many commentators here say the legacy of the Iraq invasion means the public will remain sceptical, if not hostile to intelligence.

Side issues, like the mysterious death or suicide of Dr David Kelly, a government scientist deeply involved in disarming Iraq, who spoke out of turn to the BBC, arouse some attention and a book on the subject is in it's fourth impression (since late 2007).

davidbfpo


I gave a talk on insurgency week before last at the Royal College of Defence Studies and was surprised at how little interest there was in Iraq. All they wanted to talk about was Afghanistan. Iraq seems to be purely history.

J Wolfsberger
03-17-2008, 10:44 AM
Perle is out of the generation of cold warriors, with a world view shaped by that "competition." How much do you think that experience, in him and others, is shaping our current policy? i.e. Is this group that is referred to as "Neocons" shaped by strong experience that required a hard line in a competition of ideologies?

SteveMetz
03-17-2008, 12:16 PM
Perle is out of the generation of cold warriors, with a world view shaped by that "competition." How much do you think that experience, in him and others, is shaping our current policy? i.e. Is this group that is referred to as "Neocons" shaped by strong experience that required a hard line in a competition of ideologies?

IMO, the problem is that people like Perle and Norman Podhoretz whose entire psyche has been was shaped by struggle against an evil enemy have simply shifted fire to "Islamofascism" (which I personally consider a nonsense word, at least the way they use it). Problem is that the notion of World War III or IV which they promote resonates with a lot of Americans, particularly but not exclusively evangelical conservatives.

I was relieved that Guiliani's defeat showed that as we move further from September 11, receptivity to this idea is declining. I don't think there is enough distance that whoever is president can come right out and reject it, but hopefully they can stop comparing the threat from Islamic militants to the the threat from the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany. I am worried, though, that this group might become involved in the McCain campaign. But I think he's independent enough to make up his own mind rather than being seduced by misguided advisors.

Tom Odom
03-17-2008, 01:12 PM
Rewriting history this side of the Atlantic has yet to appear, largely as Gordon Brown's government is trying to ignore Tony Blair's leadership. Few I think here will be brave enough to publically say "We were right to invade". Many of the politicians involved have left the limelight.

davidbfpo

But Mssr Perle will


We made mistakes in Iraq, but war was just (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2008/03/16/do1612.xml)
By Richard Perle
Last Updated: 12:01am GMT 16/03/2008

For a government fighting an unpopular war, five years is an eternity. In the sight of history, it's just a blink, far too short for considered judgment or a balanced accounting. But judges and accountants won't wait, so the fifth anniversary of the invasion of Iraq has renewed the debate about that action and its consequences - a debate dominated by the terrible costs, with almost no assessment of the benefits.


Amazing but not surprising that 5 years can be dismissed as somehow irrelevant without a blink or a hiccup..

Steve Blair
03-17-2008, 02:41 PM
And this has a long-standing history in American politics. Vietnam had its many examples, as has just about every conflict we've been involved in. No reason to suspect that Iraq would be any different, especially since our political machine is self-selecting in terms of who it lets through the rusty gates.

Marc, I think it was Hitler's machine that really perfected the "Big Lie." Goebbles in particular was a master of it; first for the Strassers in Berlin and later for ol' Adi himself down Munich way.

Tom Odom
03-17-2008, 03:18 PM
Marc, I think it was Hitler's machine that really perfected the "Big Lie." Goebbles in particular was a master of it; first for the Strassers in Berlin and later for ol' Adi himself down Munich way.

Steve

I believe you are correct. Big Lie has been a staple of the Hutu Power movement since the end of the genocide in Rwanda.

Tom

marct
03-17-2008, 03:56 PM
Hi Steve,


Marc, I think it was Hitler's machine that really perfected the "Big Lie." Goebbles in particular was a master of it; first for the Strassers in Berlin and later for ol' Adi himself down Munich way.

They certainly did a great job of it :wry:. Personally, I think Trotsky perfected the theory of it even earlier (aided by Lenin or vice versa depending on who published first :D). Still and all, the tactic itself is quite old - take a look at Ramesses II and his spin on Kadesh ;).

Granite_State
03-17-2008, 04:05 PM
I'm surprised it's taken this long, but the "neocon" architects of the Iraq disaster seemed to have agreed on an alibi and it is---drum roll--the "stab in the back."

Last week was the Post's story (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/08/AR2008030802724.html)of Douglas Feith's forthcoming book; today the Times includes an essay (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/opinion/16perle.html) by one of the movement's other ideologues-in-chief, Richard Perle, which lays it at the feet of, "Secretary of State Colin Powell; the national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice; and the director of central intelligence, George Tenet."

This whole process is both nauseating--it sickens me that people like Perle and Feith without the slightest shred of honor or integrity shape our nation's policy--and almost humorous as both spin like dervishes to absolve the people who most shaped the decision: the President, the Vice President, and the Secretary of Defense.

Feith's "stab in the back" theory has evolved. I heard him give a talk at AEI a few years ago where he trial ballooned the idea of blaming the military. I guess once he figured that wouldn't fly, he had to settle on the State Department and CIA. Anything, of course, but placing the responsibility where it belongs--on his desk, that of the Deputy SECDEF, the SECDEF, the VP, and POTUS.

Feith is just disgusting. Whoever pointed out the blaring "Doug Feith is a patriot" quote on his website from General Peter Pace on a SWC thread a week or two back, that was great stuff.

Perle's been an open and shut case for me since reading Charlie Wilson's War last year. He, Oliver North, and a couple of other Reagan Administration guys had some ludicrous plan to spirit Red Army defectors out of Afghanistan and use them to form a second Vlasov's Army that would bring down the USSR. The experienced CIA guys were incredulous, said it was a joke, but the plan went ahead. In the end they got two shattered conscripts who had been repeatedly raped by the mujahideen, one of whom later robbed a convenience store in Tyson's Corner. Read the book's account of it, the story is hilarious.

I'm continually amazed at how think tanks, the chattering class, Capitol Hill, and even the upper reaches of the Executive Branch are populated by folks with no earned knowledge of the real world, or often even of their subject matter. Prime case is Michael Ledeen, the neocon "Iran expert." He's never even been to Iran. And people listen to this guy!

Tom Odom
03-17-2008, 04:34 PM
Fateful Choice on Iraq Army Bypassed Debate (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/17/world/middleeast/17bremer.html?pagewanted=1&hp)
By MICHAEL R. GORDON
Published: March 17, 2008

....The plan was outlined in a PowerPoint presentation that Douglas J. Feith, a senior aide to Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, gave at a National Security Council meeting that Mr. Bush convened on March 12, eight days before the invasion began. Republican Guard units, the forces deemed most loyal to Mr. Hussein, were to be disarmed, detained and dismantled.


Ok it is now clear to me. PPT that ubiquitous mind-numbing. intellect robbing deceptively alluring means of non-communications is really to blame...

I mean when you read this, everyone had the right idea but no one could execute it. Then this guy Bremer--and he apparently had the right idea too--just went and did the wrong thing. It had to have been PPT manipulation of decisionmakers. The research on PPT manipulation is well established in think tanks in DC. Typically PPT-M shows up when briefs have bullets of 3 to 5 words that can offer different meanings to the unwary decision-maker--who everyone knows has too much to read anyway.

What me worry? :D (3 words meaning no worries)

Tom

marct
03-17-2008, 04:46 PM
Ok it is now clear to me. PPT that ubiquitous mind-numbing. intellect robbing deceptively alluring means of non-communications is really to blame...

So it's really all Bill Gates' fault :eek:! Got it :D!

Steve Blair
03-17-2008, 04:54 PM
I'm continually amazed at how think tanks, the chattering class, Capitol Hill, and even the upper reaches of the Executive Branch are populated by folks with no earned knowledge of the real world, or often even of their subject matter. Prime case is Michael Ledeen, the neocon "Iran expert." He's never even been to Iran. And people listen to this guy!

I think the real key here is no knowledge of their subject matter. I've seen people who've "been there" who have no real clue as to the history of where they've been (in other words, what was behind the "there" that they saw), and have no idea how to go about gaining that knowledge. Yet they still think they are "experts" based on their handful of trips.:wry:

We have far too many folks kicking around in these circles who don't understand even the basics of intellectual research and confuse .ppt and a few History Channel shows for real research and background.

Tom Odom
03-17-2008, 04:57 PM
We have far too many folks kicking around in these circles who don't understand even the basics of intellectual research and confuse .ppt History and a few History Channel shows for real research and background.

Steve gets it, too, Marc!

marct
03-17-2008, 05:17 PM
Steve gets it, too, Marc!

So many students will be disappointed if we ever started testing not using ppt and the History Channel :(. I mean, after all, if it's good enough for politicians and bureaucrats, what's like the problem, eh ;)?

Marc

Editorial note: the expression "eh (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eh#Canada)?" was first popularized by Bob and Doug MacKenzie (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bob_and_Doug_McKenzie) in the early 1980's. Originally, it was only used in a small stretch of Canada opposite Buffalo. The author only used it here to keep Tom happy :D

Rank amateur
03-17-2008, 06:20 PM
Here's a new one. The "Iraq war" actually started in 1968.
(http://www.slate.com/id/2186740/)



when I wrote the essays that go to make up A Long Short War: The Postponed Liberation of Iraq, I was expressing an impatience with those who thought that hostilities had not really "begun" until George W. Bush gave a certain order in the spring of 2003.

Anyone with even a glancing acquaintance with Iraq would have to know that a heavy U.S. involvement in the affairs of that country began no later than 1968, with the role played by the CIA in the coup that ultimately brought Saddam Hussein's wing of the Baath Party to power.

J Wolfsberger
03-17-2008, 07:14 PM
... has never been noted for sloppy thinking.

One of the problems with the anti-war crowd is that they don't seem to have had a problem with the numerous bombing raids carried out under the previous administration, or the economic sanctions. (With the exception that some seemed to think we should have lifted them once Saddam turned "Oil for Food" into "Oil for Politicians and Weapons.") On the other hand, the fact that Bush wasn't 100% correct in everything, and the occupation was bungled, makes him and the US totally evil.

A second problem, that Hitchens has spoken to before, is that they refuse to recognize the world is a better place with Saddam out of power. That, too, is always ignored.

It would be nice to lock leftist, anti war types and "Neocons" in a room. The next day we could shoot the survivors. ;)

Ken White
03-17-2008, 07:19 PM
date isn't that far off the mark for our involvement specifically in Iraq. Hitchens engages in his usual hyperbole and provocative style but he's not totally out to lunch in that article

One can argue that Iraq was not well planned or even a good plan -- but one should have an alternative proposal for what was to be done about the steadily increasing probes from the Middle East from 1979 through 2001 other than continue to accept them with almost no reaction. Thus far, I've seen no one offer such an alternative other than 'diplomacy' and some feel-good efforts which, given the long memories and propensity for feuds in the ME would have been highly unlikely to confer even minimal success..

One can go back to the FDR and Ibn Saud conference on the return trip from Yalta and wish the US had done many things in the ME differently over the next 30 years. Not much point in that, we did what we did and the seizure of the Tehran Embassy resulted and our totally ineffectual response to that started the ball rolling. I submit diplomacy would not have stopped it. Nor will Iraq -- but Iraq did short circuit their efforts and it will have a deterrent effect provided we don't get stuck on stupid. That's far better than doing what we did from 1979 until 2001.

While no fan of Wolfotwits, Feith et.al. and while agreeing with most above on the stupidity of the Neocon ideas (and their current CYA effort -- which is pathetic but was to be expected), I've never been totally convinced that Bush adopted the Neocon mantras -- I think he realized on a gut level that it was impossible to seal the borders of the US and that something more than diplomacy was required. He simply followed some (not all) of the Neocon ideas because they made more sense than most of the alternatives. IOW, no one had a better plan.

And, five years later, I still haven't read or heard of one...

Ken White
03-17-2008, 07:25 PM
...
It would be nice to lock leftist, anti war types and "Neocons" in a room. The next day we could shoot the survivors. ;)

I'll even donate a few. Voila, no survivors.... :D

marct
03-17-2008, 07:32 PM
I'll even donate a few. Voila, no survivors.... :D

have an ideal way of dealing with Post Modernists and others suffering from PMS (Post Modernist Syndrome) which was similar. Lock them in a spherical room and tell them to deconstruct a continuous loop of Celine Dion :eek:.

There would be no survivors :cool:.

Ski
03-17-2008, 07:38 PM
I find it quite ironic that the neo-cons are taking a page out of German history with the "dolchstoss" defense...these people are out to lunch.

Ken, sometimes lack of policy and action is good enough.

Ken White
03-17-2008, 08:06 PM
Whether it's advisable or not when you're being stalked by a Pride of Lions is another question.

Turning the other cheek is, to steal a phrase from Marc, a Post Modernists preferred methodology. Works generally okay with most westerners. Not so much with folks from the ME who are definitely not into post modernism...

Response should be tailored to sources not dreams.

J Wolfsberger
03-17-2008, 08:20 PM
have an ideal way of dealing with Post Modernists and others suffering from PMS (Post Modernist Syndrome) which was similar. Lock them in a spherical room and tell them to deconstruct a continuous loop of Celine Dion :eek:.

That's odd. I'd have thought you would be opposed to torture. :wry:

Ski
03-17-2008, 09:06 PM
A pride of lions? Please. You give the Islamic radicals too much credit sir.

Iraq had no lions, they had a broken country that had the illusion of stability and strength.

The surveillance program under Desert Spring and other Iraq tailored operations worked quite fine. It was undoubedtly cheaper, both in blood and treasure, and kept a modicum of stability in the region.

Now there is a power vacuum that we are temporarily filling. I am of the opinion this cannot be sustained indefinatly.

Ken White
03-17-2008, 10:18 PM
A pride of lions? Please. You give the Islamic radicals too much credit sir.Not really, but I'm incredibly easy. Not lions then. How about a pack of Jackals -- or even wild dogs? Still propose to do nothing? If so, we have a different approach to life.
Iraq had no lions, they had a broken country that had the illusion of stability and strength.If you were under that illusion, as were many, not my problem. IMO, they were neither stable nor strong but they did have the misfortune to have an unloved dictator and be smack dab in the geographic center of the ME, they thus became an easy target.
The surveillance program under Desert Spring and other Iraq tailored operations worked quite fine. It was undoubedtly cheaper, both in blood and treasure, and kept a modicum of stability in the region.Stability in the region was not the issue -- export of nominally Islamic fundamentalist terrorism to the rest of the world was the issue and, in particular, attacks on the US (read: Afghanistan, here we come) and more importantly, US interests worldwide (as in Khobar towers, the embassies, Beirut and all that -- read Iraq and the greater ME, here we come...) were the triggers to do more than passively accept them -- which Desert Fox and such did absolutely nothing to deter. One could argue that such halfhearted foolishness merely encouraged the Jackals...

The object in attacking Iraq was not to produce a stable ME, it was to get bases in the area in order to facilitate the local development of greater stability and to deter local adventurers in the field of global terrorism by cutting the time to accomplish that from four or five generations to only two or so. May not have been the best plan in the world but it'll probably work and it is certainly vastly preferable to continuing to encourage the attacks by NOT responding significantly.
Now there is a power vacuum that we are temporarily filling. I am of the opinion this cannot be sustained indefinatly.Shouldn't need to be sustained indefinitely, just another 15-30 years or so. Hang in there, it'll get worse before it gets better.

Ski
03-17-2008, 11:23 PM
Jackals or wild dogs is a better desciption for Al Qaeda. Not for the Baathists in Iraq. They were mosquitos - kept at bay with a nice fresh dose of DDT every so often.

Agree that Iraq was not strong, but was relatively stable, much more so than what we are seeing today. Unloved dictators are dime a dozen in the world, it does not mean we are invading their countries however. I suspect our political beliefs are different and that's good.

Where we part ways - Gathering bases is a do-nothing plan for me when we have bases scattered in the region from Turkey to Oman to Kuwait to Qatar to Bahrain to Kyrgystan...how many is enough? We could have done enough damage to non-state terror groups without invading Iraq for additional bases (do you really believe that?) We could have kept a close eye on Iraq, built up a Division size presence on the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border. Hell, we had a great deal of military surveillance on the place as is...after 13 years, we should have known everything about the damned country.

I don't believe the American public will allow us to stay in Iraq for 15 years, much less 30. We shall see.







Not really, but I'm incredibly easy. Not lions then. How about a pack of Jackals -- or even wild dogs? Still propose to do nothing? If so, we have a different approach to life.If you were under that illusion, as were many, not my problem. IMO, they were neither stable nor strong but they did have the misfortune to have an unloved dictator and be smack dab in the geographic center of the ME, they thus became an easy target.Stability in the region was not the issue -- export of nominally Islamic fundamentalist terrorism to the rest of the world was the issue and, in particular, attacks on the US (read: Afghanistan, here we come) and more importantly, US interests worldwide (as in Khobar towers, the embassies, Beirut and all that -- read Iraq and the greater ME, here we come...) were the triggers to do more than passively accept them -- which Desert Fox and such did absolutely nothing to deter. One could argue that such halfhearted foolishness merely encouraged the Jackals...

The object in attacking Iraq was not to produce a stable ME, it was to get bases in the area in order to facilitate the local development of greater stability and to deter local adventurers in the field of global terrorism by cutting the time to accomplish that from four or five generations to only two or so. May not have been the best plan in the world but it'll probably work and it is certainly vastly preferable to continuing to encourage the attacks by NOT responding significantly.Shouldn't need to be sustained indefinitely, just another 15-30 years or so. Hang in there, it'll get worse before it gets better.

Billy Ruffian
03-18-2008, 01:28 AM
It's disgusting when the rats flee a floundering ship with all their goodies securely snug in their jaws.

Rank amateur
03-18-2008, 02:06 AM
and be smack dab in the geographic center of the ME, they thus became an easy target.

Define "easy."


The object in attacking Iraq was not to produce a stable ME, it was to get bases in the area

If you're right, then the war was unnecessary. Saddam would've given us a huge base in the dessert in exchange for his life.

Ken White
03-18-2008, 02:47 AM
Jackals or wild dogs is a better desciption for Al Qaeda. Not for the Baathists in Iraq. They were mosquitos - kept at bay with a nice fresh dose of DDT every so often.you're supposed to do; concentrate on Iraq and miss the rest of the ME. Part of the strategery, I think. Seems to be working. Your mosquito advice was adhered to by three former Presidents-- you see where that got us...

Iraq is just the most visible aspect of the multi pronged strategy, Afghanistan is another -- and totally separate LOO (to use the buzz-acronym) -- while the real effort is closing off the money supply and infiltrating the operating entities (nothing classified in that, been touted in open sources here and there). The Baathists were not an issue. Saddam was not an issue. Iraq's oil was not an issue. Iraq was not an issue. The issue was destabilizing the Islamist terror base throughout the ME. Iraq just happened to be the geo location thereof because it's smack dab in the middle of the AO.
Agree that Iraq was not strong, but was relatively stable, much more so than what we are seeing today. Unloved dictators are dime a dozen in the world, it does not mean we are invading their countries however...The dictator wan't a big issue but the fact the he was unloved by many made him a better target than some others. That and the fact that an attack there was likely to be minimally disruptive to world oil supply. Not ours; the world's -- we really want China and India to have all the oil they want.

Nor was Iraq's stability an issue. Isn't really one today in broad terms other than as that stability affects our ability to do what we wish. Callous but that's life in the real world.
...I suspect our political beliefs are different and that's good.Perhaps. Though the issue to me is not political and, domestically, I'm pretty much apolitical and don't like or trust either party or ANY politician. I am a complete pragmatist, I've spent a few years in the ME and I know that four previous Presidents inadvertently encouraged them to continue their attacks over a 20 year period. Bush may not be great but at least he had enough sense to say 'enough.'
Where we part ways - Gathering bases is a do-nothing plan for me when we have bases scattered in the region from Turkey to Oman to Kuwait to Qatar to Bahrain to Kyrgystan...how many is enough?...Actually we don't have any bases in Turkey though they did allow us to use some of theirs under very tightly controlled conditions. The others you cite in the ME are all subject to similar conditions and all are small and would not allow for three or four BCT with training space. Kyrgyzstan is not in the ME (neither is Afghanistan). It's not how many, it's where they are and the capability they provide.
...We could have done enough damage to non-state terror groups without invading Iraq for additional bases (do you really believe that?)... No, I don't believe we could have done such damage -- we haven't done them much damage even with Iraq ;) ; that's a different thing entirely and is being worked quietly in many places around the world by a surprising number of US guvmint employees from many agencies (not least USSOCOM who are not into advertising). Yes, I do believe the bases were a very significant reason for the attack on Iraq; not the only reason, there were a dozen or more but the bases were a biggie.
...We could have kept a close eye on Iraq, built up a Division size presence on the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border. Hell, we had a great deal of military surveillance on the place as is...after 13 years, we should have known everything about the damned country.In reverse order; we obviously didn't know much about it all (Intel failure of significant magnitude); Kuwait is not big enough to allow a Division sized force and adequate training room plus there would have been conditions of use; yet again, Iraq is not the issue -- the support of trans national terrorism by a broad swath of people throughout the ME is the issue.
I don't believe the American public will allow us to stay in Iraq for 15 years, much less 30. We shall see.Heh. Okay. We will, indeed... :D

Ken White
03-18-2008, 03:03 AM
Define "easy."That was fairly easy.

Huh? Oh, the last five years? All that was due to (1) A massive Intel failure before the invasion by numerous agencies. (2) An Army that had no idea how to occupy another country because they had not done that in almost 60 years. (3) An Army that due to deliberate and planned lack of training and focus over an almost 30 year period under four Presidents from both parties was not prepared to pre-empt an insurgency or to fight it if it erupted. Even at that, it's been easy and five years later, we've used about one third the body bags estimated by many for the initial attack. As wars go, trust me, this one is real easy.

Yeah, aside from the casualties, always a concern but inevitable to some degree, it's also been expensive, dollar wise -- but a very large part of that is due to inane laws and regulations prompted by those laws, all passed by a series of lame Congress critters over the years in oder to 'protect the taxpayers money.' You'll have to speak to Congress about that; out of my hands.

That's the definition of easy. Not for the poor guys that got hit but, all in all, as wars go, that's easy.
If you're right, then the war was unnecessary. Saddam would've given us a huge base in the dessert in exchange for his life.Funny guy. In order for that to have occurred, we'd have had to have the ability to deprive him of life -- we obviously did not. :D

Besides, we wanted three or four, dispersed, all with big airfields to facilitate rapid deployment elsewhere -- and with no strings on their use. That meant taking them. Even Saddam's generosity had limits...

Ski
03-18-2008, 12:36 PM
Ken

I understand where you are coming from now. Don't agree with you all the way, but that's life.

We do have an air base in Turkey - Incirlik. Been there twice.

Jedburgh
03-18-2008, 01:17 PM
....I understand where you are coming from now. Don't agree with you all the way, but that's life.

We do have an air base in Turkey - Incirlik. Been there twice.
Ski - I've spent a bit of time there as well, but Incirlik is not our base. It is a Turkish AF installation, of which they permit us to use a part. We've been using it since '55, but it still ain't our base. They've made that very clear; especially clear on the occasions that they've rolled armored vehicles onto the airstrip to stop our aircraft from taking off when they were engaged across the Iraqi border.

Over the years, Incirlik has played an important role in a broad spectrum of missions, from the '58 intervention in Lebanon, to OPC/ONW and current ops. But the Turks always have the last word on what we can launch from that site - and since the interference they ran against us with OPC missions, and the issues we had with them over OIF launch, they are no longer viewed as reliable ally in the COE (despite public stroking to the contrary). In too many important regards, their interests diverge from ours - long-term, we need an air base to replace Incirlik that will meet the same regional needs.

Rank amateur
03-18-2008, 03:41 PM
In order for that to have occurred, we'd have had to have the ability to deprive him of life -- we obviously did not.


Obviously, we had the ability to kill Saddam, because he's dead now. Obviously he knew it, because he had a spider hole prepared.

Or to express my thoughts more concisely, if all we wanted were bases, we should have offered to call off the invasion in exchange for bases. Since the people in the White House are pretty smart and didn't make that offer, I suspect it was about more than bases: at least in their minds.



Even Saddam's generosity had limits...

I wasn't refferring to his genoristy. I was reffering to his desire for self preservation. I suspect that Saddam with a gun to his head would be more likely to give us permission to use bases to attack Iran than an Iraqi Prime Minister who has been told that he's liberated and holds hands with Ahmadinejad. But that's just my opinion.


Huh? Oh, the last five years? All that was due to


I'd place the blame for the last five years higher up: a combination of arrogance and ignorance of the basic fact that urban combat can't possibly play out like the 1991 slaughter in the dessert. But that's also just my opinion.


it's also been expensive, dollar wise

Given that one of UBL's objectives was to weaken our the economy, and our massive debt has contributed to the weakening economy, I personally wouldn't brush off the expense so quickly.

Slate has a whole bunch of people reflecting on whether they were right or wrong five years ago.

This is the link to the liberal hawks." (There are a few more that will be coming on line this week.): (http://www.slate.com/id/2186757/)


IMO, Richard Cohen is the most honest: (http://www.slate.com/id/2186766/)

"I admit it—I wanted to strike back."


"How Did I Get Iraq Wrong? I trusted Colin Powell and his circumstantial evidence—for a little while," by Fred Kaplan. Posted March 17, 2008. (http://www.slate.com/id/2186758/)

"How Did I Get Iraq Wrong? I underestimated the self-centeredness and sectarianism of the ruling elite and the social impact of 30 years of extreme dictatorship," by Kanan Makiya. Posted March 17, 2008.
(http://www.slate.com/id/2186763/)

Ski
03-18-2008, 04:19 PM
Thanks for the clarification. I did not know that. The education continues...:D


Ski - I've spent a bit of time there as well, but Incirlik is not our base. It is a Turkish AF installation, of which they permit us to use a part. We've been using it since '55, but it still ain't our base. They've made that very clear; especially clear on the occasions that they've rolled armored vehicles onto the airstrip to stop our aircraft from taking off when they were engaged across the Iraqi border.

Over the years, Incirlik has played an important role in a broad spectrum of missions, from the '58 intervention in Lebanon, to OPC/ONW and current ops. But the Turks always have the last word on what we can launch from that site - and since the interference they ran against us with OPC missions, and the issues we had with them over OIF launch, they are no longer viewed as reliable ally in the COE (despite public stroking to the contrary). In too many important regards, their interests diverge from ours - long-term, we need an air base to replace Incirlik that will meet the same regional needs.

Ken White
03-18-2008, 04:24 PM
Ken

I understand where you are coming from now. Don't agree with you all the way, but that's life.

We do have an air base in Turkey - Incirlik. Been there twice.

So have I -- more than twice; see Jedburgh. Also been to Izmir. We were guests and we had restrictions on use.

Ken White
03-18-2008, 04:39 PM
Obviously, we had the ability to kill Saddam, because he's dead now. Obviously he knew it, because he had a spider hole prepared.We had the ability to kill him after we found him in the hole; we did not to get the bases at the time of the invasion or for a great many months thereafter; so that's really a sort of silly argument.
Or to express my thoughts more concisely, if all we wanted were bases, we should have offered to call off the invasion in exchange for bases. Since the people in the White House are pretty smart and didn't make that offer, I suspect it was about more than bases: at least in their minds.Of course it was about more. As I said there were over a dozen reasons I can think of and they probably had a few I didn't think of -- I simply believe the bases were among the most important if not the most important of all those reasons.
... give us permission to use bases to attack Iran than an Iraqi Prime Minister who has been told that he's liberated and holds hands with Ahmadinejad. But that's just my opinion.Who said anything about attacking Iran? That's your construct, not mine.
I'd place the blame for the last five years higher up: a combination of arrogance and ignorance of the basic fact that urban combat can't possibly play out like the 1991 slaughter in the dessert. But that's also just my opinion.Those factors had a play but were not the principal problems.
Given that one of UBL's objectives was to weaken our the economy, and our massive debt has contributed to the weakening economy, I personally wouldn't brush off the expense so quickly.You don't have to, I've seen our debt far higher in my lifetime so, hopefully, you won't mind if I yawn and move on.
Slate has a whole bunch of people reflecting on whether they were right or wrong five years ago.And all these people had what role to play in the whole thing? You really pay much attention to those talking head squirrels? Surprising.

Since I'm batting somewhere between .800 and .900 on the whole thing, you'll forgive me if I sort of ignore the Punditocracy who rarely get much of anything correct in my observation. ;)

Rank amateur
03-18-2008, 05:05 PM
Since I'm batting somewhere between .800 and .900 on the whole thing, you'll forgive me if I sort of ignore the Punditocracy who rarely get much of anything correct in my observation. ;)

Since you commented on Hitchens I thought you might find it interesting. I find comparing the mea culpas to the excuses interesting and at the very least it gives Steve a platform to plug his book.;)

I took a simple approach 5 years ago. Powell knew more about military affairs than anyone in the cabinet. The cabinet ignored him. I made some predictions based on those facts. I'll refrain from guessing my batting average until I've read Steve's book, but sometimes the simple approach - "hit them where they ain't" - can produce a decent batting average.

Ken White
03-18-2008, 05:58 PM
Since you commented on Hitchens I thought you might find it interesting. I find comparing the mea culpas to the excuses interesting and at the very least it gives Steve a platform to plug his book.;)Only reason, I also skimmed your links above but didn't really see anything to attack or defend. Not that I was defending Hitchens, merely stating he wasn't totally out to lunch. Neither are the others -- nor do any of them offer any significant insights, IMO. Been my experience that those self appointed mavens rarely do...
I took a simple approach 5 years ago. Powell knew more about military affairs than anyone in the cabinet. The cabinet ignored him. I made some predictions based on those facts. I'll refrain from guessing my batting average until I've read Steve's book, but sometimes the simple approach - "hit them where they ain't" - can produce a decent batting average.Neither of your approaches were or are bad; both are good, in fact -- the latter particularly so. If you can do that...

My take on the whole thing wasn't radically different than Powell's. Like him, I reconciled myself to the fact that we were going to do it anyway -- and I think he will acknowledge, as do I, that it doesn't have to be our way to work and that sometimes you can't hit 'em where they ain't because you don't know where that is. Intel is never flawless...

Rank amateur
03-19-2008, 07:37 PM
I'm taking this thread off on a tangent, so maybe it should be split into two threads.

An Army captain is proud of his service but changes his mind on Iraq.
(http://www.slate.com/id/2186926/)

In 2002, I believed the intelligence painting Iraq as an imminent threat and supported our invasion. In 2003 and 2004, I worried about the growing insurgency and grew dismayed at our counterproductive tactics and strategy, but I still felt the war was a worthy cause.

In 2005, I volunteered to deploy to Iraq as an Army captain...

But I came home in September 2006 frustrated with the strategic direction of the war and alienated from the country that sent me there. I saw our failures to secure the country and build a new Iraq as proof of the limits of military power—and a sign that America was not omnipotent. Over a beer near Times Square in October 2006, I told George Packer (who had been embedded with my adviser team earlier that year in Baqubah) that I thought the war was now "unwinnable"—and that we must implement an adviser-centric strategy.



A senior fellow of the Freeman-Spogli Institute is optimistic post surge, but mentions some lessons.
(http://www.slate.com/id/2186767/)


So in the fifth year of the war, the tide began to turn, albeit for reasons that are not exactly fortuitous. Maybe, five years from now, we will be able to look back and point to Iraq as the first successful counterinsurgency war since the British bested the Malay rebels in the 1950s (though after 12 long years)...

The lesson is stark: If you don't will the means, don't will the end. To this Kantianism, let us add pure homily: Look before you leap. The tragedy of American power in the Middle East, the most critical arena of world politics, is that the United States ended up working as the handmaiden of Iranian ambitions.


8 lessons on Iraq: #4 and 8 seem correct to me.
(http://www.slate.com/id/2186955/)

I particularly want to talk to those of you who, like me, would like to understand the errors of this war without renouncing the use of force altogether. "I don't oppose all wars," Barack Obama declared six years ago. "What I am opposed to is a dumb war." Let's try to flesh out that distinction.

This one is actually on topic: a conservative places the blame at the top. I agree with much of it.
(http://www.slate.com/id/2186954/pagenum/2/)



Another larger mistake was to put my trust in the Bush administration, not so much on matters of intelligence—faulty intelligence was a near-universal phenomenon—but on matters of basic competence. I will admit to a prejudice here: I believed—note the tense, please—that Republicans were by nature ruthless, unsentimental, efficient, and, most of all, preoccupied with winning. It simply never occurred to me that Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney would allow themselves to lose a war. Which is what they have very nearly done.

Tom Odom
03-19-2008, 07:38 PM
So of course Mssr Bremer must answer idealogue Mssr Perle and disciple Feith as he does in this article in Nat Review



Facts for Feith
CPA history. (http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NDIwN2MzOTljOTNlODdiMDIzZWQ5ZmZjZTQyZjQ5NzM=)

By L. Paul Bremer III

A recent article in the Washington Post previewed the forthcoming book by former undersecretary of defense Douglas Feith. In his book Feith apparently alleges that I was responsible for what he calls the single biggest mistake the United States made in Iraq. He claims that I unilaterally abandoned the president’s policy, promoted by Feith and others before the war, to grant sovereignty to a group of Iraqi exiles immediately after Saddam’s defeat. On March 16, Richard Perle of the American Enterprise Institute elaborated on this theme, arguing that a key error was that “we did not turn to well-established and broadly representative opponents” of Saddam.

And so he disputes the details going so far as to produce a copy of a short memo from SecDef Rumsfeld approving a memo of his. That is in itself bizarre as Mssr Bremer uses "the former presidential envoy to Iraq" as his credit line. Presidential envoys do not work for the Sec Def; they work for the President. So Bremer using Rumsfeld's memo of approval suggests confusion.

But where it just gets too surreal is in the closing:



Admittedly, it was an imperfect political process. The occupation lasted 14 months, which no doubt frustrated and angered some Iraqis. But the time we bought allowed the Iraqis to write a progressive constitution and to embark on the long, difficult path to democratic government.

Technically I guess that is true, marking the period of the CPA and Bremer's tenure. But in 2008 that sentence just kind of stands out--yes I added the bold italics--as symbolic. To Bremer, who left soon afterward, the "occupation" lasted but 14 months? All said and done, it comes across as a 5-person band version of Nero fiddling. No one was clearly in charge but they all really tried. The music still sucked.

Tom

SteveMetz
03-19-2008, 08:08 PM
These guys need to spend less time taking shots at each other and focus on Tenet and Powell.

Peter Feaver's essay in the Weekly Standard (http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/014/884qfzox.asp) is much more useful contribution to the debate.

I'm thinking of emailing him directly. He wrote, "Despite strenuous efforts, war critics have not come up with well-substantiated cases of the administration saying something that it knew was not true or had no evidentiary basis for believing was true. Of course, there are many cases of the administration saying things that turned out to be not true. But moving the public from "you were lying" to "you were mistaken" would be significant progress. And moving it all the way to "you had understandable reasons for your policy" could be game-changing."

I think he is doing exactly what the administration did in 2002: deliberately making HALF a strategic argument. A complete argument is not simply saying "X is a threat" but to say that "the threat from X justifies the costs and risks of dealing with it using method Y."

Ken White
03-19-2008, 09:20 PM
For Rank Amatuer:

Opinions are good, everyone should have at least one. Whether any you link address all the realities is immaterial, I suppose; long as they get a point or a few correct, there's always something to like... ;)

For Tom Odom:

We can agree on the music quality -- and I've got a tin ear... :D

For Steve Metz (at last; I have an at least moderately substantive comment!):


"I think he is doing exactly what the administration did in 2002: deliberately making HALF a strategic argument. A complete argument is not simply saying "X is a threat" but to say that "the threat from X justifies the costs and risks of dealing with it using method Y."

I totally agree with you on both counts. I also acknowledge that in the case of Iraq (and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan) the argument was done exceedingly poorly if at all. Further, I'm trying to dredge up a memory of when the USA has ever really done that at all well? Can you think of any involving the commitment of troops in any thing more than token numbers?

My point is not to denigrate or challenge what you say, I do agree with you. It's just that my perception is that we do not do that very well. We certainly should, no question, however, indications lead me to believe it's sort of unlikely. Thus the follow on question is, I suppose -- how do we get that to happen routinely?

SteveMetz
03-19-2008, 10:20 PM
For Rank Amatuer:

Opinions are good, everyone should have at least one. Whether any you link address all the realities is immaterial, I suppose; long as they get a point or a few correct, there's always something to like... ;)

For Tom Odom:

We can agree on the music quality -- and I've got a tin ear... :D

For Steve Metz (at last; I have an at least moderately substantive comment!):



I totally agree with you on both counts. I also acknowledge that in the case of Iraq (and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan) the argument was done exceedingly poorly if at all. Further, I'm trying to dredge up a memory of when the USA has ever really done that at all well? Can you think of any involving the commitment of troops in any thing more than token numbers?

My point is not to denigrate or challenge what you say, I do agree with you. It's just that my perception is that we do not do that very well. We certainly should, no question, however, indications lead me to believe it's sort of unlikely. Thus the follow on question is, I suppose -- how do we get that to happen routinely?

I think in Bosnia, Panama, El Salvador, etc the expected costs and risks were weighed in the strategic decision.

Rank amateur
03-19-2008, 10:41 PM
Thus the follow on question is, I suppose -- how do we get that to happen routinely?

War is a human endeavor. The more wars we lose, the more realistic we'll get about costs. The more we win, the more arrogant we'll become and we'll assume that the next war will be short and quick.

I think it's the same for everyone. Has they're ever been a dominant Army that didn't eventually over reach?

Ken White
03-19-2008, 10:59 PM
El Salvador, Grenada and Panama though I would mention that each of those had its own batch of surprises; they were small scale so the surprises were not major.

Bosnia, possibly -- but if so, it would seem the calculus was flawed (based on length of mission). Kosovo would appear to be not an example on several levels... :mad:

Note though my caveat in the original question; "...the commitment of troops in any thing more than token numbers? (emphasis added / kw).

Far more important than that issue, I think, is my follow on question; how do we get that -- "the threat from X justifies the costs and risks of dealing with it using method Y." -- to happen routinely?

I fully understand most of the parameters in strategic decision making -- and am more conversant than I wish to be with the domestic political dimension -- but there should be a way to force that issue on reluctant Administrations (not to mention Congress. Shudder... :eek:) and hopefully to do so with knowledgeable and competent assessment of the costs and risks.

I say hopefully because I also fully understand the great difficulty in such assessments and I would never expect perfection. War will never be fully predictable and the unexpected is the norm. I also say hopefully because of the equally great difficulty of getting knowledgeable and competent people involved in such assessments as opposed to getting the judgment from whoever happens to be in position at the time...

I have watched us fail badly in such assessments too many time over the past 60 years or so and it would seem to me there has to be a better way. In the current situation, you guys came up with a pretty good assessment -- and it was essentially ignored. That, too has happened before -- numerous times.

Goldwater-Nichols was not a panacea but it did slightly more good than harm; the errors in it should be fixed and some additions made to get a valid, comprehensive strategic process embedded -- one that will force sensible risk assessment, planning and force employment. Cap Weinberger tried but he relied on common sense to heed what he said. That wasn't enough, unfortunately.

There oughta be a law...

SteveMetz
03-19-2008, 11:57 PM
El Salvador, Grenada and Panama though I would mention that each of those had its own batch of surprises; they were small scale so the surprises were not major.

Bosnia, possibly -- but if so, it would seem the calculus was flawed (based on length of mission). Kosovo would appear to be not an example on several levels... :mad:

Note though my caveat in the original question; "...the commitment of troops in any thing more than token numbers? (emphasis added / kw).

Far more important than that issue, I think, is my follow on question; how do we get that -- "the threat from X justifies the costs and risks of dealing with it using method Y." -- to happen routinely?

I fully understand most of the parameters in strategic decision making -- and am more conversant than I wish to be with the domestic political dimension -- but there should be a way to force that issue on reluctant Administrations (not to mention Congress. Shudder... :eek:) and hopefully to do so with knowledgeable and competent assessment of the costs and risks.

I say hopefully because I also fully understand the great difficulty in such assessments and I would never expect perfection. War will never be fully predictable and the unexpected is the norm. I also say hopefully because of the equally great difficulty of getting knowledgeable and competent people involved in such assessments as opposed to getting the judgment from whoever happens to be in position at the time...

I have watched us fail badly in such assessments too many time over the past 60 years or so and it would seem to me there has to be a better way. In the current situation, you guys came up with a pretty good assessment -- and it was essentially ignored. That, too has happened before -- numerous times.

Goldwater-Nichols was not a panacea but it did slightly more good than harm; the errors in it should be fixed and some additions made to get a valid, comprehensive strategic process embedded -- one that will force sensible risk assessment, planning and force employment. Cap Weinberger tried but he relied on common sense to heed what he said. That wasn't enough, unfortunately.

There oughta be a law...

The Clinton administration had a pretty grim assessment of the threat from Saddam Hussein, but realized that the costs and risks of removing him by direct intervention outweighed the expected benefits. Multiple administration's made the same assessment on "roll back" of communism in Europe.

There were a few people making that case in 2002. Zinni, for instance. While not actively engaged in the debate, that was my position.

Ken White
03-20-2008, 02:47 AM
The Clinton administration had a pretty grim assessment of the threat from Saddam Hussein, but realized that the costs and risks of removing him by direct intervention outweighed the expected benefits...An alternative view is that the domestic political risk was excessive.

With the exception of the Civil War and arguably WW II, every war in which we have been involved has been a war of our choosing. With the exception of Greece and Korea, and thus Truman, every operation since WW II in which we have been involved was effectively driven by and hobbled by domestic politics. In every case, the party not in the WH objected vociferously to the war and poor mouthed it for its entire length. The Kennedys went to Viet Nam to prove their anti-communist bona fides (and to boost the economy) as well as for ultra idealistic reasons; Johnson followed along and expanded for the very same reasons -- minus the idealism...

And the Republicans were opposed.

Fast forward to Kosovo, the Republicans were again opposed and fought it tooth and nail just as todays opposition is fighting Iraq. I believe domestic concerns cut more ice with Clinton that did a cost benefit analysis. Bush 41 demurred on going to Baghdad in 1991 ostensibly on a cost benefit basis though I would argue that it would have been far easier then than it was in 2003. In the event, domestic political concerns had a part in that decision as well. And he still didn't get reelected...

But you know all that, sorry.

The broader point, though, is that our political process and domestic politics have been the driver in our inability to do the analysis and make rational strategic decisions and I do not see that changing in the near term, desirable as it may be. In that sense, the assessments leading to this war differ little from that (or the lack of that...) of most of our previous wars -- and much as I agree with you on what should be done, I'm not particularly optimistic that it will be.
...Multiple administration's made the same assessment on "roll back" of communism in Europe.Due to fear of WW III. Probably logical. I'm not as forgiving of the four previous administrations from both parties that tried to overlook fundamentalist Islamic export of terror attacks worldwide instead of forcefully nipping it in the bud -- starting with the Tehran Embassy seizure. In the case of the Islamists, it boiled down to not understanding the enemy and fear of WW III was not an issue. That and domestic politics.

In fairness to Clinton, at least, the capability to do some things that needed doing should have been available but did not exist. That's DoD's fault -- again under several Administrations. Yet again, domestic politics.
There were a few people making that case in 2002. Zinni, for instance. While not actively engaged in the debate, that was my position.Nor was I actively engaged in the debate; and I partly agreed but partly disagreed with you and Zinni. Something needed to be done and I knew Afghanistan alone would not be enough. As I've often said, I wouldn't have done it the way it was done but it doesn't have to be my way to work. The biggest change I would have made would have been to wait until the second term while working harder on a coalition. My perception is that Bush, unsure he would get a second term at that point, decided to do something that he thought needed doing and that he feared a successor might not do. Domestic politics one more time...

That's pretty much why we have never done the assessment you and I and a good many others believe is needed. How to force that to occur is a knotty problem indeed. It will not happen just because it should.

wm
03-20-2008, 12:56 PM
Note though my caveat in the original question; "...the commitment of troops in any thing more than token numbers? (emphasis added / kw).

Far more important than that issue, I think, is my follow on question; how do we get that -- "the threat from X justifies the costs and risks of dealing with it using method Y." -- to happen routinely?

I fully understand most of the parameters in strategic decision making -- and am more conversant than I wish to be with the domestic political dimension -- but there should be a way to force that issue on reluctant Administrations (not to mention Congress. Shudder... :eek:) and hopefully to do so with knowledgeable and competent assessment of the costs and risks.

I say hopefully because I also fully understand the great difficulty in such assessments and I would never expect perfection. War will never be fully predictable and the unexpected is the norm. I also say hopefully because of the equally great difficulty of getting knowledgeable and competent people involved in such assessments as opposed to getting the judgment from whoever happens to be in position at the time...
Ken,
Wishful thinking on your part I believe. (And hope is not a plan :))

America going to war (and not just sending in a few troops a la Grenada or Panama as an exercise of testosterone release) is, IMHO, the national equivalent of a domestic "crime of passion." We knee jerk and send the troops off somewhere because we react very much as a husband would should he come home and found the missus in bed with another man--no rational thought involved, purely a visceral reaction.

The low level troop commitments have less emotional motivation, but it is still present to some degree(as the "testosterone release" phrasing in my description above indicates).

If you want strong, "take charge"national leadership, I suspect you have to accept the propensity for irrational responses to major provocations as well.

Ken White
03-20-2008, 03:50 PM
Ken,
Wishful thinking on your part I believe. (And hope is not a plan :))

America going to war (and not just sending in a few troops a la Grenada or Panama as an exercise of testosterone release) is, IMHO, the national equivalent of a domestic "crime of passion." We knee jerk and send the troops off somewhere because we react very much as a husband would should he come home and found the missus in bed with another man--no rational thought involved, purely a visceral reaction.

The low level troop commitments have less emotional motivation, but it is still present to some degree(as the "testosterone release" phrasing in my description above indicates).

If you want strong, "take charge"national leadership, I suspect you have to accept the propensity for irrational responses to major provocations as well....I said this:

""The broader point, though, is that our political process and domestic politics have been the driver in our inability to do the analysis and make rational strategic decisions and I do not see that changing in the near term, desirable as it may be. In that sense, the assessments leading to this war differ little from that (or the lack of that...) of most of our previous wars -- and much as I agree with you on what should be done, I'm not particularly optimistic that it will be.""

My point in the last few posts on this thread was to (1) Agree with Steve that what he posits is what should be done. (2) Remind everyone that it has never really happened and is unlikely to. Much as we could all agree it should.

We just get to cobble stuff together and try to make it work out -- it's the American way... :D

Presley Cannady
03-26-2008, 04:19 AM
I think he is doing exactly what the administration did in 2002: deliberately making HALF a strategic argument. A complete argument is not simply saying "X is a threat" but to say that "the threat from X justifies the costs and risks of dealing with it using method Y."

Except in 2002 the Administration made a full strategic argument. Repeatedly. And since then, the President has consistently echoed the same piece: failure to disarm Iraq, by force if necessary, will non-negligibly risk a Baathist regime--or whatever follows should it collapse--offering Islamic terrorists material support to improve on the record of 19 hijackers armed with box cutters. That is, the death of three quarters of the number lost in Iraq in a single day and the evisceration of half an annual federal outlay --or a third to twice the cost of five years in Iraq (depending on whose numbers you go by)--in a single quarter.

As for Perle and Feith, after five years of having their names dragged through the mud for a post-war everybody including State agrees they weren't allowed to muck around with, I can understand some of their resentment.

SteveMetz
03-26-2008, 02:09 PM
Except in 2002 the Administration made a full strategic argument. Repeatedly. And since then, the President has consistently echoed the same piece: failure to disarm Iraq, by force if necessary, will non-negligibly risk a Baathist regime--or whatever follows should it collapse--offering Islamic terrorists material support to improve on the record of 19 hijackers armed with box cutters. That is, the death of three quarters of the number lost in Iraq in a single day and the evisceration of half an annual federal outlay --or a third to twice the cost of five years in Iraq (depending on whose numbers you go by)--in a single quarter.

As for Perle and Feith, after five years of having their names dragged through the mud for a post-war everybody including State agrees they weren't allowed to muck around with, I can understand some of their resentment.

You've illustrated the crux of the administration's flawed argument: that the Hussein regime would or could provide WMD to terrorists. In other words, the argument pivoted on the probability of a regime which had never shown evidence of suicidal tendencies becoming suicidal.

Cogent strategy entails assuming some degree of risk when the anticipated costs of addressing the threat are greater than the probability of the threat coming to pass, or of the damage if the threat did come to pass. The administration skewed this logic by grossly overestimating the likelihood of a threat to the United States from Hussein, and grossly underestimating the expected costs of removing him by force.

I find the assertion that Feith "was allowed to muck around in" post-regime planning bizarre. If OSD wasn't who was? Do you seriously intend to make an argument that State somehow messed it up?

Ken White
03-26-2008, 04:24 PM
You've illustrated the crux of the administration's flawed argument: that the Hussein regime would or could provide WMD to terrorists. In other words, the argument pivoted on the probability of a regime which had never shown evidence of suicidal tendencies becoming suicidal.

Cogent strategy entails assuming some degree of risk when the anticipated costs of addressing the threat are greater than the probability of the threat coming to pass, or of the damage if the threat did come to pass. The administration skewed this logic by grossly overestimating the likelihood of a threat to the United States from Hussein, and grossly underestimating the expected costs of removing him by force...

I'm aware the Admin said what you cite for public consumption. Do you personally think that any great number of the decision makers really put any stock in that? Do you think that had any significant place at all in the heirarchy of reasons for the attack?

Rank amateur
03-26-2008, 04:47 PM
I'm aware the Admin said what you cite for public consumption. Do you personally think that any great number of the decision makers really put any stock in that? Do you think that had any significant place at all in the heirarchy of reasons for the attack?

I'm going to agree with Ken: (http://www.slate.com/id/2186850)


ut Rumsfeld wasn't interested in waging that kind of war. He saw the war not so much as a fight about Iraq as a demonstration of a new style of warfare—known as "military transformation" or "the revolution in military affairs"—that signaled how America would project power in the post-Cold War era. He saw, not incorrectly, a turbulent world of emerging threats, some in remote areas inaccessible from U.S. bases. The large, lumbering armies of old were not so suitable for such conflicts. Hence his emphasis on small, lightweight units of ground forces—fast to mobilize, easy to sustain—and superaccurate bombs and missiles to hit targets that only heavy artillery could destroy in decades past. With the Iraq war (and the Afghanistan conflict before it), he wanted to send rogue regimes and other foes a message: Look what we can do with one hand tied behind our back. If we can overthrow Saddam (and the Taliban) so easily, we can overthrow you, too.

It is no surprise, then, that Rumsfeld rejected the argument, made by several Army and Marine generals, that whatever happens on the battlefield, we'll need a few hundred thousand troops to impose order and help form a new Iraq. A large, lengthy occupation would have nullified his whole concept of new-style warfare and its vision of 21st-century geopolitics.

Rummy et al had a solid strategic agreement: take out all state sponsors of terrorism - high benefit - using a "transformed" military: low cost.

When it turned out that the strategic analysis was laughably wrong the spin doctors came up with arguments that were good enough to win the election, which was the spin doctor's job, but which were - as Steve points out - strategically ridiculous.

Ken White
03-26-2008, 05:40 PM
[URL="http://www.slate.com/id/2186850"]I'm going to agree with Ken:If you say so. I don't agree with Fred. Rarley do, he's a hack and you should cross check his stuff...
When it turned out that the strategic analysis was laughably wrong the spin doctors came up with arguments that were good enough to win the election, which was the spin doctor's job, but which were - as Steve points out - strategically ridiculous.You might want to check your timing on what was said and when the election occurred. You might also contemplate how "laughably wrong" was the strategic analysis. Not Fred's version. He knows not one bit more than you or I do, perhaps less (seems that way sometimes). Rather on all the things that might have been analyzed.

SteveMetz
03-26-2008, 07:05 PM
I'm aware the Admin said what you cite for public consumption. Do you personally think that any great number of the decision makers really put any stock in that? Do you think that had any significant place at all in the heirarchy of reasons for the attack?

Hard to tell. Ron Suskind, in The One Percent Doctrine, thinks they did. Personally I suspect that the President probably believed it. Some of his advisers may have been more coldly realistic, assuming that there was a political and psychological window of opportunity to remove a festering problem. I haven't been able to find any evidence, though, of a rigorous strategic assessment which weighed the potential risks and costs of military intervention against the expected utility.

I was always one of those who considered Hussein deterrable. He was prone to miscalculation, but that can be overcome through clarity of intent. More than anything, he valued his own survival and power. So long as we could hold those things as risk, he could be deterred.

The ONLY way the administration's argument held was if one or both of two things were true: 1) the costs and risks of removing Hussein by force were minimal; or 2) the future Saddam Hussein would be very different than the past Saddam Hussein and thus willing to risk his own survival and power in order to punish the United States.

Even before the intervention, I didn't see any reason to believe either of those.

Presley Cannady
03-26-2008, 11:49 PM
You've illustrated the crux of the administration's flawed argument: that the Hussein regime would or could provide WMD to terrorists.

Could is easy to answer. Within days of 19 March 2003, only knowledge and precursors could be disseminated. Within months of the collapse of sanctions, as it concerns actual weapons, then yes. A single nuclear device outside of IAEA scrutiny would take minimum five years or more from the collapse of sanctions to complete if Iraq started standing up P1 aluminum centrifuge cascades from day one.


In other words, the argument pivoted on the probability of a regime which had never shown evidence of suicidal tendencies becoming suicidal.

That begs the question of whether or not a state that delivers the means or even a finished product to terrorists who then go on to use it against the US or her allies is necessarily committing suicide--particularly with WMD other than nuclear.


Cogent strategy entails assuming some degree of risk when the anticipated costs of addressing the threat are greater than the probability of the threat coming to pass, or of the damage if the threat did come to pass.

And in a perfect world, you'd have two clearly separated means enveloped by narrow variances. The question is what do you do when the variance is extremely wide or even unknown and there's not much obvious time for you to dig up more intel to thin it?


The administration skewed this logic by grossly overestimating the likelihood of a threat to the United States from Hussein, and grossly underestimating the expected costs of removing him by force.

I'd agree with you except for the adjective "gross" and for two reasons:

1. Iraq did not have expected stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons, but according to the Survey Group final report the will to reacquire its capability and the industry and know-how to do so in a matter of months. This might have translated into increased breathing room for the United States to build a coalition. It also may have translated into increased breathing room for Iraq to isolate the US through declarations of compliance by UNMOVIC and the IAEA in much the same manner Iran is doing by standing up centrifuge cascades while making hay out of last year's NIE. To date, I've seen no one stand up and try to calculate the likelihood of either scenario beyond mutual appeals to incredulity.

2. A rogue state filling the vessel with fissile material traceable to its mines, breeders or known centrifuges, handing it to terrorists and sending them to the US to blow it up is definitely suicidal. It's also not the only means at her disposal.


I find the assertion that Feith "was allowed to muck around in" post-regime planning bizarre. If OSD wasn't who was? Do you seriously intend to make an argument that State somehow messed it up?

I'm speaking of the post-war itself, and pointing out that even Bremer characterizes Feith and his clique lost the argument on whether the US should assume the mantle of the occupying authority. It might've been a stupid position for him to take, but it disqualifies him as the father of what followed. This isn't to say that Feith, Policy and OSD don't bear responsibility. No one's out and out said it yet, but the more I read into the bickering and recriminations between ex-OSD and State officials, the more it jives with all the data and reporting on CPA's problems in staffing and budget accountability. Despite having its own line item in the supplementals, historians would do better to start with this question: "was CPA an interagency orphan?"

I don't know the answer to that question. I'm hoping you might.

Ken White
03-27-2008, 12:03 AM
So much jabber and spin that it was and is very hard to sort.

I'm inclined to think that Saddam as threat was on the list but was down around number 12 or even lower. I think Bush was convinced that a message needed to be sent to the ME (not to Islam and not to Afghanistan; different things) and that Iraq was selected as being geographically central, relatively easy militarily, least likely to disrupt world oil supplies, having a despised dictator and thus likely to arouse the least angst in the rest of the world. I think the timing was mostly predicated on the fear that, if he, Bush, did not get a second term, his successor might not do what he thought needed to be done.

Thus, I think deterring Hussein was no more than a passing thought and removing him was not a significantly higher priority; it was merely a synergistic benefit. MBAs always look for synergies... ;)

That and the Saudis probably saying "Look, if you Americans will get out of here, we'll go after our local bad guys and turn some things around." Plus the USAF really wanted to get rid of the Northern and Southern Watches... :D

I do agree with you on this aspect:
I haven't been able to find any evidence, though, of a rigorous strategic assessment which weighed the potential risks and costs of military intervention against the expected utility.I suspect (hope???) an effort was made by the J3 and / or CentCom but that it got short shrift from the Administration who imposed their views on the cost / benefit based on flawed logic hubris and optimism as opposed to a rational assessment. However, it is possible if not probable that a better assessment was made in some measure and Bush decided to go anyway. I guess we'll find out in 2033. :wry:

SteveMetz
03-27-2008, 09:29 AM
Could is easy to answer. Within days of 19 March 2003, only knowledge and precursors could be disseminated. Within months of the collapse of sanctions, as it concerns actual weapons, then yes. A single nuclear device outside of IAEA scrutiny would take minimum five years or more from the collapse of sanctions to complete if Iraq started standing up P1 aluminum centrifuge cascades from day one.



That begs the question of whether or not a state that delivers the means or even a finished product to terrorists who then go on to use it against the US or her allies is necessarily committing suicide--particularly with WMD other than nuclear.



And in a perfect world, you'd have two clearly separated means enveloped by narrow variances. The question is what do you do when the variance is extremely wide or even unknown and there's not much obvious time for you to dig up more intel to thin it?



I'd agree with you except for the adjective "gross" and for two reasons:

1. Iraq did not have expected stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons, but according to the Survey Group final report the will to reacquire its capability and the industry and know-how to do so in a matter of months. This might have translated into increased breathing room for the United States to build a coalition. It also may have translated into increased breathing room for Iraq to isolate the US through declarations of compliance by UNMOVIC and the IAEA in much the same manner Iran is doing by standing up centrifuge cascades while making hay out of last year's NIE. To date, I've seen no one stand up and try to calculate the likelihood of either scenario beyond mutual appeals to incredulity.

2. A rogue state filling the vessel with fissile material traceable to its mines, breeders or known centrifuges, handing it to terrorists and sending them to the US to blow it up is definitely suicidal. It's also not the only means at her disposal.



I'm speaking of the post-war itself, and pointing out that even Bremer characterizes Feith and his clique lost the argument on whether the US should assume the mantle of the occupying authority. It might've been a stupid position for him to take, but it disqualifies him as the father of what followed. This isn't to say that Feith, Policy and OSD don't bear responsibility. No one's out and out said it yet, but the more I read into the bickering and recriminations between ex-OSD and State officials, the more it jives with all the data and reporting on CPA's problems in staffing and budget accountability. Despite having its own line item in the supplementals, historians would do better to start with this question: "was CPA an interagency orphan?"

I don't know the answer to that question. I'm hoping you might.

This is more of the same. Hussein "could have" done bad things without any cogent explanation of why he would have. The UK and France could launch a nuclear attack on the United States today, but we're not doing regime change there. Hussein did not use chemical weapons in 1991 because the costs of doing so were clearly communicated to him. The valued his own survival above all.

On CPA, it worked for OSD. Maybe not for Feith personally, but his attempts to blame State and CIA are pathetic. OSD, with Feith in the fore, lobbied to control the "post conflict" phase and then failed to prepare for it.

Presley Cannady
03-28-2008, 10:18 PM
This is more of the same. Hussein "could have" done bad things without any cogent explanation of why he would have.

Why he would've is even easier. Because he's an evil bastard who hated America enough to inflict great harm on her: provided he could get away with it. And that's the only question: could he act in such a way that he believed put the US--for whatever reason--in a piss poor position to retaliate. I'm not prepared to argue that Hussein reached that conclusion--not in this thread. I'm just pointing out that the neoconservatives did issue--right or wrong, reasonable or paranoid--a full strategic argument.


The UK and France could launch a nuclear attack on the United States today, but we're not doing regime change there. Hussein did not use chemical weapons in 1991 because the costs of doing so were clearly communicated to him. The valued his own survival above all.

If Feith, Kagan, Perle or any of the other usual suspects was terribly worried about Hussein using WMD on the battlefield, they've kept their concerns pretty well hidden. On the other hand, there was a great deal of talk about Hussein arming terrorists. And I don't know a single neocon who's ever been so sophomoric as to argue that capability alone matters; more importantly, I've never even seen a critical coworker of the Vulcans leak a single off-handed comment that even came close to suggesting they might.


On CPA, it worked for OSD. Maybe not for Feith personally, but his attempts to blame State and CIA are pathetic. OSD, with Feith in the fore, lobbied to control the "post conflict" phase and then failed to prepare for it.

I'm still having trouble with the company chart here. The White House appoints Bremer as a special envoy to Iraq with authority over all diplomatic and humanitarian operations, then OSD taps Bremer as administrator for reconstruction activities the following week. CPA gets its own line in the supplemental, but I'm guessing those accounts are owned by DoD. And Bremer reports to Secretary Rumsfeld, but can't actually be fired by the guy? All this following the strangling of Rumsfeld and Feith's baby, ORHA, after the looting spectacle.

And State and CIA had nothing to do with this? That just doesn't add up. For that story to hold any water, Rumsfeld would've either had to have lost confidence in Feith by May 2003--which backs up Feith's story--or Bremer is seriously understating Feith's complicity in a piece aimed at defending himself from Feith's attacks. I'm not saying OSD didn't have anything to do CPA's failures; as you pointed out Bremer did own a hat nominally subordinate to Rumsfeld. On the other hand, it seems a far more likely story is that CPA was an interagency compromise acceding to State and CIA conservatism on political reconstruction. That's why I asked if CPA was an orphan, abandoned by an OSD who didn't want the responsibility of managing an occupation and by a State Department that for any number of reasons couldn't or wouldn't staff it with civil affairs professionals.

As a matter of fact, who was responsible for CPA hiring?

SteveMetz
03-29-2008, 12:23 AM
OSD staffed ORHA and, to an extent, CPA. The "blame on State" line is pure ideological pap. Most of State's staff was rejected for ORHA. It didn't have the people to staff CPA at the level it needed to be.

You are right that the org chart was confused. Rumsfeld believed Bremer worked for him while Bremer believed he worked directly for the President. All of his resources, though, were coming through DoD.

On the argument on Hussein, you have simply asserted that he would do anything in his power to harm the United States. The problem is, there is not one whit of evidence for that. He was prone to miscalculation when American intentions were not clear, but not when they were. There is neither logic nor evidence to support the assertion that he hated the United States so much that he would have undertaken the great risk of providing WMD to terrorists. After all, he had WMD for decades and had NOT done so. So the crux of the administration's argument was that in his 60s, Saddam Hussein was suddenly going to change his behavior and undertake immense risk out of hatred for the United States. Believe what you want, but I find that ridiculous.

Ken White
03-29-2008, 12:58 AM
people of all ages and backgrounds and I can count on one hand the number of people who believed this:
...
...So the crux of the administration's argument was that in his 60s, Saddam Hussein was suddenly going to change his behavior and undertake immense risk out of hatred for the United States. Believe what you want, but I find that ridiculous.was then or is now a real issue or had much to do with attacking Iraq...

Presley Cannady
03-29-2008, 02:05 PM
OSD staffed ORHA and, to an extent, CPA. The "blame on State" line is pure ideological pap.

So where did the pressure to close the curtains on ORHA come from?


On the argument on Hussein, you have simply asserted that he would do anything in his power to harm the United States. The problem is, there is not one whit of evidence for that. He was prone to miscalculation when American intentions were not clear, but not when they were. There is neither logic nor evidence to support the assertion that he hated the United States so much that he would have undertaken the great risk of providing WMD to terrorists. After all, he had WMD for decades and had NOT done so. So the crux of the administration's argument was that in his 60s, Saddam Hussein was suddenly going to change his behavior and undertake immense risk out of hatred for the United States. Believe what you want, but I find that ridiculous.

Just to be clear, I'm not arguing that Hussein hated the United States so much that he'd clearly risk his life and regime attacking it. I'm also not arguing that Hussein in the 1980s had any intentions of biting the hand that fed him. I also don't argue that Hussein felt he had the freedom to use what little capability UNSCOM hadn't destroyed to attack the US. On the other hand, is it so ridiculous neocons worried about the yet to be quantified odds that Baathist Iraq, sitting on a post-sanction stockpile of chemical and biological weapons with maybe a few nukes to enhance his sense of self-inevitability, might find away to strike back at the guys who'd checked her ambitions for a decade and change.

SteveMetz
03-29-2008, 04:46 PM
So where did the pressure to close the curtains on ORHA come from?



Just to be clear, I'm not arguing that Hussein hated the United States so much that he'd clearly risk his life and regime attacking it. I'm also not arguing that Hussein in the 1980s had any intentions of biting the hand that fed him. I also don't argue that Hussein felt he had the freedom to use what little capability UNSCOM hadn't destroyed to attack the US. On the other hand, is it so ridiculous neocons worried about the yet to be quantified odds that Baathist Iraq, sitting on a post-sanction stockpile of chemical and biological weapons with maybe a few nukes to enhance his sense of self-inevitability, might find away to strike back at the guys who'd checked her ambitions for a decade and change.

I think I'm not making myself clear. Any action in strategy must weigh expected benefits against expects costs and risks. Everything in Hussein's behavior indicated that the chances of him providing WMD was exceptionally small. It would have entailed immense risk and almost no benefit. Unlike, say, al Qaeda, he's never shown any inclination to undertake high risk/low benefit action. Therefore the chances of him doing it were slim.

Under the normal logic of strategy, that would have meant that the United States states should only have removed him for that reason IF the expected risks and costs of doing so were low. In other words, the magnitude of the threat should have determined the costs and risks we were willing to bear in order to address the threat.

The administration simply assumed away the costs and risks. If they ever did any serious, rigorous analysis of them, I haven't seen any indication of it. And they amplified the threat, mostly by the clever psychological ploy of intermingling discussions of 9/11 with discussions of Saddam Hussein. Normally--but not always--they didn't draw a direct connection. But over and over, they would mix the two topics in speeches and statements until, to much of the public, there was a connection.

In terms of ORHA becoming CPA, I don't know who approved the name change but it seems far fetched that State did given that DoD had been designated as the agency in charge of the process. DoD remained the lead agency until it was shifted to the NSC. State was never the lead agency from February 2003 until July 2005.

Rank amateur
03-29-2008, 05:53 PM
Any action in strategy must weigh expected benefits against expects costs and risks.

The two main costs are alienated allies and billions of dollars. It could be argued that the administration placed zero value on allies and believed that "Reagan proved deficits didn't matter."

Ron Humphrey
03-29-2008, 06:02 PM
The two main costs are alienated allies and billions of dollars. It could be argued that the administration placed zero value on allies and believed that "Reagan proved deficits didn't matter."

What Reagan did was bring out the fact that who your allies are is not necessarily as important a consideration as why they are your allies.

On a Strategic scale intent would sometimes seem to be a more important factor than capability due to the fact that great enough intent historically tends to find some way to fulfill itself.

Ken White
03-29-2008, 08:30 PM
The two main costs are alienated allies and billions of dollars. It could be argued that the administration placed zero value on allies and believed that "Reagan proved deficits didn't matter."The belief that the US has friends and allies is, in quite large measure, a myth of epic proportions. Dumb myth, at that, IMO.

The billions of dollars are small change -- unfortunately -- to this nation.

Rank amateur
03-30-2008, 12:07 AM
Steve:

Ken's a smart guy. It's not an issue of strategy. It's an issue of values. (If everyone had the same values, there would be no war.)

Ken White
03-30-2008, 12:40 AM
Steve:

Ken's a smart guy. It's not an issue of strategy. It's an issue of values. (If everyone had the same values, there would be no war.)Wrong again, you're not doing too well tonight on reading my mind.

It is an issue of strategy and values enter into it -- but the values that do are national values and not anyone's personal values; personal values do not translate into national because personal values are essentially morally based and nation don't have morals.

This is probably a good thing because some very moral people aren't very bright. Then, too some very dumb people aren't too moral...

It is highly unlikely everyone will ever approach having the same values, ergo war's going to be around so you need to accept that fact. But then, you knew that...

Correction: Subject line should read "That seems to be sort of egregious..." or maybe "That seems sort of egregious..." Take your pick, either is appropriate.

Presley Cannady
03-30-2008, 03:39 PM
I think I'm not making myself clear. Any action in strategy must weigh expected benefits against expects costs and risks. Everything in Hussein's behavior indicated that the chances of him providing WMD was exceptionally small. It would have entailed immense risk and almost no benefit. Unlike, say, al Qaeda, he's never shown any inclination to undertake high risk/low benefit action. Therefore the chances of him doing it were slim.

I'm probably not making myself clear either. I'm not arguing that Hussein accepts high risk for low reward, and I doubt we can name one neoconservative who believes he would have. Neocons have argued that under regulation rules, the risk reward ratio improves as forensic evidence necessarily tying a regime to heinous attack goes down, and that this is the case in a world where the precursors for chemical weapons, cultures for biological weapons, and even fissile fuel and enrichment, materials and equipment for nuclear weapons are increasingly available on the open market.

"Providing WMD" covers everything from offering training or making available scientists and engineers, supplying precursors, raw materials and equipment to full-fledged weapons; the risk of tracing the end product back to the source runs from a virtual certainty--fingerprinting uranium that could be accounted as missing from al Tuwaitha--to some considerably lower threshold, say standing up a secret shop in Ansar al-Islam's territory and delivering small but operationally useful quantities of binary toxins or even renting the space out to interested private parties.


Under the normal logic of strategy, that would have meant that the United States states should only have removed him for that reason IF the expected risks and costs of doing so were low. In other words, the magnitude of the threat should have determined the costs and risks we were willing to bear in order to address the threat.

Once again, who out there is arguing to the contrary?


The administration simply assumed away the costs and risks. If they ever did any serious, rigorous analysis of them, I haven't seen any indication of it.

This is a fair enough criticism; I've never seen any such analysis myself. Matter of fact, I've never seen any such analysis by any Administration and even more importantly none in the open literature. Like I said before, I suspect there was (nor presently is) too little intelligence to narrow the variance around the expected risk of a specific threat of this class such that range of expected costs for action and inaction don't prohibitively alias one another. At that point, you have two choices. Bide your time and hope you can make a more informed decision before the crap hits the fan, or act.

On the other hand, your story might be true as well. Maybe no one in the national security establishment did anything remotely like a cost-benefit analysis before going to war. Or maybe someone did and it never disseminated far enough to do any good. If the former, I have to ask what the hell am I getting for my tax dollars. If the latter, I'm amazed that such a report would be about the only thing damaging to the Administration's reputation that hasn't leaked yet.


And they amplified the threat, mostly by the clever psychological ploy of intermingling discussions of 9/11 with discussions of Saddam Hussein. Normally--but not always--they didn't draw a direct connection. But over and over, they would mix the two topics in speeches and statements until, to much of the public, there was a connection.

This reads a bit like recrimination after the fact, especially since the post-war has contributed nothing to the debate over whether Hussein had a working relationship with al Qaeda. Every criticism raised since May 2003 was as logically strong before hand as it is today. So this begs the question, exactly when did the neoconservative argument for presuming guilt become so patently offensive?


In terms of ORHA becoming CPA, I don't know who approved the name change but it seems far fetched that State did given that DoD had been designated as the agency in charge of the process. DoD remained the lead agency until it was shifted to the NSC. State was never the lead agency from February 2003 until July 2005.

When did CPA shift to NSC, and who were the key DC principals tasked with overseeing her operations?

Rex Brynen
03-30-2008, 10:44 PM
...my daughter used to comment on almost every unlikely occurrence with a standard two-word response:"its possible."

"Well, your bed isn't going to make itself."
"Its possible!"

"You won't do well on your test if you don't study."
"Its possible!"

"We'll never make it on time if we don't leave now."
"Its possible!"

"No, I don't think aliens took the last piece of cake."
"Its possible!"

I sometimes suspect that she had a job moonlighting in Feith's Office of Special Plans, since those who made the argument for a major and imminent national security posed by Saddam's unlikely connection to al-Qa'ida, his unlikely nuclear programme, and the unlikely use of whatever residual CW stockpiles we thought he might have in a really scary way did much the same. It relied heavily on cherry-picked intelligence, a series of worst case assumptions about unknowns, and improbable assessments of motives, calculations, and intentions. And it was all backed by a crusading zeal about the improbably domino effects of a fantasy democratization that discouraged any rational assessment of costs and benefits.

In short, I'm entirely with Steve on this one.

Ski
03-31-2008, 12:00 AM
I also am residing in Dr. Metz's camp on this issue. Pass the bourbon and beans please.

Presley Cannady
03-31-2008, 12:27 AM
Then again, for every child who falls back on the "it's possible" line, there's a "skeptic" convinced special and general relativity must be wrong simply because it is obvious, in his frame of reference, that time is absolute. What makes the crackpot and the kid's claims stand out is there's such an abundance of evidence to the contrary that it's absurd to treat them seriously.

If that were the case here, you'd expect to see four numbers--at least from one camp--given how passionately both sides claim to be right. Two for the expected risk and variance, and two for the expected cost and variance. We've seen agreement on neither. Ever. From any perspective. In any form. Period.

If there is another way to determine whether or not a threat warrants an adventure, please share.

Ken White
03-31-2008, 01:32 AM
...What makes the crackpot and the kid's claims stand out is there's such an abundance of evidence to the contrary that it's absurd to treat them seriously.but apparently I'm supposed to take the word of various politicians on why something was / is a good idea instead of looking at all the facts I can gather and making an independent judgment.

If one presumed all the blather about Saddam, threat and WMD was accurate -- and it quite obviously was not at the time to anyone who paid attention -- then some of the arguments here would make sense. If, OTOH, one did not believe that blather (and I didn't know very many who did but obviously I lead a sheltered life or have weird relatives, friends and acquaintances...) then one would do a quite different cost-benefit analysis based on quite different parameters compared to the person who believed a politician or political appointee -- or a pundit...
We've seen agreement on neither. Ever. From any perspective. In any form. Period.

If there is another way to determine whether or not a threat warrants an adventure, please share.Just so...

Presley Cannady
03-31-2008, 03:45 PM
but apparently I'm supposed to take the word of various politicians on why something was / is a good idea instead of looking at all the facts I can gather and making an independent judgment.

We should always strive for an independent judgment when its neither absurd or pendantic to do so.


If one presumed all the blather about Saddam, threat and WMD was accurate -- and it quite obviously was not at the time to anyone who paid attention -- then some of the arguments here would make sense.

Here's where we part ways, and perhaps this is because I was and still am restricted to declassified and otherwise open source literature on the subject. It was obvious to everyone that Iraq didn't have militarily significant quantities of chemical or biological weapons, and everyone agreed that Iraq did not have a nuclear weapon--yet. However, if it were obvious that Hussein didn't have any finished products, or was obviously opposed to working with radical Islamist groups like al Qaeda, there would have at least been one single open source analysis of the probabilities and variances. There wasn't. None. Even more telling, after five years of backbiting leaks not even the smell of a pre-war one has emerged from DoD, CIA or State. Not one.


If, OTOH, one did not believe that blather (and I didn't know very many who did but obviously I lead a sheltered life or have weird relatives, friends and acquaintances...) then one would do a quite different cost-benefit analysis based on quite different parameters compared to the person who believed a politician or political appointee -- or a pundit...

In what way would the two analyses differ? Given the same evidence, the only way the skeptic could arrive at a different set of numbers is if he assumed the worst case away--that's about as dishonest as assuming the worst case as fact. Otherwise, both should end up with the same expected values and variances--they'd differ only in the principles they'd follow in issuing judgments based on those estimates. The neocon would argue "we can't afford to wait," while the critic would respond with "we don't have enough information to act."


Just so...

Hmm?

Ken White
03-31-2008, 04:43 PM
We should always strive for an independent judgment when its neither absurd or pendantic to do so.I'm unsure what pendantic means but I think I agree with all that...

Here's where we part ways, and perhaps this is because I was and still am restricted to declassified and otherwise open source literature on the subject. It was obvious to everyone that Iraq didn't have militarily significant quantities of chemical or biological weapons, and everyone agreed that Iraq did not have a nuclear weapon--yet. However, if it were obvious that Hussein didn't have any finished products, or was obviously opposed to working with radical Islamist groups like al Qaeda, there would have at least been one single open source analysis of the probabilities and variances. There wasn't. None. Even more telling, after five years of backbiting leaks not even the smell of a pre-war one has emerged from DoD, CIA or State. Not one.No, we don't part ways -- I wasn't clear. I agree that the consensus was that there were in fact WMD -- what I should have said was that they were not an immediate threat to the US. Just saying""...threat and WMD was accurate..." and tying threat and WMD together wasn't adequate to infer what I meant.
In what way would the two analyses differ? Given the same evidence, the only way the skeptic could arrive at a different set of numbers is if he assumed the worst case away--that's about as dishonest as assuming the worst case as fact. Otherwise, both should end up with the same expected values and variances--they'd differ only in the principles they'd follow in issuing judgments based on those estimates. The neocon would argue "we can't afford to wait," while the critic would respond with "we don't have enough information to act."Your kidding, right? Neocon, shmeocon -- those squirrels and all other policy wonks are dangerous and should be pretty much ignored. I certainly paid no attention to that foolishness -- and my prception is that Bush did not either; he merely took aspects of their ideas because they were the only ones aho offered any idea of merit. DoD and the JCS sure did not.

The analysis would differ based on the determined need to act versus risks and potential costs. For example, if the issue was removal of Saddam, my take would be not worth it. If it were the removal of Saddam and the introduction of democracy in the region, my response would be "Better, but still not worth it."

OTOH, if the issue were to be after 22 years of attacks and probes from the ME is a forceful response desirable, my response would be yes and the cost must be borne. If, in that case, Saddam is removed and a possibility (no matter how remote) of 'introducing democracy' in the region is included, that's just synergy and mildly beneficial icing for the cake; has little bearing on my goal.

Presley Cannady
04-01-2008, 09:39 PM
I'm unsure what pendantic means but I think I agree with all that...

It's a type. Should be pedantic. I don't know how to the adverbial form of "smart aleck."


No, we don't part ways -- I wasn't clear. I agree that the consensus was that there were in fact WMD -- what I should have said was that they were not an immediate threat to the US. Just saying""...threat and WMD was accurate..." and tying threat and WMD together wasn't adequate to infer what I meant.

If by immediate you mean imminent, I don't think you'll find much disagreement at any point in the debate's history. The neocon argument for preventative war is only novel in that it addresses threats that are not imminent.


Your kidding, right? Neocon, shmeocon -- those squirrels and all other policy wonks are dangerous and should be pretty much ignored. I certainly paid no attention to that foolishness -- and my prception is that Bush did not either; he merely took aspects of their ideas because they were the only ones aho offered any idea of merit. DoD and the JCS sure did not.

The Bush Administration probably hasn't executed Middle East transformation as ambitiously as neoconservatives might've hoped, but if Kristol and friends aren't principally about primacy and rollback, what are they for?


The analysis would differ based on the determined need to act versus risks and potential costs. For example, if the issue was removal of Saddam, my take would be not worth it. If it were the removal of Saddam and the introduction of democracy in the region, my response would be "Better, but still not worth it."

OTOH, if the issue were to be after 22 years of attacks and probes from the ME is a forceful response desirable, my response would be yes and the cost must be borne. If, in that case, Saddam is removed and a possibility (no matter how remote) of 'introducing democracy' in the region is included, that's just synergy and mildly beneficial icing for the cake; has little bearing on my goal.

Enlarging the scope of the strategy aside, we're still going to come back to assessing risks and benefits. You're not going to find anyone try to argue against a God's honest gospel figure detailing the widely separated means with narrow variances, but if that were the case then why is that like the only juicy bit of scandal not being leaked by the President's critics in the national security interagency? It stands to reason that such an analysis either fails to offer clearly ranked options for policymakers or it simply doesn't exist.

Ken White
04-01-2008, 10:19 PM
It's a type. Should be pedantic. I don't know how to the adverbial form of "smart aleck."My wife and Kids will tell you that 'Ken' will often suffice...
If by immediate you mean imminent, I don't think you'll find much disagreement at any point in the debate's history. The neocon argument for preventative war is only novel in that it addresses threats that are not imminent.They're simply the new kids on the block. We have engaged preemptively on many occasions and probably will in the future. Immediate versus imminent is a semantic argument of little import; for Iraq, perhaps 'real' or 'significant' would be better words.
The Bush Administration probably hasn't executed Middle East transformation as ambitiously as neoconservatives might've hoped, but if Kristol and friends aren't principally about primacy and rollback, what are they for?Dunno. Don't care, don't pay much attention to them, personally. My universal attitude toward politicians and pundits, all types and breeds.
Enlarging the scope of the strategy aside, we're still going to come back to assessing risks and benefits...No one is enlarging the scope of the strategy; the issue I raised is what was the trigger FOR the strategy.
...You're not going to find anyone try to argue against a God's honest gospel figure detailing the widely separated means with narrow variances, but if that were the case then why is that like the only juicy bit of scandal not being leaked by the President's critics in the national security interagency? It stands to reason that such an analysis either fails to offer clearly ranked options for policymakers or it simply doesn't exist. Sorry, I have no idea what what you're trying to say there....

Bullmoose Bailey
12-16-2008, 08:42 AM
Ok it is now clear to me. PPT that ubiquitous mind-numbing. intellect robbing deceptively alluring means of non-communications is really to blame...

I mean when you read this, everyone had the right idea but no one could execute it. Then this guy Bremer--and he apparently had the right idea too--just went and did the wrong thing. It had to have been PPT manipulation of decisionmakers. The research on PPT manipulation is well established in think tanks in DC. Typically PPT-M shows up when briefs have bullets of 3 to 5 words that can offer different meanings to the unwary decision-maker--who everyone knows has too much to read anyway.

What me worry? :D (3 words meaning no worries)

Tom

Very funny.

Separately I feel some of you are coming to see what I've seen all along; neocon is another word for democrat

Tom Odom
12-16-2008, 01:38 PM
neocon is another word for democrat

Nope.

jkm_101_fso
12-16-2008, 03:58 PM
Very funny.

Separately I feel some of you are coming to see what I've seen all along; neocon is another word for democrat

Bullmoose-
Here's who we are talking about:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_for_the_New_American_Century

http://www.newamericancentury.org/