Cordesman so right, yet so wrong

[William F. Owen]

• Vastly cheaper to use infantry and irregular forces than
conventional forces, progressively easier to given such forces more
advanced weapons.

I got this from Anthony H. Cordesman "lessons from the Lebanon," that Steve linked somewhere.

There are two important point to my mind.

a.) The premise is, on one level, essentially correct, and extremely useful. - yet utterly misleading.
b.) I strongly suspect Cordesman has no idea why this is the case. He just felt it was. - otherwise he would have expressed it very differently.

There are real possibilities for "Infantry Centric" forces over "Classic Combined Arms."
The war in the Lebanon gave a nano-second snap shot of why.

IMO, this has nothing to do with "Irregular" or even "infantry" Forces, being "cheap." It's about leveraging resources for maximum benefit, and squeezing out capability from necessity.

Again, I feel this is what the USMC, "Distributed Ops" managed to get wrong, and the essential utility of examining such ideas has got lost on the "go light, SOCOM, wood-ninjas" groupie fan club, that is so in love with form over function.

[William F. Owen]

It is Cheaper and more efficient to incrementally upgrade (light/conventional) infantry forces with vehicles (including armour), ATGMs, MANPADS, and fire support than it is to hold conventional combined arms forces

This is essentially my statement and what I think Cordesman could have said.

Anyone got a view on this? Always embarrassing to have to bump-start ones own thread but I feel my initial post may have killed any useful input. :o

[marct]

Hi Wilf,


It is Cheaper and more efficient to incrementally upgrade (light/conventional) infantry forces with vehicles (including armour), ATGMs, MANPADS, and fire support than it is to hold conventional combined arms forces

This is essentially my statement and what I think Cordesman could have said.

Honestly, I have to wonder at the accounting used for deciding "cheaper". Sure, maintenance costs are lower, but what is the immediate reactive ability in comparison, because social accounting for military force should always be negative accounting, i.e. "what will it cost us if we do not have X?" As for "efficient", again, I have to wonder. Will there be sufficient time for the upgrading and associated retraining?

[slapout9]

I will later on, at my day job now. For starters just read General James Gavin's famous magazine article from 1958: "Where is our Cavalry and I don't Mean Horses". A Dragoon force...mobile infantry or more important missilemen. is what was and is needed.

[William F. Owen]

Honestly, I have to wonder at the accounting used for deciding "cheaper". Sure, maintenance costs are lower, but what is the immediate reactive ability in comparison, because social accounting for military force should always be negative accounting, i.e. "what will it cost us if we do not have X?" As for "efficient", again, I have to wonder. Will there be sufficient time for the upgrading and associated retraining?

Never even considered this! :(

I think Cheaper is a lazy word, but I can't think of a better one. I guess I mean "some capability for less money".

The way I would look at this is, if it costs X to have 30 MBTs, procured, crewed and trained, can I get a greater capability, for less or the same money?

...and capability is not an ideal word either!

[slapout9]

...and capability is not an ideal word either!

Wilf your gonna love this...how about what is the Effect you want to have on the enemy?:D

[Steve Blair]

Wilf your gonna love this...how about what is the Effect you want to have on the enemy?:D

And that effect varies from place to place, and enemy to enemy.

Sorry, but I'm not a particular fan of "one size fits all" forces, be they silver bullet forces or "war on the cheap" forces. If you go heavy, what is the cost in terms of time, money, etc. lost when you need to downgrade?

Slap, read Gavin's article a number of times. It's interesting, but not necessarily a catch-all. I also don't share your fascination with missiles, but that's a different story...;)

Seriously, there were some very interesting things that came out of Gavin's article and the later Howze Report. But the Vietnam experience also showed the value of having armor to back up those dragoons in choppers. Likewise, the "tyranny of terrain" turned out being exchanging one limitation (roads) for another (LZs)...and still telegraphed movements to the enemy.

Operationally, the most effective units in Vietnam were cavalry squadrons (divisional or the components of the 11th ACR)...combined arms units every one. Augmented with dismounted elements (an easy fix, really), they mustered a massive capability for their size and were in great demand throughout the region. Does this mean that they are what we need now? Not necessarily. Just pointing out that the "idea unit" often isn't something that planners can predict (Westmoreland, among others, tried to strip armor out of units coming to Vietnam and was later forced to reverse himself).

[marct]

Hi Wilf,


Never even considered this! :(

I think Cheaper is a lazy word, but I can't think of a better one. I guess I mean "some capability for less money".

I've been thinking a lot about "money" in its different forms and functions recently. One of the key functions is as an "accountancy measure", which is where we usually see "cheap" and "expensive" show up as terms. The problem with that is that all accountancy measures are based on assumed relevance for accounting purposes and, these days, "risk" doesn't enter into many of these schemes as an assumption (outside of the blatant forms such as insurance).

In another thread, Norfolk used the term "Peace Dividend (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3736&page=13)" which really highlights the problems with a lot of social accounting about the military - it's very short term.


The way I would look at this is, if it costs X to have 30 MBTs, procured, crewed and trained, can I get a greater capability, for less or the same money?

...and capability is not an ideal word either!

Agreed, "capability" is not ideal :wry:. If we go back to accountancy measures, you could take the cost of unit X and Unit Y, figure the difference to upgrade X to Y in terms of both material cost (purchasing equipment, etc.), training cost, training time (not usually included) and associated risk of not having unit Y during the time to retrain in terms of potential loss. That's only first order accounting :wry:. If you want to get into second order effects, look at changes in retention rates based on moral loss, etc.

[Ken White]

It is Cheaper and more efficient to incrementally upgrade (light/conventional) infantry forces with vehicles (including armour), ATGMs, MANPADS, and fire support than it is to hold conventional combined arms forces

That's a totally true statement and it can also be said that it will work.

The problem as always is in the details -- combat use of vehicles of any type pose maintenance and tactical use issues that normally dismounted troops have difficulty with. Conversely, mounted folks in the dismounted role have tactical problems and logistic issues. If you really want to have fun, put a Mech unit in Choppers for an air assault; seen that -- it's hilarious... ;)

So, I guess the ol' bottom line is, yeah you can do that -- but should you?

Which goes back to Steve's and every Military School's 'depends on the situation...'

[slapout9]

After we came of alert for the 73 Yom Kipor (spell) war the causality estimates for the 82nd were as high as 80%! Bad stuff so General Krosen decided that we needed a better way to fight and we began a series of exercises to prepare us in Retrograde Operations and what does that look like. Hizballah(spell) fought their war almost exactly as the 82nd would have right down to the use of motorcycles. In fact that may be where they learned it from. Our Battalion commander had to carry around a bunch of Arab colonels and a General and show them how we would do it as some type of an exchange program that happened after the war. He was none to happy about it either.

Once a missile has been developed that can be launched by a single infantryman and penetrate any Armored vehicle, that is a game changing event. Everything is nothing but a platform to launch a missile from the soldier to an ICBM...Shoot-Move-and Communicate. Soldiers should ride as close to the objective as they can get to save their energy. Once at the Objective they can dismount and fight fresh and they shouldn't have to carry all that stuff with them. Nothing but ammo,water and a radio...put the camping gear on a vehicle.

[SethB]

Slap, I believe that was in large part the goal of the SRATS (http://www.defense-update.com/products/s/srats.htm) program.

I don't know if it will work. That's not my rice bowl, so to speak. I do know that you can build that vehicle, or one that looks and functions identically, entirely from parts built for offroading.

[slapout9]

Hi SethB, Of course it will work. We proved it clould work as along time racing fan mostly NASCAR but also BAJA 500 now the 1000 fame. This is 1960's technology and very well proven. As part of our Ops they pulled ever Gamma Goat they could find which pretty much did the same thing as the STRATS but not as cool looking.


You may not be old enogh to know what a Gamma Goat is so here is a link. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ioK6s3Rm68A&feature=related

[William F. Owen]

Seriously, there were some very interesting things that came out of Gavin's article and the later Howze Report. But the Vietnam experience also showed the value of having armor to back up those dragoons in choppers. Likewise, the "tyranny of terrain" turned out being exchanging one limitation (roads) for another (LZs)...and still telegraphed movements to the enemy.

Operationally, the most effective units in Vietnam were cavalry squadrons (divisional or the components of the 11th ACR)...combined arms units every one.

Thank you!! I have to say, I was never impressed with the Gavin article. While some of the observation was incisive, he cherry picked the operational record to prove his point, and this has since been hijacked by the very agenda monkeys, I suspect Gavin despised. We also now know, some of what he stated as authoritative, is entirely false.

There is always the same old dichotomy of "better using what you have" and "using something better" - failure to understand this has lead to concepts like Manoeuvre Warfare, SBCT and ultimately FCS.

[slapout9]

Steve, I don't believe in one stop shopping units either and I don't believe I said that but in the context of the Israeli conflict a Dragoon type unit would have be the better way to go. I am not fascinated by missiles I am an absolute Fanatic about them:) I was building Estes model rockets since I 10 years old. I hold the distinction of setting the playground on fire from the back blast.:eek: I grew up with Missiles including living in Orlando,Fl. during the 1962 Missile Crisis and my parents retired from what was then the Glenn L. Martin Company now Lockeed Martin so I have been around what was known as the back lot where they tested them for sometime.

Wilf, you are quite right about the Agenda Monkeys he would have had no part of it. It was meant to be an illustration of what I think could be accomplished by Israel or anyone else for that matter if they were in that type of situation. Not sure what you mean about him being proven false?? If anything he has been proven right overtime.

[selil]

I am not fascinated by missiles I am an absolute Fanatic about them:)


Missiles? I like missiles.

[Steve Blair]

Steve, I don't believe in one stop shopping units either and I don't believe I said that but in the context of the Israeli conflict a Dragoon type unit would have be the better way to go.

No worries, slap. Never thought you did...even if your missile fixation almost seems LeMay-ish....:D

Gavin had some good ideas, and many of the ideas put forward in the Howze report were never fully tested. I don't think he foresaw the LZ dependence because in the early stages I don't really think anyone understood just how much work would be involved lifting larger units via helicopter. I know none of the early airmobile folks really understood just how effective air cavalry would turn out to be...or how impressive it would be once it was combined with an armored ground element (the division cavalry squadron). It's a shame how quickly so many of those lessons were lost.

Missiles are good, like any other weapon, in their proper context. And even some they're not designed for...how many times have we been bitten in our institutional ass because someone forgot what the RPG can do? But if you're dealing with an opponent that doesn't have armored vehicles, missiles can become dead weight...or considered too valuable to use on anything other than a tank. Usually it sorts itself out.:wry: But it's also a good example of the situational aspects of conflict.

[Steve Blair]

Missiles? I like missiles.

Is that anything like "Mongo like candy."?:eek:

[William F. Owen]

Not sure what you mean about him being proven false?? If anything he has been proven right overtime.

I merely meant that there are some statements that Gavin made, that I think events have proven to be incorrect.

Below is Singapore's ATGM vehicle with twin SPIKE LR fibre optic guided missiles. Combined with the 7.62mm MAG on the front, it's the embodiment of the old Soviet "Machine Gun Anti-tank Company". Each AT-Platoon is 10 vehicles. 2-3 platoons per AT Coy.

[slapout9]

I merely meant that there are some statements that Gavin made, that I think events have proven to be incorrect.

Below is Singapore's ATGM vehicle with twin SPIKE LR fibre optic guided missiles. Combined with the 7.62mm MAG on the front, it's the embodiment of the old Soviet "Machine Gun Anti-tank Company". Each AT-Platoon is 10 vehicles. 2-3 platoons per AT Coy.


Wilf, uHH Doogies you just made my day....That is What I am talking about!!!!!! :):):)

[kaur]

This Singapore's ATGM vehicle reminds me Beaufre's TMO structure's mobile commando platoon.

You can download structure here.
http://rapidshare.com/files/101250367/TMO.pdf.html

Here is Singapore's Super Rapid Advanced Mortar System. Take look at page 20.
http://www.armada.ch/05-6/complete_05-6.pdf

[William F. Owen]

This Singapore's ATGM vehicle reminds me Beaufre's TMO structure's mobile commando platoon.

You can download structure here.
http://rapidshare.com/files/101250367/TMO.pdf.html



This is intriguing. Is there more?

[Norfolk]

This Singapore's ATGM vehicle reminds me Beaufre's TMO structure's mobile commando platoon.

You can download structure here.
http://rapidshare.com/files/101250367/TMO.pdf.html


Sweet, sweet link, Kaur.:D

[kaur]

Due to the fact, that my uploading speed is very low, i just can't upload Andre Beaufre's whole book "Strategy for Tomorrow". ... but you can borrow it form library or buy it :)

http://www.abebooks.com/servlet/BookDetailsPL?bi=631346702&searchurl=an%3Dandre%2Bbeaufre%26sts%3Dt%26tn%3Dst rategy%2Bfor%2Btomorrow%26x%3D69%26y%3D10

[slapout9]

kaur, finally had a chance to sit down and read the PDF link on organization. Some really good stuff in there....liked the picture of dune buggy 120mm Mortar.

[Charlie11]

As we used to say in the old 9th Infantry Division (Motorized), Rat Patrol was a neat TV show but a terrible idea for an MTOE. When you plan mobility by lift aircraft requirements rather than mission requirements you wind up with silly things that don't have doors - or survivability. I can only assume that Singapore has no potential threats that possess indirect fire... or pointy sticks for that matter.

I did not review the mobile commando platoon doc, but I do remember that certain units were really good at rolling their little Ranger/SF jeep things at Yakima. Of course we were leaving dune buggies strewn about the landscape ourselves (hence the locally-fabricated break-away M2/MK19 mount!).

Little things like this are relatively useless, except in extreme environments where light forces need small vehicles to carry supporting equipment in places a full size vehicle cannot fit. Even then they are dangerous. The HUMMV works as a mobility platform because it has enough lateral stability to go around a corner without tipping over and can traverse relatively difficult terrain. Of course this does not make it a good weapons platform or survivable... just better than a M151 for running errands.

[Ken White]

uses -- and, in some cases, the lighter the better. A 151 (if one trains one's drivers...) is better than a HMMWV for many things. The American way of a bigger hammer is adopted because its easy to train for and we're lazy -- that doesn't mean that Americans can't be trained to use a little finesse; they can and they do it well if you train 'em right.

The key as is true in many things, is METT-TC. That simple.

[Charlie11]

Which is why I mentioned mission requirements as a primary consideration and gave an example of a situation that would call for such a vehicle. You are also correct that training is a critical factor.

Just be careful you don't wind up with this:
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-12-28-corps-jeep_x.htm

[Ken White]

chop, channel and re-engine a 151 hull to fit in an MV-22 and we're gonna pay through the nose.

Almost as bad as paying over $3M for one of these LINK (http://ftp.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/m2.htm). Given a major war, probably lose fewer of the teeny weeny 1/4 tons than the other.

[William F. Owen]

As we used to say in the old 9th Infantry Division (Motorized), Rat Patrol was a neat TV show but a terrible idea for an MTOE. When you plan mobility by lift aircraft requirements rather than mission requirements you wind up with silly things that don't have doors - or survivability. I can only assume that Singapore has no potential threats that possess indirect fire... or pointy sticks for that matter.


I don't know about "Rat patrols" but tactical ignorance of the correct way to employ equipment is always going to create problems.

Such vehicles are used in conjunction with dismounted and even armoured forces. They are a mobility system to enable the ability to disperse and concentration light anti-armour forces, while leveraging the advantages of air mobility and a vastly reduced cost, and logistic foot-print when compared with armoured forces.

Singapore can drop a 30 vehicle anti-armour screen 50km deep into Malaysia, pretty easily, or hold the same number of vehicles on the deck of small commercial freighter or move easily by wide body cargo jet.

I absolutely agree that such vehicles have less protection than a family car, but that is missing the point. You always trade security for activity, and such a system is not appropriate across entire the spectrum of environments and operations.

I have never seen any well-written tactical doctrine for employing such vehicles. In fact during my time in Singapore I did have some discussion as to writing some.

[kaur]

If you can use Strix in 120 mm mortar buggy ...

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oY9S-PcKLYs

[Distiller]

That's a totally true statement and it can also be said that it will work.

The problem as always is in the details -- combat use of vehicles of any type pose maintenance and tactical use issues that normally dismounted troops have difficulty with. Conversely, mounted folks in the dismounted role have tactical problems and logistic issues. If you really want to have fun, put a Mech unit in Choppers for an air assault; seen that -- it's hilarious... ;)

So, I guess the ol' bottom line is, yeah you can do that -- but should you?

Which goes back to Steve's and every Military School's 'depends on the situation...'

The universal infantry. Everybody can swim, run, fly. Is desireable, might even be do-able to an extent, but I think only in a professional force. Coming back to my 8/9 men standard formation hobbyhorse. And such a universal infantry can only be applied strictly to infantry, not cavalry.
In the case of the U.S. at least the USMC and Army infantry formations could be made compatible, maybe even unified. Would increase the pool of available manpower.

It was mentioned before - training. How do you train these people without actually having the weapons? It might only be cheaper in the longer run if you use virtual training.
But you need to have the weapons anyway, as there probably will be no time to buy them in case of war.

And mechanized units: At least when it comes to IMVs I think it would be possible to use a non-organic approach. Mobility companies serving various infantry battalions.


@ that Singaporean buggy: Never liked putting high-value toys on unprotected vehicles. Shrapnels and branches can damage that stuff. And when it rains it's also not good. Better take a Toyota Hilux and seat six missilemen on the flatbed instead of mounting the stuff on the buggy. And that buggy is very military, doesn't blend in very well. And terribly mobile it is neither - can't swim for example.

About the usefulness of light vehicles see South Africa's wars.

[Ken White]

The universal infantry. Everybody can swim, run, fly. Is desireable, might even be do-able to an extent, but I think only in a professional force. Coming back to my 8/9 men standard formation hobbyhorse. And such a universal infantry can only be applied strictly to infantry, not cavalry.
In the case of the U.S. at least the USMC and Army infantry formations could be made compatible, maybe even unified. Would increase the pool of available manpower.Technically achievable but perhaps not advisable. While universal infantry can be had, it would suffer from the problem of all compromises -- sacrifices great in some things for barely adequate in others.

I don't have a problem with US Army and Marine squads being identical but unlike you, I'd go the other way; having worked with Army 9 and 11 man Squads and the Marines 13 man Squad, the latter is far superior in firepower, flexibility and far most importantly in full combat, staying power.
It was mentioned before - training. How do you train these people without actually having the weapons? It might only be cheaper in the longer run if you use virtual training.
But you need to have the weapons anyway, as there probably will be no time to buy them in case of war.True on the latter point and on the use of virtual training, it has merits and benefits but there's no real substitute for actually doing things on the ground in all types of terrain and weather. Got to get dirty to do it right. Virtual is just a bit too easy...
And mechanized units: At least when it comes to IMVs I think it would be possible to use a non-organic approach. Mobility companies serving various infantry battalions.We tried that in the late 40s and early 50s. Didn't work too well, the mobility APC folks tended to think and act like taxi drivers -- who didn't want to go into bad neighborhoods -- and the tactical commanders never got enough experience to properly employ the vehicles and get full benefit of their combat power capability. Maintenance was also a major problem, a driver and a vehicle commander are not enough people to take care of a track (or even a multi-wheeled vehicle).
@ that Singaporean buggy: Never liked putting high-value toys on unprotected vehicles. Shrapnels and branches can damage that stuff. And when it rains it's also not good. Better take a Toyota Hilux and seat six missilemen on the flatbed instead of mounting the stuff on the buggy. And that buggy is very military, doesn't blend in very well. And terribly mobile it is neither - can't swim for example.

About the usefulness of light vehicles see South Africa's wars.Light strike vehicles have pluses and minuses just like any other piece of kit; they aren't for everywhere or everything. All goes down to "what works?"

ZA is a unique theater, they had and did a lot of good stuff but it was purpose designed for a specific environment; giving optimum performance. Having to be prepared for world wide employment significantly complicates both the equipping and training requirements. It's doable, just a little more difficult.

And unfortunately as is always true, politics (in and out of the forces) complicates everything... :mad:

[William F. Owen]

@ that Singaporean buggy: Never liked putting high-value toys on unprotected vehicles. Shrapnels and branches can damage that stuff. And when it rains it's also not good. Better take a Toyota Hilux and seat six missilemen on the flatbed instead of mounting the stuff on the buggy. And that buggy is very military, doesn't blend in very well. And terribly mobile it is neither - can't swim for example.


Having examined this vehicle in detail and talked to the crews, let me address a few issues. It is a mobility system. - so better than walking. It is not an armoured vehicle. It enables an ATGW platoon to do things THEY COULD NOT, if they did not have this vehicle. There have much better mobility than an SUV. Better power to weight and lower ground pressure. No, it can't swim, but you can lift it with UH-60 or smaller helo, and you can float is easily on a raft, if needed.


We tried that in the late 40s and early 50s. Didn't work too well, the mobility APC folks tended to think and act like taxi drivers -- who didn't want to go into bad neighborhoods -- and the tactical commanders never got enough experience to properly employ the vehicles and get full benefit of their combat power capability. Maintenance was also a major problem, a driver and a vehicle commander are not enough people to take care of a track (or even a multi-wheeled vehicle).
...but, the Royal Marines are doing this, and it works very well. If you have the right training all the problems go away.

[Ken White]

...but, the Royal Marines are doing this, and it works very well. If you have the right training all the problems go away.from Lympstone? :D

Last time I checked, RM training was the lengthiest in the OECD. Can / will everyone be willing to spend that much time and money on training? Is the RM doing that because that's the way they want to operate or because they can't afford more Vikings?

Either way, it's more than a training issue. As I said, it can be done -- but it is a compromise and proficiency in something gets sacrificed for flexibility achieved. Up to the individual armed force to make the choice.

[Distiller]

Looking at the half year it takes U.S. units to work up to standards before combat deployments I think that the teamwork thing between mot/mech/aerial mobility components and its perspective customers (infantry) would be manageable. Also nobody sees it as necessary for airbornes to have organic C-130s either. Of course money is the driver here.


:D Well, the reason why 8/9 instead of the USMC 13 is of course vehicle size. Also loosing vehicles with 13+X is worse than 8/9+X. If they're dead, they're dead, but if they're wounded and need MEDEVAC, larger "granularity" (Have you seen that new IDF terminology? Molecules - Compounds?) puts a lot of strain on the system. Thinking about the ELV makes me shudder.

[Ken White]

No question that all mode infantry is possible and that acceptable performance can be attained in all modes. The problem is that IMO, acceptable is okay but I prefer excellent performance if it's attainable -- and that is if units concentrate on their core tasks and doing them really well instead of getting to a fair performance level in many tasks.

For mechanized infantry with vehicle size constraints, 9 men is fine -- because the vehicle itself adds combat power and capabilities that compensate for the missing four men in the walking or airmobile infantry squad (where there is no added combat power).

[William F. Owen]

No question that all mode infantry is possible and that acceptable performance can be attained in all modes. The problem is that IMO, acceptable is okay but I prefer excellent performance if it's attainable -- and that is if units concentrate on their core tasks and doing them really well instead of getting to a fair performance level in many tasks.


This is one of those core questions, that like squad size, that IMO, comes from looking down the wrong end of the telescope.

Infantry should be optimised to operate dismounted. The vehicle is a means of support and enhance mobility - so t doesn't matter if its an APC, MRAP or LPV. Who crews the vehicle is not important. They just have to be good at their job.

MICV's turn the who issue on its head and at that point, you really don't have infantry anymore. Remember this thread is predicated on those things that effectively and easily enhance infantry - not manning the expensive toys the Generals want to play with.

[kaur]

News about mortar buggy.


The 4x4 Spider Light Strike Vehicle, armed with a 120mm smoothbore mortar system, has been undergoing some modifications to make it lighter, said Tay King Penh, senior engineer, Singapore Kinetics' Engineering Development Centre, here at the Singapore Airshow.

http://www.defensenews.com/osd_story.php?sh=VSDS&i=3379541

Here are different buggy modifications.

http://www.stengg.com/upload/306MJIVTWhk0eRlE2kH.pdf

[Xenophon]

Vastly cheaper to use infantry and irregular forces than
conventional forces, progressively easier to given such forces more
advanced weapons.

I don't think Mr. Cordesman is saying, "HEY Infantry rules, let's get rid of combined arms once and for all!"

What he may be saying by referencing cost is that infantry needs to be viewed and funded by the DoD and the US government as the most important part of the military. Maybe we don't need a new JDAM that is accurate to a half-meter vice one meter for eleventy billion dollars or a new plane to counter the imminent Chinese air invasion for a katrillion dollars a pop. Maybe we should just get the grunts the best gear and training we can, then worry about funding their supporting efforts.

[William F. Owen]

I don't think Mr. Cordesman is saying, "HEY Infantry rules, let's get rid of combined arms once and for all!"

What he may be saying by referencing cost is that infantry needs to be viewed and funded by the DoD and the US government as the most important part of the military. Maybe we don't need a new JDAM that is accurate to a half-meter vice one meter for eleventy billion dollars or a new plane to counter the imminent Chinese air invasion for a katrillion dollars a pop. Maybe we should just get the grunts the best gear and training we can, then worry about funding their supporting efforts.

I concur. What I take from it, is a bottom up approach to Combined Arms-full spectrum operations. The NATO concept of Combined Arms is still based on a WW2 model, that was itself evolved from WW1. I think there are better ways, especially when large tank formations, are far less of a problem or a likelihood!

[Jones_RE]

It's been a while since I read the article, but I took Cordesman to be referring to Hezbollah's infantry forces. That is, describing the threat of cheaply upgraded enemy infantry to a mechanized force.

Hezbollah used ATGMs, drones, mortars, and rockets to support a light infantry force. They also made extensive use of fortification, camouflage, and deception.

Western forces could upgrade their infantry with similar capabilities, but only if they were facing a similar threat. . . .

[Sabre]

I think that Mr. Cordesman discounts the principle that the enemy is also capable of thinking and reacting.

I basically took the quote to mean, that if you are starting an armed force from scratch (Hezbullah), the first thing that you need (and the best bang for your buck) is well-trained, well-equipped infantry, and then you can add capabilities

Taken to a logical extreme, if a power decided to make every single member of its armed forces a foot-mobile infantryman, then their enemies could (and would) adapt, and make at least some of their forces into motorized units, which could be ripped through by light armored dragoons or cavalry, which in turn could fall prey to combined arms: heavy armor, fire support, and air power. This begets exponentially increasing logistics, "lines of communication" and "soft targets". Tanks grouped into large combined arms units stab through lines to strike at those.

Could a large body of well-trained infantry stop a mechanized strike, while still keeping casualties to a low level that is on par with how easily and cheaply (in terms of casualties) a US mech brigade could?

An Israeli armored force, given the objective of Beirut, and the level of training that they had say, a decade ago, would have made it through the Hezzies in 2006. Will we always be in a situation where we can afford to allow an enemy force through to a city?

Thus, I don't think that it is quite as applicable to a superpower's military. If you are supposed to do everything, as certain militaries are expected to, then you will need constituted units that train consistently to perform the different missions... which will lead to some degree of specialization out of sheer necessity.

After all, where would these incremental additions come from?
Presumably, we would already have the equipment procured and on-hand, which at the very least means that we need maintainers and trainers (along with spare parts, etc), the equipment will still require *some* upkeep. The Soviets were much-maligned for not training on their equipment as much as the Western armies did, during the cold-war.

Some missions (not all, some) are better performed by a mechanized force. It not only takes training and practice, it also takes the institutional knowledge that is only built up in leaders over time (which, as of yet, is still not adequately captured in FM's, FMFM's, ARTEP standards, etc).

I've always been partial to the USMC MEU concept... I have always thought that was a fantastic way to think about, and put together, a battalion-size combat team.

[Sabre]

I just can't resist pointing out perhaps the supreme irony of Cordesman's statement, which is that even if a "Western" style army were to just have infantry, I can't imagine that they wouldn't be backed up by high-tech ground attack aircraft. So the most cost-effective arm, the infantry, is (in such a scenario) married to the least cost-effective weapon, the modern fighter-bomber (in terms of impact on the ground). It's not that fighter-bombers aren't effective, it is that they are tremendously expensive, bloating severely the ratio of cost to effectiveness.

Yes, there are missions that an F-22 can perform better than any other platform. However, UAV's can now be deployed to even the small unit level, and there are plenty of fire support requirements that can be fulfilled by artillery - is an SDB really that much better than an Excalibur shell? Especially considering that a howitzer and crew is, quite literally, several orders of magnitude less expensive than a plane that may cost 100 or 200 million, with a pilot that costs millions to train, and then millions to keep trained, every year, a ground crew and support that can consist of a dozen personnel for each aircraft, and costs millions more to deploy and support in theater. I'm not advocating the dissolution of the Air Force, but for support of ground troops, artillery is just as capable in many (not all) scenarios, and much, much cheaper.

Yet, for some reason, some military analysts are in love with the idea of doing away with tanks and artillery completely... it's amazing that someone who is supposedly read-up history is then surprised when having a platoon of tanks to back up a infantry battalion in a fight, urban or otherwise, turns out to be very good idea. Just how many times do we need to relearn that one?

[Ken White]

...
Yet, for some reason, some military analysts are in love with the idea of doing away with tanks and artillery completely... it's amazing that someone who is supposedly read-up history is then surprised when having a platoon of tanks to back up a infantry battalion in a fight, urban or otherwise, turns out to be very good idea. Just how many times do we need to relearn that one?For as long as there are civilian 'military' analysts with no combat experience, I suspect.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

had I been drinking something I believe I would have snorted it out my nose when I read your post. :D

"Analysts" and "pundits" can spout gibberish all they want since they are rarely held accounatable for their pronouncements, statements, and theories.

[Jones_RE]

There's no magic formula to victory in battle or warfare. Any enemy who possesses the will to battle won't rest until he finds a way to hinder your plans and kill your soldiers.

Perhaps the most pernicious fallacy of the pundits is the idea that superior technology wins wars. Technology is only one factor. It's a minor one. And our technological advantage is less than we realize. We have three basic advantages over other nations:

Very well trained and motivated troops. This is the most important component.

A very large number of those troops and their weapons.

Complete air and sea supremacy.

With all that on our side we could use 20 year old weapons and systems and still be the dominant military power in the world. Come to think - we DO use 20 year old weapons and we are the dominant military power in the world. :)

[William F. Owen]

Yet, for some reason, some military analysts are in love with the idea of doing away with tanks and artillery completely... it's amazing that someone who is supposedly read-up history is then surprised when having a platoon of tanks to back up a infantry battalion in a fight, urban or otherwise, turns out to be very good idea. Just how many times do we need to relearn that one?

The UK did a huge (IIRC still classified) study of 100 Infantry battle group attacks from 1943-45. It showed that support from as little as 6 tanks, meant an 85% chance of success.

The Falklands war showed the same thing.

Anyone who has really studied infantry knows, you need protected mobility, direct fire armoured support, and artillery/mortars to be a viable force, against any opponent.

[Norfolk]

Indeed. During WWII, it was found that an Infantry Battalion performed best in offensive operations when it was reinforced with a Tank Squadron (Company), and an Infantry Division was reinforced with a Tank Brigade of 3 Regiments (Battalions). In Korea, the Canadians again rediscovered this, as the Infantry Brigade fighting there went from having no tanks, to a Squadron of 19 tanks, even though fighting in close, usually mountainous country.

Interestingly, in the wake of the Second Battle of Panjwai in the summer of 2006, the Canadian Infantry Battle Group there received a 15-Tank Squadron with upgraded Leopard 1 A3s ("C2"); now it is 20-tanks strong, with the newer Leopard 2A6M replacing the Leopard 1A3, much the same proportion as was found to work best on very different battlefields in very different times from North-West Europe, though not Korea (but Armoured strength in the Army was doubled in the years after the war). Despite having Air Support on hand, CAS could not replace Armour (not to mention that friendly CAS has an unfriendly habit of killing and wounding lots of groundpounders in Afghanistan). There just is no substitute, most times, for true Combined-Arms.

[Rifleman]

I've always been partial to the USMC MEU concept... I have always thought that was a fantastic way to think about, and put together, a battalion-size combat team.

That's interesting. Recently I was looking at the 173d Airborne Brigade's website. Each infantry battalion now consists of six companies. And that's before attaching an artillery battery, etc.

I understand the necessity of combined arms but isn't there a risk that battalion combat teams will become so big with attachments that an LTC can't even fight his rifle companies effectively?

The MEU concept might be the answer, might it not?

Of course, there's no way that the Army will admit that it needs to copy anything from the USMC! :rolleyes:

[Charlie11]

Interestingly, in the wake of the Second Battle of Panjwai in the summer of 2006, the Canadian Infantry Battle Group there received a 15-Tank Squadron with upgraded Leopard 1 A3s ("C2"); now it is 20-tanks strong, with the newer Leopard 2A6M replacing the Leopard 1A3...

So the old Canadian Leo Is finally saw combat. Probably the same tanks I played with at Lahr 20 years ago. To my knowledge the US has not deployed heavy armor to the Afghan theater. I wonder if the Rumsfeld idea of avoiding Soviet mistakes and not deploying armor is still being adhered to? Seemed short-sighted at the time, more so now.

Watching a 60 Minutes piece tonight on a 2006 two day battle between an SF team and several hundred Taliban, I could not help but think how handy a few strategically placed QRF forces in the form of a cav troop would be. The battle was less than 20 miles outside Kandahar, fairly open country. The team seemed on their own for 2 days if the reporting was accurate.

You never really need an armored cav troop, until you really need an armored cav troop... or a column of Pakistani M48A3s ;)

[Cavguy]

You never really need an armored cav troop, until you really need an armored cav troop... or a column of Pakistani M48A3s ;)

Couldn't have said it better myself. :D

Going to be the subject of my presentation at the Armor Warfighting Conference in 3 weeks - going to be on a panel with two Canadian officers, who I believe will present on employment of Canadian Armor in Afghanistan.

[Steve Blair]

Couldn't have said it better myself. :D

Going to be the subject of my presentation at the Armor Warfighting Conference in 3 weeks - going to be on a panel with two Canadian officers, who I believe will present on employment of Canadian Armor in Afghanistan.

Gotta agree with that one! Sounds like an interesting presentation, too.

[Stan]

Going to be the subject of my presentation at the Armor Warfighting Conference in 3 weeks - going to be on a panel with two Canadian officers, who I believe will present on employment of Canadian Armor in Afghanistan.

Appears to be some very interesting topics (http://www.knox.army.mil/armorConf/overview.htm) planned (well, not as much as the 16th CAV :) )

I'd be really interested in the Master Gunner Panels, MRAP and Stryker presentations.... gotta love things that go BANG :cool:

[Norfolk]

Stan wrote:


Appears to be some very interesting topics (http://www.knox.army.mil/armorConf/overview.htm) planned (well, not as much as the 16th CAV :) )


I expect so, and oh to be in that room (even as a fly on the wall). On the matter of Strykers in Afghanistan, a paper written by a junior officer in 3PPCLI was publicly posted on their website:

The LAV III in Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Tactical Lessons Learned, by (http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/3PPCLI/Downloads/LAV%20III.pdf)Benjamin J. Richard (http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/3PPCLI/Downloads/LAV%20III.pdf)


This paper describes some of the lessons learned by 2 Platoon, A Coy during Op ARCHER and proposes key advantages of operating with the LAV III in the four blocks of modern warfare: humanitarian assistance operations, peace support operations, warfighting, and psychological operations (PsyOps).

[Stan]

On the matter of Strykers in Afghanistan, a paper written by a junior officer in 3PPCLI was publicly posted on their website:

The LAV III in Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Tactical Lessons Learned, by (http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/3PPCLI/Downloads/LAV%20III.pdf)Benjamin J. Richard (http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/3PPCLI/Downloads/LAV%20III.pdf)



Thanks, Norfolk ! I found their evaluations in both Humanitarian and Peace Keeping Operations very useful. The Canadians in Rwanda managed to employ 113s and 114s in much the same capacities (save the ability to perform speedy get-aways).

But, my truly favorite use of the LAV must be...


2 Platoon LAV crews quickly discovered that the mud-wall compounds and dwellings found in Afghanistan were easily penetrated by slowly driving through them using a LAV. :p

BTW, did you read our thread on Canadians and Kentucky Windage (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2319&highlight=kentucky+windage) ? Indeed a keeper !

Regards, Stan

[Norfolk]

Thanks, Norfolk ! I found their evaluations in both Humanitarian and Peace Keeping Operations very useful. The Canadians in Rwanda managed to employ 113s and 114s in much the same capacities (save the ability to perform speedy get-aways).

But, my truly favorite use of the LAV must be...



BTW, did you read our thread on Canadians and Kentucky Windage (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2319&highlight=kentucky+windage) ? Indeed a keeper !

Regards, Stan

Hi Stan!

I stumbled across it a while ago, but sadly didn't take it in then as thoroughly as I should have (I have since rectified the situation). However, my approach did not lack for thoroughness while down in Kentucky at the Maker's Mark Distillery during GW1, though.:D

But, being prone to having to relearn old lessons (some guys just gotta learn the hard way...:eek:), after the Old Man drank my bottle of Jim Beam Black, I was compelled to revisit my security precautions with its replacement (and the Wiser's, whose predecessor likewise departed from my possesssion).

Alas, my current stash has been discovered once again, though its contents remain so far intact. Good thing I have a copy of the old SF caching techniques pub, I think I'm going to need it...;)



But, my truly favorite use of the LAV must be...


2 Platoon LAV crews quickly discovered that the mud-wall compounds and dwellings found in Afghanistan were easily penetrated by slowly driving through them using a LAV.


I think that's what's most popular with the LAV (aside from resistance to IEDs), going door-to-door to make house calls. If the occupant accords one a most unsocial welcome, then this refusal of hospitality requires quick remedial action in order to effect a prompt restoration of common courtesy. Thus, the driving of a LAV through the obstinate would-be host's front-door/living-room/kitchen/bedroom, followed up by a double-tap if further remedial action is required to restore civility.

Hmmm, I wonder what the occupant's reaction would be if a Leopard 2 came barreling through his living-room...would that be considered too offensive?:eek:

[Stan]

Hmmm, I wonder what the occupant's reaction would be if a Leopard 2 came barreling through his living-room...would that be considered too offensive?:eek:

Hey Norfolk !
In some parts of Africa, this subtle maneuver was called Gaza Gardens :wry:
But, National Defense has taken all the mystery out of driving Your Own Steel Beast (http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2001/Sep/Ever_Want.htm) :eek:


An overview of the main menu reveals several play options:

* Instant action, where you assume the role of the tank’s gunner.
* Tutorials, designed to introduce you, step-by-step, into the M1A1 Abrams or German Leopard 2A4 tank.
* Tank range, where you develop and measure your gunnery skills (you maintain a training record to show your progress).
* Single or multiplayer roles.
* Mission editor, allowing you to tailor your mission to a specific set of circumstances, relive an actual battle (i.e. Desert Storm), or
develop a specific maneuver skill.
* Map editor, for use in tailoring a mission or replaying a battle.

[Norfolk]

Gaza Gardens?! Hmmm, I wonder what the etymology behind that phrase is? And subtle you say?:confused: Marc, some help please?

Ah yes, Steelbeasts...:D

NOTE TO FILE—CONSTRUCTIVE SIMULATION VERSUS SERIOUS GAMES FOR THE ARMY: A CANADIAN CASE STUDY (http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_10/iss_3/CAJ_vol10.3_12_e.pdf), by Paul A. Roman and Mr. Doug Brown(Canadian Army Journal, Vol. 10, No. 3, Fall 2007)(my old Battalion, 4RCR had a hand in this, though it was run for the chopper-boys:():




After 11 years of conducting exercises in this manner, DLSE supported it’s first serious game based exercise in October of 2006. Exercise WINGED WARRIOR is the culminating activity at the end of the Advanced Tactical Aviation Course, intended to train pilots to perform as aviation mission commanders and air liaison officers. This paper takes a critical look at the similarities and differences between exercises primarily supported by constructive simulation versus those supported by a serious game. It also introduces the concept of a training needs framework, upon which decisions regarding the most appropriate type of tool to support
a training objective, can be planned.



Ah, being paid to play video games (and by the Government no less!:cool:).

[Stan]

Gaza Gardens?! Hmmm, I wonder what the etymology behind that phrase is? And subtle you say?:confused: Marc, some help please?


Ah yes, Steelbeasts...:D

Great post, although not sure if Marc will be able to help you should you decide to drink and drive, especially if you are a Russian tank driver :D

The Drunk Tank (http://www.englishrussia.com/?p=1806)

[Sabre]

That's interesting. Recently I was looking at the 173d Airborne Brigade's website. Each infantry battalion now consists of six companies. And that's before attaching an artillery battery, etc.

I understand the necessity of combined arms but isn't there a risk that battalion combat teams will become so big with attachments that an LTC can't even fight his rifle companies effectively?


No, I don't think that there is any danger of that - a battalion commander has a full staff, with two majors and several captains to help him handle all of the moving parts. Heh, I can't ever recall having read of/spoken to/seen a battalion commander that worried that he had too many troops or weapons for his assigned mission. Besides, many attachments are then tasked out to the line companies, so they don't really affect the battalion span-of-control - which in any case, I would argue is less and less applicable at the higher levels of organization.

It would be far, far more dangerous not to have the weapons that he needs in his "toolkit". Armored Cav Squadrons have six company-sized units, and usually get two more attached, "back in the day" Army mech inf battalions had 4 line companies, an AT-company, and an HHC, and then got an arty battery and engineer company, etc tacked on - so there are other examples. I know some infantry battalions attached the battalion mortar platoon to the howizter battery, and the battery commander then made sure that the tubes were properly positioned to support the riflemen, so the "span of control" didn't change (much), in spite of the addition of a howitzer battery.

IIRC, US Army infantry battalions, even with attachments, still end up being rather smaller than the GCE of the "typical" MEU.

Besides, here on the SWJ, the large, 13-man USMC rifle squad reigns supreme, it would be most hypocritical of us to then advocate a small battalion ;)

[Cavguy]

No, I don't think that there is any danger of that - a battalion commander has a full staff, with two majors and several captains to help him handle all of the moving parts. Heh, I can't ever recall having read of/spoken to/seen a battalion commander that worried that he had too many troops or weapons for his assigned mission. Besides, many attachments are then tasked out to the line companies, so they don't really affect the battalion span-of-control - which in any case, I would argue is less and less applicable at the higher levels of organization.

Agreed. My BN in Tal Afar had six companies plus attachments without issue. RFCT in Ramadi had 9 battalions plus four IA BNs under its control, not to mention all the "eaches" in separate companies - everything from riverine units to postal.

Span of control never really seemed to hinder ops. Lack of proper resources could. Since COIN is relatively fixed, span of control is a lesser issue perhaps than in maneuver warfare.

[Richard W]

Frank Antenori was the "Team Sergeant" of an an American Special Forces "A Team" which deployed to the Kurdish area of Northern Iraq during Gulf War II. He wrote a book about his experiences titled Roughneck One Nine. Of possible interest to this thread is that the "A Team" went to war mounted in light, unarmored trucks. However they carried an amazing amount and variety of weaponry and electronics in their unarmored light trucks. They practiced relentlessly on firing ranges with all of their weaponry from pistols to very expensive missiles.

They were so confident in their weapons and equipment that prior to going overseas they determined in the event of making contact with Iraqi conventional forces that they would not run. Instead they would stand and fight (an "Alamo") and "pile them up". And indeed they did so. In an incredible fight against enemy tanks, motorized infantry and artillery. Now the "A Team" had incredible close air support. This, of course, counts for a lot. But just the same their battlefield accomplishment against a much larger and heavier force commands, in my opinion, respect.

Indeed it seems that the days of a conventional force successfully standing against and fighting a much smaller, Western military formation (supported by aircraft) are over. On the other hand if we look at what Islamic insurgent infantry (@ 3,000 in number and armed in the main with WWII technology and drawn from a part time militia) did to the IDF in southern Lebanon we may see the future of ground conflict between the West and the holy warriors of Islam. (See Drudge for links to Israeli papers wherein this campaign is still discussed by IDF veterans.)

It may be that Western infantry may at first have to fight essentially vehicle based battles against enemy conventional formations. These initial engagements may thenbe followed by extended foot engagements against enemy insurgent infantry.

Regards

Richard W

[Rex Brynen]

On the other hand if we look at what Islamic insurgent infantry (@ 3,000 in number and armed in the main with WWII technology and drawn from a part time militia) did to the IDF in southern Lebanon we may see the future of ground conflict between the West and the holy warriors of Islam.

Richard:

Hizbullah most decidedly was NOT "armed in the main with WWII technology" in the style of, say, the Taliban. On the contrary--and in addition to their small arms and MRLs--they were equipped with ATGMs, night-vision equipment, frequency-agile encrypted communications, public domain satellite imagery, probable MANPADs, and even UAVs and naval SSMs.

Indeed, by my quick and dirty count, ATGMs (some of them older-generation AT-3 Saggers, etc--but many others more modern TOW or AT-5 Spandrel/Konkurs, or very modern AT-AT-13 Metis-E and AT-14 Kornet-M) were the single largest cause of IDF deaths in 2006:

7% initial ambush (July 12)

38% ATGM direct fire
24% infantry direct fire
10% indirect fire (most of them one MRL attack)
6% antiaircraft fire
6% friendly fire/accidents
5% mines/IED
3% naval SSM

This is hardly your "normal" irregular force.

(Warning: I crunched the numbers very quickly one morning while posting to Abu Muqawama.. I should go back and recheck the data some time.)

[jmm99]

re: last Richard W posting

This post is limited to the following:

"On the other hand if we look at what Islamic insurgent infantry (@ 3,000 in number and armed in the main with WWII technology and drawn from a part time militia) did to the IDF in southern Lebanon we may see the future of ground conflict between the West and the holy warriors of Islam."

Some SpecOps guy, with combat experience, would have to address the rest.

I have read through this thread, your profile (which says naught) and your other posts. When IDF Lebanon "X" was on, every day I watched it on the 3 cable news outlets I have, followed it in Ha'aretz and the Post (Jerusalem), and read many analyses by Israeli and other commentators. That area of South Lebanon is of interest to me because of various events and characters from the Crusader Era.

But (and a big one), I have not been on the ground there; nor have I led an IDF or any other unit into combat. I will try to keep this to my perception of policy decisions.

A major component of that operation was agitprop offense by Hez; and agitprop defense by the IDF. The basic Hez line seemed (to me) to be something like this: "We are the protectors of So. Leb.; we are strong, dug-in and ready; we can beat the IDF man to man; and we are willing to die." Think Iwo Jima from the Japanese viewpoint ?

The Israeli policy (strategy ?) confused me. There was the massive "strategic" air campaign, hitting targets which might have been fine if the nominal Leb. government were the center of gravity ! Part of that (in stated IDF policy) was to cut the Hez supply and re-inforcement lines. Perhaps, but it also screwed up the escape routes for refugees (leaving a lot of "collaterals" in the OA); and hit a few villages which had to explained away.

On the ground, the IDF seemed content with targeted intrusions (which were generally successful in their limited objectives); but the media impression (to me) was not of the IDF doggie fighting upfront "man to man". It was of a lot of heavy IDF stuff blasting at the "poor", "patriotic" defenders of the villages - and of the Faith. There seemed a real IDF aversion to seeing its casualties appear on TV (except for those hit by the Hez rocket attacks, which were a sideshow).

Maybe, doing it "on the cheap" was also a factor - if so, the return rate on the savings account was pretty negative.

Perhaps, the IDF would have been better off (from an agitprop standpoint) by adopting a policy something like: "We are going to take on Hez man to man, regardless of casualties; we are in a battle for survival.". That would be the agitprop impression sought.

The reality, I suppose, might be to dismount the infantry; slowly move through the defensive posions; fix the Hez in their bunkers, and hit with close-in air and heavy stuff; bury them with demolitions and armored bulldozers (lots of combat engineer stuff).

Someone with combat experience and knowledge of IDF capabilities would have to comment on thit one - feasible or no ? It seems it could be a policy leading to very intense, but localized combat. An OA where you probably would not have too many media types ! :)

I don't see that the Lebanon incident, in its military aspects, has much to do with "the future of ground conflict between the West and the holy warriors of Islam", as you put it.

[Richard W]

Rex Brynen:

Thank you for your kind reply.

I like to read online the Israeli papers. From my reading it is my impression that the average Israeli is not shy. There was and is an enormous amount of criticism in the press about the fighting in southern Lebanon. One of the criticisms that leaped out at me was that the enemy was armed in the main with WWII technology. (The author of that complaint counted the suit case sagger as essentially WWII technology.) I think he has a point. The very rugged Soviet Infantry and indirect fire weapons used by the enemy (AK 47, PKM, RPG, mines, and "Katusha" rockets) all have their roots in WWII technology. (I imagine a weapons expert might argue that technology like the UAV, the surface to surface missile and radio encryption also appeared in WWII. [My goodness Do you not watch the font of all wisdom the History Channel?]) I posted "in the main" because the IDF veterans writing to the Editors also claimed that some small, fire team size insurgent units were uniformed, armed and equipped just like the IDF.

The point that they were trying to make (and I obviously failed to do) was that technology counted for far less than in previous Arab - Israeli conflicts. (The IDF of course is very high tech. Prior to the fighting, reportedly, around 60% of the IDF budget went to the IAF.) The IDF veterans claimed that something went very, very wrong in southern Lebanon. Some even argued that the 1956 IDF would have had no trouble rooting out the insurgents.

Essentially they argued that the IDF had become "americanized". That it was no longer man centered but machine centered. An argument the Israeli scholar Van Crevald has been making for some years now (See his Fighting Power wherein he alleges that the WWII German Army had superior fighting power over the US Army because it was man centered while the US Army was machine centered.)

My guess is that the IDF veterans who wrote on this matter would be in agreement with your 24% casualty figure due to antitank guided missiles. They commented frequently on teh tacticla problems of dealing with antitank weapons. Like insurgents everywhere they used antitank weapons in the antipersonnel role. It works.

I did not think I said that this was a "normal irregular force" .My guess is that there is no such thing. However I am saying that it is significant that a part time militia armed in the main with WWII technology fought a 21st Century professional military armed in the main with the latest and best technology to a stand still.

I did not witness the fighting. I also never had an original idea in my life. But I think the IDF veterans are on to something. And other Islamic insurgents are watching.

Regards

Richard W

[Richard W]

jmm99:

Thank you for your kind reply wherein you posted in part: "I don't see that the Lebanon incident, in its military aspects, has much to do with "the future of ground conflict between the West and the holy warriors of Islam", as you put it".

Allow me to reply: I hope you are right. The Islamic insurgents won. A Western military was humiliated. The insurgents used cheap, readily available weapons, equipment and technology. The IDF used the very best and expensive gear available. Let us pray that this was an aberration. An abnormality, That the next time the IDF will rout the insurgents with ease using amazing technology and suffering very few casualties. Let us also pray that Islamic insurgents around the world did not learn anything from this campaign and that they too will soon fall to a bloodless, high technology, Western military offensive.

Regards

Richard W

[Rex Brynen]

...that one should be very careful in using terms like "Islamic insurgent infantry."

First, not all irregular or insurgent forces in Muslim majority countries are Islamist in orientation--they may organize around nationalism/ethnicity, tribe, region, ideology, class, and/or religion--and often a complex mixture of several of these.

Second, not all Islamist paramilitary forces look the same in organization, doctrine, or firepower--there are huge differences in the way that Hizbullah fights (and between Hizbullah pre-2000 and Hizbullah 2006), the way AQI fights (rarelay stand-up, lots of IEDs), the way the ICU fights in Somalia (lots of technicals, spray-and-pray), the Taliban, etc.

The only limited tactical/operational commonalities--and even here I think this is very limited--are that strong ideological motivation may have some implications for morale, unit cohesion, and penetration/HUMINT collection.

[Richard W]

Rex Brynen:

Thank you for your kind reply.

I am afraid that I am very old fashion in my thinking. People that walk and fight on foot I think of as "infantry" even if they are insurgents, guerrillas or bandits. (No doubt I was soon receive a strong letter from some military staff college on this subject.) I also fear that the diversity of the Islamic enemy is one of his many strengths. Western military forces appear, at least to my eye, as increasingly homogeneous. What one Islamic group learns from fighting a Western military formation can be easily adopted by another Islamic group. On the other hand the Western military machine has to adapt to each different Islamic group in turn.

Regards

Richard W

[Rex Brynen]

Richard:

You might also want to reconsider the term "Islamic enemy" which seems to label a large and varied global Muslim population as intrinsically hostile--including both the (AKP) government and 99.8% of the population of a major NATO ally (Turkey)!

In Afghanistan, the US faces Taliban insurgents who are militant Islamists (although that isn't the only bond that unites them). In Iraq, the US has faced--at varying times--insurgents who are radical Sunni Islamists, Iraqi nationalist-Shi'ite Islamists, and Iraqi nationalist Sunnis--while all the time allied to a predominately Shi'ite Islamist (SIIC, Dawa) Iraqi central government.

[Richard W]

Rex Brynen:

Thank you for your kind reply.

Since the Bolshevik revolution not all communist movements have been actively hostile to the West. However I think it is fair to say that all true communists have borne a certain dislike of the West. (Particularly communists who are tenured professors in Western Universities.) I think it was (and is) fair to describe communist movements which have borne arms against the West as "communist enemies".

Between 620 AD and 720 AD the followers of the Prophet overran about half of what was then called Christendom. Around 1071 the holy warriors destroyed the last professional Christian Army at Manzikert and took the Emperor prisoner. The holy warriors subsequently turned the Mediterranean into a Muslim lake. They fueled their economy with Western slaves. (I believe that the last slave raid into Ireland was around 1814) and generally maintained a military, technological and economic superiority over the West until the 17th Century.

It has been argued, I think correctly, that but for the Crusades and unexpected for victories at places like Tours, Lepanto and Vienna that the West would have become Islamic. [See the revisionist English historian Hilaire Belloc who by the way predicted in 1920 that the Islam would revive as a military power to challenge the West yet again.])

I think that under the circumstances described above that to describe an Islamic group which is bearing arms against the West as an Islamic enemy group or movement is accurate.

On the other hand I subscribe to the old fashion Western notion of "love thy enemy". I bear no hate to any follower of the Prophet. I ask God to bless all Muslims.

Regards

Richard W

[Rex Brynen]

Richard:

Implicit (or, perhaps, explicit) in your response is the idea that the "West" and "Islam" are mutually exclusive and enduring oppositional terms. I certainly don't see it that way--nor, I suspect, do many Muslim Canadians (or Americans). al-Qa'ida does, it is true. However, that is all the more reason not to buy into the clash-of-civilizations worldview, in my opinion.

Equally, while one could cite many examples of Christian Europe and the Muslim Middle East colliding, one could point to, I suspect, just as many cases of political alliances that cross-cut religious lines—and certainly far, far more cases where countries fought coreligionists. Indeed, Muslim-Christian difference has been a poor predictor of military confrontation in the broader Mediterranean world for a very long time.

Having said that, it really isn't my main point. Rather, I want to suggest that "Islamic insurgents" is not a very useful category, since it assigns political significance (or draws some inference about mobilization, operations, doctrine, or technique) from the religious affiliation of combatants who may be fighting in a variety of ways for a variety of causes. The term Islamist insurgent (or militant) is somewhat more useful, since it narrows the field down to those groups that emphasize a political message and popular mobilization around a particular highly political reading of Islam, and who conceptualize their political goals in religious terms. However, even here, there are Islamists, and there are Islamists—some militant, most not, and even the former variegated in many very important ways.

[William F. Owen]

Allow me to reply: I hope you are right. The Islamic insurgents won. A Western military was humiliated. The insurgents used cheap, readily available weapons, equipment and technology. The IDF used the very best and expensive gear available. Let us pray that this was an aberration. An abnormality, That the next time the IDF will rout the insurgents with ease using amazing technology and suffering very few casualties. Let us also pray that Islamic insurgents around the world did not learn anything from this campaign and that they too will soon fall to a bloodless, high technology, Western military offensive.


Whaoh there Cochise!

1. The IDF are not a Western Military. They are Middle Eastern. 95% are born in Israel. Israel is not a Western Nation. It's further East than Turkey or Egypt. What is more, the IDF bears no resemblance to the UK or US Armies, even though its linage is British.

2. The Insurgents had some pretty sophisticated ATMGs, which they knew how to use because all they had done for 3 years was practice using them on the the piece of ground where they lived. Generally, if they came up against IDF infantry infiltrating at night, they abandoned the ATGM posts and fell back to bunker systems, a great many of which were discovered and over run.

3. The IDF did not use the very best expensive gear available. This is plain wrong. Most infantry Battalions had pretty average gear, and in 2006 it hadn't changed much from what folks had in 1992, also in the Lebanon.

The problem for the IDF was not tactical. It was entirely operational and strategic. The tactical problems flowed down from that. It was the fact that they were given very silly missions and no resources to accomplish them. ROE was also a massive problem. Hezbollah had none and used the IDFs ROE against them.