ISR and business as usual

[Tom Odom]

This one is really interesting when you place it against the Army/USMC versus USAF debate on COIN


Pentagon battle breaks out over a spy plane (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/iraq/complete/la-na-predators21mar21,1,2071084.story)

Defense Secretary Gates wants more unmanned Predator aircraft in Iraq. But the Air Force worries about the long-term viability of the spy plane program.
By Peter Spiegel, Los Angeles Times Staff Writer
March 21, 2008
WASHINGTON -- Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has ordered the Air Force to put nearly all of its unmanned Predator aircraft into the skies over the Middle East, forcing the service to take steps that officers worry could hobble already-stressed drone squadrons.

Pressure from the Defense secretary in recent months has nearly doubled the number of Predators available to help hunt insurgents and find roadside bombs in Iraq. But it has forced air commanders into a scramble for crews that officers said could hurt morale and harm the long-term viability of the Predator program.

Some officers said pressure from Gates resulted in one plan that could have taken the Air Force down a path similar to the German Luftwaffe, which cut back training in World War II to get more pilots in the air.

"That was the end of their air force," said Col. Chris Chambliss, commander of the Air Force's Predator wing. The Air Force plan, presented to the military leadership in January, eventually was scaled back.

and this last tidbit is just priceless:


In the debate over control of the fast-growing fleet, the Air Force argues that only qualified pilots should fly airplanes that drop bombs and fire missiles. But Army ground commanders maintain they most need and use the streaming video to plan and execute their ground operations.

[Coldstreamer]

Give pred to the army. It's a land component tool. Let the airforce do air force things.

This is not a market place for competitors to struggle for influence. A functional approach to problem solving...hang on...sorry, my mistake. Jobs at stake. Which is why the RAF flies the UK support helicopter fleet....

[Ken White]

develop a series of options to modify a unit Table of Organization and Equipment. Did that; prepared four options, change nothing (which won; fancy that...) plus three others. One was far smaller than the current version, causing my boss to say "...you're suggesting to a General in the US Army that he should give up flags and spaces in peacetime? Ain't gonna happen!"

Some things appear to be universal... ;)

[Entropy]

Well, this is a common problem with any HDLD capability and from my experience in theater fights over predator are not new. The question of who gets priority over limited assets is an enduring one.

I do think, however, the basic argument the AF is making here is legitimate - is it worth it to sacrifice future capabilities to get more capabilities sooner? Maybe, but the AF leadership would be shirking its duty to not make the leadership aware of the consequences of proposed courses of action.

And there are the cultural issues which are not all that different from those the Army has been dealing with (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/24/AR2007102402549.html) for the past several years. For example, Predator is not yet considered a "primary" aircraft, IOW one that a pilot can spend a career in, so it's viewed as a diversion from a the "real" job of flying a manned aircraft. This will be a big cultural change for the Air Force and one that will not be made quickly or easily unfortunately. I can see the writing on the wall, but I fear many bag-wearers do not.

Coldstreamer,

It's never as simple as "giving" predator to the Army. Predator is not simply an aircraft, but a system and a capability that's been under development for a decade. One could not "give" predator to the Army without giving the Army all the pilots, maintainers, DCGS, interpreters, contracts, R&D staff, etc. which is simply not possible, even assuming your assertion that predator is land component tool is true.

Consider an opposite example - give the Air Force the Patriot missile system. How ya gonna do that? Hand the systems over and say, "here ya go?" Make everyone in Patriot MOS' change uniforms? No, that's not possible and furthermore it would be stupid, even though ADA might be argued a better fit with the AF mission.

And let's keep in mind that the long-endurance ISR capability provided by predator and other AF UAV's that is now blithely judged a "land component tool" would not be available at all were it not for the AF. As Bill Sweetman puts it (http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&plckPostId=Blog%3a27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3aea7ac73d-8d82-4dfb-a50a-20d79a2a80e4):


It's worth noting that the most recent roles-and-missions spat between the Air Force and the Army centers on the latter's Warrior UAV... which would not exist were it not for the USAF's initiative in adopting a CIA-developed system, equipping it first with a laser designator and then with missiles, and integrating it into large-scale air-land operations.

The Army quite literally never thought of that. Army people are not trained to think in those terms. The Army's home-developed UAVs are broadly comparable to Israeli technology. As in Israeli technology of 20 years ago.

With that, however, I fully support the Army developing their own comparable UAVs for their specific needs as long as there is commonality in the supporting architectures and subsystems.

[slapout9]

Consider an opposite example - give the Air Force the Patriot missile system. How ya gonna do that? Hand the systems over and say, "here ya go?" Make everyone in Patriot MOS' change uniforms? No, that's not possible and furthermore it would be stupid, even though ADA might be argued a better fit with the AF mission.



Nah I don't think so....like everything it was stolen from the Army. I posted an article a while back about Sky Cavalry operations where the Army first used mannded and unmannded drones with a new capability called Televsion in the late 1950's. The article gives some pretty choice words about how the Air Force was blocking Army aircraft development to. About 90% of what the Air Force is calling new I saw being developed as a kid during the space program in the 1960's. Things have been developed and refined since then but they sure ain't new.

[Ken White]

The Army was playing with UAVs thirty years ago -- and has been since. the USAF didn't want anything to do with them for many years...

Yep, the Air Force did pick up the Predator from the CIA -- but Entropy apparently missed the fact that that the Army was the initial uniformed buyer of the Predator -- and DoD made them give it to the AF(LINK) (http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/predator.htm)...

The Army also took it a step further (LINK) (http://www.defense-update.com/products/e/ermpUAV.htm) --
note the buy is for 132 of the birds...

Oh and the Army operates its Predators with non-rated NCOs... :D

[Entropy]

Slapout, of course UAV's are not new - that is not the point. The point is that until a few years ago, UAV's were more of a gimmick within the Army than a real capability. The Air Force not only developed a successful platform, but also the doctrine and technology to integrate that platform with the rest of the force.

[Entropy]

Ken,

Predator was a joint program under DARO until it reached LRIP and the program was managed by the Navy, not the Army. Your link is incorrect. I'll troll my link archive for sourcing tomorrow if you wish.

As for the Warrior, it and the USAF Predator will be merged and managed as a joint program starting this October.

The rated / non-rated pilot debate will be an interesting one to watch. Each side has some good and not-so-good arguments but I think better technology will eventually favor the Army viewpoint. This actually has bearing on the topic of this thread - had the USAF gone with non-rated pilots back in the 1990's, there likely wouldn't be a shortage now. This is the primary reason the Army has chosen to use NCO's - they simply don't have enough pilots to fly the 500 Predator/Warriors they want to buy. If the Army had a pilot surplus, they'd probably be using them instead.

Oh, and during Vietnam the Air Force ran a quite large and secret UAV program called Firefly that flew almost 3500 missions of various types including real-time data-link video. Unfortunately, the program died after the war from the hostility of the pilot mafia as well as the program's extreme secrecy. Still, what the Air Force has historically done with UAV's goes way beyond the "playing" done by the Army.

[Cavguy]

Slapout, of course UAV's are not new - that is not the point. The point is that until a few years ago, UAV's were more of a gimmick within the Army than a real capability. The Air Force not only developed a successful platform, but also the doctrine and technology to integrate that platform with the rest of the force.

Horse hooey.

UAV's have been at use in the Army since the late 90's integrated into the (now defunct) Force XXI development. They got extensive use in the Balkans when I was there, way before 9/11 made them famous.

I'm rather familiar with this issue. In Ramadi, my job was to oversee all the operations in our sector, ground, riverine, and air. We usually had three UAV's aloft at any given time - BN (Raven), BDE (Shadow or Scaneagle), and ocassionally a Predator, Hunter, or higher level UAV. I loved the BN/BDE UAV's, they were completely under our control (from a remote base in country) and the (enlisted) operators responsive to anything we needed them for. (besides their collection plan, such as "troops in contact" events)

I distinctly remember supporting a unit in a very heavy firefight in downtown Ramadi. A high-level UAV was overhead and offered to assist. I decided to accept and tap into their feed rather than re-task another bird. Imagine my frustration in trying to get the remote USAF operators to look at what we needed to observe. Instead the "pilot" did whatever he thought was best to observe, not what the unit wanted. As a result we lost PID on enemy we were trying to engage. (cooking up a strike) I called the UAV operators to register a "WTF?" and I was unceremonously told they were a strategic asset and didn't respond to BCT's, even with troops in contact. They were highly trained pilots and analyists and would decide what to observe. :mad: The downright arrogance still gets me worked up to this day.

You can't convince me that the USAF having control of the UAV's from Nellis is a good thing. The USAF may have developed some cool doctrine, but its UAV ops are anything BUT integrated with the ground force. I imagine this is the reason the army decided to get its own (rotary) air force, like the Marines - soldiers get left hanging to dry otherwise in the USAF priority scheme.

[Coldstreamer]

Entropy,

Good points about capability development, which I must say a glossed over to get to the nexus; it is a Land Centric Capabilty, and therefore to be properly integrated within Land Componency should be owned by the Army. A great deal of the backup R&D and systems support is provided by contractor, so that it less of an issue as may first appear.

Personally, I wouldn't have a great issue with ADA going to the AF, my enduring point being that logic and need should drive, not territorial vanity.

[Entropy]

Cavguy,

The "late 90's" wasn't that long ago and the Navy had the best UAV program before that which explains why they were the managers for Hunter, Pioneer and Predator under DARO.

The Air Force developed the Predator and turned it into a capable weapons and ISR platform that is integrated with other weapons systems. Yes the Army has UAV's and I'm sure you put them to good use, as you should. But unless I'm mistaken they are essentially just cameras in the sky. For example, can your mortar or arty teams use them to correct fire? Can they designate for your other weapons systems? Can your apaches get your video feed to develop SA when they're enroute to your tic? Unless I'm mistaken, the current crop of Army UAV's can do none of these things.

As for integration with the ground force, that is a two-way street. There is nothing preventing the Army from buying as many ROVERs as it wants or integrating the datalink technology more directly into its weapon systems as the Air Force is currently in the middle of doing. The technology and architecture are there for the Army to exploit if it chooses to do so.

In the meantime, the Army likes what the USAF made so much it wants to buy a bunch of its own predators (500!) which is fine by me.

And I'm genuinely sorry about your bad predator experience, there really is no excuse for that.

Coldstreamer,

One might argue that everything is ultimately land-centric ;)

I postulated moving ADA to the AF in jest to simply make the point. Truth be told, however, a lot of pilots were more afraid of Patriot than the Iraqi air defenses - the capabilities of the system are such that the aircrew tends not to survive. As an intel guy I had to brief the location and status of the various Patriot batteries before each mission.

[Paul Smyth]

It seems there are some conflating issues here: historic precedence, inter-service rivalries, vested interests, budgeting issues, resource shortfalls, long-term force structures, near v far capability development, doctrine and operational effectiveness.

We should not be surprised that there is a genuine concern that if the 'Army' is given ownership/responsibility of a capability with theatre-wide utility it may not be employed optimally, especially in European countries with small armies with less vision than the USA. SFs demonstrate the point from the reverse angle - they are a Theatre asset but are quick to point out their strategic credentials - overwhelmingly manned by the Army but functionally separate. Troops should have their own ISTAR assets. Period. But Reaper must be able to operate across the entire battlespace, and if necessary in gorrillas. For that reason alone it needs to be operated by people who can integrate it anywhere in the AOR and who understand airspace and packaging issues. If we apportion ownership on the basis of 'customer' then the Army would own JSTARs/Nimrod R/Harrier et al.

Personally, I don't especially care who 'owns' a capability as long as it is used properly. We seem to forget that there should only be one campaign in theatre - the Joint Campaign, owned by the Joint Commander. The assets in his AOR are his and should be used in accordance with his priorities - compare the negative comments from Lt Gen Franks (VII Corps) about CENTAF in DESERT STORM with the positive ones from Gen Schwarzkopf. The case for LCC ownership of 'everything' is naturally fuelled by the ongoing COIN efforts, but the imperative for a truly Joint approach and the correct allocation of responsibility (for a capability) to component attributes is amplified by the potential for state v state war, which would seriously expose structural fudges made on the basis of current ops.

[Coldstreamer]

I'd go with that.

[slapout9]

Oh, and during Vietnam the Air Force ran a quite large and secret UAV program called Firefly that flew almost 3500 missions of various types including real-time data-link video. Unfortunately, the program died after the war from the hostility of the pilot mafia as well as the program's extreme secrecy. Still, what the Air Force has historically done with UAV's goes way beyond the "playing" done by the Army.


Glad you brought that up. Drones (remote control aircraft) were developed by the Army which were used for Air Defense training and that was pretty much where the idea came from. Do research on White Sands, New Mexico or MICOM Army Missile Command and there are all kinds of examples.

[slapout9]

It seems there are some conflating issues here: historic precedence, inter-service rivalries, vested interests, budgeting issues, resource shortfalls, long-term force structures, near v far capability development, doctrine and operational effectiveness.

We should not be surprised that there is a genuine concern that if the 'Army' is given ownership/responsibility of a capability with theatre-wide utility it may not be employed optimally, especially in European countries with small armies with less vision than the USA. SFs demonstrate the point from the reverse angle - they are a Theatre asset but are quick to point out their strategic credentials - overwhelmingly manned by the Army but functionally separate. Troops should have their own ISTAR assets. Period. But Reaper must be able to operate across the entire battlespace, and if necessary in gorrillas. For that reason alone it needs to be operated by people who can integrate it anywhere in the AOR and who understand airspace and packaging issues. If we apportion ownership on the basis of 'customer' then the Army would own JSTARs/Nimrod R/Harrier et al.

Personally, I don't especially care who 'owns' a capability as long as it is used properly. We seem to forget that there should only be one campaign in theatre - the Joint Campaign, owned by the Joint Commander. The assets in his AOR are his and should be used in accordance with his priorities - compare the negative comments from Lt Gen Franks (VII Corps) about CENTAF in DESERT STORM with the positive ones from Gen Schwarzkopf. The case for LCC ownership of 'everything' is naturally fuelled by the ongoing COIN efforts, but the imperative for a truly Joint approach and the correct allocation of responsibility (for a capability) to component attributes is amplified by the potential for state v state war, which would seriously expose structural fudges made on the basis of current ops.


Hi Paul, this is truly the issue and a truly Joint Approach is the only real solution or you will keep having the turf battles. In the Air, on the Land, in the Sea, Services responsibilities divided up that way is bound to lead to internal conflicts.

[Entropy]

Well said Paul. It's one reason I'm glad the predator and warrior programs are being combined into a joint program. Commonality in key systems is a good thing.

[Ken White]

Ken,
Predator was a joint program under DARO until it reached LRIP and the program was managed by the Navy, not the Army. Your link is incorrect. I'll troll my link archive for sourcing tomorrow if you wish.Any DoD program is rife with misapprehensions and confusion not to mention a convoluted development history -- we can over-engineer anything -- but it's sort of irrelevant, we are where we are. Let's just leave it at the CIA saw the promise, weaponized the bird and the services, plural, came after while acknowledging that the Warrior is a Predator clone.
As for the Warrior, it and the USAF Predator will be merged and managed as a joint program starting this October.Pity if true and I don't doubt that it is. Whether it should be is another story because Joint Programs with wings seem to have a tendency to come under USAF control -- to the detriment of guys on the ground...
...If the Army had a pilot surplus, they'd probably be using them instead.Possibly but probably not. Still, admittedly state of the art dependent.
Oh, and during Vietnam the Air Force ran a quite large and secret UAV program called Firefly that flew almost 3500 missions of various types including real-time data-link video. Unfortunately, the program died after the war from the hostility of the pilot mafia as well as the program's extreme secrecy. Still, what the Air Force has historically done with UAV's goes way beyond the "playing" done by the Army.It wasn't that secret, pictures abounded at the time. I had to take a team to go recover one that fell off a DC130 northwest of Hue. We got to it before Clyde and sling loaded it out with a Chinook. That was not a good day...

As Slapout pointed out they all sprang from ADA drone targets; Firefly was derived from the Firebee which was both an Air Force and Navy bird. That too is academic. The issue is providing support to troops on the ground; as you also said:
One might argue that everything is ultimately land-centricTrue dat. :D

[Ken White]

It seems there are some conflating issues here: historic precedence, inter-service rivalries, vested interests, budgeting issues, resource shortfalls, long-term force structures, near v far capability development, doctrine and operational effectiveness.Yes to that.
We should not be surprised that there is a genuine concern that if the 'Army' is given ownership/responsibility of a capability with theatre-wide utility it may not be employed optimally...Yes to that -- if you mean concern by the USAF. The flip side of that is a resounding 'no.' The Army will have genuine and historically merited concern that theater wide use will not be optimal for support of troops in contact.
...Troops should have their own ISTAR assets. Period. But Reaper must be able to operate across the entire battlespace, and if necessary in gorrillas. For that reason alone it needs to be operated by people who can integrate it anywhere in the AOR and who understand airspace and packaging issues.Agree and disagree. I have no quarrel with the USAF owning and deploying Reaper as it sees fit -- but I also strongly believe the Army should own and deploy Warrior as it sees fit and you did not add that caveat.
If we apportion ownership on the basis of 'customer' then the Army would own JSTARs/Nimrod R/Harrier et al.True -- and an idea with some merit... ;)
Personally, I don't especially care who 'owns' a capability as long as it is used properly.I agree with that; the issue I believe is precisely who determines 'properly?'
...We seem to forget that there should only be one campaign in theatre - the Joint Campaign, owned by the Joint Commander. The assets in his AOR are his and should be used in accordance with his priorities - compare the negative comments from Lt Gen Franks (VII Corps) about CENTAF in DESERT STORM with the positive ones from Gen Schwarzkopf. The case for LCC ownership of 'everything' is naturally fuelled by the ongoing COIN efforts, but the imperative for a truly Joint approach and the correct allocation of responsibility (for a capability) to component attributes is amplified by the potential for state v state war, which would seriously expose structural fudges made on the basis of current ops.Admirably 'joint.' However, as is true of any generalization, subject to caveats. Having experience with close air support with and without an overarching 'joint' air effort, I am in no doubt that the CAS is better without total consolidation and a Theater ATO. No doubt what so ever...

As to Frank's and Schwarzkopf's experience, that has much to do with the Air Component Commander. Some folks just do a better job than others... :D

On the entire topic of who owns and who uses what, Entropy also said:
As for integration with the ground force, that is a two-way street. There is nothing preventing the Army from buying as many ROVERs as it wants or integrating the datalink technology more directly into its weapon systems as the Air Force is currently in the middle of doing. The technology and architecture are there for the Army to exploit if it chooses to do so.True statement -- it also, as does your opinion, neatlyelides the fact that all those ROVERs may not need a video of an area 200 km away while the boys in blue search for 'strategic' targets; that is no guarantee of coverage when and where needed, merely access to what ever the ACC or JFACC deems important to them at the time. Which may or may not be the pressing concern of the Theater Commander, much less the Ground Component Commander...

[slapout9]

Hi Ken, also the Air Force already has Global Hawk for their Strategic Stuff so why do they need to control the predator which has a good old Army missile on it. Hellfire-fire and forget:D


Link to how the Army figured it out a long time ago..enjoy
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NpFg9JVvyEE

And you damn right that's a Real Army Sergeant hosting the show!!

[Merv Benson]

Most air Force missions are transient, i.e. they go from point A to Point B and back and sometimes spend a short time over a target. That is one reason why air power is a poor substitute for boots on the ground in an interdiction mission.

The Predator breaks that mold. It can lurk over a specific area without have to take a leak for several hours or days. For interdiction missions and for watching the MSR the Predator is an ideal compliment to the forces on the ground and it seems logical to me that those forces should be calling the shots.

There are probably other missions where it fits the Air Force MO better.

Another factor that fits into this debate is the Air Force's natural desire to control the air space. It does not want surprises for other air craft that are in that space. That is an area where the ground troops, with help from technology, need to find a way to cooperate. There has already been a heated debate on this with the smaller UAV's.

I am not sure I buy the Air Force argument about pilots. I think some experienced gamers would feel right at home with the joystick, in pretty short order. Give them some time in the simulator to make sure they are not going to crash and burn and I think they would have an abundance of pilots.

[Ken White]

Hi Ken, also the Air Force already has Global Hawk for their Strategic Stuff so why do they need to control the predator which has a good old Army missile on it. Hellfire-fire and forget:D

Link to how the Army figured it out a long time ago..enjoy
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NpFg9JVvyEE

And you damn right that's a Real Army Sergeant hosting the show!!

All those proponents of 'jointness' always forget that consolidation inevitably increases the bureaucratic quotient and promotes a 'one size fits all' approach which means compromises in mission accomplishment in the name of efficiency. No question that centralization increases efficiency -- there is also little doubt that it adversely impacts effectiveness. I'm inclined to opt for cops and forces that are effective more so than efficient -- not that there's much in the world more inefficient than a war anyway... :D

God knows what'll happen if the Navy buys Global Hawk for the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Mission System. Nobody on E-ring will speaking to anyone else, I reckon... ;)

I guess with that mustache and all that hair, that young MSG was never in the eighty twice...:D

Thanks for the link.

[Entropy]

Ken,


Whether it should be is another story because Joint Programs with wings seem to have a tendency to come under USAF control -- to the detriment of guys on the ground

Well, I disagree. The purpose is to ensure commonality so the guys on the ground don't have to carry one set of gear to link with Army assets and another set of gear to link with Navy and a third to link with Air Force. Of course, cost containment is also a reason. I also reject the assertion that USAF "control" automatically results in the detriment to the guys on the ground. I see similar statements all the time - statements that are apparently to be taken as objective fact but are really debatable.

And speaking of "control" we need to establish what that means. Control can be any or all of the following:

1. Control over requirements, development and acquisition
2. Administrative control
3. Operational control

Predator has always been intended as a Joint Force commander asset, not exclusively an air component asset. Predator utilization in theater is not up to the "Air Force" - the priorities are set by the joint force commander and, as is the case with all air assets that operate above a certain altitude block, coordinated through the CFACC.


but I also strongly believe the Army should own and deploy Warrior as it sees fit and you did not add that caveat.

Using our current doctrine, I'm assuming here that by "Army" you really mean the "land component commander" (LCC). I have no problem with that but the CFACC must still be the agency for deconfliction and coordination. For all the same reasons the LCC needs a measure of unity of command over all ground forces be they Army, Marine or Coalition, the air component needs the same over air assets.


Having experience with close air support with and without an overarching 'joint' air effort, I am in no doubt that the CAS is better without total consolidation and a Theater ATO. No doubt what so ever...


I wonder how long its been since you've had first-hand experience with CAS? I'm guessing not in the past several years - a lot has changed.


True statement -- it also, as does your opinion, neatlyelides the fact that all those ROVERs may not need a video of an area 200 km away while the boys in blue search for 'strategic' targets; that is no guarantee of coverage when and where needed, merely access to what ever the ACC or JFACC deems important to them at the time. Which may or may not be the pressing concern of the Theater Commander, much less the Ground Component Commander...

Well, rover (the newer versions at least) can also receive the imagery from a manned fighter's targeting pod - indeed from almost any AF platform with a sensor. Can the same be said for Apache or Kiowa's? Again, this is the kind of integration the AF is way ahead of the Army on and is a big area FCS is supposed to address.

And again, the "boys in blue" (by which I assume you mean the CFACC) are not out there executing their own missions willy-nilly, but implementing the joint force commander's intent and the JFC wants coverage of strategic targets too. If the CFACC is not providing adequate support the the CFLCC, then the CFLCC can take the issue up with the JFC who is the decider. The idea the CFACC can or is executing missions contrary to the JFC's wishes, or is going off and doing its own thing to the detriment of the land component is ludicrious, especially if you're talking about predator which is a JFC-owned asset. The vast majority of predators and, indeed, all tactical aircraft, are used to support the ground forces, but the JFC also uses predators for strategic reconnaissance and the Joint special ops commander has some too for their specific missions.


No question that centralization increases efficiency -- there is also little doubt that it adversely impacts effectiveness.

Not in all or even most cases. Did Goldwater-Nichols adversely impact effectiveness? Centralization often increases effectiveness. Again, what is more effective, a UAV C2 architecture that's common over the whole force, or one where each service develops its own incompatible system? A common standard architecture means better integration across the whole force.

And this doesn't mean that each platform has to be the same. If the Army wants a UAV with greater endurance, or different weapons options, or whatever, that's great. The problems and ineffectiveness creep in when the services want to use proprietary datalink, C2, etc. In other words, centralization is not an either-or concept.

[Cavguy]

The Air Force developed the Predator and turned it into a capable weapons and ISR platform that is integrated with other weapons systems. Yes the Army has UAV's and I'm sure you put them to good use, as you should. But unless I'm mistaken they are essentially just cameras in the sky.
For example, can your mortar or arty teams use them to correct fire?

Yes, All of them can from Raven and above, I've done it.


Can they designate for your other weapons systems?

Some can, to different levels. All can spot designate in some method, and some can laser designate. Keeping it vague here.


Can your apaches get your video feed to develop SA when they're enroute to your tic?

If they have something similar to Rover installed, they could. All our UAV's can be received in Rover as well as Aircraft.


And I'm genuinely sorry about your bad predator experience, there really is no excuse for that.

No problem, wasn't you. But it happened more than once, and that's the worst case. I came off harder than I should, I do love the USAF, a USAF F-15E drop ended a bad firefight I was in once.

But the notion you can do COIN from the air with ISR, or even effeciently interdict the enemy, is a myth at the present time.

Case in point, the nation threw every surveillance asset it had, from satellites to aircraft to UAV's on a single stretch of road south of Balad to stop IED activity (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/30/AR2007093001675.html). Some months later, the program was cancelled because of outright failure.

Anyway, I was cranky posting at 2AM last night. Sorry for the harsh tone, I promise to play nice!:D

[Ken White]

how can that be? He spluttered...:D

[Cavguy]

Some quotes from Rick Atkinson's article linked above:

Read the whole thing. (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/30/AR2007093001675.html?sid=ST2007092900754)


IED Blitz would focus as many forms of surveillance as possible in a "persistent stare" at a bomb-infested 20-kilometer stretch of Route Tampa, just south of Balad on the road to Baghdad. The blitz would enlist satellites, U-2 spy planes, 14 Mako unmanned aerial vehicles, a pair of larger I-Gnat drones, and the Horned Owl, a Beechcraft turboprop airplane equipped with ground-penetrating radar used to assess whether road shoulders had been disturbed by digging.

Attacks had grown increasingly extravagant, with "daisy-chained" munitions that included as many as 22 artillery shells wired together to explode simultaneously in a 300-yard "kill zone." Intelligence analysts assumed that such ambush sites took hours or even days to prepare. On the basis of past attack patterns, they predicted that 60 IEDs would be planted in 75 days on this short segment of Route Tampa.

Hundreds of thousands of photographs would be snapped as part of a technique called "coherent change detection." Two images of the same scene taken at different times would be compared, pixel by pixel, to spot changes in the landscape -- such as the anomalies caused by an insurgent planting a bomb. Ground convoys could be warned, and, if the reconnaissance was nimble, hunter-killer teams could flush emplacers or triggermen.

The operation, estimated to cost at least $3 million, would be directed from Defense Department offices leased in Fairfax County.



Blitz began on Tuesday, Aug. 24, 2004. So brilliant were the digital color images that analysts could read the brand names on plastic water bottles littering the roadside. They could distinguish an apple from a pomegranate at a fruit stand.

What they could not see was a bomb or a bomber.





The most disheartening day came on Thursday, Nov. 4. By chance, virtually all surveillance assets -- satellites, U-2s, drones -- happened to be focused simultaneously on one small swatch of Route Tampa. Traffic appeared normal. Two hours later, another sequence of images revealed a scorched crater where a bag of artillery shells triggered by a detonation wire had just killed one American soldier in a truck and severed the leg of another. Dozens of photos showed the burning vehicle veer across the median, and rescue vehicles convene at the site. No images revealed the IED being placed, or the triggerman.

Analysts soon surmised that bomber cells around Balad in late summer had shifted "to a just-in-time device-placement method," as a Defense Intelligence Agency analyst put it. Instead of requiring hours or days to survey an ambush site and bury a device, "hasty emplacement" took two hours or less.

Blitz ended on Nov. 15. In 10 weeks, 44 IEDs had detonated or were discovered by ground clearance teams. Asked how many had been detected by aerial surveillance, the Air Force officer said, "To be honest with you, I can't say any of them.

"We had only a 20-kilometer stretch," the officer added. "There are thousands of kilometers in Iraq."


This is why I get nervous anytime someone tells me the tech in FCS or Air power will solve my problems through ROVER or any other gimmick. We focused almost national asset and tech available, plus hundreds of personnel on twenty klicks of road and were unable to stop or identify attacks.

[Coldstreamer]

Pull back to the Drop Ship and nuke them all from Orbit. Only way to be sure.

I'll try for something sensible tomorrow, possibly.

Tech gobbledigook just doesn't deliver the goods in COIN and insurgencies. That stretch of Tampa would have been better secured if all the money and talent had been diverted from model aeroplanes with cameras to a couple of good HUMINT teams who could have given proper warning of when the devices were laid, and led to strikes to arrest the insurgent cell commanders, who could then be sweated to spill the beans on their pals, and then reconciled to become stakeholders in a future they could contribute to.

Oops. Couldn't help myself.

[slapout9]

Pull back to the Drop Ship and nuke them all from Orbit. Only way to be sure.



:D:D:D I spilled some coffe reading that one.

[Entropy]

Cavguy,

To be sure there are limits to aerial ISR, just as any capability has inherent limits. There isn't a silver bullet here and the enemy gets a vote too as they learn our various capabilities and exploit their inherent weaknesses.

The good news is that the AF and Army seem to be trying to put aside the mutual distrust and both are making an effort to work together. Hopefully that continues.

Returning to the original point of this thread for a minute, the Air Force willl have to come to grips with how the UAV fleet fits into the service culturally. As long as UAV's are an ancillary job viewed as a distraction from the "real" job of flying manned aircraft, the service is gonna have problems. Most of these issues were identified almost ten years ago (https://research.au.af.mil/papers/ay1999/saas/tobin.pdf) - it's sad that so little has been done to address the UAV cultural problems.


Pull back to the Drop Ship and nuke them all from Orbit. Only way to be sure.

lol:)

[Ken White]

...
Well, I disagree. The purpose is to ensure commonality so the guys on the ground don't have to carry one set of gear to link with Army assets and another set of gear to link with Navy and a third to link with Air Force. Of course, cost containment is also a reason....I totally support commonality; control is another issue.
...I also reject the assertion that USAF "control" automatically results in the detriment to the guys on the ground....You may do so and I'll acknowledge it was a generalization and thus hyperbolic in sense. However I would ask (from the admitted and biased standpoint of a grunt) if even the occasional lapse is acceptable.
...I see similar statements all the time - statements that are apparently to be taken as objective fact but are really debatable.Any statement can be debated; however, the old saw "where there's smoke..." comes to mind. Perhaps rather than debate it, one should question the provenance.
And speaking of "control" we need to establish what that means. Control can be any or all of the following:

1. Control over requirements, development and acquisition
2. Administrative control
3. Operational control

Predator has always been intended as a Joint Force commander asset, not exclusively an air component asset. Predator utilization in theater is not up to the "Air Force" - the priorities are set by the joint force commander and, as is the case with all air assets that operate above a certain altitude block, coordinated through the CFACC.You apparently have more faith in the total grasp of the situation in a theater on the part of joint force Commander than I do and you undoubtedly have more faith in the CFACC than I do. People err; people with the best intentions in the world err. Combat breeds error.
Using our current doctrine, I'm assuming here that by "Army" you really mean the "land component commander" (LCC). I have no problem with that but the CFACC must still be the agency for deconfliction and coordination. For all the same reasons the LCC needs a measure of unity of command over all ground forces be they Army, Marine or Coalition, the air component needs the same over air assets.It may surprise you but I do not disagree with that. Where we probably differ is on where that CFACC Boss should place his priorities. As well on who owns some of those air assets he deconflicts...
I wonder how long its been since you've had first-hand experience with CAS? I'm guessing not in the past several years - a lot has changed.In my case, about 38 years, so you're correct -- in my sons case with two tours in Afghanistan and one in Iraq, I suspect he's as current and knowledgeable as anyone having been in tactical command in both theaters and having an attached JFAC and getting support from the Dutch, the RAF and the USAF -- and the random Apache (Brit, Dutch and US) or Kiowa..

Still, I agree that it has changed and most of that change is for the better. That doesn't address the fact that CAS is still not high up the priority list, is it?
Well, rover (the newer versions at least) can also receive the imagery from a manned fighter's targeting pod - indeed from almost any AF platform with a sensor. Can the same be said for Apache or Kiowa's? Again, this is the kind of integration the AF is way ahead of the Army on and is a big area FCS is supposed to address.The answer to your question is yes; the response to your statement is -- partly true. Reluctantly so on the part of many in the USAF heirarchy but partly true. Obviously you missed the fact that a lot of FCS technology has been spun out to the field. I'd also point out that since the USAF insists on having a blue suiter serve as JFAC it then becomes incumbent upon the USAF to provide the required support for that mission (vice the USAF desired level thereof) Before you take umbrage, don't -- they're doing it and deserve an attaboy for that. ;)
And again, the "boys in blue" (by which I assume you mean the CFACC) are not out there executing their own missions willy-nilly, but implementing the joint force commander's intent and the JFC wants coverage of strategic targets too. If the CFACC is not providing adequate support the the CFLCC, then the CFLCC can take the issue up with the JFC who is the decider...True; a bureaucratic solution that takes time but true.
...The idea the CFACC can or is executing missions contrary to the JFC's wishesYou may assume the JFC has detailed ATO knowledge. I'd rather not. I doubt in any event they'd go against his wishes.
...or is going off and doing its own thing to the detriment of the land component is ludicrious, especially if you're talking about predator which is a JFC-owned asset. The vast majority of predators and, indeed, all tactical aircraft, are used to support the ground forces, but the JFC also uses predators for strategic reconnaissance and the Joint special ops commander has some too for their specific missions.No intent to imply that the CFACC would be doing their own thing in the sense you state; simply pointing out that some 'strategic' missions are of little or no consequence (that is fact and as an Intel guy I'm sure you've seen dry holes in the quest for info) and if the assets are committed to them and some distance away from a ground action, then said assets are of little use to the GFC.

I do not disagree with you about the USAF predators -- had you included Warriors, I'd disagree.
Not in all or even most cases. Did Goldwater-Nichols adversely impact effectiveness?To an extent. Limiting the President's military advisor to the Chairman was not a good thing. There are other minor quibbles and a couple of major issues IMO.
... Centralization often increases effectiveness...Obviously your experience and mine differ markedly on that score; I've seen a lot of it over 27 years in uniform and another 18 as a DoD civilian and have never seen it increase effectiveness.
...Again, what is more effective, a UAV C2 architecture that's common over the whole force, or one where each service develops its own incompatible system? A common standard architecture means better integration across the whole force.

And this doesn't mean that each platform has to be the same. If the Army wants a UAV with greater endurance, or different weapons options, or whatever, that's great. The problems and ineffectiveness creep in when the services want to use proprietary datalink, C2, etc. In other words, centralization is not an either-or concept.I totally agree with all that. However, that's not the issue. Again, control is the issue, not commonality -- nor is who deconflicts the AO above 3000' AGL as opposed to who controls a specific air asset...

(Acknowledging that such deconfliction can amount to de facto if not de jure control; a technique 7th AF and Momyer applied in Viet Nam to bring the Marines to heel... :rolleyes:)

[Entropy]

Ken,

First of all, thanks for your extended replies. I'll respond to a few points:

First is control as in who "controls" the specific air asset. Take CAS for example. Typically in theater the CFLCC submits prioritized air support requests which the CFACC matches to available assets. For CAS this usually takes one of two forms - the CAS is either prededicated to a specific unit, mission or operation, or the CAS is on ground or airborne alert for anything that might prop up. For dedicated CAS the asset is, for all intents and purposes, controlled by the ground force commander. The aircraft looks at what the ground commander wants it to look at and engages when and where the ground commander wants it to engage. Alert CAS, by contrast, is available for contingencies. Once tasked, that asset is controlled by the ground element. And this isn't just for USAF aircraft, but every aircraft under CFACC authority including our coalition partners, the Navy and the Marines.

So I'm not sure where the issue of "control" is. How would A-10's with Army pilots, for example, be any different from A-10's with Air Force or Spanish or Marine pilots?


That doesn't address the fact that CAS is still not high up the priority list, is it?

What, exactly, would make CAS "high up on the priority list?" The USAF in particular has put a lot of effort into improving CAS including rapid development of new and smaller bombs, more precision/accuracy, much improved all-weather and night capabilty, the A-10 SLEP and capability upgrade and even modifying "strategic" aircraft like bombers into capable CAS aircraft. What more should the AF be doing WRT CAS? As of now, I think the AF is doing all the right things. The main problem in my view is that joint CAS doctrine is new and not yet fully implemented by either service and the two services don't do nearly enough training together pre-deployment, nor CAS training individually.


No intent to imply that the CFACC would be doing their own thing in the sense you state; simply pointing out that some 'strategic' missions are of little or no consequence (that is fact and as an Intel guy I'm sure you've seen dry holes in the quest for info) and if the assets are committed to them and some distance away from a ground action, then said assets are of little use to the GFC.

It sounds like you're arguing that tactical needs should always take priority over operational and strategic needs because strategic needs are of "little or no consequence." On what basis do you make the claim that strategic missions are so inconsequential?


You may assume the JFC has detailed ATO knowledge. I'd rather not.

The knowledge need not be detailed. The various missions are clearly spelled out and geographically annotated on a couple pages or a few powerpoint slides. Maps clearly show the what, where, when and why for each ATO cycle and are available to everyone. The CFLCC has a sizable liaison element within the CAOC as well.

[Ken White]

Ken,
First of all, thanks for your extended replies...Let me start by saying that contrary to the appearance on this thread, I'm not an AF basher. I totally agree with the need for more F22s and a full buy of F35s as well as several other programs, including a bigger buy of Reapers. I regularly knock all the services here for one thing or another. All are necessary, all generally do a good job and all are filled with great people. Unfortunately, none of them are flawless and most of their problems, IMO, can be traced to excessive emphasis on protecting the institution by the folks at the top; parochial protection to the extent of damaging each other. That said...
First is control as in who "controls" the specific air asset...I meant control as in 'own.' I don't object to control as in operational control; that makes sense. I do object to parochial attempts by any service to claim sole ownership of a technology or type of weapon. I routinely fault all four services here and elsewhere for undue parochialism and turf protection; the Army and Marines are as bad as the other two.

I'm familiar with how the CAS system works, that has not changed too much since I retired and I try to stay abreast of what's going on.
... Alert CAS, by contrast, is available for contingencies. Once tasked, that asset is controlled by the ground element. And this isn't just for USAF aircraft, but every aircraft under CFACC authority including our coalition partners, the Navy and the Marines.All true, all sensible to a great extent and all bearable. My only point on the topic is the 'once tasked' portion; I've seen too many cases of non-release 'just in case.' My son tells me this is rarely a problem nowadays and that's good.
...As of now, I think the AF is doing all the right things...I totally agree. As of now. We both know that five years ago that was not the case, ten years ago the AF was trying to shed A-10s and ignore the mission. My fear is that post Iraq it will again fall off the screen. Perhaps not; we'll see.
...The main problem in my view is that joint CAS doctrine is new and not yet fully implemented by either service and the two services don't do nearly enough training together pre-deployment, nor CAS training individually.Agreed but in defense of both, they're sort of busy... :wry:
It sounds like you're arguing that tactical needs should always take priority over operational and strategic needs because strategic needs are of "little or no consequence." On what basis do you make the claim that strategic missions are so inconsequential?No, only over inconsequential strategic missions. Most are not inconsequential but some are and we both know that. There's also the matter of assigning priorities; some people get automatic priority simply because of who they are, not what's needed. Some missions get priorities on the whim of the requestor who just happens to have -- or be accorded -- priority. That's sometimes justified, sometimes not. I'm not advocating priority always to troops in contact or even to any specific mission set, merely saying that the process is, as you said, still being refined and if it tilts at all, it should in this kind of operation (Afghanistan and Iraq) tilt toward the ground tactical and away from the 'strategic.' Other wars and types of operation may -- will -- require different parameters.

Once again, you seem to have far more faith in the upper echelons (Purple, that...) to do the right thing than I do. ;)
The knowledge need not be detailed. The various missions are clearly spelled out and geographically annotated on a couple pages or a few powerpoint slides. Maps clearly show the what, where, when and why for each ATO cycle and are available to everyone. The CFLCC has a sizable liaison element within the CAOC as well.I know. We'll have to continue to disagree on the total desirability of the current process in that regard, I'm still skeptical. Possibly fortunately, that makes little difference, take some pleasure in the fact that your version is in charge and will likely remain so... :wry:

Then figure how well it will work out in a major and fluid conventional war... :cool:

[Entropy]

Let me start by saying that contrary to the appearance on this thread, I'm not an AF basher.

Well, I could tell that almost right away! The AF bashers tend not to be shy and make their views apparent rather quickly! :)


IMO, can be traced to excessive emphasis on protecting the institution by the folks at the top; parochial protection to the extent of damaging each other.

No disagreement there. I would go further and suggest the AF is probably the worst, or at least the most defensive. I think this guy gets it about right (http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/lawing.html).


I meant control as in 'own.' I don't object to control as in operational control; that makes sense. I do object to parochial attempts by any service to claim sole ownership of a technology or type of weapon. I routinely fault all four services here and elsewhere for undue parochialism and turf protection; the Army and Marines are as bad as the other two.

By "own" I'll assume you mean who gets to spend the O&M money and what uniforms the operators wear. As I alluded to upthread, that's one form of control, but development and procurement is another form. So while I might be convinced the Army needs it's own fixed-wing CAS aircraft, I also think the AF will need a significant say in the development of said aircraft and should probably be the program manager. Why? Well, first one has to ensure interoperability because no weapons system is an island. Secondly, the Army (and the Marines, for that matter) don't have much experience in FW aircraft development. One would not expect the Air Force, for example, to have much success in managing the development of an armored vehicle or air defense missile and the same is true in reverse with aircraft.

There are other options as well. For example, Air Force CSAR aircraft (and their crews) have been given to the CFLCC as medevac birds. While these units are Air Force in every way, they are completely outside the control of the CFACC. The CFACC still has its own CSAR aircraft on alert and has and does allow them to be used for medevac missions if the CFLCC needs additional assistance. The system works really well, actually, because the CSAR aircraft have a lot more capability than the medevac aircraft which provides the CFLCC with better medevac overall. The downside, of course, is that USAF CSAR assets are being used much more than originally intended, but that is the case with almost everything in the military these days.

So I see no reason why arrangements cannot be made to place certain capabilities directly under the Commander who needs them regardless of which service "owns" the assets.

Another example is special operations which is it's own co-equal component next to the CFLCC, CFNCC, and CFACC. While they get priority for their missions on the use of AC-130's for example (which is an AFSOC asset), AC-130's actually spend most of their time supporting the regular forces with CAS.


All true, all sensible to a great extent and all bearable. My only point on the topic is the 'once tasked' portion; I've seen too many cases of non-release 'just in case.' My son tells me this is rarely a problem nowadays and that's good.

Your son's experience is pretty much what I remember from a couple of years ago. IIRC, when retasking took place it was only when the ASOC asked for it.


I totally agree. As of now. We both know that five years ago that was not the case, ten years ago the AF was trying to shed A-10s and ignore the mission. My fear is that post Iraq it will again fall off the screen. Perhaps not; we'll see.

That is certainly the big fear and one that I share.


There's also the matter of assigning priorities; some people get automatic priority simply because of who they are, not what's needed. Some missions get priorities on the whim of the requestor who just happens to have -- or be accorded -- priority....Once again, you seem to have far more faith in the upper echelons (Purple, that...) to do the right thing than I do.

Maybe so, but in my experience the senior purple leadership has done pretty well. Obviously leadership plays an important role here and who is picked as the JFC is critically important.

On priorities, how assets are divided will always be a source of contention since everyone's priority list is different. Your point about people getting priority because of who they are and not what's needed might be a perceptual one. However, it also works both ways. Assets held at upper echelons and prioritized there indeed may not be divided as they should - but pushing the assets down echelon creates problems of its own and can also result in people getting assets because of who they are, not what they need.

Let's look at a hypothetical. Suppose the theater commander has 20 predators available. He could take everyone's priority list, put them together and divide up the assets. Or he could parcel them out, giving the land component 14, and each of the other components 2 and let them fill their individual priorities. ISTM there are advantage and disadvantages to either method depending on the situation.


Then figure how well it will work out in a major and fluid conventional war...

True dat!

[Ken White]

...
No disagreement there. I would go further and suggest the AF is probably the worst, or at least the most defensive. I think this guy gets it about right (http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/lawing.html).

Agreed; that's a good paper and he accurately assesses the Army's problems in integrating CAS. My perception is that is due to a cultural bias and to the fact that it is so expensive to actually train with real birds in peacetime that it gets sluffed. I'd also suggest that the experience of some in the Army with spotty CAS availability causes the Army to often place the integration of air fires in the nice to have category and thus to skimp on the planning. I believe that is changing. My hope is that we will not once again slide into structural decay and non use...
By "own" I'll assume you mean who gets to spend the O&M money and what uniforms the operators wear...True.
...As I alluded to upthread, that's one form of control, but development and procurement is another form. So while I might be convinced the Army needs it's own fixed-wing CAS aircraft, I also think the AF will need a significant say in the development of said aircraft and should probably be the program manager. Why? Well, first one has to ensure interoperability because no weapons system is an island. Secondly, the Army (and the Marines, for that matter) don't have much experience in FW aircraft development. One would not expect the Air Force, for example, to have much success in managing the development of an armored vehicle or air defense missile and the same is true in reverse with aircraft.In principle, I agree (other than saying you're wrong on the Marines capability and knowledge). In practice, I distrust the parochialism of all the services to do that fairly and well. People are by nature selfish, prone to biases and defensive. The procurement system needs to be designed to negate those traits and force a fair and reasonable series of designs and purchases.

Add to that the fact that your version will inevitably lead to excessive compromises and my service supreme version will lead to parochial standards that are whimsy and we're confronted with the fact that procurement is tough. Still, on balance, I very strongly believe that cooperation (even if forced -- and it will probably have to be :wry: ) is vastly preferable to consolidation. DoD's single manager process for procurement is not an unalloyed success...
So I see no reason why arrangements cannot be made to place certain capabilities directly under the Commander who needs them regardless of which service "owns" the assets.Again I agree in principle; in practice, my observation has long been that everyone doesn't play fair; simple as that. It has to be forced.
Another example is special operations which is it's own co-equal component next to the CFLCC, CFNCC, and CFACC. While they get priority for their missions on the use of AC-130's for example (which is an AFSOC asset), AC-130's actually spend most of their time supporting the regular forces with CAS.True but if the bird is supporting the 82d and it gets a call from the 3d SFG it may very well divert. ;) -- that irrelevant of the on the ground reality.
That is certainly the big fear and one that I share.We can both hope not; surely we're smart enough to not have to bury the wheel so it can be reinvented at great cost later by another generation (he said, tentatively...)
Maybe so, but in my experience the senior purple leadership has done pretty well. Obviously leadership plays an important role here and who is picked as the JFC is critically important.Yes -- and the system doesn't do that well. It rewards the next in line, not the best qualified. Don't get me started on DOPMA :mad:
On priorities, how assets are divided will always be a source of contention since everyone's priority list is different. Your point about people getting priority because of who they are and not what's needed might be a perceptual one. However, it also works both ways. Assets held at upper echelons and prioritized there indeed may not be divided as they should - but pushing the assets down echelon creates problems of its own and can also result in people getting assets because of who they are, not what they need.It's situation dependent. Yes, pushing them down does create problems but all that just reinforces the fact that people are the problem. If the right people are in charge, there are few problems in allocation; let one biased or incompetent slip in the wrong job and the processes get skewed. Designing a system that mitigates that to the maximum possible extent (it cannot be totally eliminated) is important.
Let's look at a hypothetical. Suppose the theater commander has 20 predators available. He could take everyone's priority list, put them together and divide up the assets. Or he could parcel them out, giving the land component 14, and each of the other components 2 and let them fill their individual priorities. ISTM there are advantage and disadvantages to either method depending on the situation.True -- METT-T ALWAYS has to be applied. To everything...

That, really is all I'm suggesting. My perception is that is not done as often as it could be and human nature is a significant part of the prob. But then, I'm old and cynical... :D

[Entropy]

In principle, I agree (other than saying you're wrong on the Marines capability and knowledge)

AFAIK, the Marines had little input into the fixed-wing aircraft they currently use. Harriers were purchased because that was the only VTOL option and they got the F/A-18 because that's what the Navy bought.


Add to that the fact that your version will inevitably lead to excessive compromises and my service supreme version will lead to parochial standards that are whimsy and we're confronted with the fact that procurement is tough.

True, but I think it's clear the military as a whole has adopted the compromise approach. You see it in the desire to procure "multi-role" equipment beginning in the late 1980s instead of replacing dedicated equipment. There are very few one-trick ponies left in the military - even a fighter like the F-22 has ground-attack mission it will perform in future conflicts. The Army seems to be embracing this as well with FCS.


Still, on balance, I very strongly believe that cooperation (even if forced -- and it will probably have to be ) is vastly preferable to consolidation. DoD's single manager process for procurement is not an unalloyed success...

One might argue that consolidation is a form of forced cooperation. I prefer cooperation as well but until and unless we have a truly joint force one of the services will still be the alpha dog on any project. This actually brings me back full-circle to DARO. This was a joint agency which was intended to be a kind of National Reconnaissance Office for airborne reconnaissance. The Army opposed DARO from the outset, refusing even to man its allocated billets. The other services weren't crazy about the loss of control either and they eventually helped the Army kill it. Ironically, the Army's attitude toward DARO is a big reason its UAV program is playing catch-up - predator might even have been given to the Army if it had embraced the organization - who knows? And I'm dubious of the NRO model anyway - the agency was fantastic in its early years but overtime its become just another Washington bureaucratic organization whose primary interest is the defense, expansion and justification of its budget - all else is secondary. Anyway, add politics and Congress into the mix and ISTM we'll be stuck with our imperfect system for a long time unfortunately.


Designing a system that mitigates that to the maximum possible extent (it cannot be totally eliminated) is important.

Agreed. Flexibility is important too, imo. A system that works great for one type of conflict will not work for another.


True -- METT-T ALWAYS has to be applied.

Yep. Ironically, I didn't learn about METT-T until I joined the Air Force! (I spent the first part of my career in the Navy) I also never spent a day in a fighter unit in the AF, but my Navy experience was supporting tacair, so my perspective on the AF is probably not typical. ;)

[Ken White]

AFAIK, the Marines had little input into the fixed-wing aircraft they currently use. Harriers were purchased because that was the only VTOL option and they got the F/A-18 because that's what the Navy bought.The Marines and the Navy conspire on specs and performance. Not to make an issue of a non-issue but both the Marines and the Army do in fact have fixed wing experience over more years than the AF is old. Not as much, obviously and not big thing, IMO.
True, but I think it's clear the military as a whole has adopted the compromise approach...True, sensible and not a problem -- actually a plus. So long as someone doesn't try to skew the system.
One might argue that consolidation is a form of forced cooperation. I prefer cooperation as well but until and unless we have a truly joint force one of the services will still be the alpha dog on any project.True and it is -- just doesn't need to get out of hand. Long as the rest of the pack keeps the alpha dog honest, life is good.
Agreed. Flexibility is important too, imo. A system that works great for one type of conflict will not work for another.True.

Yep. Ironically, I didn't learn about METT-T until I joined the Air Force! (I spent the first part of my career in the Navy) I also never spent a day in a fighter unit in the AF, but my Navy experience was supporting tacair, so my perspective on the AF is probably not typical. ;)Ecumenism is good, parochialism is bad. I read that somewhere... :D

[Entropy]

I fear we are fast running out of things to disagree on, which is a sure sign of a dying thread!

So returning a bit to the article that generated this thread, I'll merely suggest that the Air Force will need to make flying UAV's "coequal" with flying manned aircraft. With the huge and rapid increases in the predator fleet, relying on what amounts to a temporary duty assignment - one that is negatively viewed within the pilot community - is unsustainable. I don't have much faith that the needed changes will come quickly but sooner or later the USAF will have to change.

[Entropy]

And finally, here's another view that's touches on most of what we've discussed here and whose recommendations are similar to mine (http://formerspook.blogspot.com/2008/03/continuing-battle-over-uavs.html).

[Ken White]

Thanks for the link and the exchange. Always good to learn someting...

[Ron Humphrey]

And finally, here's another view that's touches on most of what we've discussed here and whose recommendations are similar to mine (http://formerspook.blogspot.com/2008/03/continuing-battle-over-uavs.html).

Does the issue with not being to get enough pilots for DRONES seem somewhat unusual considering that there are how many restrictions andrequiremets to be a actual physically flying pilot which would not necessarily be the case for a remote flier.

- Eyesight not nearly as bad your sitting in a chair so not nearly as likely to lose your glasses from a tight turn etc.

- Physical condition not necessarily requirement for full mobility in comparison to physical fliers

- Age: old enough to know what to do, young enough to do it

- Two full generations of seriously over gamed gamers needing a purpose and direction in their lives.

- the only limitations to how hard ad fast to fly is the equipments physical restraints and the drivers mental capacities to do so

ETC.

Not everything can be handled by remote but when it can and if it can be done with a group outside the normal demographic why the heck not

[slapout9]

Hi Ron here is a link to Strategy page that talks about that very issue, along with the fact that 2/3 of the Army's request for Predator support goes un filled by the Air Force.


http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htlead/articles/20080323.aspx

[Entropy]

Ron,

The main reasons are systemic and cultural. Part of the identitiy of the USAF is that pilots (primarily) are officers and pilots represent the leadership at the high levels of the service. I posted a link to a AU paper above written ten years ago that talks about all these issues (here's the link again - PDF file (https://research.au.af.mil/papers/ay1999/saas/tobin.pdf)).

In some ways, predator for the Air Force looks like the Army's advisors and transition teams. For the Air Force it's currently viewed as, at best, a career broadening assingment, at worst a career killer. The current problem is that it's basically a temporary assignment, so when pilots rotate out they have to be replaced, but obviously every body that leaves creates a requirement for a replacement - a replacement that requires training. So much training is being spent on replacements that expansion of the total force of available pilots is slowed as a result. One can extend the pilot in the temporary assignment to alleviate that problem somewhat, but the longer the extension the more you're hurting his/her career and the more you'll have to force people to take predator assignments. So really, it's fundamentally a turnover problem and the way to solve it is to keep those pilots in place, but to do that the AF has to make sure their careers don't get screwed as a result. My suggestion is to make predator a primary weapons system like the manned aircraft which would allow them to spend the bulk of their careers with the platform which would allow them to promote through the system normally.

The other option is to open bring back warrants (which I would love) or create a new enlisted career field, but I don't think that is in the cards for cultural reasons.

The Army appears to be going the enlisted route, which makes sense for them. As long as those guys and gals receive the licenses and ratings they need and as long as their UAV's are rated to fly in controlled airspace then there will be no functional difference between a USAF predator pilot and an Army "warrior" pilot.

Given that it looks like the warrior and predator programs will be merged, I expect the Air Force will be poaching a lot of your Army enlisted pilots with promises of commissions. Perhaps that's how the AF will ultimately solve the pilot predator shortage! :D

[Ron Humphrey]

Ron,

Given that it looks like the warrior and predator programs will be merged, I expect the Air Force will be poaching a lot of your Army enlisted pilots with promises of commissions. Perhaps that's how the AF will ultimately solve the pilot predator shortage! :D

The Army always has been good at finding solutions to problems, especially those in the other forces :wry: