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SWJED
03-24-2008, 11:35 PM
U.S. Captains Bear Weight of Iraq Strategy (http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/03/21/africa/21captain.php) by Michael Kamber, International Herald Tribune.


During the war in Iraq, young army and Marine captains have become American viceroys, officers with large sectors to run and near-autonomy to do it. In military parlance, they are the "ground-owners." In practice, they are power brokers.

"They give us a chunk of land and say, 'Fix it,' " said Captain Rich Thompson, 36, who controls an area east of Baghdad.

The Iraqis have learned that these captains, many still in their 20s, can call down devastating American firepower one day and approve multimillion-dollar projects the next. Some have become celebrities in their sectors, men whose names are known even to children.

Many in the military believe that these captains are the linchpins in the American strategy for success in Iraq, but as the war continues into its sixth year the military has been losing them in large numbers — at a time when it says it needs thousands more.

Most of these captains have extensive combat experience and are regarded as the military's future leaders. They're exactly the men the military most wants. But corporate America wants them too. And the hardships of repeated tours are taking their toll, tilting them back toward civilian life and possibly complicating the future course of the war...

Ranger94
03-25-2008, 01:05 AM
U.S. Captains Bear Weight of Iraq Strategy (http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/03/21/africa/21captain.php) by Michael Kamber, International Herald Tribune.

We will do more good if we educate the Sgt's and below.

It is my understanding from my readings in SWJ and my experience in combat is that if tactical actions are elevated to 0-3 level (other than briefings) then I have failed as a Jr. COIN leader.

To put it another way, if I as a team leader or squad leader, if I fail to see the stratigic implications of a "shot fired" then I have failed.


Respectively,
RLTW SSG
I am still reading 3.24 and "Eating Soup...". and hoping I get it all

Ken White
03-25-2008, 01:09 AM
to understand that...

Ron Humphrey
03-25-2008, 01:20 AM
We will do more good if we educate the Sgt's and below.

It is my understanding from my readings in SWJ and my experience in combat is that if tactical actions are elevated to 0-3 level (other than briefings) then I have failed as a Jr. COIN leader.

To put it another way, if I as a team leader or squad leader, if I fail to see the stratigic implications of a "shot fired" then I have failed.


Respectively,
RLTW SSG
I am still reading 3.24 and "Eating Soup...". and hoping I get it all

Getting those in higher positions to buy off on the risk and subsequent necessity for occasional imperfection or mistakes not being the end of ones career for NCO's will be pretty hard to get. Officers already carry immense responsibility in their own jobs let alone in CI type environments. The'll have a hard time being comfortable with such a thing unless there is a good training and education base to show that those NCO's should be able to do it. Without that they will probably be wary of placing too much on their NCO's shoulders.
Just my thought but I could be wrong on this one as things may have changed in that respect in the last few years

Ken White
03-25-2008, 02:29 AM
Getting those in higher positions to buy off on the risk and subsequent necessity for occasional imperfection or mistakes not being the end of ones career for NCO's will be pretty hard to get. Officers already carry immense responsibility in their own jobs let alone in CI type environments. The'll have a hard time being comfortable with such a thing unless there is a good training and education base to show that those NCO's should be able to do it. Without that they will probably be wary of placing too much on their NCO's shoulders.
Just my thought but I could be wrong on this one as things may have changed in that respect in the last few yearsMy belief is that they're dead wrong -- and while I acknowledge that attitude is probably quite prevalent today, it hasn't always been that way. Fortunately for the Army...

I also am sure that many more do not have that concern which is a good thing as my suspicion is that, as was true in Viet Nam and at other times (the average rifle company in the 82d in 1962 probably had 2.5 Officers, priority was to USAREUR), there'll be an Officer shortage and sooner rather than later.

Officers probably need to get used to the thought of having SFCs and SSG as acting platoon leaders. They'll do okay. I've seen SGTs as Acting PLs and one serving as a 1SG -- all of 'em did a good job. One gets responsible behavior when one expects it; if one expects poor performance, that's generally exactly what one will get. And certainly, IMO, deserves...

I spent over six years as a PSG, peace and war, had four Platoon Leaders and only one of them for eight months in 1961-2 at Bragg; none of the others were around for more than two or three months. Do the math on that. They only gave me a PL in Viet Nam after seven months without one when I got promoted and was getting transferred up to Brigade. I had two weeks to train him. He made Colonel so I guess we did okay. I made SGM in a little over 11 total years (there was a war on ;) ), every stripe in a different unit, so I don't guess I screwed up too badly running Cav, Scout and Recon platoons on three continents. :D

120mm
03-25-2008, 02:04 PM
Officers probably need to get used to the thought of having SFCs and SSG as acting platoon leaders. They'll do okay. I've seen SGTs as Acting PLs and one serving as a 1SG -- all of 'em did a good job. One gets responsible behavior when one expects it; if one expects poor performance, that's generally exactly what one will get. And certainly, IMO, deserves...

I'm currently reading the David Weber series on Honor Harrington. In the book, "In Enemy Hands" he quotes a mythical Fleet Admiral as saying: I'd rather be short-handed, than have incompetents running things.

Back when I was teaching ROTC, an Active Duty CPT and I would often sit around and shoot the #### about how a crappy officer actually made it HARDER for the NCO who was really leading the platoon to do his job.

And then, when you promote said crappy officer, he makes it hard for the NCO by being a crappy Company Commander.

While it's a lot easier to have an even marginally competent officer to pick up the slack, the bad ones are just bad and we should just give up trying to fill the slots.

jcustis
03-25-2008, 03:06 PM
A very junior staff sergeant recently left my staff and checked in the the joint reception center at Camp Lejeune. Instead of heading to the unit he thought he was slated to go to, he was re-directed to one about to head over to Iraq, by way of a rotation at Mojave Viper...which started in 4 days.

When he called me while headed home on pre-deploy leave, he remarked with a laugh that he had been assigned the platoon commander slot for his company's 4th plt (yes Wilf, it seems some units are abandoning the 3x rifle plt, 1x wpns plt structure). I asked him where his platoon commander was, and how long he'd be working in the acting role.

"There is no lieutenant coming sir, it's all me. Isn't that pretty crazy?" he chuckled. I was thrown off guard at first, but I sat back and mulled over those words for moment and realized just how ignorant I was to presume that he had to have an officer holding the reigns. I'd trained him after all, and knew his capabilities.

I think you're spot on Ranger94. Both ends of the spectrum just need to reach that accomodation in terms of tactical judgment, responsibility, accountability, etc. Put another way, you've got to take the ball and run with it, but don't showboat into the endzone and drop it at the 1 yd line.

Steve Blair
03-25-2008, 03:29 PM
there was a time not so long ago when a first sergeant could end up running the company because the three assigned officers were either on leave or detached duty. Sergeants actually took out extended scouting patrols, and corporals often did the same. Amazing sometimes how little we recall of our own history....

Ron Humphrey
03-25-2008, 03:36 PM
there was a time not so long ago when a first sergeant could end up running the company because the three assigned officers were either on leave or detached duty. Sergeants actually took out extended scouting patrols, and corporals often did the same. Amazing sometimes how little we recall of our own history....

And not everyone likes the thought of that

Ken White
03-25-2008, 03:37 PM
...
While it's a lot easier to have an even marginally competent officer to pick up the slack, the bad ones are just bad and we should just give up trying to fill the slots.I've long said "Show me a poor officer and I'll show you an unfortunate guy who had a lousy NCO for his first Platoon Sergeant..."

And there are too many of those lousy dudes about. Fortunately, that's changing as a lot of the deadwood that got hired in the 1975-1985 time frame depart to retirement...

I realized reading my post from last night that it read like I was sniping at Ron. I was not. I fully understand how he feels and I know that many, maybe even most, would agree with him. I'm sympathetic, understand but do disagree with that approach.

My point, which I didn't make at all well was that it hasn't always been that way and that it doesn't need to stay that way.

In 1968, the average Bn Cdr in Viet Nam found he had few if any Captains and senior NCOs, he had a slew of brand new 2LTs and SGts. Good, dedicated kids who'd do anything -- but they didn't know much, so he had to watch them closely. He didn't break that habit when he got to be a General in the 70s and 80s. Unfortunately, all those 2LTs and SGTs thought they were supposed to act the same way as their mentor had so when they got to be senior in 90s and 00s, they kept micromanaging. It became embedded in the Army; total lack of trust. It's dangerous, an Army is built on trust. Or should be.

It wasn't always like that. Prior to 1968, there were micromanagers but they were rare and, far more importantly, they were actively discouraged (as opposed to recently when they have been encouraged). In 1966, my Bde Cdr, A senior BG had a standing night order "Wake me if all three Bns are in heavy contact." In late '68, the Division we were OpCon to had one also -- either the CG or one of the DCGs would be awakened if A Bn (out of 12 counting our OpCon) was in contact. yes, they were different people but the climate led to that glaring difference. Been downhill ever since

Climates can be changed.

I saw some briefing slides somewhere from COL Roper's last trip to Iraq. One bullet made me chuckle. It said; "Be prepared to delegate to the point of discomfort." Just so.

JCustis tells of the future; heed him. And don't fear it, it'll work. Has before...

Ron Humphrey
03-25-2008, 03:40 PM
I've long said "Show me a poor officer and I'll show you an unfortunate guy who had a lousy NCO for his first Platoon Sergeant..."

And there are too many of those lousy dudes about. Fortunately, that's changing as a lot of the deadwood that got hired in the 1975-1985 time frame depart to retirement...

I realized reading my post from last night that it read like I was sniping at Ron. I was not. I fully understand how he feels and I know that many, maybe even most, would agree with him. I'm sympathetic, understand but do disagree with that approach.
..

I agree with you but I many times feel the need to portray what many who actually count ( as opposed to lil ol me:wry:) in the decisions have shown themselves to feel as that ultimately determines what happens.

Cavguy
03-25-2008, 05:54 PM
I've long said "Show me a poor officer and I'll show you an unfortunate guy who had a lousy NCO for his first Platoon Sergeant..."

Ken,

Interesting historical background. We've spent a lot of time about the effect of OIF on officers, but what about our NCO development.

A question for you, and an observation.

You mentioned you made SGM in 11 years. One trend I noticed while in command was that we're again promoting rapidly not only in the officer corps but the NCO Corps. The average PSG has between 9-11 years of service these days when taking the job. Previously I would say it was 14-16 in the pre-2003 army. Same with 1SG's, now I'm seeing them as early as 13 years in. I felt very lucky, 2 of my 3 1SG's were both over 20 years with tons of experience.

This isn't to say that these people aren't capable and deserving. But I have noticed that the current PSG crop, and to a lesser extent 1SG crop, are competent, but not wise/experienced in the way I found my first PSG and 1SG. They tend not to mentor their PL's as well, or are much more reluctant to. They tend not to have as much of a mastery of the basics of their MOS - for example, proficency in tank gunnery. I see a few more 1SG's and PSG's with "no time for officers", creating a somewhat parallel chain of command/responsibility. Broad brush strokes, but a trend I am observing. Also with "automatic" promotions up to SSG, I'm seeing more deadwood creep upwards than would have before.

On the upside, we have combat seasoned NCO's who have led under great stress, can't underestimate the impact of that. And they're by in large doing a tremendous job under great stress.

So at the end of this - how did rapid promotions affect the NCO corps following Vietnam in the above ways? What can we expect or what should we watch out for?

Vic Bout
03-25-2008, 07:22 PM
having come from a career field that in the last few years has been bringing kids (18X) off the street and turning them into overnight green berets. Sure the process is designed to assess and select only the best, but it's a system that turns out 21 year old staff sergeants with 3 or 4 years TIS as well. Not that we didn't see plenty of that in Viet Nam...but last time I checked my calendar said 2008. So the end-state is smart, fit, young soldiers with very little army-culture experience.

Ken White
03-25-2008, 08:05 PM
get my ears lowered and swing by Lowe's.

Well, I first became a PSG with four years in the Marines but then a three year break before I entered the Army as a PV2. I ended up as a PSG three years later, I'll leave it to you to determine if that was seven years or three. Either way it was less than your today average. Different time...

I have to note that my rapid climb was due in large measure to being in Airborne and SF units the entire period. Those guys got promoted faster than did most of the Army during that period. That was also before the centralized boards at DA (with which my court martials might have had an, uh, adverse impact ;) ). Having said that, I was faster than some, not as fast as others all due to a variety of factors. The DA board removed some inequities in the old system but they also added some new ones. One of the terrible flaws is that the current system rewards mediocrity; stay around, keep out of trouble and eventually you'll get promoted. Like Vic say, that was then, this is now...

There used to be a paragraph in AR 600-200 that said the central board will select and the individual will be promoted unless his commander writes a letter to have him removed from the list for cause. I used to tell evey Officer I could "When you get to be Chief of Staff, change that to read 'the indivdual will be promoted only when his commander writes a letter to approve that promotion.'" Rationale being commanders won't take the time to write a letter to remove a marginal gut, so they slip through until the Peter Principle strikes; conversely, they will make time to write a letter to promote the sharp guys.

Believe it or not, the foregoing isn't a digression, it's part of the answer to your question -- todays system rewards mediocrity.

Time in service is a major criteria for promotion today -- I submit it should not be; performance and potential (EVERYBODY gets promoted based on perceived potential. Well, theoretically, anyway) should be the sole criteria. some people are quite mature and capable at 18; others are still childish and insecure at 40. Five years of being a TC or a Squad Leader give a guy a whole lot more valid experience than the guy who spent three of those five years as a Recruiter or Drill Sergeant; yet the system says five years is five years and that to look at it otherwise is not 'fair.' My answer to that is that war is not fair. Unfortunately, my opinion doesn't sway the Per community or Congress... :rolleyes:

It's like I said about Officers, same thing applies -- a round peg will fit in a square hole -- but it has to be smaller.

I cannot speak to the NCO Education system today other then to note that Hacksaw discussed it when I was lamenting about its poor quality based on my son's experience in the 90s and talking to others from the same period. If they've improved it and gotten a combat focus, good -- but six years and more ago it was a check the block effort and almost a total waste of time. your later NCOs may have suffered from that.

On Tank Gunnery, you hit on one of my pet peeves -- I was at Knox, as a DAC when OAFM created the Master Gunner program -- I violently disagreed with it then and I still do. Thus your PSGs knew little because it wasn't their job. If it had been, they would've all been Master Gunners. The Master Gunner program was a quick fix answer to declining NCO quality in the late 70s and it was, as usual, a poor band-aid that can't take water. I started out in life as a Tanker; gunnery is a PSGs job just as Tactics are the PLs job. The sad thing is that in mounted units in peacetime, Co / Trp and Bn / Sqn Cdrs get graded on maintenance and gunnery -- because they're hard numbers and 'objective' (what happens if I do Gunnery on a nice June day and you get a blustery March day is not discussed). All the foregoing was a digression of sorts, sorry... :)

There are always some NCOs who dislike Officers for a variety of reasons. Generally, there aren't that many and most NCOs understand why there are Officers and accept them pretty well. My observation has been that if there are as large number of 'Officer dislikers' in a unit, then there may be an Officer problem in that unit. Most NCOs realize they ain't edumacated but most are smart enough to know when they're being patronized or [1] misused; [2] inadequately or inefficiently used; [3] overused and they tend to react negatively. Alternatively, sometimes a senior NCO somewhere in the chain has an attitude and it pervades the unit. In any event, it's been my experience that if such a sensing occurs, a pretty thorough search for the root cause ought to be made.

Just before I retried from my retiremnt in 1995, a few of us were sitting around talking and an old Colonel mentioned that when he'd been a LT at Hood, the Div was on the way back in from an exercise and LTG Ulmer, then the III Corps commandante, stopped, told them to move ALL the Officers to a theater for an Officers call with him and let their NCOs bring the units back to garrison. A young LTC sitting there said "That was wrong" (of Ulmer's order) and an even younger CPT said "No way I'd ever do that." I'm uncouth so I just looked at both of them and said "That's dumb." The Colonel, who of course had been to Couth School, did far better. He looked at 'em, smiled and said "If you can't trust your NCOs, whose fault is that?"

As to the 'deadwood.' It occurs naturally in all societies and groups at all ranks. If the advancement process is skewed to produce more at any cost instead of holding to quality control, then it will float to the top. It has to be culled and thrown ashore. It's hard to do that today but not impossible. Command and Leadership IS hard work but it's imprtant. It is often difficult for those in the Army to remember that quality is more important than quantity.

Which leads me at long last to answer your final questions. Rapid promotions in Viet Nam didn't hurt that much; most of the folks thus promoted were okay. There were a few over warlike / zealous type who couldn't adapt to peace time but they left pretty quick; plus a few loser, most of whom got run out. What hurt the Army post-Viet Nam was the move to time in service as the arch criteria for NCO promotion -- a lot of folks who had hidden out for years suddenly got promoted and many were marginal. That was followed by an influx of sub-standard recruits in the 1970-80 period who were around for years and in some cases, were not too helpful. Many are just now retiring...

That led to things like the Master Gunner bit and Officers overly involved in training (allowing the NCOs who will ALWAYS take the "no sense in both of us doing this " route to sluff off) and we end up with a perfectly natural and predictable decline in NCO training ability. As my kid the former1SG says, "...they don't know how to do it because no one ever made them do it -- or even let them do it." He, by the way, did not and does not believe the 1SGs job is beans, bullets and paper -- he considered himself the most experienced guy in the Troop and so he was the 'Master Trainer.' Made sense to me. Officers direct training. NCOs do training -- or should.

Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future, said Nils. True dat. At a guess, I expect you'll see a continuing misuse of Officers and overlarge Staffs that keep them away from troops and, unless NCOES is radically changed from a few years ago, a decline in the ability of NCOs to act as trainers. Thus there will be pressure for Officers to oversee nut and bolt training which will be a mistake. If the Officer shortage gets significant at unit level (50:50 chance, I'd say), then you'll see NCOs step up and learn the job and do it. OTOH, if we continue to be over Officered then I'd expect a slight decline in NCO quality. If the system lets them do their jobs, they'll improve themselves. Too early to tell which way that'll go.

The high reenlistment rate today, particularly in the Combat Arms is likely to create a glut of SSGs soon unless HRC gets smarter than they've ever been before (an unlikley occurrence). If those guys come back to the peaceful US and the Army returns to its pre 2001 state, there will be hate and discontent and they won't reenlist again; then there'll be an NCO shortfall :D

All in all, the system will cope. There are enough lessons learned available to the Army leadership to stop most potential problems. Whether there's the vision to do that remains to be seen.

Sorry for the length, rather put too much in and let you throw out what you don't want than cut it too short to provide a reasonably decent answer.

Norfolk
03-25-2008, 10:08 PM
From the article:



During the war in Iraq, young army and Marine captains have become American viceroys, officers with large sectors to run and near-autonomy to do it. In military parlance, they are the "ground-owners." In practice, they are power brokers.

"They give us a chunk of land and say, 'Fix it,' " said Captain Rich Thompson, 36, who controls an area east of Baghdad.

At the word "viceroy", my ears pricked up. This is very much the sort of thing that I have been watching and waiting to see develop in the U.S. Army and USMC. If the US Army and Marines were to take only one thing away from Iraq (and to a certain extent, Afghanistan), it would be this: that even (especially) the subaltern, or junior officer, would become fully self-aware and self-confident of his role and status as a de facto proconsul, the agent and executor of his nation's policy and strategic interests. This growing self-awareness and self-confidence of the junior and field-grade officer classes is very "Imperial", and in a good way.

Twenty years ago, even ten years ago, there would have been no shortage of officers intensely aware of the political nature and realities of war, and still more filled with initiative; but until the reality of massive and long-term SSO and COIN campaigns made a virtue of necessity, there had been a marked reluctance (which still remains in so many ways) for military professionals to in fact act in political fashions, for political ends. Afghanistan and Iraq have changed, and continue to change, this. Commonwealth Armies had to do much the same back in the days of the British Empire, as the comparatively rigid and "cog on the machine" mentality considered desirable for MCOs had to give way to more responsibility and more trust granted to field-grade and junior officers in order to get the job done. And if that meant that even a platoon commander had to wear the hats of diplomat, spy, engineer, mayor, and His Majesty's unofficially-official plenipotentiary, in addition to his military hat in order to get r' done, well, then that's how it would be done.

The ultimate disintegration of the Empire notwithstanding (nor the examples of the two World Wars, in which rather more automaton-like qualities were sought, or at least developed - with more or less predictable results:wry:), the concept of the officer as a political actor first, in the sense that he was first and foremost the agent of his Government's policies - being a soldier meant only that he specialized in the more violent forms of diplomacy and persuasion - worked well, on the whole. War, being an intrinsically political beast, is ultimately one or lost at the political level - even if that requires brute force to achieve. As such, the developing "politicization", used in this sense, of the Officer Corps in the USA and USMC is a welcome development. Nearly an entire generation of junior and field-grade officers have experienced this development, and for those who are able to remain in service, this may well go some way to breaking down the traditional, and unnatural, divide in the US between the political and the military.

The US, though not "Imperialist", is certainly an Imperial Power, and in Afghanistan and Iraq has had to assume much of the role and burdens of such. As an Imperial Power ipso facto, it denies what it is at its own peril; US officers need to be self-aware political actors, fully cognisant and involved in their "political" tasks, and always acting with a view to the achievement of their Government's political objectives, not just their assigned military objectives. The traditional American radical divide between politics and the military has got to end, and Iraq and Afghanistan is bringing it much closer to an end; in any case, it is a luxury that an Imperial Power can ill-afford. This article shows that it is in the process of ending.

jcustis
03-26-2008, 03:11 AM
This is a stellar thread and one that dovetails into conversations I've had time after time at the ammo table, while sitting in the smoke pit, or while waiting in the turret to move to the SP and cross LD.

I've had the good fortune to work closely with some stellar NCOs who had their head set straight on their shoulders and were receptive to some of the things we discussed. Time after time, the issue of micro-management (and to a certain degree, micromanagement of safety) would come up and it became an awkward moment because we knew it was an important issue, but feelings were likely to get hurt. I like to walk through minefields though, so we usually found our way in the middle of one, throwing a lot of stuff out there to where I learned a lot in the process.

I think it's easy to say micro-management is bad because it stifles the NCOs being able to handle "their business". That was usually the going-in position from the NCOs, and I typically countered with something about the commander probably not feeling comfortable that the NCOs could handle the particular situation that in the end left everyone bent out of shape. Usually I'd throw out an example of a hazing incident, or how something put a commander's ass on the boss's radar screen because an NCO exercised poor judgment. We'd agree that those are things that are reasonable to give an officer the pucker, but then they'd counter that the Corps had gotten so risk-averse and zero-defect ridden that micro-management = a careerist.

I've come to realize over time that there are certain truths (and Ken has hit about every one), and I've seen it with my own eyes. I'll be the first one to admit that I've looked at a Marine and whispered to myself, "Jesus H Christ, you are some kind of f-ed up," only to kick myself because he WAS A MARINE UNDER MY COMMAND!

Better training is one solution, and that training needs to be applied to both enlisted and officer alike. What are other ways we can counter the insidious creep of micro-management? Heck, is micro-management solely in the eyes of the beholder and therefore subject to the adage, "well, it's kind of relative." Is it possible to be a careerist for the right reasons, or will you always sell a little of yourself in the process?

Before this ramble gets any worse, I think we need to go back (for sure within the combat arms) to a solid foundation on the Systems Approach to Training and Unit Training Management. A lot of folks know the words, but they have never been trained to be experts in the fundamentals. If we all were, and everyone simply did their job (and therefore didn't cause someone to do 10, 15, 20% more) as they were supposed to, we'd kick ass. This thread is causing some reflection, because I have to ask myself if I've done a good job of ensuring subordinates understand what it is I want them to do.

EDIT: My one last point is that although we have made outstanding strides in the Marine Corps with our resident formal schools programs and are putting out a much better product from the Advanced Infantry Training Center, we had better very quickly figure out how to open the tap a lot further.

We have kick-ass small unit leaders out there who are getting it done by doing it. They may not know all the new-fangled doctrinal terms behind it (and yes, we should hold them accountable for learning them), but they are currently on the streets and leading in the best locale we could hope for. When we hit the garrison years (and yes, they will come sooner than we expect), if we don't find a way to get more of these fine young men into formal schools, we will go back to the inverse relationship of officers being the lead trainers, allowing that space for sloughing off. I have to admit my own reservations when an NCO tells me that he did X, Y, and Z when he was in Iraq for the Xth time. I saw men who did X, Y, and Z piss-poorly during both of my deploys, so I tend to want to see something more concrete, and that's the stamp in his record jacket that says he graduated from a formal school. The great NCOs are going to be insulted when the young Lt (who is well trained but not experienced) comes in and thinks that things need to be done with the formality and efficiency that he is used to at the Infantry Officer Course. The slighted NCO is going to therefore reconsider the options of re-enlistment, or at least entertain the idea that he can make a go of it on the outside...and then we will have eaten our own.

Ken, you've got a PM that was prompted by this thread. Cheers.

120mm
03-26-2008, 07:24 AM
I've long said "Show me a poor officer and I'll show you an unfortunate guy who had a lousy NCO for his first Platoon Sergeant..."


I was ROTC just a couple years ago, and we are commissioning kids who are functionally illiterate, have to get a PT waiver to get in the army and I swear some of them are borderline retarded.

There is no way that these folks will ever be anything but a drag on the system. The only way an NCO could improve their officership is to see that they were "accidentally" killed in the line of duty.

I had a series of lousy NCOs as a platoon leader and I survived. It wasn't pretty, but I'm still here. I don't put the burden of the Army's negligence in commissioning ####heads on the NCO corps.

William F. Owen
03-26-2008, 09:11 AM
I was ROTC just a couple years ago, and we are commissioning kids who are functionally illiterate, have to get a PT waiver to get in the army and I swear some of them are borderline retarded.
.

...but everyone knows the solution. Creating good officers is not a mystery. If there are bad officers and NCOs, then we (the UK and US) just choose not to create good one.

We choose to have lower standards and poorer leadership. We know how to get excellent officers, but IF there are a large section of bad ones, then apparently someone has decided we don't want/need them.

Steve Blair
03-26-2008, 01:26 PM
I was ROTC just a couple years ago, and we are commissioning kids who are functionally illiterate, have to get a PT waiver to get in the army and I swear some of them are borderline retarded.

We see this too.

I've been through three detachment commanders. One was fixated on numbers, and he commissioned some people who had no business being anything other than shift leaders at McDonald's (if that). But it was the numbers game. He could report X number of commissionees in a year...an increase of Y over last year. Then we got a commander who didn't care about numbers but did care about quality. Our numbers are down, but his commissioning classes are damned strong. We'll see where the new one goes....

But that's what happens when you start rating these programs based on numbers. It's easier to rate a detachment based on numbers than it is on quality of commissionees. So we tend to take the easy route. The Army unit at our campus recently got tasked to increase numbers, and you can bet they'll see a drop in quality soon.

I'd be interested to hear how Navy ROTC handles this sort of thing.

Eden
03-26-2008, 02:05 PM
As a brand new cavalry platoon leader - 'H' series MTOE, real cav, not the poor substitute we have today - in 1983, the troop's senior NCOs were a mix of burn-outs and shake-and-bake Vietnam vets. By the time I took over my first company in 1986, the quality of NCOs was uniformly better - better trainers, better maintainers, better motivators - and continued to improve while I stayed with troops. I think this improvement was partly due to improved enlistment standards during the Reagan years and an improved NCOES. We were getting better material and it showed. When I went back to troops as S-3, XO, Bn commander 1996-2002, I still thought highly of the NCO corps, but I did note some disturbing developments.

First was the erosion of motivational skills. In the '80s we made it much easier to get rid of problem soldiers. This was a good thing because there were plenty of boys lined up at the recruiting station and you had to spend less time on the knuckleheads. But we were also getting rid of kids who, with a little more effort, might have made the grade. So a whole generation of NCOs grew up without being forced to 'motivate' somebody who you were stuck with. Call it the loss of 'wall-to-wall' counseling skills.

Second was an abdication of the sense of ownership we had with our problem children. The Army has created such a web of support groups for alcohol abuse, wife beating, financial idiocy, and the like, that our first line of defense became sending the soldier elsewhere when things went wrong. In fact, it has gotten to the point that trying to solve problems in-house is seen as malfeasance. NCOs are no longer fathers, big brothers, and priests; they are referral agencies, and both they and their soldiers are the poorer for it.

Third was a rise in - well, I won't call it careerism, but a heightened concern over 'careers'. I blame the explosion in sergeant major positions for this. Personally, I have never met a sergeant major at the brigade level or higher who added value to his unit. I am sure good ones exist, but for the most part they are part personnel clerk and part mafia don. Why we take our best NCOs and move them away from troops is beyond me. This from a guy who owes what limited success he had to several first sergeants and battalion command sergeants major. Anyway, I think the measure of success for an NCO has receded a little too far into the ether of higher headquarters.

Finally, one of my least favorite Army inventions - Sergeant's Time. For the uninitiated, this was setting aside four hours a week reserved for the NCO to train his soldiers on whatever he felt ws necessary. Of course, it should be the other way around. There should be four hours a week for the officers to train the troops on whatever they want. The presumption should be that sergeants are spending the other 56 hours on Sergeant's Time. And of course, Sergeant's Time had to be briefed to the officers and reviewed up to the brigade level, so the whole thing became a bureaucratic exercise, while implying that NCOs were not the unit's primary trainers. Of course, this horror is only a symptom of 'fill-in-the-white space' training briefings and micromanagement that ultimately weakens the corps it is meant to strengthen.

Don't get me wrong, we still have the strongest NCO corps in the world in terms of breadth and depth of quality. And I suspect that my largely peacetime experience doesn't reflect what is happening today. But my point for the younger members of the forum is that the culture of the military often works in mysterious and invisible ways.

As for the officer corps, my memory tells me that junior officers are pretty much the same as they have always been, but that quality is declining once you hit field grade. But when the promotion rate to Lt Col is in the 90's, what can you expect?

jcustis
03-26-2008, 02:43 PM
Second was an abdication of the sense of ownership we had with our problem children. The Army has created such a web of support groups for alcohol abuse, wife beating, financial idiocy, and the like, that our first line of defense became sending the soldier elsewhere when things went wrong. In fact, it has gotten to the point that trying to solve problems in-house is seen as malfeasance. NCOs are no longer fathers, big brothers, and priests; they are referral agencies, and both they and their soldiers are the poorer for it.

Amen. As with our master gunner woes, we are inclined to send a errant gunner to the debrief shack for remedial training via a "trained guy" and are poorer for not doing the remediation ourselves

Ranger94
03-26-2008, 03:11 PM
All of the comments are great but most seem to resemble comments that could have been made prior to FM3.24. Debates about how to manage NCO/Officer relationships have gone on for years.

Norfolk's comments bring up the exact point of the article. But it is limited. We need to understand that an NCO will be a "...executor of his nation's policy and strategic interests".

Isn't this the point of Gen. Krulak’s "Strategic Corporal"? It is obvious that fictional Cpl. Hernandez is well trained in squad movement, est. a TCP, maintain security and report format. We have extensive training in Offense and Defense. At one point in Krulak's fictional mission, Cpl. Hernandez "know(s) better than any of (his squad)....the fate...of the entire multi-national mission hung in the balance".

How does he know this? Was it his own character? Was it training? Did his Lt give him that detailed a mission statement (task and purpose)?

In the article about the captains, Capt. Gilbert "ordered traffic control barriers....checked on refurbished water pumps...approved money...soccer uniforms..dropped off..."etc. At any given point he must have left an NCO in charge as he moved on to the next task. Did that NCO understand that a secure TCP could deteriorate to the point were his tactical decision could have strategic implications. If he did know, then how?

"Be prepared to delegate to the point of discomfort.” Micromanagement is not really an option in COIN, is it?

Ken White
03-26-2008, 05:09 PM
...I think this improvement was partly due to improved enlistment standards during the Reagan years and an improved NCOES. We were getting better material and it showed. When I went back to troops as S-3, XO, Bn commander 1996-2002, I still thought highly of the NCO corps, but I did note some disturbing developments.Yep, the army owes Shy Meyer a lot for the changed focus in recruiting. I also noted the downturn in the mid and late 90s and agree with all your reasons that occurred.
NCOs are no longer fathers, big brothers, and priests; they are referral agencies, and both they and their soldiers are the poorer for it.Amen!
Personally, I have never met a sergeant major at the brigade level or higher who added value to his unit.Having been both a Brigade CSM and a Brigade Ops Sgt, I can truthfully say I had more power to do good as the latter. Brigade and higher CSMs mostly have negative power. I have known a few who did some really good things (I wasn't one of 'em) but for the majority, I'm inclined to agree with your assessment. It's too personality dependent.

What CSMs exist for at those levels is to keep their Boss out of trouble on people (and unit) handling. Too many today seem to be too sycophantic to tell their boss what's right instead of what he wants to hear. I've been out of that loop for a while but visits to my kids when all three Boys were in and to the one still in seem to indicate that's still a problem.

Absolutely agree with your take on who's supposed to be training who and Sergeant's Time. What a yo-yo idea...

Ken White
03-26-2008, 05:16 PM
...
How does he know this? Was it his own character? Was it training? Did his Lt give him that detailed a mission statement (task and purpose)?

In the article about the captains, Capt. Gilbert "ordered traffic control barriers....checked on refurbished water pumps...approved money...soccer uniforms..dropped off..."etc. At any given point he must have left an NCO in charge as he moved on to the next task. Did that NCO understand that a secure TCP could deteriorate to the point were his tactical decision could have strategic implications. If he did know, then how?

Hernanadez knew because he learned due to not being mishandled as you say in the next quote; Gilbert's NCO knew for the same reason.
"Be prepared to delegate to the point of discomfort.” Micromanagement is not really an option in COIN, is it?Only if the boss is stupid...

Then you can be guaranteed that Hernandez and the other guy won't know...

Charlie11
03-27-2008, 01:18 AM
You nailed the essence of NCO/junior officer relations in the transitioning H/J series army. As a young cav platoon leader in the mid-80s my junior NCOs were sharper than my platoon sergeant. He was a good guy - had the cleanest vehicles on post - but he was functionally illiterate and tactically deficient. My E5s and I just worked around him in a strange but effective manner. Those junior NCOs were platoon sergeants by the First Gulf War and were magnificent, sharper than anything but the most seasoned platoon leaders.

It all comes down to the quality of the incoming soldier and the experiences, mentoring, and responsibility they receive early in their careers. OIF and related operations would seem to provide tremendous opportunity for junior NCOs to exercise leadership and independence far beyond any garrison/NTC rotation reality that existed in the peacetime force. The danger of course is burning out these young warriors and losing them. Or losing them.

As for "Sergeant's Time," I'm just gonna let that old battle die...

Master Gunner? Training for Canadian Army Trophy we executed an abbreviated MG course taught by a mobile training team from Knox. I wondered then why this was not an automatic part of the armor/cav NCOES, a requirement for staff sergeant. The guys who had been to MG school acted like they some dark secret that only they could harness and control. I always just figured they liked being in the warm tower during winter gunnery rather than risk being on a track with a busted heater.

clayton
03-27-2008, 02:16 AM
Steve Blair
I'd be interested to hear how Navy ROTC handles this sort of thing.


I guess it's time for someone who was in the Navy to sound off. Just a couple of impressions about this thread.

1. I don't think any one service has cornered the market on micromanagement. Many if not most of the issues covered in this thread could equally apply to the Navy. And, unlike the Army and Marine Corps, most of big Navy (surface and submarine communities) has not seen a major shooting war since WWII - so all those bad habits of garrison time are even worse in the Navy. Since my time in the mid to late nineties, there's been much talk of officers taking over many of the roles and responsibilities of the NCO's (or CPOs in our case). In fact, micromanagement of the JOs and CPOs was pretty rampant back then. The mid-90s also saw an exodus of junior officers in the Navy that, in my humble opinion, was in-part influenced by this negative command climate. I think some of these problems might have their origin in our broader society (I'm not trying to pass the buck of military stupidity). I do recall an interesting article in the Washington Post comparing the response to Katrina to the response to the San Francisco earthquake. The writer noted how the responders in San Francisco did not wait for orders or let red tape or bureaucratic inaction stop them from taking action. The author's point was that we've become a much more legalistic (and timid) society, who waits for direction and fears the repercussions of taking initiative. If you believe that point, then it's not a reach to assume that this attitude would creep into the military with increased micromanagement being one of the results.

2. The Navy's personnel system isn't much different or better than that of the other services. In my time, attrition was a four letter word. They worked to reduce attrition at boot camp and at OCS (though that wasn't a large source of officers). One of the results of the decline in boot camp attrition was that sailors who were unfit for the Navy were making it to the fleet (and would be kicked out from there). I believe at one point in the late 90s, roughly 40% of first term enlistees in SURFLANT (Surface Forces Atlantic) did not complete their initial term of enlistment. It's probably on the web somewhere in a news article for those more thorough than me. I was OCS and had family members in NROTC and the Academy. I don't think the NROTC experience was much different from Steve Blair's ROTC story. I did meet a number of NROTC graduates in the fleet who made you think they waived the requirement for a pulse at their initial medical screening.

The bottom line is that I think these problems are military-wide with some to much variation allowed for each individual service. Y'all might hate being compared to the Navy, but there are similarities. It could be worse - I could be in the Air Force telling you how great things are there.:)

120mm
03-27-2008, 10:07 AM
Master Gunner? Training for Canadian Army Trophy we executed an abbreviated MG course taught by a mobile training team from Knox. I wondered then why this was not an automatic part of the armor/cav NCOES, a requirement for staff sergeant. The guys who had been to MG school acted like they some dark secret that only they could harness and control. I always just figured they liked being in the warm tower during winter gunnery rather than risk being on a track with a busted heater.

I'm glad to meet someone else who thought the Master Gunner was a problem. And it sucked so bad, they decided to do the "Master Fitness" thing army-wide.

So, everyone sends their PT stud to Master Fitness school, where they get smoked by other PT studs, so they can come back and injure a bunch of your people doing stupid stuff. I don't KNOW what they taught at either school, I'm sure it looked good on paper, but the folks sent never actually shared it with anyone else ANYWHERE I went....

Sorry for the hijack. You just hit a "sore spot" with the MG comment....

Presley Cannady
03-30-2008, 03:58 PM
This might be nothing more than a fanciful brainbug, but wasn't the British Empire run for a century or more on the wits of junior officers and seasoned noncoms in the far flung corners of the world?

davidbfpo
03-30-2008, 10:00 PM
This might be nothing more than a fanciful brainbug, but wasn't the British Empire run for a century or more on the wits of junior officers and seasoned noncoms in the far flung corners of the world?

As much as films, books and nostalgia may give that impression the British Empire was far more complicated. Yes there were areas, even countries, that in peace and war were run by a tiny handful of Brits, e.g. Sudan. Staying there this was after the disaster for prestige of General Gordon (British Army officer loaned to the Eygptians) and the large commitment many years later to restore Anglo-Egyptian rule, Kitchener and the massacre at Omdurman.

The civil factor was stronger than the military; often themselves young, training given and experience valued. The District Officer notably in Africa and the Political Agent in India, especially NW Frontier. The civil direction given was in very specific terms to a senior political appointee and cascaded down, until the arrival of modern, reliable communications from London.

Successes aplenty, also miserable failures: Afghanistan (Army destroyed), Bengal famines (during WW2), the fall of Malaya & Singapore, and the opening battles in the Boer War and Zulu War (illustrated by Zulu Dawn and Zulu films).

davidbfpo

Tom Odom
03-31-2008, 12:11 AM
Successes aplenty, also miserable failures: Afghanistan (Army destroyed), Bengal famines (during WW2), the fall of Malaya & Singapore, and the opening battles in the Boer War and Zulu War (illustrated by Zulu Dawn and Zulu films).

And there was the Sudan where failures and success alternated to the point the Sudanese service became a separate branch of the Foreign Service.
Best
Tom

davidbfpo
03-31-2008, 08:34 PM
Taken from an article in The Times (UK) today commenting upon the situation in Basra, Iraq by Professor Michael Clarke: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article3646296.ece

After the disastrous loss of the American colonies Britain built its empire, and its Commonwealth, on setting the rules, deploying few forces of its own and chancing its arm that it could keep order everywhere in a territory by demonstrating that it could keep order anywhere. It could do this only by having real influence at the political centre.

davidbfpo

kaur
04-01-2008, 08:07 AM
I'm reading here last Economist and it contains 14-page special report about US. Among other interesting articles there is story "Power and peril"


The army is losing its best and brightest. West Point, the alma mater of American generals going back to Ulysses S. Grant, has seen a relentless rise in the number of officers who leave at the earliest opportunity. Whereas only about 35% of the West Point class of 2000 had quit after five years, for the class of 2001 the proportion rose to 46% and for the class of 2002 to 58%. Retention problems are particularly severe among captains and majors with 11-17 years' experience—the potential future military leaders. The army currently has only half as many senior captains as it needs, and forecasts that it will suffer from a shortfall of 3,000 captains and majors (out of a cadre of 52,000) until at least 2013. The maximum age for recruits has been raised to 42, and fitness and educational standards have been lowered.

120mm
04-01-2008, 10:01 AM
I'm reading here last Economist and it contains 14-page special report about US. Among other interesting articles there is story "Power and peril"

I'm hip-shooting, here, but didn't U.S. Grant, W.T. Sherman and a majority of THEIR classmates quit after our first war of occupation in Mexico?

I wonder if there is the subject of a good paper, there.

VMI_Marine
04-16-2008, 11:34 PM
Excellent thread. I had the privilege of working with two different organizations on this last deployment - an Army cav troop near Fallujah, and a USMC MiTT near Haditha. Both experiences were very instructive. The cav troop CO believed in enabling his subordinates, not micromanaging, and had some fantastic results. Each of his platoons was responsible for a village and the surrounding area, and the LTs and their NCOs did a great job of developing the LOOs in those villages. The NCOs, at least down to section leaders, often met with local personalities in the village, and had a great understanding of the nuances in each village.

When I moved out west, the MiTT in Haditha had been augmented with a reinforced platoon of Marines from a nearby infantry battalion. They put a squad of Marines with each IA company, and the squad leader became the advisor to the IA company commander. From what these sergeants told me, it was a rough start at first, since Iraqis place so little stock in NCOs. By the end of their deployment, however, these sergeants were advising Iraqi captains and majors on all sorts of tactical matters. On the one hand, it was pretty remarkable to see. On the other hand, it's a little sad that this is the first time I've seen that technique used.

ODB
04-16-2008, 11:58 PM
Unfortunately the ones who need to advance to make real changes on a broader scale never get to that point, they are not political enough. IMHO we are not putting warfighters and trainers in these positions. Best CSM I ever had never made it above Bn.......CSM Donald Purdy......some may know the name.....any guesses on who the BN CDR was at the time? Time frame 1993-94

Steve Blair
04-17-2008, 12:44 PM
I'm hip-shooting, here, but didn't U.S. Grant, W.T. Sherman and a majority of THEIR classmates quit after our first war of occupation in Mexico?

I wonder if there is the subject of a good paper, there.

Been done to a degree, although I can't remember the name of the book offhand. Sherman and Grant both quit for different reasons, and both had dreams of becoming financially successful in the civilian world. Didn't work out for either of them....although they did do a thing or two afterwards.:D

McClellan also left the army, although officers like Lee and Longstreet did not. Back then one of the main reasons seems to have been financial and family separation...more often the former than the latter if extant memoirs and the like are anything to go by.

ODB
05-02-2008, 02:02 AM
Thought about startin a seperate thread with this, if others think as much please move it. After going through my hard drives I finally found this on the last one. IMO this goes along with many of the posts, thoughtsand feelings.

Purdy on Leadership

by Don Purdy
CSM, USA (Retired)
1) Some senior NCOs are nothing more than bootlickers, who sing the "Army of One" song to their superior officers everyday. Commanders need to hear the good, bad and the ugly, and then be given good solid recommendations. They need their senior NCOs to be TRAINERS. LEAD BY EXAMPLE. DO as the troops do. LEAD FROM THE FRONT. GET IN THE DIRT. This bull#### of "I have done that" is garbage. What you are doing now is what counts. Quit worrying about your next assignment. Focus on your mission now. Your mission is to train soldiers for war, and it's damned hard work. If you do it right you will leave the Army in worse shape physically than when you came in. BE HARD BUT FAIR. You must have MORAL COURAGE.

2) Training is just a word they can't spell. Chief trainer means chief bootlicker. TICKET PUNCHERS.

3) "Moral courage" means telling your commander what he wants to hear these days. I was condemned by my peers and superiors for speaking up, and telling it like it was. I was called a relic from the past that should be put in a glass case. I was focused on training for war not peace. Discipline was my watchword, and the soldiers did not decide what punishment was right or wrong where I served as CSM. I was the Chief Trainer. The buck stopped with me. I participated in all training and lead by example. I was told by a Division CSM that I would never serve above BN level because I was too intrusive. That means I scared commanders with the truth. The next thing he asked was why do you train with your soldiers? The question was shocking, but the answer was simple. When I speak everyone listens. That went over his head like a tent. I carried a rifle not a pistol, and I damn well knew how to use that weapon and my soldiers knew how to use their weapons as well.

4) Combatives are important. Boxing, wrestling, and bayonet fighting are not antiquated. CQB is just what it means, Close Quarter Battle. MOUT, Trench systems, and bunkers must be cleared, and you had better be aggressive and prepared to do bayonet or hand to hand fighting. When others were laughing at my unit for doing these, my soldiers were prepared and understood what "fix bayonets" meant. They were aggressive and well disciplined. Substandard performers were put out immediately. My First Sergeants were not mail men or chow deliverers; they were the Chief Trainers of their companies.

5) We trained for war not peace. Live fires were a priority, and were not canned. Leaders and soldiers had to react. Maneuver elements maneuvered, and had to rely on the SBF not to shoot them but only the enemy. Bayonets were fixed and there were dummy targets for the soldiers engage with those bayonets. Re-supply missions were planned and executed. The battlefield had to be policed of casualties, and equipment by any means available, even if it meant driving vehicles cross country, or physically carrying the wounded. Reload drills, dead gunner drills, and crew drills were executed over, and over, and over again. These were executed day and night. NODS went on your face when the sun went down. They weren't hanging around your neck. We executed live fires at night with NODS in the woods, and the live fires were not canned. Raids, ambushes, search and attack were all executed at night up to company size. This took us over one year to get to that level. Mortars could hit their targets. Units could move silently day or night, and didn't get lost. We did not rely on GPS. WE USED MAPS AND COMPASSES. We lived out of our rucksacks, slept on the ground, in all types of weather from the BN CMDR on down. Frostbite, and heat casualties were not common because we trained to live and fight in the same environment. We did not look like bums. We shaved every day, wore our equipment properly, camouflaged our faces (and hands when necessary), soldiers knew how to maintain themselves and their equipment in the field, and uniformity was important. Soldiers knew what a cat hole was and trash was carried in their rucks, not thrown on the ground or buried for the hogs to dig up. Uniforms were worn properly. The companies received one hot meal a day and understood how to conduct tactical feeding. Our cooks knew how to function in the environment. The combat trains did not live in tents. Their perimeter was secure, weapons were clean, and noise and light discipline were maintained. Cooks, clerks, and all other support personnel knew how to use their weapons, and were trained on basic Infantry skills. Misfires were damn well rare and punishment was swift when it did happen. We suffered no live fire deaths because we trained properly, and used good old-fashioned common sense. We never had the soldiers execute missions they were not properly trained for. The NCOs trained the soldiers; the officers commanded. Our motto was "what ever you do, do it right!" Rate of sick call in the field was almost zero. Morale was high because of good, hard leadership from the front, and realistic, tough training. We even executed a day of live fire training during support cycles. You need a strong CSM who understands discipline and training. He can talk it and walk it.

6) There is no such thing as a good field soldier. You are either a soldier or not a soldier. Everything from appearance to police call is important. This bull#### about my space and my rights is just that: BULL####. Barracks are not his or her home; it's a place for them to live. For saying this I was told I had a mess kit mentality. This individuality BS of "I need my own room" is garbage. We waste more money building these Condos so soldiers can feel good, and not be part of a team; its sickening. They should live in fire team bays. It builds cohesion. Key control alone is a nightmare. "Of course don't bother the poor soldier, just let him live like a pig. When he gets sick or you find out he or she is a drug dealer, blame
it on the NCO Corps even though you, the illustrious battalion commander and brigade commander, said 'leave the soldiers alone in their precious rooms.' " Soldiers are owed a place to sleep, their pay, and the best leadership and training that can be provided.

7) DISCIPLINE is the key. DRILL AND CEREMONY is the foundation of discipline. When I say fall in I want to hear your heals coming together. When I speak, you jump. All ceremonies should be executed with weapons so each unit can execute the 15-count manual of arms. Carrying a card around in your pocket does not develop good morals. Morals are developed through solid leadership not gimmicks and headgear.

8) You want to be politically correct, stay on the block. You want to be different or an individual looking to be a victim, stay on the block. If you're a pervert and proud of it, stay on the block. You want to be a soldier, then become part of a disciplined team. This is not a job, it's a profession. You're here to fight our country's war, not to be a gut-eating, self-serving individual. Senior Officers, and NCOs, I am telling you right now, if things don't change, you will have the blood of soldiers on your hands. There is an enemy out there who is determined, and he is not concerned about individual feelings, or time out. If you don't train them hard now, and demand from them now what in the hell do you think the enemy is going to do to them. If they can't take the heat in training, how are they going to take it on the battlefield? Technology, my ass, soldiers win wars. Be hard on them now or watch them die, or worse, break and run. BE HARD, BUT FAIR! Being fair does not mean they dictate punishment or babying them. A Russian General said "Hard on the training field, easy, on the battlefield". General Patton said "Leading from the rear is like trying to push spaghetti up hill." You want your soldiers to respect you not love you. When they look at you they should see a competent leader. The best compliment I ever received was from a soldier who was PCSing. I was a PLT Sergeant in the First Ranger Battalion. He said,"Sergeant Purdy, I hated to hear you come in, in the morning, and some times I just flat hated you, but I would follow you to hell with gasoline drawers on."

Everytime I find myself acting a little wayward I dig this up and it surely refocuses me.

Schmedlap
05-02-2008, 04:30 PM
DRILL AND CEREMONY is the foundation of discipline. When I say fall in I want to hear your heals coming together. When I speak, you jump. All ceremonies should be executed with weapons so each unit can execute the 15-count manual of arms.

I'm a bit hesitant to question CSM Purdy, but this one kind of baffles me. What does the 15-count manual of arms - or even drill in ceremonies in general - have to do with discipline? My understanding of discipline has always been a melding of competence and integrity - knowing what is right and always doing what is right, even when you don't feel like doing it and you can probably get away with not doing it. Failing to conform in a formation makes you stick out like a sore thumb and the repercussions are fairly swift - is such conformity really discipline? Or is it just a survival mechanism?

Ranger94
05-02-2008, 04:40 PM
I'm a bit hesitant to question CSM Purdy, but this one kind of baffles me. What does the 15-count manual of arms - or even drill in ceremonies in general - have to do with discipline? My understanding of discipline has always been a melding of competence and integrity - knowing what is right and always doing what is right, even when you don't feel like doing it and you can probably get away with not doing it. Failing to conform in a formation makes you stick out like a sore thumb and the repercussions are fairly swift - is such conformity really discipline? Or is it just a survival mechanism?

What is the primary purpose of drill (drill and ceremony)?
The purpose of drill is to enable a commander or noncommissioned officer to move his unit from one place to another in an orderly manner; to aid in disciplinary training by instilling habits of precision and response to the leader’s orders; and to provide for the development of all soldiers in the practice of commanding troops.
-Army Study Guide

120mm
05-03-2008, 10:23 AM
I'm a bit hesitant to question CSM Purdy, but this one kind of baffles me. What does the 15-count manual of arms - or even drill in ceremonies in general - have to do with discipline? My understanding of discipline has always been a melding of competence and integrity - knowing what is right and always doing what is right, even when you don't feel like doing it and you can probably get away with not doing it. Failing to conform in a formation makes you stick out like a sore thumb and the repercussions are fairly swift - is such conformity really discipline? Or is it just a survival mechanism?

Drill and Ceremony teaches people how to "excel" without standing out.

My 14 year old daughter just joined the high school drill team, and she recently condensed this into it's essence: She likes drill team competitions, because it's the only "sport" where you "win" by not being the "star".

CommoChief
05-23-2008, 08:29 AM
All,

First thanks for the creation and maintenance of this site. I have been reading for some time and finally decided to post.
1. Promotions: My view of officer promotions is that we (the Army), as an institution, are making the worst decision possible. We are allowing the promotion of young officers who simply lack the ability to function as Captains. The criteria for promotion should be 'Captains command Companies'. If a BN CDR does not believe that a particular LT is going to be able to develop into a Company Commander that he would trust with the lives of his own children then do not allow this promotion to take place. The current policy of allowing a promotion at 38 months when coupled with the lack of OER accountability and sound mentoring from the CO and BN commanders is seriously flawed. Thankfully most of the 'baby Captains' realize they have been promoted not based upon their ability to perform at that grade but rather as a way of masking the attrition rate of more senior Captains. The incompetents, for the most part, are at least smart enough to realize it and continue to allow their NCOs to handle the day to day business. The competents, and there are more than a few, likewise continue to listen to their NCOs and their competent peers and competent young MAJ. The same holds true on the NCO side. The 'automatic' promotion is a problem only if we allow it to be. All that is required is for the leadership of the CO and BN, officer and NCO alike, to have the courage and tenacity to refuse to promote those who are not ready. The process involves holding leaders at all levels accountable for leadership development and mentoring. If a young subordinate has not made enough improvement, after being coached and mentored and counseled then the commander must do the paperwork to deny the promotion. Do not allow 'big army' to dictate who is going to be the future small unit leaders simply because the paperwork trail is hard and the BDE CDR or BDE CSM wants to know why 'x' number of NCOs were not reccomended for promotion.

2. Training: We have a generation of young Officers who have almost no experience in HIC. Shooting table 8 at Graf is not a substitute for a full up heavy force rotation at CMTC. How are these Officers supposed to be the lead trainers when they have almost no experience in gunnery or maintenance or manuever. This is going to hold true for the 'four year SSG' as well. This is going to require much involvement from folks who have that experience (informal training) or are school trained.

3. Experience: On the positive side of the ledger we have a vast amount of experience in actual combat operations as motorized and dismounted infantry. The actions on contact for a motorized or dismounted tank platoon are different than while mounted on tanks but the reporting proceedures and battlefield preperation is not. We can't forget that many of these lessons will carry over to HIC.

Solutions: If as a leader, you do not trust your subordinates enough to keep from micromanaging them why are they in the job in the first place? Find some competent hard charger, without regard to rank, and put them in the job. Many bruised egos will occur but this is far more preferable to allowing an incompetent subordinate leader to command troops in the field.

Sorry this went so long and for the tone but this is too important to 'play nice'.

Tom Odom
05-23-2008, 01:44 PM
Solutions: If as a leader, you do not trust your subordinates enough to keep from micromanaging them why are they in the job in the first place? Find some competent hard charger, without regard to rank, and put them in the job. Many bruised egos will occur but this is far more preferable to allowing an incompetent subordinate leader to command troops in the field.

Sorry this went so long and for the tone but this is too important to 'play nice'

Well in the interest of playing nice, try introducing yourself here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/forumdisplay.php?f=33). Your ideas will have more traction,

Tom