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AmericanPride
03-27-2008, 10:39 AM
Hello all.

I'm currently in the process of doing a research paper for a class on war and peace. The quoted text below is my thesis. The basic premise is that the multi-polar political system has flooded the state actors with information. New technology also enables the participation of significant non-state actors, and more effective management of the information collected. As a result, the strategic aspects of intelligence will more directly influence all levels of decision making and execution ('strategic corporal'). The ways in which state actors discriminate information will dictate their actions. This creates the appearance that war has transformed, though its basic drivers remain the same.

Reviewing my thesis, I in my mind come to a resounding "duh, so what?" at the end. So my questions are:

(1) To what extent is strategic intelligence relevant to state decision making on war?

(2) In what ways has technology transformed, or modified, the relevance of intelligence, if at all? Does an increase in capabilities generate a proportional increase in dependence on the effects it enables?

(3) What is the link between the causes of war and intelligence? Are states more likely or less likely to enter conflict with more effective information management?

I've put together a list of 20 or so sources, so I'm currently wading through the waves of pages and concepts to connect all the components together. Thanks for any assistance.


The “transformation” of warfare, its increased intensity, and decentralization originates from the increased tempo of the decision-making process enabled by technology and facilitated by the factional nature of the modern political system. Underneath the masks of ideology and religion, the fundamental drivers and components of war remain the same. The concept of hard power, operationalized by the military as firepower and maneuver, remains essentially unchanged, but now existing in the modern context of a fragmented political structure. The notion of soft power arises from the complex dynamic of political, military, and economic interactions on multiple levels, shifting focus from dominance to influence, and an orientation on the effects that may be produced by a variety of compulsive means other than physical violence. For this reason, the nature of intelligence in war has undergone the most notable transformation. The capacity to make relevant decisions more rapidly than the adversary has become of extreme importance due to the fluid and mixed environment in which war and politics now exist. Information management which enables this capacity by increasing the tempo of the decision-making process will have a decisive impact on all levels of warfighting. This paper will focus on the strategic aspects of war where the political and military aims work in collusion, and why strategic intelligence will define the security challenges of the 21st century. The method in which state actors collect, evaluate, and apply strategic intelligence will decisively judge their fate.

William F. Owen
03-27-2008, 11:11 AM
I note with interest your suggesting that information technology increases tempo.

Research done in the UK shows this to be very much in doubt. In WW2 Divisional HQs were much smaller, and did things far quicker using less people and resources. My understanding is that there is substantial evidence from both the UK and Sweden that higher levels of information actually slow down decision making and thus tempo.

It has been further suggested that what increases really increased tempo is small thoroughly trained Divisional and Formation staffs. Not sure if this helps, but I can forward you a thesis that deals with this if you are interested.

John T. Fishel
03-27-2008, 11:39 AM
3. Depends (the classic answer) on the intel. If we had accurate info on WMD in Iraq in 2002 would we have gone to war? If we had accurate intel on Saddam's intentions prior to his 1990 invasion of Kuwait, could we have prevented it?

This leads to #1:

As a Lieutenant (back in the dark ages) I was a strat intel officer assigned to the Pentagon. We analyzed all kinds of info (political, economic, military, and informational - the classic instruments of power) from all sources for the decisionmaking political and administrative leadership. Responding to our analysis (I'm talking here about the entire intel community) they would use this as input to their policy decisions. Intelligence, of course, was not their only source of critical info. For non-denied areas, the media was often better informed than the entire intel community. This remains the case although, perhaps, the degree to which it is true may have changed. In addition to intel on friends and adversaries the decisionmakers have to take account of our own capabilities. For the military, this is coordinated through the 3 shop. As Graham Allison points out in Essence of Decision (if you haven't read it for pol sci you must;) ) Presidents are limited by the capabilities of their bureaucracies. Finally, recognize the wisdom of Clausewitz' (Saint Carl to the denisons of SWJ) in his one point of total consistency through all 8 books, that war is the continuation of policy/politics with the addition of other means.

I'll leave the other questions for others more current like Wilf.:)

Hope this was of some use.

Cheers

JohnT

William F. Owen
03-27-2008, 12:14 PM
@ Finally, recognize the wisdom of Clausewitz' (Saint Carl to the denisons of SWJ) in his one point of total consistency through all 8 books, that war is the continuation of policy/politics with the addition of other means.

@ I'll leave the other questions for others more current like Wilf.:)


@ - To paraphrase the excellent Colin S. Gray, "If Clausewitz didn't say it then it's probably wrong."

@ - actually all a bit above my pay grade, old Chap!

wm
03-27-2008, 12:28 PM
(1) To what extent is strategic intelligence relevant to state decision making on war? I suspect the degree of relevance has much to do with the personalities of the state decisionmakers. By this I mean, how much access to intel the decisonmakers demand and how much use (read "opennness of mind to being persuaded by 'facts' delivered by strategic intel") they actually make of the intel provided. Sports analogy--suppose a football coach had a scout who reported, with some provable degree of accuracy, what plays the opposing football team would run next. Further suppose the coach chose not to believe the scout, chose to ignore the scout's input in his decisonmaking, and/or chose not to inform his own defense about what plays to call to counter what the opponent called.

2) In what ways has technology transformed, or modified, the relevance of intelligence, if at all? Does an increase in capabilities generate a proportional increase in dependence on the effects it enables? Because of the availability of near instantaneous imagery as combat information, I suspect that operators place less reliance on having a trained "intel" guy provide assessments of what the bad guys are up to or may be planning.

(3) What is the link between the causes of war and intelligence? Are states more likely or less likely to enter conflict with more effective information management?
The decision to go to war probably has little to do with a rational risk calculus and/or the kind of cost-benefit analysis that you learn about in classical economics and political theory/international relations courses. I suspect what makes it seem so rational has to do with all the "Monday morning quarterback/post mortem" analyses done after the shooting starts.

States act based on their perceptions of reality. Insofar as intel may alter that perception of reality (for good or bad), the "go-to-war-propensity" pendulum could swing either way. See my response to 1 above.

I suspect that you might want to review the thread on the the neo-con alibi here (http://http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5084) among other threads (like the one on Iran Nukes NIE) to get more grist for developing an answer to this question. The bottom line from where I sit is that a state's leadership makes a decision to go to war and then tries to come up with reasons that enables it to justify that decision in the moral/legal context defined by Just War Theory's jus ad bellum conditions.

John T. Fishel
03-27-2008, 12:36 PM
Wilf--

I thought you gave a really good answer to #2 - so I didn't touch it.

Regarding Saint Carl: Although I've used him for years and read in On War I had never read the whole thing until this semester when I assigned it to my course on War & conflict from ancient times to the present. Stupid me, I had to read it too!:eek: The Howard/Paret translation with essays by both along with Brodie and the latter's commentary is superb. Despite being written in great detail at the end of the Napoleonic era, it is surpising how well the examples hold up today. Unlike Sun Tzu, who writes in aphorisms, Clausewitz goes into excruciating detail and that is, I think, one of the real strengths of the work. The examples he chooses often are timeless. So, whoever said tha old dogs (like me) can't learn new tricks? (And if you are reading this Steve Metz, I will expect a remark to resemble since I just left myself wide open.:D)

Cheers

JohnT

William F. Owen
03-27-2008, 01:02 PM
Despite being written in great detail at the end of the Napoleonic era, it is surpising how well the examples hold up today. Unlike Sun Tzu, who writes in aphorisms, Clausewitz goes into excruciating detail and that is, I think, one of the real strengths of the work. The examples he chooses often are timeless.


Yes! Yes! Yes! This is why the old dead Prussian is so good (or "way cool"). The enduring empirical nature of his writing is excellent, and a thorough understanding of CvC leads you to so many other good things, as well as an ability to dismiss a lot of others.

I would strongly recommend reading Foch's Principles of War, 1903 English translation was 1918. Foch was a big CvC fan and it shows CvC in a more modern context. I think it excellent! One day I really need to examine if it truly is CvC in application, but my current understanding is that it is.

Warning: - Robert Leonhard, who I consider one of the best living Military minds is very down on Foch's book. Never asked him quite why, but I guess I should.

Sun Tzu? "A single hamster cannot defeat a bear, but many hamsters make a good meal"

Steve Blair
03-27-2008, 01:23 PM
What technology tends to do is create a series of information bottlenecks. While it has the capability to greatly increase optempo, it also has the ability to slow actual reaction time greatly. This is because as information becomes easier to gather, higher levels develop a greater need to "see" everything. As more information flows up the chain, it quickly overwhelms the capability of people to absorb and evaluate it, so it lingers and often doesn't get to the people who need it.

With the increased flow of information comes the "need" of some higher formation commanders to try to control everything they can "see." The great anecdotal example of this is the Vietnam "charlie-charlie" bird. You have guys on the ground slogging through terrible terrain and the Brigade CO running the show from 500 feet yelling that the troops should "move faster" because it "doesn't look that bad from up here." All this combines to create Saint Carl's "friction," and results in units reacting much slower than they might otherwise.

But it doesn't have to happen that way. If you want some good examples of fairly fast turnaround enabled by technology, take a look at some SOG operations from the same period. Here the focus was on getting the job done, and often tech was used as a tool for that and not the master.

Technology makes it easier for the process to become the end instead of the process serving the end. And that's my take on that...for whatever it's worth...:wry:

AmericanPride
03-27-2008, 02:52 PM
Thanks for the responses and also whoever moved the thread (I realized I posted in the wrong forum after the fact :rolleyes:).


Research done in the UK shows this to be very much in doubt. In WW2 Divisional HQs were much smaller, and did things far quicker using less people and resources. My understanding is that there is substantial evidence from both the UK and Sweden that higher levels of information actually slow down decision making and thus tempo. It has been further suggested that what increases really increased tempo is small thoroughly trained Divisional and Formation staffs. Not sure if this helps, but I can forward you a thesis that deals with this if you are interested.
I would appreciate that document. It seems to me that what you state suggests that information management depends on the competency of the decision maker involved. But if we're to assume that the decision-maker is a rational actor (I'm more or less required to use realism, or a modified version of it, as a theoretical framework), and everything else being equal, can we claim with any kind of confidence that the rapidity in which an actor turns around information from collection to application will be a decisive factor in political or military action vis-a-vis other actors? (Obviously I am not entirely familiar with the ins and outs of the intelligence cycle, so I must ask: is the pace of the intelligence cycle an indication of its effective use?) I recently read through Keegan's book Intelligence in War, and while he suggests that "exertion" (in the Clausewitzian sense) is the decisive factor in victory, I think he misses the underlying causes which brought the forces together at the decisive point. I suppose then, beginning with the idea that intelligence, in a broad sense, is necessary, I assumed that more of a good thing would automatically indicate a better thing. But I see why that may not be the case.


3. Depends (the classic answer) on the intel. If we had accurate info on WMD in Iraq in 2002 would we have gone to war? If we had accurate intel on Saddam's intentions prior to his 1990 invasion of Kuwait, could we have prevented it?

If we are to assume that a state's interests are permanent (for theoretical purposes), I think the next question becomes: does intelligence decrease uncertainty? Clausewitz called intelligence a "chasm" between conception and execution. And if we're also to assume that states are concerned with relative power and gains among them, can we say that a state with less certainty about another's behavior will be more likely to resort to violence in order to realize its interests? The classic "prisoners dilemma" suggests that if actors had knowledge of one another's intentions, they will cooperate.


I suspect the degree of relevance has much to do with the personalities of the state decisionmakers. By this I mean, how much access to intel the decisonmakers demand and how much use (read "opennness of mind to being persuaded by 'facts' delivered by strategic intel") they actually make of the intel provided.

This is the key problem in realist theory (which I'm using as a theoretical framework for my thesis). Other authors suggest however, realism can be modified from the state-centric focus to the nature of the faction, or factions, governing the country. But I'm trying to explore whether or not intelligence as a concept is inherent in the state consideration, determination, and pursuit of its interests. So while it can be said that interests determines friends and foes, realism asserts that states have the singular interest in their security and that politics is self-help. With that assumption, I will modify my question to: to what extent does strategic intelligence assist the state in discriminating between friend and foe?


What technology tends to do is create a series of information bottlenecks.

This is something I addressed a few pages into my paper when I came upon relating the nature of the political system to state decision making. It seems to me that while technology can enable more decisions to be made faster, it reduces the number of choices actually available because it simultaneously provides information which discredits options that might otherwise seem viable. This assumes of course that states are rational actors and will choose the option with the most utility as far as their interests are concerned.

Steve Blair
03-27-2008, 03:02 PM
The other thing increased information based on technology does is create more "fingers in the pie" because more people gain access to that information. And that need in turn drives your information management framework.

Information is normally subjective, especially information dealing with humans (motivations, actions, etc.), as opposed to objective. As your information flow increases, the need for effective analysis grows at the same pace. However, I think this gets offset (and in some ways canceled) by the number of people who gain access both to the information and the product of the analysis. A number of different opinions and information can lead to decision paralysis, especially if those close to the top of the food chain are not comfortable making decisions (or want a comfortable amount of "group think" behind those decisions). Likewise, the ability to discern between useful information and "white noise" and/or disinformation becomes even more critical as the flow increases.

Regarding Keegan, I'd be wary of many of his statements in some areas. He's done some good stuff, but I also think that he's become a little full of his own sense of all-knowingness when it comes to history. He's good to read, but be sure you check the sources he uses and allow yourself to come to your own conclusions. If you haven't read it already, I'd recommend the most recent edition of Handel's "Masters of War." He does a great job of breaking down Saint Carl (among others) and points out that Clausewitz was more focused on tactical and operational intelligence than he was what we would consider strategic intelligence.

John T. Fishel
03-27-2008, 03:38 PM
Again, it depends. While decreasing uncertainty can increase the sense that one's action are rational it may also provoke rashness. Alternatively, while the existence of uncertainty may provoke action against an adversary to defeat the possible threat, it is equally likely to produce policy paralysis. The role of the individual actor again. That said, you will probably get better policy the more you can reduce uncertainty with solid data and analysis.

Don't be particularly concerned about being forced into a realist mode. Allison's work (mentioned previously) demonstrates that the best predicting of his 3 models is the classical rational actor. The other 2 (org theory and the 'political' [stressing individual background, biases, and preference] only fill holes in the rational actor explanation/prediction. The key to its use is the rigor with which the model is applied - and I don't mean quantification necessarily.

Cheers

JohnT

William F. Owen
03-27-2008, 03:46 PM
. I suppose then, beginning with the idea that intelligence, in a broad sense, is necessary, I assumed that more of a good thing would automatically indicate a better thing. But I see why that may not be the case.
.

The problem with intelligence is that it is not an absolute thing. It's subjective, and constantly changing in both nature and relevance. You often don't known how good it is, till it's moment has come and gone.

Tom Odom
03-27-2008, 05:06 PM
At the risk of self-promoting, read my memoirs, especially the final three chapters on Rwanda regarding intelligence reporting, analysis, and strategic warning concerning the prospects for a larger war in central Africa.

Journey into Darkness: Genocide in Rwanda (http://www.tamu.edu/upress/BOOKS/2005/odom.htm), TAMU press 2005. Your library probably has it.

I also suggest that you read this article in SWJ magazine:
Guerrillas From the Mist: A Defense Attaché Watches the Rwandan Patriotic Front Transform from Insurgent to Counter Insurgent (http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/swjmag/v5/odom.htm)

Best

Tom

Umar Al-Mokhtār
03-27-2008, 05:56 PM
It’s nice to see that Tom isn’t beneath engaging in a little blatant self-promotion of his many literary accomplishments. ;)

Information overload certainly becomes a by-product of increased collection capability. This may, or may not, "blur" the picture. However, I believe this is more relevant to the utilization of operational intelligence where the LIMFAC is time.

“The method in which state actors collect, evaluate, and apply strategic intelligence will decisively judge their fate” rings true throughout the history of conflict. Within the realm of strategic intelligence more may be better yet also increases the requirement for analysts to determine what is useful information and what may be dis-information. Despite the advances in collection and analysis, we still cannot “see” into the heart and mind of a state leader.

It is not merely a factor of what, or how much, you know; it’s in how you leverage that knowledge into viable action.

Jedburgh
03-27-2008, 05:59 PM
If you are looking at the influence of intelligence upon decision making at the national strategic decision-making level, then I highly recommend giving a read of a book I've recommended on this board a couple of times: Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars (http://www.amazon.com/Knowing-Ones-Enemies-Intelligence-Assessment/dp/0691006016)

The book was published by Princeton University Press in '86 and consists of sixteen essays that describe in fair detail intelligence collection, analysis and decision making at the national level in countries about to go to war (Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France, Great Britain and Italy before WWI and Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Japan, and the US before WWII).

And, although they don't go into as much detail on the strategic intelligence feed into national-level pre-conflict decision making, I also recommend Irresolute Princes: Kremlin Decision Making in Middle East Crises, 1967-1973 (http://www.amazon.com/Irresolute-Princes-Kremlin-Decision-1967-1973/dp/0312175663/), Chinese National Security Decisionmaking Under Stress (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub623.pdf), and Who's at the Helm? Lessons of Lebanon (http://www.amazon.com/Whos-at-Helm-Lessons-Lebanon/dp/081330993X/). There's more, but that's just an off-the-cuff recommendation before I go get my post-lunch coffee.....

Umar Al-Mokhtār
03-27-2008, 07:31 PM
Signals of War: The Flaklands Conflicts of 1982 by Lawrence Freedman is pretty good but nothing beats:

The Guns of August by Barbara Tuchman

Tom Odom
03-27-2008, 07:41 PM
It’s nice to see that Tom isn’t beneath engaging in a little blatant self-promotion of his many literary accomplishments.

It was not blatant. It was flagrant. :D

CR6
03-27-2008, 08:35 PM
The Guns of August by Barbara Tuchman

Good choice, from the standpoint of how leaders can become locked into the execution of pre-determined plans (Moltke the Younger), despite intelligence that the actual situation is different from the one for which you planned.

I also recommend Stoessinger's Why Nations GO to War, specifically chapter one, for a discussion of how personality and state of mind affect rational thought under stress.

J Wolfsberger
03-28-2008, 11:19 AM
One point that hasn't been made yet, is that most of our intelligence sources (SIGINT, ELINT, etc.) tell you about capability and potential. They give no insight into intentions, which are, in any case, changeable as the wind.

With regard to the latter, the only source is human intelligence, i.e. the mistress, cabinet member, bureaucrat, etc. who's been turned and is now feeding information to the other side. (A US capability that was gutted in the late seventies and is only now being rebuilt.) Even then, the intel is only as good as what the source is told. If his own people are lying to him, the best he can do is pass on the lies. On top of which, the source may be lying to us for his own motives.

Our decision to go into Iraq provides a good example of the problems:

1. We knew Saddam would use chemical weapons. (He already had, against Iran in war and Kurdish civilians in "revolt.")
2. We knew he had the capability to produce them. (Anyone who can't convert a fertilizer, pesticide, pharmaceutical, etc. plant to manufacture chemical weapons, and hide the capability, simply isn't trying.)
3. We were getting reports from inside his cabinet that he claimed to still have them. (These apparently were true.)
4. We were told by Iraqi expats that he had them. (These apparently were false, and presented out of personal motives.)
5. We had chatter among his officer corps about the use of their own chemical weapons. ("Do you think he'll really use them?" "Are you ready if he does?")

To summarize, the intel that he had chemical weapons was good. As it turns out, the reason it was good is that Saddam was trying to make it good, running a domestic and international bluff.

Didn't work out well for him.

(WHAT!?! Tom wrote a book!?! Who knew? :eek:)

Jedburgh
03-28-2008, 12:17 PM
One point that hasn't been made yet, is that most of our intelligence sources (SIGINT, ELINT, etc.) tell you about capabilityand potential. They give no insight into intentions, which are, in any case, changeable as the wind.

With regard to the latter, the only source is human intelligence, i.e. the mistress, cabinet member, bureaucrat, etc. who's been turned and is now feeding information to the other side....
As a career HUMINTer, I have to say that any claim that only HUMINT can provide insight to intentions is false. SIGINT, when collection is targeted effectively, is also a valuable direct source of information regarding intent. When HUMINT and SIGINT are effectively coordinated to collect on a target set, each feeding into the other in a structured collection effort, then the degree to which intentions can be ascertained is greatly expanded beyond the individual capabilities of either. Of course, the other INTs often have significant value in corroborating, invalidating, or simply providing additional indicators of assessed intent - IMINT immediately comes to mind.

You also must understand that capabilities are inextricably linked with intent. Neither intentions without capabilities nor capabilities without intentions pose a threat. A threat only exists when both are manifested together. The statement that "capabilities give no insight into intentions" is false. Capabilities, how they are obtained, structured and used in the context of the collection target, are often an important indicator of intent. So, it is not a question of capabilities vs intentions, but of coming to a logical judgment of intent in light of a host of indicators from the spectrum of collection assets available.

It is rare that a single collection asset, no matter how well placed, will provide stark warning of a clear and unmistable intent (decision made, action about to be initiated) for a specific course of action to be taken at the national strategic level by a potential threat. If only it was that easy.....

Steve Blair
03-28-2008, 12:42 PM
It was not blatant. It was flagrant. :D

Or was that flatulent?:D:eek:

In all seriousness, Tom, your book's on my "to buy" list. Only "Mars Learning" is ahead of it right now.

Umar Al-Mokhtār
03-28-2008, 01:28 PM
You also must understand that capabilities are inextricably linked with intent. Neither intentions without capabilities nor capabilities without intentions pose a threat.

It seems to me that it isn’t always true since the Grand Fenwick Expeditionary Force had intentions without capabilities yet still managed to bring the US to its knees. :D

wm
03-28-2008, 01:52 PM
As a career HUMINTer, I have to say that any claim that only HUMINT can provide insight to intentions is false. SIGINT, when collection is targeted effectively, is also a valuable direct source of information regarding intent. When HUMINT and SIGINT are effectively coordinated to collect on a target set, each feeding into the other in a structured collection effort, then the degree to which intentions can be ascertained is greatly expanded beyond the individual capabilities of either. Of course, the other INTs often have significant value in corroborating, invalidating, or simply providing additional indicators of assessed intent - IMINT immediately comes to mind.

You also must understand that capabilities are inextricably linked with intent. Neither intentions without capabilities nor capabilities without intentions pose a threat. A threat only exists when both are manifested together. The statement that "capabilities give no insight into intentions" is false. Capabilities, how they are obtained, structured and used in the context of the collection target, are often an important indicator of intent. So, it is not a question of capabilities vs intentions, but of coming to a logical judgment of intent in light of a host of indicators from the spectrum of collection assets available.

It is rare that a single collection asset, no matter how well placed, will provide stark warning of a clear and unmistable intent (decision made, action about to be initiated) for a specific course of action to be taken at the national strategic level by a potential threat. If only it was that easy.....

To piggyback on this post, I'd add that a failure to use an integrated intelligence effort is more likely to produce a false picture. I submit the August 1968 Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia as a case study in how not to do I & W intelligence. Or at least how not to use the data that assets used for I&W have collected.

Tom Odom
03-28-2008, 01:53 PM
Or was that flatulent?:D:eek:

In all seriousness, Tom, your book's on my "to buy" list. Only "Mars Learning" is ahead of it right now.

As a southern boy I don't do flatulence

I merely fart :D

More than ever or so my wife tells me

And tells me...:wry:

Jedburgh
03-28-2008, 02:07 PM
It seems to me that it isn’t always true since the Grand Fenwick Expeditionary Force had intentions without capabilities yet still managed to bring the US to its knees. :D
If you recall (http://www.amazon.com/Mouse-That-Roared-Peter-Sellers/dp/B00009MEKJ), the original strategic intent of Grand Fenwick was for their army to attack the US and lose, thus capitalizing on the perceived American willingness to fund rebuilding of defeated enemies - which appeared a foolproof plan, given the state of their army.

However, it was only after they stumbled into attaining a unique capability - the Q-Bomb - that their designated military leader was able to bring the US and other world powers to accept terms. But this was in contradiction to the original intent of his political leaders, who never made clear to him in the first place that he wasn't supposed to win.....

wm
03-28-2008, 02:23 PM
In relation to the analysis of roaring mice and their wartime aspirations, I suggest this book (http://www.amazon.com/White-Flag-Principle-How-Lose/dp/1568582595).

Umar Al-Mokhtār
03-28-2008, 02:31 PM
it was the United States’ blatant disregard for the fragility of the Duchy of Grand Fenwick’s pre-industrial economy, which was dependent almost entirely on making Pinot Grand Fenwick wine. After the US-produced the spurious "Pinot Grand Enwick" wine, the loss of revenue threatened to undermine Fenwick’s economy. Thus the Duchess Gloriana XIII was placed in a completely untenable position and, faced with total economic collapse, approved Prime Minster Count Rupert Mountjoy’s plan to send a punitive expedition to punish the US. :D

It is a little known fact that the Grand Fenwick Expeditionary Force is one of the few foreign powers to successfully invade the United States. Consisting of 20 long bowmen selected from the 700 in the Duchy and three men-at-arms selected from the 20 who have the right to carry spear and mace, clad only in chain mail, and nobly led by that epitome of military professionalism the stalwart Tully Bascombe, the GFEF inadvertently snatched victory from certain defeat. :eek:

Umar Al-Mokhtār
03-28-2008, 02:40 PM
wm, where did you get your hands on that French military doctrine manual? :p

J Wolfsberger
03-28-2008, 03:02 PM
As a career HUMINTer, I have to say that any claim that only HUMINT can provide insight to intentions is false. SIGINT, when collection is targeted effectively, is also a valuable direct source of information regarding intent. When HUMINT and SIGINT are effectively coordinated to collect on a target set, each feeding into the other in a structured collection effort, then the degree to which intentions can be ascertained is greatly expanded beyond the individual capabilities of either. Of course, the other INTs often have significant value in corroborating, invalidating, or simply providing additional indicators of assessed intent - IMINT immediately comes to mind.

...

Hmm. I understand your points. Let me try to rephrase in way we might agree on: The other forms of intel serve to confirm (through observation of activity) our estimate of intent.

The point I was getting at (perhaps poorly) is that no amount of SIGINT (for example) will inform you whether a telephone reference to "Uncle's birthday present" is to a terrorist event ... or a new tie.

Ron Humphrey
03-28-2008, 03:30 PM
Hmm. I understand your points. Let me try to rephrase in way we might agree on: The other forms of intel serve to confirm (through observation of activity) our estimate of intent.

The point I was getting at (perhaps poorly) is that no amount of SIGINT (for example) will inform you whether a telephone reference to "Uncle's birthday present" is to a terrorist event ... or a new tie.

If you happen to know that the "Uncle's birthday present" was recieved opened and being used for the last two months then one does know to further investigate what this "new" present may be:D

Jedburgh
03-28-2008, 04:01 PM
...The point I was getting at (perhaps poorly) is that no amount of SIGINT (for example) will inform you whether a telephone reference to "Uncle's birthday present" is to a terrorist event ... or a new tie.
Here you are operating on the generalization that SIGINT is ineffective in collecting information on intent because the communication is coded in one or form or another.

First off, many collection targets do make statements that help us to assess intent in the clear, with no attempt at disguising what they are saying. It may be because they are naively assuming that we can't intercept the mode of comms that they are using - or that they assume that we can't understand the language/dialect used in the conversation. In both cases they are often dead wrong. Sometimes literally.

Secondly, as stated in my previous post, no collection asset operates in a vacuum. Each feeds into the others, in multiple continuous loops, that integrates both raw and finished intel in collection planning that is constantly updated. To follow up on your example, a HUMINT asset may learn that a specific code-phrase of the type you refer to will be used to initiate ramping up the threat attack phase, but has nothing more than a general idea of to whom - or exactly how - the code-phrase will be passed along. That will key multiple collection assets into the hunt for the phrase - which will also lock us on to some of the key players in the emerging event. If we are lucky enough to intercept that specific communication.

As an aside, today's wireless comms, linking cell phones, internet, etc. fuses many operational aspects of both HUMINT and SIGINT and absolutely requires close collaboration in order to detect, intercept and exploit these comms and the human networks involved.

All the collection disciplines must work together to be effective. Unfortunately, too often we see turf battles and conflicts over resources rather than true collaboration - especially at the national level in the IC.

Ken White
03-28-2008, 04:27 PM
...
All the collection disciplines must work together to be effective. Unfortunately, too often we see turf battles and conflicts over resources rather than true collaboration - especially at the national level in the IC.I agree with your premise -- in all senses -- but we, as nearly as I can tell, have denigrated Humint to the point where it and on the ground reports (at strategic, operational and tactical levels) are virtually discounted by many analysts unless corroborated by technical means. Technical primacy isn't an unmixed blessing.

I submit that isn't terribly smart...

(I will forego my Stansfield Turner diatribe to avoid offending young ears)

Jedburgh
03-28-2008, 08:18 PM
I agree with your premise -- in all senses -- but we, as nearly as I can tell, have denigrated Humint to the point where it and on the ground reports (at strategic, operational and tactical levels) are virtually discounted by many analysts unless corroborated by technical means. Technical primacy isn't an unmixed blessing.
Ken, I don’t agree with the across-the-board categorization of analysts discounting HUMINT. There are elements within the military and the broader IC that have long understood and valued HUMINT collection. However, I have to say - excepting those areas - I agree with your point. My previous post really speaks to the ideal, and those elements I mentioned are really the only ones that tend to consistently approach the smooth workings that I tried to describe.

There are a couple of factors at work that I believe drive the problem you point out. Most importantly, you are absolutely correct in that many elements require corroborating information prior to acting on any single-source intelligence.

The following discussion includes a healthy amount of my personal opinion on the matter. Be warned.

Over the past few years, there have been a number of highly-visible unfortunate incidents as a result of targeting based on single-source intel that turned out to wrong – sometimes intentionally so from a manipulative source, sometimes just plain ol’ bad info. The numbers that have passed without mention is much larger. Also unfortunate is the fact that much of that originated with HUMINT.

The reasons are both simple and complex, and essentially boils down to inexperienced HUMINTers operating in a challenging new environment. But it has much greater implications than that.

We’re all aware of the massive cuts in military HUMINT during the draw-down period of the ‘90s – and of the recent rapid increase in HUMINT slots in the past couple of years. The former deprived the force of a huge amount of institutional knowledge – not only those who took the money and left early, or went into another field, but also those absent numbers that we did not train and put to work during the thin years. The latter was a rush to put bodies in the field, while relaxing standards and waiving or dropping some requirements (language skills, for example). So, the cherries are now both less prepared for ops than before, and have less access to operationally experienced mentors than they would have had a decade earlier (meaning the ratio of junior enlisted/NCOs to experienced SNCOs and WOs).

The effects of the rapid expansion have cascading effects beyond that of the new enlistees into the field as well. Because there weren’t enough HUMINTers to fill all the new NCO & Warrant slots created, they were filled by a combination of promoting beyond experience and recruiting from outside the field. No need to expand on promoting beyond experience or capability, but I will harp on the issue of NCOs with no HUMINT, and sometimes even with no MI experience filling HUMINT NCO and Warrant positions. They are now expected to lead, train and mentor HUMINT soldiers in the COE. So, we have a severe lack of focused HUMINT experience across the entire rank spectrum, with a lack of leadership capable of catching and correcting errors.

This ties directly into poor source handling and bad reporting. Bad reporting, when it results in mis-targeted ops, tends to eventually result in the analysts discounting the source. Even when it doesn’t drive mis-targeting, if the analyst (who is deluged with reporting) continually receives clearly poor reporting from a specific source or sources, he inevitably begins to discount that reporting, putting at the bottom of the pile to review, or simply not bothering to include it in a finished intel product unless something else comes up to corroborate the info. When the source tends to be in the majority from one ‘INT, then the analysts begin to either discount that ‘INT, or to not trust anything from that ‘INT until there is clear corroboration from another source – despite the level credibility formally given to the source.

To finally get to a point, Ken (if you’ve stuck with me this far), this ultimately breeds bias into analysts against HUMINT. Its not the fault of the analysts – it’s the fault of the system that has produced so many HUMINTers incapable of effective collection and (just as important) effective reporting.

The common excuse across the board for several of the issues I’ve mentioned is that, given the COE, the large group of rapidly accessed HUMINTers will gain invaluable experience and learn as they go along. Unfortunately, what I am seeing in reality is a lot of learning of the wrong lessons. When we don’t have a suitable proportion of operationally experienced NCOs and Warrants as mentors, to guide and correct the young’uns in this type of environment, this is what you get. Deploying entire teams with no experience – the entire team either gets it right, or gets it wrong. And when they get it wrong, they return home and, now being battle tested professionals, their wrong lessons spread like a virus. Please don’t misunderstand me – we do have some very bright lights in the field, natural HUMINTers who are doing an outstanding professional job. However, from the feedback I am seeing, there is an uncomfortable degree of mistaken learning going on in the HUMINT community. And when it comes from HUMINTers who now have operational deployments under their belts, it is too often taken as gospel by those who are not MI.

Much of my rant, with some changes for context, can also be applied to other HUMINT collection assets in the IC – which has also undergone a rapid expansion. Again – we have some outstanding people doing great things out there that go largely unsung. But I am concerned that they are being overwritten by the others I discussed here, and that the right lessons may get overwhelmed by the bad – because the ultimate decision makers are not part of the HUMINT community, and what they absorb too often comes from the wrong people. Your "technical primacy" comment hits here as well - a disturbing trend in the HUMINT field is to look for hi-tech "assists" for HUMINT collection, when what we really need is just focused selection and training of HUMINT personnel.

Ken White
03-28-2008, 09:10 PM
Particularly this:
"However, I have to say - excepting those areas - I agree with your point."Kidding but you'll have to admit that was too good to pass up... :D

I'll also point out that I did caveat a tad; ""...are virtually discounted by many analysts unless corroborated by technical means. "" (emphasis added /kw)

I have met a few with some smarts and the gumption to trust their instinct and the guy who's out there; just not enough of 'em.
Over the past few years, there have been a number of highly-visible unfortunate incidents as a result of targeting based on single-source intel that turned out to wrong – sometimes intentionally so from a manipulative source, sometimes just plain ol’ bad info. The numbers that have passed without mention is much larger. Also unfortunate is the fact that much of that originated with HUMINT.Agree -- and I agree with your exposition of the various whys which leads us to this:
To finally get to a point, Ken (if you’ve stuck with me this far), this ultimately breeds bias into analysts against HUMINT. Its not the fault of the analysts – it’s the fault of the system that has produced so many HUMINTers incapable of effective collection and (just as important) effective reporting.Yes, thus we have a systemic failure that gets swept under the table. Yet again, it all boils down to the training we pay lip service too but do not do well.

On an allied note, An old Cav Colonel recently said, with respect to tactical reconnaissance; "We don't do that very well, Americans don't have the patience for it. We just go out looking for trouble and to do that, you've got to have Armor." On the surface he's correct about the national dearth of patience and he's absolutely correct about the US Army approach to combat reconnaissance since WW II. I submit that while he's correct, he's wrong on what should be -- patience can be trained; patience on the part of the kid you want to sneak about and patience on the part of senior commanders who are unwilling to take the time to do a job right -- or pay for the training so that can be done.

I think that latter bit about commanders is a big part of why a lot of Analysts like tech means; it's rapid -- and it produces something to show the boss instead of a faceless troop, handler or agent.

In both the cases of poor tactical reconnaissance and of excessive reliance on technical means, I think we have a philosophical and practical failure at high levels...

And I know we have a training quality failure...

John T. Fishel
03-29-2008, 12:08 AM
I was an analyst who used Sigint, Humint, Imint, and Osint. Most of the Sigint either sucked or was so tactical as to be useless to those of us working on the strat level. But some ... some was pure gold!:D Much of the Humint was attache reporting and much of that was garbage. But there were some real gems. I kept a report from Vernon Walters as DATT in Paris for several years as much for the entertainment value as for the intel value. Imint tended to be very good but didn't always show you stuff that was useful. Finally, our Osint was great press reporting - consstently the best stuff out there. But none of it stood up on its own. there was a reason we were considered and all source analysis org - multiple types of source were always better than one alone.

Cheers

JohnT

PS I'm not as old as Ken but in the same ballpark.

Entropy
03-29-2008, 07:34 AM
With regard to the value of various "ints" every case is situational. None of the intelligence collection disciplines are inherently better than any other. The single piece of raw intelligence that clearly and definitively shows intent is something that pretty much exists only in novels and in Hollywood screenplays. Even something as definitive as the Zimmerman Telegram has to have supporting evidence and this is particularly true with Humint because of deception. The age when HUMINT was king was really the age when HUMINT was the only game in town. Furthermore, in the case of Stalinist regimes like Saddam's Iraq, North Korea and Stalin's USSR, Humint is really impossible, so the other disciplines are the only option.

To get back to the OP for a minute, however, here's my take on the questions raised:


(1) To what extent is strategic intelligence relevant to state decision making on war?

A lot obviously depends on the state and political system itself. For example, in dictatorships the supreme leader often promotes himself to be his own intelligence analyst, usually with disastrous results. Much depends on who has the power to make war - is it a single person, a junta or a representative body?

Secondly, in all cases intelligence is skewed to a greater or lesser degree by cognitive bias. Relatively few intelligence personnel and agencies make any attempt at all to correct such bias and in some regimes such bias is actually amplified (IOW paranoia). The term "rational actor" is often used when characterizing how another nation or leader may act, but I feel it is a dangerous term - one that allows and excuses mirror-imaging. IOW actions that appear irrational to one person or nation may appear perfectly rational to another.


(2) In what ways has technology transformed, or modified, the relevance of intelligence, if at all? Does an increase in capabilities generate a proportional increase in dependence on the effects it enables?

IMO, technology has greatly improved intelligence collection and dissemination but has hindered most everything in between, particularly analysis and production. First there are the hundreds of hours wasted on Powerpoint when most times a map and a pointer will do, or a simple oral presentation or a written summary. Secondly, there are simply many orders of magnitude more information to sift through that weighing and analyzing it all into a coherent picture becomes exponentially difficult. You'll find that many automated intelligence tools today are designed to manage that information flow and essentially act as a middle-man between you as the analyst and the raw data. Such measures are necessary given the torrent of information but there is always the danger that something important will get filtered out and never sea an analyst's eyes. Unfortunately, a side effect is that this middle-man and the glut of information tends to exacerbate the problem of confirmation bias - analysts looking through reams of data tend to focus and place more importance on those things which tend to confirm their preconceptions or tend to tell their middle-man filters to look for what they already expect.

I've been an all-source analyst and even for relatively obscure topics the amount of information can be daunting, particularly when historical information and archives are taken into account. Furthermore, technology has made analysis more difficult in many ways because so much of the information is from or based on arcane knowledge of a particular collection discipline. Unless one has a good understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the collection system, an analyst can easily make a wrong judgment about the validity of a particular piece of information from that system. For example, it's important for an analyst to know that the SIGINT system is only capable of collecting, for instance, below the battalion level.

Unlike what is commonly believed, all intelligence collection assets are limited in that they cannot collect all information at all times. Collection coverage of whatever subject of interest can be, and frequently is, adjusted for a wide variety of reasons. Therefore, there will be periods when certain targets or activities have more collection coverage and there will be less coverage at other periods. In general, more collection coverage means more reports on that topic are generated and a reduction in collection coverage means fewer reports. Now, if the all-source analyst is unaware of a change in collection status they are likely to misjudge because they may assume that the increased number of reports, for example, represents increased activity and not a simple increase in collection coverage. A sharp analyst will account for this but only if he/she is familiar with the intricacies of collection and the intelligence problem itself. But of course, there is always the possibility that an increase in collection coverage coincides with an actual increase in activity. This is another inherent factor an analyst must weigh on just one source of information.

This effect is even more problematic for historical data, however. When looking at an archive of reports it's unlikely an analyst will know what the collection posture was when those reports were generated, which makes trend analysis much more difficult.

An even bigger problem is that increased collection can expose what appear to be increased activities but are really just normal. For instance, suppose in country X a certain unit does a certain kind of out-of-garrison training on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays. Now lets assume the facility this unit resides in is normally imaged by satellite only once a week - say Mondays. Over time an analyst may build up a historical record that shows this unit does this particular type of training weekly and does it on Mondays. Now suppose that tensions between the United States and country X increase and, as a result collection against country X also increases. Now let's suppose the facility is imaged three times a week - Monday, Wednesday and Saturday. Suddenly an analyst may see that there are two training events per week instead of one and may erroneously conclude that this type of training at this facility has doubled when in reality it hasn't. This "discovery" that "more" training is taking place my lead to further erroneous conclusions as the report that training "doubled" makes its way around the IC and to policymakers. Tensions may increase leading to even greater collection and the "discovery" of the third training event. So now the intelligence community may be reporting that a certain activity has "tripled" when in fact it hasn't.

I've seen variations of the above scenario in various forms played out time and again, particularly with current intelligence analysts and new, inexperienced and poorly trained analysts, which there are an awful lot of nowadays. However, the technology is the root cause and it frustrates even experienced analysts.

So technology is both a blessing and a curse for the intelligence analyst. The variety, ability and timeliness of both collection and dissemination have all increased, but the analytical resources required to process the information (and by analytical resources I mean people with brains) has also increased as has the complexity and, indeed, difficulty of the task itself.


(3) What is the link between the causes of war and intelligence? Are states more likely or less likely to enter conflict with more effective information management?

I don't think there's a definitive relationship or answer here. The decision to go to war often comes down to potential or perceived outcomes resulting from various courses of action - something that even the best intelligence analyst cannot predict with great accuracy. Additionally, in many governments intelligence has no real independence from policy and so intelligence is less able to influence a decision to go to war - rather it serves to promote a course of action that's already been decided.

Ultimately I don't think it's a question of whether a state is more or less likely to enter a conflict. Instead, perhaps its a question as to whether the wisdom of a decision about entering a conflict might be marginally increased with more effective intelligence/technology, though the jury is still out on that IMO. After all, war is required to test such theories and so far the record is not good.

J Wolfsberger
03-29-2008, 11:46 AM
And I may have given a false impression. Intel has to be all source. The point I was aiming at is the erosion of our HUMINT capability. (Ken, we're in complete agreement on who should bear responsibility for that stupidity.)

But I will stick to the assertion that however good the other sources are, they can never completely replace HUMINT.

William F. Owen
03-29-2008, 01:00 PM
@ The reasons are both simple and complex, and essentially boils down to inexperienced HUMINTers operating in a challenging new environment. But it has much greater implications than that.

@ We’re all aware of the massive cuts in military HUMINT during the draw-down period of the ‘90s – and of the recent rapid increase in HUMINT slots in the past couple of years. The former deprived the force of a huge amount of institutional knowledge – not only those who took the money and left early, or went into another field, but also those absent numbers that we did not train and put to work during the thin years. The latter was a rush to put bodies in the field, while relaxing standards and waiving or dropping some requirements (language skills, for example).

@ So, we have a severe lack of focused HUMINT experience across the entire rank spectrum, with a lack of leadership capable of catching and correcting errors.


This speaks to my experience. I was recently approached about sharing my views and ideas on HUMINT, by a consultancy group, who claimed to be under a government contract.

I declined to be involved because the level of naivety was staggering, especially as concerns some of the legal and even ethical issues that had to be addressed, and the failure to understand that it is almost this area alone that creates the "dark art" problems, - while the fundamentals of HUMINT are pretty easy to grasp, the complexity of the restrictions that have to be enforced seem to go unnoticed. Why? I'll never know!

John T. Fishel
03-29-2008, 02:07 PM
Hi Entropy--

Good post. I will only take issue with you on an aspect of the rational actor approach/model. This is, as Graham Allison pointed out in his classic Essence of Decision, the realist model of international relations that has long dominated the field (Thucydides through Morgenthau and the Military decision Making Model). It tends to explain and predict better than any other single model as long as (1) the analysis is rigorous and (2) the analyst has a solid understanding of the explicit goals of the target. For example, if one had read Hitler's Mein Kampf and assumed that Hitler believed what he said in the book then all his subsequent actions were a rational strategy to achieve some essentially irrational goals. Use of the model would, under those conditions, have been an effective predictive tool - as it was for Churchill (who used it implicitly). Like Adam Smith's economic theory (which has been expanded but never overturned) the rational actor model assumes that individuals rationally seek to satisfy their interests. This works in the aggregate in economics. In IR/intel/policy it depends on a little more before the whole thing comes together. Again, Allison showed that much of what the rational actor model does not explain/predict can be explained by 2 other models: (1) organization theory and (2) an individual political model. But what he does not do is to connect the 3 models and show how they mesh in the way that Adam Smith did. For Smith the individual rationally sought to maximize his economic interest. He and his successors added the notion of the firm doing the same thing. The result was the entire economy rationally maximizing its economic interest moved "as if by an invisible hand." Realist IR theory historically starts with the state and never moves down. Allison made the move downward. The final step (and why the rational actor model explains/predicts better than any other single approach) is to bring it back up - individuals acting rationally in organizations tend to move the state into rational policies (with the caveat noted above in the Hitler example). So, the danger you note is not inherent in the model but rather in the way the analyst uses it - or misuses it, as the case may be. One other caveat - in some (few) cases what is rational for theindividual or organization is not rational for the state (or the economic system as a whole - hence the need for regulation).

The only other comment I have is related to what technology can do. Your thoughts on that express most of the dilemmas and positive results very well. (I left the intel analyst business before the advent of the PC so I only experienced deluges of paper.) But what computer technolgy can do for the analyst is to call up all reporting on a given subject. Much of what we got from Humint was F6 (old term for "source has never reported before - reliability unknown - and validity of info unknown"). :confused: this stuff was often discarded unless the analyst saw it being reported again from a different source - in which case he could/should upgrade the source and the info. But given paper files, it essentially depended on the analyst to remember. Now a click of the mouse can bring ups all reports on the subject or from the source for comparison. A good capability of technogy, I think, as long as we know enough to use it.:D

Cheers

JohnT

selil
03-29-2008, 02:18 PM
Good post. I will only take issue with you on an aspect of the rational actor approach/model. This is, as Graham Allison pointed out in his classic Essence of Decision, the realist model of international relations that has long dominated the field (Thucydides through Morgenthau and the Military decision Making Model).

Correct me if I'm wrong, but in essence what you're saying is the "rational choice model" is predicated on the "point of view" of the subject?

Is this part of the Durkheim philosophy?

My thought is that in some cases we talk about Tilly, and others who look at resource mobilization and extending that into concepts such as driving group think, and that resulting in collective action by intelligence analysts. This would be totally counter to independence of thought and analysis. Perhaps a simpler way to state it would be "rush to judgment".

Tom Odom
03-29-2008, 02:22 PM
Ken, I don’t agree with the across-the-board categorization of analysts discounting HUMINT. There are elements within the military and the broader IC that have long understood and valued HUMINT collection. However, I have to say - excepting those areas - I agree with your point. My previous post really speaks to the ideal, and those elements I mentioned are really the only ones that tend to consistently approach the smooth workings that I tried to describe.

All of what you say is true, Ted. But I would add three small but central points:

a. The Post-Vietnam merger of the old Army Security Agency stove-piped structure with Military Intelligence meant largely that ASA took over tactical MI because it had an extant command structure that favored technical collection.

b. Flowing from above, the bias toward technical collection brought with it an inherent bias toward greater intelligence structure at all levels and rewarded those who stayed inside that structure with promotions. That is the reason most MI generals have never been battalion or brigade S2s. It is also the reason that then XVIII Airborne Corps commander LTG Gary Luck told us on the Certain Victory team that the Army had spent way too much on MI for what we got from MI. His G2 by the way as a newly crossed over ASA Major was my very first company commander and then MI battalion XO. He never served a day in a maneuver battalion or brigade and was tactically illiterate.

HUMINT is ---big surprise--human centric. That means the money costs are constant to sustain skills. MI had rather spend money building force structure. Funny MI is the same way toward sustaining tactical SIGINT language skills.

c. MI has never been focused on analysis because that too is a human-centric skill. Besides MI officers get to general by managing MI force structure, not serving as analysts. If they do become G2s at division and corps they manage analysts. More collection in terms of more collection means is always the goal.

Best

Tom

AmericanPride
03-29-2008, 03:21 PM
Thanks for the input everyone. After reading through these pages, I've come to realize the breadth and depth of the subject I'm trying to grasp. I'll have to tighten up my thesis somewhat to make sure I don't wander too far off course. Some of the thoughts expressed will also be helpful in developing my own awareness when I enter the field.

Entropy
03-29-2008, 03:28 PM
J. Wolfsberger,


But I will stick to the assertion that however good the other sources are, they can never completely replace HUMINT.

I would take that further and suggest that, in general, the same can be said of any of the intelligence disciplines. Of course, much is situational and in a given situation one "int" may be inherently better at providing the needed information than another.

John Fishel,

For the most part I agree with you about the rational actor model in theory, but in practice it all too often results in failure. Even when we do have "a solid understanding of the explicit goals of the target" and use rigorous analysis failure is still frequent, but more often the model is simplistically used and is little more than a cover for mirror-imaging.

As a case study, we can look no further than Saddam and Iraq. Dr. Gerrold Post's psychological profile of him back in 1990 (http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/iraq/saddam_post.htm) proves reslilient today with the benefit of hindsight, yet we still critically misjudged what he saw as his greatest threats and his WMD decisionmaking - two factors that directly lead to war.

So even if the rational actor model is judiciously applied huge errors in analysis still occur. The reason for this, in my view, is that analysts are inevitably forced to put themselves in an adversaries shoes to predict what they would do in given circumstances. The record of such prediction is not a good one unfortunately.

More often, however, the model is not applied rigorously in day-to-day intelligence production because most analysts (particularly current analysts) simply don't have the level of expertise and intimate knowledge of the adversary to make even educated guesses. In these situations mirror-imaging is most often the rule rather than the exception and the model provides a false sense of security and false analytical rigor.

This reminds me of Occam's razor, which is a dangerous tool for the intelligence analyst because of deception.

Finally, I agree with you completely regarding HUMINT reporting. Fortunately, the system no longer uses inappropriately precise designations like "F6" - instead using a plain-language source description, but it's still difficult for the all-source analyst to determine the strength of the information in HUMINT reports. I hope those producing HUMINT reports understand how critical their insights and source descriptions are to the all-source analyst.

John T. Fishel
03-29-2008, 05:14 PM
No, I'm not saying that the model always looks at the state being analyzed from that state's point of view. In fact, it is rare that the analyst has that kind of information. Most tyrants do not write their intentions into books as did Hitler. The problem for the realists like Chamberalin and Daladier was that they had not read Hitler or assumed that he did not mean what he said and, therefore, assumed his rationality was like that of any other European state. Most realist analysis operates that way asumming states act in their "objective" interest.

No, I wasn't referring to Durkheim. I haven't read enough of him to be comfortable citing him.:o

Finally, groupthink is always a danger but rigorous analysis and constantly questioning one's assumptions can minimize its negative effects. Not only do we have Irving Janis' groupthink concept but we also have the more conventional view that several minds are better than one alone. Both are, IMHO, true.

Cheers

JohnT

John T. Fishel
03-29-2008, 05:28 PM
I think that you and I are in basic agreement. What I am suggesting is not that the rational actor model - rigorously applied, of course, ;) - is always a good predictor/explainer but rather that it is simply the best one available. I tend to think about its efficacy arbitrarily as 80% accurate. I then posit that org theory adds another 10% predictive capability, and the political model another 5% (Remember these are my arbitrary assigned values - may be more but probably are less.) That leaves 5% of the cases unexplained or worse, wrongly predicted. Compound that with Sam's introduction of "groupthink" and your challenge of mirror imaging and you increase several times the nimber of cases mis-predicted/explained.

That said, what is the alternative to using the rational actor model? To go back to AP's questions and dilemma, he's stuck with it. So, he needs to use it as rigorously as he can and supplement it with things like Allison's Models II and III, testing it for evidence of Janis' groupthink. Sorry AP, you don't have to do all that; it's not a doctoral dissertation:eek: - just be aware of the possibilities and pitfalls.

Cheers

JohnT

PS I did like the A - F, 1 - 6 scale. Used well it was a good shorthand but it never was scientific and F 6 was most often misinterpreted as meaning bad info instead of unknown quality of both source and info.

AmericanPride
03-29-2008, 05:48 PM
Dr. Fishel,

I think the assumptions of realism will be sufficient for the scope of the paper and the class. The paper is in essence a research paper to explain, by theory, the causes of war. But I wanted to take it a step further and focus on a particular component of decision making within the framework of the theoretical model. The problems of realism are clearly visible, but I think if I shift the emphasis away from the pace of the decision-making process toward the consequences of its design (in relation to strategic intelligence) for states, I will be better off. In this way, I can skirt the issue of technology, addressing only how it relates to intelligence capabilities, and focus on how states use strategic intelligence.

Ken White
03-29-2008, 08:25 PM
...
PS I did like the A - F, 1 - 6 scale. Used well it was a good shorthand but it never was scientific and F 6 was most often misinterpreted as meaning bad info instead of unknown quality of both source and info.you could see how many F6s were laying about in comparison to all others that came in -- kept one sorta honest... ;)

Entropy
03-30-2008, 03:22 AM
John,

Thanks again for your comments.

I do believe the rational actor model does have utility but it's always important to recognize it limitations, and, in fact, the limitations of attempting to apply any model to particular circumstances. That said, I think much depends on the character of the nation and it's particular decision-making process. Ideally one would want models tailored to the peculiarities of each nation, but that brings up another set of problems.

Americanpride,

A potential problem you may run into is that decision-making processes vary widely. For simplicity's sake, you might want to consider reducing your scope further to look at a particular category or archetype of national decision-making process.

AmericanPride
03-30-2008, 03:48 AM
John,
Americanpride,

A potential problem you may run into is that decision-making processes vary widely. For simplicity's sake, you might want to consider reducing your scope further to look at a particular category or archetype of national decision-making process.

Well, I'm aiming to illustrate in my conclusion that states that can collect, analyze, and apply strategic intelligence, however they manage it, more rapidly will be more successful. I'm going to tailor my thesis somewhat to reflect the slight change in emphasis.

Ken White
03-30-2008, 03:57 AM
Which is most important...

AmericanPride
03-30-2008, 04:12 AM
Which is most important...

I think that's certainly a problem that countries have to face. The multi-polarity of the international system, in addition to the proliferation of non-state actors, introduces a flood of variable interests and intentions. In addition, technology proliferation can make the capabilities and effects of these actors unpredictable. I think states will have to fall back on the "good plan now rather than perfect plan tomorrow" maxim as far as strategic intelligence is concerned.

Ken White
03-30-2008, 05:29 AM
if you address it, be sure you give adequate emphasis to domestic political considerations which are always a driver at the national level.

I have no problem with a 75% solution -- a lot of the Political masters do not, in my observation, subscribe to that. We have, in the west, become far more risk averse as societies today in comparison to say, 1940 and that can have an impact on your thesis.

Good luck with the paper.

Jedburgh
03-30-2008, 12:47 PM
Well, I'm aiming to illustrate in my conclusion that states that can collect, analyze, and apply strategic intelligence, however they manage it, more rapidly will be more successful. I'm going to tailor my thesis somewhat to reflect the slight change in emphasis.
Again, I refer you to Knowing One's Enemies, the book I recommended in my first post (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=43293&postcount=15) in this thread.

The studies clearly demonstrate that the personalities and individual biases of the national level leaders - the consumers of strategic intelligence - often have a greater influence upon strategic decision making than does the quality of intelligence or the rapidity of its acquisition.

In theory, I agree with your premise - that rapid acquisition, analysis and dissemination of accurate intelligence to national decision makers increases the likelihood of success. However, I have to state that the historical record puts the emphasis on the word "likelihood". Throughout history, national leaders have often dismissed, cherry-picked or simply refused to consider solid intelligence in favor of other information that played to their personal biases, or simply contrary recommendations from close confidantes whom they trusted more than their intelligence apparatus.

......Another one that previously slipped my mind is For the President's Eyes Only (http://www.amazon.com/Presidents-Eyes-Only-Intelligence-Presidency/dp/0060921781), which is focused on the President as a consumer of intelligence, and looks at the office in that perspective from George Washington to Bush I. However, the first book is really the one that speaks directly to your topic.

AmericanPride
03-30-2008, 03:15 PM
Again, I refer you to Knowing One's Enemies, the book I recommended in my first post (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=43293&postcount=15) in this thread.

The studies clearly demonstrate that the personalities and individual biases of the national level leaders - the consumers of strategic intelligence - often have a greater influence upon strategic decision making than does the quality of intelligence or the rapidity of its acquisition.

In theory, I agree with your premise - that rapid acquisition, analysis and dissemination of accurate intelligence to national decision makers increases the likelihood of success. However, I have to state that the historical record puts the emphasis on the word "likelihood". Throughout history, national leaders have often dismissed, cherry-picked or simply refused to consider solid intelligence in favor of other information that played to their personal biases, or simply contrary recommendations from close confidantes whom they trusted more than their intelligence apparatus.

......Another one that previously slipped my mind is For the President's Eyes Only (http://www.amazon.com/Presidents-Eyes-Only-Intelligence-Presidency/dp/0060921781), which is focused on the President as a consumer of intelligence, and looks at the office in that perspective from George Washington to Bush I. However, the first book is really the one that speaks directly to your topic.

The problem is that I'm using realism has a theoretical framework for my thesis, and that model does not allow for analysis of the internal workings of the state, much less the personalities of particular leaders. I think that in order to keep my thesis tight and controlled, I'll have to stick with the state-level analysis and forgo opening up that can of worms. As far as I can see, I'll have to assume that leader personalities are embedded in the broad concept of the state. How do you think I should approach that dilemma?

John T. Fishel
03-30-2008, 03:24 PM
AP--

As you know, Realism assumes that the state can/must be treated as if it were a single, individual actor who is rationally pursuing his interests. Granted, there are many flaws in that assumption as Entropy and Selil have pointed out, but it works well most of the time. (I use 80% as my ballpark estimate.) So, as long as you demonstrate that you are aware of the possible pitfalls with an explantory note or in the text itself, you should be fine. As a professor of political science at U of MD told my wife when she was a PhD candidate, "Done is better than perfect."

Drive on!:cool:

Cheers

JohnT

Ron Humphrey
03-30-2008, 03:30 PM
The problem is that I'm using realism has a theoretical framework for my thesis, and that model does not allow for analysis of the internal workings of the state, much less the personalities of particular leaders. I think that in order to keep my thesis tight and controlled, I'll have to stick with the state-level analysis and forgo opening up that can of worms. As far as I can see, I'll have to assume that leader personalities are embedded in the broad concept of the state. How do you think I should approach that dilemma?

You may have to look towards developing a certain set of parameters within which you assign default values and determine the likely results of any cost/benefit analysis in the decision making process that the players you do decide to include would use. It wouldn't be perfect but with the background from the books they have pointed out and comparing to some decisions you can find which have been made it may give you at least a close approximation from which to work..

GL

AmericanPride
03-30-2008, 09:16 PM
I completed the draft of my paper. I tailored the thesis somewhat to focus more on the theoretical aspects rather than the intricate details of practical application. I'd like to ask if anyone is available to review it (it's a little more than 15 pages), but I understand if schedules do not permit that.

Thank you all for your help.