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Cpt C
03-31-2008, 07:04 PM
Gentlemen,
I scratched out this paper and I would like to receive your feedback. There are many great COIN papers already in existence, but I couldn't find anything that you could actually get every man in a conventional infantry platoon to read (down to the privates). So that is what this paper is targeted at- it's short and to the point. It doesn't really lay out COIN strategy, but talks about the platoon-level tactics and techniques required to implement a COIN strategy. It is also not the ideal, perfect answer; but rather is something that you could expect out of any run-of-the-mill platoon. It attempts to bridge the gap bewtween strategy and platoon-level implementation.
The organization is still rough and I would appreciate comments on how to better seperate the COIN techniques from the counter-guerilla techniques and still have a good paper. Or should I just get rid of the non-COIN-specific stuff? Thanks. All comments are appreciated.
CPT C

Cavguy
03-31-2008, 07:17 PM
Gentlemen,
I scratched out this paper and I would like to receive your feedback. There are many great COIN papers already in existence, but I couldn't find anything that you could actually get every man in a conventional infantry platoon to read (down to the privates). So that is what this paper is targeted at- it's short and to the point. It doesn't really lay out COIN strategy, but talks about the platoon-level tactics and techniques required to implement a COIN strategy. It is also not the ideal, perfect answer; but rather is something that you could expect out of any run-of-the-mill platoon. It attempts to bridge the gap bewtween strategy and platoon-level implementation.
The organization is still rough and I would appreciate comments on how to better seperate the COIN techniques from the counter-guerilla techniques and still have a good paper. Or should I just get rid of the non-COIN-specific stuff? Thanks. All comments are appreciated.
CPT C

All,

CPT C's here after I saw a draft of the paper. He's looking for some feedback on it from the community.

CPT C, don't forget to post an intro here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?goto=newpost&t=1441). Welcome aboard!

davidbfpo
03-31-2008, 08:30 PM
The draft paper reads well, although too many words are abbreviated, notably intelligence becomes intell. Needs clearer sections and sub-titles. Perhaps a few references and links. Then I'd let a few prospective readers at it, soldiers in a platoon. A very short keypoints summary, suitable for a pocket sized memo card (UK Army shoot don't shoot card).

From a police officers comfortable armchair.

davidbfpo

Steve Blair
03-31-2008, 08:40 PM
I liked the looks of this as well. Makes some good points without wasting space or getting too far into depth that would be out of place in a document like this. The abbreviations didn't bother me, but I do agree with David that it would benefit from clear section breaks and similar devices. References or "for further reading" sections might be good, but added on at the end (or as an annex/appendix) that wouldn't bog down the main document.

walrus
03-31-2008, 08:44 PM
Great paper, I hope you continue developing it and using it.

I'd make a few suggestions, not based on modern experience. I apologise for being picky.

1. Introduction:


The heart of COIN is in the basic principles and the mindset, and an open-minded Lieutenant and a few good NCO’s can have an incredible impact on their Area of Operations (AO).

True, but why stop at good NCO's? Your most junior acting lance blank file trooper is quite capable of undoing all your good work very quickly. He (she?) needs to understand exactly same the things your NCO's do and be able to walk the talk.


2. Sir, I applaud your use of the concept "Boots on the ground"

3. "Never go out the same way you came in." I think you might mean the reverse, but I get your drift. I also wouldn't know if you are using deception plans in Iraq, but if people aren't, I would commend the concept, which is worth a whole unpublishable paper of it's own. I think that being expected to be going somewhere and turning up somewhere completely different might be an even greater surprise in this cell phone ridden world than it was forty years ago.

4.
Killing the enemy during a fire-fight is great, but catching him in your covert ambush before he even knows you are there is so much more satisfying (and safe!). This requires getting inside the enemy’s planning cycle and knowing his next move before he makes it

Once again I applaud you. I have yet to hear of any successful ambushes in Iraq, but I hope there are many. They have a devastating effect on the enemy's morale, especially if combined with #3.

5. Although it is not related to your paper, I wish it was possible for the Theatre Commander to order all troops to take off their sunglasses before they talk to an Iraqi. 90% of communication is non verbal and the eyes always speak volumes.

Good luck.

max161
03-31-2008, 10:31 PM
Here is something I wrote many years ago.

Jason Pape
04-01-2008, 12:03 AM
CPT C -

I've experienced the same frustration talking to some of my peers about how to approach COIN / Phase IV at the battalion and brigade level. Either because they haven't seen it done, or because the approach they observed didn't work in their AO when they were there, they are convinced this stuff "just doesn't work." So I started brainstorming on different approaches units can take...not as a list of "best practices" but more of a menu for "how we might conduct business in our AO, given the current conditions, taking into account a multitude of considerations."

This is a working draft...I need to make it more objective. I do not intend for it to lean in one direction or the other, but I obviously show my bias as it is now. There are reasons to go either way, given one's context.

All feedback is welcome. Please let me know if this is a useful tool for discussion.

Cavguy
04-01-2008, 01:17 AM
CPT C -

I've experienced the same frustration talking to some of my peers about how to approach COIN / Phase IV at the battalion and brigade level. Either because they haven't seen it done, or because the approach they observed didn't work in their AO when they were there, they are convinced this stuff "just doesn't work." So I started brainstorming on different approaches units can take...not as a list of "best practices" but more of a menu for "how we might conduct business in our AO, given the current conditions, taking into account a multitude of considerations."

This is a working draft...I need to make it more objective. I do not intend for it to lean in one direction or the other, but I obviously show my bias as it is now. There are reasons to go either way, given one's context.

All feedback is welcome. Please let me know if this is a useful tool for discussion.

Jason,

Let me digest this one. I already have some thoughts from first read, but need to think on it. Glad to see you show up from companycommand.

Be sure to post in the intro thread.

Niel

Beelzebubalicious
04-01-2008, 11:53 AM
Cpt C,

I have not put on a military uniform, but I have spent some time in Iraq and other places in an international development capacity. From a capacity building and development perspective, there are a whole range of actors (contractors) out there doing various projects that all (sometimes loosely coordinated) attempt to improve the infrastructure, services or socio-economic environment. Related to Kilkullen's 4th point about organizing for inter-agency operations and 23rd point about practicing armed civil affairs, I would like to see more attention focused on learning who the other actors on your side and in the civil society are and coordinating with their efforts. These people often have an intimate knowledge of the communities they work in, their needs and are working to address them. They're not necessarily reaching out, so it's even more reason to extend to them. There are a lot of independent and ad-hoc examples of this and I've seen it work well, but it's not always systematic and therefore, opportunities are missed and efforts sometimes overlap and/or conflict with each other.

RaymondMillen
04-01-2008, 12:57 PM
Great and insightful COIN TTPs. You may consider a section addressing how the platoon's actions link with the company and battalion effort; basically some basic insights from one platoon leader to another.

Because battalions and below engage the local community, the ultimate objective is to have the local police assume the security burden. Some manpower (a four-man cadre at the police station) can be devoted to developing the police not only with basic military skills, but also instilling a sense of discipline and values. Most cultures have a basis of values, mostly engendered by the Ten Commandments, so the local police need to be reminded of their importance to the authorities.

The cadres can identify those individuals with leadership potential to attend formal training at the Regional Training Center in order to assume leadership positions upon return. Selecting the next generation of leaders is a subtle process because the local power brokers (police chiefs, mayors, etc.) rely on patronage to secure their position. So, the cadre leader or higher leader has to find ways to have them buy off on selected personell without arousing suspicion.

Because the goal of both the insurgents and counterinsurgents is to gain control of the population, the counterinsurgents must exercise appropriate measures to gain the upper hand. Curfews, census taking, police foot patrols, daily interaction with the people are the initial step. The police should establish a neighborhood watch, cultivate informants, and provide a means for people to report suspicious activites. Trinquier's gridding technique is an excellent way for organizing a neighborhood watch program. In this manner, the authorities can identify recent arrivals of new people into the community and investigate them. In the end, we want the populace to look to their police for security issues rather than the coalition.

Platoon leaders and company commanders can meet with the local authorities to discuss the one project the community needs. Don't ask them what they want because this will result in a litany of deficiencies that will far exceed the capabilities of the coalition. I call this the "one project at a time" approach. The next step, and most difficult, is finding an agency (NGO, UNAM, etc.) which will agree to the project. To make a lasting impact, the agency should provide the skills training, equipment, materials and salaries, while the local populace provides labor. In this manner, the people gain skill sets and pride in ownership. If insurgents destroy the project, they alienate the population automatically. It is also useful to bring in agencies to provide workshops on skills training (e.g., basic electrical, plumbing, mechanical maintenance, carpentry, etc.). In this manner, a local economy is created at minimum cost and the community experiences the benefits of the government. Creating prosperity from below is much better than attempting to create economic development from the national level and hoping it trickles down.

These are just a few thoughts helping the succession of platoon leaders see how their actions contribute to the higher COIN effort and provide continuity of effort from one rotation after another.

Cheers,
Ray Millen

William F. Owen
04-01-2008, 03:39 PM
No problem, simply plan it as if you were conducting a raid. Have a planned infil and exfil route. Have an overwatch position. Have the big guns on your vehicles lock down the high-speed avenues of approach. And have a time limit. At that point you have pretty much done everything you can at the platoon level to secure yourself. You now have some relative freedom to have a squad with the PL and interpreter walk into the market and gain some intel and build rapport with the locals. Use your interpreter while a few soldiers buy cigarettes and Pepsi. To the locals it just looks like you parked your vehicles and jumped out to talk, but you have the whole street locked down. The same actions should be taken when searching a house, stopping by the police station, or enjoying a cup of chai with the local sheik.

I have to congratulate the author on this. This is excellent abstracted tactical doctrine or "patrol based thinking." It's a raid! - or - It's an ambush! It's all very, very simple. Balance security against the activity, and match the process to the desired outcome. Good stuff!

Ken White
04-01-2008, 03:50 PM
I have to congratulate the author on this. This is excellent abstracted tactical doctrine or "patrol based thinking." It's a raid! - or - It's an ambush! It's all very, very simple. Balance security against the activity, and match the process to the desired outcome. Good stuff!

However, I'd suggest that it is also an application of plain old common sense and basic tactical thinking -- in other words, what you highlight that he's suggesting is basic -- and we Americans do not do the basics well because we have to learn on the job after the war starts and as we go instead of being trained in them upon entry.

That technique should be so ingrained that it would not merit mention. Lick on us that it does merit saying...

Good for him for saying it.

marct
04-01-2008, 06:34 PM
One really nice point hat I would like to see extended is

. Get together once a week and have an informal discussion on what you read. The goal is to come together on a Company COIN strategy.
While it was meant for a pre-deployment setting, I would try and keep it going after deployment. Basically, it would shift from a strategy planning event to a strategy monitoring event - a "sense-making" activity as it were. I'm not sure how feasible this would be, but I would strongly suggest that such a weekly group (or groups) contain a cross-section from all ranks.

Nice paper :D.

Ken White
04-01-2008, 07:22 PM
to my comment above -- hopefully, everyone knows to do this without any training... :confused:

Cpt C
04-01-2008, 08:37 PM
but that is not reality. thus, the existence of this paper...

Ken White
04-01-2008, 08:53 PM
about that failure for over 50 years to anyone who would listen and a lot who didn't want to listen -- and I've been doing so on this board for a year.

It is pathetic that we do not teach the basics to new entrants, officer and enlisted -- it is even more pathetic that five years after we went into Iraq the Army still isn't teaching the basics. Isn't pathetic, it's criminal.

The paper is a good effort -- regrettably, it doesn't address the broader problem which is way above both our pay grades.

Pardon the venom but you hit a long standing sore spot. I've seen way too many bodies caused by massive stupidity in high places and failure to properly train people when they enter is a pet rock of mine. You also obviously missed my comment above that the fact we do not train well is a lick on us...

If you're talking about having Platoon get togethers fairly frequently to just talk about what's going on -- that shouldn't need to be trained...

SWJED
04-02-2008, 08:23 AM
... on the Council. Thanks for posting your COIN Cliff Notes CPT C. Downloaded for a read today. I'd be interested in publishing the final version on the Small Wars Journal.

Welcome aboard!

Dave

Cpt C
04-02-2008, 05:55 PM
I just want to say thanks to all of the feedback so far- good and bad. You guys are helping me put together a decent product. Please keep the comments coming.
Craig

Ken White
04-02-2008, 06:14 PM
Welcome Aboard.

I'll also reiterate Cav Guy's suggestion that you go to the "Tell us about you #2" last page (LINK) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=43804#post43804) and join the crowd. Can't tell the players without a program... ;)

Mark O'Neill
04-02-2008, 08:24 PM
CPT C,

I think it is good thing when people think enough about things, and feel passionate enough about it, to get up and do something about it.

Whilst not intending to be negative towards the industry and application you have displayed, I am not sure that a lot of the material you detail is not just 'sound' small unit TTP rather than specifically 'COIN' material. ( I guess this is similar to the view offered earlier by Ken).

Whilst there is a need for such material, I am relatively confident that most of it must be being taught somewhere, as it is currently practised in theatre. The US infantry units I have spent time with all appear to practise this stuff to varying degrees. Some of them are very, very good at it.

I know for a fact that material much like this has been 'rote' in the Australian Army since before Vietnam -it was taught for many years from the 1960s at the Battle Wing in Canungra.

Are you aware that the COIN CFE had / has a COIN Handbook for junior leaders that was given out for a few years?

It was put together by an Aussie SF SNCO and a few US Navy Seals with some supervision at the end by an Officer on staff who had been involved in FM 3-24. It even evolved into a second edition. Whilst not 'perfect' it was more than adequate, and I beleive in parts quite good considering the speed in which it was drafted and created in theatre.

If you PM me and provide a .mil address I will see if I can find a .pdf or other form of e-copy to send to you.

Issue of the handbook was suspended in late 07 in anticipation of a replacement item being issued in CONUS. (It did take a fair bit of effort to keep it current and publish it - the CFE is not assigned personnel or resourced for a doctrine writing task).

I recently became aware that the issue of an handbook in CONUS still has not occurred (Cav Guy might know more about when this will actually happen).

Cheers,

Mark

Cpt C
04-02-2008, 09:51 PM
Mark,
No, I was not aware that ther was a handbook. As far as specific COIN training, most units are left to do it on their own (army units are currently spending about a year at home between deployments). The only place that I am aware of that is consistently teaching COIN to the conventional army is the COIN academy in Iraq. Most company commanders go to this course when they first arrive in theater. COIN is also breifly touched on in other army schools, but not so much as to have a definitive impact on the conventional army as a whole. We are working to change that here at Fort Benning and are making some headway.
However, as you mentioned, there are many handbooks and tools out there for units to refer to. The problem is working that training into a conventional unit's training cycle between deployments. There is so much to do in so little time that it is difficult to implement it at the large level (and, unfortunately, many units do not do it out of laziness). So when this training does occur, it is often at the battalion or company level, and some companies are better than others.
You mention that some of what I refer to is just regular infantry tactics. Yes, I did get a little off track into counter-guerilla tactics and I plan to re-write and clarify that distinction. However, I mostly just identified and described the regular infantry tactics necessary to implement a greater COIN strategy. I know that a lot of this knowledge is already out there, but the point of my paper is more to give focus and guidance to small-unit leaders in iraq, not completely re-train them. Someone else had similar comments that "you shouldn't have to train that stuff." Well, we do. I just returned from a 15-month deployment where I served as a rifle platoon leader and recon PL and bounced all around the map and worked with just about every different type of organization in theater. I can tell you first hand that MOST CONVENTIONAL UNITS ARE NOT EVEN TRYING TO FIGHT COIN. The U.S. Army is an extremely massive organization and not everyone is a John Rambo. Not everyone is on forums in their spare time trying to learn more about COIN. Most people in the CONVENTIONAL army are just there for a pay check, have a wife and kids at home, and will do as little as possible in a combat zone. COIN is difficult. COIN puts soldiers out in the open, exposed to the enemy. So many units aren't doing it. In fact, many are doing what I call "patrolling to survive," which i can get into with you off line. Additionally, it is not what young bubbas signed up to do. They signed up to kick in doors and shoot people (which, admittedly, I totally identify with). That is what the U.S. army is trained to do (and is very very good at). It is in our blood, so that is what we do in theater.
I don't mean to be bashing my organization, but we have to be honest with ourselves. This is reality. Our army is doing great things to change our mindset and embrace the COIN fight. All units do cultural awareness training, which is a great start. COIN is slowly trickling through our ranks, but it will take time to change as a whole.
I know what an infantry platoon trains on. I what how what life is like in Iraq right now. I know how short their attention span is. I know how many other things they have on their mind besides learning COIN. So I wrote this paper for them. It's my way of saying "hey, you don't need to completely retrain to win this fight. Let's just refocus a little bit. These techniques will support your unit's COIN strategy and will get us out of the desert faster." It's not a complete lesson on COIN- smarter men than me have already done that. But this is something that you might actually get everyone in an infantry platoon to read, without all the fluff that they really don't need to know anyway (or care to know, honestly). Just what they need to know to roll out the wire and complete the mission (which is why I call it the "cliff notes"). The higher-level commanders will work the larger strategy piece. Again, this is not the ideal solution, but this is reality.
I hope that helps. If I am not conveying that in my paper, please let me know. I really appreciate your comments. They are making me think deeper about where this paper should go. Please keep the comments coming.
Craig

Ken White
04-02-2008, 10:54 PM
""hopefully, everyone knows to do this without any training... "" Let me clarify that the comment referred specifically and only to Marc T's comment about the advisability of having routine Platoon confabs; simply getting the joes together and everybody talks about what's happening...

It did not apply to training or to your very good paper.

With respect to the tactical stuff, I said that what Raymond Millen said concerning TTP is in fact basic infantry / maneuver unit tactics and should be taught, adding; "''in other words, what you highlight that he's suggesting is basic -- and we Americans do not do the basics well because we have to learn on the job after the war starts and as we go instead of being trained in them upon entry.""

IOW, I agree with you that we do not train it in the institution, at both officer and enlisted entry training -- and we should. I can totally understand the thrust of your comments just above and can empathize -- but I do know some units, as Mark O'Neill said, do train themselves and do a very good job. That comes down to the personality and the desires of commanders and there are indeed too many who do not want to do the COIN thing at all.

Keep on pushing.

walrus
04-02-2008, 11:29 PM
Mark posted:


I know for a fact that material much like this has been 'rote' in the Australian Army since before Vietnam -it was taught for many years from the 1960s at the Battle Wing in Canungra.

Cpt C,

I just found my little "Notes for Students" from JTC Battle Wing days. It starts with "You cannot go into action with an open book in your hands" and that sets the tone of the remainder. The rest of my Canungra notes would have been pulped years ago.

I'm not sure its much help, being a little "jungle" oriented, and there is no legal way I can release it. So what I'll do is read what I have in conjunction with your paper and I'll see if there is any constructive comment I can make as a result.

Cavguy
04-03-2008, 02:30 AM
Whilst not intending to be negative towards the industry and application you have displayed, I am not sure that a lot of the material you detail is not just 'sound' small unit TTP rather than specifically 'COIN' material. ( I guess this is similar to the view offered earlier by Ken).

:) I told him the same before he came and posted here. Even the TTP is useful - but he reflects a lot of what I see everyday - officers (at all grades) don't generally understand the difference between counter-guerrilla and counter-insurgency. I hear C-IED, SKT, C-Sniper, E2S, etc. described as "COIN" all the time. Houston, we have an education problem. :(


Whilst there is a need for such material, I am relatively confident that most of it must be being taught somewhere, as it is currently practised in theatre. The US infantry units I have spent time with all appear to practise this stuff to varying degrees. Some of them are very, very good at it.

Varies by unit, but it's amazing what fear of death will do. The gap he's addressing is in "published" material. Very little of what he is writing is actually on paper.


I know for a fact that material much like this has been 'rote' in the Australian Army since before Vietnam -it was taught for many years from the 1960s at the Battle Wing in Canungra.

I think there's a value in it getting "re-written" from time to time for the masses. Soldiers are generally anti-intellectual, anti-non-US generated doctrine, and anti-any war older than they are when seeking advice. Even if it's "everything old is new", it has tremendous credibility coming from the current generation rather than an old or foreign source. You wouldn't believe the problems I have getting people to read Bernard Fall, Trinquier, and Galula just because they're French, and all the bias against the French military learning. So even if it's been out before, it's valuable to hear it from a contemporary context. And amazing how the lessons are so similar ....

I'm not saying that's right, it's just how it is.


Are you aware that the COIN CFE had / has a COIN Handbook for junior leaders that was given out for a few years?

Whilst not 'perfect' it was more than adequate, and I beleive in parts quite good considering the speed in which it was drafted and created in theatre.

...

I recently became aware that the issue of an handbook in CONUS still has not occurred (Cav Guy might know more about when this will actually happen).

Well, it's been an adventure. Send me the old one via my email on coin.army.mil. Focus has been shifted off of a handbook and more onto a FM 3-24.2, Tactics in counterinsurgency. Handbooks are good, but the schoolhouse needs doctrine to teach off of, and to begin DOTMLPF funding for the issues - can't do that with a handbook.

That said, look for some of it to be out soon in 'handbook' format.

Ken White
04-03-2008, 03:08 AM
...Focus has been shifted off of a handbook and more onto a FM 3-24.2, Tactics in counterinsurgency. Handbooks are good, but the schoolhouse needs doctrine to teach off of, and to begin DOTMLPF funding for the issues - can't do that with a handbook.

That said, look for some of it to be out soon in 'handbook' format.in front of the horse... Still.

I know, I know. Yeah, that's the way the process works -- still backwards; if the troops could use it to good effect, that ought to be the priority. Bureaucracy...

Sigh. :(

Cavguy
04-03-2008, 03:43 AM
in front of the horse... Still.

I know, I know. Yeah, that's the way the process works -- still backwards; if the troops could use it to good effect, that ought to be the priority. Bureaucracy...

Sigh. :(

I wouldn't quite go that far. The idea is that there are plenty of TTP manuals from CALL out there, (and there's lots) and enough COIN articles and ideas. In fact, the major issue is there are too many handbooks and TTP's, often conflicting. What is now needed is to 'codify' what is going to be the Army answer for tactical application of COIN principles, and settle some of the debates going on.

Ken White
04-03-2008, 04:52 AM
I wouldn't quite go that far. The idea is that there are plenty of TTP manuals from CALL out there, (and there's lots) and enough COIN articles and ideas. In fact, the major issue is there are too many handbooks and TTP's, often conflicting. What is now needed is to 'codify' what is going to be the Army answer for tactical application of COIN principles, and settle some of the debates going on.unless things have changed radically, the dissemination is spotty. Hopefully, that has changed...

Divisions and Schools do their own thing focusing on their experience and AO in the case of Divs, area of expertise for the Schools. Then the Theater tries to standardize a bit. Both of 'em...

Getting everyone on one sheet of music has never been easy; communities vary in their interests and approaches. It generally gets worked out even if it is too often not very timely.

The lack of standardization is a problem in a sense; it's also an advantage in a sense as competing ideas aren't all bad and can be advantageous -- in the end, it boils down to what works for the unit where they are when they're there and no book is ever going to cover all that. Still, the basics are what's important and they don't change much...

An even better idea than a handbook would be to train people a little better (Sorry, the debbil made me do it... :D).

Jason Pape
04-03-2008, 12:44 PM
Mark -

I wish you were right about this stuff being common knowledge. You SHOULD be right. But the sad fact is, as Craig explained...too many "leaders" (at all echelons) in our Army still do not practice, let alone understand COIN. What Craig is doing here is needed at all levels, despite all that has already been written on the subject of COIN. You'll note above that I ran into the same frustration at the field-grade level. And like Craig, I decided to sit down and just start brainstorming all the things "we" take for granted as common-knowledge at this point...but from the brigade perspective. We really do need to figure out a way to translate FM 3-24, etc. into TTPs and approaches that more people can get their minds around (ideally with real-life evidence as "proof" that it actually works). Otherwise, we'll lose the nay-sayers completely.


Craig -

Coincidently, I recently came across this (links below) AAR from a Rifle Co Cdr in OIF 06-08 that complements your piece quite well. It's one of the best company-level COIN documents I've seen lately...worth taking a look at as you continue to refine your piece. Don't lose heart. We need to be having the same kind of conversation you're writing about at all levels - particulary company/platoon & brigade/battalion - and it wouldn't it be great if we could somehow get the ideas nested and?

Keep doing what you're doing...it's great work - and needed! It's amazing how many people still don't believe it's possible (or right) for our Soldiers to do this stuff. Most people here are believers (hence the "so what?")...hopefully we can use their collective knowledge and constructive criticism to strengthen our message and spread the word.


Walrus -

You'll enjoy this document, as it provides evidence to some of the things you mentioned you'd like to know are happening...

Link 1 (https://forums.bcks.army.mil/secure/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=536480)

Link 2 (https://cp.army.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=69080)

jcustis
04-03-2008, 01:18 PM
Keep doing what you're doing...it's great work - and needed! It's amazing how many people still don't believe it's possible (or right) for our Soldiers to do this stuff. Most people here are believers (hence the "so what?")...hopefully we can use their collective knowledge and constructive criticism to strengthen our message and spread the word.

Yeppers, this is good stuff and important work, no matter how you look at it. I'm kind of gruffy like Ken White that if you sit back and look at these things, many of them are basics that sadly have to be learned over and over, or forged new outright, because we just don't work the basics well.

I remember in the Infantry Officer Course that the instructor staff put out this bound reader of sorts, with articles from all over the place that spoke to the business of being a good platoon commander. In this day and age of .pdfs and point papers, does anyone know of a good COIN reader that encompases these AARs, TTPs, smart cards, etc. and is current as of say 12 months ago? There are some good handbooks, but the ones like the SOSO handbook I can recall from 4 years ago is woefully out of date when it comes to many of the non-kinetic issues.

Tom Odom
04-03-2008, 01:34 PM
Yeppers, this is good stuff and important work, no matter how you look at it. I'm kind of gruffy like Ken White that if you sit back and look at these things, many of them are basics that sadly have to be learned over and over, or forged new outright, because we just don't work the basics well.

I remember in the Infantry Officer Course that the instructor staff put out this bound reader of sorts, with articles from all over the place that spoke to the business of being a good platoon commander. In this day and age of .pdfs and point papers, does anyone know of a good COIN reader that encompases these AARs, TTPs, smart cards, etc. and is current as of say 12 months ago? There are some good handbooks, but the ones like the SOSO handbook I can recall from 4 years ago is woefully out of date when it comes to many of the non-kinetic issues.

Yes there is. Look at the latest issue of the USMC Lessons Learned Center Newsletter (March)for information on the Company-level SOSO series originated at JRTC. Now at 7 volumes, all published since 2005. Includes information from SWJ members.

Also look at the Southern Afghanistan COIN Handbook still in use in theater and cited as part of the USMC LLs report on USMC Operations in Afghanistan.

Then regarding non-kinetic issues (aside from how they are discussed in the above citations) look at the planning studies cite on here as part of the recent thread on EBO.

Finally as advisory hopefully looked on as integral to COIN look at the advisor team newsletter with again great input from SWJ.

Bottom line: the information is out there. If there is a problem, it deals more with sorting through it all.

Tom

Ken White
04-03-2008, 03:11 PM
...Bottom line: the information is out there. If there is a problem, it deals more with sorting through it all.
Tomthat and getting the document / info to the right place at the right time. I saw some really neat and very helpful stuff about fighting in Viet Nam, published in late 1965. Would've been great stuff to know; wish I'd run across it before 1972.

Not trying to attack CALL or anyone else in the documenting and informing business. They all do a vary valuable job. All the services mean well and spend big bucks trying to do that -- but the info generally doesn't get where it should in a timely manner and our use of short tours and the rapid rotation between tours is not helpful in that regard. I base that comment not only on my long bygone experience but in talking to people who are out in the field today. Distribution may be better than it was in my day but the spear chunkers tell me they rarely get it in a timely manner.

Nor does the great work by the documenters excuse the fact that we do not train the basics at all well...

Tom Odom
04-03-2008, 03:59 PM
that and getting the document / info to the right place at the right time. I saw some really neat and very helpful stuff about fighting in Viet Nam, published in late 1965. Would've been great stuff to know; wish I'd run across it before 1972.

Not trying to attack CALL or anyone else in the documenting and informing business. They all do a vary valuable job. All the services mean well and spend big bucks trying to do that -- but the info generally doesn't get where it should in a timely manner and our use of short tours and the rapid rotation between tours is not helpful in that regard. I base that comment not only on my long bygone experience but in talking to people who are out in the field today. Distribution may be better than it was in my day but the spear chunkers tell me they rarely get it in a timely manner.

Nor does the great work by the documenters excuse the fact that we do not train the basics at all well...

Understand, and no, I don't see it as an attack at all. CALL has expanded itself dramatically in just the past few years. Much of that has been to address the issues you point to, and no, we don't have it solved either. But in this realm the internet and automation has done much that was simply not possible in 1972. SIPR and NIPR allow near instantaneous connection with both theaters and I will say those connections are very active.

My bottom line on all of this is that like all things military it goes back to leadership. that is to say continued Army level leadership emphasis on improving the sharing of knowledge and leadership that starts with team leaders and goes up, emphasizing seeking out that information.

Best

Tom

Ron Humphrey
04-03-2008, 04:02 PM
Yes there is. Look at the latest issue of the USMC Lessons Learned Center Newsletter (March)for information on the Company-level SOSO series originated at JRTC. Now at 7 volumes, all published since 2005. Includes information from SWJ members.

Also look at the Southern Afghanistan COIN Handbook still in use in theater and cited as part of the USMC LLs report on USMC Operations in Afghanistan.

Then regarding non-kinetic issues (aside from how they are discussed in the above citations) look at the planning studies cite on here as part of the recent thread on EBO.

Finally as advisory hopefully looked on as integral to COIN look at the advisor team newsletter with again great input from SWJ.

Bottom line: the information is out there. If there is a problem, it deals more with sorting through it all.

Tom

Some very good stuff there

Ken White
04-03-2008, 04:33 PM
...My bottom line on all of this is that like all things military it goes back to leadership. that is to say continued Army level leadership emphasis on improving the sharing of knowledge and leadership that starts with team leaders and goes up, emphasizing seeking out that information.

Best

TomSo you said it far better than I did. And you did state the absolute truth and the reason for dissemination failures. Too many in the Army forget that, from Corporal up, EVERYBODY is a trainer, all the time, in combat and out. Show me a unit that doesn't perform well and I'll show you one where the emphasis on training all day every day has been allowed to be overcome by alligators...

Good job.

Cavguy
04-03-2008, 05:38 PM
that and getting the document / info to the right place at the right time. I saw some really neat and very helpful stuff about fighting in Viet Nam, published in late 1965. Would've been great stuff to know; wish I'd run across it before 1972.

I base that comment not only on my long bygone experience but in talking to people who are out in the field today. Distribution may be better than it was in my day but the spear chunkers tell me they rarely get it in a timely manner.


Going to disagree some with you here Ken. If the soldier is interested, he only has to take 1 or 2 steps to find what he's looking for.

If said soldier wants info on COIN, he doesn't have to look far to get to:

COIN.ARMY.MIL (http://coin.army.mil) - lists top reads, classes, links to other forums (including here)
BCKS COIN FORUM (https://forums.bcks.army.mil/secure/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=62317) - Where he can ask FOUO level questions and share (also related to 30+ professional forums on company command (https://cp.army.mil), MI, S3/XO, NCO Net, etc)
Small Wars Journal - 'nuff said we link to the SWJ library from COIN.ARMY.MIL
CALL (http://call.army.mil) - Not always the easiest to search, but tons of info on EVERYTHING.

CALL now has a POC in EVERY installation whose sole job is to find information at the request of users in CALL's database. It's the COIN L2I program. Soldier can say "I want everything on Detainee ops for a PLT" and within 48 hours call will send it to them.

If the line isn't getting it in today's information environment, it isn't because the Army hasn't led the horse to the water.

The larger issue is one of willingness. I was a heavy user of Company Command and LOGNET forums. Both allowed me to tap into the expertise of peers and experts in fields. I was a much, much more effective commander because of Company Command. Want some creative ideas on rewarding soldiers? It's there. Want a good supply room SOP? It's there. Want creative ways to train house clearing training? it's there. Have a question? Your peers and those who have gone before will answer it in a few hours. I saved countless hours because I was willing to read and learn from those who have gone before.

However, out of 13 company commanders in my BCT, I was the only one active on that site. Whenever I found something good, I passed it on to my peers. But it just amazed me that they were unwilling to utilize a resource that would make them tremendously more effective at leading soldiers. The lick is on them, not the Army.

I did see a good idea from the Israeli army at a recent conference. They appointed a "KM" specialist additional duty in each PLT, whose job was to scour fourms and sites and bring the latest relevant info to the bosses.

Dissemination of good knowledge is also faster than ever. Let's take the CO CDR document Jason Pape linked above, which I think is the best current OIF AAR I've read at company level.

Three weeks ago - document posted on companycommand.mil
Yesterday@0830 - Jason sends me the document and asks if I have seen this
Yesterday@0845 - I finish reading it, and think it's outstanding. I get permission from the author to distribute widely in the .mil community.
Yesterday @0900-1100 - Forward to the CTC O/C teams, CALL, CALL L2I, COIN Road to War Orgs, post on COIN.ARMY.MIL AKO and SharePoint, post on BCKS COIN forum, highlight the document on company command, send to USMC IW Center and commander's courses, COIN CFE's, plus interested individuals.
Yesterday @1500 - Get word from Tom that the commander of JRTC has the document, who will soon be the commander of a very large US Army division. I also get forwarded the document from about 5 others asking the same question Jason did - "have you seen it?" Other BCKS forums cross-post the document.
Today @0800 - Document sent to CALL for publishing and immediate distro.

Talk about KM success! Thousands of accesses in just a few hours.

Your soldier now has access to it in any number of forums. Key people in many chains of command have the document for use. All he has to do is look. He's likely going to get a paper copy sent to his CO CP in a few weeks as well. His boss may force it on him through distro.

I just don't buy that motivated professionals can't find useful and relevant info today. If they're not getting it, it's because they're not making the effort. IMO. Effective range of that excuse is zero.

========

Onto FM versus handbook ....

The larger, and bigger question, is multiply the document above x100. Each places a slightly different flavor. One unit uses COIN COG, another TCAF, another Combat Analytics, another uses HTS, etc. Which is right? Which one is the "best" to use overall?

There is no answer on the street. FM 3-24 tells you how to think about it, and how to analyze it, but not how to do it tactically. We don't have any authoritative document saying "TCAF and COIN COG are the standard every soldier should be trained on". CCC, ANCOC, BOLIC, and other instructors can take TTP's and teach them, but there is no doctrine for them to reference regarding tools and systems for applying COIN doctrine. So Knox teaches X, Benning Y, etc. Afghanistan has a handbook. Iraq has a handbook. CALL has another handbook. 3ID has a handbook. All have slightly different approaches, some better than others. Many of the proponents of their individual systems (COIN Center is equally guilty here) claim the other systems are "insufficient" and "wrong". Joe is confused, so he does what makes sense to him, or does what he always does. But we lose synergy because everyone’s doing their own thing, and not everything is “right.”

That's the point from our earlier conversation - the current "gap" is for a FM. A non-theater specific set of guidelines/methods for tactical level application of COIN doctrine that everyone can/will impliment. To settle on a "least bad" solution. Just like all doctrine, it's a baseline for everyone, and no one is restricted from innovating or using another system. But it will standardize what is "the" way, like MDMP does, 5 paragraph OPORDs, IPB, etc, so we can communicate between units and branches effectively.

Niel

Ken White
04-03-2008, 07:01 PM
Going to disagree some with you here Ken. If the soldier is interested, he only has to take 1 or 2 steps to find what he's looking for.I do not doubt that; always been true. I can recall many years ago being hassled by most of my peers for visiting the Post Library about one a week -- and I wasn't looking for new fiction.
...CALL now has a POC in EVERY installation whose sole job is to find information at the request of users in CALL's database. It's the COIN L2I program. Soldier can say "I want everything on Detainee ops for a PLT" and within 48 hours call will send it to them.

If the line isn't getting it in today's information environment, it isn't because the Army hasn't led the horse to the water.

The larger issue is one of willingness. I was a heavy user of Company Command and LOGNET forums. Both allowed me to tap into the expertise of peers and experts in fields. I was a much, much more effective commander because of Company Command. Want some creative ideas on rewarding soldiers? It's there. Want a good supply room SOP? It's there. Want creative ways to train house clearing training? it's there. Have a question? Your peers and those who have gone before will answer it in a few hours. I saved countless hours because I was willing to read and learn from those who have gone before.

However, out of 13 company commanders in my BCT, I was the only one active on that site. Whenever I found something good, I passed it on to my peers. But it just amazed me that they were unwilling to utilize a resource that would make them tremendously more effective at leading soldiers. The lick is on them, not the Army.Good for CALL. I've never doubted the info is available, from what I hear, it still doesn't get there unless people work at it and I'm sure efforts to fix that are being made. That said, if it is available and unit doesn't have it, then it's the units fault. Basically, we are in total agreement on all this. That has long been the problem -- IMO, it goes back to selection and who gets promoted. One size does not fit all...

I'd also submit there is a significant training shortfall. We tell folks "You are responsible for your career." Ridiculous. What they should be told is that "You are responsible for the training and capability of your subordinates; screw it up and you're toast." I know a number of reasons we do not do that -- and I submit that if you're going to send people to combat; you have an obligation to do that which transcends all those valid sociological and political reasons to not do it.
I did see a good idea from the Israeli army at a recent conference. They appointed a "KM" specialist additional duty in each PLT, whose job was to scour fourms and sites and bring the latest relevant info to the bosses.That is a good idea but I was doing that forty plus years ago, that's no brag, I did it because my first PSG tabbed me to be the searcher 20 years earlier and I was far from alone, most good units back in my day did that. All of the change in the post Viet Nam Army was not the golden gift some make it out to be.
Dissemination of good knowledge is also faster than ever. Let's take the CO CDR document Jason Pape linked above, which I think is the best current OIF AAR I've read at company level...Talk about KM success! Thousands of accesses in just a few hours.Yes it is -- and a lot of Attaboys due all involved. We can be thankful there was not a loser or excessively bureaucratic stumbling block among those involved (and in fairness, there are far fewer of those about today than there were even five years ago -- ain't combat great? :D)
I just don't buy that motivated professionals can't find useful and relevant info today. If they're not getting it, it's because they're not making the effort. IMO. Effective range of that excuse is zero.While I agree, can I suggest an issue is what to do about those who do not make the effort? As you said above; one out of 13. As Martha Stewart would say "That is not a good thing."

No snark -- that has long been a serious problem -- the problem -- and my sensing is it is better than it was but still has a long way to go. The same problem exists with NCOs, about one out 10 or so really wants to be tactically and technically proficient above the level of survival and future promotion. That problem really needs to be fixed...
========

Onto FM versus handbook ....That's the point from our earlier conversation - the current "gap" is for a FM. A non-theater specific set of guidelines/methods for tactical level application of COIN doctrine that everyone can/will impliment. To settle on a "least bad" solution. Just like all doctrine, it's a baseline for everyone, and no one is restricted from innovating or using another system. But it will standardize what is "the" way, like MDMP does, 5 paragraph OPORDs, IPB, etc, so we can communicate between units and branches effectively.

NielTotally concur with all that and having done the doctrine and FM writing stint in my misspent youth am aware of the process (and its shortfalls) but my base point -- and I didn't say it well -- goes back to something I said here some months ago. I said handbook, bad shorthand on my part, I really meant a Co/By/Trp level FM. FM 3-24 is good, long overdue, needed etc. etc. -- but what about something Joe Team Leader can stick in his ACU pocket? We used to do the books by command echelon -- and we started at the bottom and worked up and much effort was concurrent in different departmens of the same school; now, it seems we start at the top and work down and we're far slower than we used to be (too many cooks?). The staff weenies (I used to one of those too :( ) and the POM should not be the priority, that should go to the guy on the ground.

And that's really all I meant.

Surferbeetle
04-03-2008, 07:07 PM
Cavguy,

Keep up the good work on this, COIN knowledge management is the better for your efforts.

An AKO wide webmail which summarized some of your key points (links, km available, projected date for the 3-24 ttp's, etc) in the last post aimed at E6+, WO1+, and O3+ types would generate ALOT of interest, conversation, and perhaps even change among us knuckledraggers...

marct
04-03-2008, 07:45 PM
I thought it was an interesting piece and worth looking at on the viewpoints of the ISAF. In particular, the point that caught my eye was


The trouble, the MPs said, is that the 37 countries contributing to NATO's International Security Assistance Force lack a "well defined strategic vision for its presence" in Afghanistan. While NATO troops performed "brilliantly at the tactical level, the alliance does not yet have a sufficiently explicit goal for what it wants to achieve".

Link here (http://www.google.ca/url?sa=t&ct=res&cd=5&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.cda-cdai.ca%2FCDA_Commentary%2FAfghanSit011007-1.pdf&ei=ujH1R678J4rkiAHaj_y3Ag&usg=AFQjCNHBPKVa_XhWS7OfnAFTeUOP4OaudA&sig2=-a8w2ritARIyFizOYfUxiw).

marct
04-03-2008, 07:50 PM
""hopefully, everyone knows to do this without any training... "" Let me clarify that the comment referred specifically and only to Marc T's comment about the advisability of having routine Platoon confabs; simply getting the joes together and everybody talks about what's happening...

That was certainly how I took it :D. I'll admit, I was taking it a touch beyond a "confab" and more into the real of "collective sensemaking" across the ranks with, possibly, a touch of the old Maoist "speaking anger" added in (forget the source, it's a great group dynamics method ;)).

I keep thinking back to the founding of the 1st Marine Raider BTN and its use of Maoist principles for organizational learning, adaptation and motivation. In the type of topsy-turvy "reality" (?) that is COIN, such principle can stand a group in good stead.

Ken White
04-03-2008, 08:51 PM
That was certainly how I took it :D. I'll admit, I was taking it a touch beyond a "confab" and more into the real of "collective sensemaking" across the ranks with, possibly, a touch of the old Maoist "speaking anger" added in (forget the source, it's a great group dynamics method ;)).The first few will be vague and general, specificity and openness come with repetition. Unless firm steps are taken to stop them, the kids will open up. Needless to say, they should not be so stopped but encouraged to speak up. Unless one is afraid of them... ;)
I keep thinking back to the founding of the 1st Marine Raider BTN and its use of Maoist principles for organizational learning, adaptation and motivation. In the type of topsy-turvy "reality" (?) that is COIN, such principle can stand a group in good stead.Mao may have been Carlson's source but the idea pre dates Mao. Ever been to a First Nations Band Council meeting? 'Speaking anger' -- but quietly... :wry:

marct
04-03-2008, 08:56 PM
The first few will be vague and general, specificity and openness come with repetition. Unless firm steps are taken to stop them, the kids will open up. Needless to say, they should not be so stopped but encouraged to speak up. Unless one is afraid of them... ;)

Too true :D! Still, setting up that type of organizational culture is, IMO, a very useful adjunct to the more technical TTPs in this type of fight. 'sides that, it gets back into the discussion-mentoring idea.


Mao may have been Carlson's source but the idea pre dates Mao. Ever been to a First Nations Band Council meeting? 'Speaking anger' -- but quietly... :wry:

LOLOL - I'll have to make a "no comment" statement on that one, since the answer is "yes". As a note, when I was growing up, my mother used to run Consciousness Raising groups in our living room - and people wonder why I started to read so much :rolleyes:.

Jason Pape
04-04-2008, 03:56 AM
Gentlemen -

Craig came to SWJ looking for some help. Remember who started this thread and why. Some constructive criticism, recommendations, or references toward his post if you will...

I'm new to SWJ as a poster, but have been an avid observer for some time. The reason I've hesitated to post in the past is because the discussions always seem to devolve into bouts of banter between council members. It's quite exclusionary to those who are not part of the "in crowd." Some of this could be done on email perhaps?

Let's not forget...Craig et al are the ones who are IN THIS FIGHT and they could use some help. While many on SWJ are past their fightin' years or simply commentating from the periphery, Craig and his peers are in the middle of it all - trying to sort things out. So rather than scoff at his misinterpretation of COIN, or joke about stuff written on the fringe before the young captain was even born, shouldn't we try to help the lad out?

I'm sorry if this comes across as curt, but with all the talk about mentoring and training (I would use the word educating)...I think we owe him better.

Surferbeetle
04-04-2008, 04:11 AM
I'm sorry if this comes across as curt, but with all the talk about mentoring and training (I would use the word educating)...I think we owe him better.

Jason,

Part of adapting to COIN is recognizing that the 'Burger King' mentality (in & out, with the burger and fixings of your choice in five minutes or less) does not apply. Many were the hours I spent over chai and cigarettes while we all figured out 'who was who' and what we would be able to agree upon before we even got to the point of discussing it...

If you are in a hurry check the sources Cavguy provided in this thread and do a search for the specific topics. You can also click on the poster's name here at the SWJ to review what topics they have commented on or search this site...there is enough info here to keep one busy for months, possibly years...

Regards,

Steve

Rank amateur
04-04-2008, 12:56 PM
It's quite exclusionary to those who are not part of the "in crowd."

As someone who is definitely not part of the "in crowd," I feel qualified to comment. When you post here about a subject, it is inevitable that someone will respond who has more knowledge, more expertise and and more experience than you. If you don't take their comment personally - if you don't feel like you've lost a debate - then there is to reason to feel like you're not welcome.

In my opinion, it is the most intelligent conversation on the internet and I've found the council to make remarkably open to diverse personalities and dissenting views.

SWJED
04-04-2008, 01:48 PM
There is neither an “in crowd” nor "out crowd" on the Council. This thread started as a very good discussion about a very promising paper submitted by a new Council member - let's get back on topic. Thanks.

marct
04-04-2008, 03:03 PM
This thread started as a very good discussion about a very promising paper submitted by a new Council member - let's get back on topic. Thanks.

Very good point! I think both Jason and Steve have highlighted an interesting problem that has a direct effect on smaller units.


I'm sorry if this comes across as curt, but with all the talk about mentoring and training (I would use the word educating)...I think we owe him better.


Part of adapting to COIN is recognizing that the 'Burger King' mentality (in & out, with the burger and fixings of your choice in five minutes or less) does not apply. Many were the hours I spent over chai and cigarettes while we all figured out 'who was who' and what we would be able to agree upon before we even got to the point of discussing it...

Let me start with Jason's comment and specifically draw out some of the differences between mentoring, training and education. The simplest differences are

Mentoring - a 1:1 relationship between a "master" and an "apprentice" or "journeyman" in a craft (or profession). Mentoring is a relationship that is ongoing and often breaches the formal boundaries of organizations (e.g. SNCOs often mentor junior officers). Possibly more important is that "mentoring" is a way of passing on craft "knowledge" (technically, in Victor Turner's terminology, "tribal gnosis") that pertains to how the craft operates, the history of the craft, and, most importantly, the perceptions that are important to survive and prosper in the craft. It tends to deal with the informal knowledge of the craft.
Training - this is a 1:many relationship where specific technical skills are passed on. Furthermore, these skills are limited to skills that have been worked out in extremely fine detail; they are almost "mechanistic" - think about learning the multiplication tables by rote as an example.
Education - ideally, education operates on a 1:few relationship and is designed to pass on the formal knowledge of a craft (or profession) and to certify that knowledge in some generally accepted form.Let me give an example of this. Training teaches you how to kick down doors and clear a building; education provides the framework for kicking down doors in general terms, and mentoring teaches you to recognize clues as to when kicking down doors in a specific situation is a good or bad idea.

Let me get back to the issue of sensemaking meetings both before deployment and post-deployment.

First off, one of the things that I think everyone can agree on is that no matter how well prepared you are for an event or mission, your preparation will be insufficient. Or, in other words, "no plan ever survives contact with the enemy" and "Sierra happens". When this happens, and it will as CPT C notes in his paper, how are you going to deal with it? This is a question of making sense of what is going on.

Now, if we are talking about a conventional engagement, that can be handled well enough by trained responses. Remember when I said that training was similar to rote learning? Well, what happens is that training, especially physical training, gets stuck in muscle memory and cannalizes parts of the brain, specifically neural circuity that identify sensory cues at a purely sub-conscious level and triggers of pre-programed ("trained") responses. This works pretty well in a conventional conflict and an open battlefield but, in many ways, is a disadvantage in a COIN fight where your opponent knows how you are trained. In effect, they can use your training against you by setting up events or situations that take advantage of that training to produce results that change other people's perceptions about you.

Okay, so let's shift over to education now. Most of CPT C's paper focuses on that - he is providing a private level context for the training they already have and in a language they will understand and be able to read quickly (unlike, say, FM 3-24). That is a laudable goal and I think he has done a really good job with it. But how does it / will it play out in theatre? As with any form of education, it is only an approximation (actually an abstraction) of reality. The answer is the same as with most systems of education - middlin' well. It is too intellectual, even when it isn't :wry:. Once your company is in theatre, they will inevitable run into something that will confuse them because it doesn't really fit into either the training or education (technically, this is called a "breach" or a "reality shock" in their phenomenology). What happens then?

Well, while a lot of people have studied this, I always liked Burkart Holzner' (http://www.amazon.com/Reality-Construction-Society-Burkart-Holzner/dp/B000OEDF0Y/ref=sr_1_4?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1207320037&sr=1-4)s version of the options (highly abstracted and paraphrased):

They may move into a dreamlike state where "reality" isn't "real";
their sense of reality may dissolve such that they deny sensory evidence;
their belief in all their education (actually model of reality) may collapse - in some cases they become fixated on specific events that have bypassed their neo-cortex and lodged in their limbic memory (shell shock or PTSD is an example of this). In extreme cases, they may go catatonic;
in order to avoid a mental collapse, they may fixate on some individual observation or belief to the point of neurosis; and,
in some cases, they may rapidly shift one construction of reality for another (think Damascus road conversion types).Now, pretty much every culture we (Anthropologists) have studied (that's about 5000+) recognizes this problem in one way or another and, surprise surprise, has come up with similar solutions; usually centering around some form of mentoring and often in some ritualized form (Charles Laughlin calls this the Shamanic Cycle or Cycle of Meaning (http://www.biogeneticstructuralism.com/docs/cycle.rtf)). This ritualized form almost always involves a "specialist" who either interprets or helps to interpret the experience of the individual for them. This is what Mao did with his "speaking anger", and it is really Mao's formulation of it that has been globalized even though, as Ken pointed out, he certainly didn't originate it.

Which, in my academic roundabout way, gets back to the whole point of CPT C's paper - living with COIN. Ongoing meetings that act as sense-making "rituals" and cross rank boundaries reduce the likelihood of reality shock while, at the same time, providing a safe space for mentoring to take place thereby increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of a company in achieving its mission. At the same time, they also increase the likelihood that individuals in the company stay sane (as well as alive!).

Marc

Jason Pape
04-04-2008, 05:20 PM
I do apologize for the tone of my previous post. My intent was not to correct anyone in particular, but to recommend a correction in our collective course to bring us back to the topic...a captain looking for feedback re: COIN. And he has received some terrific feedback thus far! But given the incredible talent in this forum, he could get more.

I've attached a small document with some thoughts on this, so that I don't take up any more space on this thread with my tangent. This is not meant personally...just something to consider.

Afterall, SWJ is about

the exchange of information among practitioners, thought leaders, and students of Small Wars, in order to advance knowledge and capabilities in the field. We hope this, in turn, advances the practice and effectiveness of those forces prosecuting Small Wars.

Now..I'm going to go back and read Cpt C's piece again and see if I can contribute anything else.

Jason Pape
04-04-2008, 06:08 PM
BOG - avoid absolutes. I (think I) know what you're trying to get at, and I'm often concerned we're not "on the ground" enough - especially w/ MRAPs, etc. But remember...you're encouraging a discussion here - not making rules. There are some missions (even within the larger COIN framework) that do not require you to be "on foot."

Language - check out http://www.tacticallanguage.com/ in addition to LingNet. If you have a boss who tells you to use Rosetta Stone...fight it. You need to know how to converse, not speak words, in IRAQI (not Arabic).

AO Expert - also discuss how you're going to continuously consolidate all of that information (including how you're going to get at the tacit knowledge your Soldiers don't even realize they've developed) so that it doesn't leave theater with you. Too often, we wait until to the end-of-tour to try and put it all together for the relief; it's almost always just a collection of data. Try to create a "Matrix-type download of what WE know about the AO" that remains with the unit after you leave and allows them to continue to explore and update as they go.
Here's an example I had all the way back in OIF I (condensed for space & to get rid of classified stuff, but gives you the idea; haven't de-clasified my newer one):
https://www.us.army.mil/suite/folder/7430604
(AKO login required)

Time Limits - again, avoid rules. Having a "time limit" is almost as bad as doing patrols for a specified time. Rather - THINK about time. eg. IF we are on-site for more than X minutes, we should do Y IOT mediate risk. Sometimes it takes longer than X to do what you need to do. Things like cache hunting and destruction take a long time! My scouts were typically "in sector" for 72-96 hours at a time. It's good that you talk about patterns and "schedules"...talk about those more!

Finally...another piece worth discussing at the platoon level: an article called "Operations David & Goliath" starting on page 9 of this link (http://www.skilluminati.com/docs/4GW_FMFM1A.pdf). It's certainly not the answer...it's simply something to have a discussion over.

Hope this helps...

Jason Pape
04-04-2008, 07:41 PM
Craig -

One other thing came to mind...something worth talking about at the platoon level: FORCE PROTECTION.

My concern is that some young leaders in today's environment might believe their primary goal is to protect their Soldiers even more than it is to accomplish their mission. ie. I worry that we are placing force protection above mission accomplishment. While they are not mutually exclusive, you cannot always have both.

As an example, and perhaps as a tangent - I worry about the politicization of the MRAP fielding in Iraq. I worry even more about people who implicitly support the "more protection is better" argument. I'm an Armor Officer, and I love the Abrams MBT, but I did everything I could to stay off off tanks in Iraq. When I was almost blown up by a massive IED and my commander tried to get me back on "track," I refused because it would not allow me to do what I needed to do in COIN. I worry about reinforcing a "commute to work" mentality with the MRAP, etc. and wonder whether more (as in Frag Kit 6 & gunner's 'cloches') is really better, or if force protection might become such a concern that it is a detriment to successful COIN Ops.

I think we need to have candid conversations with our junior leaders about how accepting risk, or better - mitigating risk in a deliberate manner, rather than risk-avoidance is the right mentality. Even deeper...the discussion that MAYBE, by taking greater risk now (ie. staying closer to the ground rather than climbing onto MRAP elephants) we might be negating risks to come...

To me (Armor-Cav guy), moving dismounted is A technique with several advantages but also very limited (in speed, distance and support). The MRAP, to me, represents the latest chapter in a vicious cycle of pursuing protection rather than fighting smarter, harder, and LIGHTER. Previous chapters in the protection novel included Frag Kit 6 and gunner's 'cloches' (see Maginot Line for illustration) on M1114s...both responses to an enemy TTP that, in my mind, don't make enough of a difference to justify the drawbacks (weight, obscuration, etc.)

I'm a huge fan of the M1114. But not what I see now. You might as well put the gunner inside with the rest of the crew, or go with the MRAP. But most people seem very satisfied with more armor, more stuff on the cupola, and heck...even a new vehicle altogether...the MRAP. But 1. how many lives will it save? 2. How much will it hamper our agility, ability, and mentality to get at COIN the right way?

I'm still not getting to my point. Let me try it this way...
1. More is not always better! More armor (usually) = more weight = less mobility and less agility. And if it doesn't REALLY mean better protection (if a catastrophic IED is still a catastrophic IED) then it isn't worth the baggage.
2. More protection (often) encourages less thinking. I've personally seen units (leaders) lulled into thinking their C-IED or armor package "protect" them like a magical cloak, thus forgetting about patterns, CREW fratricide, etc. There are some places we MUST go REPEATEDLY and REGULARLY...we need CREW, armor, and deliberate clearance techniques to do that. But we should not adopt that mentality for ALL operations.
3. In the end, we are part of a profession that requires us to be prepared to take casualties. We owe all that we have to protecting our Soldiers and setting them up for success. But we cannot forsake mission accomplishment for protection. Sometimes...SOMETIMES...taking risks, and taking causalities as a result of these risks, means more Soldiers are saved in the long-run due to mission accomplishment. This is the hard-smart-counterintuitive discussion I'm most eager to have with junior leaders. So...instead of providing more protection that allows us to do routine missions and get the most guys back for refit & Cinnabon...we need to be willing to go light, stay out longer, and take reasonable risks that make us more effective. Ironically, if our #1 concern is saving Soldiers lives, I worry that we will lose more Soldiers in the long run...

Ron Humphrey
04-04-2008, 07:56 PM
know into context when describing it to others. Thats part of what SWJ gives is a way in which varying experiences and knowledge from others comes together in a picture which kinda makes sense.

Thanks for your efforts.

This kinda reminds me of a discussion I was in where the best I could do to describe what your speaking of was the following.


If the population in your AO do not feel secure than you the counter insurgent aren't secure no matter how much armor you wrap around yourself.

It ain't perfect but I think it reflects some of what Galula, Kilcullen, and others have stated. And you having lived it can represent the validity of it by simply sharing your experience.

Ken White
04-04-2008, 09:15 PM
Though I have to say your last three paragraphs above are, IMO, particularly good and very much correct.

William F. Owen
04-05-2008, 06:45 AM
Craig -

One other thing came to mind...something worth talking about at the platoon level: FORCE PROTECTION.

My concern is that some young leaders in today's environment might believe their primary goal is to protect their Soldiers even more than it is to accomplish their mission. ie. I worry that we are placing force protection above mission accomplishment. While they are not mutually exclusive, you cannot always have both.


The term and concept of "Force Protection" is UK in origin. Anyone who reads Leonhard will know that you balance security against activity, so the ultimate logic of force protection is to nothing other than protect the force.

Thus - their primary goal is to protect their Soldiers even more than it is to accomplish their mission.

IMO the concept of Force Protection verges on silliness, (like IPB) if explicit in nature, rather than implicit. It's a statement of the obvious (like hearts and minds) which has taken on a life of it's own.

The primary means of creating force protection is to defeat the enemies core functions. (This has recently become the "onion layers of defence" which is entirely passive and thus not useful) - the best force protection is to the defeat/suppress/exhaust the enemy. It is the heart of the so-called COIN mission.

Cpt C
04-06-2008, 04:00 AM
Jason and Will,

Thank you for your comments. i wasn't going to spill over into this subject in detail, but you both mentioned something that is a very important issue to me. I briefly mentioned in an earlier post "patrolling to survive." This is what I use to refer to the techniques that many units are currently using in Iraq. Basically, it consists of "buttoning up" in your brad/hmmwv/tank/etc, doing a few laps through the major roads in your AO, and calling that your patrol. And I'm not talking out of my ass here- I could write an alarming long list of battalions that i personally witnessed doing this when I was in iraq (just a few short months ago). This technique is used by units who don't necessarily want to get into any real #### and just want to get home (not that you can really blame anyone for that). However, this technique is flawed in that the exact opposite occurs. It allows the enemy safe haven to build his engagement areas, coerce the populace, and study and patternize the counterinsurgent. And then all of a sudden that unit will realize that their AO has gone to #### and they are having mass-casualty engagements because of it. And so will everyone else who has to travel through that AO to get to somewhere else (I was often that guy).
Too much emphasis on Force Protenction can encourage "patrolling to survive." And sometimes at no fault of the soldier; too much armor and weight can make it almost imposssible to patrol on foot and engage the populace in the middle of an iraqi summer. The american public doesn't want to see american casualties, so they hammer politicians to give us more armor, who in turn hammer the army to give us more armor, who do, and then eventually the soldier is so overburdened that he cannot perform his infantry (or other) tasks. it is a vicious and unfortuante cycle. But we also do it to ourselves. I have seen units affix bullet-proof glass to their vehicles that completely surrounds the soldier in the hatch (without even a gun port). This is claimed to be a Force Protection measure, but it completely prevents the soldier in the hatch from returning fire. I can't even begin to count how many times I had to return fire from the hatch of my stryker and I can't imagine what it would be like if i wasn't able to do so. A Force Pro measure such as this is going too far and stifles not only the ability of the soldier but also the warrior ethos within that soldier. It is a careful balance that leaders must figure out, regardless of which vehicle platform they have.

I guess the message that I want to get out to people is that sometimes the best Force Protection measure is actually to sacrifice some Force Protection in order go get into the populace and eradicate the enemy. Instead of just focussing on protecting yourself from that IED blast, stop it from ever occuring in the first place. That is how you will win the fight.

Craig

jcustis
04-10-2008, 01:24 PM
Craig,

I have read this piece at least five times to digest it further, and it is still good stuff. Like the AAR linked in to this thread, and along with the 28 Articles, your stuff is going into a binder that I will carry forward in a few months. You guys are on the right track, believe me. I thought I was a well-trained, experienced, and well-read officer who "gets it," but everytime I come here I realize that what I really know is between jack and ####.

Still, I have a few points that I hope will strengthen this:

-If we intend for a document to truly reach the masses, we have to remember the intended audience. In your third paragraph, you mention that the company's officers should read the Twenty-Eight Articles. Why just the officers? I know the point you are trying to make, but remember the intended audience. The amazing thing about COIN is that we must remember that just because you are a combat arms guy, you don't hold a monopoly on knowing what's best. Until early to mid 2002, we weren't even thinking about it,so who is to say officers are somehowe smarter about it? I'm not saying this to somehow dimish what you've taken the time to labor over, but you are trying to find widespread readership and acceptance. For that matter, are officers really doing the heavy lifting anymore? I hear it said that it isn't even a company commander's fight, so if it rests on the back of platoons, it certainly doesn't rest on the back of the single lieutenant there...so why are officers the predominant bloc of folks being published?


o You will get this information best through conversation, not direct questioning (though at times it may come to that). Learn what is important to the local populace and use that to start genuine conversations. Even if you don’t really care, you need to pretend like you do for those 10 or 15 minutes that you are engaging that Local National. It will result in you gaining the situational understanding and intel that you need to accomplish your mission.

-This is an outstanding point that I think could stand some expansion. I've come to realize that unless you are well-trained in interrogation techniques, you cannot elicit information well with simple direct questions. It is too easy to be told: 1) outright lies; 2) what they think you want to hear.


o Make your interpreter feel like part of the team. They are probably already getting paid a healthy amount, but make sure that they are getting to meals, going on leave when authorized, getting escorted to the PX when necessary and available, and are being treated well (most ‘terps are not!).

-Abso-freakin'-lutely...This is a critical aspect of handling linguists that we have to master, but as you say, most of them are not treated well. I'd be interested if you'd discuss what you think are the underlying causes of poor treatment in a PM, but for purposes here, it might be good to offer up a bibliography of sorts for further TTPs and research on the business of employing linguists. There is education to be had in this area, but too often, what the troops will do is mimic a style they saw the last time around that was in use by a leader. That style may not have been appropriate, the same way that a boot NCO may think leadership is acting like a drill instructor because that is all he has as a frame of reference. Make sense? The good linguists who don't whine should be pampered as best we can, lavished with small gifts, and always allowed to take advantage of some of the services the troops enjoy. We did not do this my second time over for OIF II, and I can see that this failure may have contributed to the attrition we had to deal with.


o Maintain a time limit in your sector of one hour (or whatever you deem appropriate per your enemy situation). As soon as you cross into your AO the time starts.

-I'm not sure I understand why you use the expression, "cross into the AO". Aren't we supposed to be already living in the AO? I think this reinforces the bad notion of commuting to the fight. On a tactical level, we need to stop thinking of AOs, sectors, and zones, because they are still fairly arbitrary divisions. We need to revert to something more basic, like neighborhoods, tribal districts, boroughs, etc. We are not trying to change "Areas of Operation" but rather the people within them - thus changing a neighborhood. It's sort of like the distinction between a house and a home. I think your people (both higher, lower, and laterally) will have a different perspective and outlook based on the choice of term.

You're doing good work regardless, so keep it up and come out with another chapter soon.

William F. Owen
04-10-2008, 01:36 PM
On a tactical level, we need to stop thinking of AOs, sectors, and zones, because they are still fairly arbitrary divisions. We need to revert to something more basic, like neighborhoods, tribal districts, boroughs, etc. We are not trying to change "Areas of Operation" but rather the people within them - thus changing a neighborhood. It's sort of like the distinction between a house and a home. I think your people (both higher, lower, and laterally) will have a different perspective and outlook based on the choice of term.


So, a units tactical responsibility would be protecting the "Al-Atawa" Clan, not the persons living within the AO boundaries?

Not sure how that would work, but your general observation is insightful, original, and useful. This is impressive stuff, by any measure. Much obliged!

jcustis
04-10-2008, 01:45 PM
So, a units tactical responsibility would be protecting the "Al-Atawa" Clan, not the persons living within the AO boundaries?

We would be protecting all of the people living with the AO's arbitrary boundaries, but we would have to go back to what these Captains are getting at - look, listen, touch the people and get a feel for who exactly is where, what they do, how they get there to do it, and where their relatives live.

You could have three, four, or five neighborhoods that break out under tribal/sect lines, and all within an AO. For a few days, your tasks and purpose focus on X tribe that are within Y neigborhodd. Then later on in the week, the focus shifts to Y tribe in Z neighborhood.

I think you could focus your efforts on a particular tribe/sect, and by increasing their security you in turn increase the security for an adjacent tribe or sect, but sadly I am still too dim on the demographics of Iraq to know how valid that assumption would be.