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SWJED
04-01-2008, 12:04 AM
The Basrah Gambit – Defining Moment for Iraq or the Jaysh al-Mahdi? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/03/the-basrah-gambit-defining-mom/) By Malcolm Nance at SWJ Blog.


Engaging the Mahdi Militia in Basrah and labeling them as equal to Al-Qaeda in Iraq is a deadly gamble that may leave Iran the winner.

On 19 March, 2008 CNN’s Iraq war correspondent, Kyra Phillips gave a live interview from in front of the crossed Swords at the Tomb of the Unknowns parade ground in Baghdad’s International Zone (IZ). She cheerfully reported that Iraq had somehow changed after five years and the lack of mortar and rocket fire allowed her to broadcast live. Rockets and mortars were a daily occurrence in the heavily fortified center of government over the previous 1,825 days. On this indirect fire free day, Phillips proclaimed, “there was a time twice a day there would be mortar rounds coming into this area. Now, five years later, Kiran, very rarely are you seeing that type of action, mortars or rockets coming in here. And the fact that I'm here live right now tells you this is a sign of progress.”

The media’s definition of “very rarely” would be exactly four days. That Sunday the IZ and surrounding neighborhoods would be bombarded with a 12-hour long barrage of rockets and mortars, which killed 13 civilians in the outlying neighborhoods. The barrages continued throughout the week and embassy workers and residents of the IZ were informed they could not go outside of concrete structures without body armor and helmets – a standing order for the first five years, which somehow needed to be reiterated. Phillip’s ridiculously premature assessment that the surge had dispelled mayhem and resentment of the 2003 invasion, was short-circuited by the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), or Mahdi Militia...

Ron Humphrey
04-01-2008, 01:05 AM
After reading this I find myself with some questions

1- Considering that something like this did have to happen at some point (as the author points out) and that JAM did as expected (which is to say disappeared before incurring too many losses). Then also taking into account that either militia Badr or Mahdi both have Iranian connections. Does anything change the fact that it had to happen and at least in large part seems smarter to have done so when there would be more rather than less backup available if needed.

2. Am I mistaken and have the militias been effectively providing for and caring for their area and that everything that a government should do was being done by these hero thugs in Basra: if so why did the actual Iraqi government have to go in there and screw it all up? Am I missing something here.

3. Although I did hear and see that Sadr called a ceasefire I don't remember hearing that the IA/ IP have stopped moving through the area and securing neighborhoods. Are we to believe that Maliki doesn't realize exactly what this means and let's not forget that this operation was Iraqi planned and although support may be provided all in all it would seem that it will be dealt with in more of an Iraqi manner than what might be done in an American operation.

4. How exactly should this have been handled since everyone seems so certain that this wasn't the right way.

Ken White
04-01-2008, 01:22 AM
After reading this I find myself with some questions.
. . .
4. How exactly should this have been handled since everyone seems so certain that this wasn't the right way.Heh. Fair question, though...;)

tequila
04-01-2008, 08:55 AM
If you're going to whack the hornet's nest, and yes it did need whacking, then at least make sure (1) the hornets don't win (2) you don't just go after just one species of hornet when there are at least four that need to get dead.

What Sadr has done is show that his militia can stand up to and defeat the best efforts of the Iraqi Army, that he can turn the violence on and off even in the face of an offensive by said army, and thus can control the streets of southern Iraq and Baghdad even from a perch in Qom. Maliki looks pathetic while the Iranians preen as the one side that all Shia factions can go to for intercession.

We'll see how this plays out, but right now it's hard to imagine the last few days as any kind of success.

Abu Buckwheat
04-01-2008, 09:54 AM
If you're going to whack the hornet's nest, and yes it did need whacking, then at least make sure (1) the hornets don't win (2) you don't just go after just one species of hornet when there are at least four that need to get dead.

BBWwaaaahahahahahaaa.... well that comment made writing the whole blog entry in one flight back to CONUS worth it. Hey tequila, can I use this in my next book? :)

Seriously though ...

My assertion is that this was not part of the surge but a completely different component of a North-South offensive. The MNF-I and the Kurd IA Divisons would clear Mosul while Maliki would be give the chance to use the Badr Corps, er, I mean, the "Iraqi Army" and police to clear Basrah.

The ruse of going after only the "rogue" JAM units surely weakened the JAM but no one who has spent anytime there (I spent almost a year in Basrah and all of my Iraqi bosyguards are from there) was going to think that the JAM was not wildly popular. they are more popular than the central government, but not because they provide services. They provide a gunweilding voice and see that the future could bear great promise for them. The JAM, the Hizb'Dawa and the Badr Corps have been banging away to gain dominence for five years and this last year the JAM has made headway. Granted, the Garamsheh tribe runs all of the guns and crime, and this is fueled by the money that still flows from the tolerated Ali Baba port at Mina Abu Floos. The big question is what made Maliki think Shiites were going to really fight hard against the JAM when the JAMs could come to their family's front door any given night and kill them all? Thats why policemen surrendered ... for their family's sake. Everyone knows everyone in Southern Iraq.


4. How exactly should this have been handled since everyone seems so certain that this wasn't the right way.

To answer the question they could have bought a Kurd/Peshmerga division down south quietly and let them do it. They would have done the job in a slugfest like bloodbath that would probably raze a good piece of western and northern Basrah. However, Maliki would be out of office the next day. The final answer: Train IA units for the mission in secret in Fallujah (live fire training), pretend you are going to Ramadi, turn left, drive overnight and blitz Basrah with heavy US armor and air support from the afloat Marine unit in the Gulf ... then effect the BSP super rapido! ... however this would have taken allot of troops we just don't have and a level of planning they don't have. There was no real airpower or heavy armor (the T-55s and T-72s being up in Taji-stan) supporting the offensive except for some M113s and some police Cougars. This was doomed from the inception and it appears both Cheney and McCain were briefed about it. Thats MHO.

Tom Odom
04-01-2008, 12:32 PM
Malcom,

Great blog, Welcome back!

Tom

Rank amateur
04-01-2008, 03:25 PM
I've noticed a number of editorials that say all of the fighting took place amongst anti AQI groups. That could be a big factor in the domestic debate.

Abu Buckwheat
04-01-2008, 06:12 PM
All Shiite groups are anti-alQaeda ... they're Shiite! AQ thinks Shiites are apostates anyway which, by Takfiri definition, they're Kufr and that means any Shiite can be killed at anytime.

Rank amateur
04-01-2008, 08:30 PM
All Shiite groups are anti-alQaeda ... they're Shiite! AQ thinks Shiites are apostates anyway which, by Takfiri definition, they're Kufr and that means any Shiite can be killed at anytime.

I knew that - except for the words Kufr and Takfiri :eek:- but when we're moving troops to take part in inter shiite battles it's a lot harder to argue that "Iraq is the central front in the war on terror."

Ken White
04-01-2008, 08:44 PM
I knew that - except for the words Kufr and Takfiri :eek:- but when we're moving troops to take part in inter shiite battles it's a lot harder to argue that "Iraq is the central front in the war on terror."just watch what goes on. To my knowledge, no one other than politicians and pundits uses that phrase. What, precisely, does Central Front mean in any event?

Not that, even were that 'central front' statement remotely sensible, would it be negated by the fact that we're moving troops to take part in inter Shiite battles. That occurs on almost a daily basis there. Given a fight of any kind in Iraq, we're almost certainly going to be at least peripherally involved. Look at Najaf in '04. What difference does that make?

Rank amateur
04-01-2008, 09:41 PM
even were that 'central front' statement remotely sensible,

I'm an ad guy. "Not remotely sensible" is what I do. Not remotely sensible can also decide elections. Just my opinion, but I think "bring home the troops who are not fighting Al Qeada" could win votes.

Ron Humphrey
04-01-2008, 09:51 PM
I'm an ad guy. "Not remotely sensible" is what I do. Not remotely sensible can also decide elections. Just my opinion, but I think "bring home the troops who are not fighting Al Qeada" could win votes.

But this begs the question are those votes associated with grievance against a wrong action or are they votes without an inform and accepted awareess of the consequences of doing so.

In other words if you want me to do something because it's what you feel, believe whichever fine your the populous and ultimately you rule, However if you require this without consideration of it's very likely aftershocks and the very good possibility that you or your family may suffer from it in the long run then it's on you.

If on the other hand you are like many others who wish to push for what they want without being willing to accept responsibility for its outcomes, then Should the decision be quite that simple?

Ken White
04-01-2008, 10:39 PM
I'm an ad guy. "Not remotely sensible" is what I do. Not remotely sensible can also decide elections. Just my opinion, but I think "bring home the troops who are not fighting Al Qeada" could win votes.doing things that were not highly sensible would get you killed, you'll not mind if I agree with you on deciding elections and even on the bit about winning votes while pointing out that such an attitude has no place in geopolitics (See Kennedy, J; Johnson,L; Carter, J. Reagan, R; Bush G.H.W.; Clinton W.).

IOW, there's a time and place for not being sensible and one for being very sensible. It's sort of important not to conflate the two...

That doesn't mean for a second that bringing the troops out precipitously would be sensible and I'll also suggest that it might not buy nearly as many votes as you think. Further, the majority of those it did buy would be voting against a party, person or issue rather than for the issue cited.

I don't know of anyone who isn't ready for Iraq and Afghanistan to be over and done with. They aren't and won't be for a while. Why we're in either place is not irrelevant because the 'why' is directly related to the failure of four previous administrations from both parties to confront an obvious threat. That's hard for the western mind to grasp but it's harsh reality. A precipitous departure from either place will be touted as another failure. That, too is hard for western minds to grasp.

Whether you or I would have done it the way it was is immaterial; it was done that way. What the future holds is murky but I'll wager one thing -- if we leave early, we'll be back there (and it will be far harder) during your lifetime.

Sort of like Ron said above -- gotta think about the aftershocks...

Rank amateur
04-02-2008, 12:26 AM
then Should the decision be quite that simple?

John Kerry thought that every issue should be analyzed and explained in agonizing detail. (If I could've figured out a way to get him elected I'd be a lot smarter - and richer - than I am.:D)

Schmedlap
04-02-2008, 02:17 AM
I'm unclear on some assumptions that seem to underpin much of the discussion about recent activity in Basra and Nassiriya. My impression is that the following are generally accepted as true:

1. JAM/Sadr is no better or worse than Badr/ISCI in terms of the security situation and any possibility of a future stable Iraq

2. Some type of action had to be taken against JAM and/or Badr in Basra, at some point in the near future

3. JAM has inflicted more damage upon the ISF than the ISF has inflicted upon JAM

If 1 and 3 are accepted as true, could someone please explain why?

tequila
04-02-2008, 08:45 AM
1) ISCI/SCIRI began life as a creation of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. It was originally a breakoff faction of al-Dawa which split mainly because its members chose to follow Ayatollah Khomeini's doctrine of vilayet-i-fiqh, or clerical rule. It may have achieved some independent political life since 2003, but its IRGC ties are strong and well-documented. Its political position regarding Iraqi federalism (advocating for a strong southern federal region with near-independent powers) is in line with Iranian interests.

3) Who knows proper casualty figures - I doubt anyone does. What matters is that the ISF was unable to seize or maintain control over any Mahdi Army strongholds in Basra until Sadr told the militia to stand down, while Sadr's forces were able to launch attacks throughout the south and put the ISF on the run in numerous locations including in Nasiriyah. I saw TV footage of Mahdi Army militia strolling about in broad daylight as late as yesterday, as well as several Mahdi Army fighters driving captured ISF hummvees. That Maliki extended his "deadline", took the deal, as well as claiming all along that he never targeted the Sadr Current specifically, shows that the ISF did not exactly sweep all before it.

Schmedlap
04-02-2008, 01:57 PM
Its political position regarding Iraqi federalism (advocating for a strong southern federal region with near-independent powers) is in line with Iranian interests.

And the assumption is that the Iranian interests, in this case, do not align with Iraq's interests in long-term stability? A "federal region with near-independent powers" sounds like a description of Kurdistan.


What matters is that the ISF was unable to seize or maintain control over any Mahdi Army strongholds in Basra until Sadr told the militia to stand down, while Sadr's forces were able to launch attacks throughout the south and put the ISF on the run in numerous locations including in Nasiriyah.

It sounds like the criteria of success hinges not on what is accomplished, but how. ISF was only able to get this far because Sadr stood down. Nassirya may be under control now, but not before JAM seized the initiative. Why did Sadr tell his goons to stand down? Was he feeling generous? Was JAM incurring too many losses to sustain? Was he acting upon advice from Iran?

tequila
04-02-2008, 02:21 PM
And the assumption is that the Iranian interests, in this case, do not align with Iraq's interests in long-term stability? A "federal region with near-independent powers" sounds like a description of Kurdistan.

It is also the recipe for a divided, militarily weak central government.

My own assumption is that Iran's maximal solution is a stable but weak Iraq which which it can dominate through its tight relationships with Shiite religious parties and the Iraqi Kurdish parties. The best way to accomplish this is through a strongly federalist constitution and a weak central government.


It sounds like the criteria of success hinges not on what is accomplished, but how. ISF was only able to get this far because Sadr stood down. Nassirya may be under control now, but not before JAM seized the initiative. Why did Sadr tell his goons to stand down? Was he feeling generous? Was JAM incurring too many losses to sustain? Was he acting upon advice from Iran?

My own feeling is that Sadr did not want to force the U.S. to intervene on the side of the ISF. He knows from 2005 that taking on U.S. forces head-on is suicide. Routing the ISF comprehensively in Basra would only bring in more airstrikes and possible U.S. intervention in Baghdad and perhaps even down south. An outright military defeat of the ISF and the US is not in the cards, but a military standoff combined with a well-orchestrated political victory that shows the hollowness of Maliki's posturing looks pretty good. Not a bad place to be with local elections on the horizon.

Ron Humphrey
04-02-2008, 02:21 PM
And the assumption is that the Iranian interests, in this case, do not align with Iraq's interests in long-term stability? A "federal region with near-independent powers" sounds like a description of Kurdistan.



It sounds like the criteria of success hinges not on what is accomplished, but how. ISF was only able to get this far because Sadr stood down. Nassirya may be under control now, but not before JAM seized the initiative. Why did Sadr tell his goons to stand down? Was he feeling generous? Was JAM incurring too many losses to sustain? Was he acting upon advice from Iran?


And I think we'll find that this may come down more on the side of an IO/IE failure on the part of ISAF than on actual capability to accomplish the mission.

Rank amateur
04-02-2008, 02:55 PM
The NYT has more info - via the UK - on the fighting.
(http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/02/world/europe/02basra.html?ref=world)

The defense secretary, Desmond Browne, also used his statement in the House of Commons to acknowledge that British military involvement in last week’s fighting in Basra was more extensive than previously disclosed.

At one point, he said, British tanks, armored vehicles, artillery and ground troops were deployed to help extract Iraqi government troops from a firefight with Shiite militiamen in the city.

Mr. Browne said British involvement in that battle was in addition to other actions in support of Iraqi forces.

He said those actions included aerial surveillance of the city; low-level missions by combat aircraft aimed at reinforcing Iraqi troops by establishing a menacing aerial presence over combat zones; the use of helicopters that carried food and ammunition to the Iraqis; and medical care for wounded Iraqi troops at British combat hospitals outside the city.

Mr. Browne said the use of British ground troops in the fighting was ordered “in extremis,” suggesting that the deployment of forces from the British base at Basra was a last-ditch measure to save Iraqi troops.

tequila
04-03-2008, 08:53 AM
More NYT:

U.S. Cites Planning Gaps in Iraqi Assault on Basra (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/03/world/middleeast/03basra.html?hp=&pagewanted=print)- NYTIMES 3 April.


Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/c/ryan_c_crocker/index.html?inline=nyt-per) first learned of the Iraqi plan on Friday, March 21: Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/nuri_kamal_al-maliki/index.html?inline=nyt-per) would be heading to Basra with Iraqi troops to bring order to the city.

But the Iraqi operation was not what the United States expected. Instead of methodically building up their combat power and gradually stepping up operations against renegade militias, Mr. Maliki’s forces lunged into the city, attacking before all of the Iraqi reinforcements had even arrived. By the following Tuesday, a major fight was on.

“The sense we had was that this would be a long-term effort: increased pressure gradually squeezing the Special Groups,” Mr. Crocker said in an interview, using the American term for Iranian-backed militias. “That is not what kind of emerged."

...

The operation indicates that the Iraqi military can quickly organize and deploy forces over considerable distances. Two Iraqi C-130s and several Iraqi helicopters were also involved in the operation, an important step for a military that is still struggling to develop an air combat ability.

But interviews with a wide range of American and military officials also suggest that Mr. Maliki overestimated his military’s abilities and underestimated the scale of the resistance. The Iraqi prime minister also displayed an impulsive leadership style that did not give his forces or that of his most powerful allies, the American and British military, time to prepare.

...
As the Iraqi military and civilian casualties grew and the Iraqi planning appeared to be little more than an improvisation, the United States mounted an intensive military and political effort to try to turn around the situation, according to accounts by Mr. Crocker and several American military officials in Baghdad and Washington who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Two senior American military officers — a member of the Navy Seals and a Marine major general — were sent to Basra to help coordinate the Iraqi planning, the military officials said. Soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division were pressed into service as combat advisers while air controllers were positioned to call in airstrikes on behalf of beleaguered Iraqi units. American transport planes joined the Iraqis in ferrying supplies to Iraqi troops ...

Wx Guesser
04-08-2008, 11:01 PM
Long time lurker, first time poster....
Saw this in an email and am curious what the more experienced and knowledgeable think. Is this an attempt to get JAM legitimacy? An attempt to enter the political process with a statesman-like gesture? Neither? Both?

http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL0434078820080407


Iraq's Sadr to disband Mehdi Army if clerics order

By Khaled Farhan

NAJAF, Iraq (Reuters) - Iraqi cleric Moqtada al-Sadr is ready to disband his militia if Shi'ite religious leaders demand it, his aides said on Monday, a surprising offer given renewed clashes between his fighters and security forces.

The news came after Shi'ite Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, who launched a crackdown on Sadr's Mehdi Army late last month, ordered the cleric to disband his militia or face exclusion from the Iraqi political process.

Ron Humphrey
04-09-2008, 12:37 AM
Long time lurker, first time poster....
Saw this in an email and am curious what the more experienced and knowledgeable think. Is this an attempt to get JAM legitimacy? An attempt to enter the political process with a statesman-like gesture? Neither? Both?

http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL0434078820080407

it is wise as many here have stated before to take the actions of others as those of rational players then this would make perfect sense.

Sadr envisions himself as a representative of the populous and also holds his faith in high enough regard that he is studying to become an Ayatollah. As such should he choose to act against the grain of those religious leaders he might very well not only lose his "army" but lose any chance of leading other than marginally in a religious context within Iraq.

So he puts it to the leaders there. If they say yes disarm then he is fine with that because in the end he still looks to become a large part of the religious forum and thus has both political and social clout. Should they say no don't disband than he has a much larger bargaining chip with the current GOI in that any actions he orders have been in a way signed off on by those clerics.

Please take a moment and introduce yourself LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=44321#post44321)to us as it provides a context on where your coming from and allows for much more accurate responses:D

tequila
04-09-2008, 10:17 AM
Religious leaders tell al-Sadr to keep militia intact: Sadr spokesman (http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/04/07/iraq.sadr/index.html)- CNN


Iraq's top Shiite religious leaders have told anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr not to disband his Mehdi Army, an al-Sadr spokesman said Monday amid fresh fighting in the militia's Baghdad strongholds.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki demanded Sunday that the cleric disband his militia, which waged two uprisings against U.S. troops in 2004, or see his supporters barred from public office.

But al-Sadr spokesman Salah al-Obeidi said al-Sadr has consulted with Iraq's Shiite clerical leadership "and they refused that." He did not provide details of the talks.

Ron Humphrey
04-09-2008, 12:22 PM
Religious leaders tell al-Sadr to keep militia intact: Sadr spokesman (http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/04/07/iraq.sadr/index.html)- CNN

Considering how misleading some information that comes out in media is due to what can only hope is simple ignorance of culture, the question would be which leader's exactly gave this edict. There are various conditions which might exist depending on who it was.

tequila
04-09-2008, 01:34 PM
Sadr always proposes to disband the Mahdi Army upon orders from the Najaf Hawza whenever there is some sort of controversy - he also did this back in 2004 and after Karbala in 2006. He knows that the Hawza will never intervene so directly into politics and publicly order said disbandment specifically for the Mahdi Army alone. Most likely is that the Hawza refused to acknowledge the query at all.

The Mahdi Army is not going to disband any more than the Badr Brigade "disbanded" by rebadging itself in Interior Ministry uniforms and calling itself the Badr "Organization."

tequila
04-09-2008, 11:08 PM
Reider Visser has updated thoughts on the Basra operation and the issue of Iranian influence. He cautions against reading the situation as simply a Maliki/ISCI alliance against Sadr, instead hinting at this being a primarily Maliki-rooted initiative as the PM seeks new allies and his own power base. Iran maintains a key presence on all sides. A superbly informative read as always.

Maliki, Hakim, and Iran's Role in the Basra Fighting (http://www.historiae.org/iran.asphttp://)

Ron Humphrey
04-09-2008, 11:11 PM
[QUOTE=tequila;44443]Reider Visser has updated thoughts on the Basra operation and the issue of Iranian influence. He cautions against reading the situation as simply a Maliki/ISCI alliance against Sadr, instead hinting at this being a primarily Maliki-rooted initiative as the PM seeks new allies and his own power base. Iran maintains a key presence on all sides. A superbly informative read as always.

I'll try it again-
Link retry (http://www.historiae.org/iran.asp)

Ron Humphrey
04-09-2008, 11:26 PM
But I'm not sure there aren't some key pieces of the US side of the puzzle being left out. Also seems to me the Kurdish and Sunni pieces are going to be a larger factor than is hinted to here.

I will agree with the fact that some figures here would do well to look a little deeper into how things work over there then they currently do.:wry:

Ken White
04-10-2008, 12:02 AM
think he's got the broad strokes correct. This from your link:
"The artificial constellation of the so-called “moderate coalition” under Maliki is to a large extent the result of a weaponry-focused American misreading of the many channels of Iranian influence. This was best summed up by Ryan Crocker’s comments in the US Senate on 8 April: in an attempt at playing down the significance of Mahmud Amadinejad’s popularity in Iraqi government circles, Crocker referred to the staunch anti-Iranian attitude of the Iraqi Shiites during the Iran-Iraq War. What Crocker failed to mention was that his own administration’s main Shiite partner in Iraq, ISCI, is the only sizeable Shiite party that fought on the Iranian side."is, I believe correct in essence but wrong in detail -- at least in one detail.

The problem is not that the US is "weaponry focused" (whatever in the world that's supposed to mean); it is, as I pointed out a couple of days ago, that our prime "Arabists" continue to misread the nuances in the AO; they see what they hope to see as opposed to what is.

Rex Brynen
04-10-2008, 12:24 AM
The problem is not that the US is "weaponry focused" (whatever in the world that's supposed to mean); it is, as I pointed out a couple of days ago, that our prime "Arabists" continue to misread the nuances in the AO; they see what they hope to see as opposed to what is.

I'm not sure which "Arabists" you're referring to, Ken, and which aspect you think they're misreading.

Most of the Iraq specialists that I know (inside and outside government) would absolutely agree with Tequila on the nuances of Shi'ite politics in Iraq (and the multidimensional patterns of Iranian connections, influence, and constraints).

Ken White
04-10-2008, 01:46 AM
I'm not sure which "Arabists" you're referring to, Ken, and which aspect you think they're misreading.

Most of the Iraq specialists that I know (inside and outside government) would absolutely agree with Tequila on the nuances of Shi'ite politics in Iraq (and the multidimensional patterns of Iranian connections, influence, and constraints).Those in the US government.

I agreed with Tequila -- or, rather, with his linked article (broadly; minor caveats of little note). I disagreed with Crocker. They are applying western logic to what they see and are told by their nominal counterparts in the area as opposed to watching what's happening and trusting their own intel folks.

What you see there is rarely what you get...

tequila
04-10-2008, 02:00 AM
I think by "weaponry focused", Visser was saying that Crocker's testimony focused on Iranian weapons/military aid to factions in Iraq as its primary means of influence. Visser says this focus on military aid alone is incorrect - Crocker should focus as well on Iran's myriad and longstanding political ties to varying Iraqi factions, which are at least as important and probably far more so than whatever EFPs the Quds Force doles out to the "special groups".

I think Visser is on the mark here. I winced when Crocker mentioned the "Lebanonization" of Iraq - in the past American representatives in Baghdad have indicated they believe Iran is pushing the "special groups" to eventually become a Hizbullah-like proxy in Iraq. What this ignores is that the "special groups", even in the American description, are little more than independent contractors, mercenary gangs, and criminals masquerading as Shia resistance fighters. The "special groups" to the extent that they exist are not a coherent grouping, have no political aims, and exist mainly to set off IEDs. The real Iraqi version of Hizbullah already exists in the ISCI, and it is more firmly ensconced in political power than Lebanese Hizbullah could ever dream, backed by the power of both Iran and the U.S.

Ron Humphrey
04-10-2008, 02:18 AM
think he's got the broad strokes correct. This from your link:is, I believe correct in essence but wrong in detail -- at least in one detail.

The problem is not that the US is "weaponry focused" (whatever in the world that's supposed to mean); it is, as I pointed out a couple of days ago, that our prime "Arabists" continue to misread the nuances in the AO; they see what they hope to see as opposed to what is.

Tolstoy wrote in War and Peace:

When a man acts alone he always carries with him a certain series of considerations, that have as he supposes, directed his past conduct, and that serve to justify to him his present action, and to lead him to make projects for his future activity.

If we accept that the same principle applies for the thinking, planning and perceptions of a man, then how is one to differentiate when one is simply seeing what they wish, what they expect, or what is actually taking place.

Ron Humphrey
04-10-2008, 02:29 AM
I think Visser is on the mark here. I winced when Crocker mentioned the "Lebanonization" of Iraq - in the past American representatives in Baghdad have indicated they believe Iran is pushing the "special groups" to eventually become a Hizbullah-like proxy in Iraq. What this ignores is that the "special groups", even in the American description, are little more than independent contractors, mercenary gangs, and criminals masquerading as Shia resistance fighters. The "special groups" to the extent that they exist are not a coherent grouping, have no political aims, and exist mainly to set off IEDs. The real Iraqi version of Hizbullah already exists in the ISCI, and it is more firmly ensconced in political power than Lebanese Hizbullah could ever dream, backed by the power of both Iran and the U.S.

What roles do the ISCI actually play in the Iranian governance which would make them anything more than a supported proxy in Iraq. If the only thing they get out of it is control of Iraq while carrying major IOU's to Iran why would it not be preferable to them to owe Iran little to naught and be in control anyway?

Since the theme seems to be that the party's over and all thats left is to pass out the parting gifts?

Ken White
04-10-2008, 03:15 AM
...Crocker should focus as well on Iran's myriad and longstanding political ties to varying Iraqi factions, which are at least as important and probably far more so than whatever EFPs the Quds Force doles out to the "special groups". Agreed.
...What this ignores is that the "special groups", even in the American description, are little more than independent contractors, mercenary gangs, and criminals masquerading as Shia resistance fighters.True, thus my annoyance at the (intentional?) mis-labeling -- or misstating by our folks.
...The real Iraqi version of Hizbullah already exists in the ISCI, and it is more firmly ensconced in political power than Lebanese Hizbullah could ever dream, backed by the power of both Iran and the U.S.I'm not sure the initial statement is correct and, while I agree to an extent with the last comment, I don't think it'll make a long term difference.

Rex Brynen
04-10-2008, 03:17 AM
I winced when Crocker mentioned the "Lebanonization" of Iraq

He's right, he's just got the model wrong: Iranian policy closely mirrors that of the Syrians (not the Iranians) in Lebanon--that is, backing a number of different horses at the same time, while trying to position themselves as the mediator/balancer/most important patron.

tequila
04-10-2008, 06:54 AM
What roles do the ISCI actually play in the Iranian governance which would make them anything more than a supported proxy in Iraq. If the only thing they get out of it is control of Iraq while carrying major IOU's to Iran why would it not be preferable to them to owe Iran little to naught and be in control anyway?

Research a bit about the history of ISCI - they were originally a splitoff of al-Dawa, the "original" Shia religious party in Iraq, who were heavily influenced by the Iranian Revolution and went with Khomeini's theory of vilayet-i-fiqh rather than the more standard "quietist" school propagated by Najaf at the time. The IRGC, much as it formed the core of Hizbullah originally, formed ISCI's Badr Brigade out of ISCI volunteers and later on Shia POWs from the Iran-Iraq War. Thus Badr's core principally consists of those Iraqi Shia who turned traitor and fought on Iran's side during the war - you can see where the antipathy towards them in Iraq might come from.

Thus ISCI has historically aligned with Iran for both practical and philosophical reasons. Visser agrees that it is simplistic to call them simply Iranian patsies, just as it is also quite simplistic and inaccurate (IMO far more so in the Lebanese case) to call Lebanese Hizbullah simply Iranian patsies. Both movements have their own motives and political objectives. But on a concrete basis, ISCI's political goals in Iraq mirror those of Iran's (a crippled central government combined with a very strong Shia-dominated southern federal region, thus assuring Iraq's perpetual weakness) far more than any other group, other than perhaps the Kurds (who also favor a weak center dominated by federal regions).

Ron Humphrey
04-10-2008, 12:42 PM
Research a bit about the history of ISCI - they were originally a splitoff of al-Dawa, the "original" Shia religious party in Iraq, who were heavily influenced by the Iranian Revolution and went with Khomeini's theory of vilayet-i-fiqh rather than the more standard "quietist" school propagated by Najaf at the time. The IRGC, much as it formed the core of Hizbullah originally, formed ISCI's Badr Brigade out of ISCI volunteers and later on Shia POWs from the Iran-Iraq War. Thus Badr's core principally consists of those Iraqi Shia who turned traitor and fought on Iran's side during the war - you can see where the antipathy towards them in Iraq might come from.

Thus ISCI has historically aligned with Iran for both practical and philosophical reasons. Visser agrees that it is simplistic to call them simply Iranian patsies, just as it is also quite simplistic and inaccurate (IMO far more so in the Lebanese case) to call Lebanese Hizbullah simply Iranian patsies. Both movements have their own motives and political objectives. But on a concrete basis, ISCI's political goals in Iraq mirror those of Iran's (a crippled central government combined with a very strong Shia-dominated southern federal region, thus assuring Iraq's perpetual weakness) far more than any other group, other than perhaps the Kurds (who also favor a weak center dominated by federal regions).

Considering that this is as you infer a well known fact in the area doesn't it seem somewhat unusual to assume that our leaders there are unaware let alone necessarily complicit in its fruition. I realize it may seem naive of me but somehow I just don't think it's gonna be quite as easy as for ISCI as it may look on the surface.

tequila
04-10-2008, 02:08 PM
Considering that this is as you infer a well known fact in the area doesn't it seem somewhat unusual to assume that our leaders there are unaware let alone necessarily complicit in its fruition. I realize it may seem naive of me but somehow I just don't think it's gonna be quite as easy as for ISCI as it may look on the surface.

Our President was unaware of the Sunni/Shi'i divide in Islam until shortly before the invasion of Iraq.

If there is some secret American plan to sideline or curb ISCI, it does not appear to be working given that party's level of influence in the Iraqi government and security forces. OTOH, ISCI does have the advantage of being a relatively well-disciplined force and never having been caught trying to kill American soldiers - few factions in the Iraqi government can really make that claim, excepting the Kurds.

Ron Humphrey
04-10-2008, 02:19 PM
Our President was unaware of the Sunni/Shi'i divide in Islam until shortly before the invasion of Iraq.

If there is some secret American plan to sideline or curb ISCI, it does not appear to be working given that party's level of influence in the Iraqi government and security forces. OTOH, ISCI does have the advantage of being a relatively well-disciplined force and never having been caught trying to kill American soldiers - few factions in the Iraqi government can really make that claim, excepting the Kurds.

Cutural awareness being important and not quite as good as it could have been I don't think anyone disagrees however I wasn't trying to point to some sort of "secret" operations but rather thinking about the fact that as well as westerners not always reading those in the mid-east the shoe fits on the other side as well and as such there may be considerations within the overall context which they haven't seen also.

I just think one should never be drawn into thinking they have seen the whole picture on either side. It's only wise to always review what they think they know in order to compare it to the reality they face. I think quite a few of those in positions of power know that better than we may give them credit for.

tequila
04-10-2008, 02:29 PM
It's only wise to always review what they think they know in order to compare it to the reality they face. I think quite a few of those in positions of power know that better than we may give them credit for.

I hope you are correct. However, hope has had a rather poor track record over the past five years.

Ron Humphrey
04-10-2008, 03:22 PM
I hope you are correct. However, hope has had a rather poor track record over the past five years.

May or may not be a lot of Iraqi's and / or Afghans out there who would disagree with that

Kinda hard to tell yet:wry:

Rank amateur
04-10-2008, 04:01 PM
Then how is one to differentiate when one is simply seeing what they wish, what they expect, or what is actually taking place.

In advertising, we do focus groups and polling. In conventional combat I imagine the key is expecting fog, friction and enemy adaptation and not getting personally attached to any particular tactic or plan. (There's a Darwinian process; people who see what
they want to see will sooner or later end up dead or defeated.)

Personally, I think the way we've defined "victory" and "defeat" in Iraq - and all the politics that surrounds those issues - pretty much guarantees that even if you can see what's actually happening, not very many people are going to agree with you.

I'm sure that Marc and Rex will also have some excellent suggestions for you.

the shoe fits on the other side as well.

Undoubtedly and those who attack us pay a high price for their misjudgment.


I think quite a few of those in positions of power know that better than we may give them credit for.

I hope you're not seeing what you want to see ;), but that just goes to show how difficult the problems of perception are.

Ron Humphrey
04-10-2008, 07:04 PM
I hope you're not seeing what you want to see ;), but that just goes to show how difficult the problems of perception are.

But luckily enough for us I'm not the one who decides who does what, where.

Now one would think those who do decide have a some much wider scope than I:wry:

Ken White
04-10-2008, 07:06 PM
...
Personally, I think the way we've defined "victory" and "defeat" in Iraq - and all the politics that surrounds those issues - pretty much guarantees that even if you can see what's actually happening, not very many people are going to agree with you.
...I'm curious as to what those definitions are?

Rank amateur
04-10-2008, 10:09 PM
I'm curious as to what those definitions are?

An excellent question. (I'm talking about layman's spin, but I haven't seen any coordinated effort by anyone to replace the spin with a more nuanced approach. Present company excluded of course. The dialog on council is always extremely intelligent and nuanced.)

Near as I can tell, anyone who wants to withdraw troops is admitting defeat and anyone who wants to stay supports victory. There doesn't seem to be a very big "weigh the costs and benefits" camp and those people seem to end up being quickly labelled defeatists. It might change after our election but both candidates have a vested interest in keeping the debate binary until then. I don't really see any candidate saying "I just saw a 15 slide PowerPoint that made me change my mind."

Interestingly, I found a game theory simulation that suggested we should be lowering our definition of victory. Which would suggest that I'm wrong or the country isn't being rationale.

Ron Humphrey
04-10-2008, 10:38 PM
Near as I can tell, anyone who wants to withdraw troops is admitting defeat and anyone who wants to stay supports victory. There doesn't seem to be a very big "weigh the costs and benefits" camp and those people seem to end up being quickly labelled defeatists. It might change after our election but both candidates have a vested interest in keeping the debate binary until then. I don't really see any candidate saying "I just saw a 15 slide PowerPoint that made me change my mind."

Is that the idea that everyone including the GOI wants large amounts of American forces there for any longer than absolutely necessary is highly lacking a realistic assessment. Everyone wants the same thing for a variety of different reasons. The difference is to be found in the fact that some don't like it when the world doesn't move to their beat. A wise approach is to consider what can be done while maintaining a forward momentum towards a long term solution.

This doesn't fit to well with those who think that
A: The world can go to heck in a handbasket and well still be able to avoid suffering for it because we our US

B: How can we fund our five thousand plus govt gimme programs if we actually have to spend money trying to help stabilize countries who may not be able to do it on their own(for a variety of reasons)and which if we don't could and probably will cost us much more in the long run

Let me ask you a question. If you are hired to run an advertising campaign for blue shoes and get the contract for 3 million then two months after you start the company decides it isn't happy because the results aren't what they want them to be. And lets just throw in that one week after you got the job there was a world wide boycott of blue shoes because black is the new blue what would you tell them.

A: ok here's your money back sorry bout that

B: You have to give it a little more time because we're working behind the scenes to make blue the new purple

C:(whatever your answer is since i'm pretty sure you won't pick either A or B)


Interestingly, I found a game theory simulation that suggested we should be lowering our definition of victory. Which would suggest that I'm wrong or the country isn't being rationale.

As to that sometimes simulations are good for telling you that you might have to adjust your expectations in order to match them to the given scenario:D

Ken White
04-10-2008, 10:54 PM
...
Near as I can tell, anyone who wants to withdraw troops is admitting defeat and anyone who wants to stay supports victory. There doesn't seem to be a very big "weigh the costs and benefits" camp and those people seem to end up being quickly labelled defeatists. It might change after our election but both candidates have a vested interest in keeping the debate binary until then. I don't really see any candidate saying "I just saw a 15 slide PowerPoint that made me change my mind."I suppose one could look at it that way. I have a strong personal dislike of the terms victory and defeat attached to any COIN or nation building effort. The best one can hope for is a satisfactory outcome -- that obviously can vary dependent upon outlook.

In any event, I think it's safe to say that if we do withdraw precipitously, the Islamists will claim 'victory' and thus trumpet our 'defeat.' That can have a detrimental long term effect albeit not probably a fatal one -- so any cost benefit analysis should consider that in some detail.

What the candidates now say and what they will do if elected and getting all the detailed classified briefings are more than likely to be quite different things. I was almost looking forward to Kerry being elected in '04 so I could watch him back and fill in December. You're correct that both do have an interest in keeping it binary until then, though.
Interestingly, I found a game theory simulation that suggested we should be lowering our definition of victory. Which would suggest that I'm wrong or the country isn't being rationale.Americans. Not being rational? Surely you jest, Sir! :D

Heh -- I thought that was an American specialty...

In fairness to them, though, in this case they're using the worlds that ignorant politicians and media (and even the random General...) use. That misue of the words has skewed the meaning of them beyond all hope of redemption for this one, I'm afraid. This may not be the most politicized war we've ever had but it sure is the one with the widest communication (of sorts...). ;)

Rank amateur
04-11-2008, 01:55 AM
A: ok here's your money back sorry bout that

B: You have to give it a little more time because we're working behind the scenes to make blue the new purple

C:(whatever your answer is since i'm pretty sure you won't pick either A or B)


B, but when they asked "how long is a little more time?" I'd give them an answer, because this is what I do for a living and I know what a reasonable time is. I know how to set metrics and see if we're on the right track or not. I also know that if I don't get results it's because I screwed up. (None of my clients have ever made a mistake.;))



I have a strong personal dislike of the terms victory and defeat attached to any COIN or nation building effort. The best one can hope for is a satisfactory outcome -- that obviously can vary dependent upon outlook.

We agree. (Although every time I say that, you say we don't.;)) I just think that once the commander in chief uses the terms victory and defeat it is extremely difficult to find middle ground. Now that I think about it, that's probably a more accurate expression of what I meant initially. If we hypothetically came to an acceptable outcome, I don't think many people would accept it. They'd still be looking for victory or looking back at all the mistakes. (It goes back to seeing what you want, biases, self images, allegiances etc. All that spin doctor stuff that has it's uses but can also cause problems.)

Ken White
04-11-2008, 02:27 AM
This is not a good idea:
Originally Posted by Ken
A: ok here's your money back sorry bout that

B: You have to give it a little more time because we're working behind the scenes to make blue the new purple

Cwhatever your answer is since i'm pretty sure you won't pick either A or B)This medium doesn't lend itself to the subtleties that direct communication allows and Ken didn't say that.

EDITED TO ADD: Other than not understanding your meaning, I don't personally have a problem with the technique but on an open board, it can cause confusion. Someone else sees it, takes it out of context and a month from now I get accused of saying "You have to give it a little more time..." I respond, correctly, that I've never said that, then he produces the 'quote.' no big thing but I try to quote people verbatim to avoid such problems.

That said, I suggest that I did not and would not offer you any money back because I have none of yours; if, as I suspect, you meant something sort of allegorical by that, it went right over my head???

I am not suggesting that you 'give it a little more time.' My view has been and is that we'll be there for many years, so no reason for me to ask for more time. No attempt to make anything into something it is not. I don't think anybody in DC or Iraq is trying to do that and I know I'm not. If, by that comment, you meant that what the Islamists say about victory or defeat is irrelevant, all I can do is suggest that you might want to give that some thought.

IOW, I think your message got lost in the medium...
B, but when they asked "how long is a little more time?" I'd give them an answer, because this is what I do for a living and I know what a reasonable time is.And what would your answer be? Ten weeks? Ten months? Ten years? Make it too long and you'll lose, make it too short and you may get stuck with something you can't deliver. So what is your reasonable time? You do messages for a living, if you fail, your client may lose a buck or two and get a tax write off. If we fail in Iraq, even more lives than it's already cost will be at stake. You do it for a living but are lives at risk if you err? not to mention that the ol' fog of war is awfully hard to see through -- and harder to predict.

Not that Politicians don't ignore that and err... :mad:
I know how to set metrics and see if we're on the right track or not. I also know that if I don't get results it's because I screwed up. (None of my clients have ever made a mistake.;))Be nice if it were that simple. First, metrics and war do not mesh well; too many intangibles and unforeseeable unknowns. Second, a lot of of folks who are also good at metrics have set or are setting metrics on this one -- most have been wrong and I predict the next crop will be equally wrong.

Your clients must be politicians; they have the same ability -- every time there's a screw up it's never their fault...
We agree. (Although every time I say that, you say we don't.;)) Then stop using the word! ;)
I just think that once the commander in chief uses the terms victory and defeat it is extremely difficult to find middle ground.Too true -- that's one of many reasons I object to the word, it sets up unreasonable -- even unrealizable -- expectations. Hate it when the Pols use it but they and the media I can excuse on grounds of ignorance. Harder to excuse the Generals who should know better.
Now that I think about it, that's probably a more accurate expression of what I meant initially. If we hypothetically came to an acceptable outcome, I don't think many people would accept it. They'd still be looking for victory or looking back at all the mistakes. (It goes back to seeing what you want, biases, self images, allegiances etc. All that spin doctor stuff that has it's uses but can also cause problems.)Sure, that's the American way. The One third rule applies. 1/3 would object, 1/3 would agree and the middle third would split with a tilt to one side depending on how well, on balance, we came out of it. Always been that way and likely most always will. That's okay.

Ron Humphrey
04-11-2008, 03:02 AM
B, but when they asked "how long is a little more time?" I'd give them an answer, because this is what I do for a living and I know what a reasonable time is. I know how to set metrics and see if we're on the right track or not. I also know that if I don't get results it's because I screwed up. (None of my clients have ever made a mistake.;))
.)

As to this as Ken said metrics for real time decisions in war are pretty fuzzy and more often than not if one gets stuck on them one will probably get stuck

Also consider that the client not being liable for bad luck in an ad campaign at worst cost someone their livelihood. In War whether the "clients" like it or not if it goes wrong someone or many someones die. It is largely different doing risk management in markets vs in war and it would be better for all of us if some would come to realize that. Unfortunately probably won't happen because most that have that problem aren't really paying attention to the war itself but what propaganda value it holds for them

Rank amateur
04-11-2008, 01:06 PM
My apologies to Ken and Ron. I was responding to multiple quotes, started copying the quote tags and then deleted some quotes and got confused about who said what. (Maybe someone can fix it for me. I can't edit it anymore.)


To summarize my thoughts. War is messy. COIN particularly so, but I think we need to move beyond "it takes a long time" to "A COIN effort is going down the wrong track if [or the right track if]...."

From Abu Muqawama (http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com/)


While we're on the subject of Lebanonization, though, here's another historical analogy that Amb. Crocker missed. In Lebanon, in September 1983, the U.S. lent direct support to what it assumed was a national institution, the Lebanese Army, in the battle at Souk el-Gharb. By doing so, it became, in the eyes of the rest of the Lebanese population, just another militia and thus fair game. What happened next? Ask any U.S. Marine.

Now we all know the situations in Iraq and Lebanon are not exactly the same, but Souk el-Gharb was running through Abu Muqawama's head during the battle of Basra two weeks ago when we were lending our support to the "national" army of Iraq in its fight with the Sadr crew. To us good-natured Americans, it may have looked as if we were lending our support to the legitimate, national institutions of Iraq. But to other Iraqis, it probably looked as if we were taking sides in the intra-Shia political dispute between ISCI and Sadr in the run-up to this fall's provincial elections.

I think we can discuss the issue here, which is one reason why I like having discussions here, but I can't see the Senate having a reasonable discussion about it.


Then stop using the word!

An excellent example of how a single word can make it difficult to wrap everything up. Imagine how long we'd both go on if we both believed that this was a debate, instead of a conversation, and that one of us would be declared a winner and the other a loser.



In any event, I think it's safe to say that if we do withdraw precipitously, the Islamists will claim 'victory' and thus trumpet our 'defeat.' That can have a detrimental long term effect albeit not probably a fatal one -- so any cost benefit analysis should consider that in some detail.

An excellent point. I think the analysis really depends on how the debate is framed. Losing a battle in a long war isn't a problem. In a long war, you can have Pyrrhic victories. On the other hand, if you frame Iraq in black and white terms, no one likes to lose.

tequila
04-11-2008, 05:10 PM
Well now, this is interesting: Petraeus on the Sadr movement (http://www.aswataliraq.info/look/english/article.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=4&NrArticle=75996&NrIssue=2&NrSection=1):


General David Petraeus, the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, said Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr is a "leader of an important and legitimate political movement," urging the Iraqi government, in whose selection Sadr was a kingmaker, to recognize and deal with it.

"I think the way, the best way to characterize Muqtada al-Sadr is that he is the face and the leadership of a very important and legitimate political movement in Iraq," he said."

Muqtada, the leader of the Sadrist movement, is the son of Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, who was assassinated by the former Iraqi regime's intelligence agencies in early 1999. The elder Sadr was Marja al-Taqlid, source of emulation, for Shiite Muslims. Muqtada is also the leader of Jaysh al-Mahdi, or the Mahdi Army, militias, which he founded in July 2003 as a military wing for his movement.

"Sadr's movement is part of the alliance that elected the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki," Petraeus said during a joint press conference he held in Washington on Thursday with U.S. ambassador in Iraq Ryan Crocker.


Much more from both Petraeus and Crocker on Sadr's movement in 10 April press conference in DC. You can see it on CSPAN's website (http://www.c-span.org/)- scroll down to "Petraeus and Amb. Crocker News Conference on Iraq (April 10, 2008)".

The Muqtada question is right at the beginning. Crocker and Petraeus both emphasize the Sadrists' legitimacy, say that that Sadr is not an enemy of the U.S., and Petraeus even calls on the Iraqi government not to "back anyone into a corner".

Ron Humphrey
04-11-2008, 05:26 PM
Well now, this is interesting: Petraeus on the Sadr movement (http://www.aswataliraq.info/look/english/article.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=4&NrArticle=75996&NrIssue=2&NrSection=1):



Much more from both Petraeus and Crocker on Sadr's movement in 10 April press conference in DC. You can see it on CSPAN's website (http://www.c-span.org/)- scroll down to "Petraeus and Amb. Crocker News Conference on Iraq (April 10, 2008)".

The Muqtada question is right at the beginning. Crocker and Petraeus both emphasize the Sadrists' legitimacy, say that that Sadr is not an enemy of the U.S., and Petraeus even calls on the Iraqi government not to "back anyone into a corner".

never quite so predictable as some might think it is:wry:

Ken White
04-11-2008, 05:41 PM
...
To summarize my thoughts. War is messy. COIN particularly so, but I think we need to move beyond "it takes a long time" to "A COIN effort is going down the wrong track if [or the right track if]...."I agree. Now all we have to do is convince the politicians and that 1/3 who are adamantly opposed to the Iraq intervention at all levels that should happen...
I think we can discuss the issue here, which is one reason why I like having discussions here, but I can't see the Senate having a reasonable discussion about it.Sadly true. Even more sad is the fact that neither Iraq or US policy are the real issues.
An excellent example of how a single word can make it difficult to wrap everything up. Imagine how long we'd both go on if we both believed that this was a debate, instead of a conversation, and that one of us would be declared a winner and the other a loser.Also totally true and a sad commentary on public and politics in the US today.
An excellent point. I think the analysis really depends on how the debate is framed. Losing a battle in a long war isn't a problem. In a long war, you can have Pyrrhic victories. On the other hand, if you frame Iraq in black and white terms, no one likes to lose.Also true though I would submit some battles are far more important than others and their loss can affect the future course of the war.

Ken White
04-11-2008, 07:45 PM
Life's never quite so predictable as some might think it is:wry:or writ or supm'n... :wry:

Fortunately, I'm all for that; life would sure be dull and boring, otherwise. :D

Ron Humphrey
04-11-2008, 10:22 PM
Any one want to lay odds on the actual perpetrators of the Sadr's aides assassination having been Special groups rather than IA/IP or Coalition as seems to be the first place many are looking :rolleyes:

davidbfpo
04-12-2008, 10:08 AM
Under this title in The Daily Telegraph (UK) the author Con Coughlin, who supported the Iraqi invasion advocates UK forces leave Basra airbase: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2008/04/11/do1104.xml

The comments it has attracted do include some reasoned responses.

He has also written an article on Afghanistan 'Whose side are the Afghans on?', which reveals he is accompanying the UK's most senior military officer, Air Chief Marshal Jock Stirrup: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2008/04/12/wafghan112.xml (which I will copy to an Afghan thread).

davidbfpo

Schmedlap
04-13-2008, 06:49 AM
Any one want to lay odds on the actual perpetrators of the Sadr's aides assassination having been Special groups rather than IA/IP or Coalition as seems to be the first place many are looking :rolleyes:

My initial gut reaction - and my continued belief - is ISCI. Najaf brings in million and millions of dollars in donations to the shrines. ISCI doesn't want JAM nosing in on their territory. They get their cut for now. When Sistani kicks the bucket, they hope to get a bigger slice. The farther away JAM stays, the bigger the slice for ISCI.

SWJED
04-27-2008, 12:08 AM
‘What’s Happening In Basra?’ (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/04/whats-happening-in-basra/)
by Paul Smyth
Small Wars Journal Magazine


The recent Iraqi military operation in Basra has generated much speculation in media and commentary circles, but without access to classified sources it is extremely difficult to accurately judge what has been happening in Basra and why. Even attempts to draw on Iraqi sources or anonymous quotes from within the Coalition do not eradicate confused or contradictory reporting. Hence, some commentators will claim that the targets of the Iraqi security clampdown in Basra are the criminal and Iranian sponsored ‘Special Groups’ that plague the city, while others will equally assert that it is the militia followers of Moqtada Al Sadr which are being attacked in order to weaken his power base ahead of provincial elections.

Whether the subject in view is the motive behind the operation, its timing and conduct, the performance of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the militias, the role of Iran or the relative effect the operation is having on the standing of the various protagonists, there is no consensus of opinion which reigns supreme...