Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife

[patmc]

I have been closely following the MTT debate the past 2 years because it has been having a major impact on company grade officers, and will likely continue to do so.

The two main debates I pick out are: 1. Should we be advising? and 2. Who should be the advisers?

1. The first debate seems to have been resolved, and the Army has accepted that we will need to train and advise foreign nations so their security forces can take over and we can leave.

2. The second issue is much more heated and still unfolding. LTC Nagl calls for an Advisor Corps, which permanently trains and advises foreign nations. Some argue that BCTs can do it as part of their full-spectrum capabilities. Others argue that SF should do it. I think the realistic answer is that a combination of all 3 of these will continue.

First, Advisor Corps. This would be a great idea, but I don't know if it is realistic due to manpower, skills required, and personnel issues. Currently, MTT's are officer and senior NCO heavy. An Advisor Corps of 20,000 officers and senior NCO's would drain the conventional force. Finding 20,000 that are qualified and have the motivation to do it would be a further challenge. Right now, MTT's are ad hoc and largely based on dwell time. Thousands of officers and sgts are not volunteering for these assignments. One friend told me, "If I wanted to advise Iraqis, I would have submitted a packet (SF packet)." One branch was offering choice of duty AND grad school, but could not fill slots. Now because those follow-on assignments are filled, branch will try to get you a top 5 choice. Further, on the officer side, Captains want to command. The MTT is not a command track assignment, and an Adviser Corps with 2-3 year duty, delays the captain's chance to command. As the Major boards are coming earlier and earlier, this will create two tiers, those who commanded right away, and those not as lucky. We all know that despite what the Army says, command is more important than any other job. Maybe not right, but reality.

BCTs. To build internal MTTs, the BCT could task each BN with one team, or could pull up the manpower for centralized Brigade Level control and training. The manpower crunch of CPTs, MAJ, SFC's, and MSG's would definitely hurt the BNs and Brigade. To train these teams, the BCT would need to pull external resources, or send their pax to a centralized school. Standards and doctrine need to be published to allow units to train the MTT mission if it is to become a METL task. The only upside to this is cohesion, as there is increased chance these pax have worked together before, though this is not guaranteed.

SF. I am not an expert in this realm, but I know that training local forces is a SF mission. The problem in Iraq and Afghanistan is the sheer number of forces that need training and advising. The benefits of SF units are obvious; there are just not enough of them.


Where does this leave the Army? Not in a good spot. Right now, we're using a combination of these 3 methods. A centralized Advisor Corps would probably be the best solution, but I do not think it is realistic with the force we have today. It is probably the hard right, but I do not think it will happen.


This was the result of mulling over the article during PT run this morning, hopefully it makes some sense.

[John T. Fishel]

You have correctly pointed out that there are costs to all such approaches. But, it seems to me - with due respect to my friend, John Nagl - that the place to start in the long term is an expansion of SF. I would argue for 2 addtiional SF groups with #1 priority given to the FID mission. I would also expand the National Guard (or USAR) with 2 additional SF groups with the same priority. Where do we get these units? Congress has to expand the Army and that costs money and time.

We also need to do the other things because, no matter how much we expand SF, it will not be enough. However, to do what is needed in all areas and still have adequate strength for all the required conventional missions we need to expand the Army. Indeed, we may need to expand the entire armed services to the levels we had at the end of the Cold War. Note that this was a period of no draft - the AVF was well established.

Cheers

JohnT

[Distiller]

Isn't the problem the long duration of an advisory tour? Why not keep it at the same length as a combat tour?

And why not make it mandatory for higher officer and NCO ranks? Kind of cross-cultural training. Foreign/allied troops learn the American way, U.S. officers/NCOs get exposure in potential ops areas.

And I think that an Advisory Corps is totally wrong. Teacher and trainer get a good part of their value and authority from hands-on experience. An AC would be the academic approach - might as well outsource to Blackwater then!

And troops should be "advised" by their respective weapons branch officers/NCOs. Tankers by tankers, artillery by artillery, SF by SF.

Same goes for aerial and naval forces.

[John T. Fishel]

Distiller--

Advisory duty really is much more than just training American kids to be soldiers. It takes much more than being able to work in the language to do it well. It takes being alert to the fact that another country's soldiers believe that they honestly know what they need to do and that you and your advisors don't have all (or even most) of the answers. But it is in our national interest to get them to change their way of doing business. Not in every way but in some critical ways.

Let me give you 3 examples of the difficulties of an advisory effort:

1. In Honduras, I led a team that was working with the Honduran military in a situation that could have resulted in serious misunderstandings and down the road difficulties for us. My team was an ad hoc group of officers from SOUTHCOM HQ & USARSO. One of the officers was a female captain from Puerto Rico - a native Spanish speaker. At one point, she braced the Honduran LT who was working with us and began to direct him using the familiar form of you - tu. What she didn't realize was that Honduras is one of the most formal Spanish speaking countries in the world and that using tu with this officer was a serious insult. I found it necessary to intervene to remove her from the situation and repair the damage.

2. In Panama after the invasion, my organization was charged with providing the initial training for the Panamanian police who were made up of exclusively Panama Defense Force personnel brought back on duty. They had all been trained as soldiers and most had spent careers as police officers. So, when our 3 took a group of them out to the range to fire their weapons he asked if they knew how to shoot. They all answered that of course they did. So, he put them on the range and began to fire familiarization. He quickly realized that their fire discipline was a disaster and that they were "drilling holes in the sky!" So, he had to adjust and make sure they understood that they really needed some refressher training. I should add that he was a fully qualified Latin American FAO who spoke excellent Spanish and was, himself, a graduate of the Colombian Lancero (Ranger) school. No US MP who was not also a FAO could have turned that situation around.

3. Throughout our successful advisory effort in El Salvador, the USMILGP was commanded by fully qualified FAOs who were often SF as well. All the trainers were SF or FAOs (or both). Yet, from 1981 through the end of the war in 1992, the MILGP always wanted to get the Salvadorans to develop an NCO corps like ours. But it wasn't going to happen. Their military culture would not stand for it. My point is that even the best qualified US officers and NCOs in an advisory situation may well miss the point and attempt something that is undoable. Part of the problem was that tours as advisors were only a year long. As the tour was ending the advisor was just beginning to understand what was doable and what was not.

So, while I don't think John's Advisory Corps is the best solution, I do think it can serve as a fair to middling interim solution to the problem we are currently facing along with some of the other things patmc discussed.

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

Think you've well stated the current dilemma -- and it is that. The Advisor Corps isn't going to fly -- and, IMO, should not. I have to disagree with John on adding more SF Groups, they're having quality problems manning the current force structure. He is correct in saying that even were they expanded, they could not do it all.

Thus you're stuck with ad-hoc ways of getting the conventional Army to do the Advisory job when it's required. The best single thing that could be done to improve that capability is a rapid language course...

In whatever language is required in the future. Of course, my solution is don't do COIN and advising on a major level; we really don't do it well at all. Never have and that is unlikely to change. We haven't got the patience for it and one can't do that kind of stuff even marginally well if one's going to have short tours and 15 months is a short tour; 12 months is also. Seven months or less is just a visit.

We need to convince folks that hosting people who wish us ill is uncool. Best way to do that is to visit those that do so in a an unpleasant mode, wreak major destruction and leave rapidly -- saying be nice or we'll be back.

[Tom Odom]

Just to echo John T.

Sometimes even the Pros from Dover don't get it. My greatest headache in establishing a demining program in Rwanda was cultural ineptitude on the part of two successive field grade SF officers. I --using the Ambassador's charter to do so--denied one country clearance to come back into the country. The other was relieved by his chain of command at the request of USSOCEUR and yours truly, again with Ambassadorial concurrence.

I heard for way too long in my career as a FAO that basic skills counted more than intercultural skills. That is simply a dumb argument to make because you have to have both. The locals must respect you for what you know and like you for the way that you relate to them. I have known "FAOs" who might have technical skills but did not like the locals and showed it. I have also known FAOs who were fine in relating to the locals but who were tactucally clueless.

Selection of advisors has to bridge both qualities. If we go through the effort to train advisors and send then down range, we have to screen, retain, and reward those who can do the job.

Tom

[wm]

Maybe we ought to consider this from a different angle--rather than bring the Mountain (aka MTT) to Mohammed (AKA host country military), maybe we should bring Mohammed (AKA those to be trained) to the Mountain (AKA the trainers).

Once upon a time I remember doing mission planning to bring a couple of battalions worth of troops from another country here to the good old USofA and training them here. (We did not get the mission; I do not know whether it ever actually came to pass.)

Anyone have any thoughts on using that avenue as a means of getting the job done. We could develop a training cadre for another country's armed forces--sure would seem to be as cost effective as us sending a bunch of our folks down range for extended deployments. Sort of like Patrice Lumumba University on a larger, more conventionally focussed scale.

As an adjunct to this, we might try a variant on the old AC/RC partnership program--we could partner some of our units with those of the target nation's armed forces, do a training needs assessment , and let the two units work out a way forward to meet solve the training needs.

[Tom Odom]

Anyone have any thoughts on using that avenue as a means of getting the job done. We could develop a training cadre for another country's armed forces--sure would seem to be as cost effective as us sending a bunch of our folks down range for extended deployments. Sort of like Patrice Lumumba University on a larger, more conventionally focussed scale.

We have done that withn School of the Americas. It has its strengths and it has its weaknesses. We have also done it here with partnership units from the newly emerged republics and we do it as a matter of course with JMRC and flyaways. The differences are in degrees of stability in the particular country and region as well in the visibilty we and the host nation desire. There are also questions of intent and force design. When you bring another country's individual soldiers here you are training the soldier and then allowing him to adapt what he learns to his own circumstance. If you bring a unit here, then you are training that unit to do it the way we do it. That works well with some countries and less so with others. But if your intent is to assist a country by increasing its military capacity, advising on the ground with some external training is at least to me the best way to go.

Tom

[Eden]

I spent, oh, a third of my career as an intstitutional trainer but never as an adviser. I have worked with advisers, SF, and MTTs in operational settings. So my perspective is as an outsider with some theoretical knowledge. I would make a few comments.

1. Competent trainers can't spend their whole careers as trainers. They must be regreened or they lose competency fairly rapidly. The shelf life of an institutional trainer is probably about three years. Moreover, the 'training' world and the 'operational' world both benefit when you have a fairly comprehensive turnover. The operator who spent three years as a trainer tends to have a firmer grasp of his subject than one who never served as a trainer at all, while a trainer with no recent operational experience is less effective than one who has such experience.

2. As pointed out, not everybody can be a good trainer or a good adviser. Some can be both. I have seen 'experts' from the SF/FAO/agency world who were not effective in these roles; I have also seen 'non-experts' with no particular cultural, linguistic, or social preparation beyond what one gets at the deployment center, turn out to be exceptionally capable at bonding with their 'native' charges.

With that in mind, it seems self-defeating to try to form a seperate corps of soldiers who only 'do' instructing/advising. The 'foot soldiers' in this effort must be rotated in and out of the 'real' army. On the other hand, there should be a corps of specialists who do the screening, recruiting, organizing, quality control, and deep thinking. They could be drawn from a variety of sources into something like the proposed Advisory Corps. I think a model for this type of organization already exists in the British Army - unfortunately I can't recall the archaic name they have hung on it, but it started as the School of Musketry and most of its members seem to be Welsh LE commissions.
Anyway, this is a fairly small group whose sole function in life is to oversee various forms of intstitutional training. They are the experts not in the actual subjects being taught, but in the creation of training programs, the selection and training of instructors, the evaluation of programs, and the creation of appropriate standards. They are seeded throughout the training world and work directly for training commanders, but they are guided by a strong sense of expertise and a firm belief in the principles of their corps. They also drink like fish, but that may just be a British thing.
What we would have to add is a cultural/linguistic element and perhaps some regional orientation.

[John T. Fishel]

with one of the Salvadoran Immediate Reaction Battalions - all 1200 soldiers. It simply was too expensive to continue.

The School of the Americas and its successor, the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, generally trained soldiers and officers in individual skills. USARSA, when it was in Panama, did run courses for classes of a number of Latin American military academies usually given at the end of pre-commisioning. Another feature of USARSA was its Guest Instructor program where Latin American officers were integrated into the faculty.

That said, neither USARSA nor WHINSEC are really effective training programs for large units. We also did some police training - I think for Haiti - on certain US Army posts with courses run by both military and police. Again, it is expensive and I'm not sure how effective it is. The best one seems to have been the Salvadoran but it took a big chunk of 7th SFG to do it and was, as I said, prohibitively expensive.

JohnT

[Ken White]

Not only my experience but most people I've ever talked to at any length on the topics corroborate your two numbered points.

This:
...On the other hand, there should be a corps of specialists who do the screening, recruiting, organizing, quality control, and deep thinking. They could be drawn from a variety of sources into something like the proposed Advisory Corps.I believe is very true and very important. We are going to be -- have to be -- a total spectrum force whether that is liked or not. We have that capability to be that, all that's required is the will and effort. What you say is a requisite first step; we simply have to better select and screen people for jobs. The key to doing that well is, as you say:
...Anyway, this is a fairly small group whose sole function in life is to oversee various forms of intstitutional training... (emphasis added /kw)The bureaucracy is a BIG part of the problem...
...What we would have to add is a cultural/linguistic element and perhaps some regional orientation.T-MAAG...

[wm]

We have done that withn School of the Americas. It has its strengths and it has its weaknesses. We have also done it here with partnership units from the newly emerged republics and we do it as a matter of course with JMRC and flyaways. The differences are in degrees of stability in the particular country and region as well in the visibilty we and the host nation desire. There are also questions of intent and force design. When you bring another country's individual soldiers here you are training the soldier and then allowing him to adapt what he learns to his own circumstance. If you bring a unit here, then you are training that unit to do it the way we do it. That works well with some countries and less so with others. But if your intent is to assist a country by increasing its military capacity, advising on the ground with some external training is at least to me the best way to go.

Tom
Gee Tom, it sounds like we need someone to clarify the goals (both the US's and those of the countries we are assisting) then, don't we? :wry:

I agree with you that an in-country presence in a stable environment is probably the best way to try to improve an existing capacity. It does not require importing a ton of resources to execute, and one can observe and critique in a relatively leisurely way. It is sort of like coaching a sports team during an unopposed scrimmage.

But, we do not seem to have that sort of luxury in the current AOR. Instead, we are playing an away match in a hostile stadium (think England v. Italy in Rome playing a Round 1 World Cup spoccer match) in a "best-of-seven" tournament. We are looking to replace our A side with the freshman side, even though the score in the current match is still close, there are at least 4 or 5 more matches to play, and the other side is slipping in ringers from last year's world championship team to play in the "skill" positions.

Maybe if we can get the freshman side away from the distractions, give them some good training sessions on a "neutral" pitch away from the screaming fans in the stadium, and simultaneously slip some of our own "A" side ringers in to help out the team we are using to substitute for the very tired folks currently on the pitch, we can build a dynasty that will win this time and hold on to the championship for years to come.

I know the problems with sports metaphors. Please insert "achieve a desireable and sustainable outcome" for "win this time and hold on to the championship for years to come."

[wm]

Not only my experience but most people I've ever talked to at any length on the topics corroborate your two numbered points.

This:I believe is very true and very important. We are going to be -- have to be -- a total spectrum force whether that is liked or not. We have that capability to be that, all that's required is the will and effort. What you say is a requisite first step; we simply have to better select and screen people for jobs. The key to doing that well is, as you say:The bureaucracy is a BIG part of the problem...T-MAAG...

Sure sounds like "train the trainers" to me, Ken. With the added point that we do an especially good job at selecting that initial cadre. Maybe we could use some of our SF brethern as that cadre to train our "conventional" folks as a break from their deployments.

[Ken White]

Sure sounds like "train the trainers" to me, Ken. With the added point that we do an especially good job at selecting that initial cadre. Maybe we could use some of our SF brethern as that cadre to train our "conventional" folks as a break from their deployments.Whoops -- already used that line once today...;)

All true. Get SF off the fun of door kicking and back to their less fun and hard work primary job and that's easily achievable. Been done before, works well.

Interesting aside on the selection of the initial cadre. The Infantry School back in the '70s tried an experiment with IOBC. They decided to go to a Cadre process and selected a really sharp CPT, LT, 1SG and four SFCs. Ran the Class. It did great -- exceeded all the norms and broke records on everything. All observers agreed it was a highly beneficial effort and di great things. Then they tried to replicate that Cadre throughout the IOBC Bn. Pipeline couldn't support the quality required.

So said all involved. My take was that the pipeline wouldn't support the quality involved, a different thing...

[wm]

Interesting aside on the selection of the initial cadre. The Infantry School back in the '70s tried an experiment with IOBC. They decided to go to a Cadre process and selected a really sharp CPT, LT, 1SG and four SFCs. Ran the Class. It did great -- exceeded all the norms and broke records on everything. All observers agreed it was a highly beneficial effort and di great things. Then they tried to replicate that Cadre throughout the IOBC Bn. Pipeline couldn't support the quality required.

So said all involved. My take was that the pipeline wouldn't support the quality involved, a different thing...

Saw interesting outputs tied to quality of Platoon Level cadre at ROTC advanced camp--cadet platoons with good RA cadre (SFC and CPT) did great stuff, platoons with not so great cadre did less well. (I can here you saying "duh!!!" now--wait for it.) To your "could versus would" point, good cadre was hard to come by--no one who was a fast burner wanted to be sent off to be ROTC cadre. Funny thing though--platoons with a high percentage of prior service cadets seemed to do better with poor cadre than with good cadre (maybe it was because it was what they were used to when they were EM).

[John T. Fishel]

want to expand SF (or the entire force) precipitously.:eek: My focus was pretty long term. IMHO SF should never reduce quality - I am skeptical of direct accession. Would much rather see SF accessing real sergeants than ones who just came on board.

But I am concerned with how we solve the short and medium term problems better. John's Advisor corps idea ought to be looked at and possibly tweaked.

On re-greening. Yes, very important. But there are several ways to skin that cat. SF does it one way. Other units will do it differently. But it always needs to be done. Is that one of the costs of making SF a branch?

Writ large, the Army (armed forces) have passed a lot of functions off to the private sector. We can't just take them all back all at once. (Some we may never want to take back!) But for those functions that should be returned to the Army, it will take time, increased force structure, and more $.- lots more!:(

Cheers

JohnT

[Tom Odom]

I agree with you that an in-country presence in a stable environment is probably the best way to try to improve an existing capacity. It does not require importing a ton of resources to execute, and one can observe and critique in a relatively leisurely way. It is sort of like coaching a sports team during an unopposed scrimmage.

I am not saying that is the ideal; merely that it is probably the easiest if all we are doing is training them.


But, we do not seem to have that sort of luxury in the current AOR. Instead, we are playing an away match in a hostile stadium (think England v. Italy in Rome playing a Round 1 World Cup spoccer match) in a "best-of-seven" tournament. We are looking to replace our A side with the freshman side, even though the score in the current match is still close, there are at least 4 or 5 more matches to play, and the other side is slipping in ringers from last year's world championship team to play in the "skill" positions.

Maybe if we can get the freshman side away from the distractions, give them some good training sessions on a "neutral" pitch away from the screaming fans in the stadium, and simultaneously slip some of our own "A" side ringers in to help out the team we are using to substitute for the very tired folks currently on the pitch, we can build a dynasty that will win this time and hold on to the championship for years to come.



Sports metaphors aside, we don't have the luxury in the current wars to do what you propose. Certainly we are doing limited training abroad (as in outside the AOR) and we have even had small elements here. In any case, there is something to be said for doing it on the ground where it counts the most.

And that is where advising differs from training. The advisor lives and fights with his counterparts; the trainer gives the training in the field or classroom and then is done.


Gee Tom, it sounds like we need someone to clarify the goals (both the US's and those of the countries we are assisting) then, don't we?

Yeah and it is a hell of a lot harder to do than it is to put it in a rhetorical question. That, too, is very much part of advising.

Tom

[wm]

And that is where advising differs from training. The advisor lives and fights with his counterparts; the trainer gives the training in the field or classroom and then is done.


Need not be that way. We used to send our AC battalion that was detailed to do RC training support to beautiful Camp Shelby, MS to live and work with their ARNG counterparts for the duration of the summer AT sessions--they lived, worked, and played together for the duration.


BTW, I was not trying to be flippant with my point about clarifying the goal. I was suggesting that we do not seem to have unity of purpose between the MTT plan and the overall plan for our commitments in the AOR, probably because IMHO we do not seem to have a clearly articulated and consistent set of goal statements. It is pretty hard to plan and execute an operation successfully without a clear and consistent mission statement/statement of commander's intent.

[Rob Thornton]

I think the realistic answer is that a combination of all 3 of these will continue.

Pat I think you've nailed it. There are questions of capabilities and questions of capacity. There are "surge" requirements and "steady state" requirements.

While ARSOF has a great deal of capability with regard to FID (for reasons of character selection, because they receive specialized training, and because the missions they do build experience in those areas), the capacity requirements have created conditions where the demand outstrips what was up to time our answer as a resource. There are also other missions which have increased the OPTEMPO for all of our SOF. I'd say one of the great things about ARSOF is that offers us a capability to work with indigenous forces where the infrastructure and sustainment mechanisms are immature, and they offer us a higher probability of success when the outcome requires people with special character, training and skills we don't normally see in the GPF.

With regard to BCTs, the reality on the ground is that BCTs are being placed in conditions that often require them to either field, augment, or support the gamut of transition teams. The character of the BCT CDR determines how successful they will be. Even within a BCT though, there are issues of capability and capacity - e.g. if a BCT gets asked to field a BDE MiTT, and 3 x BN MiTTs to work with an IA BDE on a 1:1 ratio, that is pretty well withing both their capability and capacity - considering that they still must conduct day to day offensive and defensive operations, and support the TTs they have fielded. If however that same BCT got asked to work on a 1 to say 6 ratio they would have a capacity issue. If they got asked to provide 2 IA BDES worth of MiTTs, 6 x PTTs (police) and 6 x BTTs, they'd have both a capacity and a capability issue. This last bit is important, because although we are using military teams to train PTTs, SpTTs, and BTTs, the skill set we as a military bring to a table is not going to be a perfect lift for training police (although we probably could mitigate that some with a good train up - in the end, we are often the only folks who can operate in those conditions). If a BCT was given the mission to do more, far enough out to do a good MA, and were given the additional resources (time, augmentation, special training, etc.) they could improve more I think - but you can only pile the plate so high before stuff falls off. I'd add that as more people come from TTs back into BCTs, the training base for the BCTs to draw on with regard to understanding the advisory mission is growing.

Individual augmentees brought together in an Ad-Hoc fashion - will remain a staple I think for as long as our steady state looks like it does now, or increases - ex. the need for more TTs in Afghanistan has already been identified. While this is far from perfect, it does allow for some tailored solutions. It goes not only to what normally springs to mind when we say "advisory effort" in Iraq now, but also to the PRTs, and the advisory teams that work at the ministerial levels working to build institutions and bureaucracy's that supports the kind of DOTMLPF developmental challenges HN security forces must create to support the government. Yes it is ad-hoc, but I'd say mostly these teams have done OK (and in many cases better then OK, and a few not so good), and at a time where manning is so critical across the force, it may just be the best we can do. I'm not saying we can't or should not tighten up with regard to HRC selection - particularly when there is a critical advisory job that requires both specific technical experience and professional maturity, but I am saying that within the broader context of the mission in Iraq, I think we continue to get better at it.

Some of the problems we create for ourselves. Ex. if a BN CDR responsible for day to day security operations in a city has assessed that the HN Army forces or doing pretty good and can stand on their own with minimal assistance, but the police need allot of help or they are going to fail, and he does not have the organic combat power to form PTTs out of hide, should he have the authority to reorient those ad-hoc, non-organic MiTTs in his AOR to turn them into PTTs? My point is that every set of conditions is a little different and somebody has to be in charge of the limited resources available in order to move things forward as effectively and efficiently as they can be, we often create self inflicted GSWs with regard to making it difficult for the tactical and operational commanders to adapt to the conditions that are emerging vs. the ones somebody sees from way back in space, time, or both.

The last think I'd say to consider, where does this mission go in the future? After Iraq and Afghanistan (whatever that means in years) do we believe that we no longer have a capacity issue? If you have no capability in a given area, then do you have any capacity? If you believe that you are going to have capability and capacity issues in meeting requirements generated as a result of a broader strategy, or FP - how do you institutionalize it do where you don't have to go through the Ad-Hoc process we did in Iraq and Afghanistan? What is the risk to the GPF for doing so? What is the risk for not?

These are some of the challenges with regard to determining where SFA (Security Force Assistance) needs to go, but they are not all. No easy answers.

BTW - I talked with a BCT S-1 this last week, he told me they had projected inbound for their unit reset a total of three FGs for the BCT - they will go through the reset like everybody else, piecemeal, and hopefully they'll have all their folks prior to deploying, but I'd be willing to bet there will be some 03s filling some 04 holes, and 02s filling some 03 holes - things are tough all over.

Best Regards, Rob

[John T. Fishel]

What interests me is the command relationship between the BCT cdr and the MiTTs in his AO. If he has them OPCON he should have no problem at all. If they are TACON then he should be able to give them a new mission. But, it it is any other relationship he has a problem - greater or smaller but a problem (or should I say challenge:rolleyes:). Of course, if he is a culturally insenstive jerk then I, for one, don't want him to have OPCON or TACON of the MiTT.

What is the "normal" command relationship in this situation?

Cheers

JohnT

[Tom Odom]

What interests me is the command relationship between the BCT cdr and the MiTTs in his AO. If he has them OPCON he should have no problem at all. If they are TACON then he should be able to give them a new mission. But, it it is any other relationship he has a problem - greater or smaller but a problem (or should I say challenge:rolleyes:). Of course, if he is a culturally insenstive jerk then I, for one, don't want him to have OPCON or TACON of the MiTT.

What is the "normal" command relationship in this situation?

Cheers

JohnT


It is very much a function of AO and commanders. And it is a balancing act--without a command relationship, the MiTTs suffer on support. With a tight command relationship they risk becoming an extension of the BCT and that affects their role with their host nation forces.

Rob of course can offer more detail

Best

Tom

[John T. Fishel]

the balancing act. About what I expected. Especially since we have a propensity to ignore our own doctrine on such things as command relationships - witness UNOSOM II:rolleyes:

Cheers

JohnT

[John Nagl]

I appreciate the learned discussion the NYT Op-Ed on an Advisor Corps generated, but I feel the need to clear up a persistent misunderstanding about my Advisor Corps proposal. It is not a BRANCH--like the Military Police Corps or the Adjutant General's Corps--but a UNIT, like the XVIIIth ABN Corps or the III Corps. Thus, soldiers rotate into and out of it. The original CNAS paper was pretty clear on this point:

"This proposed organization would solve the vast majority of the problems afflicting embedded combat advisors—providing them with doctrine, training, and a permanent home. Service members would be transferred to the Advisor Corps for a standard three-year Army tour of duty, during which they should expect to deploy for one year and then hand off the mission to the next advisory division, facilitating the consolidation of lessons learned. Upon the end of their combat tours, some advisors could remain at the Advisor Corps as trainers and doctrine writers, while others could return to the conventional Army sporting their new “Combat Advisor” tab—which should give them a competitive advantage for promotion as the advisory mission becomes the main effort in both Iraq and Afghanistan over the next few years."

The proposed increase in the size of the Afghan National Army, from 80,000 to 120,000, will only increase the already unmet demand for Combat Advisors. We need to do that task better, and we need to do it soon. The discussion on the Small Wars Journal is important in building consensus at least on that need, if not on how to solve the problems afflicting our current answer to this pressing problem.

[ODB]

I tend to try to learn from history and view those lessons as they apply today. Many are in agreement that current force structure/force taskings are misutilizing todays forces. Many think various branchs should grow, the military should grow, and the debate goes on. My number one questions is why do we even do rotations/tours? It is my personal belief that when the order was given we should have gone with everything we own. Not half our force and relay later on units rotating out. If we would have brought the full brunt of our military from the beginning would we be in the situation we are? We would have enough SF to conduct FID/COIN operations, conventional forces to #1. Secure all borders (we can't do that here) nothing in nothing out, 2# Man damn never every city, town, village. We could lock the entire country down. Unfortunately our politicians and society has deemed war a game to be played fairly, humanely, and without true force. How many times did units rotate out of WWII? I remember reading a few years back about guys who were gone for 7 years straight. I look at it like this, we do it the right way over a period of five years straight or do we play this game for 10-15 years.

Don't remember who posted about the SF growth and subsequent postings. Problem is the Army's inate ability to manage personnel. They knew for years close to 50% of SF would be retirement eligable over a 5 year period, guess what they did just that retired and went elsewhere. So the Army says hey 20 years ago we brought guys off the streets straight into SF it worked then why not now. Problem is that huge 50% of retirees. 20 years ago a few sprinkled inexperienced guys could be trained, mentored, and developed by seniors without a ripple effect throughout the force. Not mention these college educated, 4 years SF experience with multiple tours are ripe for every other agency and private sector jobs out there, how many are stick around? If I'm not mistaken the average age in SF has gone from 32 years to 27years...huge experience and maturity gap.

What all this does is tie into the fact that everyone wants to do everyone elses job. Conventional forces want to do what SF does, guys in SF want to do what Infantry guys do and so on and so on. If everyone stayed within their capabilities and scope of things they would stay busier than ever and we would be leaps and bounds ahead of where we are currently. Yes there are many great individuals throughout the force and many different entities actually conduct joint operations as it should be. Unfortunately for everyone of those there is more not doing this.

Sorry I kinda rambled have a million more thoughts but will spare you those and save them for later.

[Distiller]

I tend to try to learn from history and view those lessons as they apply today. Many are in agreement that current force structure/force taskings are misutilizing todays forces. Many think various branchs should grow, the military should grow, and the debate goes on. My number one questions is why do we even do rotations/tours? It is my personal belief that when the order was given we should have gone with everything we own. Not half our force and relay later on units rotating out. If we would have brought the full brunt of our military from the beginning would we be in the situation we are? We would have enough SF to conduct FID/COIN operations, conventional forces to #1. Secure all borders (we can't do that here) nothing in nothing out, 2# Man damn never every city, town, village. We could lock the entire country down. Unfortunately our politicians and society has deemed war a game to be played fairly, humanely, and without true force. How many times did units rotate out of WWII? I remember reading a few years back about guys who were gone for 7 years straight. I look at it like this, we do it the right way over a period of five years straight or do we play this game for 10-15 years.

Don't remember who posted about the SF growth and subsequent postings. Problem is the Army's inate ability to manage personnel. They knew for years close to 50% of SF would be retirement eligable over a 5 year period, guess what they did just that retired and went elsewhere. So the Army says hey 20 years ago we brought guys off the streets straight into SF it worked then why not now. Problem is that huge 50% of retirees. 20 years ago a few sprinkled inexperienced guys could be trained, mentored, and developed by seniors without a ripple effect throughout the force. Not mention these college educated, 4 years SF experience with multiple tours are ripe for every other agency and private sector jobs out there, how many are stick around? If I'm not mistaken the average age in SF has gone from 32 years to 27years...huge experience and maturity gap.

What all this does is tie into the fact that everyone wants to do everyone elses job. Conventional forces want to do what SF does, guys in SF want to do what Infantry guys do and so on and so on. If everyone stayed within their capabilities and scope of things they would stay busier than ever and we would be leaps and bounds ahead of where we are currently. Yes there are many great individuals throughout the force and many different entities actually conduct joint operations as it should be. Unfortunately for everyone of those there is more not doing this.

Sorry I kinda rambled have a million more thoughts but will spare you those and save them for later.


That's foremost a societal thing. Even in a volunteer service - who is willing to spend his life in the bogs, some desert or jungle, when others of his age have a familiy life, are much more comfortable and prosperous?

Excessive rotations and ratios of 6 or 7 to 1 are certainly undesireable. 4 to 1 I guess should be the goal. But the current armed forces still have a structure that is designed for a full-scale blow-up in case of mobilisation with a very top heavy structure. Also don't forget all the perks and promotions that come with deployments - everybody wants a piece!

And it's also a question of mentality. The warrior spirit, or whatever you might call it. Not doing it as a job, or as duty for the fatherland, but out of a mentality (not necessarily one compatible with civil society). It would also need a vastly different social structure of the forces, a different definition of duty, discipline, ranks. Strategic compression in the extreme, and almost like a religious order. Takes a certain desperado mentality. People who are fed up with society, those who are running away from something - you end with something like the Légion Etrangère. No way to build larger forces on that.

A more realistic way might be foreigners. Promise them U.S. citizenship and an education for X years in the bogs. No need to rotate them. The Byzantine way.

[Rob Thornton]

What is the "normal" command relationship in this situation?

Hi John, I think Tom has got the most important piece of it:


It is very much a function of AO and commanders. And it is a balancing act--without a command relationship, the MiTTs suffer on support. With a tight command relationship they risk becoming an extension of the BCT and that affects their role with their host nation forces.

The role of the BCT CDR cannot be underestimated. Depending upon who he is and what the conditions are - such as: is there an existing TT structure in his AOR?; what is the enemy situation?; how big is the AOR?; what types of HN security forces and how many are there in his AOR?; how mature are they, and do they work together?; what do the CDR's other LOEs (Lines of Effort) look like? and a host of other questions shape the situation.

Add into it the way those conditions shape the other players and the challenges of the CDR to retain balance grow.

Over the last two weeks we've interviewed three different BCTs who operated in Iraq at the same time, but in different locations. All inherited different conditions and as such approached the problem different from one another. It had to be that way, a cookie cutter solution would have resulted in problems, and tied their hands in a number of ways. That is one of the strengths I think in the way we develop leaders, and we should exploit that strength at all levels. They employed different organizational solutions, different TTPs, different emphases, and different levels of trust based on the conditions and personalities in their AOR.

What I think needs to be emphasized is the CMD vision that begins in this case with MNF-I, comes down through MNC-I and MNSTC-I to the various GO level commands such as MND-N or MND-B, or IAG (at least at my time) and makes its way out to all subordinate commands, so that regardless of the conditions, the desired endstate and key components of that vision are understood - so that even as the tactical and operational level leaders adapt to the conditions in their AOR(s), they are still guided by overarching themes.

Unity of command may not always be required (or desired if the personalities don't support it (of course if its a personality issue, the personality in question may need to be addressed)), but unity of effort is critical! Whatever supports Unity of Effort should be the rule, if things are tracking because the right personalities are in place and the current command relationship works and works well, then it may not be a requirement, but if the current command relationship is broke - either because somebody in the chain is recalcitrant, does not get it, or is just so removed in time, space, and understanding as to be ineffective and incapable of good consistent judgment, then the command relationship needs to be adjusted as to support unity of effort.

I'll put up a summary of the last couple of weeks over the next few days that captures the different approaches and some of why those approaches were chosen - maybe on the SWJ blog - I just need to catch my breath and sit down and do it.

The three big take aways - BCT CDRs have a key role in SFA in Iraq, there should not be a "cookie cutter" approach to how this is done, and there absolutely must be unity of effort.

Best, Rob

[Gian P Gentile]

Of course, my solution is don't do COIN and advising on a major level; we really don't do it well at all. Never have and that is unlikely to change. We haven't got the patience for it and one can't do that kind of stuff even marginally well if one's going to have short tours and 15 months is a short tour; 12 months is also. Seven months or less is just a visit.

We need to convince folks that hosting people who wish us ill is uncool. Best way to do that is to visit those that do so in a an unpleasant mode, wreak major destruction and leave rapidly -- saying be nice or we'll be back.

Ken:

Sage advice from you as usual. Too bad others in higher places might not be listening. I think your plainly spoken words might be a good recipe for Afghanistan.

WM here seems to agree:


I agree with you that an in-country presence in a stable environment is probably the best way to try to improve an existing capacity. It does not require importing a ton of resources to execute, and one can observe and critique in a relatively leisurely way. It is sort of like coaching a sports team during an unopposed scrimmage.

But, we do not seem to have that sort of luxury in the current AOR. Instead, we are playing an away match in a hostile stadium (think England v. Italy in Rome playing a Round 1 World Cup spoccer match) in a "best-of-seven" tournament.

If we can get the policy right then many of the recommendations by others on this thread like John Fishel and Tom Odom makes sense.

gian

[ODB]

"Excessive rotations and ratios of 6 or 7 to 1 are certainly undesireable. 4 to 1 I guess should be the goal. But the current armed forces still have a structure that is designed for a full-scale blow-up in case of mobilisation with a very top heavy structure. Also don't forget all the perks and promotions that come with deployments - everybody wants a piece!"

One of the issues with constantly rotating units is the lack of stability in regions. One unit does things one way the next unit reinvents the wheel and this cycle keeps repeating itself. I'll play my own devil's advocate in that I know this can also be beneficial in the fact that different approachs and views can solve problems as well. Unfortunately about the time you build a good working, trusting relationship with the local population your tours done and the relationship building starts again. Additionally with unit rotations this could be minimized by rotating the same units in the same areas, many of the local population will remember many of the units personnel thereby building the relationship quicker. This also needs to happen here at home between the SOF community and conventional forces. There is no reason why SOF units and conventional forces cannot link up and train together prior to deployment, this alone would prevent a lot infighting and help establish each others roles within BCT AORs. When BCT commanders have a good feel for the forces within their AOR, a solid working relationship built prior to deployment, and their capabilities and assets they bring to the table these CDRs are much more likely to utilize them properly.


want to expand SF (or the entire force) precipitously. My focus was pretty long term. IMHO SF should never reduce quality - I am skeptical of direct accession. Would much rather see SF accessing real sergeants than ones who just came on board.

A realistic approach to this would be direct accession of mid level NCOs. Bring them into the SF Groups for a 90-120 day assessment period. After that time of assessment you would either make them 18 series or they would return to their normal capacity. This would mainly work within MOS that are compatible ie 11B = 18B, wouldn't be able to this for medics but many of these guys could go to the school house later to receive medical training. This additionally would help fill the void with seasoned NCOs without taking them out of the fight for 12-24 months for formal training. There use to be a policy in place to be able to do this don't know if they still exist or not but would be a great way to boost the force, down side is many conventional forces would be losing quality NCOs that otherwise might not have made the switch.

[William F. Owen]

Sorry, I may be over simplifying this but, isn't the raison d'etre of every officer and NCO to be able to able to train and lead troops?

So if said officers and NCO's can speak a second language, they can lead and train troops using that language, (assuming no cultural impedimenta versus the target audience).

So you have the ability to train and a second language. What more is needed? Form specialist training cadres as and when required. That's how the UK does it. All you need is a good language training programme.

[Hacksaw]

Wilf,
You ask what is the difference... Essentially I would tell you the difference is scope. The US has a good language training program as well, but it, like everything else, is stretched at the seams. LTC Nagl's proposal for a 20k MTOE unit pulls at those seems as well. If I understand Gian correctly, we primarily have a policy crisis. To use an analogy, it appears we (US and closest allies) have behaved similarly to a character in "Caddy Shack". As Spalding approaches the snack shop he starts listing all the things he "wants". In a sense, we have done the same thing... and created a lot of indigestion.

Live well and row

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Wilf,


So you have the ability to train and a second language. What more is needed? Form specialist training cadres as and when required. That's how the UK does it. All you need is a good language training programme.

It is also worth noting that "trainer" and "Advisor" are not synonymous. Neither do the qualities that make a good commander of “his” or “her” unit directly transfer to the role an advisor plays – part of which is to build confidence by having his or her counterpart assess the situation independently and make decisions.

You can train someone in rote style fashion to run a range, to qualify on a system, to conduct a battle drill, even to conduct planning. Lots of science available in training. Advising however is also a great deal of art – it means assessing the situation as your counterpart sees it, and helping him to reach the right conclusions while at the same time judging when to pick up the ball if the consequences of the wrong decision are such that they cannot be recovered from. Certainly being technically, and tactically competent in the area you are advising is critical – nobody wants an advisor who lacks a skill set, however, the ability to influence – bending without breaking is important to the long term success. As such personality matters – and attributes and traits play a role in how successful the mission is. These people exist in all of our formations, and yes I think the leaders who we often identify as folks we’d follow anywhere or would wish to work for again posses, or often possess them in spades. However, we still advance people we would not wish to follow anywhere, or would not wish to work for again, sometimes its out of necessity, some times its an oversight – but it is what it is. Sometimes we would do one, but not the other – i.e. we would welcome the hard, authoritarian character of a professional who was competent under the toughest conditions, but we would not want to work for them otherwise. Sometimes we’d be willing to work for a guy in other conditions, but might not want them leading troops into combat. The best advisors I’ve seen embodied both – they could give advice without actually running the HN force for themselves – micro management breeds apathy, and we have to be very careful there.

Best, Rob

P.S. Tom, I think you had a good idea on the need for a spinoff thread.

[ODB]

Might be misplaced here but I think it goes along with the subject. We all have our personal preferences on what to train the HN forces in. In here lies part of the problem. Along with deciding the proper force to use to train HN forces we need to standardize their training across the board. Accordingly this training is based on the type of HN force unit. Many of the basic tasks can be and should be trained identically throughout the host nation. A standard POI should be developed for all basic tasks for all forces to use to train HN forces. This would help HN forces training progression along with replacement units knowing the HN forces level of training and capabilities. In a dream world this would be easy to implement, but unfortunately many of us know we have a difficult time doing this with our own forces. Would like to know your thoughts on this?

[Stan]

Hey ODB,


...This would help HN forces training progression along with replacement units knowing the HN forces level of training and capabilities. In a dream world this would be easy to implement, but unfortunately many of us know we have a difficult time doing this with our own forces. Would like to know your thoughts on this?

Good points.

It wasn't long ago (circa 2003) that only Army CA, FAOs and G-5 personnel received training in the execution of host nation relations. That said, they had little to do with developing operational doctrine (once known as "host nation engagement strategies") for the theater CINCs or ASCC. Before we begin training based on HN capabilities (or shortcomings), a little lesson in relations at the tactical level is in order.

BTW, welcome aboard First Class :p

Regards, Stan

[Tom Odom]

Might be misplaced here but I think it goes along with the subject. We all have our personal preferences on what to train the HN forces in. In here lies part of the problem. Along with deciding the proper force to use to train HN forces we need to standardize their training across the board. Accordingly this training is based on the type of HN force unit. Many of the basic tasks can be and should be trained identically throughout the host nation. A standard POI should be developed for all basic tasks for all forces to use to train HN forces. This would help HN forces training progression along with replacement units knowing the HN forces level of training and capabilities. In a dream world this would be easy to implement, but unfortunately many of us know we have a difficult time doing this with our own forces. Would like to know your thoughts on this?


Yes as long as we are cautious and measured in applying such models. I say that because in my earlier life as a DATT in Rwanda I had worked closely with the Rwandans, USEUCOM, and USSOCEUR to model the proposed training to Rwandan capabilities and needs. 3rd SFG of course was to get the mission and I had a 3rd SFG LNO with me while all of this was agreed to. What happened afterward was the battalion that actually got the mission turned around and took the training plan for Cambodia from 1st Group and tried to implement it. Caused major problems that went all the way to Vice President level to sort out, all of which could have been avoided had the unit listend to its own LNO.

Standardized training can work if applied intelligently. What does not work are cookie cutters. The cookies never come out quite right. Africa is chock a block full of military hardware from that approach. All of this goes back to the art of the advisor because if things are set up correctly, the advisor should be influencing the program versus merely conducting a set training program or managing training accounts from an embassy SAO.

best

Tom

[John T. Fishel]

on his own work, it is wise, perhaps, to listen to what he has to say.:D John Nagl's post caused me to go to the original CNAS piece (which I confess, I had not read- Sorry John:o). It is well thought out and, more importantly, makes the case to solve certain current problems.

That still leaves some of the issues we've discussed here as relevant and raises a few others. The original piece does not, for instance, address the command relationship question in the field. What, for example, is the relationship between the Advisor Corps commander in his role as advisor to the MOD and the Joint Force Commander? And with the Ambassador? Not that these are unresolvable issues but they will come up - perhaps more strongly with a MTOE organization than ad hoc ones.

Another issue is doctrine proponency. As I understand it the Advisor Corps would be a deployable unit - in some cases the primary one (hopefully most of the time). The Imperial XVIII Airborne Corps doesn't write airborne doctrine - TRADOC institutions do. So, what John is proposing is that the 4 star TRADOC commander cede his responsibility for advisor doctrine to the 3 star commander of the Advisor Corps. I know, we all felt that we in the field knew what the doctrine should be much better than any doctrine writers. But, did we have the time to do it right? My greatest frustrations were not that somebody else was writing the doctrine but that my (and others like me) comments, critiques, and objections were not being taken seriously and were simply ignored. This aspect of the proposal needs, IMO, refinement to resolve a potential problem that is sure to arise. My own suggestion would be an Advisor Corps LNO cell at CAC where, I think, the doctrine proponency should reside.

One more issue is how long the Advisor Corps should exist. I don't think I have seen a better way to address current problems which will exist for some period of time. But if the Army needs to expand to meet a new peer threat will we continue to need the Advisor Corps of 20,000? Alternatively, is an Advisor Corps the best solution for the long term or would expanded SF do better?

What about task organizing BnAT with elements of an SFODA?

Worth the debate. Thanks John, for sending us back to the original full piece.

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

Said item is refreshed about as well as it can be -- but I did not change my mind.

The Advisory Corps is not a good idea. Some reasons why:

As slowly as we react, given a decision to do that today, it would take three years to stand up. Will it be required or desired in three years? Possibly, possibly not

Will it probably be required in three years and into the future. Possibly in the three year window, beyond that, I'm quite skeptical. My suspicion is that Congress is going to be very skeptical of any large commitment to FID (emphasis on large) anywhere in the world for some time. As they should be.

I say they should be because we do not do FID at all well. The Advisory Corps idea envisions a series of one year tours and the theory is that the Corps will force or ensconce continuity of effort. I submit that rotations of those in command will not provide the continuity envisioned. The fix to that is to make it a five or six year tour with three or four spent in the AO. Don't think that will fly and lacking that, the rotation will adversely impact the Advisory effort.

If my very flaky Math skills are correct, the Advisory corps would require a rotating crop of over 600 MAJ, 120 LTC and over 34 COL. While I believe the US Army to be over-officered, I don't think the overage will cover that at all well and I submit that rank structure will effectively remove the field Grade complement of over 10 BCT -- or strip a lot of staffs (which may be a good thing...). I do not think the Army can afford an Advisory Corps.

Using the ask for fifteen, expect ten and get five rationale, what about an Advisory Division? That means your problem is only a third as large. That is still quite high cost for a capability that MAY be required -- and may not be...

Capability to provide adequate language training spaces(and in which languages?) is highly suspect.

Better to adapt the T-MAAG concept and keep the Advisory element training at Riley going while ramping up language training and developing accelerated language training (six to 12 weeks) to minimal conversational competence in likely languages.

A far greater problem than our admittedly ad-hoc and in some ways flawed current advisory effort is our tendency to short change our nominal allies in the host nation on equipment. Troops without shoes using hand me down will tend to have problems.

I have no question that attempts to pull us into small wars will occur for the next few years. I do question the way some propose to handle them. We should play to our strength, not deliberately plan to do something we have proven we do not do well.

[ODB]

Alternatively, is an Advisor Corps the best solution for the long term or would expanded SF do better?

I think we can all agree toda's SF is stretched thin, add to the fact the State Dept missions are being picked up again for SF during their time between deployments. Growing them is not a bad call but to what extent beyond the current growth? The residual growth needed as well, schools, bases, ranges. Current trends on installations is all land and ranges have been given to BCTs and SF Groups are left to beg BCTs for land and ranges or train off site. The trend seems to be heading towards squeezing SF out of the picture. Looking at the current picture Conventional forces conducting FID and COIN, loss of land and ranges......and this articlehttp://www.veteransofspecialforces.org/Main/Archives/long_farewell.html which is also in SOF magazine with the title Demise of the Green Berets.



What about task organizing BnAT with elements of an SFODA?

This would make a tremendous amout of sense. FID being an SF mission to begin with the elements that are required to support, train, equip, etc... HN forces are in place. Gives the MTT/AG a direct source of support, allows ODAs to focus on COIN/UW if needed and the ability to supplement the MTT/AG in training. Could be a win, win situation, but those a rare.


Yes as long as we are cautious and measured in applying such models. I say that because in my earlier life as a DATT in Rwanda I had worked closely with the Rwandans, USEUCOM, and USSOCEUR to model the proposed training to Rwandan capabilities and needs. 3rd SFG of course was to get the mission and I had a 3rd SFG LNO with me while all of this was agreed to. What happened afterward was the battalion that actually got the mission turned around and took the training plan for Cambodia from 1st Group and tried to implement it. Caused major problems that went all the way to Vice President level to sort out, all of which could have been avoided had the unit listend to its own LNO.

Standardized training can work if applied intelligently. What does not work are cookie cutters. The cookies never come out quite right. Africa is chock a block full of military hardware from that approach. All of this goes back to the art of the advisor because if things are set up correctly, the advisor should be influencing the program versus merely conducting a set training program or managing training accounts from an embassy SAO.

This touch on an earlier post of mine dealing with lack of cooperation between units. Too many closed minded people making decisions, not looking at what is already in place and what the lessons learned are. Many people need to learn it for themselves, instead of taking advice from another unit or organization. Personally have seen this many times over my career and never understood it, will save that for another time perhaps. I completely agree with not having a cookie cutter solution, except in basic tasks, those which can be applied across the board. Skill level I and II for the most part. A good part of the problem is the TTP's being taught to HN forces are not consistent throughout the country. One HN unit is taught one way by one unit and then the next unit tells them to forget that now they are going to do it this way instead. Becomes very confusing to them and is a major setback. Interesting you bring up Africa, just seen an article where conventional forces are in Africa conducting FID.


BTW, welcome aboard First Class
Always wanted to fly First Class but for some reason thought the flight attendants were better looking in First Class:p

[John T. Fishel]

as to why you say we don't do FID well. My experience in Latin America suggests that we do it rather well and have done so on many occasions over time. Recent FID missions in the region include both Panama and El Salvador. In the former, the primary advisors were not SF although SF played an important but secondary role. In El Salvador SF played the primary role while non-SF played the important secondary role.

I could go on with other cases and probably expand to other regions but I really am interested in your argument.

BTW your other arguments are ones that we (and John N) ought to consider seriously.

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

the Army does not do large scale FID well. One of those cases where I knew what I meant but no one else did because I said it poorly. :(

I did mention large scale with respect to Congress and future commitments. I should have made clear the big ones were my concern in all cases. I apologize for my error.

I agree the CentAm efforts went well and I strongly agree with your statements here about the advisability of using SF in that role. I also agree that we have done others here and there fairly well but I note that none were massive efforts requiring the bulk of the Army -- those haven't worked out well from the Philippines forward.

My concern is that the big Army and far more importantly, the Nation, do not have the patience or inclination to do it well on a large scale. The troops are capable of adapting to it and I contend that if Joe is trained for COIN, he can adapt to conventional war with no problem. Conversely, if trained for conventional war, he can also adapt to COIN but the transition is not as smooth. Joe is not the problem. Nor are the LTs and CPTs -- it's the senior NCOs and Officers that have the adaptation problem. That can be rectified but if it is, then you're likely to be confronted with a difficult adaptation being done for no reason because of no commitments to do that by the time you complete the adaptation.

That because the Nation doesn't want to do it. My belief is that the Nation put its head in the sand post Viet Nam and will want to do so again even though this war cost far less than did Viet Nam (in everything except money and we have so much more of that now than we did then it really doesn't count as 'more'). Given that factor, the senior leadership of the Army is likely to want to replicate the actions of their predecessor's post VN and eschew COIN. That would be a bad mistake. We have to possess the capability but we should aim to do it on a small scale and let the pros do it if it is remotely possible.

There's no dichotomy there; we need to be prepared to do it on a large scale -- we just emphatically do not need to go looking for an excuse to do it.

Parkinson's Law and capabilities come to mind... :D

[John T. Fishel]

Not sure I agree with all you said but cetainly with some:(. You do address my biggest fear - thhat when this set is all over the Army and the nation will want to stick their collective head in the sand and prepare only for the "big one." While we certainly need the big war capabilities we also need to be able to do small wars - we have done far more of them throughout our history than big ones, both well and badly. And we will most likely do a lot more small wars in the future.

Enough! Time to call it a night. got to do my bedtime reading - The Great Game!:cool:

Cheers

JohnT

[Maximus]

Quote: Originally Posted by Ken White
Of course, my solution is don't do COIN and advising on a major level; we really don't do it well at all. Never have and that is unlikely to change. We haven't got the patience for it and one can't do that kind of stuff even marginally well if one's going to have short tours and 15 months is a short tour; 12 months is also. Seven months or less is just a visit

We need to convince folks that hosting people who wish us ill is uncool. Best way to do that is to visit those that do so in an unpleasant mode, wreak major destruction and leave rapidly -- saying be nice or we'll be back.

Ken:

Sage advice from you as usual. Too bad others in higher places might not be listening. I think your plainly spoken words might be a good recipe for Afghanistan.

Gentlemen,

Have been following this exchange with great interest. The quotes above got me thinking: wouldn’t it be great if war was this easy. On second thought though, my mind came back to our retaliatory tomahawk “raids” into the Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998. Did Al Qaeda get the “be nice or we’ll be back” message? Unfortunately, I think we sent just the opposite message: if you’re not nice we’ll launch an airstrike or two, maybe a few missiles, but otherwise leave you alone. And this only served to motivate Al Qaeda even further. If we left Afghanistan today, I’m afraid we’d pay an even greater price.

What else could we have done in 1998? Some might say altogether eliminate places where we believed Al Qaeda training grounds were on the map. This simply wasn’t an option in 1998, and unless Al Qaeda launches a WMD attack in the US or against one of our closest allies, I don’t think it will ever be an option.

So what other options did we have/do we have? Sending in the “stormtroops” from the 1stMarDiv or 82nd Airborne sounds great as well. Launch us into Afghan/Pakistan border, destroy a few villages alleged to support Bin Laden, Zawahiri, and Mullah Omar and then come home to a parade. Don’t have to worry about lengthy deployments, heavy logistics tails, none of this SASO or COIN stuff. Don’t have to debate is the proper term: IW, Complex IW, hybrid, small wars, SASO, Phase IV or Phase V, COIN, etc. In fact, this is what we were told in the initial days of OIF: after Baghdad falls, the President wants his “stormtroops” home. This certainly motivated all the Marines in the “march up.” As we all know now though, the so-called “stormtroops” were extended for 5 months, sent home for about 7, and have been back on the ground ever since. Aside from reality differing from the “wreak destruction” and leave option, I think there’s a few other problems with this way of thinking as well. What’d we do after the Japanese attempted to wreak major destruction on us at Pearl Harbor? Did we succumb to their will? Again, just the opposite. And did the Japanese succumb to our will after losing island-after-island, enduring an intense firebombing campaign against Tokyo, the bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, etc. I think in many ways Phase 4 and Phase 5 operations applied in Japan in 1945 just as they do in Iraq now. With respect to Iraq, did Saddam ever succumb to our will after Desert Storm or later when we tried an airstrike/tomahawk heavy attack during Desert Fox? I’d argue he was a constant pain in the a__ and our containment strategy against Iraq throughout the 1990’s was quickly losing all effectiveness, if not worse.

With respect to no large US advisor mission has ever succeeded… have we ever really tried? We had many “advisors” in Vietnam but these advisors were faced with many of the same problems we have today: too often ad hoc, not always the “best and brightest,” inconsistent training, unity of command, mirror imaging, etc. I think Ken makes a good point about it would take around 3 years to stand-up LtCol Nagl’s proposed Advisor Corps. Maybe. Depends on if we’re serious about the importance of the effort. I made a similar argument on the Marine Corps side of the house in late 2005-2006. We’ve (USMC) made strides in the right direction, but I still don’t think we’ve found the answer. If we identified training and advising indigenous forces as the main efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2005-2006, Ken’s 3 year mark would already be here or at least we’d be very close. So here we are in 2008, still arguing about priorities, deployment lengths, stretching the force, allegedly destroying our conventional warfighting capabilities, etc. Leaves me wondering again and again: do we really want to succeed or is preserving the force and the current status quo the priority. As we close on the 5-year anniversary of the fall of Baghdad, the thought of us still arguing about what to do in Phases 4-5 really troubles me.

Semper Fi,
Scott

[Ken White]

...Have been following this exchange with great interest. The quotes above got me thinking: wouldn’t it be great if war was this easy...Sure would, pity it never is.
... On second thought though, my mind came back to our retaliatory tomahawk “raids” into the Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998. Did Al Qaeda get the “be nice or we’ll be back” message? Unfortunately, I think we sent just the opposite message: if you’re not nice we’ll launch an airstrike or two, maybe a few missiles, but otherwise leave you alone. And this only served to motivate Al Qaeda even further. If we left Afghanistan today, I’m afraid we’d pay an even greater price.True in both cases, IMO.
What else could we have done in 1998? Some might say altogether eliminate places where we believed Al Qaeda training grounds were on the map. This simply wasn’t an option in 1998, and unless Al Qaeda launches a WMD attack in the US or against one of our closest allies, I don’t think it will ever be an option.That's true as well. I would submit that had we heeded the gospel according to Ken, 1998 as you appear to use the year, would not have occurred. Goes back to Carter's mishandling of Iran; Reagan's miserable failures in Lebanon, G.H.W. Bush's failure to drive on to Baghdad when it would have indeed been messy -- but almost certainly not as messy as this has been.I won't even address clinton's fly swats. All those things and four Presidents from both parties put us in Iraq in 2003.
So what other options did we have/do we have? Sending in the “stormtroops” from the 1stMarDiv or 82nd Airborne sounds great as well. Launch us into Afghan/Pakistan border, destroy a few villages alleged to support Bin Laden, Zawahiri, and Mullah Omar and then come home to a parade. Don’t have to worry about lengthy deployments, heavy logistics tails, none of this SASO or COIN stuff. Don’t have to debate is the proper term: IW, Complex IW, hybrid, small wars, SASO, Phase IV or Phase V, COIN, etc.I doubt that would have been an option -- I certainly wouldn't advocate it, sounds terminally stupid, in fact. Bears and BB guns and all that. I've alrerady given my opinion on fly swats; so I thought did you -- they do more harm than good.
In fact, this is what we were told in the initial days of OIF: after Baghdad falls, the President wants his “stormtroops” home. This certainly motivated all the Marines in the “march up.” As we all know now though, the so-called “stormtroops” were extended for 5 months, sent home for about 7, and have been back on the ground ever since.Whose fault is that? Serious and I think an important question.
Aside from reality differing from the “wreak destruction” and leave option, I think there’s a few other problems with this way of thinking as well. What’d we do after the Japanese attempted to wreak major destruction on us at Pearl Harbor? Did we succumb to their will? Again, just the opposite. And did the Japanese succumb to our will after losing island-after-island, enduring an intense firebombing campaign against Tokyo, the bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, etc. I think in many ways Phase 4 and Phase 5 operations applied in Japan in 1945 just as they do in Iraq now.And I think you've just mixed then and now. As well as a potentially existential threat with a pestiferous threat. It was a different world then -- and vastly different capabilities are now available. Even more and better capabilites could be available if we had spent the money in better places than we have...
With respect to Iraq, did Saddam ever succumb to our will after Desert Storm or later when we tried an airstrike/tomahawk heavy attack during Desert Fox? I’d argue he was a constant pain in the a__ and our containment strategy against Iraq throughout the 1990’s was quickly losing all effectiveness, if not worse.Yet another example of what applying half hearted measures will get you. War cannot be fought in the 'softly, softly' mode, to do so is simply to prolong the agony and cause more casualties for everyone. Polticians cannot seem to absorb that fact. Soldiers and Marines should be able to -- but they aren't in charge. Important point, that...
With respect to no large US advisor mission has ever succeeded… have we ever really tried?That's not what I said; I said no large scale COIN effort has done well. Contrary to what you seem to assert below, the Advisory effort in Viet Nam, hampered by all the things you mention, was really pretty successful. Can't say as much for the overall COIN effort there.
We had many “advisors” in Vietnam but these advisors were faced with many of the same problems we have today: too often ad hoc, not always the “best and brightest,” inconsistent training, unity of command, mirror imaging, etc.This is likely to change in what way?
I think Ken makes a good point about it would take around 3 years to stand-up LtCol Nagl’s proposed Advisor Corps. Maybe. Depends on if we’re serious about the importance of the effort.That is my point -- we are not serious and we are highly unlikely to get serious about it so we'll be doomed to halfhearted measures.
I made a similar argument on the Marine Corps side of the house in late 2005-2006. We’ve (USMC) made strides in the right direction, but I still don’t think we’ve found the answer. If we identified training and advising indigenous forces as the main efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2005-2006, Ken’s 3 year mark would already be here or at least we’d be very close. So here we are in 2008, still arguing about priorities, deployment lengths, stretching the force, allegedly destroying our conventional warfighting capabilities, etc.Ain't America grand; 300M opinions looking for a home. That, too is unlikely to change no matter how much some wish.
Leaves me wondering again and again: do we really want to succeed or is preserving the force and the current status quo the priority.The latter.
As we close on the 5-year anniversary of the fall of Baghdad, the thought of us still arguing about what to do in Phases 4-5 really troubles me.
Semper Fi,
ScottMe too -- but it's reality. Reality is a bore but it seems to be always with us.

BTW, I trust you also noted the fact that while I disagree with an Advisory Corps, I agree with John Nagl on the need for Advisory training; on the lack of flexible and adaptive thinking on the part of E-ring; and on the fact that we must be prepared to do COIN work. Trying to avoid it is smart IMO, but we have to be able to do it and do it better than we did this time. That's why I support the T-MAAG concept, far better COIN training than we're managing today and that both the Army and Marines HAVE to be full spectrum forces.

Unlike a lot of people, I believe that the services and the kids can do that full spectrum bit. Can the leadership adapt to it? That's another question...

[dubya]

I recently read Col. Nagl's book and the piece he did last June for the Center for a New American Security

http://www.cnas.org/en/cms/?145

I'm interested in what others here thought of the book and his suggestions about an Army Advisor Corps.

Thanks.

[tequila]

You can check and contribute to this thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5189&highlight=nagl).

[Ken White]

There's a lot of information here. Before starting a new thread, check the existing threads to see if one on the topic already exists and, if so, continue that thread rather than starting e new one.

In this case, I appended the New thread name to the existing thread; I'll change it back to the original name later.

[dubya]

Yup I'm a worm who's unfamiliar with this particular software package... but I will learn.

Thanks for your patience!

[marct]

Going back to the original CNAS piece (available here (http://www.cnas.org/en/cms/?145)), one thing that really stuck out for me was this.


Advisor Team Composition

Team Leader
Team NCOIC
Team Adjutant
S1 NCOIC
Team Intelligence Officer
Team Intel Sergeant
Team Intel Specialist
Team Ops Officer
Team Ops Sergeant
Team Logistics Officer
Team Logistics Sergeant
Team Medical Officer
Team Medical Sergeant
Team Light Wheel Mechanic
Infantry Squad (Personal Security
Detachment/Infantry Trainers)
Total Strength: 25
(insert, p.7)

Now, maybe I'm being a touch too sensitive here, but I think that John has missed 2 major components - a cultural analyst and a DB/IT expert.

To my mind, half of the reason for creating such a specialized Corps would be to transfer the experience back into the Army. Certainly the career path proposals appear to me to be an attempt to regularize service with an Advisor Corps (AC), but I don't see any on-the-ground way of retaining cultural knowledge and institutionalizing that.

Part of the reason I am mentioning this is the current role of the HTTs. It strikes me that an AC would be a natural place to train part of the HTT component, so IMO, it would also make sense to work such a component nto the actual operation of the teams themselves.

[Surferbeetle]

Going back to the original CNAS piece (available here (http://www.cnas.org/en/cms/?145)), one thing that really stuck out for me was this.

Now, maybe I'm being a touch too sensitive here, but I think that John has missed 2 major components - a cultural analyst and a DB/IT expert.

To my mind, half of the reason for creating such a specialized Corps would be to transfer the experience back into the Army.


Marc,

Too true, an inability to understand the culture can get you and your team killed especially when you are forward and away from a nice big warm FOB.

Here is an old military review link (http://passthrough.fw-notify.net/download/683886/http://leav-www.army.mil/fmso/documents/human-terrain-system.pdf)
which describes the HTT concept...it's in line with what you are describing.

Regards,

Steve

[Tom Odom]

The Sergeant Solution (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120761487358596679.html?mod=opinion_main_comment aries)
By ROBERT H. SCALES

But no matter what he says, it is clear that the writing is on the wall. The bulk of American ground forces will be leaving Iraq. The only question is how many and how fast.

After we leave, the Iraqis will have to shoulder the burden of maintaining stability in their country. How well prepared they are for this task will depend on how strong the Iraqi army's noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps is when we leave. NCOs, sergeants and corporals, provide a center of gravity for effective fighting forces and often lead small units. They will be vital to sustaining the Iraqi army through the battles ahead.

I would have to say that Bob Scales got this one wrong. If we are truly dependent on creating a successful NCO corps in Iraq, especially when as General Scales says the writing is on the wall and most troops are coming out, then we are screwed.

This simply tranference of values--the Iraqis have no tradition of strong NCOs--and wishful thinking, especially when it is set against a limited timeframe as prescribed by the author.

Tom

[Stan]

I would have to say that Bob Scales got this one wrong. If we are truly dependent on creating a successful NCO corps in Iraq, especially when as General Scales says the writing is on the wall and most troops are coming out, then we are screwed.

This simply tranference of values--the Iraqis have no tradition of strong NCOs--and wishful thinking, especially when it is set against a limited timeframe as prescribed by the author.

Tom

I fully concur, Tom. A serious misconception. Even if Iraq's former military psyche, relative levels of discipline and culture could be reversed, it is unlikely to exclusively happen following a 5-week training course for Corporals. I don't agree with settling for 'just strong enough' to defeat one's enemy - wrong strategy for a training environment, and 'set to fail' down the road to experience.

[Ken White]

the handwriting being on the wall. I suspect we'll be there in some numbers for some time. We'll see.

Re: NCOs in the ME. the Iraniha had no such tradition but started trying to build one around 1964. When I was there five years later, there were signs of a beginning professional NCO corps. Friends who were there later said that by 1975, it was small but very competent and, even more importantly, had the faith and respect of the Officers. It may be noteworhty that when Khomeini cemented his power in late '79, among the people they killed in the blood orgy that followed were a number of senior NCOs from all services.

[William F. Owen]

If we are truly dependent on creating a successful NCO corps in Iraq, especially when as General Scales says the writing is on the wall and most troops are coming out, then we are screwed.

This simply tranference of values--the Iraqis have no tradition of strong NCOs--and wishful thinking, especially when it is set against a limited timeframe as prescribed by the author.

NCO's, as seen in the British Army are a pure product of the class system. How the NCOs work in the UK is exactly how an Edwardian Gentleman and landowner organised his servants and staff. It's the same system - and it worked pretty well. (No place for it today. Better ways must, and can, be found.)

The US does not really have a "proper" class system, which is why their NCO system is not the same as the UK.

Now look at the IDF/Palmach. A British trained and inspired Army, that has no class system, as anyone from Europe of the US would understand it. Works just fine as Officers are trained as NCOs first. There is no parallel development course, and arguably they do just fine without an NCO culture along UK, or even US lines.

Now, I am not that familiar with Iraqi societal structures, but they do seem to have had an educated middle class - which almost always forms the basis for an officer corps - not NCOs. If Iraq is anything like Algeria, then there is simply no hope of forming a professional NCO culture.

[William F. Owen]

Advisor Team Composition

Team Leader
Team NCOIC
Team Adjutant
S1 NCOIC
Team Intelligence Officer
Team Intel Sergeant
Team Intel Specialist
Team Ops Officer
Team Ops Sergeant
Team Logistics Officer
Team Logistics Sergeant
Team Medical Officer
Team Medical Sergeant
Team Light Wheel Mechanic
Infantry Squad (Personal Security
Detachment/Infantry Trainers)
Total Strength: 25

Looks awfully like an SF A-team structure to me. IIRC, a 12-man A-Team could train, organise and lead a 650 man battalion. I only know of one A-team that actually did it, and that was part of Project White Star, but I'm sure Ken will correct me on this!

[Tom Odom]

As I read Gen. Scales piece, I interpreted it as him hoipng that an Iraqi NCO Corps would emerge that would be capable of leading small units in COIN operations.

My experience from teaching, living with, and serving around Arab armies suggests this is not an achievable goal in a short to mid term, short being our efforts so far and possibly another year or two, and mid term being 10 plus years.

Sudan: 4 months in the Sudanese Army as student and I can safely say that NCOs were regarded as nothing more than glorified bat boys who terrified the troops as necessary.

Egypt: 5 years in and out of Egypt as a UN observer, student, travelr, and historian. Interesting in that Egyptian Army was/is a an amalgamation of British, Soviet/Russian, and Egyptian culture. While the first did have an effect in that it created an NCO corps (as it did in Sudan), the Soviet approach coupled with the Egyptian emphasis on status means that an Egyptian NCO has not progressed beyond the file closer mentality of the 18th/19th century.

Jordan: the Arab Legion still claims a close identity with its British roots. My interaction with it has been limited to studying its operations and teaching its officers with some in-country time as an observer. The roles of The NCO corps seems frozen in time around the period that Glubb Pasha helped form the Legion.

There are very few militaries in the world that will turn to its NCO corps the way we do. There are even fewer militaries in the world that senior NCOs are expected to act as advisors and often mentors to the officers around them. I do not believe Sudanese, Egyptian, or Jordanian officers would accept such a role for their NCOs. My contact with Iraqi military culture is limited to studying Arabic in close contact with former Iraqi officers as well as studying the Iraqi military as an intelligence officer. Nothing I have seen indicates the Iraqis are any different that the Sudanese, Egyptians, or the Jordanians when it comes to how they use their NCOs.

Tom

[Rex Brynen]

There are very few militaries in the world that will turn to its NCO corps the way we do. There are even fewer militaries in the world that senior NCOs are expected to act as advisors and often mentors to the officers around them. I do not believe Sudanese, Egyptian, or Jordanian officers would accept such a role for their NCOs. My contact with Iraqi military culture is limited to studying Arabic in close contact with former Iraqi officers as well as studying the Iraqi military as an intelligence officer. Nothing I have seen indicates the Iraqis are any different that the Sudanese, Egyptians, or the Jordanians when it comes to how they use their NCOs.

Indeed, I think the challenge of developing competent NCOs in Iraq will be particularly severe, given the extent to which decades of extreme authoritarianism drove much of the initiative out of the military. The Iraqi Army under the Ba'th was not a place where you wanted to be very creative or innovative. Rather, you were understandably reluctant to take responsibility (and blame) for actions when you could leave it for others to decide (or fail to do so).

Obviously this is a particular problem when you're trying to train an configure an Iraqi military for what will be primarily COIN duties for the foreseeable future, given the extreme importance of small unit leadership in COIN operations.

If so, that raises an interesting question in training/mentoring: to what extent do you 1) try to change existing military (and societal) culture in building a new conception of the role (and required qualities) of NCOs in the new Iraqi military; 2) forego this as an impossible task and train along existing local models; and 3) pursue a middle course/synthesis/hybridization (or new models altogether)?

It my gut sense (as someone who doesn't do this!) that the first is near-impossible, other than in the most limited and subcultural sense, a view reinforced by the posts I see here and elsewhere in SWJ. I'm interested, however, in how one addresses the second and third options--especially the third. What exactly does that look like in Iraq? In Afghanistan? Where are the real areas one should concentrate efforts?

Thoughts from those who have been there/done that?...

[marct]

Hi Steve,


Too true, an inability to understand the culture can get you and your team killed especially when you are forward and away from a nice big warm FOB.

Actually, I'm quite familiar with the HTT concept and the current HTS :D. What is bothering me about the exclusion of something similar by John is that it seems to contradict the title of his work - Institutionalizing Adaptation - by leaving out one of the more successful mutations to appear in the past couple of years. Right now, the HTS is scrambling to meet the demand for cultural knowledge but, if something similar to an Advisor Corps were to be created, then that Corps should, as part of its deployment, conduct at least minimal exercises in gaining cultural knowledge. So why, I ask, is it left off :confused:?

[Ken White]

"There are very few militaries in the world that will turn to its NCO corps the way we do. There are even fewer militaries in the world that senior NCOs are expected to act as advisors and often mentors to the officers around them. I do not believe Sudanese, Egyptian, or Jordanian officers would accept such a role for their NCOs. My contact with Iraqi military culture is limited to studying Arabic in close contact with former Iraqi officers as well as studying the Iraqi military as an intelligence officer. Nothing I have seen indicates the Iraqis are any different that the Sudanese, Egyptians, or the Jordanians when it comes to how they use their NCOs."Thus, as Rex notes:
If so, that raises an interesting question in training/mentoring: to what extent do you 1) try to change existing military (and societal) culture in building a new conception of the role (and required qualities) of NCOs in the new Iraqi military; 2) forego this as an impossible task and train along existing local models; and 3) pursue a middle course/synthesis/hybridization (or new models altogether)?

It my gut sense (as someone who doesn't do this!) that the first is near-impossible, other than in the most limited and subcultural sense, a view reinforced by the posts I see here and elsewhere in SWJ. I'm interested, however, in how one addresses the second and third options--especially the third. What exactly does that look like in Iraq? In Afghanistan? Where are the real areas one should concentrate efforts?I'm inclined to agree with him and believe that option 3. is the best -- and an achievable -- solution.

Wilf's correct that class and Edwardian attitudes play a part in that (even in the US) but that has also been diluted a great deal by the experience of the World Wars and societal changes since the '60s. NCOs in the British, Canadian and US Armies (as well as in most NATO Armies to one extent or another) today really draw any power to get things done from tactical and technical competence. That competence counts far more in how they are viewed by superiors, peers and subordinates than any other factors

In all Armies, including all those mentioned by name here, normal human factors play. Thus, Officers want NCOs to be competent just not as competent as they are. That's logical, no sense in having two equally well educated and trained sets of bosses for one less well educated and trained set of followers. Regardless, the world has settled on the three categories of military people as a de facto standard and most of the world has culturally allotted a pecking order to those the sets.

Culture is hard to change. It is not immutable, just a difficult and thus time consuming process, so any change in the way NCOs are viewed and used has to accept the cultural norms. Back to the basic point, the NCO's value is in his overall competence. In every military force I have seen, including Arab armies, truly competent NCOS get some respect. Mentoring of Officers does occur but it is, IMO, far more subtle than it is in western armies BUT it is accepted from only those NCOs accorded Super Hero status, the water walkers and legends. There typically aren't (or weren't) too many of them.

Thus it seems to me that the way forward is to accept the cultural difficulties and produce, through careful selection and training while we are in a position to influence that, more competent NCOs than was the norm before we got there. As nearly as I can gather, that's what we're trying to do. My sensing is that we'll thus end up with just that hybrid and if one put the Egyptian Army of 30 plus years ago on the scale at One and the US/British model at Ten; with any luck one could end up with a Four to Six in Iraq (slightly higher in Afghanistan due to less class trauma). Not at top level but better than it was with the potential to improve. A hundred years ago, even fifty years ago, the Officer-NCO relationship in the US Army was quite different than it is today...

[Tom Odom]

Ken,

Great post.


Thus, Officers want NCOs to be competent just not as competent as they are.

That single sentence is where all the cultural devils play. Indeed it is in defining competence and what levels of competence are acceptable, much less sought after. I agree that 100 years ago our NCOs were a different sort (then I met Stan and was transported back in time:D). That is not to say the debate on NCOs and NCO duties has been completely resolved in our own military. The dumbest officer I ever met in Africa was the one who told Stan after I departed Zaire that he was going back behind a desk "where he as an NCO belonged." I can confidently say that the best units we see here are the ones that make best use of their NCOs. But I cannot say that for every unit.

And therein lies the rub with General Scales premise that somehow it will be up to the Iraqi NCOs to determine success in Iraq. If we end up with 30 years, maybe so. Remember however that the British influence in Egypt was much longer. Frankly I hope that we our greatest influence has been on the leaders the Iraqis can identify as charismatic because ultimately they will as a culture select charisma over competency.

best

Tom

[Rank amateur]

they will as a culture select charisma over competency.


They're not the only ones.;) The Sunni insurgency seemed relatively decentralized and relied a lot on what I'll call "local initiatives" or "independent action." Do you think that the Lions of Iraq will be more effective at whatever level they have that compares to NCO? Will that have any influence on the Iraqi Army?

[SteveMetz]

Thing is, though, it can be done. Look at the Bacevich, et al. monograph on El Salvador. Something of the same situation--no NCO tradition. We kind of crammed it down their throat, and it eventually worked out.

I'm not as familiar with the Arab context but it sure would seem that the lightbulb would go one in someone's head and they would say, "Let's see--no Arab state has won a major war for several centuries. Maybe it might be time to consider some innovation."

[Ken White]

Progress is a two forward, one back process. Should we improve the basic competence of NCOs in Afghanistan and /or Iraq, when we leave -- and we will someday -- I'd expect regression. However, I'd also expect that the younger guys who saw the real benefits for a period would oppose total return to old ways and gradually reassert a new model. The cycle would then repeat.

My perception is that your final light bulb idea is very slowly gaining traction throughout the ME -- and that in relation to many things, not just wars...

[Tom Odom]

They're not the only ones.;) The Sunni insurgency seemed relatively decentralized and relied a lot on what I'll call "local initiatives" or "independent action." Do you think that the Lions of Iraq will be more effective at whatever level they have that compares to NCO? Will that have any influence on the Iraqi Army?

True and I take your point on charisma. But the Arabs love the dramatic and the grand gesture even if it is a complete myth. They go so far as to create myth in order to prove its truth: I once had a senior Egyptian officer give me a two hour staff ride (battlefield tour) on a fight in Sinai that did not happen. They eve n wrote a chapter in a key book on the 73 War about that "battle." They left out that chapter in the English version. As for SOI, those are essentially tribal militias and as such relay on traditional leadership models.


Steve: Thing is, though, it can be done. Look at the Bacevich, et al. monograph on El Salvador. Something of the same situation--no NCO tradition. We kind of crammed it down their throat, and it eventually worked out.

I'm not as familiar with the Arab context but it sure would seem that the lightbulb would go one in someone's head and they would say, "Let's see--no Arab state has won a major war for several centuries. Maybe it might be time to consider some innovation."

Yes it can and it has been done. I have seen it work in Rwanda first hand. But the Rwandans did it themselves; they studied other armies and fought inside other armies, learning as they went.

In the case of the Middle East, some units have done quite well. The SARNG did well at Kahfji in 1991--with a lot of Marine support. But it has not been performance centered on NCO competency. That to me is the breakthrough that as yet has not happened; when they see their NCO competency as the strength of their military, they will be getting somewhere.

Tom

[Rob Thornton]

I think its worth while to consider the conditions in which the Iraqi Army is being "re-built". Its a mixed bag of sorts (to a certain degree like our own). While Basra might be seen at one end, the day to day security operations a good chunk of the IA conducts consist of small unit "patrol" type actions.

For my part I saw a transition from loyalty and authority based solely off of kinship to one based off of demonstrated reliability and proficiency. This was primarily occurring at the low tactical level, but was to a lesser degree happening at the staff level - and even at the more senior CDR level.

A BN that consistently takes the fight to the enemy, makes the hard choices, and delivers performance gets recognition and improved relations with the Americans its partnered with, and as a result, it often gets recognition from higher. This was the case with 1/2/2 IA who once 2nd IA DIV got a good CDR in BG Moutah was recognized as a solid BN - it even gained a good rep in IGFC all the way to Baghdad.

That recognition was eventually felt down through the ranks - it showed in the way each patrol prepared, and fought - it became part of their honor. Out of the staff officers, it was a fairly mixed bag between Sunni Arab, Sunni Kurd, a sprinkling of Shiite, and on or two Turkoman. While the companies started out segregated by ethnic and tribal lines, by the end they were starting to blend with new recruits - the ability to go out with a full patrol became more important then maintaining kinship integrity.

That is the environmental part - there was also the role exposure to Americans has had. From the formation of the ING in late 2003 and 2004 to 2008, Iraqis have had pretty consistent exposure to U.S. forces. The quality and type of exposure has evolved, and the nature of the relationship with regard to security has changed - from manning static defensive positions along CF MSRs, to being respected for their ability to patrol, identify insurgents and their operations, quickly generate opportunities and catch the enemy unprepared, willingness to engage an enemy, etc.

There has also been a great deal of additional training sponsored by the BCTs on their FOBs -much of it geared at small unit leadership as well as some advanced individual skills. Taken in stride with combined patrols between U.S. and Iraqi squads, sections and platoon, combined larger operations, etc. Iraqi leadership has made some great strides. For some time they have seen firsthand the quality of our junior leaders and what that has allowed us to do. The majority of the IA officers I know desire like quality in their forces - they see it essential in order to conduct sustained (not much rotating for them unless its to another part of Iraq) operations.

Some good work has been in an effort to institutionalize OES and NCOES - interestingly, a great deal of the formal, more permanent pieces of this is starting to migrate to contractors. Iraq, should it choose, will have the means to sustain these efforts through oil revenues, and I suspect much more should it choose - I suspect in 2-5 years they may be among the better equipped and trained forces in the region.

I would also submit that because of the growing level of sustained cooperation between U.S. and IA forces in combat, they will enjoy a different relationship, a bond if you will, then most others in the region - soldiers and jundi have connected in a personal level that you don't get by doing a 30 day operation in a foreign country- but you do get by sharing dangers, and having somebody show up with more guns when they are needed most. The fact that I've lost both American and Iraqi friends in the last few years has created a strong relationship for me with that country.

I bring all this up not to discount any body's particular view based on their experiences, but to point out that there are other considerations with regard to change.

Best, Rob

[ODB]

A personal experience to add to what Rob was saying about the relationship between US and Iraqi forces. During a recent PDSS to Iraq as I was walking around the FOB we would be operating from I ran into an Iraqi soldier I had trained and fought with 18 months earlier on a previous deployment. He was excited to see me and to know we would be back training them. This personal relationship helped tremedously in gaining the IA Bn's trust and willingness to fight. I can only see this continuing to improve over time.

One of the hardest things I have had to deal with is an IA unit who lost it's will to fight due to it's leader being shot. Many of the soldiers in the IA units I have been with are in that unit because of the unit's leader. They have close ties through tribal or family relationships. The soldiers under these leaders would follow these guys into hell soaked in gasoline, they are that loyal. Unfortunately when one of these repected men are incapacitated many of the soldier lose their will to fight and want to give up. Many times this has been aleviated by providing care for the leader as if he is still alive, it is a short term fix but has gotten us out of some sticky situations.

[clayton]

It seems that the last few pages of this thread have highlighted an important factor that limits the effectiveness of any advisory effort but that never seems to get the importance it deserves: the internal dynamics of the host nation military. In other words, we can send in as many advisers as we want, but some militaries will not be able to noticeably improve their performance and this is due to internal factors ranging from cultural biases, societal cleavages (whether tribal or class), insufficient education, or interference from other host nation governmental institutions.

In terms of culture, it has been noted quite well in this thread that the failures of many militaries to adapt to the our advice can be traced to certain cultural beliefs or societal structures. Correct me if I'm wrong, but we are advising them on the creation of a western-style military which is characterized by such things as a strong NCO corps. There was an interesting little book published in 1990 called [I]Importing the European Army: The Introduction of European Military Techniques and Institutions into the Extra-European World, 1600-1914[[I] by David Ralston. In the book, he argued that as certain developing countries (Russia, the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, China, and Japan) adopted reforms to improve their armies by making them into a more European-like force, they then had to implement changes to their government, economy and society to ensure the success of the military policies. You can't just force an modern institution onto an underdeveloped country. While globalization has changed many of the conditions that affected the countries in the book, the fact remains that many countries today still harbor internal conditions that aren't that receptive to our style of military.

Nagl's legions of advisers ignores the fact that devoting that many people to the cause may not necessarily ensure a corresponding increase the military capacity of our partner nations. There needs to be an understanding of the needs of the targeted nation as well what can be accomplished with that country (and what it is willing to accept). Success stories seem to be in cases where the country is willing and able (Rwanda as mentioned by Tom Odom) or where we devote money, time and education (Colombia, El Salvador). We can't afford to do the latter in every country so we have to be sensible about the advisory effort. The advising debate seems somewhat similar to the economic development debate of the 1950s and 1960s (I'm not that old, but I do remember reading about it in my graduate poli sci classes. However, this was before the Navy when most of my brain cells saw fit to escape for some fresh air and never bothered to return). We assumed back then that we could help countries develop their economies if we provided them with enough loans, grants, and advice. That didn't seem to work well back then (or even now) because among many other things, some countries weren't ready or capable enough. I think the same thing holds true for building partnership capacity. That doesn't mean that we shouldn't try, but we should seek to target our efforts a little more wisely.

One last thing about Nagl's proposal (I'm going for Rob Thornton-like length with this post:)). We always talk about what we can do for the country being advised, but we rarely talk about what the advisory effort does for us (the US Military). If we want our Soldiers/Marines to be able to function in these new hybrid wars, then what better way for them to learn some cultural understanding than by going out and working with foreign soldiers in their own environment. You can't learn every culture but you can learn how to adapt quickly to other cultures. Additionally, advising provides a warfare education to our people by allowing them to see what other militaries do and what types of conflict/adversaries that they must face. If you want worldly soldiers, then you must send them out into the world and you want to do this before the war starts. This has been the exclusive province of SF and SOF, but this needs to change (or continue to change) so that the conventional military can reap these benefits. I do like the USMC FMTUs in that they're using regular combat MOSs to fill these slots. These guys can take what they learn and bring it back to the fleet.

Sorry, enough rambling for tonight. Hopefully, this made some sense.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf's correct that class and Edwardian attitudes play a part in that (even in the US) but that has also been diluted a great deal by the experience of the World Wars and societal changes since the '60s. NCOs in the British, Canadian and US Armies (as well as in most NATO Armies to one extent or another) today really draw any power to get things done from tactical and technical competence. That competence counts far more in how they are viewed by superiors, peers and subordinates than any other factors


I agree that the British Army NCO gains his status from technical competence, but that in itself is a reflection of the class system and the Yeoman tradition of British soldiering. The Bowman at Agincourt were mostly educated, skilled craftsmen, such as carpenters and blacksmiths.

The main differential today is the level on education on entry into the Army. The exception being the Royal Marines, that, in my experience attracts at disproportionate amount educated and skilled enlisted men.

Again, an object lesson is the IDF, in that it is a generally successful Army with no western NCO culture, though they do have professional and competent NCOs, but not in the way most here would recognise. An IDF platoon or company commander is generally the most skilled and competent man, and has already been an NCO. - to quote an IDF Colonel, I know "why would you choose to do otherwise?"

I would also warn against assuming that there is one type of NCO culture. I believe there are two or three successful models, but they are all dependant on how respect is gained in the varying cultures. The UK model would fall flat on it's face in the IDF and the IDF model would be unwelcome and uncomfortable for the British Army.

[Ken White]

...
I would also warn against assuming that there is one type of NCO culture. I believe there are two or three successful models, but they are all dependant on how respect is gained in the varying cultures. The UK model would fall flat on it's face in the IDF and the IDF model would be unwelcome and uncomfortable for the British Army.I go a lot further than two or three; there are a half dozen or so in the US Army alone, not least the three major Infantry type units which differ.

The USMC replicates some of them and has a couple of its own. The British Regiment; Scottish (Lowland and Highland subsets) Regiment and the Para Regiment as well as several others crew give the British Army a pretty diverse set as well. As you say, the IDF is a whole different ball game. There are probably as many types of NCO cultures as there are Armies -- or close to it.