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Jedburgh
11-19-2007, 05:03 PM
ICG, 19 Nov 07: Deradicalisation and Indonesian Prisons (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/indonesia/142_deradicalisation_and_indonesian_prisons.pdf)

Even as the police are focusing their deradicalisation program on prisoners and ex-prisoners, they are the first to acknowledge that the current state of Indonesian prisons undermines their efforts. It is a telling indictment of the system that they do their best to keep top terrorists at police headquarters, out of the normal prison system entirely, because the chances of backsliding are so high.

Choices about isolation or integration are important but they cannot be made outside a broader program of prison reform, particularly an attack on prison corruption, which is very much on the agenda of the new director general of corrections. More important than choosing between two policies, in any case, is training prison administrators to look at terrorist prisoners as individuals and tailor prison programs to their needs.

Deradicalisation programs are important but they will inevitably be trial-and-error in nature; there is no single intervention that can produce a rejection of violence among a disparate group of people who have joined radical movements for many different reasons. Within JI alone there are the ideologues, the thugs, the utopians, the followers and the inadvertent accomplices; local recruits from Poso are motivated by very different factors than those who graduate from JI-affiliated schools in central Java.

Much more thought needs to be given to how to evaluate the “success” of deradicalisation programs, because there is a danger that many people deemed to have been deradicalised are those who were never the real problem, or that the reasons individuals renounce violence have nothing to do with police programs. Even if we could measure the number of people deradicalised according to specific criteria, that figure would only have meaning if we had some sense of the number of new recruits and knew that the balance was going in the right direction.

Focusing on the criminals-turned-jihadis in prison is also important. In all the prisons where “ustadz” are held, there is likely to be a small group of such men but it is not clear that anyone is tracking them or turning deradicalisation efforts in their direction. If it is important to design programs to ensure newly released JI members have vocational opportunities, what about the criminal recruits who may, like Beni Irawan, the Kerobokan guard, turn out to be more militant than their mentors? These men also need to be the focus of special programs and thus far have been left out.

It is hard to set performance goals for deradicalisation because it means so many different things to different people. But setting such goals for improving prison management is possible, desirable and critically necessary.
Complete 35 page paper at the link.

Jedburgh
01-26-2008, 02:15 PM
The Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor, 24 Jan 08:

Jailing Jihadis: Saudi Arabia’s Special Terrorist Prisons (http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373926)

Saudi Arabia is nearing completion of new purpose-built prison facilities for its program of rehabilitation and counseling for Islamist militants. Under this program five new specialized prisons have been built in Riyadh, Qassim, Abha, Dammam, and Jiddah over the span of approximately nine months. These new facilities have been designed to facilitate the dialogue process while at the same time housing individuals assessed to be significant security risks. These five new prisons are each designed to hold up to 1,200 prisoners.

The decision to build specially-dedicated facilities in which to focus on the counseling program was based upon a number of considerations. First and foremost was the fact that the existing prison facilities were not designed to promote dialogue and it was determined that successful advancement of the rehabilitation program could best be done through new specially-designed facilities. Furthermore, these new facilities would make the classification and segregation of detainees easier. The classification of detainees into those more predisposed to dialogue, and then separation of them from other more militant prisoners, would encourage and facilitate the work of the Advisory Committee, the Ministry of the Interior body that runs the rehabilitation program.....

davidbfpo
04-03-2008, 09:59 PM
Try: Saudi Arabia showcases its controversial programme to rehabilitate convicted jihadis through art; on this link http://www.frontlineclub.com/club_articles.php?id=319

davidbfpo

Jedburgh
04-08-2008, 07:18 PM
RAND, 7 Apr 08: Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners (http://rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2008/RAND_TR571.pdf)

This study therefore seeks to explore the issue of radicalization and extremist activity in the prison environment. Using a combination of prison theory, historical examples and contemporary open source material, this report seeks to identify lessons from previous instances of dealing with extremist prisoners. It is hoped that these lessons may provide insights about the challenges posed by the increasing number of violent imprisoned jihadists.

There appear to be considerable overlaps between the historical precedents for dealing with prisoners in earlier conflicts, such as that in Northern Ireland, and the subject of this study. A substantial proportion of the lessons already identified from the management of extremist prisoners are therefore likely to remain valid. However, there are some aspects of the contemporary situation that appear to require greater examination and understanding. A notable difference between the examples of Irish Republican and Basque groups and contemporary violent jihadists concerns their respective attitudes to the recruitment of new members in prison. The nationalist groups deliberately avoided such recruitment, while imprisoned violent jihadists appear to regard recruitment in their prisons as a prime objective. This report draws a number of conclusions about what is and (arguably, more importantly) what is not known about the nature and extent of the problem. It highlights a number of areas that appear to require additional research and exploration.....

kaur
07-01-2008, 01:15 PM
Rehabilitating the jihadists – Volume 14, Issue 5 – May 2008

Saudi Arabia tackles the radical threat from within

A programme aimed at reintegrating jihadists into society forms an important and innovative part of Saudi Arabia's efforts to deal with radicals. So far, it appears to be a success – albeit a qualified one.

http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-14-2008/volume-14-issue-5/rehabilitating-the-jihadists/

Jedburgh
09-25-2008, 02:05 PM
...the Saudi program continues to draw attention. CEIP, Sep 08:

Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cp97_boucek_saudi_final.pdf)

Key components of the Saudi strategy:

• Prevention: Saudi Arabia has employed hundreds of government programs to educate the public about radical Islam and extremism, as well as provide alternatives to radicalization among young men. Projects from athletic competitions, to lectures, writing contests, and public information campaigns have all had a significant impact on Saudi public perceptions of terrorism.

• Rehabilitation: The centerpiece of the rehabilitation strategy is a comprehensive counseling program designed to re-educate violent extremists and sympathizers and to encourage extremists to renounce terrorist ideologies. Members of the Ministry of Interior’s “Advisory Committee” frequently meet with detainees or draw from a large number of religious scholars to counsel prisoners to counter “corrupted understandings” and “misinterpretations of correct doctrine.” In many cases, Saudi Arabia encourages family participation in the rehabilitation process, even providing alternative income for families whose sole breadwinner has been imprisoned.

• Aftercare programs: The Ministry of Interior employs several initiatives to ensure that counseling and rehabilitation continue after release from state custody, including a halfway house program to ease release into society and programs to reintegrate returnees from Guantanamo Bay. Through educational training, continued religious and psychological counseling, and extensive social network support, the program works to help detainees past the period in their lives when militant activity is most appealing.

davidbfpo
09-30-2008, 09:23 PM
Tonight BBC Radio Four broadcast an intriguing forty minute piece entitled 'Is AQ Winning', amidst the issues was Information Operations and the Saudi prison programme. Podcast available on: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00dny8b

Listening whilst at work and several references to those at CTC West Point.

davidbfpo

120mm
10-01-2008, 12:50 PM
Within the last two weeks, my world-view has been rocked by the concept of "Wicked Problems" and how they addressed, combined with the concept that conservative fundamentalist Islam can be an effective means to deal with radical Islam.

I think I'm getting a brain-cramp. Is that my mind opening?

davidbfpo
10-01-2008, 05:34 PM
120mm,

It is an add feature, in the UK and possibly elsewhere that some Salafist groups tackle extremism with their theological / ideological methods and thoughts. It came as a surprise to me to learn after 7/7 that in the UK some such groups had been opposing extremism / terrorism long before the state did.

Try an article by ex-Met Police SB officer, Bob Lambert in this journal: http://www.thecordobafoundation.com/attach/Arches_issue_02x_Web.pdf

Yes these groups have a particular viewpoint, which we'd not have much in common with, but they can be effective against extremism.

On the Saudi angle and what is done in Saudi Arabia I remain sceptical (not helped by watching 'The Kingdom' this week).

davidbfpo

gh_uk
10-02-2008, 08:01 AM
A recent piece from the Economist on this subject (http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12273877).

I'd endorse David's view above - Bob Lambert's got some interesting experience in this area. I think he's just finished his PhD thesis on radicalisation and recruitment. He recently had an interview in the Critical Studies on Terrorism Journal (http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a794893155~db=all~order=page) in which he was critical of HMG's embrace of the Quilliam Foundation (http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/).

Jedburgh
10-22-2008, 10:14 PM
IPI, Oct 08: Beyond Terrorism: Deradicalization and Disengagement from Violent Extremism (http://www.ipacademy.org/asset/file/384/BETER.pdf)

.....though much current attention has focused on the process of radicalization and the espousal of violent extremism, Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan argue that insufficient attention has been paid to the other end of the spectrum: the factors which prompt individual and collective withdrawal from violent extremist or radical groups—i.e., the processes of disengagement and deradicalization. Disengagement refers to a behavioral change, such as leaving a group or changing one’s role within it. It does not necessitate a change in values or ideals, but requires relinquishing the objective of achieving change through violence. Deradicalization, however, implies a cognitive shift—i.e., a fundamental change in understanding.

Furthermore, it has been argued that, cumulatively, such processes can have a positive impact on global counterterrorism efforts by promoting the internal fragmentation of violent radical groups and by delegitimizing their rhetoric and tactics in the eyes of the broader public. To this end, Bjørgo and Horgan have edited a volume (http://www.routledgestrategicstudies.com/books/Leaving-Terrorism-Behind-isbn9780415776684) gathering together research, analyses, and case studies on processes of disengagement from violent extremism, as well as descriptions and assessments of global initiatives facilitating withdrawal from violent extremist groups.

This report draws on their work and reflects the discussions at a conference on Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement from Violent Extremism, hosted by the International Peace Institute (http://www.ipacademy.org/) and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on April 22, 2008, in New York City.....

davidbfpo
01-18-2009, 08:14 PM
Once again the Saudi rehab programme for extremists via art gets an airing, last appeared in April 2008 with a showing at The Frontline Club, London (on this thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4807&highlight=frontline+club

and now in Foriegn Policy: http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/01/16/focal_point_from_jihad_to_rehab . Do I detect a shortage of materiel or astute PR by the Saudis?

Incidentally the links on the FP link are betterm for e.g. John Horgan being interviewed: http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/episodes/from-jihad-to-rehab/audio-why-militants-quit/3833/

davidbfpo
02-14-2009, 02:56 PM
Not earth shattering, but the figures on the numbers involved were new to this faraway observer: http://www.heraldnet.com/article/20090201/NEWS01/702019905&news01ad=1

How the US CT regard such a trend has been commented upon before, IIRC not on SWJ.

davidbfpo

Jedburgh
03-05-2009, 02:40 PM
MEI, Nov 08: Islamist De-Radicalization in Algeria: Successes and Failures (http://www.mideasti.org/files/Ashour-Algeria.pdf)

This Policy Brief analyzes the de-radicalization process of armed Islamists in Algeria. It investigates the causes of, and the conditions under which, the dismantlement of the armed wing of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), known as the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), has taken place. That de-radicalization process was not limited to the AIS, but also included factions from the notorious Armed Islamic Group (GIA), the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), and other smaller militias. The article concludes by highlighting comparative de-radicalization cases and providing a framework explaining the causes behind successful de-radicalization.

Bob's World
03-05-2009, 03:05 PM
As I read this thread I didn't know if I should laugh, cry, or simply pound my head against my desk until the pain went away. I think I'll just go hit the gym and run a few miles.

I can't decide which is greater when it comes to this concept of "Deradicalization": The Ignorance of the program, or the Arrogance.

First, it is founded in the popular, but baseless "Pied Piper Theory of Insurgency" (My name for it, I'm sure it has a more official name elsewhere), that presumes that some dynamic leader comes along with a magical flute of ideology and that he somehow bewitches (radicalizes) young men to follow him to their doom. Now if we simply expose the Pied Piper as a fraud, they will see the light and settle down and become good citizens once again.

First, this totally absolves the government giving rise to these young insurgents of any responsibility for contributing to the causation for the insurgency through their failures of governance. As I have stated several times before, and will continue to state, dynamic leadership and effective ideology are both critical requirements to a successful insurgency; but neither will resonate with a target populace unless conditions of poor governance (defined as dissatisfaction within a significant segment of the populace that is so great it demands action, and no legitimate means to resolve the failures exist for that segment) exist first.

Causation and Motivation are two very different things, and should not be confused. Causation typically lies in poor governance. Motivation is typically some inspiring ideology or big event, or both. Addressing motivation without publicly recognizing and addressing causation is a fraud on the populace.

The duty of government is not to fix the thinking of its populace, the duty of governance is to fix its governance of the populace.

I am picturing King George sending a deradicalization team to the Colonies back in 1775, offering "athletic competitions, to lectures, writing contests, and public information campaigns" to the citizens of Boston. Not bringing any changes to governance to address the grievances of the populace, but instead a program designed to distract them from their shortfalls and convince them why they should be satisfied.

Total BS. I think the North Koreans had a similar program for POWs back in the 50s.

Personal opinion, this is a very, very disturbing trend, and we should have no part of it.

davidbfpo
03-06-2009, 08:30 PM
This issue appears fairly reglarly, usually with a lurid news headline and then disappears. The link goes to an article which takes a longer view, the author works in a London "think tank" IISS: http://raffaellopantucci.wordpress.com/2009/02/04/uk-prisons-incubators-for-terrorism/#more-112

davidbfpo

davidbfpo
03-07-2009, 02:12 PM
(Partly quoted) I can't decide which is greater when it comes to this concept of "Deradicalization": The Ignorance of the program, or the Arrogance....First, it is founded in the popular, but baseless "Pied Piper Theory of Insurgency". Now if we simply expose the Pied Piper as a fraud, they will see the light and settle down and become good citizens once again....Causation and Motivation are two very different things, and should not be confused. Causation typically lies in poor governance. Motivation is typically some inspiring ideology or big event, or both. Addressing motivation without publicly recognizing and addressing causation is a fraud on the populace....The duty of government is not to fix the thinking of its populace, the duty of governance is to fix its governance of the populace.

Typically Bob's World comments have led to some hard thinking about policy in the UK and in a May 2008 government paper on our nationals strategy: http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/prevent-strategy/preventing-violent-extremism?view=Binary

I found this described as an objective: 'support individuals who are at risk of radicalisation'. On Bob's criteria we have failed IMHO. So back to thinking again.

davidbfpo

Bob's World
03-08-2009, 03:20 AM
In my experience, politicians in particular, and governments in general, do not take responsibilities for their failures well. Far easier to blame the effects of those failures on some third party.

This is why most counterinsurgency efforts are such long, drawnout affairs. The effort is usually focused on defeating the illegal element of the populace that is acting out, as opposed to fixing the failures of governance that led to the illegal activities in the first place.

The book "1776" is a great case study in this phenomena. The King of England had so many opporutinities to offramp the growing insurgency in America, but could not get past the fact that he was in the right (legally, and logically), and recognize the much more emotional, subjective factors of poor governance that typically give rise to insurgency.

Jedburgh
06-22-2009, 04:42 PM
ICSR, Apr 09: Incredible Dialogues: Religious Dialogue as a Means of Counter-Terrorism in Yemen (http://icsr.info/publications/papers/1245345445AneSkovBirkReport.pdf)

In 2002, Yemen, a country known to have been a breeding ground for al-Qaeda members, initiated a project to use dialogue as a means to alter the ways of suspected militant Islamists held in the state’s prisons. The project received international attention for its bold attempt to use their common reference to Islamic law as a peaceful means for the state to impact the militants. However, the actual implementation of the strategy was steeped in arbitrary arrests, indefinite detentions, torture and other violations of human rights. Furthermore, it was unclear what the charges against the detainees were and what impact the dialogue sessions had. The project was discontinued in 2005.

This paper examines the Yemeni experience of dialogues with Islamists it concludes that, though such a strategy might be a useful means for counter-terrorism, an environment for genuine dialogues cannot be established without taking into account wider issues of the state’s legitimacy vis-à-vis its citizens.

davidbfpo
06-22-2009, 04:57 PM
A good book on this theme is: 'Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and collective disengagement', edited by Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan (Pub by Routledge 2009). Some theoretical and general chapters, then case studies and not just featuring Islam. Took time to read and worthwhile.

I will copy this to the main reading thread.

davidbfpo

davidbfpo
07-09-2009, 02:51 PM
A different aspect to the traditional 'rehab' policy in Saudi Arabaia: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/saudiarabia/5779827/Saudi-Arabia-convicts-330-terror-suspects-in-one-court-case.html

davidbfpo

Rex Brynen
07-09-2009, 03:30 PM
Recent publication on this topic, focusing on the Egyptian and Algerian cases:

Omar Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements (http://www.routledgestrategicstudies.com/books/The-De-Radicalization-of-Jihadists-isbn9780415485456) (London: Routledge, 2009).


This book is the first detailed study of the causes of de-radicalization in armed Islamist movements. It is based on frontline research that includes interviews with Jihadist leaders, mid-ranking commanders, and young sympathizers, as well as former security and intelligence officers and state officials.

Additionally, it is also the first book to analyze the particular conditions under which successful de-radicalization can take place. The current literature on Islamist movements attempts to explain two principal issues: their support of violence (radicalization) and their changing attitudes towards democracy and democratization (moderation). However, the reasons behind renouncing (behavioural de-radicalization) and de-legitimizing (ideological de-radicalization) violence have not been evaluated to date. The author provides an in-depth analysis of the de-radicalization processes of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers (1951-73), former allies of al-Qa'ida, such as al-Gama'a al-Islammiyya (Islamic Group of Egypt, 1997-2002) and al-Jihad Organization (2007- present), as well as of Algerian Islamist groups (1997-2000). The book also analyzes cases of de-radicalization failure.

The two questions that the book highlights and attempts to answer are Why? and How? For example, why do radical Islamist militants revise their ideologies, strategies and objectives and initiate a de-radicalization process; and what are the necessary conditions behind successful de-radicalization? De-radicalization of Jihadists shows how a combination of charismatic leadership, state repression, social interactions and selective inducements can ultimately lead jihadists to abandon 'jihad' and de-legitimize violence.

This book will be of great interest to students of radical Islamist movements and Islamic Studies, terrorism and political violence, security studies, and Middle Eastern politics.

Omar Ashour is a Lecturer in Politics in the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter. He has a PhD in International Relations from McGill University in Canada.

goesh
07-10-2009, 12:53 PM
http://fubar.com/stashEntry.php?stashId=5613345

It's a good day to die

I just don't believe counseling and incentives can turn a man who wants to die with you that easily but I don't argue against the attempts of conversion

Fuchs
07-10-2009, 01:19 PM
Have the de-programming techniques of anti-sect activists been considered ?

davidbfpo
07-10-2009, 02:15 PM
Fuchs,

I've read a few books on this theme and none refer to this activity. Some mention is made of leaving gangs behind. John Horgan has written on the issue, so maybe check his writings?

davidbfpo

marct
07-10-2009, 05:37 PM
Hi David,


I've read a few books on this theme and none refer to this activity. Some mention is made of leaving gangs behind. John Horgan has written on the issue, so maybe check his writings?

Cult deprogramming was fairly big in the US and, to a lessor degree, in Canada in the 1970's and 80's. Here are a couple of references:

Combatting Cult Mind Control: The #1 Best-selling Guide to Protection, Rescue, and Recovery from Destructive Cults (http://www.amazon.com/Combatting-Cult-Mind-Control-Best-selling/dp/0892813113/ref=sid_dp_dp)

Strange Gods: The Great American Cult Scare (http://www.amazon.com/Strange-Gods-Great-American-Scare/dp/0807011096/ref=sid_dp_dp)

The Politics of Religious Apostasy: The Role of Apostates in the Transformation of Religious Movements (Religion in the Age of Transformation) (http://www.amazon.com/Politics-Religious-Apostasy-Apostates-Transformation/dp/0275955087/ref=sid_dp_dp)

goesh
07-11-2009, 05:05 AM
There is no empirical data to even suggest there is a lessening amongst our foes in their efforts to seek spiritual purity, the good death. We come at this problem with our linear, 3 dimensional thinking, grabbing at telelogical snippets taken from Jung, Skinner and Freud, attempting to construct theoretical models of how men can be dissuaded from the path of spiritual purity. I think the complexity of conversions of this nature are beyond our Western capabililty of fully understanding. If it is working in Saudi Arabia, we can't fully understand it and we can only best honor the purists by shooting them in the head. It can be argued that the upsurge of IEDs and other detonations in Afghan is tactical but I think not. It is but an exacerbation of the recent actions in the Swat valley, a mere shifting of energy and resources towards the Afghan flank, part and parcel of their circular thinking and culture.

marct
07-11-2009, 01:46 PM
Hi Goesh,


There is no empirical data to even suggest there is a lessening amongst our foes in their efforts to seek spiritual purity, the good death.

Actually, there is empirical that shows that people can, and do, move away from that particular path.


We come at this problem with our linear, 3 dimensional thinking, grabbing at telelogical snippets taken from Jung, Skinner and Freud, attempting to construct theoretical models of how men can be dissuaded from the path of spiritual purity. I think the complexity of conversions of this nature are beyond our Western capabililty of fully understanding. If it is working in Saudi Arabia, we can't fully understand it and we can only best honor the purists by shooting them in the head.

Speak for yourself good buddy :D!

I do agree, however, that people who use a bricolage model with no empathic understanding (verstehen) are doomed to failure. Theoretical models, as I constantly tell my students, are maps with varying degrees of reflecting the actuality of the terrain. Most of these models suffer from pretty serious flaws including, but not limited to, the basic beliefs of those who try to use them. If we want to understand and model "spiritual purity", then we really have to experience some form of it.

Years ago, back when I was working on my BA, I spent quite a bit of time reading the writings of mystics. One of the things that really stood out was that mystics frome every religious tradition had more in common with each other than with their supposed co-religionists. A second point, that became clearer with a lot of reading on ritual, was that all religious symbol systems are quite limited and fragile and what mystics do is to leverage the paradoxes in them to expand beyond their boundaries to achieve what you are calling "spiritual purity".

When we look at what AQ and others of their psychotic ilk are doing, however, we can see that they are restricting the symbol systems even more than normal. This is, actually, a rather unstable proposition (symbol systems have a certain "habit" of returning to core configurations), and that is where the leverage point is - the symbolic centre of gravity if you will. If you want an example inside Islam, look at the AQ habit of declaring people takfir at the drop of a hat - that is an extremely unstable symbolic configuration.

Rex Brynen
07-11-2009, 02:15 PM
I think the complexity of conversions of this nature are beyond our Western capabililty of fully understanding. If it is working in Saudi Arabia, we can't fully understand it and we can only best honor the purists by shooting them in the head.

In the case of Egypt's very successful deradicalization effort, carrot and stick methods—including regulation of conjugal visits by prisoners' wives—were used to induce the shift. It has been a major shift too, with the once militant Islamic Group and parts of Jihad now engaged in active proselytization for the cause of non-violent Islamism, and engaged in a very pointed rhetorical battle with AQ over the issue.

There are many other factors at play too, including theological engagement by pro-regime clerics (more important in Saudi Arabia than Egypt) and longer term socialization by civil society, but I'm not sure that the dynamics of deradicalization are inherently so complex and culturally-bound as to not be understandable. (Replicable by outsiders is, however, another thing!)

davidbfpo
01-14-2010, 11:42 PM
A short article by Shiraz Maher on the Saudi Arabian prison de-radicalisation programme: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704130904574643891690484198.html?m od=WSJ_Opinion_LEFTTopBucket

Starts with:
It is now clear that the failed terrorist attack by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab on Christmas Day was directed by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The reasons for the sudden resurgence of this previously almost extinct chapter of the global jihad network lie not in Yemen, though—where AQAP is based—but across the border in Saudi Arabia.

Ends with:
Omar Ashour, an expert on deradicalization programs at Exeter University, thinks this approach will ultimately result in more recidivism. "The Egyptians tried something similar in the 1970s and failed," he says. "The Saudi program is not comprehensive because it doesn't address the wider issue of religious and ideological reformation. While it doesn't do that, it can only offer a temporary panacea."

It appears that as long as the Saudis fail to address the regressive literalism and intolerance of their own state religion—which fuels radical Islam around the world—they will also fail to rehabilitate true jihadis.

The author is an ex-radical from Hizb-ut-Tahrir, who has written and reported on radicalisation for several years and was linked to UK "think tank" Policy Exchange - not known for an anti-Saudi stance.

An interesting balance to Christopher Boucek's longer period of work on the issue cited earlier.

graphei
01-17-2010, 10:12 AM
I believe Time had a piece on this a few years ago and the Saudis trotted outs some stats on how successful their program is. I wonder what the re-lapse rate is a few years out?

I always found it deeply ironic that the Saudis of all people are rehabilitating jihadis.

Charles Martel
01-17-2010, 04:55 PM
First, it is founded in the popular, but baseless "Pied Piper Theory of Insurgency" (My name for it, I'm sure it has a more official name elsewhere), that presumes that some dynamic leader comes along with a magical flute of ideology and that he somehow bewitches (radicalizes) young men to follow him to their doom. Now if we simply expose the Pied Piper as a fraud, they will see the light and settle down and become good citizens once again.

First, this totally absolves the government giving rise to these young insurgents of any responsibility for contributing to the causation for the insurgency through their failures of governance.


We have to do both, push the governments that restrict human rights and opportunity (pick any gov't in the Middle East as a prime example) to change as well as deradicalize the environment. Radical Imams do in fact gather followers by building layers of legitimate-sounding religious discourse on the substrate of resentment against the effects of those governments until the followers believe violence is not only their sole option but their sacred duty.

Many non-violent (I hate the word moderate) Imams simply do not have the education in Islamic jurisprudence to counter radicals in a manner that appeals both intellectually and emotionally to the target population. The radicals have built an intellectually solid, albeit narrowly based, argument that justifies violence against both infidels and innocents, who are tools in that fight. Deradicalization efforts have to tip the radical argument off that narrow base by exposing its nihilism and by promoting alternative, broader interpretations that attract wider support.

Midnight basketball won't do it. We have to both change the underlying conditions and undermine the efforts that capitalize on the resentment. Neither is sufficient by itself.

Bill Moore
01-17-2010, 11:18 PM
Posted by Bob's World,


Causation and Motivation are two very different things, and should not be confused. Causation typically lies in poor governance. Motivation is typically some inspiring ideology or big event, or both. Addressing motivation without publicly recognizing and addressing causation is a fraud on the populace.

The duty of government is not to fix the thinking of its populace, the duty of governance is to fix its governance of the populace.

The so called Pied Pipers have always been critical to any social movement. Once the movement has started it may be possible to have a leaderless jihad or other revolt, but I remain skeptical of how effective that will actually be. I think you give way too much credit to the power of good governance to prevent conflicts and radicalization. States are not composed of like minded people who all have the same vison of good governance (not even when Mao attempted to force this type of belief on his people with mass re-education), but rather states are composed of groups/individuals with different ideas of what good governance is. Was it a failure of the U.S. government and Western European governments to provide so called good governance that led to the radicalization of a few extreme leftists who resorted to terrorism? Should we have changed our form of government from a Republic to communism in order to please them? Why did foreign fighters from Morocco, Libya, France, etc. travel to fight in Iraq? Was it a failure of their local governments to provide "good" governance? Or did they travel to Iraq to fight because Pied Pipers on the internet and in their Mosques provided (created) the cause and motivation? Your argument assumes that their own government has failed, so they went to Iraq to fight. I assume our government has failed also, and that is why American kids are going to Somalia and Pakistan to join the jihad? UBL is effective because he is a good leader (many attempted to be Pied Pipers and failed) that provides his followers a vision (sick as it may be), and he comes across as genuine so people who are like minded follow him, and they will continue to follow him (his ideology) after he dies.

As for State reform in the Middle East, just be careful what you ask for. Democracy in countries where the majority live in poverty and are poorly educated, and deeply segregated could and have resulted in radical governments and mass violence. I can't recall who said it, but there is a popular saying the current government in Saudi is terrible, but it is better than any alternative.

Everyone is fighting for what they think good governance means.

Posted by graphei,
I always found it deeply ironic that the Saudis of all people are rehabilitating jihadis.

Why? The jihadis are actual a threat to the Saudi's existence. The jihadis want nothing more than to rule over their holy land.

jmm99
01-18-2010, 01:07 AM
We agree that leaders are important. So are cadres (we middle-rankers) and also the mass of the populace. I believe a fair generalization (yes, there are exceptions) is that leaders are more motivated by ideology, cadres more by perceived opportunity, and the masses more by perceived security (or more realistically in these screwed-up environments, the better perceived insecurity - credit: M-A Legrange).

I believe that COL Jones has refined his position on Causation, Motivation and Causes (as contained in the Narratives) - see Distinguishing "Causes" from "causes" (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=91233&postcount=22) and Agreed as to what a cause is (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=91253&postcount=26).

I have no position about the Saudi program cuz I don't have enough knowledge about it and no experience with it. I do know that the Saudi ideology is not that far removed from UBL's; but the "Causes" in their "Narratives" are quite different. As you correctly state:


The jihadis are actual a threat to the Saudi's existence. The jihadis want nothing more than to rule over their holy land.

The Powers That Be in the Kingdom are betting that their Narrative will beat AQ's Narrative. In confined conditions, that probably is a good bet; but whether that will stick once people are out of the program is something else.

In a way, this reminds me of our Socialist allies in the Cold War (certainly Marxist-based, but with a different Narrative than the Coms). That alliance won a few political battles and avoided some military battles.

Regards

Mike

Bill Moore
01-18-2010, 03:30 AM
We agree that leaders are important. So are cadres (we middle-rankers) and also the mass of the populace. I believe a fair generalization (yes, there are exceptions) is that leaders are more motivated by ideology, cadres more by perceived opportunity, and the masses more by perceived security (or more realistically in these screwed-up environments, the better perceived insecurity - credit: M-A Legrange).

I believe that COL Jones has refined his position on Causation, Motivation and Causes (as contained in the Narratives) - see Distinguishing "Causes" from "causes" and Agreed as to what a cause is.

Mike, what I read on BW's post was that deradicalization was sheer arrogance and laughable. While I agree attempting to change a rational man's position through a re-education program (much like the communists tried with their prisoners and their conquered populations, and if they didn't pretend to change their mind they were often killed) on which form of governance is arrogance to the extreme. However, radicalization is different from political grievances. Kids and adults are frequently brainwashed through sosphisticated methods and often with the help of narcotics to weaken their resistance. They are isolated from alternative views and feed a diet of hatred based partially on truth, but largely on lies.

I see radicalization being closer to kids getting sweep into a religious cult than an insurgency. Most insurgents are not radicalized, but are fighting for several reasons. Kids and young men who travel from Morocco or elsewhere to conduct a suicide attack have probably been radicalized.

The assumption of de-radicalization programs is if these "victims" are exposed to a different interpretation of Islam and taught that killing innocent civilians is a sin, etc., and they're given alternative ways to vent their anger, etc. they "may" shed their radical views. For instance let's take the kid who attempted to blow up the NW flight on Christmas. He grew up in a very moderate family with means and had a good education, yet somewhere along the line a "leader" persuaded him to conduct a suicide attack that would kill over 200 innocent non-combatants. I'm sorry, but that isn't a failure of good governance, there is something else going on here.

The stats I have seen have shown that about 30% of those who been through these programs return to jihad over time (how much time?). Like all stats this leaves a lot unanswered questions. My point is I think it is bit simplistic to boil everything down to good governance. That Nigerian kid declared his own personal jihad on the U.S. and it had nothing to do with governance and everything to do with "Pied Pipers".

jmm99
01-18-2010, 04:44 AM
in any sort of generalized way that would make that term useful for doctrinal guidance.

To me, the quality of governance requires reference to the specific context and some measurement (even if only qualitative and a "fuzzy pattern") of the People's perception of that governance.

What goes on with suicide bombers has to end up with a belief strong enough to die for - with the certain knowledge that no possibility exists for survival. How they get there must be by varied paths (probably too many or too deep to apply any sort of generalized preventive program).

In any event, focusing on them is akin to focusing on a cruise missile (9/11) or mortar shell (suicide bombings) - they are the means to project explosive power (as well as personalizing the attack - to create a Wind of Hate in Dave Grossman's terms). So, I'd look to the people that send them.

As to them, kill, detain or convert are the options. Convert is probably not a good option for leaders; possibly an option for middle-level cadres; and probably an option for many low-level doggies. As I said, I've little knowledge and no experience with the Saudi program.

Regards

Mike

graphei
01-18-2010, 08:15 PM
Why? The jihadis are actual a threat to the Saudi's existence. The jihadis want nothing more than to rule over their holy land.

Some jihadis are a threat to them, but I wouldn't say all. Wahhabism is the theological backbone for many jihadi groups and for decades Saudis disavowed knowledge of many of these groups while quietly pumping their coffers full. Many of these men know their bank balances down to the penny (I heard the stories from their kids/relatives at school in London) and all of a sudden they either can't account for a couple million and/or they are duped into giving millions to a front charity for a militant group? :rolleyes:

While I don't doubt there are many Saudis- even in the royal family and government- who are legitimately trying to do their part, I'm not quite convinced everyone is on board.

Bill Moore
01-18-2010, 10:13 PM
While I don't doubt there are many Saudis- even in the royal family and government- who are legitimately trying to do their part, I'm not quite convinced everyone is on board.

Agreed, there are very few instances where everyone is on board in any country, which is why I think the good governance will solve all problems card is danagerously over played.

In the U.S. there was huge opposition to both WWI and WWII, and more recent time while it was official policy not to support terrorists, many Americans donated money to the IRA. In any democracy you have left leaning, center leaning, and right leaning groups and individuals and variations within those groups. Each has their own interpretation of good government, and some will resort to violence to pursue their ideal form of government.

What does the average American, the average German, the average Mexican, the average Nigerian, really think about various issues? I think the term average used in this fashion is an illusion at best. For those who accept the argument that good governance is the cure for all global ills, it would seem that they would accept that the government should fold everytime an armed group challenges its policies. Obviously it must be a "popular uprising". Seems like a receipe for chaos and failure to me. Principles are worth fighting for, and groups opposed to my and perhaps our principles feel the same way. If there are groups out there opposed to a particular government, then it is highly probable that there are groups opposed to those groups (as both Afghanistan and Iraq "clearly" demonstrate).

Eventually you have to take a stand, and "sometimes" the political process will be violent as it has been throughout the history of mankind.

davidbfpo
01-22-2010, 10:41 PM
CT Blog pointer to a WINEP report starts with:
In December 2001, Sajid Badat and Richard Reid, two young Muslims from England, were scheduled to blow up two U.S.-bound planes by using explosive-laden footwear, Jacobson writes. Reid -- like Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, al-Qaeda's most recent alleged plane bomber -- made the attempt and failed. Badat, however, abandoned the plan, later telling prosecutors he wanted to "introduce some calm" into his life. What led Badat to choose an alternative path? (My emphasis)What can we learn from his case and from the many other terrorist "drop outs" who have left al-Qaeda? In a newly released Washington Institute study, I explore these difficult but important questions.

I have asked about those who have given up the fight, not necessarily the cause and few academics appear to have considered this - so even if I've not read the report yet - I welcome this and will return when read.

The link to full report:
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/terrorist-dropouts-learning-from-those-who-have-left

davidbfpo
02-10-2010, 01:51 PM
I suppose this was to be expected and appearing in The Daily Telegraph is no surprise.

In short:
Saudi Arabia says it will not give up a controversial rehabilitation programme for Islamist radicals heavily criticised in the US after former inmates set up an al-Qaeda cell in neighbouring Yemen.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/saudiarabia/7195400/Saudi-Arabia-defends-al-Qaeda-rehabilitation-scheme.html

Note a 20% recidivism rate is cited by the Saudis (not seen that before).

davidbfpo
06-25-2010, 09:56 PM
The much-lauded and criticised Saudi rehab process has re-appeared after a rare official statement:
About 25 former Guantanamo Bay detainees have returned to violence after going through a rehabilitation programme in Saudi Arabia, a senior Saudi official has said.

Abdulrahman al-Hadlaq, the director of the interior ministry's ideological security administration, said on Saturday that about 20 per cent of the 120 repatriated former prisoners have returned to radical activity after graduation from a rehab centre in Riyadh, the Saudi capital.

More on the link:http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2010/06/201062013047249951.html or Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE65I22220100619

Hat Tip to The Legal War on Terror Weekly Brief.

Jedburgh
06-28-2010, 04:12 PM
ICSR, 25 Jun 10: Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalisation and De-radicalisation in 15 Countries (http://icsr.info/publications/papers/1277699166PrisonsandTerrorismRadicalisationandDera dicalisationin15Countries.pdf)

Introduction

• This report offers a wide-ranging analysis of the role prisons can play in radicalising people – and in reforming them. In doing so, it examines the policies and approaches of 15 countries, identifying trade-offs and dilemmas but also principles and best practices that can help governments and policymakers spot new ideas and avoid costly and counterproductive mistakes.

• Prisons matter. They have played an enormous role in the narratives of every radical and militant movement in the modern period. They are ‘places of vulnerability’ in which radicalisation takes place. Yet they have also served as incubators for peaceful change and transformation.

• Much of the current discourse about prisons and radicalisation is negative. But prisons are not just a threat – they can play a positive role in tackling problems of radicalisation and terrorism in society as a whole. Many of the examples in this report demonstrate how prisons can become net contributors to the fight against terrorism.

davidbfpo
10-22-2010, 08:16 AM
Hat tip to a Canadian helper.

The Macdonald-Laurier Institute has released a new report entitled ‘From Rehabilitation to Recruitment’, an in-depth look at the problem of prison radicalization – the recruitment and indoctrination of future terrorists within prison populations by fellow inmates. While Canada’s problem with prison radicalization is still limited in comparison to other countries, author Alex Wilner argues that now is the time to stop this phenomenon in Canada before it starts, and offers a number of recommendations for preventative action.

Link:http://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/files/pdf/FromRehabilitationToRecruitment.pdf

Bob's World
10-22-2010, 02:30 PM
Considering that perceptions of injustice are one of the major causal factors for increasing the conditions of insurgency in a community, it should be little surprise that in the prison system one might find a community that finds the rule of law as applied to them to be injust.

This is certainly true in America where one really can't rationalize the percentages of minorities who end up in the system. Or in Saudi Arabia where some 9,000 have been arrested on suspicion of "terrorism" over the past 7 years or so and held without charge or trial.

By understanding from the perspective of the populace and working to address those things that contribute most to perceptions of injustice is the best way to "deradicalize" this populace. These other programs are mere mitigation of the symptoms, and not true solutions.

I don't think we fully appreciate the magnitude of the problem, or the interconnectivity through informal networked means.

My Uncle was a corrections officer at the facility where Sirhan Sirhan is held. When he walked by his cell on 9/10/01 he noticed Sirhan sitting in a meditative state with a freshly shaved head. "Why the new hairdo?" he asked. "I'm preparing for war," Sirhan replied. The following day is, of course, history.

One more good reason we should put the bulk of our intel community in prison...:)

davidbfpo
03-26-2011, 12:37 PM
This Canadian parliamentary report has some depth - in the variety of witnesses heard - and the testimony of Professor Andrew Silke (UK) on the effect of prison is important:http://parl.gc.ca/40/3/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/anti-e/pdf/09issue.pdf


Perhaps another surprising observation is that in the U.K. we have had over 400 al Qaeda-linked extremists convicted of terrorism-related offences since 2001. Approximately 300 of these people have been released already, and many have received relatively short sentences. Most of these people are on the streets in the U.K. One finding is that there does not seem to be any evidence of these people re-engaging in extremism or becoming involved in violence again. The re-conviction rate or the re-offending rate of these individuals is extremely low. It has surprised many people who assumed that if someone was radicalized, chiefly engaged in violence and had spent time in
prison, they would still be dangerous when they came out. From most of them we see that prison represents a transition period where they move on to other issues and away from violence.

Link to report:http://www.parl.gc.ca/40/3/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/anti-e/rep-e/rep03mar11-e.pdf

davidbfpo
05-11-2012, 06:39 PM
Spotted in an ICSR report on the Yemen:
At its core are 100 veteran jihadists, who escaped local prisons in 2006 and 2011. The group also counts on 11 former Guantanamo detainees, who returned to terrorism after undergoing "rehabilitation" programs in Saudi Arabia.

See main post (No. 57), with full copy of the ICSR report:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=12784&page=3

davidbfpo
07-25-2012, 01:47 PM
A rare insight into how Spain is accommodating it's violent past, now that the Basque separatist ETA has declared a ceasefire and the brave people on either side:http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/16/world/europe/after-assassinations-basque-killers-explain.html?_r=1&smid=tw-share

davidbfpo
12-03-2012, 11:28 AM
A thoughtful article, from a country with very few convicted terrorism prisoners and if Canada is struggling with a plan and implementation, how will others fare?

Link:http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/11/30/as-convicted-terrorists-face-possible-release-canada-faced-with-growing-problem-how-do-you-rehabilitate-them/

Bill Moore
12-04-2012, 04:09 AM
I'm happy to hear that the West is considering approaches other than re-radicalization. Disengagement from violence should be sufficient and potentially achievable. Trying to convince a person to give up their deeply held religious beliefs seems irrational, and quite frankly it flies in the face of the freedoms we have sworn to defend.


‘This is all based on their fundamental belief that they’re doing the right thing, they’re doing God’s will, so that’s a really challenging thing to overcome’


The CSC’s current approach is to focus on changing violent behaviour rather than ideological or religious beliefs, the government source said. Each offender has a customized correctional plan — a mix of spiritual counseling and social and educational programs. The CSC works with the Interfaith Committee on Chaplaincy to provide religious support for offenders.

This article in my opinion adds evidence that their positions have little to do with their economic status in life, so spending billions to support economic development will not address the underlying cause that motivates serious Islamists. We have a hard time understanding true believers when they're opposed to our way of life, we simply assume they're fighting us because they haven't reaped the benefits of it and we just give them more opportunity they'll drop their beliefs.

davidbfpo
06-11-2013, 07:46 PM
A long comprehensive article by Jason Burke of The Guardian, which assembles information from around the globe and tries give an answer to this:
The problem, however, is that nobody knows if they actually work.

Link:http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/09/terrorism-do-deradicalisation-camps-work?

That the Pakistani police have such a programme I don't recall before. One thing is for sure:
Equally, success in many places, such as Singapore, may be as much to do with 24/7 surveillance of the released militants as anything else, experts say.

I am sure a week ago I read elsewhere that the Yemen is copying the Saudi model for returning GITMO prisoners; since the Saudis now admit a 20% recidivism rate one wonders if the Yemen will ever admit theirs.

There is an existing thread on 'Terrorist Prisoners and Deradicalization':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5219 and the wider 'Studies on radicalisation & comments':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7188

davidbfpo
03-17-2016, 12:10 PM
A good 'Long read' in The Guardian on a topical subject:http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/17/are-french-prisons-finishing-schools-for-terrorism

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