So I Started Reading the Feith Book...

[SteveMetz]

...as much as it bugged me to put money in his pocket, given that I'm working on an OIF decisionmaking project and will be doing interviews after my book comes out, I need to know what's in it. I'm only 30 pages in it--it's articulate and well-written, but I can already see the seeds being sowed for the "stab in the back" argument.

[Steve Blair]

...as much as it bugged me to put money in his pocket, given that I'm working on an OIF decisionmaking project and will be doing interviews after my book comes out, I need to know what's in it. I'm only 30 pages in it--it's articulate and well-written, but I can already see the seeds being sowed for the "stab in the back" argument.

That's why you use libraries, Steve....:cool: Read the book without giving him a thin dime.

[SteveMetz]

Libraries seem so....socialistic. I prefer to own the means of production.

[Rex Brynen]

Libraries seem so....socialistic. I prefer to own the means of production.

In this particular case, wouldn't that be the means of obfuscation?

[marct]

Libraries seem so....socialistic. I prefer to own the means of production.

Tsk, tsk - I thought you folks got rid of slavery, Steve? I mean, after all, Feith produced the book, so it is only logical to view him as the means of production :eek::D.


In this particular case, wouldn't that be the means of obfuscation?

Not at all, Rex! I'm shocked (but not "appalled" ;)) that you would think so! After seeing him on that 60 minutes interview, I am firmly of the opinion that he has had a Road to Damascus type of conversion experience and is now solidly in the Green Party / Earth First camp. After all, he has produced such an amazingly large amount of organic fertilizer....

[Tom Odom]

MarcT: Not at all, Rex! I'm shocked (but not "appalled" ) that you would think so! After seeing him on that 60 minutes interview, I am firmly of the opinion that he has had a Road to Damascus type of conversion experience and is now solidly in the Green Party / Earth First camp. After all, he has produced such an amazingly large amount of organic fertilizer....

that would be Feith-based "intelligence" and associated higher-level thought...

He is articulate; so was Jim Jones. No wonder GEN Franks liked him so much :wry:

Tom

PS

Steve please read each word twice and that will count for me...:D

[marct]

that would be Feith-based "intelligence" and associated higher-level thought...

He is articulate; so was Jim Jones. No wonder GEN Franks liked him so much :wry:

That's the trouble we have with some of your accents! And I always thought Bush was talking about faith-based initiatives :eek:! Oh, well.

BTW, I was doing a little chatting with some friends, and they mentioned that they had seen a vision of Feith and sent the link.
http://www.lasr.net/images/events/NE0401013e043.jpg

[SteveMetz]

You people are just MEAN

[Tom Odom]

You people are just MEAN

I know but we are GOOD at being mean :D

here is another bit from yet another beacon of higher intellect:



Inside the Ring (http://www.washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080411/NATION04/540376560&template=nextpage)

Feith Speaks:
...For example, Mr. Feith criticizes former Secretary of State Colin Powell and former Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage for the failure of diplomacy in the lead-up to the 2003 invasion.

Mr. Feith said Mr. Powell did not make any speeches in France or Germany as part of efforts to win support from those countries, and failed to win Turkey's backing for a northern invasion route into Iraq, which seriously hampered the war effort.

And that would be after the SecDef dismissed said countries as "Old Europe"...

Now drink your Koolaid, read some more, and take a nice nap...

[Stan]

Amazon already has 14 used books available, saving nearly 40% :eek:

Must be a quick read :D

[Eden]

While the level of repartee and rapier-like wit is gratifying...really, it's like having a seat at the Algonquin Round Table...could someone give us ignorant folks a paragraph or two on what exactly makes Mr. Feith the dastardly ignoramus he appears to be?

[Tom Odom]

While the level of repartee and rapier-like wit is gratifying...really, it's like having a seat at the Algonquin Round Table...could someone give us ignorant folks a paragraph or two on what exactly makes Mr. Feith the dastardly ignoramus he appears to be?

Try here (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Douglas_Feith)as a start...

[marct]

Hi Eden,


While the level of repartee and rapier-like wit is gratifying...really, it's like having a seat at the Algonquin Round Table...could someone give us ignorant folks a paragraph or two on what exactly makes Mr. Feith the dastardly ignoramus he appears to be?

Some of it comes from the fact that he was one of the primary architects of the push to invade Iraq and is now attempting to blame everything that went wrong on other people. Basically, he is taking no responsibility for his actions at all. What is even worse, at least for me, is that he seems to have convinced himself that he is not to blame - either that or he is an excellent liar (which is possible...). At best, he is self-deluded and, as with many charismatic ideologues, invites others to share in that delusion.

[Tom Odom]

Hi Eden,



Some of it comes from the fact that he was one of the primary architects of the push to invade Iraq and is now attempting to blame everything that went wrong on other people. Basically, he is taking no responsibility for his actions at all. What is even worse, at least for me, is that he seems to have convinced himself that he is not to blame - either that or he is an excellent liar (which is possible...). At best, he is self-deluded and, as with many charismatic ideologues, invites others to share in that delusion.

Now there you go, Marc, being nice again....

[marct]

Now there you go, Marc, being nice again....

Sorry, Tom... Just one of those Canadian cultural things (along with politeness, helping little old ladies across the street, and lampooning politicians).

[SteveMetz]

I'm only 70 pages or so in, but I've noticed that Feith keeps stating over and over that in the weeks after September 11, the administration decided the enemy was a "network," not an organization. It's pretty easy to see where this is going--it's setting the stage for a defense of the Iraq decision.

But my initial thought is that pretty much everyone who has analyzed how one destroys a network focuses on the need to identify and neutralize critical nodes. I'm anxious to see the logic that makes Iraq a critical node in the transnational terrorist network.

Now, nose back to the grindstone....

[SWCAdmin]

I heard his rap on the Diane Rehm show, a DC area NPR affiliate. Here's the page (http://wamu.org/programs/dr/08/04/10.php#20379), there's a link there to an audio feed.

She poked him in the eyes a couple of times. He's deft with his spin, has his story, is sticking to it. Remarkable how prescient he comes off in his telling.

I hope no one on the bus got hurt when it bumped over Powell.

[William F. Owen]

But my initial thought is that pretty much everyone who has analyzed how one destroys a network focuses on the need to identify and neutralize critical nodes.

As you know, I do not subscribe to any of the impedimenta proselytised in the new theories of war, such as networks,

...but my understanding of such gobbledegook was that you attacked the linkages between the nodes and not the nodes themselves, as the power of the "network" is in the linking mechanism. If not, then the nodes are merely "layers" in a hierarchy.

...now back to the book written by some guy called S. Metz :)

[selil]

Not quite Wilf,

A network system that is tightly coupled like a hiearchy, political hegemony, or military social network if you attack the connectors then the nodes will faill. Imagine cutting command and control and you get the idea.

If the network is loosely coupled the network connections may be loosely coupled and the nodes themselves are the point to attack. In cell networks the coupling may be one direction and one to many. Cutting the network connections will have little effect.

In loosely coupled social networks (especially) the nodes may not all be of the same importance and they can be disturbed or placed into an instable state by interupting critical points. This is true if there is a primary ideological focus, it is very true if there is a financial or social capital focus, and in the case of social movements thought leaders can become the critical locus.

[Jedburgh]

......but my understanding of such gobbledegook was that you attacked the linkages between the nodes and not the nodes themselves, as the power of the "network" is in the linking mechanism. If not, then the nodes are merely "layers" in a hierarchy....
The key term is critical nodes.

Eliminating a link between identified operational elements (e.g. the cut-out is the link, the agent is one node and the handler is another) results in only temporary disruption of that part of the network. Whether you capture or kill the individual acting as a physical cut-out, or shut down the website acting as a virtual cut-out, its the same thing - both can be replaced without significant effort.

Eliminating the agent is also just a temp disruption. Another can be recruited, and handlers tend to run intel cells in parallel, just for that contingency - as well for corroboration of information.

The critical node in this simplistic example is the handler. Eliminate him and the entire intel network he had running is done; capture him and there is significant potential of not only rolling up his net, but of attacking higher in the network.

This same basic principle described for the intel cell holds for logistics and operational cells, and for the network as a whole. Destroying links only temporarily disrupts the network. Identifying and eliminating critical nodes is how you eventually destroy the network.

However, in practice, when dealing with a group that competently structures its clandestine organization, you are often forced to settle for the temporary disruptions and hope that the information gleaned eventually leads to effective targeting of critical nodes for destruction. It is a long and painstaking process - unless you get incredibly lucky.

[William F. Owen]

The critical node in this simplistic example is the handler. Eliminate him and the entire intel network he had running is done; capture him and there is significant potential of not only rolling up his net, but of attacking higher in the network.


Higher up the network? So this, by implication is a hierarchical system, and thus an organisation, not a network.

I feel I may have started an entirely useless discussion! Apologies. :o

[Jedburgh]

Higher up the network? So this, by implication is a hierarchical system, and thus an organisation, not a network.

I feel I may have started an entirely useless discussion! Apologies. :o
No system consists purely of equals working together in pursuit of their goals. If you restrict yourself to that mode of thinking about networks, you are operating with blinders. I certainly feel you are mistaken in attempting to slap a divider between the terms organization and network.

A clandestine network is a form of organization, and although it's structure may reflect classic hierarchies in certain respects, it would be a mistake to categorize it as such. Even traditionally tightly structured Maoist organizations (such as the PKK and Sendero Luminoso), although they do have clear hierarchies at the upper-to-mid levels, their cellular structures devolve in a manner similar in character to the subject under discussion at the operational and tactical levels. In any case, no matter what organization or grouping is the target, there are always leaders, although the context and nature of the leadership roles often differs significantly from one group to the other.

A network in the context of which I am referring to is not a purely hierachical system (much less so even that the Maoist examples provided above), but may consist of several connected hierarchies, as well as autonomous entities, within a loosely structured system that functions well enough to provide strategic direction to one degree or another. Where tactical and operational direction, planning and guidance orginate varies with both leadership personalities and organizational structure.

Compartmented, decentralized cellular threat organizations are not plain ol' hierarchies. If only that were so, it would be that much easier to deal with them.

The conversation is not useless, but perhaps better suited to a different area/thread.

[JJackson]

I had assumed (from the flag: Hammer & Sickle) they had Marxist-Leninist roots but these days were a broader church - although still socialist - welcoming anyone who was willing to fight for a Kurdish nation state.

[selil]

Check out this link to power points discussing "Leaderless Jihad"... If you look about two thirds of the way in there is a network graph that shows linkages between groups and individuals.

http://www.newamerica.net/files/Microsoft%20PowerPoint%20-%20Sageman.pdf


Jedburgh, I looked but can't find the thread we discussed networks in previously. Seems it was pages long.

[marct]

Selil and Jedburgh's points about critical nodes notwithstanding, you can attack either the critical node or a critical circuit (nodes and connections) in a loosely coupled network. Even more importantly, you can induce "noise" (think of rumour in a social network) or feedback (think truly viscious rumours) through a network circuit that can damage or destroy it. In a tightly coupled network, you can do the same thing by accelerating a circuit vector. For example, you can take an orthodox belief in a social circuit and then put it on steroids - "everyone must believe X or they will be killed", etc. A biological analogy would be poisoning someone with overdoses of vitamin B.

[Jedburgh]

Selil and Jedburgh's points about critical nodes notwithstanding, you can attack either the critical node or a critical circuit (nodes and connections) in a loosely coupled network. Even more importantly, you can induce "noise" (think of rumour in a social network) or feedback (think truly viscious rumours) through a network circuit that can damage or destroy it. In a tightly coupled network, you can do the same thing by accelerating a circuit vector. For example, you can take an orthodox belief in a social circuit and then put it on steroids - "everyone must believe X or they will be killed", etc. A biological analogy would be poisoning someone with overdoses of vitamin B.
At this point, I think I should clearly state that all my maundering on about networks is relative only to clan threat networks of human beings. Ranging from HOIS agent nets, to terrorist organizations across a broad spectrum of types, as well as the underground support structures for overt insurgencies.

Destruction is the goal we strive for with such networks, and damn difficult to reach, unless you catch'em early and eliminate the movement at the fetal stage. The methods that Marc refers to are difficult to plan and implement effectively against an organization with any roots at all. On the rare occasions when such tactics have been effective (i.e. Kenya, the Philippines) it has been in a relatively narrow sense, and only resulted in the type of temp disruption that I mentioned in an earlier post. When that temp disruption is exploited in a structured manner to dig deeper into the threat structure, and the opportunity is seized for aggressive follow-up, then it can lead to network destruction, but not as a stand-alone approach.

Again, I'm referring only to the types of organizations I mentioned above, not to emerging, immature entities that can be easily (in a comparative sense) destroyed by the methods Marc stated. On the other, repressive governments have often used such methods with great success against dissident networks. The study of dissident networks in Eastern Europe during the Cold War period offers a lot of valuable lessons on clan comms and security measures evolved by the various groups to mitigate against this sort of threat to their underground existence.

[marct]

Hi Ted,


Destruction is the goal we strive for with such networks, and damn difficult to reach, unless you catch'em early and eliminate the movement at the fetal stage. The methods that Marc refers to are difficult to plan and implement effectively against an organization with any roots at all. On the rare occasions when such tactics have been effective (i.e. Kenya, the Philippines) it has been in a relatively narrow sense, and only resulted in the type of temp disruption that I mentioned in an earlier post. When that temp disruption is exploited in a structured manner to dig deeper into the threat structure, and the opportunity is seized for aggressive follow-up, then it can lead to network destruction, but not as a stand-alone approach.

Too true on how difficult they are to implement! Temporary disruption, i.e. "noise operations" is usually about the best you can hope to achieve in any established network. The only case I am aware of where the "toxic noise" approach actually worked, it took several hundred years - no something that is "salable" to the general public at the moment :cool:.


Again, I'm referring only to the types of organizations I mentioned above, not to emerging, immature entities that can be easily (in a comparative sense) destroyed by the methods Marc stated. On the other, repressive governments have often used such methods with great success against dissident networks. The study of dissident networks in Eastern Europe during the Cold War period offers a lot of valuable lessons on clan comms and security measures evolved by the various groups to mitigate against this sort of threat to their underground existence.

The Canadian government used on of the sneakiest forms of this type of attack on emerging radical networks that I have ever seen - they funded them. Sounds insane, but the RCMP managed to sidetrack over 100 potentially "revolutionary" groups by the simple expedient of early infiltration and financial support. The leadership structure was subtly manipulated - financially rewarded for pursuing rhetoric rather than action, and punished (financially) when direct action leading to social harm took place.

[ipopescu]

Some of it comes from the fact that he was one of the primary architects of the push to invade Iraq and is now attempting to blame everything that went wrong on other people. Basically, he is taking no responsibility for his actions at all. What is even worse, at least for me, is that he seems to have convinced himself that he is not to blame - either that or he is an excellent liar (which is possible...). At best, he is self-deluded and, as with many charismatic ideologues, invites others to share in that delusion.

Dale Herspring brings up again this interesting episode, in a new book - Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power: p.123

--On February 11, 2003, Under Secretary Feith appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to discuss postwar Iraq. Predictably, he assured everyone that everything was under control. "I do want to assure the committee that when we talk about all of the key functions that are going to need to be performed in post-war Iraq, we have thought about them across the range from worst case to very good case."--

Enough said.

[bourbon]

what exactly makes Mr. Feith the dastardly ignoramus he appears to be?
Dear Eden,

Doug Feith is an ideologue to the Nth degree, as such, to quote The Quiet American by Graham Greene: “He’ll always be innocent, you can’t blame the innocent, they are always guiltless. All you can do is control them or eliminate them. Insanity is a kind of innocence.”

Best.

[SteveMetz]

Dale Herspring brings up again this interesting episode, in a new book - Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power: p.123

--On February 11, 2003, Under Secretary Feith appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to discuss postwar Iraq. Predictably, he assured everyone that everything was under control. "I do want to assure the committee that when we talk about all of the key functions that are going to need to be performed in post-war Iraq, we have thought about them across the range from worst case to very good case."--

Enough said.

I mention Feith on pages 82, 104, 109, 115, 116, 131, 132, 135, 192 of mine (http://www.scribd.com/doc/2483388/Iraq-and-Evolution1st-proof1?secret_password=n7skdvw6gcteyuin76z).

[SteveMetz]

I was sidetracked for a few days, but now I'm back on track. Tale after tale of how "mistakes were made," but NEVER by the President, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, or Feith himself. The most recent nausea inducing twist of scapegoating is on page 139 where Feith writes, "Our armed forces and civilian officials lacked the institutions, authorities, and resources needed for reconstruction work." He clearly intended that as a way of shifting blame to others for what transpired. I guess it never occurred to him that a strategy based on nonexistent capabilities is flawed (Strategy 101: a strategy must be suitable, acceptable, AND feasible). Oh well, "mistakes were made."

[Tom Odom]

I mention Feith on pages 82, 104, 109, 115, 116, 131, 132, 135, 192 of mine (http://www.scribd.com/doc/2483388/Iraq-and-Evolution1st-proof1?secret_password=n7skdvw6gcteyuin76z).

I hope you use stupid nine times

[SteveMetz]

I hope you use stupid nine times

I guess I could just use the template I designed for OERs.

[Tom Odom]

I hope you use stupid nine times

On second thought add idiot to match and then double it...:mad:

[SteveMetz]

We're bordering on Limbaughism here--he is so obsessed with bashing the State Department at every opportunity that it's getting downright absurd. On p. 151 he writes, "...training and equipping foreign military forces was normally a job for State, not Defense." The implication here is that DoD had to make great exertions because of State's failure.

Does he really not understand that while security assistance programs are administered by State, the State Department doesn't actually train or equip a military? Or does he actually know but figure that his readers won't?

[SteveMetz]

And he continues on p. 151: "...Congress had not foreseen that a mission of this kind (rebuilding the Afghan army)...might be the key to winding down our enormously expensive military effort in Afghanistan."

See--that explains it: it was Congress' fault for not anticipating the need to rebuild the Afghan army. We can't blame OSD for not antcipating it since, as Feith explains earlier by quoting Rumsfeld, crap happens. But Congress, State, and the military should have been prescient enough to develop capabilities that the President and SECDEF told them not to in anticipation that the President and SECDEF would later change their minds.

[SteveMetz]

And, again, p. 158, "...the bureaucracy was underequipped and poorly organized for strategically important stability and reconstruction operations."

Why, then, did the administration develop a strategy which placed great stress on stability and reconstruction operations? It's like a basketball player who jumps into the air with the ball, then starts thinking about what he's going to do. Plus, by early 2002 when such capability was needed, the administration had had nearly a year and half to come up with some sort of comprehensive reorganization and legislation package to augment stabilization and reconstruction. But it had not. In fact, it had not done so by March 2003. All this after the orginal strategy assumption--things will kind of take care of themselves--proved wrong.

[Tom Odom]

And, again, p. 158, "...the bureaucracy was underequipped and poorly organized for strategically important stability and reconstruction operations."

Why, then, did the administration develop a strategy which placed great stress on stability and reconstruction operations? It's like a basketball player who jumps into the air with the ball, then starts thinking about what he's going to do. Plus, by early 2002 when such capability was needed, the administration had had nearly a year and half to come up with some sort of comprehensive reorganization and legislation package to augment stabilization and reconstruction. But it had not. In fact, it had not done so by March 2003. All this after the orginal strategy assumption--things will kind of take care of themselves--proved wrong.

Steve,

As a moderator,l hopefully speaking for the other mods as well as Bill and Dave, I really hope that you plan to review this book, perhaps on the SWJ Blog or at least on a formal book review thread.

Logical question from above: And why did the DoD place such limits on whom Garner could recruit for reconstruction planning even as they proclaimed that DoD had the lead in such plans?

Tom

[SteveMetz]

Logical question from above: And why did the DoD place such limits on whom Garner could recruit for reconstruction planning even as they proclaimed that DoD had the lead in such plans?

Tom

Of course the story line from Tom Ricks and others is that someone in the White House--probably Cheney--did it. But I don't know if Feith provides another explanation. Haven't gotten that far yet and have to put the book down to write an MSM citation. Given the rancor between DoD and State, my guess would be that if Rumsfeld himself didn't orgininate the restrictions, he didn't oppose them.

That said, even had Garner hired Tom Warrick and everyone else he wanted, the net effect would have been marginal. The problems were much too big for a few experts to solve by the time ORHA was created.

[ipopescu]

Logical question from above: And why did the DoD place such limits on whom Garner could recruit for reconstruction planning even as they proclaimed that DoD had the lead in such plans?

In the book I'm currently reading (referenced above), Herspring pins most of the blame on Feith for preventing the hiring of more experts and Arabists due to their alleged lack of dedication to the president's mission. They did not share the freedom agenda of the administration, and Feith did not want them involved. He is also said to personally insist on preventing OSD staff from joining inter-agency planning groups, for the same reason.

[SteveMetz]

In the book I'm currently reading (referenced above), Herspring pins most of the blame on Feith for preventing the hiring of more experts and Arabists due to their alleged lack of dedication to the president's mission. They did not share the freedom agenda of the administration, and Feith did not want them involved. He is also said to personally insist on preventing OSD staff from joining inter-agency planning groups, for the same reason.


I've ordered the Herspring book but not yet received it. I'll be interested as to what his sources are. That's not the way I portray it in my book. I'll withhold judgement but looking at the advertisement for the Herspring book, it looked like just one more anti-Bush screed. I strove mightily to be balanced and objective in mine. I felt the administration made major errors, but I didn't want to pin them with ones that I couldn't verify by sources other than administration opponents.

[ipopescu]

I'll withhold judgement but looking at the advertisement for the Herspring book, it looked like just one more anti-Bush screed. I strove mightily to be balanced and objective in mine.

It's more like an anti-Rumsfeld screed. Sources are mostly MSM and personal interviews. I do not detect a conscious effort on his part to be very objective, but he's not extremely biased either given that his thesis - Rumsfeld was a very bad SECDEF - is not that controversial. What's interesting as it relates to this thread is that Feith is the only character in the book that comes out worse than Rumsfeld :D

[selil]

I strove mightily to be balanced and objective in mine. I felt the administration made major errors, but I didn't want to pin them with ones that I couldn't verify by sources other than administration opponents.


I have to agree. Hang the POTUS on the mistakes they made and don't make stuff up. There will be enough blame to go around in the end. I think the argument in coming years will be framed somewhat in the form of a weak kneed democrat led congress unable to reign in a unitarian executive power juxtaposed with improper planning by the executive branch. The end result will be to punish the military with a massive RIF, somewhat isolationism, distrust of the democrats as weak even in the seat of power, and neo-con petulance at the crashing economic woes that Iraq and the GWOT have created.

What I don't see happening is a massive anti-war/peace movement or a protest populist movement in regards to civil rights.

[SteveMetz]

It's more like an anti-Rumsfeld screed. Sources are mostly MSM and personal interviews. I do not detect a conscious effort on his part to be very objective, but he's not extremely biased either given that his thesis - Rumsfeld was a very bad SECDEF - is not that controversial. What's interesting as it relates to this thread is that Feith is the only character in the book that comes out worse than Rumsfeld :D

Do you know what Peter Feaver's take on the book is (given his inside perspective)?

[ipopescu]

I don't think he read it yet. I'm reading an advance copy because I will write a review for it.

[marct]

I think the argument in coming years will be framed somewhat in the form of a weak kneed democrat led congress unable to reign in a unitarian executive power juxtaposed with improper planning by the executive branch. The end result will be to punish the military with a massive RIF, somewhat isolationism, distrust of the democrats as weak even in the seat of power, and neo-con petulance at the crashing economic woes that Iraq and the GWOT have created.

Quite possibly.


What I don't see happening is a massive anti-war/peace movement or a protest populist movement in regards to civil rights.

Add to that a deafening lack of politicians taking responsibility for their actions, ideologues pointing fingers and an upsurge in the popularity of this work (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b3mi-bKtDGA).

Actually, I'm more concerned about the fact that the rest of the world is starting to view any US administration as a bunch of clowns who will inevitably blame someone, anyone, else for their own failures. Not exactly the sort of "allies" one wants, old chap!

[Ken White]

...Actually, I'm more concerned about the fact that the rest of the world is starting to view any US administration as a bunch of clowns who will inevitably blame someone, anyone, else for their own failures. Not exactly the sort of "allies" one wants, old chap!We should be used to it... :D

I'd also suggest that it is not an affliction solely of US Administrations; I've seen a few others use the same 'logic' fairly frequently...

[Steve Blair]

I trace some of it back to learned behavior from watching Congress flounder and cast blame for the last 30 years or so. Sure the executive branch has had more than its share of idiots, but what can you say about a group that sits and whines when it has the controlling majority in both the House and Senate? Too many lawyers and professional politicians in the place for my liking, I'm sad to say....:eek:

[marct]

Hi Ken,


We should be used to it... :D

I'd also suggest that it is not an affliction solely of US Administrations; I've seen a few others use the same 'logic' fairly frequently...

True - but who cares about what our PM's do anyway ;). On that note, I just got a breaking news alert that the RCMP was raiding Conservative Party headquarters (http://www.cbc.ca/canada/ottawa/story/2008/04/15/rcmp-tories.html) in Ottawa...


I trace some of it back to learned behavior from watching Congress flounder and cast blame for the last 30 years or so. Sure the executive branch has had more than its share of idiots, but what can you say about a group that sits and whines when it has the controlling majority in both the House and Senate? Too many lawyers and professional politicians in the place for my liking, I'm sad to say....:eek:

LOLOL - personally, I would have said too few professional politicians and too many ideologue amateurs :D, but your point is taken.

[Ken White]

...True - but who cares about what our PM's do anyway ;). On that note, I just got a breaking news alert that the RCMP was raiding Conservative Party headquarters (http://www.cbc.ca/canada/ottawa/story/2008/04/15/rcmp-tories.html) in Ottawa...about it -- I really had several other governments in mind... :D

On the Tory Hq raid, I am shocked, shocked I say, that such a thing would be suspected of them. Brian has assured me there is no there there... ;)

[marct]

Hey Ken,


On the Tory Hq raid, I am shocked, shocked I say, that such a thing would be suspected of them. Brian has assured me there is no there there... ;)

Doesn't really surprise me at all ;). If we ever get together for a couple of pints, we can trade Brian stories :D.

[SteveMetz]

Steve,

As a moderator,l hopefully speaking for the other mods as well as Bill and Dave, I really hope that you plan to review this book, perhaps on the SWJ Blog or at least on a formal book review thread.

Tom

Since I've become a serial ranter here (imagine a less charming version of Lewis Black), I can just gather up all of these crumbs into a review. Here's my lead:

The book is a wellspring of invaluable information intertwined with one of the most unreflective apologias ever packaged as a memoir. The people generally considered to be most responsible for American strategy--President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld--are portrayed as prescient and blameless. Colin Powell, George Tenet, the organizations each of them led, and, to a degree, the uniformed military are the culprits stabbing the administration in the back, snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.

[Tom Odom]

Since I've become a serial ranter here (imagine a less charming version of Lewis Black), I can just gather up all of these crumbs into a review. Here's my lead:

The book is a wellspring of invaluable information intertwined with one of the most unreflective apologias ever packaged as a memoir. The people generally considered to be most responsible for American strategy--President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld--are portrayed as prescient and blameless. Colin Powell, George Tenet, the organizations each of them led, and, to a degree, the uniformed military are the culprits stabbing the administration in the back, snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.

Well it certainly offers a clear bottom line up front. I would certainly prefer reading your review over reading this work of historical fiction. I wonder what his students think of him. Then again maybe they don't think. :wry:

Best

Tom

[Steve Blair]

Well it certainly offers a clear bottom line up front. I would certainly prefer reading your review over reading this work of historical fiction. I wonder what his students think of him. Then again maybe they don't think. :wry:

Best

Tom

Why would they think? Far better to parrot what the guy says, kiss some tail, and come out with a good grade....:wry: It sickens me, but I've seen it happen before.

Steve, does this work of historical fiction beat the grade set by McNamara's? If so we're working on a record of some sort.....:eek:

[SteveMetz]

Why would they think? Far better to parrot what the guy says, kiss some tail, and come out with a good grade....:wry: It sickens me, but I've seen it happen before.

Steve, does this work of historical fiction beat the grade set by McNamara's? If so we're working on a record of some sort.....:eek:

Yanno, I don't think I've read McNamara's book. I can, though, see a comparison to Westmoreland's equally uncritical and unreflective memoir. I got an email from Tom Ricks about an hour ago and he said he asks himself what Rostow would have written in 1968. I don't know about that, but I had breakfast with Westmoreland and Rostow in the early '90s (only because I was Westmoreland's escort lackey for the day) and he clearly was self critical and reflective. Westmoreland was not.

But, if it rained in DC, according to Feith, it was State's fault. I did just hit the section on applying the Geneva Conventions to detainees and he couldn't think of a way to blame Powell, so he had to use Ashcroft as the substitute scapegoat.

[SteveMetz]

As I get to the Iraq sections, I see Mr. Feith continues his longstanding process of ignoring real criticism and, instead, creating and demolishing straw men assuming, I guess, that readers will lose track of this tactic.

On p. 183 he writes, "Soon after Saddam's overthrow in 2003, some war critics began to contend that not only was the war unnecesary, but that Saddam had never been a significant problem for the United States--regarding terrorism, WMD, or any other matter."

Now, there may have been "some war critics" taking that absurd position. But the serious criticism was that the extent of the threat posed by Hussein did not justify the expected strategic costs and risks of invasion and occupation. Mr. Feith does not address this serious criticism, instead devoting his attention to the easily debunked one he described in this quotation.

[J Wolfsberger]

... Mr. Feith does not address this serious criticism, instead devoting his attention to the easily debunked one he described in this quotation.


Aha! I've figured it out!

Mr. Feith is running for President.

[SteveMetz]

Finally, an explanation for what went wrong with the post-conflict planning!! On pp. 189-90:

Chalabi--a secular, U.S.-educated Iraqi businessman and banker--became a central figure in the story of the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, but not because he shaped or implemented U.S. policy. It was, rather, because of the suspicion and antagonism he excited in key parts of the U.S. national security establishment, as well as within the Arab world. That suspicion would in the end derail the U.S. government's preparations and plans for Iraq's political transition.

So, see, it wasn't that OSD inadequately planned for the post-conflict transition. OSD was stabbed in the back by "key parts of the U.S. national security establishment" antagonistic to Chalibi. It is all so clear to me now!

[JJackson]

Thank you Steve

Now let me just check I have got this clear if we had dumped all that Phase IV stuff and photocopied them a copy of the constitution and put in Chalibi as President we could all have gone home after we had pulled down Saddam’s statue?

[SteveMetz]

On p. 200 he takes another dig at the CIA for not, in his estimation, pushing hard enough to remove Saddam Hussein out of concern for the stability of Iraq.

So, Doug, how's that instability stuff working out for you?

[SteveMetz]

p. 203 "The coup option (for removing Saddam Hussein) would thus require either a huge leap of faith--or a complete abandonment of principles."

A "huge leap of faith"?? In contrast to the idea that Chalabi would run Iraq, the Iraqi military and police would secure the country, and Iraqi itself would pay for reconstruction?

[Ken White]

Heh. That's rich coming from him. He and Wolfotwits having a discussion on the merits of principle is scary to contemplate. What a yo-yo... :mad:

[Tom Odom]

Rumsfeld to Write His Memoirs (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/15/washington/15brfs-RUMSFELDTOWR_BRF.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Rumsfeld+memoirs&st=nyt&oref=slogin)
Donald H. Rumsfeld, who resigned as secretary of defense in late 2006, will write his memoirs for the Sentinel imprint of Penguin Group USA. Mr. Rumsfeld, 75, will cover not only his years in the Bush administration but also his experiences with Presidents Richard M. Nixon, Gerald R. Ford and Ronald Reagan; his work in the private sector; and his early life.

Man I cannot wait to get my copy....

After WWII, the Center for Military History made its name for the next 4 plus decades with the Green Book series.

What are we going to call this peculiar group of memoirs emerging (dripping? spewing?) from the icons of the current administration? The Dream Books?

We have so far

George Tenet's "They Were Mean to Me"

Bremer's "I was only a proconsul so don't blame me"

Feith's "Damn the State Department, You guys go with Ahmed (Chalabi)"

Franks "COIN? Who needs a coin?I am outta here"

Who will be next?
Powelll--naw he did his 10 years ago and the ending was better
Cheney--no way
Conde Rice--possibly
Wolfowitz--possibly if he can get the World Bank to front the advance


Tom

[Rex Brynen]

...a "Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Feith walk into a bar.." joke.

[marct]

...a "Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Feith walk into a bar.." joke.

Rex, Rex, Rex <shaking his head>..... When did the unholy trinity ever walk anywhere when they could send their aids to do it instead :D?

[Steve Blair]

Rex, Rex, Rex <shaking his head>..... When did the unholy trinity ever walk anywhere when they could send their aids to do it instead :D?

Naw...it's more like they wanted to go to the bar, but DoS changed the maps on them so they couldn't find it...and they didn't have the funds available to hire new aides to go find it for them, so they ended up staying home and writing OpEd pieces about how DoS bungled the map-making business.:D

[marct]

Naw...it's more like they wanted to go to the bar, but DoS changed the maps on them so they couldn't find it...and they didn't have the funds available to hire new aides to go find it for them, so they ended up staying home and writing OpEd pieces about how DoS bungled the map-making business.:D

Either that or they never learned how to read maps, couldn't figure out google.maps and no longer had access to SOF guidance :D.

Of course, this type of scenario is always possible....

***********
(tape recorded conversation from White House logs - 14/2/05)

Cheney: Gentlemen, the time has come to instigate a special investigation into possible problems we may have at the Pentagon. Of course, you know what I am referring to - alleged incidents of merry making, at our expense, in Sines. I think Donald should take the lead on this one since we obviously have to protect the President from any possible links.

Rumsfeld: Shock and Awe, Shock and Awe - that's the way to do it! Look, let's send in a small, specialized team to take down the possible insurgents operating there; nothing too large or out of proportion, say a Battalion of Armor after a saturation bombing strike.

Wolfowitz: Excellent idea, Sir! Totally in agreement! Couldn't have put it better myself! After all, we all know what sort of disreputable, un-American activity goes on at that place!

Feith: I think the ideological implications are clear. Obviously our "colleagues" (said in a voice dripping venom) at State have been conspiring with various un-American forces trying to destroy the virtue of our military. Still, Sir, are you absolutely certain that an air strike should be the start of it? (spoken as he carefully terms on a small digital audio recorder).

Rumsfeld: Well, Dunlop keeps saying that we can use them in this type of situation.... I mean, we paid for it, so we might as well use it, right?

Wolfowitz: Totally agree, Sir!

Cheney: Now, gentlemen, I don't need, or want, to know any of the details on this operation. But I will point out that, back when I was in private industry, this type of operation would usually be outsourced. I can recommend a couple of contacts from back in the day if you would like...

Wolfowitz: Fantastic idea, Sir!

Rumsefld: Hmmm, that might be the best way to go, despite what George keeps saying...

Feith: Hey, didn't State hire some people from Blackwater? Could we, like, maybe find out who they got and give them a secondary contract - through State of course?

Cheney (to Rumsfeld): Here's the contact names.

Rumsfeld: Right, thank you Sir. Gentlemen, let's go.

****
AP 17/2/05
Local DC bar site of Old West style gun fight

In the "strange but true" category, last night, local DC bar Sines was the site of a strange gun fight. At approximately 9:47, six men dressed in cowboy costumes and carrying six-shooters walked into the bar and started rounding up hostages. Unfortunately for them, fourteen members of the elite 82nd Airborne were in the bar at the time after having just reported in to the Pentagon that day. The six "cowboys" were completely incapacitated and held while DC police could be called to arrest them. Subsequent identification of the six suspects revealed that they were unemployed Indian actors who had just that day flown into the US on H1b visas.
****

[Tom Odom]

Rumsfeld: Shock and Awe, Shock and Awe - that's the way to do it! Look, let's send in a small, specialized team to take down the possible insurgents operating there; nothing too large or out of proportion, say a Battalion of Armor after a saturation bombing strike.

There are no insurgents...they are dead enders

There are no insurgents...they are dead enders

There are no insurgents...they are dead enders

There are no insurgents...they are dead enders

There are no insurgents...they are dead enders

In the Pentagon :D

[wm]

****
AP 17/2/05
Local DC bar site of Old West style gun fight

In the "strange but true" category, last night, local DC bar Sines was the site of a strange gun fight. At approximately 9:47, six men dressed in cowboy costumes and carrying six-shooters walked into the bar and started rounding up hostages. Unfortunately for them, fourteen members of the elite 82nd Airborne were in the bar at the time after having just reported in to the Pentagon that day. The six "cowboys" were completely incapacitated and held while DC police could be called to arrest them. Subsequent identification of the six suspects revealed that they were unemployed Indian actors who had just that day flown into the US on H1b visas.
****
MarcT, you had me worried there for a minute. When I first started to read this, I thought you were going to indicate that Buckaroo Banzai's Hong Kong Cavaliers had sold out to the dark side of the force.

[SteveMetz]

While the pathological scapegoating in the book ranges from annoying to disgusting, every once in a while Feith hits the target. I liked this line (describing a 2002 meeting): "The French defense ministry was represented by Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, a appealing person of formidable intellect and diplomatic finesse worthy of a government far more honorable than the one then in office in France." (p. 306).

That's gonna leave a mark.

[J Wolfsberger]

"The French defense ministry was represented by Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, a appealing person of formidable intellect and diplomatic finesse worthy of a government far more honorable than the one then in office in France." (p. 306).

I don't know, Steve. Wasn't it the best government Saddam could buy?

[SteveMetz]

I don't know, Steve. Wasn't it the best government Saddam could buy?

I think there's an interesting story there that hopefully will come out some day. I was told by someone in C9 in Baghdad in April 2003 that they had captured documents that listed the payments to French officials. They shipped them back to Washington, never to hear of the issue again.

[Ken White]

when he made his swing through Paris, Berlin and Moscow in December 2003 and all three nations suddenly did a vigorous about face and agreed to forgive massive quantities of Iraqi debt after six months of saying they would NEVER do that...

[SteveMetz]

Wouldn't surprise me.

[SteveMetz]

I'll tell ya, at times this slips from far fetched to downright bizarre, as Mr. Feith sales off the edge of reality. Check this out.

Of course, Feith never considers for a second that a position he held might actually be wrong. Hence when his position doesn't carry the day, he attributes it to the nefarious maneuvering of other individuals or organizations.

One of the biggies is whether or not to place a great emphasis on the Iraqi "externals" (especially Chalabi). He contends over and over that CIA and DOS led the opposition to this, mostly because Chalabi complained about them in the 1990s.

But then he has to explain why, if stressing the "externals" was the right approach, it didn't become the administration's position. He contends that POTIS and the NSC Principles were in favor of it, but CIA and DOS were able to work around the policymakers and influence Bremer and Franks. How, you might ask did they do this? You're going to love this: he argues that it was because DOS and CIA had senior reps on the CENTCOM staff (the POLAD and CIA equivalent) while OSD and the Joint Staff didn't. The implication is that this allowed CIA and DOS to exercise more influence over CENTCOM than OSD and the Joint Staff.

He writes: "The makeup of the interagency teams at the combatant commands helps explain why CENTCOM's thinkin on contested issues--training exiles, involving Iraqis in our war plans, setting up a provisional government--often clashed with the views of the Pentagon leadership. Rumsfeld wasn't shy about imparting his thinking to his commanders, but no Secretary of Defense would contribute daily war-planning guidance--or influence military officers' attitudes--as persistencly or effectively as the resident State and CIA advisers with whom those officers were in continuous collaboration." (p. 371-2)

Please, Mr. Feith, put the bong down and walk away!!!

[Ken White]

"...no Secretary of Defense would contribute daily war-planning guidance--or influence military officers' attitudes--as persistencly or effectively as the resident State and CIA advisers with whom those officers were in continuous collaboration."and I don't mean angry. Surely no one is that naive. Surely?? Sure...hello! Hello, Doug??? :(

I sincerely appreciate you reading this and posting excerpts -- so I don't have to waste coins on it... :wry:

[SteveMetz]

and I don't mean angry. Surely no one is that naive. Surely?? Sure...hello! Hello, Doug??? :(

I sincerely appreciate you reading this and posting excerpts -- so I don't have to waste coins on it... :wry:


I'm sure that's just the way it happened: Franks thought to himself, "Well, SECDEF told me to do 'A' but Powell has the POLAD tell me every day to do 'B' so I'm going with 'B'."

I wonder if there are unicorns and leprechauns in Mr. Feith's world?

[SteveMetz]

On p. 397 Feith decries that while the conventional campaign was underway, Franks was willing to send a military liaison to the Kurdish parties but not the INC. Feith attributes that to the nefarious influence of CIA and DOS. I'm sure that was the reason and it didn't have anything to do with the fact that the Kurds had tens of thousands of trained fighters in the field, and the INC had an untrained and unequipped paper force of a few hundred. I think there was a unicorn there at the time too.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

like those "Hearts, Stars, and Horseshoes, Clovers, and Blue Moons! Pots of Gold and Rainbows, and me Red Balloons!" :D

[Rex Brynen]

like those "Hearts, Stars, and Horseshoes, Clovers, and Blue Moons! Pots of Gold and Rainbows, and me Red Balloons!" :D

Iraq--Its Magically Delicious? (or, perhaps, "They're Always After me Lucky WMD!")

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

that might be true now.

But before Team America showed up, it was a happy place. They had flowery meadows and rainbow skies, and rivers made of chocolate, where the children danced and laughed and played with gumdrop smiles. :D

[SteveMetz]

I've finally figured out that what Feith does is use an old lawyer's trick: even if your case is weak, if you repeat nonsense enough times and with enough ardor, is may magically become credible. I can't even count the number of times now he's asserted that it would have made a huge difference if the "Free Iraqi Forces" had been "trained and integrated into CENTCOM's thinking."

[Ken White]

In addition to the Unicorns, there's perhaps a touch of what the Koreans call Happy Smoke involved here... :wry:

[SteveMetz]

P. 403: "In developing the IIA (Iraqi Interim Authority) concept, of course, we had in mind our recent experience in in Afghanistan, where the United States immediately recognized an interim government of Afghans and never became an occupying power. Despite the obvious differences, the Afghanistan case offered some lessons worth heeding."

Strange that word never got to Mr. Feith that everyone in Afghanistan didn't live happily ever after following the application of that approach.

Bottom line: what Feith (and other administration officials) missed is that NOTHING can wholly avoid conflict during the healing of a badly wounded society. He contends that if we'd just done "B" instead of "A," it would have all worked out. I don't buy that. Violence was inevitable once we elected to knock down the rickity system holding it together. And it would have been inevitable even had we not done so.

[marct]

Iraq--Its Magically Delicious? (or, perhaps, "They're Always After me Lucky WMD!")

I think this just says it all...

[selil]

Just a suggestion, DO NOT go to youtube and search for "Unicorn Planet", DO NOT in anyway suggest that Feith's book is similar to "Unicorn Planet". Remember I said DO NOT do this......

[Tom Odom]

I've finally figured out that what Feith does is use an old lawyer's trick: even if your case is weak, if you repeat nonsense enough times and with enough ardor, is may magically become credible. I can't even count the number of times now he's asserted that it would have made a huge difference if the "Free Iraqi Forces" had been "trained and integrated into CENTCOM's thinking."

Yup and those frogs had wings they wouldn't have sore butts...

There would have been a lot of mid-airs on take off, given frogs' inabilities to wait in line for clearance

butt that is beside the point. I mean, what's a few crashed frogs versus sore butts :D

here goes with Feith-based logic

Chalabi was the answer

Chalabi was the answer

Chalabi was the answer

Got it

Chalabi can fly

Chalabi can fly

Chalbi can fly

Ergo Chalabi is a frog

Or at least looks like one :D

[wm]

Here's (http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=102515) an interesting piece from the English language Turkish Daily News. Interesting excerpt follows:

On the AKP role in the incident he said, "The Turkish government was, for the first time ever, in the hands of a recently elected Islamist political party. That party, in power for only four months, did not share the pro-American tradition of Turkey's other leading parties – and key Turkish officials were novices who lacked experience in working in the Turkish legislative assembly."

But qualifying the AKP as "not pro-American," Feith failed to mention that two previous governments led by left-wing former Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit were totally against a war in Iraq.

[SteveMetz]

I will say this: Mr. Feith has written an absolutely landmark classic in the burgeoning field of logical contortionism.

http://www.broughtonapartments.co.uk/basement%20pictures/slides/contortionist.jpg



I like this one as he concocts an alibi for the looting of Baghdad: "Whatever Saddam's own doubts that the United States would actually invade, his regime may have planned the scorched-earth campaign as part of a postoverthrow insurgency strategy" (p. 414).

So, Hussein was convinced that the United States would never invade in the first place. Hence his unwillingness to fully cooperate with UN weapons inspectors or to undertake serious military preparations for the defense of Iraq. But at the same time, he made plans to loot all of Iraq's government ministries and his own palaces.

And, of course, he follows this demonstration of logical contortionism with slam #34,446 at the *real* culprits: "If so, the CIA's failure to discover those plans in advance was a serious problem."

I'll bet the CIA never was able to find those unicorns and leprechauns which populate the Magical Land of Feith either. That organization is simply worthless.

[Rex Brynen]

I'll bet the CIA never was able to find those unicorns and leprechauns which populate the Magical Land of Feith either. That organization is simply worthless.

I couldn't tell you--I failed my lifetstyle poly for TS/SCI MAGICALBEASTS.

[SteveMetz]

I couldn't tell you--I failed my lifetstyle poly for TS/SCI MAGICALBEASTS.

Geez, you're just supposed to rely on them for strategic advice, not date them!

[marct]

Geez, you're just supposed to rely on them for strategic advice, not date them!

Just in from an anonymous informant....


Unicorns United denies ties to Feith
April 23, 2008

In a statement that has surprised a number of analysts, Unicorns United spokesman Galadriel has categorically denied giving Douglas Feith any strategic advice or direction.

"Are these analysts crazy?" Asked Galadriel to a packed press conference. "I mean,get serious! [Douglas] Feith doesn't meet even the minimal requirements for conversation with any unicorns!" [see here (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unicorn#The_hunt_of_the_unicorn)]

[Ken White]

"Whatever Saddam's own doubts that the United States would actually invade, his regime may have planned the scorched-earth campaign as part of a postoverthrow insurgency strategy" (p. 414)."Given the fact that Saddam did announce that's what he was going to do (and we all ignored it); did release all the prisoners from the jails (probably on the advice of Achalov (LINK) (http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-2347321/2-Russian-generals-given-awards.html#abstract), an ex-spetnaz urban warfare specialist); did plant weapons caches all over the country; did fire up Saddam's mujahadeen and a few other things.

We pretty much got the word that's what was going to happen -- and proceeded to blithely ignore it. I'd like to say I twigged on to it but I didn't; couldn't figure out why he gave the two Russians medals -- until about July of 03. Then it dawned on me; Saddam telegraphed the whole thing and most of us just missed it.

Not that the tolerance of looting is thereby excused.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

The Purple Oyster, also known as the "Purple Oyster (of Doom)", or "PO(oD)", is said to have once been one of the minions of the Invisible Pink Unicorn, but was cast out of her Pastures for the Great Evil of attempting to convince believers of the heretical notion that pepperoni and mushroom pizza is more pleasing to her than pineapple and ham.

[J Wolfsberger]

Just in from an anonymous informant....


"Are these analysts crazy?" Asked Galadriel to a packed press conference. "I mean,get serious! [Douglas] Feith doesn't meet even the minimal requirements for conversation with any unicorns!"

I don't think any members of the SWC meet that particular requirement. (Or would admit they did.) ;)

[marct]

I don't think any members of the SWC meet that particular requirement. (Or would admit they did.)

But I doubt if any of us claim to get our strategic insights from them either ;). Then again, maybe he used an intermediary....

http://www.bolinat.com/unique/products/sml/9641.jpg

Personally, I suspect this is who he used :mad:
http://www.clubdesmonstres.com/banshee.jpg

[wm]

But I doubt if any of us claim to get our strategic insights from them either ;). Then again, maybe he used an intermediary....

Marc,

Come on,the real sources are the aliens/EBE(extraterrestrial biological entities) (probably mostly Grays) that everyone like Stanton Friedman knows are still hiding out in the underground facilities at Area 51 and Dulce, NM.

[marct]

Hi Wayne,


Come on,the real sources are the aliens/EBE(extraterrestrial biological entities) (probably mostly Grays) that everyone like Stanton Friedman knows are still hiding out in the underground facilities at Area 51 and Dulce, NM.

Last I heard, the grey's had been underbid by a consortium from China and Pakistan. Then again, given wo their negotiator was, this may not be surprising ;).
http://www.indigenouspeople.net/Spirituality/Mysticenter/quan_yin.jpg

Rumour has it that the current decline in the American economy, besides being the direct fault of State and the CIA, is from the grey's selling off their current stock holdings in US companies after loosing their advising contract :cool:.

[wm]

Hi Wayne,



Last I heard, the grey's had been underbid by a consortium from China and Pakistan. . . .

Rumour has it that the current decline in the American economy, besides being the direct fault of State and the CIA, is from the grey's selling off their current stock holdings in US companies after loosing their advising contract :cool:.

I suspect the Pakistan/China connection may just be Reptilians and perhaps Blonds or the ubiquitous MIB. BTW, on your latter point, everyone knows that State and CIA are rife with MIBs; so, I suspect some disinformation activities passing blame for their own missteps onto the poor Greys. ;)

[Tacitus]

Apologies if this is already posted somewhere in this thread, but a story in The Washington Post that Georgetown University has not asked Mr. Feith to return to his pedagogical duties next year.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/22/AR2008042202465.html

Says he hasn't decided what to do next, but is occupied with "book stuff." No word if that includes joining the Small Wars Council. Or not.

[SteveMetz]

Just when I think it can't get any more bizarre: on pp. 496-497, Feith says POTUS approved a plan to turn over political power to Iraqis as quickly as possible. Bremer initially accepted that but then was brainwashed by the nefarious Department of State and CIA (kind of Rosemary's Baby ceremony, no doubt). So rather than implement the President's policy, he undertook a year of American occupation. The blame hence lies with him.

For this "explanation" to be true, one has to assume that the President failed to notice that Ambassador Bremer was not implementing his policy. And no one pointed that out to him.

Yep, Dougie, makes perfect sense!

[John T. Fishel]

Bremer's book, My Year in Iraq, seem like the unvarnished truth!:eek:

[SteveMetz]

Bremer defends himself but at least is psychologically and morally capable of admitting to mistakes. Feith, on the other hand, has no problem spinning the most surreal, even laughable explanations to prove that he never made a mistake.

[SteveMetz]

Two final thoughts about this and then, to borrow Chief Joseph's phrase, "I will rant no more for forever."

1. Feith does not understand the roots and causes of the post-Hussein conflict in Iraq. It was due to the unwillingness of the Sunni Arabs to accept a loss of power and status, and the unwillingness of the Shiites and Kurds to allow the Sunni Arabs to have disproportiante power and status. Feith asserts that a speedy handover of political authority to some sort of cobbled together Iraqi government would have prevented the rise of resistance. I don't think so since this would not have addressed the root cause of the conflict. Plus, Feith never makes clear whether this cobbled together Iraqi government was going to be defended by a cobbled together Iraqi security force, or by American troops. Given how hard it has been to build a new Iraqi security force, it's hard to imagine the former. And the latter would have inspired just as much anger, resentment, and resistance as having CPA run things in Baghdad. So Feith's silver bullet--a speedy handover of authority to Iraqis--is a pipedream (or feithdream).

2. Feith, like other members of the administration, cannot grapple with the idea that people may understand their policies and perceptions and still oppose them. He attributes all opposition, domestic and foreign, to failed strategic communications (mostly on the part of the State Department). As I often say, if you have a crappy product, the solution is not better advertising; it's a better product.

Now, if you'll excuse me, I've scheduled several hours of scream therapy.

[SteveMetz]

OK, I lied. One more. I just couldn't let this pass. In the conclusions, he offers advice to the intelligence community. This is my favorite: "Maintain a scholarly or scientific frame of mind--the opposite of the ideologue to whom the facts don't matter."

[Tom Odom]

1. Feith does not understand the roots and causes of the post-Hussein conflict in Iraq. It was due to the unwillingness of the Sunni Arabs to accept a loss of power and status, and the unwillingness of the Shiites and Kurds to allow the Sunni Arabs to have disproportiante power and status.

Clearly you do not grasp that Wolfowitz as Feith's immediate boss had already declared that such sectarian schisms were of such a low order as to have no influence on the outcome. Ergo, they could not be root cause because they had no roots....


It is all very clear when you live in a controlled environment like the 2003 OSD.

Tom

[SteveMetz]

Clearly you do not grasp that Wolfowitz as Feith's immediate boss had already declared that such sectarian schisms were of such a low order as to have no influence on the outcome. Ergo, they could not be root cause because they had no roots....


It is all very clear when you live in a controlled environment like the 2003 OSD.

Tom

Guilty as charged. This could explain why my resume didn't make it past the initial screening by some 22 year old intern when I sent it to the Transition Team after the 2000 election.

[marct]

Feith, like other members of the administration, cannot grapple with the idea that people may understand their policies and perceptions and still oppose them. He attributes all opposition, domestic and foreign, to failed strategic communications (mostly on the part of the State Department).


OK, I lied. One more. I just couldn't let this pass. In the conclusions, he offers advice to the intelligence community. This is my favorite: "Maintain a scholarly or scientific frame of mind--the opposite of the ideologue to whom the facts don't matter."

if he has been studying logic with Gusterson and Price :confused:? I mean, after all, they appear to be so close in their formal reasoning that some type of linkage probably exists.


As I often say, if you have a crappy product, the solution is not better advertising; it's a better product.

Now, now, Steve, let's not be too hasty. After all, to people like Feith, the product cannot be crappy by definition, so the true source of the problem must lie in the false consciousness of the consumer. This is a basic philosophical point institutionalized by the Dominicans, expanded upon by Marx and converted into application by such high minded groups as the KGB, the SS, Jim and Tammy-Fae Bakker and certain radical Post-Modernists. The essential Truth that they propound is exactly the same as what Feith is saying "Eat Sierra and like it... If you don't like it, it's someone else's fault!!!!!"


Now, if you'll excuse me, I've scheduled several hours of scream therapy.

You might try this (http://craikido.blogspot.com/2007/11/unique-japanese-exercise-provides.html) instead of scream therapy - a useful set of skills for when you interview Dougie in the future :cool:.

[SteveMetz]

Now, now, Steve, let's not be too hasty. After all, to people like Feith, the product cannot be crappy by definition, so the true source of the problem must lie in the false consciousness of the consumer. This is a basic philosophical point institutionalized by the Dominicans

Now that just proves that Dominicans should stick to playing major league baseball.

By the way, I'm going to a Feith presentation on the book at Hudson on Monday.

[marct]

Now that just proves that Dominicans should stick to playing major league baseball.

Better than some of their other activities :cool:.
http://www.jesusneverexisted.com/IMAGES/bookburners.jpg


By the way, I'm going to a Feith presentation on the book at Hudson on Monday.

Oh, that should be so much fun :rolleyes:! Try to remember that since he won't be at Georgetown next year, he talk will be aimed at showing MSM executives that he really does have what it takes to have his own sitcom in primetime.

[Steve Blair]

Try to remember that since he won't be at Georgetown next year, he talk will be aimed at showing MSM executives that he really does have what it takes to have his own sitcom in primetime.

Only if he hooks up with one of the Hilton girls or a semi-finalist from American Idol. Otherwise he ain't got a snowball's chance in hell.:cool:

[Tom Odom]

Now that just proves that Dominicans should stick to playing major league baseball.

By the way, I'm going to a Feith presentation on the book at Hudson on Monday.

We want VIDEO!!!!! With a blog follow up of course!:D

[SteveMetz]

We want VIDEO!!!!! With a blog follow up of course!:D

Well, to sate your yearnings, you could go to the CSIS web site (http://www.csis.org/), click on CSIS TV on the right, and watch his presentation from last night.

[SWJED]

Iraq War Is Everyone Else's Fault, Feith Explains (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/24/AR2008042403481.html) by Dana Milbank, Washington Post.


Mistakes were made. But not by him...

[Tom Odom]

Well, to sate your yearnings, you could go to the CSIS web site (http://www.csis.org/), click on CSIS TV on the right, and watch his presentation from last night.

No no

We want video of you grilling him, kind of a reverse "Ask Ben Stein" as in "Steve Metz Asks..." :D

[SteveMetz]

No no

We want video of you grilling him, kind of a reverse "Ask Ben Stein" as in "Steve Metz Asks..." :D


Naw. He'd just start crying. Then I'd have to hug him and go, "There, there!"

[Cavguy]

The well known lefty mouthpiece The Washington Times has posted a scathing review of the book.

How Iraq War was planned, executed By John Weisman (http://www.washingtontimes.com/article/20080427/BOOKS/201699044/1010)


There is a lot to recommend "War and Decision," Douglas J. Feith's apologia of his 2001-2005 tour as Donald Rumsfeld's under secretary of defense for policy. Few books have chronicled the labyrinthine, cutthroat process of policy-making from the inside in as detailed a manner as has Mr. Feith. Mr. Feith is also a fine writer. But the most important contribution "W&D" makes to the growing body of literature about Afghanistan, Iraq, and the war on terror and why it should be required reading in schools of public service and government was probably inadvertent on Mr. Feith's part.

"W&D" should be widely read so we never again make the mistakes Mr. Feith and his fellow Pentagon, State Department, CIA and White House senior political staffers made during their planning and execution of the Iraq war, or their tunnel vision abandonment of a successful Afghan campaign that has condemned us to near stalemate and a rejuvenated, opium-funded Taliban. It is obvious Mr. Feith is bright. His vacuity about the real world, however, is shocking.

It's cross town rival, The Washington Post, has a similar, humorous take from Dana Milbank. I also read the tidbit where Feith will be losing his Georgetown position soon.

"Iraq War Is Everyone Else's Fault, Feith Explains" (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/24/AR2008042403481.html)


Mistakes were made. But not by him.

Doug Feith, the No. 3 man at the Pentagon before, during and after the invasion of Iraq, has come in for his share of blame for the failures there -- in large part because he led the Pentagon policy shop that badly misstated the case for war and bungled the planning for the aftermath. Gen. Tommy Franks called him "the dumbest [bad word] guy on the planet." George Tenet of the CIA called his work on Iraq "total crap." And Jay Garner, once the American administrator in Iraq, deduced that Feith is "incredibly dangerous" and, "He's a smart guy whose electrons aren't connected."

Now Feith, whatever the state of his electrons, is showing just how dangerous he can be. He's written a book designed to settle the score with his many opponents in the administration, and in a book-launch event last night at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, he pointed his finger every which way but inward.


Classic. That Feith inhabits a dream word seems to be a conclusion from across the spectrum. Glad to see such idots can't access high positions. :mad:

[SteveMetz]

Unfortunately, I didn't make the presentation at the Hudson Institute today. Got in my car to drive down, and it started shaking and the check engine light came on, so I had to abort.

[Ski]

He was the cabin boy on the ship of fools...

[Cavguy]

Unfortunately, I didn't make the presentation at the Hudson Institute today. Got in my car to drive down, and it started shaking and the check engine light came on, so I had to abort.

Kind of like he did with Iraq .....

No analogy there! :D

[Abu Buckwheat]

The book is a wellspring of invaluable information intertwined with one of the most unreflective apologias ever packaged as a memoir. The people generally considered to be most responsible for American strategy--President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld--are portrayed as prescient and blameless. Colin Powell, George Tenet, the organizations each of them led, and, to a degree, the uniformed military are the culprits stabbing the administration in the back, snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.


BBBBBWWWWWWAHAHAHAHAHA. How did I miss this one?


"Maintain a scholarly or scientific frame of mind--the opposite of the ideologue to whom the facts don't matter."

NO HE DIDN'T! He admits it ... Facts don't matter! All of you make me cry. :D

[bluegreencody]

Jon Stewart talks to Doug Feith about his book... Two parts-22 minutes...
http://www.thedailyshow.com/video/index.jhtml?videoId=168543&title=douglas-feith-uncut-pt.-1&to=2

[SWJED]

Feith's Version (http://www.washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080518/COMMENTARY/162727519/1012&template=printart) - Washington Times op-ed by Daniel Gallington.


... So, I wasn't surprised when Doug asked me to "write something" about his new book, "War and Decision." While not a book review as such, here are some of my specific reactions to it:

(1) Unlike most of the "Washington insider" books I have seen over the years, this is a very carefully written and serious historical work...

(2) The book is extremely well-documented; so well so it will become a basic source document about the war...

(3) Mr. Feith's development of the timeline in the decision to go to war demonstrates — probably better than any other Washington political insider story — how the U.S. national security policy "process" really works...

(4) The more significant weaknesses of the interagency policy process in the decision to go to war in Iraq (and in the Bush administration in general), seemed to be centered at the National Security Council (NSC)...

(5) The president's decision to go to war in Iraq is explained and defended as best it can be, though it probably was a mistake, in that if we knew then what we know now we probably would not have done it...

(6) Mr. Feith is both candid and critical about how the immediate and near-term postwar situation was "managed" in Iraq. The book makes it clear how this set in motion most of the policies and institutions that have resulted in (at least contributed to) the chaos that has persisted in Iraq since the war. And — in this respect — there still seems plenty of blame to go around...

[SteveMetz]

Feith's Version (http://www.washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080518/COMMENTARY/162727519/1012&template=printart) - Washington Times op-ed by Daniel Gallington.


If by "candid and critical" the author means blaming everything on Bremer, Powell, Franks, and Tenet, then I guess it qualifies.

[SWJED]

War and Indecision (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/06/war-and-indecision/) - Book Review by Bing West, Small Wars Journal Blog.

War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0060899735/002-4808147-8119255?ie=UTF8&tag=smallwarsjour-20&linkCode=xm2&camp=1789&creativeASIN=0060899735). Douglas J. Feith.

Hardcover: 688 pages
Publisher: Harper (April 8, 2008)


War and Decision, an analytical description of a dysfunctional National Security Council and disloyal senior officials, will be studied for years by journalists, historians and aspiring political appointees. Half of the book is a convincing refutation of unfair allegations about the author. The other half presents a balanced analysis of policy debates about Iraq inside the administration between mid-2001 and mid-2004. While the length of War and Decision may deter the casual reader, its hefty substance gives credence to three themes...

[SteveMetz]

War and Indecision (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/06/war-and-indecision/) - Book Review by Bing West, Small Wars Journal Blog.

War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0060899735/002-4808147-8119255?ie=UTF8&tag=smallwarsjour-20&linkCode=xm2&camp=1789&creativeASIN=0060899735). Douglas J. Feith.

Hardcover: 688 pages
Publisher: Harper (April 8, 2008)

West seems to have wholly bought Feith's description of himself as a fighter for truth and reason against nefarious liberals. People I know inside the system (who are not ideologues of either end of the spectrum) tell me that the accusations against Feith were more often true than not, and that any leaking done by CIA and State Department was more than matched by organizations like the VP's office. I, of course, don't really know, but am just reporting what I've heard.

[wm]

The SWC has many appropriate threads for the following. I am not sure why I chose to post it here. Anyway, here is an interesting quotation submitted for consideration.


It is always a bad sign in an army when scapegoats are habitually sought out and brought to sacrifice for every conceivable mistake. It usually shows something very wrong in the highest command. It completely inhibits the willingness of junior commanders to take decisions, for they will always try to get chapter and verse for everything they do, finishing up more often than not with a miserable piece of casuistry instead of the decision that could spell release. The usual result is that the man who never does more than supinely pass on the opinion of his seniors is brought to the top, while the really valuable man, the man who accepts nothing ready-made but has an opinion of his own, gets put on the shelf.
This paragraph was written as an aside in the middle of a discussion about the Axis leadership far from the scene telling Rommel to stand in tactically/operationally poor positions during his retreat across Libya in Dec 1942--Jan 43.

Here's the bibilographic data:
Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers, as translated by Paul Findlay, edited by B.H. Liddell-Hart, p382 of the DaCapo Press paperback edition.

[Tom Odom]

West seems to have wholly bought Feith's description of himself as a fighter for truth and reason against nefarious liberals. People I know inside the system (who are not ideologues of either end of the spectrum) tell me that the accusations against Feith were more often true than not, and that any leaking done by CIA and State Department was more than matched by organizations like the VP's office. I, of course, don't really know, but am just reporting what I've heard.

La meme chose pour moi, mon amis.

[bourbon]

Fault Lines: Inside Rumsfeld's Pentagon (http://bostonreview.net/BR33.4/bacevich.php), by Andrew J. Bacevich. Boston Review, JULY/AUGUST 2008.

Professor Bacevich's review of Feith and Sanchez's books.


The Return of the Neocons: Bush Hawks Aggressively Working to Rewrite Accepted Iraq War History (http://www.washingtonindependent.com/view/the-return-of-the), by James Risen. The Washington Independent, 06/19/2008.

In a series of lengthy interviews over several weeks, Feith explicitly stated that his objective in writing his book was to start the process of altering the accepted history of the Iraq war, to adjust the Rumsfeld team’s place in history. He wants to change the narrative -- before it is too late.

Feith sees his book as nothing less than the opening salvo in what he and many of his allies hope will be a major and prolonged campaign by Bush administration hawks to develop a new school of revisionist history of the early 21st century, in which they will be heroes, rather than the villains. They see this fight for historical dominance as the last battle of the war in Iraq.