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View Full Version : Tactical Jenga vs. The Strategic Stopwatch



SWJED
04-12-2008, 02:47 PM
Just got back from spending five days watching Dr. David Kilcullen in action at Joint Urban Warrior (JUW) 08, a US Marine Corps and US Joint Forces Command cosponsored program.

Here is a slide from one of Dr. Kilcullen's briefs I thought might stimulate some commentary here on the Council. It depicts a framework for understanding (or more precisely “how to think about”) the transition of responsibility and authority of security, essential services, humanitarian assistance, economic development, and political governance from a coalition to host nation.


http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/images/jengaandthestopwatch.jpg

William F. Owen
04-12-2008, 03:33 PM
Looked at this slide for 10 minutes. I read the words, and I understand them, but I just don't get it. It means nothing to me.

...and I think Dave Kilcullen is good news, but this leaves me shaking my head.

Please explain.

Steve Blair
04-12-2008, 03:47 PM
but the concept makes sense to me. What he's doing is attempting to show how outside considerations can interact with the realities of what's happening in the theater. The spikes show areas where local considerations might bump up against the external timeline and create domestic issues (like "is the surge working") and thus spark in-theater damage control (or adjustments to the external timeline).

I think it's more of an internalized illustration, based more on how domestic considerations drive tactical decisions (or can at least influence them). Haven't had enough coffee yet to really break it down, but I can see what he's doing. I don't necessarily agree with all of it, but I can see where he's going.

William F. Owen
04-12-2008, 03:54 PM
What he's doing is attempting to show how outside considerations can interact with the realities of what's happening in the theater. The spikes show areas where local considerations might bump up against the external timeline and create domestic issues (like "is the surge working") and thus spark in-theater damage control (or adjustments to the external timeline).
.

So there's a tension between what the policy makes/politicians want, and the reality of progress on the ground? Ya Allah! Hold the Front Page!

...and the Jenga thing? The more you interact with it, the more likely it is to fall over? Stopwatch, unstoppable and predictable?

Maybe I've had too much coffee!

Ron Humphrey
04-12-2008, 04:05 PM
So there's a tension between what the policy makes/politicians want, and the reality of progress on the ground? Ya Allah! Hold the Front Page!

...and the Jenga thing? The more you interact with it, the more likely it is to fall over? Stopwatch, unstoppable and predictable?

Maybe I've had too much coffee!

Battlefield Geometry, due to the overall constrictions placed on operations by external requirement it is necessary to move pieces. The important questions are the ones only the operational commanders can try to answer because if any movement starts to bring the house down they would be the first to see it and possibly be able to move something else instead.

Also consider that in Jenga your not the only player moving pieces, so do all other players and thus one must watch closely to be able to see what else is being moved and where current fault lines may lay.

Stopwatch makes sense to me because those on the outside have pressures of their own which give them quite a bit less flexibility in adjusting fires quickly and thus the constant need to stay tracking at a certain pace.

Randy Brown
04-12-2008, 05:46 PM
I really want to like (and borrow) this graphic, but the application of Jenga as an analogy ultimately ... falls apart for me.

Others here have rather cleverly noted how the game involves multiple actors, looking for fault lines, etc. Still, for me, evoking the game works cross-purposes with the intended message behind the slide.

Assuming that the Jenga tower represents stability/order/a working government, consider: The way in which one wins a game of Jenga is to be the last person to make a move, immediately proceeding the point at which someone else makes the whole thing tumble to the ground.

Not to put too coarse a point on it, but you could also say that the objective is to make the destruction of the structure look like someone else's fault.

I hope to come up with a constructive suggestion of a more constructive analogy, preferably in the form of a game or activity. In the meantime, anyone else have any suggestions? Or interpretations?

Randy Brown
04-12-2008, 05:55 PM
Yes, my reptilian English-major brain is in overdrive on this topic, but even if Jenga represents "troop levels," rather than "host-nation effectiveness" (my original assumption), the whole tipping tower image still makes me queasy. I get visions of troop-carrying helicopters lifting off of Jenga-block rooftops ...

SWJED
04-12-2008, 06:53 PM
... the purpose of this drill is to drive discussion without burdening you all with context - something I should not have to do with the superior minds associated with the Council. This is one slide from a much larger briefing - and no, I'm not yet going to post the entire brief...

Ken White
04-12-2008, 07:40 PM
comment intelligently? That's un-American. Or something... ;)

(so it's okay for Wilf... :D)

SWJED
04-12-2008, 08:06 PM
Just want to hear Council member’s thoughts concerning transition.

At JUW one response to 'tactical Jenga' was "transition is not like Jenga, more like the opening scene from the original Indiana Jones (http://www.indianajones.com/site/index.html) - Raiders of the Lost Ark" - where, when attempting to retrieve a precious idol - set with all kinds of 1930ish IED-like traps - Jones balances time and agility to replace the idol with a bag of sand. The counter-response from someone in the audience was along the lines that you have to be able to calculate the "right time" and have something of substance to replace the "idol" - not useless sand...

SWJ Disclaimer: The link to Indiana Jones was thrown in only because I love the soundtrack and this post does not represent the views of the Department of Defense or Steven Spielberg.

Cavguy
04-12-2008, 08:19 PM
I may be just thick, but I just don't get Dr. Kilcullen's slide. I love most of his other ones, but this one isn't intuitive, and the explination from Dave hasn't really cleared it for me.

Then again, just another DAT* trying to do the best I can ....

*=Dumb assed tanker

SWJED
04-12-2008, 08:54 PM
... this a free for all about transition. I posted one slide to generate discussion - which it has. If I had just posted a thread that asked what do you think about the same I probably would have heard the sound of crickets chirping and I don't mean Buddy Holly and company (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htr2B7w29l0).

Rank amateur
04-12-2008, 09:21 PM
Presumably the X axis is time. What does the Y represent? Why does it get consistently lower?

SWJED
04-12-2008, 09:38 PM
Presumably the X axis is time. What does the Y represent? Why does it get consistently lower?

You tell me - that is the point of this drill RA... Geezy, wheezy Batman. See your quote box for inspiration.

Gian P Gentile
04-12-2008, 10:29 PM
Looked at this slide for 10 minutes. I read the words, and I understand them, but I just don't get it. It means nothing to me.

maybe that is why i rarely use pp slides in the classroom to teach history and perhaps even why I have never cared much for Boyd and his so-called brilliant thinking reduced down into charts and slides.

I am a big fan of the written word, so can somebody who understands the slide write out in a couple of paragraphs what it means. Kilkullen is an excellent writer which is why I have often been baffled by his reliance on these meta-pp slides presentations. If he wanted to use a slide why didnt he just write a couple of the salient points into sentences, put that on the slide and lecture from it?

My guess is that he is saying that because there is more flexibility in Iraq (I assume we are talking about Iraq here) with "tactical conditions" (I am not sure what that term means, is he talking about US forces or Iraqi, or Iraqi conditions, or combinations of all of these?) than "strategic" because that timeline is somehow fixed (not sure what that means either) then this is gentile's interpretation of what the main point of the slide to be:

continue American efforts in Iraq along the lines he (along with Biddle) has recommended before that orients our efforts on reconciling and rebuilding Iraq from the grass roots, or bottom up approach.

Am I on to something here or just "stupido" like my friend wilf and others too who are confused with the slide.

SWJED; perhaps it is the time for you to be didactic and not coy with the meaning here since you spent a number of days listening to Dr Kilkullen.

Rank amateur
04-12-2008, 10:31 PM
I'll say the y axis is the level of coalition intervention required. The objective is to withdraw resources without collapsing the governmet: like jenga.

My personal spin is that - like jenga - the only way to prevent the entire structure from collapsing is to stop withdrawing pieces.


Kilkullen is an excellent writer

I agree - he chooses every word carefully - which is why I'm surprised that he chose the jenga analogy. Every game ends with the structure collapsing.

Gian P Gentile
04-12-2008, 10:39 PM
I'll say the y axis is the level of coalition intervention required. The objective is to withdraw resources without collapsing the governmet: like jenga.

My personal spin is that - like jenga - the only way to prevent the entire structure from collapsing is to stop withdrawing pieces.



I agree - he chooses every word carefully - which is why I'm surprised that he chose the jenga analogy. Every game ends with the structure collapsing.

thanks, my friend, this helps

gian

Ron Humphrey
04-12-2008, 10:40 PM
This will make a lot more sense i it ends up driving towards the Coalition forces having to draw down ( take pieces out) while at the same time the HN fills gaps with whatever forces it has put together effectively. The key is whether those forces are able to hold up.

In such cases as they are then the tower stands longer. In such cases as an external actor is able to weaken or remove them from that gap , it weakens the overall structure. The end game so to speak would be for a HN infrastructure which can hold it's own to the extent that outsiders may be able to weaken but not capable of bringing the tower down.

Rank amateur
04-12-2008, 11:16 PM
thanks, my friend, this helps
gian

You're very welcome. Let me add Gian's comment's in World Politics Review (http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=1924)



In COIN, a precondition for success is the existence of a legitimate government. The United States has one success in the history of counterinsurgency since WW II to its credit: it succeeded in assisting the legitimate government of El Salvador defeat an internal communist insurgency. However, it was not the U.S. military that defeated the FMLN guerrillas, but the Salvadoran military under the control of its own government, with U.S. encouragement and no more than 50 or so U.S. military advisors. Moreover, El Salvador was not simply a sovereign state: El Salvadoran society was and is a single identity -- an essential prerequisite for successful internal defense of a government struggling for survival and legitimacy.

None of these conditions apply to Iraq, where the Iraqi government does not appear to be legitimate in the eyes of its people -- whether Shia, Sunni or Kurd -- and it seems that one Iraqi society does not exist.

And mention a concept I'm sure you're all familiar with: Occam's razor (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam's_Razor)


This will make a lot more sense i it ends up driving towards the Coalition forces having to draw down ( take pieces out) while at the same time the HN fills gaps with whatever forces it has put together effectively.

This is a logically consistent theory, but - and I really hope you won't be offended by this term - it is a socialist theory. You can make a lot of logically consistent arguments about welfare - and sending out welfare checks to poor people will reduce the violence in a community - but in reality the theories don't matter; human psychology does. In the real world, people on welfare don't start looking for jobs until the welfare is about to run out. I really think that the Sunni sheiks are smart enough to realize that as soon as there is reconciliation we're going to stop sending them US dollars.

John T. Fishel
04-12-2008, 11:39 PM
I was stumped by the slide.:confused: Even worse, this old fogie had never heard of Jenga, so what was I to make of it.:eek: Wish Kilcullen or SWJED (yeah, Dave ;)) had put it in simple English.

To move tangentially, don't make too much of the unity of the Salvadoran Armed Forces - police really didn't answer to the military high command; they were under a separate Vice Ministry of Public Security and the 3 police institutions didn't like each other very much. Today, the police - National Civil Police - are under a wholly separate ministry and there are still some tensions with the Ministry of Defense, but not as bad. Final comment, the Philippines with US assistance, was able to defeat the Huk Rebellion - see Edward G. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars.

But I still don't get the slide so that is the reason for my tangential reaction.

Cheers

JohnT

slapout9
04-13-2008, 12:00 AM
The slide looks like a poor imitation of Warden's TVA slide. The Time Value of Action. I sent SWEDJ a copy to post if he wants. I could not figure out how to do it:eek: But basically it is meant to convey that the longer you take to achieve your objective the more things can go wrong and the more likely you will fail in achieving your objective.

This is a good picture one Warden's posters it combines both the business and war response in it,
http://estore.websitepros.com/1761861/Detail.bok?no=27

Warden was talking about this over a decade ago!

Gian P Gentile
04-13-2008, 12:27 AM
I was stumped by the slide.:confused: Even worse, this old fogie had never heard of Jenga...Final comment, the Philippines with US assistance, was able to defeat the Huk Rebellion - see Edward G. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars. JohnT

John T:

Dont feel bad because when I first saw Jenga without looking at the slide I thought it was perhaps some obscure counterinsurgency war which i had never heard of; or, perhaps subliminally I mixed it up with Jena.

Acknowledge your elaboration of El Salvador and your point on the Huk Rebellion. I did not use the Huk Rebellion because American efforts toward it were largely in supplying military equipment as compared to El Salvador which had a lengthy commitment of American advisers. But your point is well taken and thanks for putting it up.

I am working on an essay but cant get anything down so I keep clicking on SWJ or AM blogs; sort of like I am having a "25 or 6 to 4" moment. You know the classic 70s rock group Chicago song about having writers block.

gian

slapout9
04-13-2008, 12:31 AM
Gian you need some Slapout MTV:)

Gian P Gentile
04-13-2008, 12:35 AM
Gian you need some Slapout MTV:)

Slap, buddy, I just listened to it. Not a big fan of R/B;

as grand master of ebo (respectfully stated of course); what effect are you trying to produce.

gian

Ron Humphrey
04-13-2008, 12:41 AM
This is a logically consistent theory, but - and I really hope you won't be offended by this term - it is a socialist theory. You can make a lot of logically consistent arguments about welfare - and sending out welfare checks to poor people will reduce the violence in a community - but in reality the theories don't matter; human psychology does. In the real world, people on welfare don't start looking for jobs until the welfare is about to run out. I really think that the Sunni sheiks are smart enough to realize that as soon as there is reconciliation we're going to stop sending them US dollars.

RA,

I am afraid that that would be taking it quite a bit out of context with the situation considering we are not dealing with a position of permanent client governance here but rather a circumstance under which we must leave a country with the capability to care for itself in all manners necessary. Reality of life is that a government serves one main purpose and that is to provide basic direction for it's parts. Each of those parts have responsibilities and contribute to security and economic strength in some way. This being different from what you reference which is support and guidance for it's parts.

I'm not sure if I should bother trying to respond beyond that considering how totally your characterization of what I said was. :(

slapout9
04-13-2008, 12:55 AM
Slap, buddy, I just listened to it. Not a big fan of R/B;

as grand master of ebo (respectfully stated of course); what effect are you trying to produce.

gian

Whatever it was I don't think I succeded....You seem like a Hendrix guy to me?

jcustis
04-13-2008, 01:04 AM
Well...

From my perspective (and I've sat through Kilcullen so I think I know his mindset wrt slide), I've started to form the opinion that Shinseki's call for larger force numbers wouldn't have made a difference. This runs totally counter to what I've opined in the past, and as painful as it is for me to retract my opinion, it's been an interesting ride :D.

I think we would have be able to smother areas with forces and make ourselves happy that we "had things on lockdown", but the reality is that we would have simply provided more targets, pissed off more people, and prolonged things.

We weren't ready for Phase IV execution, for a number of reasons we have beaten to death here. And since I believe we are just finally getting to a point where we are effectively understanding and employing COIN, we would have been woefully miserable at it five years ago, but would have just had more forces plodding around and breaking more pottery.

John T. Fishel
04-13-2008, 01:15 AM
I'm really glad I'm not alone and that you young whippersnappers can join me in my senior moments.:D

In some ways the Huk thing was a lot like El Sal. Lansdale had a small team to advise and work with Magsaysay. The rapport worked and they introduced an effective COIN strategy with suppoting operations and tactics.

Concerning numbers and Phase IV: JC, numbers without a good strategy would have been ineffective. But without the numbers I really don't think any strategy would have worked. We have the numbers today - not even mainly US but rather Iraqi...

Cheers

JohnT

Gian P Gentile
04-13-2008, 01:28 AM
Whatever it was I don't think I succeded....You seem like a Hendrix guy to me?

totally; and thanks for the tip on "25." fixed it.

although I am sure the great Jimi had some threads to plenty of good R/B folks.

gian

Gian P Gentile
04-13-2008, 01:55 AM
We weren't ready for Phase IV execution, for a number of reasons we have beaten to death here. And since I believe we are just finally getting to a point where we are effectively understanding and employing COIN, we would have been woefully miserable at it five years ago, but would have just had more forces plodding around and breaking more pottery.

Although I always read your thoughtful postings with interest, I have to disagree with you here. I think we have succumbed to a meta-narrative that tells us that we have been screwed up in Iraq up until Feb 2007 and then once the Surge hits then the corner is turned. As you probably can tell from my writings in other places I disagree violently with this interpretation.

I do think massive amounts of more troops would have made a difference if we were looking to really control the country with military force. I remember as a BCT XO in April 2003 in Tikrit trying to balance early Coin ops with raids, and with trying to secure all of the ammo dumps around; we simply did not have enough troops to do it all. To think that with the same number of troops but in your implied counterfactual having them trained on Coin and perhaps with a General like General Patraeus at the helm then things would have turned out differently places way too much on the idea that the American military is really in control of things in Iraq.

For example and jumping ahead to the current situation; if it was the additional brigades under the Surge practicing so-called new coin tactics that lowered violence in the latter half of 2007 and if the majority of those brigades continuing to practice their so called new methods are still in place, then how do you explain the recent increase in violence not only in the south but in Baghdad?

The assumption to Dr Kilkullen's thinking is that good Coin methods underpinned by sound theoretical thinking can replace mass of troops on the ground. I dont buy it and I never have. His Jenga slide actually reminds me of the way many airmen during world war II and even after would use metaphor and theoretical constructs to explain how the relatively simple act of dropping HE bombs on structures and blowing them up would have this sophisticated network-like, systems effect on the entire enemy economy. John Warden's rings comes to mind here too.

I have come to conclude from a military perspective that using American military power to conduct Coin in Iraq is impossible.

gentile

jcustis
04-13-2008, 03:15 AM
I do think massive amounts of more troops would have made a difference if we were looking to really control the country with military force. I remember as a BCT XO in April 2003 in Tikrit trying to balance early Coin ops with raids, and with trying to secure all of the ammo dumps around; we simply did not have enough troops to do it all.

If I may ask sir, what was your BCT raiding? Were you going after FRLs? When elements of the 4ID came into zone vicinity of Samarra, Apaches went to work engaging targets across the the highway from an entire battalion coil (which I was a part of); "targets" in an area we'd already cleared and have control over. There was a lot of ordnance and weapons around in Tikrit when TF Tripoli moved south, but by the time we pulled out we had already established a pretty brisk trade in cigarettes and orange drink.:D

I'll have to disagree with you about COIN in April 2003. It wasn't happening. Sure, military leaders were trying to talk with Iraqi leaders and figure out whether we needed to be talking to mayors, sheiks, or some incarnation in-between, but we were also installing ourselves as "mayors" of sorts, and were all to quick to write PAO stories about it (which may have fueled our problems).

There's been substantial Bremer-beating concerning the disbandment of the military (and I don't want to belabor that here), but if we had been doing it with, by, and through Iraqis back then, does the large numbers hypothesis still hold true?


if it was the additional brigades under the Surge practicing so-called new coin tactics that lowered violence in the latter half of 2007 and if the majority of those brigades continuing to practice their so called new methods are still in place, then how do you explain the recent increase in violence not only in the south but in Baghdad?


I don't think we were screwed up in Iraq until 2007. I think we were simply screwed up in pockets, and those pockets served as areas (or seams/gaps if you will) where our enemy was able to get into our loop, build his center of gravity, and drive us to swat the fly with the proverbial hammer. We were not unifromly screwed up across the entire country.

As for explaining the current spate of violence, if you cull through my previous posts on the SWC, I believe that we did not surge enough in Baghdad (I was thinking a deliberate clear and hold through the city requiring several divisions), that we needed to square ourselves with Sadr, and that Iraq was only on a low simmer when we rolled into summer 2007. Come elections in the US, the violence would pick up for sure. Maybe that is coming true, but I don't know.


The assumption to Dr Kilkullen's thinking is that good Coin methods underpinned by sound theoretical thinking can replace mass of troops on the ground.

Perhaps you and I read Kilcullen differently sir, but I don't see him as actually having this sort of underpinning in his work. I think he believes that lower numbers of troops, actively practicing COIN and not wrapping themselves in too many force protection pillows, and working through the folks who really know that turf, are going to get you to your endstate faster than plodding around en masse.

I think he recognizes there is a time and place for large formations, but if they aren't being employed properly, the are just shooting our strategy in the foot. We did not have the aptitude, temperance, nor patience to do a good job in 2003-2005, regardless of how many boots we had on the ground. Tie this problem to the woefull reconstruction efforts during that period, and I can totally agree with you that the military was not in control of things in Iraq. Like John T. Fishel said, no matter of troops would have mattered with a crappy strategy.

Mark O'Neill
04-13-2008, 12:54 PM
I have to admit, like some other people who have posted in this thread, I had no idea what 'jenga' was. It is not played in Australia.

When I first saw the title I also wondered which insurgency the 'Jenga' had fought in and why I hadn't previously heard of them......:o

That said, Dave D, I get nothing from that slide other than a motherhood statement of the obvious - I think that without context it might be doing DK a disservice.

Cheers

Mark

John T. Fishel
04-13-2008, 01:05 PM
is an Aussie!!!!:confused:

Mark O'Neill
04-13-2008, 01:17 PM
is an Aussie!!!!:confused:

That is exactly the point in my title - he has been working with the US so long that he uses terms that Aussies do not use or understand...

You could walk thorugh Sydney for days and quiz people about what 'Jenga ' is - most would probably guess it is a type of Indian Takeaway.....

Tom Odom
04-13-2008, 01:34 PM
looking at a wrist watch.

I know it must be useful 'cause someone built it...

But I could use it equally to keep track of my left wrist versus my right

Or as a reminder which hand to use when...

SWJED
04-13-2008, 01:50 PM
Well, the point here is to get some discussion going concerrning transition.

Several days prior to the briefing I asked Dave K. to present something to the 180 JUW participants that would stimulate thoughts along that line. The tactical Jenga and the strategic stopwatch was simply a visual tool to generate that thought. The bottom line for the brief was to set up key questions and issues, to introduce some ways of thinking about the problem and for Dave to seek participant input via a healthy Q&A session. The brief did all that.

Up to this point (the briefing) the participants had been struggling a bit in coming to terms with the differences in an events driven transition (conditions based) vs. what we all know as a political truth – a time imposed transition. Part of the timed transition is a drawdown in coalition force levels that the tactical commanders have no control over.

Concerning the stopwatch, Dave illustrated what he called the “Aden Syndrome” with his hypothesis that in a timeline-driven drawdown, local allies will turn against the withdrawing power at the approximate midpoint of the drawdown - local allies fearing loss of external support, must consolidate their future power base in an environment that is not going to include external actors, so they turn on departing external power to shore up local support and avoid retribution from resistance actors. He used two examples - Aden, 19 June 1967 and Iraq 31 March 2004.

He went on to discuss the irreversibility of a drawdown – doing so would indicate deterioration of the security situation, admitting deterioration would undermine political support – both domestic and host nation, the shifting of domestic and host nation political expectations as a drawdown continues, and the drop in troop readiness as the extraction of combat forces is completed. A caveat was that the decrease in readiness applied to forces drawn out of theater – not out of major combat operations.

Dave went on later to discuss the evaluation and assessment of the transition posing this – if it’s Jenga, how do you know the stack is getting wobbly? Concerning the stopwatch – if it’s a stopwatch, how do you ask for a timeout?

That’s the wavetop, and again – the purpose here is to get some discussion going on transition and the Jenga slide was posted merely as a means to get that discussion off the ground – for a knuckle dragger like me it most certainly did.

I hear those who have a healthy distaste for PowerPoint but in front of large audience a slide used as prop is quite useful in generating discussion as well as Q&A.

On edit: Mark, welcome back!

wm
04-13-2008, 01:56 PM
I see the chart as an attempt to demonstrate that one’s point of view has a direct impact on how one sees progress. Using the 80,000’ strategic, soaring eagle’s view of the world, progress towards one’s goal(s) may seem to be linear, as the straight line shows. However, one needs to remember that the stopwatch needs to be rewound or it will slow down and not perform as desired—hence the downward slope of the line. Another interesting point about the eagle’s eye view is that as the eagle dives towards its prey, it loses the ability to see other options. It may end up with a meal that is sub-optimal. By focussing on the chipmunk during its dive, it may miss the javelina 100 feet away.

At the ground-level, tactical, worm’s-eye-view level, one starts with a monolithic effort, or coherent/cohesive force, as indicated by the original Jenga tower. The wavy line seems meant to show that progress at this level is much hard to track. Over time, the tower loses its structural stability as blocks are removed. Removing blocks may represent fragmentation of effort away from the original single focus. It may also represent a fracturing of the original force structure caused by asymmetrical unit rotations or an overall reduction in the deployed force. Others have already noted another aspect of the unpredictability of stability caused by the Jenga blocks’ removal: uncertainty is introduced as each side makes its choice of a next play. That is part of the reason that stability of the tactical effort is rather unpredictable.
As an aside, to those who haven’t played Jenga, sometimes removing an additional piece brings a little more stability to the surviving structure. Of course it is not as stable as the original monolith, but it may be more stable than a preceding combination.

One thing I do not like about either metaphor is the pessimism that seems operative in each, reflected by the downward trend in each line. Another problem for me was much better put by Tom Odom’s metaphor. I can put this slide to a lot of different uses, not least of which is a mystical example to obfuscate what I took to be an obvious point. (Slapout MTV’s “All Along the Watchtower” link works here: “There's too much confusion, I can't get no relief.”) Maybe Slapout MTV also needs a link to the Stone’s tune, “You can’t always get what you want.”

SWJED
04-13-2008, 02:33 PM
As an aside, so as not to be confused with an obscure insurgent group, the latest rock video discovered by Slapout or an Australian take-away delicacy, here is some info on Jenga (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jenga).


http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/34/Jenga.gif


Jenga is played with 54 wooden blocks; each block is 3 times as long as it is wide, and slightly heavier in height than in width. The blocks are stacked in a tower formation; each story is three blocks placed adjacent to each other along their long side, and each story is placed perpendicular to the previous (so, for example, if the blocks in the first story are pointing north-south, the second story blocks will point east-west). There are therefore 18 stories to the Jenga tower. Since stacking the blocks neatly can be tedious, a plastic loading tray is included.

Once the tower is built, the person who built the tower moves last. Moving in Jenga consists of taking one and only one block from any story except the completed top story of the tower at the time of the turn, and placing it on the topmost story in order to complete it. Only one hand at a time may be used to remove a block; both hands can be used, but only one hand may be on the tower at a time. Blocks may be bumped to find a loose block that will not disturb the rest of the tower. Any block that is moved out of place may be left out of place if it is determined that it will knock the tower over if it is removed. The turn ends when the next person to move touches the tower, although he or she can wait 10 seconds before moving for the previous turn to end.

The game ends when the tower falls in any significant way -- in other words, any piece falls from the tower, other than the piece being knocked out to move to the top. The loser is the person who made the tower fall (i.e. whose turn it was when the tower fell); the winner is the person who moved before the loser.

Rank amateur
04-13-2008, 02:43 PM
Dave went on later to discuss the evaluation and assessment of the transition posing this – if it’s Jenga, how do you know the stack is getting wobbly? Concerning the stopwatch – if it’s a stopwatch, how do you ask for a timeout?


Did Mr. Kilcullen offer a third option? Or are we stuck with two ineffective alternatives?

Steve Blair
04-13-2008, 03:32 PM
Gotta go with Gian in terms of the written word often (but not always) being superior to snazzy graphics. That said....

I take the stopwatch to represent the time limit often imposed on any COIN activity by political and domestic realities in democracies (Merom's "How Democracies Lose Small Wars" goes into some of this). It's a fixed scale, although those at the tactical level often don't know just how fixed that scale is (and for that matter neither do the politicians or those that monitor "home front moods"...although I contend that such monitoring is often skewed by the perceptions and biases of those doing the monitoring). I'm not a fan of the Jenga analogy, although it does capture to a degree what can be happening on the ground. Better, perhaps, for some to think of building a house of cards with four players.

Gian said:
I have come to conclude from a military perspective that using American military power to conduct Coin in Iraq is impossible.

This is accurate as far as it goes, but I would change it to state that is isn't really possible to conduct COIN anywhere with just military power. That's been demonstrated time and again. COIN is an integrated show, which might be why Kilcullen chose Jenga as his illustration. All the pieces have to fit together somehow for it to succeed, and when parts start falling out (or being removed) the whole becomes shaky. It's also often a question of how one uses military power. Placing force protection above all is clearly not the way to get things done, and never has been. I could kill the whole thread with many examples from American military history alone of how this is true, but for this discussion that just isn't necessary.

I'd also argue that the Big W and Big B (Warden and Boyd) are not as useful for COIN as many might wish (and no...I'm not doggin' on you, Slap...;)). Actually, I'm not sure that they are especially useful in any limited war scenario. Elements of their theories and techniques certainly CAN be, but on the whole they tend to worry me in any situation that requires restraint and finesse.

What's the answer, then? I don't claim to have one, but there's some stuff dancing around at the edge of consciousness that's trying to gel into something. The short version is that I don't think Kilcullen's stopwatch line is quite as fixed as it might seem (since public opinion is a malleable thing and politicians have the attention span of an ADD 2 year old on a sugar high) and I also think that the tactical environment is in many ways slightly more predictable (or at least comprehensible) than Jenga might imply. To make the Jenga bit work you'd need to have someone sticking blocks back in toward the bottom from time to time.

slapout9
04-13-2008, 03:49 PM
I'd also argue that the Big W and Big B (Warden and Boyd) are not as useful for COIN as many might wish (and no...I'm not doggin' on you, Slap...;)). Actually, I'm not sure that they are especially useful in any limited war scenario. Elements of their theories and techniques certainly CAN be, but on the whole they tend to worry me in any situation that requires restraint and finesse.


Hi Steve,actually this may surprise you and a lot of other people. The first time I met Warden he told that he thought that a Guerrilla/Insurgency type war is the one situation where he did not think his theory would work:eek: He sees them largely as civil wars and we should not became involved in them except as an outside support such as Afghanistan against Russia or El Salvador type ops run by Special Forces.

Rank amateur
04-13-2008, 04:34 PM
He sees them largely as civil wars and we should not became involved in them except as an outside support such as Afghanistan against Russia or El Salvador type ops run by Special Forces.

Generally, I would agree with that, but Afghanistan is the "duck bill platypus." Because we were attacked from there, we had to respond.


To make the Jenga bit work you'd need to have someone sticking blocks back in toward the bottom from time to time.

I believe that is our official strategy. Officially, the Iraqis are making progress towards building the necessary blocks but the situation is still to fragile to make the replacement now.

Steve Blair
04-13-2008, 04:42 PM
Hi Steve,actually this may surprise you and a lot of other people. The first time I met Warden he told that he thought that a Guerrilla/Insurgency type war is the one situation where he did not think his theory would work:eek: He sees them largely as civil wars and we should not became involved in them except as an outside support such as Afghanistan against Russia or El Salvador type ops run by Special Forces.

Sadly, things don't always work out the way folks might like...

Slap, I was never sure if Warden thought his theories would work in COIN or not. I tended to think not, simply because the AF as a whole doesn't really concern itself deeply with COIN, and he was an AF product. What tends to worry me is when other people get their hands on theories and start trying to apply them in places they might not work.

And RA, my comment was directed at the model...not what's happening in Iraq or elsewhere.

Ken White
04-13-2008, 05:47 PM
Rank Amateur said, early on:
"...In the real world, people on welfare don't start looking for jobs until the welfare is about to run out. I really think that the Sunni sheiks are smart enough to realize that as soon as there is reconciliation we're going to stop sending them US dollars."He followed that later with:
"Did Mr. Kilcullen offer a third option? Or are we stuck with two ineffective alternatives?"My answer to both those is that Kilcullen didn't offer one but I will -- and it takes care of both your concerns. We're gonna be there for a long time.

WM said:
"One thing I do not like about either metaphor is the pessimism that seems operative in each, reflected by the downward trend in each line. Another problem for me was much better put by Tom Odom’s metaphor. I can put this slide to a lot of different uses, not least of which is a mystical example to obfuscate what I took to be an obvious point. (Slapout MTV’s “All Along the Watchtower” link works here: “There's too much confusion, I can't get no relief.”) Maybe Slapout MTV also needs a link to the Stone’s tune, “You can’t always get what you want.”"Agreed, regardless of intent, the slide shows a negative trend line, psychologically (or common sense wise for those of us with no background in psych) a bad ploy.

Steve Blair said:
"...Slap, I was never sure if Warden thought his theories would work in COIN or not. I tended to think not, simply because the AF as a whole doesn't really concern itself deeply with COIN, and he was an AF product. What tends to worry me is when other people get their hands on theories and start trying to apply them in places they might not work."Emphasis added by me because I think that that is so-o-o important -- and so often ignored, usually to our detriment...

JCustis said:
"I think he recognizes there is a time and place for large formations, but if they aren't being employed properly, the are just shooting our strategy in the foot. We did not have the aptitude, temperance, nor patience to do a good job in 2003-2005, regardless of how many boots we had on the ground. Tie this problem to the woefull reconstruction efforts during that period, and I can totally agree with you that the military was not in control of things in Iraq. Like John T. Fishel said, no matter of troops would have mattered with a crappy strategy.'Yep; works for me...

William F. Owen
04-13-2008, 06:04 PM
1. Smash the stop watch.

2. Set fire the wooden blocks of the Jinga thingy.

3. Go and find the chap who wrote "Knifing Soup on your Trousers" or what ever it was called, and ask him to knock up another slide that we can all understand.

Hope this helps!

Ken White
04-13-2008, 07:28 PM
it does you, your cause and discussion here more harm than good. You're a smart guy but others here are as well. You're entitled to state your opinions -- and if you'll recall, I'm more often in agreement with you than not -- but it not only is not necessary to deride others in so doing, it seems to me it's actually counterproductive.

You can do better.

I suggest your points 1 and 2 above were unnecessary and that your number 3 is awfully close to insulting a fellow council member about a book you acknowledge you haven't even read. What's the point of the post except to be snide and condescending? Is there one?

Gian P Gentile
04-13-2008, 08:49 PM
Ken jumped in and caught me laughing then whipped me back into professional shape. I need this every now and then as many out there probably know. I have been lost ever since I gave up command and no longer have the benefit of a CSM as battle-buddy and keeping his colonel straight.

But back to the thread; I wonder if Dave D might comment on whether or not Dr Kilkullen ever mentioned or was it discussed at this conference the deteriorating situation of the American Army to the point, if not already there, of breaking? We tend to treat the American Army (and marines?) in all of these analyses in a clinical manner; like they both are unaffected masses that will just keep happily rolling on with no effect at all on them.

(thanks ken, but wilf you did have me rolling)

Ken White
04-13-2008, 09:26 PM
he sometimes pushes the envelope. I guess we all do on occasion. I just tend to encourage avoiding personalizing the argument and being too dismissive of the opinion of others. We all, me included, err on that occasionally. Not a good medium for that IMO.

I am not sharing my poncho liner -- you guys keep trying to hog the covers... :D

On a more serious note, Dave will have to speak to Dr. Kilcullen, of course. However I'd suggest the Army and Marines are far from unaffected but are also far from broken. I may be wrong but my sensing is that there'll be a slow drawdown for a couple or three years and then the residual force, maybe three BCTs (+), will be there for a long time. As in real long...

Thus I rather tranquilly await Iraqi restaurants on the streets of Barstow, the Springs, El Paso, Hinesville and Killeen (to go with the Afghan models in Clarksville, Jacksonville, Fayetteville and Watertown)... ;)

Steve Blair
04-13-2008, 09:45 PM
it does you, your cause and discussion here more harm than good. You're a smart guy but others here are as well. You're entitled to state your opinions -- and if you'll recall, I'm more often in agreement with you than not -- but it not only is not necessary to deride others in so doing, it seems to me it's actually counterproductive.

You can do better.

I suggest your points 1 and 2 above were unnecessary and that your number 3 is awfully close to insulting a fellow council member about a book you acknowledge you haven't even read. What's the point of the post except to be snide and condescending? Is there one?

Gotta agree with this. Everyone has opinions, but here we should post them respectfully. I haven't seen anyone here (myself included) who has a corner on truth. Let's all remember why we're here: to make sense of (hopefully) this thing we call "small wars." It may be that "war is war is war," but even the most skeptical should admit that there are a number of plateaus or break points between total peace and LeMay-esque "nuclear combat." In my view (and with mod hat off at this point), claiming anything different is ignoring many thousands of years worth of military history and human history.

Back to the question (or thought) about the Army "breaking": I'd say it's in much better shape now than it was during the latter stages of Vietnam. Ken's got the first-hand experience there...but I've done a fair amount of reading and analysis into that area and I'd say we're in fair shape. Not as good as we could be, perhaps, but certainly not as far-gone as we were in 1969 or so. What I see are strains similar to those the all-volunteer force experienced in the later 1800s. Different level of combat to be sure, but the same sense of being stretched too thin and paid too little to take on a job too few care about. It's a point to be watched, but it's a far cry from race riots and some of the other sundry problems the military faced in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Gian P Gentile
04-13-2008, 10:07 PM
It's a point to be watched, but it's a far cry from race riots and some of the other sundry problems the military faced in the late 1960s and early 1970s.


Agree that we wont see mutinies or things like that which the French Army experienced in early 1917. But I think it is much worse than you or Ken allow for. I think that Gens Casey and Cody have tried over the past few months to show how serious things are without using the "B" word. 3000 captains short; equipment under serious stress; an Army that does pretty much nothing but coin (I got the operational necessity for that because we are fighting two coin wars now). and at least for the next 10 months troop levels stay the same in Iraq and Afghanistan which means 12 months in and 12 months out for many combat outfits. The troopers are completing their third tour and will soon be staring down their 4th or even 5th? Right, there wont be mutinies or cataclysmic breaks; just a slow grinding down to a shell of the force we had in 2001. I accept the role of an army in the American Democracy and if our nation wants to break us for Iraq then so be it; I have served and will continue to do so until unable. I just wish folks outside of SWC members and in the greater nation would take seriously and debate this issue.

gian

Cavguy
04-13-2008, 11:14 PM
However I'd suggest the Army and Marines are far from unaffected but are also far from broken. I may be wrong but my sensing is that there'll be a slow drawdown for a couple or three years and then the residual force, maybe three BCTs (+), will be there for a long time. As in real long...


Been doing a lot of thinking about this recently - and have to agree.

"Platoon" was on the other night, followed by "Full Metal Jacket". I wasn't around then to comment on the accuracy of those units relative to the rest of the Army/Corps, but watching "Platoon" especially made me realize that I had never seen an Army unit anywhere near the state of Charlie Sheen's unit, or the general lack of discipline and standards, or the fighting spirit of the men.

I was watching Ralph Peters the other night on a PBS news show, he made one comment that struck me - "The army is not broken. I just got back from Fort Bragg and morale was not high, but not bad either, not as I would expect it six years in ... I don't even understand it myself." I don't always agree with Mr. Peters, but his comment rang true. The force is tired, even bitter, but hasn't lost the will to fight or its cohesion/discipline. As I read about the post/late -Nam army - drugs, insurbordination, indisipline - I haven't seen any of that emerge (beyond what is normal)- yet.

I think the indicator to watch for, and the one most dangerous for the army, is the collapse of discipline. Numbers can be rebuilt, but from my observations the "soul" of the force is the key. It still seems healthy right now, even given the stress.

That's not to get cocky either, it could happen suddenly, in a tipping point fashion, rather than a long decline. Anyone with experience have advice on the indicators to watch?

Rank amateur
04-13-2008, 11:19 PM
A I just wish folks outside of SWC members and in the greater nation would take seriously and debate this issue.

gian

I'm pretty confident that the subject will be discussed fairly seriously before the next election. (Though I will concede there is still a chance that the next election will be about Obama's pastor.)

Back on topic. I think I understand the slide now. Mr. Kilcullen is smart enough to know that the only way to get a crowd to criticize both the Republican plan and the Democratic plan is to have the Democrats attack the Republican plan and the Republicans attack the Democrats plan and then there is is a decent chance that most of the people in the room will come to the conclusion that neither plan is going to work.

Ron is 100% correct that the theoretical exit strategy is having the Iraqis replace the Jenga pieces. I agree 100% with Ken that the reality is if we stick with the Jenga model we're going to need to stay there for a very long time. I don't think the stopwatch is going to work either. I'm pretty sure that Mr. Kilcullen's next slide isn't, "so we're screwed and have no hope." Is there anyone out there who doesn't believe that we need some new ideas and a different model?


Anyone with experience have advice on the indicators to watch?

I have no experience, but I think the answer is wives (or husbands in some cases.) I'm not joking. 20 year olds can fight with no girlfriend back home, but when wives start saying "You have to choose between the Army and me" we're in trouble.

Cavguy
04-13-2008, 11:23 PM
I think that Gens Casey and Cody have tried over the past few months to show how serious things are without using the "B" word. 3000 captains short; equipment under serious stress; an Army that does pretty much nothing but coin (I got the operational necessity for that because we are fighting two coin wars now).

gian

Sir,

Good point. I too am worried about ARFORGEN breaking the army, I don't know that it won't be a tipping point, that after a 4th or 5th tour the LT/CPT/SGT/SSG just says "enough, I can't take it", and we see an en-masse departure from the Army.

I also am getting extremely distressing anecdotal reports of BCT readiness upon arrival at CTC's prior to deployment - unfilled key staffs, non-CCC CPT's in many key positions, some units without a MEL4 S3/XO, etc. All manned to 90% just before the CTC rotation, and in the "crawl" phase of teambuilding. There is a large experience base from prior deployments, but it's akin to a "pro bowl" team rather than a "Super Bowl" team, which the modular BCT was supposed to solve - but can't with just-in-time manning. Makes me really worry that we have finally scraped the bottom, and may have entered a death spiral in readiness - that may result in elevated risk in deploying units. Perhaps that is behind Casey's comments?

Maximus
04-13-2008, 11:53 PM
Three months ago I had the opportunity to interview more than 15 Soldiers from LtCol Yingling's battalion in Ft Bliss as they were conducting a final exercise prior to deploying. During the interview process I spoke to senior NCOs, platoon leaders, company commanders, the battalion sergeant major, XO, and CO. It was a unique experience in that I was an unbiased outsider (Marine) asking hard questions and I feel I received honest answers. The primary focus of my mission was to get feedback on the 360-leadership assessment that LtCol Yingling had implemented in the battalion. My secondary mission was to assess the Soldiers' views on the "no ranks" combatatives initiative that he also implemented.

During my time in the desert, I watched the Soldiers conduct proper PCC/PCI, leadership supervise guard post turnover and routinely run their troops through ROE type scenarios. Morale, as best I could tell, was very high. I think this a particularly important "metric" for this unit as their mission in Iraq is to serve as prison guards for more than a year. This is a mission that I'm not sure too many units would openly welcome.

I learned a lot from my short visit. Leadership was almost 100% supportive of the 360-assessment process. "No ranks" combatatives were a welcome addition to the Army and all Soldiers stated that seeing the Bn CO and Sgt Major grappling with their Soldiers was great. Most said this was the best unit they'd ever served in. The only other unit that some Soldiers rated higher was one they'd served with in combat.

All this said, concerns about young leadership and company commanders that had yet to go to captain's career course were evident in the unit.

Semper Fi,
Scott

Gian P Gentile
04-14-2008, 12:37 AM
Sir,

Good point. I too am worried about ARFORGEN breaking the army, I don't know that it won't be a tipping point, that after a 4th or 5th tour the LT/CPT/SGT/SSG just says "enough, I can't take it", and we see an en-masse departure from the Army.

I also am getting extremely distressing anecdotal reports of BCT readiness upon arrival at CTC's prior to deployment - unfilled key staffs, non-CCC CPT's in many key positions, some units without a MEL4 S3/XO, etc. All manned to 90% just before the CTC rotation, and in the "crawl" phase of teambuilding. There is a large experience base from prior deployments, but it's akin to a "pro bowl" team rather than a "Super Bowl" team, which the modular BCT was supposed to solve - but can't with just-in-time manning. Makes me really worry that we have finally scraped the bottom, and may have entered a death spiral in readiness - that may result in elevated risk in deploying units. Perhaps that is behind Casey's comments?

Cavguy:

Right; I think your characterization of it is very good. I will rely on it in the future. I dont know what "breaking" or "broken" looks like either. It certainly wont look like France in early 1917 after the Nivelle offensives where some large units actually mutinied. It wont look either like the American Army in 1970 with huge drug and discipline problems. But it might just look like something you describe above and to be sure General Casey is seeing those very same things which is why I am sure he has been trying to carefully raise alarm bells. Considering Kilkullen's Jenga and tactical conditions on the ground in Iraq and the fact that the American Army has a huge role to play with those conditions, I consider this to be a worthwhile topic for this thread. Or perhaps we should start another one if others want to continue to purse the Jenga riddle.

gian

SWJED
04-14-2008, 01:08 AM
Cavguy:

Right; I think your characterization of it is very good. I will rely on it in the future. I dont know what "breaking" or "broken" looks like either. It certainly wont look like France in early 1917 after the Nivelle offensives where some large units actually mutinied. It wont look either like the American Army in 1970 with huge drug and discipline problems. But it might just look like something you describe above and to be sure General Casey is seeing those very same things which is why I am sure he has been trying to carefully raise alarm bells. As for RA's request to get back on topic for this thread; well, considering Kilkullen's Jenga thing and tactical conditions on the ground in Iraq and the fact that the American Army has a huge role to play with those conditions, I consider this to be a worthwhile topic for this thread. Or perhaps we should start another one if others want to continue to purse the Jenga riddle.

gian

Gian - Don't be coy, you know full well this is not about solving a Jenga riddle - the post was put up to discuss transition. I'll break away the breaking of the Army posts into a new thread if warranted. But please, don't condescend, thanks - Dave

jcustis
04-14-2008, 01:31 AM
as to advance a couple of questions to muddy the water...

What is the desired endstate when the clock runs out? Put another way, what are the "right" conditions and circumstances for say, Iraq, at the end of all this that will put the pottery pieces back together with sufficient glue?

Are the "right" conditions in your mind at odds with what you understand the administration's desired endstate to be? Furthermore, is the administration's endstate clear anymore? I know we have heard and can say that it involves a sovereign Iraq, with security for the civilian populace, and the rule of law in place and supported by law enforcement, courts, etc., but what the hell does that REALLY mean?

I know I've beat this drum at length already, but how do the recent events in Basrah/Sadr City square with the desired endstate? I look at the stunts that Sadr has pulled recently and I ask myself, It's great that he supposedly convinced his followers to be non-violent, but why is he allowed to retain so much stroke?

I also look at the Maliki government, the response in Basrah, the acts of some of the police commandos, and ask What next dude? It's beginning to be your show, but all I'm hearing are boos. What will we be doing when the fractures become worse in say, another year when something happens in Kurdistan (I can't crystal ball that anything would, but I use that area to illustrate my point)? What will we be doing if the purported Iranian influence in the south gets worse? We are laying the blame squarely at the feet of the Iranians in the recent testimony, but what's the foot-stomp? Is it a dull saber rattle, or part of some grand scheme to move towards diplomacy by highlighting how pissed we are about their EFPs?

I'm slowly beginning to wonder if the model is less tactical Jenga and simply a case musical chairs, where the game started with only half as many chairs as there are players.

EDIT: I'm torn by all these questions because I really don't know if the American public - which can either pull one or more pieces, or wind the clock forward - understands what the endstate is anymore. I fear that we will come to the end not because we are done and it is time to go, but we have achieved a "decent interval" and that is enough because we have lost enough treasure and can go no further.

Gian P Gentile
04-14-2008, 01:50 AM
Gian - Don't be coy, you know full well this is not about solving a Jenga riddle - the post was put up to discuss transition. I'll break away the breaking of the Army posts into a new thread if warranted. But please, don't condescend, thanks - Dave

Dave:

Appologies; did not mean to be condescending but I can see how you would take my words that way. I appreciate the work that Dr Kilkullen does for the military (although I disagree with most of what he writes and thinks) his committment and service are never in question. Too, I accept your point earlier that perhaps we were making too much fun with his slide when in context he used it in an effective way during his presentation.

Again, sorry, did not mean to offend, just trying to be clever and not coy, but understand how my words were perceived in that way.

Ken is chomping at the bit to get at me here.

Gian P Gentile
04-14-2008, 01:59 AM
as to advance a couple of questions to muddy the water...

What is the desired endstate when the clock runs out? Put another way, what are the "right" conditions and circumstances for say, Iraq, at the end of all this that will put the pottery pieces back together with sufficient glue?

Are the "right" conditions in your mind at odds with what you understand the administration's desired endstate to be? Furthermore, is the administration's endstate clear anymore? I know we have heard and can say that it involves a sovereign Iraq, with security for the civilian populace, and the rule of law in place and supported by law enforcement, courts, etc., but what the hell does that REALLY mean?

Well put, Jcustis.

I dont know either and General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker were not clear either when asked in testimony last week. And it is exactly the questions you raise about what is the strategic endstate in Iraq that I combine with my own questions about the current state of the Army and is it worth breaking over Iraq, especially if smart folks like you cant even figure out what the goal is anymore?

this is why i continue to link the condition of the Army to this most important thread and its discussion. Transition of course is the key issue in this thread but the army's ability to affect that transition is directly tied to it.

gg

slapout9
04-14-2008, 02:43 AM
This is an older version of Wardens Time Value of Action. When I first met Warden I asked him what was the most important thing to remember and to my surprise this is it. I had a copy of his book and he accidentally drop it and it fell open to graph of the Time Value of Action.:eek: Spooky

http://smallwarsjournal.com/images/time-value-action-war.jpg

So which point on the graph does the council think the US is at?

Ken White
04-14-2008, 03:00 AM
First, on a topic in several of the above posts; the Army in the early 70s. Both the drug and disciplinary problems existed -- both are also vastly overstated, mostly by revisionist historians with wee adzes to grind (most couldn't handle an ax). Both resulted as much from the societal breakdown that started in 1968 more than they did from any trauma from Vet Nam. The Army, in a harbinger of things to come, took about a year or so to realize there was a problem; another year or so to admit it and start programs to fix the problem and yet another year or two for those programs to start to work. By 1972-3 they were on the way to being significantly reduced, by 1977 they were for all intents and purpose gone.

My point is that it wasn't as bad as many today seem to believe or as many 'histories' imply, that it got fixed reasonably rapidly -- and that we are, indeed, no where near that today.

Cav Guy said:
"...I think the indicator to watch for, and the one most dangerous for the army, is the collapse of discipline. Numbers can be rebuilt, but from my observations the "soul" of the force is the key. It still seems healthy right now, even given the stress.

That's not to get cocky either, it could happen suddenly, in a tipping point fashion, rather than a long decline. Anyone with experience have advice on the indicators to watch?agree -- and watch reenlistments. Not officer retention, reenlistments. We're over-officered (I know, I know -- but that overwork is due to Parkinson's Law, not being woefully understrength :wry:). As long as the re-up rate stays at 25% or greater, there are no significant problems. Drug and alcohol, divorce, indebtedness are all indicators but they are also influenced by many things. I recall an early 1960s study that determined the divorce rate was higher for persons on short tours than it was for the Army as a whole or those on long tours. Duh. Cav Guy also said:
"...BCT readiness upon arrival at CTC's prior to deployment - unfilled key staffs, non-CCC CPT's in many key positions, some units without a MEL4 S3/XO, etc. All manned to 90% just before the CTC rotation, and in the "crawl" phase of teambuilding."Happens in all wars, a peacetime structure (which IMO we should never adopt but that's another thread) has difficulty adapting to war. Elements of the Army have been at war many times over the last 58 years -- The US Army has NOT been to war since 1945. Most CPTs command or get staff jobs before they get to the CCC anyway -- or sure used to. You'd be amazed at how many non MEL4 MAJ -- and CPT -- have done a good job as an S3. Is it desirable? No. Is it an invitation to disaster? Only if commanders lacking self confidence allow it to be. Remember there was a time when Bn staff O's were all 1LTs, so the Co Cdrs outranked them. That was changed after Korea not to get more experience at Bn level (though that was of course the stated rationale) but to justify an overstrength in officers for mobilization purposes. Bn S3s were CPT by TOE until the mid-60s.
"...but it's akin to a "pro bowl" team rather than a "Super Bowl" team, which the modular BCT was supposed to solve - but can't with just-in-time manning. Makes me really worry that we have finally scraped the bottom, and may have entered a death spiral in readiness - that may result in elevated risk in deploying units."Be far worse if it were a big war; we'd be sending in bush league teams. That's why I object to peacetime standards; they make life nice and fairly easy but they develop mindsets that don't adapt to wars at all well. I suggest we saw that in the first 18 months in Iraq and still have vestiges.

As an aside, In two tours in Viet Nam, I can assure that both Airborne Brigades I was with were C-4 across the board for the whole tour. Even with 2LT Co Cdrs, we had good, effective units.

Rank Amateur said:
I'm pretty confident that the subject will be discussed fairly seriously before the next election. (Though I will concede there is still a chance that the next election will be about Obama's pastor.)Discussed seriously by whom? Certainly none of the candidates --none of them, including McCain (an Airdale) have much of a clue.

R.A also said:
"Is there anyone out there who doesn't believe that we need some new ideas and a different model?"I know a number who don't believe that, some serving, some not. I'm one of the latter. I'd also suggest that there is no practical alternative to the Jenga model.
I think the answer is wives (or husbands in some cases.) I'm not joking. 20 year olds can fight with no girlfriend back home, but when wives start saying "You have to choose between the Army and me" we're in trouble.Got to disagree. That's true for officers (more often than not);it is not true for the Enlisted guys (again, more often than not). The Army effectively bribes enlisted guys into marriage; we should pay folks to stay single; instead we pay 'em extra if they're married -- plus married EM get other breaks their single buddies do not. Perverse system. Bottom line is that the divorce rate will go up but a lot of those divorces would probably have occurred without the deployments as an excuse. IIRC, the rate effectively tripled during Viet Nam and the Army didn't really break -- it bent, far more so than today -- but it didn't break. It's noteworthy that even in peacetime, units that deploy a a lot for training, the 82d and SF, have a divorce rate that is almost double that of the entire Army.

Ancillary point, most Officers will depart before divorcing; most NCOs won't. We are (in my opinion) over-officered and we have had a great reenlistment rate for several years, particularly in the combat arms -- so we should have an adequate number of NCOs and an acceptable if low fill of officers.

Gian said:
"Ken is chomping at the bit to get at me here."Nah, I agree with you :D and 'breaking' is a concern; I just don't think we're as close to that as you do. We do need to get back to big war stuff but we can go another year or two without any major danger in that sphere. Be nice if we didn't have to but I don't see much of anyway to get there. I will say that JCustis said "I know we have heard and can say that it involves a sovereign Iraq, with security for the civilian populace, and the rule of law in place and supported by law enforcement, courts, etc., but what the hell does that REALLY mean? to which you responded:
"I dont know either and General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker were not clear either when asked in testimony last week. And it is exactly the questions you raise about what is the strategic endstate in Iraq that I combine with my own questions about the current state of the Army and is it worth breaking over Iraq, especially if smart folks like you cant even figure out what the goal is anymore?"I think that both of you know to one degree or another what was meant by the desired end state and that your real and totally fair question is; "Is it worth it." Casey and Cody are answering for the Army. Only y'all can answer that for yourselves. I'm long retired so I have no vote but I do have a serving son who's been there a few times and shares all the concerns expressed here -- and he thinks it is worth it. So far. When he gets worried, I will... :cool:

Ken White
04-14-2008, 03:09 AM
I sent this to Bill Nagle who has allowed me to post this. This is an older version of Wardens Time Value of Action. When I first met Warden I asked him what was the most important thing to remember and to my surprise this is it. I had a copy of his book and he accidentally drop it and it fell open to graph of the Time Value of Action.:eek: Spooky

http://smallwarsjournal.com/images/time-value-action-war.jpg

So which point on the graph does the council think the US is at?

and went off the paper on an uphill slope about two years ago, I'd say. He may need to go back to the drawing board.

jcustis
04-14-2008, 03:25 AM
I see your point Ken, and I do think I have a good grasp on the endstate. I'm at a loss, however, when I read comments posted to Youtube clips, military servicemember support sites, and even on threads on Military.com. I tend to think that I'm not the audience for the IO campaign, but we aren't getting through to the level we need to be...The American public does not have an inexhaustible well of patience, especially in the midst of a looming recession.

Although I agree that we will be in Iraq for a long time, the risk factors are going to change within a year of the new President coming into office, regardless of party affiliation. We will downsize sharply and the guys left on the ground wil be advisers in a pure sense that we are familiar with from wars past (to include yours). I'm not worried that it will come to that, I suppose, because I don't think our military is going to be broken in the process. The collective will of our nation will be broken before the troops, and I'm afraid that we won't see the watershed before it's already on top of us. That watershed is going to be something akin to another Samarra Mosque bombing, or a fight on the order of Fallujah in Nov 2004.

I wish I didn't hold that view, and I may sound overly-fatalistic, but I've always seen that damn glass as needing a refill. :D

Ken White
04-14-2008, 03:46 AM
in this whole thing has been beyond bad. You're correct on the public but there's also a degree of collective wisdom that seems to appear and preclude the really bad knee jerks. We'll just have to see how it unfolds.

Well, I, on the other hand, have always been a half full guy. I guess if we ever get to have a drink together, we need to get a level headed submariner who believes their old mantra "If you aren't having fun, you aren't doing it right" to sit between us and say "Belay that, all our glasses are at half mast and I'm buying the next round." :D

William F. Owen
04-14-2008, 04:59 AM
it does you, your cause and discussion here more harm than good. You're a smart guy but others here are as well. You're entitled to state your opinions -- and if you'll recall, I'm more often in agreement with you than not -- but it not only is not necessary to deride others in so doing, it seems to me it's actually counterproductive.

You can do better.

I suggest your points 1 and 2 above were unnecessary and that your number 3 is awfully close to insulting a fellow council member about a book you acknowledge you haven't even read. What's the point of the post except to be snide and condescending? Is there one?

Gentleman,

I apologise unreservedly for my post. It was in extremely poor taste, and I intended no offence whatsoever. It was intended purely as humour, but missed the mark badly.

On reading the offending item this AM, I am more than somewhat ashamed of my action and have no idea what possessed me to write it, as I certainly I did intend to offend Dave Kilcullen, (who has been personally helpful to me) or John Nagl, who I know, full well, frequents this board - and I have no wish to offend.

Again, and in closing, I apologise to all concerned.

ODB
04-14-2008, 05:04 AM
I came in the Army after DS/DS. Everyone I saw had a CIB or combat patch, but funny thing is 5 years later you rarely saw someone with those things. Those first five years were some of my best years. Training was realistic and battle focused, we were still experiencing the hangover from the war. As the years passed the training became more and more check the block, tasks that had to be completed quarterly, semi-annually, and annually. Ever year we did at least one CTC rotation. Our training transition from individual tasks to collective tasks. Many of the leaders I had when I came in experienced wartime conditions in some form, many of those leaders 5 years or so later retired, many of the younger soldiers ETS'd and so we went and again became a peacetime Army. Ever once in a while we'd get someone in the unit who was a Panama or Grenada vet and we'd regain our focus as much as possible them they would continue on and we'd lull back into peacetime Army. As unfortunate as this is this is the nature of things. Having talked with veterans over the years many have experienced this same trend.

A few years after 9/11 we had many soldiers who had more combat strips than service strips. These soldiers had not spent any significant amout of time in the Army in garrison. Yes we had a lot of DUI's, fighting, divorces, etc...but when gone 18 months out of 24 months it's going to happen. Especially with young soldiers and young wives. They just didn't know how to act in a garrison environment. The best is a month after we returned from fighting overseas we had to do CTC rotation so we could be validated to go to war. This is a primary example of peacetime Army at it's best.

If the re-enlistment rates stay high I feel it can do nothing but benefit the Army in the future. Many of these young troops will have multiple deployments and experiences to fall back on and hopefully keep their troops battle focused throughout the years following todays current conflicts and not allow the Army to lull itself to sleep. I was one of the lucky ones who had great leadership at a young age (2 CSM's who were Vietnam Veterans) and many SL/PSG/1SG who were Panama and Grenada Veterans that developed me into what I am today.

One last thought from the boots on the ground perspective. We are tired, tired of the political games our congress plays with us. Let us do our jobs and you do yours. Media do good or do nothing, at this point nothing would be good. An in general if the population thinks that what news is telling them is the truth then we are in for a world of hurt in the next 4 years.

One question. Would a massive reduction in force actually be the right answer to end it? Let those who trained to fight it this kind of war do so the way it is suppose to be don, by, through, and with indig forces? Sorry 2 questions.

selil
04-14-2008, 01:24 PM
I was reminded earlier this month by one of my "war widows", young ladies married to young service members who are absent from home, that her husband of five years has spent three of them in Iraq. He is some sort of communications guy at the e-5/6 level (I'm being purposefully vague) and we was given the opportunity to re-enlist and get a bonus. When he said he wanted out they said they'd just suck him back in and no bonus. That is going to radically change re-enlistment numbers. Did I mention he "was" a reservist? One of my Marine reservists (cannon cocker) got 72 hour notice that he was to report earlier this semester. I know short call up times are not the norm and IRR threats aren't likely the norm either. It is hard not to notice though that of the dozen+ veterans I had in my classes we are now down to exactly 2. One is thinking he's going to jump for a warrant officer position, and the other is Air Force and not subject to recall.

Steve Blair
04-14-2008, 01:32 PM
One of my Marine reservists (cannon cocker) got 72 hour notice that he was to report earlier this semester. I know short call up times are not the norm and IRR threats aren't likely the norm either. It is hard not to notice though that of the dozen+ veterans I had in my classes we are now down to exactly 2. One is thinking he's going to jump for a warrant officer position, and the other is Air Force and not subject to recall.

We had a kid (Marine college officer program) have more or less the same thing happen to him. He had a week to drop classes and get stuff in order before reporting to training. So far it hasn't touched any of our AF people (regular duty or reserve).

Back to the slide....:D I do like the jenga model, although as mentioned earlier it might benefit from the idea of players putting sticks in the lower areas at the same time someone's taking them out above. JCustis' musical chairs idea is also fitting. The stopwatch, I think, is based more on what politicians believe is American domestic patience and/or political expediency (in our case...it can be different in other countries) and often ignores outside circumstances or realities. It's an internal clock, and that may well be where some of our problems start. As soon as things get difficult the focus swings to internal factors and away from whatever the desired end-state might have been when the whole thing started.

Of course, any time there's a change in leadership (and it's worth considering that the US has a controlled revolution of sorts every two years - since you have to take congressional elections into account as well) the stopwatch resets...but with a variable amount of time. It could be less than before, more than before, or stay the same.

Just some early morning thoughts...feel free to hack away at 'em.

Eden
04-14-2008, 01:35 PM
This thread seems to have developed a split personality, so I'll try to hold up both ends.

First, on the stresses in the Army. I agree with Ken that the Army is over-officered and definitely over-generaled, but I worry more than he does about the quality of the officer corps. Promotion rates to major and lieutenant colonel have skyrocketed; I can't help but feel this will reduce the quality of our senior officer corps in the future as a larger percentage of drones survive into the ranks where decisions are made, rather than just implemented. I also worry that our younger officers are being short-changed as promotions accelerate and they have less time to learn their trade. Yes, they gain priceless combat experience and that is good, but I think that our future officer corps will have a very narrow set of well-developed skills and will lack that broad understanding of the institution required for intelligent leadership.

The bottom line on this is that we are still organized to fight WWIII; our personnel, training, acquisition, and doctrinal systems have not been changed to reflect current circumstances. This is why everything seems to have become an adhocracy as we struggle to circumvent - rather than modify - the system. This will, eventually, lead to a train wreck of some sort.

As for jenga and stopwatches: The problem with the stopwatch analogy is that it implies that there is a definable block of time available that is impervious to change. Performance on the ground and the resources expended affect - I might go so far as to say they determine - the time available for reaching your endstate. I believe that the American public can both be patient and accept casualties if they perceive that progress is being made. So we can extend the time available for action if we can demonstrate that sacrifices made are worthwhile.

It is also unhelpful that our desired endstate is not achievable given our current committment of resources. I am not a fan of Obama, but his question of Petraeus during the recent congressional testimony was spot-on: why have we set the bar so high? We are, in effect, trying to make Iraq more stable and safer than, say...Pakistan, or any number of other countries out there that have active terrorist cells, sectarian strife, and one or more smoldering insurgencies.

wm
04-14-2008, 03:23 PM
why have we set the bar so high? We are, in effect, trying to make Iraq more stable and safer than, say...Pakistan, or any number of other countries out there that have active terrorist cells, sectarian strife, and one or more smoldering insurgencies.

I suspect that the answer to this question requires us to talk about the elephant in the room.

It will certainly be a little dificult to set up POMCUS sites and training areas like Graf and Hohenfels in an unstable environment. Forward basing for SACCENT/USARIZ (vice SACEUR/USAREUR) requires a very stable and safe environment.

Ken White
04-14-2008, 03:59 PM
Eden, I share your concerns on the Officer corps but having seen the same accelerated promotions during Korea and Viet Nam, am probably slightly more comfortable that most -- not all -- of them will work out. Sigh. One of the penalties of being old... :(

This from you:
The bottom line on this is that we are still organized to fight WWIII; our personnel, training, acquisition, and doctrinal systems have not been changed to reflect current circumstances. This is why everything seems to have become an adhocracy as we struggle to circumvent - rather than modify - the system. This will, eventually, lead to a train wreck of some sort.Is way too true. I have heard that efforts to change the organizational structure and the doctrinal systems are underway -- logically, the training and acquisition processes will follow. Worrisome is the fact that no one seems to be addressing the Per system.

WM, as 'Enery 'Iggins said, "I do believe you've got it!" :D

wm
04-14-2008, 05:32 PM
The bottom line on this is that we are still organized to fight WWIII; our personnel, training, acquisition, and doctrinal systems have not been changed to reflect current circumstances. This is why everything seems to have become an adhocracy as we struggle to circumvent - rather than modify - the system. This will, eventually, lead to a train wreck of some sort.
This from you:Is way too true. I have heard that efforts to change the organizational structure and the doctrinal systems are underway -- logically, the training and acquisition processes will follow. Worrisome is the fact that no one seems to be addressing the Per system.
I suspect that the WWIII prep mentality is also why we seem to think we need that forward base at the head of the Persian Gulf. BTW be wary of applying logic to the DoD acquisition system. It is not all about getting the troops the right tools to do their jobs. :(


[WM, as 'Enery 'Iggins said, "I do believe you've got it!" :DThanks Ken. I wonder why we cannot be upfront about this as our objective. The story ought to be a fairly easy one to tell and can be sugarcoated enough so as to make the hosts not appear to be selling out on their political sovereignty

Ken White
04-14-2008, 06:21 PM
I suspect that the WWIII prep mentality is also why we seem to think we need that forward base at the head of the Persian Gulf. BTW be wary of applying logic to the DoD acquisition system. It is not all about getting the troops the right tools to do their jobs. :(I do see minor glimmers of improvement; one can only pray.
... I wonder why we cannot be upfront about this as our objective. The story ought to be a fairly easy one to tell and can be sugarcoated enough so as to make the hosts not appear to be selling out on their political sovereigntyDunno. Good question; I agree it could've been sold and told and would likely have done far better with many than some of the cockamamie things they did put out. This is the worst administration I've seen for getting their message out. For a crew that's supposed to be on-message and controlling, they've really done poorly.

USMCTanker
04-14-2008, 08:31 PM
Just want to hear Council member’s thoughts concerning transition.

At JUW one response to 'tactical Jenga' was "transition is not like Jenga, more like the opening scene from the original Indiana Jones (http://www.indianajones.com/site/index.html) - Raiders of the Lost Ark" - where, when attempting to retrieve a precious idol - set with all kinds of 1930ish IED-like traps - Jones balances time and agility to replace the idol with a bag of sand. The counter-response from someone in the audience was along the lines that you have to be able to calculate the "right time" and have something of substance to replace the "idol" - not useless sand...

SWJ Disclaimer: The link to Indiana Jones was thrown in only because I love the soundtrack and this post does not represent the views of the Department of Defense or Steven Spielberg.
I was the short, bald individual and JUW 08 who made the Raiders of the Lost Ark analogy, resulting in the shots across the bow from the SMEs and Dr. Kilcullen. I still believe my analogy to be accurate.

In my uneducated (and unsolicited) opinion, transition can be considered a close system. Input = throughput = output. The Jenga reference to me infers the removal of military forces without backfill. The end state with the game is always failure - the Jenga structure always collapse.

What I am suggesting is that the idol (US military forces) is replaced with a bag of sand (a combination of all instruments of national power). That sand could be host nation security forces, economic incentives, diplomatic actions, you name it. The bottom line is that in order to keep from getting "squashed by the rolling ball", a balance of effort with the host nation must be maintained.

Examples:

Withdrawing forces from South Vietnam without maintaining effective diplomatic/economic/military programs = squashed by the big boulder

Establishing a long term military presence, economic relationships and political unity in Japan = exiting the temple with the idol

This is my first post to the Small Wars Journal and would love to have my random thoughts torn apart. I am considering this theory as a thesis for a MMAS. Thank you for allowing me to comment.

S/F,
John

Ken White
04-14-2008, 08:46 PM
JUW08 but what you said above makes sense and I'm curious as to what Dr. Kilcullen and the SMEs found objectionable (unless it was just the 'unsolicited' part -- that always upsets 'em... :D ).

As to the above cited response from the audience; well, duh. True but also went without saying.

Memo to self: continue to avoid using film, sports and game metaphors and references in discussing bidness...

Randy Brown
04-14-2008, 10:27 PM
One caveat before I beg your collective indulgence for taking up too much headspace and timing.

Yes, I am aware that the purpose of this discussion is focused on the topic of "transition," not games and competitions of mental, physical, and architectural skill. Wrestling with the rhetorical concepts presented in the PowerPoint fragment first used to get the conversational-Raiders-of-the-Lost-Ark-ball rolling, as well as subsequent comments and insights offered by other posters, I decided to engage in a little research and play regarding Jenga, and how it might be modified to more accurately reflect the conflicting realities (and the realities of conflict) at work in "transition."

My efforts were immediately rewarded with some Fun Jenga Facts Worthy of Cliff Claven himself, including:

"Jenga" is the imperative verb in Swahili "to build."
There are authorized variants of Jenga, including: those involving colored blocks and randomization through dice ("Throw'n Go Jenga"); "Truth or Dare Jenga (don't ask, don't tell?); and even an "Xtreme" version that does not use uniform shapes or angles.

See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jenga for more facts on the game.

Inspired by this initial success, I sought to conceptualize a Jenga variant that would incorporate factors including, but not limited to:

A fixed timeline for success or failure.
Actions by multiple actors, each self-interestedly pursuring different objectives or conditions for victory.
Both "offensive" and "defensive" tactics.
Opportunities for negotiation and alliance.

Below, please find an attempt to model "transition" using two sets of Jenga blocks. I propose to call the result "Jenga Jihad," because I have a sportscaster's penchant for alliteration, and because I like the juxtaposition of "To Build" and "To Struggle." (Cultural nano-brief follows: "Jihad" does not equal "holy war.")

I offer all this as a serious effort to play with a serious concept, and look forward to your comments. I'd also welcome any reactions driven by actual playtesting, as my family's Jenga set is currently deployed as a field-expedient set of building blocks, and may even be the fairy princess' last line of defense.

Enjoy!

Jenga Jihad

Players: Two or more.

Supplies Required:


Two sets of Jenga(tm) blocks, each consisting of 54 unpainted wooden blocks.

Stopwatch, clock, kitchen timer or equivalent device.


Game Layout:

Two Jenga towers are placed at a distance approximately two Jenga-block-lengths from each other. One tower is designated as the “Troop Levels” tower; the other is designated as the “Host Nation Government” tower.

Player No. 1 (“The Jenga-ist”) Objectives:

Dismantle your “Troop Levels” tower to achieve the smallest number of blocks possible (achieving “minimal/optimal footprint”), without allowing the structure to collapse. Simultaneously, build up your “Host Nation Government” tower as high as possible (without sacrificing stability!), using the blocks removed from the first.

Other Players’ (“The Jihadists”) Objectives:

Prevent Player No. 1 from achieving his/her objectives by removing one block from either the “Troop Levels” or “Host Nation Government” towers on each turn. Standard Jenga rules regarding block removal, “bumping,” ends of turns, etc., apply. (Again, see: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jenga (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jenga)) Using the blocks you remove each turn, start and continue to build a small “Faction” tower anywhere within two Jenga-block-lengths of the “Troop Levels” and/or “Host Nation Government” towers.

Game Play:


Play ends either at the end of 12 minutes, timed by stopwatch or other device, or when the “Troop Levels” or “”Host Nation Government” tower collapses. (Editor’s note: 5 to 6 minutes is average for standard Jenga; the 12-minute duration here is only a suggestion.)

Player No. 1 goes first, removing first a block from the “Troop Levels” tower and replacing it onto the “Host Nation Government” tower. On subsequent turns, Player No. 1 may remove a block either from the “Troop Levels” tower, or from any “Faction” tower; he/she may also add to any “Faction” tower.

Play either alternates between two players, or rotates clockwise.

Unlike standard Jenga, blocks may be removed from the topmost level of any tower.

The topmost level on any tower must be complete (3 blocks, running perpendicular to the next-lower level) before a player may add further blocks to build upward. However, in order to stabilize a tower, players may also replace blocks on or lower than the topmost level. (In other words, blocks must not always be added to the top of a tower.)

On each turn, players may remove one block from any of the following: The “Troop Levels” tower, the “Host Nation Government” tower, or any other player’s tower.

Players may seek to influence others through negotiation, including the establishment of alliances.



Optional Rules:


Player No. 1 may NEVER remove blocks from the “Host Nation Government” tower (to do so would be to invite Civil War).


OR


Player No. 1 may remove blocks even from the “Host Nation Government,” particularly if he/she is attempting to build up one or more “Faction” towers.


Victory Conditions:


Player No. 1 wins if both the “Troop Levels” and “Host Nation Government” towers remain standing at the end of play, and if the “Host Nation Government” tower is the tallest as compared to any remaining “Faction” towers. Any player openly allied with the “Host Nation Government” can also be considered to share in this victory.

Any other player wins if his/her “Faction” tower remains standing after the collapse of either the “Troops Levels” or “Host Nation Government” towers.

In the event that more than one “Faction” tower remains standing after the collapse of either the “Troops Levels” or “Host Nation Government” towers, the player with the tallest “Faction” tower (Editor’s note: This is not necessarily the tower comprising the most blocks) is the winner.

Spud
04-15-2008, 01:01 AM
Damn ... I actually get that. Time to find some Jenga blocks and have a crack

SWJED
04-15-2008, 01:54 AM
You did a real nice job at JUW 08 - thanks much. Welcome to the Council.

Uboat509
04-15-2008, 02:35 AM
I like Jenga metaphor. As soon as I saw the title of the thread I formed a picture in my head before I even saw the slide. The way I interpreted it was perhaps a bit more abstract than others did. The Jenga tower represents the overall problem of transition and we must play the game (I don't picture a direct correlation between the removal of the blocks and specific things like troop levels and such, rather I saw it as task we must accomplish representing everything we must accomplish in Iraq). Those have played Jenga know that the early moves are relatively easy but the later moves get progressively harder and require more time to accomplish as the tower gets more unstable. The problem then becomes that we are now on a stopwatch, imposed by political expediency and John Q Public's ADHD among other factors. (I also saw the stopwatch as representing dwindling resources as well as time, by the way.) We no longer have as much time as we would like to make our moves. Unlike the normal game however, the goal is not to win by having your opponent crash the tower but have the tower still standing when time runs out (Ken's acceptable outcome vs "victory"). It is an imperfect metaphor but that is the way I pictured it.

SFC W

slapout9
04-15-2008, 03:06 AM
Well lets see. Lets change the rules some. What if the Jenga tower represented the insurgency network and you have to figure out how to collapse it within a certain time frame? You would try to find a COG that would collapse the whole thing at once.... but insurgencies are more complicated than that. So the question is how could you collapse the tower in the fewest steps possible, within the alloted time and establish a secure environment. Once that is done you could do the nation building thing.

selil
04-15-2008, 01:29 PM
I think we're truly missing the real meaning of Jenga in this context.

slapout9
09-16-2009, 07:59 PM
The Jenga Gun:) all problems have solutions....all solutions cause problems.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F9BmTmMEOhQ