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SWJED
04-17-2008, 01:01 AM
Would appreciate any thoughts on the following RFI from a Marine:


... I've done a good deal of COIN study and a little practical application in Iraq. As I was thinking through how to design a regimental HQ's PME program for an upcoming deployment, it became clear to me that I have no idea how to teach COIN.

I can teach TTP's (VCP, counter IED, etc.), but HQ's personnel above the company don't really do TTP's except as personal protective measures while traveling about. We can also train COC battle drills, but using MERC Chat to pass word of a TIC or downed aircraft isn't COIN either. We need to do these types of events, but what I am aiming at for this project is education rather than training.

Power point classes that I've seen are also only marginally useful. Because each situation is so different, there are few enduring principles that always apply. Slides with LOO's and pillars are so abstract that I don't think Marines internalize much from them.

I think reading is the key, but that reading needs to be reinforced by action to generate vicarious experience. Therefore I want to explore some sort of case study method which allows us to analyze situations in their historical context and then use that experience to reach some group synthesis about how to do COIN at the Regt. Level. My hope was that there were some ready made games out there that could be used as a training tool to facilitate this. For instance, read a book about Algeria. Play a game about Algeria. Something along those lines. I am open to any ideas that anyone may have.

Thanks in advance...

selil
04-17-2008, 01:09 AM
Sounds like y'all need a little tools called education modeling theory. Use of a model (scenario, concept, idea, strategy, tactic) to create knowledge (big K) using game theory and such for the mechanism. I know that isn't "exactly" what he was asking, but as he was tossing away mechanisms (power point, loo(?), and such) I'm reading a need for deriving knowledge. Like most people he thinks education is transmission/communication tools, and not the learning/modeling tools. Remove the TLA's from the post and I'd make some real swings if needed.

slapout9
04-17-2008, 01:52 AM
Ok Dave I give up.... what is the Catapultam......stuff on your signature line?

selil
04-17-2008, 02:13 AM
Something about flinging stones at you?

USA&USMC_COIN_Center
04-17-2008, 02:31 AM
Come on over to COIN.ARMY.MIL (http://coin.army.mil). Go to the knowledge center (Sharepoint or AKO) and download the COIN Leader Workshop. It details lots about performing in the COIN environment independant of OIF or OEF, and may meet your needs, along with many other tools.

PM or email coin@conus.army.mil (coin@conus.army.mil)with questions.

MAJ Niel Smith
USA & USMC Counterinsurgency Center
Combined Arms Center
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

SteveMetz
04-17-2008, 11:35 AM
Come on over to COIN.ARMY.MIL (http://coin.army.mil). Go to the knowledge center (Sharepoint or AKO) and download the COIN Leader Workshop. It details lots about performing in the COIN environment independant of OIF or OEF, and may meet your needs, along with many other tools.

PM or email coin@conus.army.mil (coin@conus.army.mil)with questions.

MAJ Niel Smith
USA & USMC Counterinsurgency Center
Combined Arms Center
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

I have a somewhat out of the box suggestion. I'm currently reading Jeremey Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (http://www.amazon.com/Inside-Rebellion-Insurgent-Cambridge-Comparative/dp/0521677971/ref=pd_bbs_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1208431919&sr=8-1). This is based on very detailed field research on three insurgencies: Uganda, Mozambique, and Peru. It has almost nothing to do with counterinsurgency, but offers great insights into the insurgement movements. You might draw the case studies and out and pose the question of how your peeps might have organized a counterinsurgency campaign had they been called on to do so.

Here's the downside: it's a very academic work, so can be tough reading, especially the conceptual parts. But you don't really need those, just the case studies.

marct
04-17-2008, 04:36 PM
you can take the case study methodology a step further by breaking people into teams, creating scenarios, and then having them game against each other. I've used that to good effect in teaching globalization / anti-globalization material.

Surferbeetle
04-17-2008, 05:46 PM
From Wired (http://blog.wired.com/defense/2007/11/culture-modelli.html)


The Navy, it turns out, has a "Sim Iraq" in mind, too. A literal one. The service has issued a call for a developers to build "a highly interactive, PC-based Human, Social and Culture Behavioral Modeling (HSCB) simulation tool to support training for military planners for handling insurgencies, small wars, and/or emergent conflicts."

Menning
04-17-2008, 11:42 PM
Having taken two COIN electives at CGSC, I recommend reading several books. We always use Galula's Counterinsurgency Theory and Practice combined with O'Neill's Insurgency and Terrorism to understand COIN theory. For a detailed look at the application of COIN principles, I'd recommend Galula's Pacification in Algeria 1956-1958. By examining Galula's four prerequisites for insurgency and O'Neill's types of insurgency, a person can already start applying COIN theory to a specific situation. Ensuing discussion involving Galula's application of COIN principles can help facilitate discussions regarding the efficacy of theory and practice in any given AOR.

As for the "gaming" element, I again return to how we do it during a short course at CGSC. Once you have the theory and principles down, encourage those involved to break down a given insurgency using the theory. One side can play the blue team and the other red, and introduce insurgent/counterinsurgent actions and how they affect the status of the fight.

Galula's Theory and Practice is a quick, digestible read and a person can pick and choose what to read from O'Neill's work if brevity is important.
One last thing, Trinquier's Modern Warfare is also a quick read that emphasizes the operational level of COIN theory and might prove useful. I hope some of this helps.

SteveMetz
04-18-2008, 01:46 AM
Having taken two COIN electives at CGSC, I recommend reading several books. We always use Galula's Counterinsurgency Theory and Practice combined with O'Neill's Insurgency and Terrorism to understand COIN theory. For a detailed look at the application of COIN principles, I'd recommend Galula's Pacification in Algeria 1956-1958. By examining Galula's four prerequisites for insurgency and O'Neill's types of insurgency, a person can already start applying COIN theory to a specific situation. Ensuing discussion involving Galula's application of COIN principles can help facilitate discussions regarding the efficacy of theory and practice in any given AOR.

As for the "gaming" element, I again return to how we do it during a short course at CGSC. Once you have the theory and principles down, encourage those involved to break down a given insurgency using the theory. One side can play the blue team and the other red, and introduce insurgent/counterinsurgent actions and how they affect the status of the fight.

Galula's Theory and Practice is a quick, digestible read and a person can pick and choose what to read from O'Neill's work if brevity is important.
One last thing, Trinquier's Modern Warfare is also a quick read that emphasizes the operational level of COIN theory and might prove useful. I hope some of this helps.

I'm on a one man crusade to try and transcend the Cold War classics. It's would be like assigning books on American politics from the 1960s to a bunch of student who were going to go out and manage political campaigns.

Cavguy
04-18-2008, 02:18 AM
I'm on a one man crusade to try and transcend the Cold War classics. It's would be like assigning books on American politics from the 1960s to a bunch of student who were going to go out and manage political campaigns.

Not necessairly disagreeing with you, but what short books matching the above themes (and simplicity) would you recommend instead?

Galula and Trinquier are oft mentioned because they are short, practical, and still mostly relevant.

I can think of a few insightful more recent articles, but no books with a digestable tactical/operational summary of approaching COIN.

Rex Brynen
04-18-2008, 03:44 AM
I can think of a few insightful more recent articles, but no books with a digestable tactical/operational summary of approaching COIN.

If so (and I suspect you're right), this may be the post profound, worrisome, and alarming statement I've seen posted on SWC. Sheesh. :eek:

(And I agree with Steve that I find much that is dated or otherwise problematic in Galula and Trinquier.)

Mark O'Neill
04-18-2008, 08:12 AM
Not necessairly disagreeing with you, but what short books matching the above themes (and simplicity) would you recommend instead?

Galula and Trinquier are oft mentioned because they are short, practical, and still mostly relevant.

I can think of a few insightful more recent articles, but no books with a digestable tactical/operational summary of approaching COIN.

Niel,

I am wondering why the need or fascination we all seem to have for 'short' and 'simplicity'. There is simply no correlation between the fact that these attributes make a text more digestable to 'average' folks and the utility, accuracy, validity and worth of the thoughts that the texts contain.

Someone shared an excellent powerpoint presentation with me yesterday that contained a prescient quote from LTGEN (UK) Graeme Lamb whilst in Baghdad in the middle of last year:

“The reality is that what we about here in Iraq is multidimensional, and it cannot be simplified if none of it fits easily into in nice neat terms. Any search for the neat and tidy allows those who don’t really understand it, even in the simplest terms, to get us into dangerous situations ”

To my mind this precisely highlights the problem with 'short and simple'. These problems are anything but 'short and simple' and reductionism to make them such is a flawed idea. You end up with the perception of understanding, but actually have something quite different, which is dangerous. No one has ever promised that COIN is intellectually egalitarian. Nor that it can be 'dumbed down' to suit the Army training system's resolute belief that it could even train monkeys to write Shakespeare if only given enough typewriters and time...

I share some of Steve's concerns with many of the so called 'cold war' texts, but not because of their age. After all, Callwell and Gwynne are far older, but still have considerable utility in aiding understanding in many areas.

My concern, and with Galula in particular, is that simple advice is taken way out of the context it was derived and them slavishly applied at levels and in places where it clearly has little or no practical utility.

Time and time again I have seen people take simple blandishments, derived from observations of a finite tactical level problem over one year in a specific AO (with unique culture, terrain, political history etc), and try and extrapolate meaning at the high operational and low strategic end of the present conflict spectrum. It is ludicrous and it simply does not work. Yes, Galula can offer some pointers to a company commander owning a piece of dirt at the tactical level. But I believe he has very little of practical use beyond motherhood statements after that.

In order to address our current set of problems (particulalry within the ITO), I believe that is well past time for people to look beyond the deification of Saint Robert. It is time to seek wider readings from people who have actually engaged in dealing with issues akin to our current problem set. And this must mean at levels other than the tactical. As an example Robert Kromer is one who springs to mind off the top of my head. (NB, I am not sanctioning / endorsing everything that Kromer wrote, merely pointing out that he worked at a level of the Vietnam war more akin to where most of our current problems lie).

The fact is that we can lose this war at the tactical, operational and strategic levels, but we can only 'win' it at the strategic (think back to the apocryphal story with the Vietnamese General cited by Summers). I do not have any sense that we are in danger of 'losing' the tactical fight anytime soon- particularly given the learning and improvement over the last three years. From what I have seen and learnt in theatre Galula's utility starts to wane considerably as we move up to where we must win - the high operational and strategic. Time then to start looking at other people, perhaps like Liddell-Hart and Beaufre as starters (and even Chainsaw Bob on how to get CMO happening at high levels..).

Regarding contemporary writings, I tend to agree with the posts previously. I have not yet seen the new edited work by Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian , I have one on order and have some hope that it might be step in the right direction. Steve Metz's SSI monograph last year also springs to mind- I thought it was a good contribution.

I am increasingly thinking that many are sitting around waiting for someone else to 'do something'. I put myself somewhat in this category at the moment. The situation will only change when one of us finds the time (and courage perhaps) to go out there and try and write a book.

In the mean time we can all continue to amuse ourselves with journal articles and anodyne powerpoint presentations at conferences replete with dubious analogies....

regards,

Mark

Cavguy
04-18-2008, 11:52 AM
I am wondering why the need or fascination we all seem to have for 'short' and 'simplicity'. There is simply no correlation between the fact that these attributes make a text more digestible to 'average' folks and the utility, accuracy, validity and worth of the thoughts that the texts contain.

First, excellent and detailed post, I don't have a lot of time to respond right now. I don't disagree, I'd love everyone to read lots of detailed texts with complex background.

Not everyone's a scholar or a reader.




“The reality is that what we about here in Iraq is multidimensional, and it cannot be simplified if none of it fits easily into in nice neat terms. Any search for the neat and tidy allows those who don’t really understand it, even in the simplest terms, to get us into dangerous situations ”

Completely agree - consider this I read last night from H.R. McMaster -


Colonel McMaster sat in his makeshift office and said, “It is so damn complex. If you ever think you have the solution to this, you’re wrong, and you’re dangerous. You have to keep listening and thinking and being critical and self-critical. Remember General Nivelle, in the First World War, at Verdun? He said he had the solution, and then destroyed the French Army until it mutinied.”



To my mind this precisely highlights the problem with 'short and simple'. These problems are anything but 'short and simple' and reductionism to make them such is a flawed idea. You end up with the perception of understanding, but actually have something quite different, which is dangerous.

Yes, but .... is someone with a limited knowledge truly more dangerous than someone with a deep knowledge?


I share some of Steve's concerns with many of the so called 'cold war' texts, but not because of their age. After all, Callwell and Gwynne are far older, but still have considerable utility in aiding understanding in many areas.

Good point, we still read Saint Carl, Sun Tzu, Lawrence, etc. - they are all dated but have good points. I'm not saying either of the discussed works are to that level - but I pulled relevant and tactical points from them, and contextualized them within my experience.


My concern, and with Galula in particular, is that simple advice is taken way out of the context it was derived and them slavishly applied at levels and in places where it clearly has little or no practical utility.

This is really a risk with almost any "how to" work, and not an argument for not reading them.


Time and time again I have seen people take simple blandishments, derived from observations of a finite tactical level problem over one year in a specific AO (with unique culture, terrain, political history etc), and try and extrapolate meaning at the high operational and low strategic end of the present conflict spectrum. It is ludicrous and it simply does not work. Yes, Galula can offer some pointers to a company commander owning a piece of dirt at the tactical level. But I believe he has very little of practical use beyond motherhood statements after that.

Agreed. Going back to the OT - the poster was wanting to instruct COIN at the small unit level - not shape MNC-I policy.


In order to address our current set of problems (particularly within the ITO), I believe that is well past time for people to look beyond the deification of Saint Robert. It is time to seek wider readings from people who have actually engaged in dealing with issues akin to our current problem set. And this must mean at levels other than the tactical. As an example Robert Kromer is one who springs to mind off the top of my head. (NB, I am not sanctioning / endorsing everything that Kromer wrote, merely pointing out that he worked at a level of the Vietnam war more akin to where most of our current problems lie).

Same problems Steve noted with Kormer. Great stuff - but hardly current.

Even FM 3-24 doesn't really address that. People like Galula and Trinquier because they do that - tell you "how to" at the tactical and even operational level, even if dated and written for a specific time and place. The wisdom to sort the wheat from chaff seems to be most of the complaint.


Regarding contemporary writings, I tend to agree with the posts previously. I have not yet seen the new edited work by Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian , I have one on order and have some hope that it might be step in the right direction. Steve Metz's SSI monograph last year also springs to mind- I thought it was a good contribution.

No dig on Steve's Monograph, but these works aren't on the same plane. They are not not a manual on "how to" or principles for tactical execution of COIN in a modern environment based on learning or distillation of knowledge. Most officers and soldiers have neither the time nor inclination to read long and detailed works on a subject, and time is also a constraint for those in the deployment cycle. People want short because they can use short, and I think some knowledge applied imperfectly is better than detailed knowledge unapplied. I know it was for me as a commander.

I would love it if everyone loved long books, deep thoughts, and analysis, and as professionals (esp officers) we should. But wishing won't make it so. I think being armed with a little knowledge is better than none - largely because it also works as a gateway to more learning.

I never read Galula or Trinquier before my last deployment, but I have since (and wish I had before), and realized that I did most of what they advocated, adjusted for Iraq and where I was. The little I had read specifically on COIN before deploying the second time took me a long way when pared with my experience.


I am increasingly thinking that many are sitting around waiting for someone else to 'do something'. I put myself somewhat in this category at the moment. The situation will only change when one of us finds the time (and courage perhaps) to go out there and try and write a book.

Agreed, unfortunately these things tend to come out after the conflict. I don't think many academics could write the update to Galula or Trinquier - they don't have the tactical cred or experience. Galula and Trinquier had extensive tactical and operational execution experience in Vietnam and Algeria, which both increased the quality of their works and more importantly the credibility of them with the audience.

So I agree we have to do it, but few of us currently have the time. (Rob Thornton seems to have lots of time to type - :D)


In the mean time we can all continue to amuse ourselves with journal articles and anodyne powerpoint presentations at conferences replete with dubious analogies....

I may resemble that remark. :eek: But .... those articles and powerpoints started me on a path to more complexity - Kilcullen's 28 Articles was extremely important when it came out to me - framed much of what I had learned, and gave me some new things to think about that sparked further research and reading.

Mark O'Neill
04-18-2008, 12:05 PM
Guys, re: my typing dyslexia in the previous post, please read '"Kormer" for "Kromer" :o

Mark

Bill Moore
04-18-2008, 03:14 PM
can teach TTP's (VCP, counter IED, etc.), but HQ's personnel above the company don't really do TTP's except as personal protective measures while traveling about. We can also train COC battle drills, but using MERC Chat to pass word of a TIC or downed aircraft isn't COIN either. We need to do these types of events, but what I am aiming at for this project is education rather than training.

Heck it is Friday morning, so I'll kick the hornets nest once again. I can't speak for the person who made the request, but it seems he/she is getting at that gray area between education and training. Sort of like how do you implement strategy at the tactical level. Education being stragetic and training being tactical. The staff is in the middle, they have to know how to fuse both. Our operational level doctrine is outstanding for conventional warfighting, but one could make an argument that our staffs are not ideally task organized or trained to command and control COIN. We're great at responding to a troops in contact, medevac, pushing supplies out, etc., but I think we still fall short in the area of translating COIN strategic ideas into operational level plans that effect tactical operations.

The simple fix, but big Army will do Cheetah flips is to put Special Forces in charge, with big Army in support. SF can form an irregular or unconventional Joint/Interagency/Combined Task Force, and provide operational guidance to the supporting units. This will allow big Army to focus primarily on conventional warfighting skills, but still make significant contributions to the COIN fight without changing their staff structure significantly.


We can also train COC battle drills, but using MERC Chat to pass word of a TIC or downed aircraft isn't COIN either.

This statement is key and he is correct. These drills are common to all operations and must be trained, but what about COIN? May I propose SF?

Randy Brown
04-18-2008, 04:46 PM
Earlier comments about "education is strategic, training is tactical" are on point, but only, if you'll forgive me, to a point. We've got Strategic SSGs and LTs out there, fighting the COIN fight.

I'm wondering if there's some sweet spot, somewhere in the middle, between education/training and strategic/tactical.

As a lessons-learned guy, I'm continually asked by our deploying soldiers about where to find TTPs, SOPs, etc. That's training stuff--I get that. At the same time, however, there's a real hunger for educational stuff that's a little meatier, without being too hard to digest. These soldiers want to know how to think, not what to think--but they also don't want to get a PhD in the process.

As an example of the type of thing they want, a few deploying/deployed Embedded Training Team (ETT) members have pointed out Lester Grau's "Bear Went Over the Mountain" and "The Other Side of the Mountain." These are collections of case studies of Soviet and Mujahideen tactics. Soldiers seem to like the multiple-vignette, easy-to-pick-up-and-put-down format. (One even called them "good latrine books"--apparently the true test of whether something is digestible.) They want to know whether there's similar, more contemporary material, applicable to OIF and/or OEF.

Earlier comments in this thread regarding learning-through-gaming make me wonder whether there's any existing or potential collection of vignettes, aimed at the COIN practioner level. I'm even reminded of the "Choose Your Own Adventure" books popular in the 1980s, or the "Encyclopedia Brown" (no relation) mysteries of a generation earlier. These were children's books, yes--but they forced a different kinds of interactions with the materials. Anyone seen anything like this in a COIN context?

Mark O'Neill
04-18-2008, 06:22 PM
:o
Guys, re: my typing dyslexia in the previous post, please read '"Kormer" for "Kromer" :o

Mark

OK, I give up, one of those days I guess.. lets try 'Komer'....

Ken White
04-18-2008, 07:16 PM
and that's usually dangerous... :wry:


Heck it is Friday morning, so I'll kick the hornets nest once again. I can't speak for the person who made the request, but it seems he/she is getting at that gray area between education and training. Sort of like how do you implement strategy at the tactical level. Education being stragetic and training being tactical. The staff is in the middle, they have to know how to fuse both. Our operational level doctrine is outstanding for conventional warfighting, but one could make an argument that our staffs are not ideally task organized or trained to command and control COIN. We're great at responding to a troops in contact, medevac, pushing supplies out, etc., but I think we still fall short in the area of translating COIN strategic ideas into operational level plans that effect tactical operations.Is that not a function of the facts that COIN IS the Operational level when and where implemented and, far more importantly and less arguably -- the fact that we doctrinally, educationally and training wise virtually ignored COIN and ID for almost 30 years?

Did not that neglect extend at least in part to SF who looked at, er, uh, other missions, while admittedly keeping a finger or two in the COIN / ID water?


The simple fix, but big Army will do Cheetah flips is to put Special Forces in charge, with big Army in support. SF can form an irregular or unconventional Joint/Interagency/Combined Task Force, and provide operational guidance to the supporting units. This will allow big Army to focus primarily on conventional warfighting skills, but still make significant contributions to the COIN fight without changing their staff structure significantly.Aside from the rather enjoyable contemplation of seeing portly Generals doing cheetah flips, I may see some practical problems.

Philosophy impeded practice. I've been retired retired for 13 years; a lot can change. However, from 1960 until 1995, there was a constant tension within SF and at the Center between proponents of emphasis on DA vs. UW vs. ID. My belief is that SOCOM has exacerbated those tensions. If that is true, then it is a potentially disruptive effect your recommendation confronts.

Size. Not everyone is equipped to be SF, only so many will have the requisite psychological profile and be able to adapt to alien cultures and languages. As currently constituted, SF could capably deal with the SEA missions as they are structured and with Afghanistan -- that is true as is OR using your approach. I submit SF isn't large enough to do those and add Iraq, or, really, to do Iraq on it's own. Obviously that's tour length and a few other things dependent but on balance, I don't think there's enough SF to do what you suggest in the current circumstances.

Increasing the size. You could do that. Having been there a long time ago in a galaxy far away when that happened, I wouldn't recommend it. Not at all...

Focus. One of the strengths of SF is the regional or area focus and specialization. More than one anecdote would seem to indicate that SF elements operating in an unfamiliar environment are just as prone to errors as are conventional units. If regional orientation is a strength, that further limits the ability to provide an adequate sized force for the C2 effort required.

C2 capability. SF is unique and has great capabilities in its designed area of expertise but the nuts and bolts of war at the operational level -- which I very strongly contend is precisely what COIN is in the country involved -- on stuff like "...responding to a troops in contact, medevac, pushing supplies out, etc." they'd be a bit out of their element and thus, the big army force they were trying to provide elegant and informed C2 for would, by default own the tempo.

At the risk of drawing ire and fire from you, UBoat, ODB and others, I have to point out that a conventional Infantry Battalion can be trained to do much -- not all -- of what SF can and would do in a COIN fight. Conversely, I do not believe SF can expand without significant loss of quality to do what a slew of those Infantry Battalions can do. I'd also ask while this grand COIN fight is going on, who would be working the missions that SF has that those Infantry Battalions cannot or should not be trained to do...

All that said, there's a valid case for integration of SF Officers and NCOs on the staffs of COIN or ID involved units -- and vice versa...

Randy Brown
04-18-2008, 10:40 PM
After writing/thinking out loud in my last post in this conversation, I began to remember a short text from my Officer's Basic Course. It took me a couple of hours, but I finally came up with the example of E.D. Swinton's The Defence of Duffer's Drift. Seven tactical scenarios with lessons delivered in the form of seven dreams by "LT Backsight Forethought," written after Swinton served in the Second Boer War (1899-1902).

Here it is on the Internet:
http://regimentalrogue.tripod.com/duffersdrift/Duffers_Drift.htm

Has anyone seen anything like this--short on words, big on concepts, and that encourages readers to engage the material in an atypical manner--applied to the COIN context?

SWJED
04-18-2008, 11:55 PM
... I directed the author of the request here. Please keep the ideas coming and again, much appreciated.

ODB
04-19-2008, 03:18 AM
At the risk of drawing ire and fire from you, UBoat, ODB and others, I have to point out that a conventional Infantry Battalion can be trained to do much -- not all -- of what SF can and would do in a COIN fight. Conversely, I do not believe SF can expand without significant loss of quality to do what a slew of those Infantry Battalions can do. I'd also ask while this grand COIN fight is going on, who would be working the missions that SF has that those Infantry Battalions cannot or should not be trained to do...

Actually no fire from me, well not much anyways.;) I was the above guys for 14 years before I came SF (I know late transition). Which to this point is a good thing. (If you wanna no more PM me Ken) Yes many of the infantry battalions can do a lot of what we do. Big difference is the assets available. As you mentioned those specific things we legally can do that they can't. Welcome to loss in quality or should I say maturity and experience? But I'm sure that has been said many times over throughout the years.


Is that not a function of the facts that COIN IS the Operational level when and where implemented and, far more importantly and less arguably -- the fact that we doctrinally, educationally and training wise virtually ignored COIN and ID for almost 30 years?

Did not that neglect extend at least in part to SF who looked at, er, uh, other missions, while admittedly keeping a finger or two in the COIN / ID water?

100% on point here. As I've stated earlier if we stayed in our respective lanes a lot of things would be meshing better.


All that said, there's a valid case for integration of SF Officers and NCOs on the staffs of COIN or ID involved units -- and vice versa...

Well said would like to add one thing to this. This integration or "cross pollination" needs to start in professional development and advance course levels as well. The learning process needs to start here, additionally I believe this would help SF and conventional forces understanding of each others capabilities and METL. What's your thoughts out there on this?

Lastly, Ken I would love to pick your brain over a bottle of Kentucky bourbon sometime....:D

Maximus
04-19-2008, 03:31 AM
After writing/thinking out loud in my last post in this conversation, I began to remember a short text from my Officer's Basic Course. It took me a couple of hours, but I finally came up with the example of E.D. Swinton's The Defence of Duffer's Drift. Seven tactical scenarios with lessons delivered in the form of seven dreams by "LT Backsight Forethought," written after Swinton served in the Second Boer War (1899-1902).

Here it is on the Internet:
http://regimentalrogue.tripod.com/duffersdrift/Duffers_Drift.htm

Has anyone seen anything like this--short on words, big on concepts, and that encourages readers to engage the material in an atypical manner--applied to the COIN context?


Not sure if you have CAC access. If yes, The Defense of Jisr al Doreaa located here: https://combinedarmscenter.army.mil/SO/COIN/Documents/Defense_of_Jisr_Al_Doreaa.pdf is exactly what you've requested. In my opinion, a brilliant piece of work that serves as a great learning tool for tactical level leaders in wars of insurgency.

Semper Fi,
Scott

Randy Brown
04-19-2008, 03:33 PM
Not sure if you have CAC access. If yes, The Defense of Jisr al Doreaa located here: https://combinedarmscenter.army.mil/SO/COIN/Documents/Defense_of_Jisr_Al_Doreaa.pdf is exactly what you've requested. In my opinion, a brilliant piece of work that serves as a great learning tool for tactical level leaders in wars of insurgency.

Semper Fi,
Scott

Steel on target, thanks! I look forward to passing this reference to users throughout my organization.

And, while I'm still trying to figure out the SWJ interface--where's the button to electronically send you a virtual beer?

Bill Moore
04-19-2008, 06:23 PM
Ken,

A lot of us have been having frank discussions about conventional and SF (not SOF, but SF) roles in COIN. Others are simply talking past one another reinforcing the party line, which is less than helpful.

Since we both have more years in SF than most CPTs have on this planet (although during different eras) it worth discussing the education and training that separates us from conventional forces.

First, we have a selection process that weeds out the weak and undesirable and those who really don't want to be in our organization. Quite simply we have the finest construction material available to form a great organization. Many of these fine Soldiers come from the conventional ranks, but the difference is we weed out the weak links.

Then we put them through a qualification course second to done that last well over a year where they are educated and trained on their MOS technical skills, tactical skills, common combat skills, language, culture, and unconventional warfare is sprinkled throughout the course (this is key, because we engrain a different mindset in our Soldiers). The conventional army can't, nor should they even try to replicate that.

Then the new green beret is assigned to ODA where he gains operational experience and receives advanced training (both individual and team) for whatever mission set(s) his detachment has under the mentorship of a very experienced Team Sgt and Warrant Officer. Most of our Soldiers, not all, are career Soldiers, so this process is a life long training/education experience. The Marines nor the Army will never replicate it, but they'll spend a lot of money trying.


there was a constant tension within SF and at the Center between proponents of emphasis on DA vs. UW vs. ID. My belief is that SOCOM has exacerbated those tensions. If that is true, then it is a potentially disruptive effect your recommendation confronts.

That conflict continues, and while it is frustrating when we swing too heavy to one side or the other, the reality is they are complementary. Experienced SF operators can either work through, by and with other nations forces as trainers, or they can combat advise them as they are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan. If they did not have the warrior skills engrained in them through DA training, then they would be hard pressed to be viable combat advisors (look at the difference between an ad hoc MiTT and an ODA). Our men don't join SF to be in the peace corps, where they talk to little old ladies in their native tongues about the price of tomatoes. If they couldn't be warriors, they would leave the force. We signed up to be warriors, diplomats and teachers.

Coventional forces, neither Army nor Marines, or task organized or trained to do this, nor they come close to having the depth of experience to lead these operations. My point about having SF lead irregular warfare missions, doesn't mean they have to deploy a large headquarters forward, not with the C4I we have now, but to provide operational direction/guidance. BCTs will still C2 themselves, but the strategy they support will come from gray beard SF types in some type of headquarters that is joint and interagency in CONUS (with a forward element) that is uniquely organized and trained to C2 irregular warfare missions.

Conventional forces are capable of doing much of what we do, but at a cost. If they're serious they'll have to rape their units of their best Offices and NCOs, which will have an undesired second order effect. Seems to be we have managed to overly complicate things, when we have side lined the force that is uniquely trained for this and that our tax payers have paid for to a key supporting role.

Ken White
04-19-2008, 07:21 PM
Angels fear to tread...


Ken,

A lot of us have been having frank discussions about conventional and SF (not SOF, but SF) roles in COIN. Others are simply talking past one another reinforcing the party line, which is less than helpful.True, people will get parochial. We all do to one degree or another even though it's generally unhelpful to our own position. The key is to catch ones self and interject reality, I think.

Thoughts on the nest few paragraphs of yours follow pretty much in order. True on the selection process. The process gets rid of a lot of weak links but it will never get rid of all of them and I'd caution that the law of supply and demand does seem to get satisfied. Having wandered into the fold before there was a Training Group and having watched it form and do its thing for a while, I agree with you on the depth of training -- I would point out, however, that I'm not advocating nor do I see any need for conventional units involved in COIN (or multi spectrum capable units) to even try to replicate that training. They just need to adapt a small part of it that is pertinent. That was done with conventional units destined to deploy to Viet Nam in the early days and the first few units over there did learn and did perform well (in spite of MACV). COIN is not rocket science; I agree with Gian -- it isn't even the graduate level of war; it's merely more precise management of effects than is required in conventional combat (Yeah, I know that's simplistic but you get my point -- even if many will miss it. :wry:).

The Marines and the Army are not, I do not think, trying to replicate SF training -- they are trying to adapt those SF techniques that are pertinent and achievable in an Infantry Battalion construct to their purposes. It is my view that should be encouraged, not discouraged. Imitation is the most sincere form of flattery and all that -- plus, the object is to get the job done regardless of who gets credit I always thought...

I still have an aversion to the word Warrior applied to what should be competent, trained and self disciplined Soldiers but I don't disagree with your point. That doesn't address the fact that the dichotomy between DA / UW / ID is in high places -- I know the Teams can cope -- and that affects missions and employment (and perhaps aids in a perception of sidelining...).
Coventional forces, neither Army nor Marines, or task organized or trained to do this, nor they come close to having the depth of experience to lead these operations...I agree but would suggest that adequate training to do an acceptable job -- I'll take a 75% solution in a second; perfection is a myth -- is possible and much is already being done in that vein; the issue is whether to embed it in the system or not. Further, I'm not sure I agree that the depth of experience is now lacking (again, in adequate as opposed to bountiful amounts) -- admitting that it probably was a year or more ago. Time will tell on that score, I think.
My point about having SF lead irregular warfare missions, doesn't mean they have to deploy a large headquarters forward, not with the C4I we have now, but to provide operational direction/guidance. BCTs will still C2 themselves, but the strategy they support will come from gray beard SF types in some type of headquarters that is joint and interagency in CONUS (with a forward element) that is uniquely organized and trained to C2 irregular warfare missions.I totally agree with that, thus my suggestion that both sides -- and they are opposing sides in the perennial battle for $$$ and spaces, most unfortunately and needlessly -- should swap folks on their staffs.


Conventional forces are capable of doing much of what we do, but at a cost. If they're serious they'll have to rape their units of their best Offices and NCOs, which will have an undesired second order effect. Seems to be we have managed to overly complicate things, when we have side lined the force that is uniquely trained for this and that our tax payers have paid for to a key supporting role.Raping units of best Officers and NCO to create special purpose units is absolutely the wrong thing to do. The entire unit just needs a little additional training to more effectively operate in the COIN mode. Again, we aren't talking rocket science here. The BCTs are modular by design so that CA, PsyOps, MI -- what have you -- can be tacked on easily, If we improve initial entry training, officer and enlisted (and we REALLY need to do that to inculcate a thorough knowledge of the basics) then a little added unit training will create a reasonably competent COIN force of adequate size (note that point...) to reliably cover an AOR. You guys are doing great stuff where you are; the 'Stan is different and Iraq is different yet. Again, I'm afraid raw numbers are going to impact the goal of letting SF do it all in some places at some times; METT-TC and such...

As to sidelining, I'm certainly not suggesting that or anything close to it. Nor do I think anyone in power is trying to do that. I would suggest that in some cases and some theaters over emphasis on DA has effectively sidelined some -- not all -- SF elements...

ODB
04-19-2008, 08:14 PM
With the current situation in Iraq wouldn't the ideal scenario be along the lines of this: (In AOs where both forces are represented)

1. SF focus would be FID and intel collection (HUMIT)
2. Conventional forces would be conducting their operations based off the aboves intel.
3. In many cases operations would be combined (SF, HN, and Conventional)

Don't get me wrong in some places this is how things are happening, when the BCT and SF are coordinating their efforts and have a good working relationship and understanding of each others capabilities.

Seems to me with BCT commanders owning the ground and as much as it pains me to say this SF is a supporting force (force multiplier), the understanding by conventional commanders of eachs role would in effect make it a smoother operation. This is started in the education of both sides. Unfortunately over recent years many on both sides have blurred these lines and responsibilities. Understanding the current force structure and size on both sides many BCT elements are on their own in parts throughout the country.

I have found it interesting in conventional forces unwillingness to train with SF and SFs unwillingness as well. On installations where both are stationed we should be taking advantage of each other. Simple think an ODA using an infantry battalion as its indig force for a few weeks of training. The experiences both would gain. Additionally in a perfect world many of these units that are stationed together would be deployed in the same AO simultaneously. The working relationship and capabilities would be a sight to see IMO.

IMHO there is no reason we cannot at least have OPD/NCOPD taking place between the forces

Feel free to let me have it....:o

Ken White
04-19-2008, 11:11 PM
With the current situation in Iraq wouldn't the ideal scenario be along the lines of this: (In AOs where both forces are represented)

1. SF focus would be FID and intel collection (HUMIT)
2. Conventional forces would be conducting their operations based off the aboves intel.
3. In many cases operations would be combined (SF, HN, and Conventional)And I hear that is also being done very successfully in Afghanistan and that the combined ops have been particularly effective.
Seems to me with BCT commanders owning the ground and as much as it pains me to say this SF is a supporting force (force multiplier), the understanding by conventional commanders of eachs role would in effect make it a smoother operation. This is started in the education of both sides...As is always true, personalities intrude. Ideally, that's what would happen but all it takes is a jerk on one side to mess it up.
... Unfortunately over recent years many on both sides have blurred these lines and responsibilities. Understanding the current force structure and size on both sides many BCT elements are on their own in parts throughout the country. You've hit on the key parameter -- the size and scope of the effort. In an area with good SF potential and a functioning host nation forces, life is great and no US conventional forces are required -- or desired.

However, if the size of the country or effort required is beyond the capability of a pure SF operation, then other troops are required. If there is an adequate host nation force, then no US MPF are needed -- and that would be ideal on a number of counts. Lacking a fully functional military force in that nation and enough SF to do the job totally, what alternative is there? I'm sure open to suggestions...
I have found it interesting in conventional forces unwillingness to train with SF and SFs unwillingness as well. On installations where both are stationed we should be taking advantage of each other. Simple think an ODA using an infantry battalion as its indig force for a few weeks of training. The experiences both would gain. Additionally in a perfect world many of these units that are stationed together would be deployed in the same AO simultaneously. The working relationship and capabilities would be a sight to see IMO.True. IMO, it goes in cycles. In the early 60s it was fairly common because all you had to do to get money for anything was say 'counterinsurgency' so both SF and conventional guys took advantage of that.

Before SOCOM some joint training happened at Bragg, not as often and as well as it should but a bit. After SOCOM and the added and moved Groups, I suspect it got to be very rare. Shame, it is more needed now than ever
IMHO there is no reason we cannot at least have OPD/NCOPD taking place between the forces.True, easy to do -- all it takes is the will. That's a great idea!

Surferbeetle
04-19-2008, 11:20 PM
Bill, Ken, and ODB,

Some of the things that stand out in your posts include quantity vs. quality, integration, and unity of command.

As phase IV of the war has dragged on we have moved from Divisions and Groups doing their own thing in their own AO to a tighter unity of command with a deeper focus upon synchronized COIN ops. This is a good thing and was overdue. Integration of DOS, USAID, and others into COIN & DOD or vice versa is still a work in progress although the cooperation between two of the lead gentlemen (DOD & DOS) on the ground is the best that I have seen to date. This does not mean however that we have reached a 'go' status on interagency, or ac/rc/arng/usn/usaf/sf/sof cooperation. If we transplanted this low level of cooperation that we currently see into a CAT or ODA it would not fly, and indeed there would be some behind the dumpster counseling until all concerned understood how things were going to work.

Some of the reasons that I see for the bickering is that all concerned have spent much time studying their piece of the elephant and are convinced that in a life-threatening situation their knowledge of their piece of the elephant will keep them and theirs alive. Reflecting upon our return upon investment during '03-'06 brings this attitude into question.

Our successes in this war are due to the fact that all of the team members are finally getting together on the field (at the same time) and having to work together to describe the elephant. This needs to continue and we can use basic team psychology to improve things. Too steal from my one of friends in my solt class 'ability comes before rank and nobody wants to be the weak link in the chain'.

Like it or lump it, there are more regular ac folks than irregular rc/arng/sf/sof/dos/usaid/oga folks. So for me, bottom line is we take what we got, everybody gets on the same page, everbody gets some f-ing unity of command going, and most importantly we win this sob. I for one do not want to have my kids downrange trying to fix what we have started.

My 0.02c,

Steve

Ken White
04-19-2008, 11:22 PM
Well said......

mmx1
04-20-2008, 06:04 AM
After writing/thinking out loud in my last post in this conversation, I began to remember a short text from my Officer's Basic Course. It took me a couple of hours, but I finally came up with the example of E.D. Swinton's The Defence of Duffer's Drift. Seven tactical scenarios with lessons delivered in the form of seven dreams by "LT Backsight Forethought," written after Swinton served in the Second Boer War (1899-1902).

Here it is on the Internet:
http://regimentalrogue.tripod.com/duffersdrift/Duffers_Drift.htm

Has anyone seen anything like this--short on words, big on concepts, and that encourages readers to engage the material in an atypical manner--applied to the COIN context?

The idea was readapted as "the defense of hill 781" in 1988 for mechanized warfare, a COIN version would be an ideal soldier's primer.

Edit: Ah, nvm, I see Maximus has posted a relevant primer. Off to fetch a copy Monday morning.

Cavguy
04-20-2008, 06:11 AM
Not sure if you have CAC access. If yes, The Defense of Jisr al Doreaa located here: https://combinedarmscenter.army.mil/SO/COIN/Documents/Defense_of_Jisr_Al_Doreaa.pdf is exactly what you've requested. In my opinion, a brilliant piece of work that serves as a great learning tool for tactical level leaders in wars of insurgency.

Semper Fi,
Scott

It's also on the AKO Fileshare (in addition to the SharePoint your linked) of COIN.ARMY.MIL (http://coin.army.mil), and on Company Command. Was written by a former CO now an O/C at NTC.

Vic Bout
04-21-2008, 02:29 PM
I have found it interesting in conventional forces unwillingness to train with SF and SFs unwillingness as well. On installations where both are stationed we should be taking advantage of each other. Simple think an ODA using an infantry battalion as its indig force for a few weeks of training. The experiences both would gain. Additionally in a perfect world many of these units that are stationed together would be deployed in the same AO simultaneously. The working relationship and capabilities would be a sight to see IMO.


Somebody, somewhere is trying to make the SF/CF integration/interoperability piece work. Case in point: prior to my last IZ deployment my ODA went to JRTC (mid-2006). Before we got there we were swamped with SOF/Conventional integration/interoperability checklists, how-to's, and common operational picture stuff. Upon arriving Ft Polk we were linked with a conventional Cav unit and told that they would be deploying to and owning the same battlespace for our deployment. In short, somebody got it right...train with the guys you're going to fight next to. We had an outstanding JRTC rotation....most of the integration/interoperability stuff was sensible, relative and workable.

Of course, the good idea fairy fell off the wagon (again) and the happily ever after never happended. The Cav unit was re-directed to another location in-country and we ended up working with a BN of the 82nd instead. Luckily, they had mature leadership and a cross-pollenated staff (former SOF experience) that enabled us to build a lasting rapport that supported a successful combat rotation.

There are some SF/CF horror stories to come out of OIF/OEF and I actually lived through a couple of them. And, as in all cases, it comes down to leadership. Pedantic, bull-headed, SOF-hating conventional 0-6's almost always trump immature and inexperienced ODA commanders.

But then I'm just running off at the keyboard...

Ken White
04-21-2008, 04:07 PM
... And, as in all cases, it comes down to leadership. Pedantic, bull-headed, SOF-hating conventional 0-6's almost always trump immature and inexperienced ODA commanders.that hardheaded big Army hating Double Decade guys can push immature and inexperienced ODA commanders to places they probably shouldn't go.

There's plenty of fault on both sides. That said, I was glad to read the first part of your comment; good to know it can and is being done right.

Randy Brown
07-07-2008, 02:56 PM
I realize this might be a "dead thread," but, given our earlier conversation here regarding "Defence of Duffer's Drift," I thought I might call attention to the recent and similarly formatted CALL Pub 08-39, "Nightmare on Wazir Street." Check it out at: call.army.mil (http://call.army.mil).

Steve Blair
07-07-2008, 07:25 PM
This pub is discussed in this thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5563). Check it out if you're interested.