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Jedburgh
02-18-2006, 03:42 PM
Here are a couple of articles discussing migration of IED TTPs from the Middle East to South Asia:

UPI, 15 Feb: Thai Militants Learn From Iraq Insurgency (http://minstrelboy.blogspot.com/2006/02/thai-militants-learn-from-iraq.html)

Islamic separatists in violence-wracked southern Thailand have begun to employ weapons and tactics that appear to be imported from the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to analysts and experts.

One technique in particular, the use of a cement casing around a homemade bomb which both disguises it to look like a roadside marker and increases its lethality by creating razor sharp shards of concrete shrapnel, seems to have been imported directly from Iraq.

"That comes straight from Iraq -- or at least from the same training manuals they're using in Iraq," said Zachary Abuza, author of "Crucible of Terror" -- widely considered the definitive study of Islamic extremism in Southeast Asia. "Certainly, those kinds of tactics were never used in Thailand before."

Over the past year, the separatists have undergone "a remarkable transformation. It's unique ... I've never seen anything like it before in an insurgency," said defense analyst Jeff Moore who has written about the issue for Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre.

Moore told United Press International that during 2004 there were a half dozen raids and ambushes against Thai security forces and other targets, but in 2005, there were nearly 90. "Almost overnight they went from a gang of saboteurs and assassins to a small army. A guerilla army, but an army nonetheless," he said.

During the same time frame, Thai security forces also noted "an increasing sophistication in the construction and use" of improvised explosive devices by the insurgents, Panitan Wattanayagorn told UPI

Commentary from the Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Focus (http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?search=1&articleid=2369876):

Alternate Futures for Thailand's Insurgency

The Thai insurgency has formally entered its third straight year. Between January 2004 and January 2006, more than 1,200 people were killed. In January 2004, violent incidents averaged 30 per month; by December 2004, violent incidents averaged 120 per month. By June 2005, bombings averaged more than one per day. More than 300 were killed and more than 300 wounded in the six months following the introduction of the Emergency Decree in July 2005 (The Bangkok Post, October 24, 2005). In 2006 alone, 19 people have been killed, seven in one day—five of whom were policemen. The presence of over 40,000 security forces has done little to stop the insurgency.

While the majority of victims are killed in drive by shootings and assassinations, the technical capacity of the bombs has increased dramatically. Thai Muslim bomb-makers now assemble 10kg bombs composed of a variety of components, including powergel, TNT, potassium chlorate, and ammonium nitrate. The detonators have become sophisticated to the point that the government had to block all un-registered pre-paid cell phones in the three southernmost provinces. Authorities also have evidence that the militants are now experimenting with infrared devices as detonators, although they have not consistently deployed these bombs (The Nation, November 29, 2005). The Thai militants are also learning techniques from abroad. According to a senior intelligence official, "They have stolen cement kilometer road markers to make bombs, for which we have seen instructions posted on some web sites in the Middle East" (Reuters, October 6, 2005).

...and here's some additional background on the insurgency:

There is a decent discussion of the issue on the Counterterrorism Blog of 10 Jan 06 (http://counterterror.typepad.com/the_counterterrorism_blog/2006/01/the_thai_insurg.html#more).

ICG, May 05: Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_east_asia/098_southern_thailand_insurgency_not_jihad.pdf)

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Dec 04:
Trouble in Thailand's Muslim South: Separatism, Not Global Terrorism (http://www.apcss.org/Publications/APSSS/TroubleinThailandsMuslimSouth.pdf#search=%22troubl e%20in%20thailand's%20muslim%20south%22)

Edit: When I reviewed this post after posting the follow-up below, I discovered that 3 out of 5 links no longer led to the intended article. All of'em are fixed, although the UPI article was no longer available through the original source, thanks to a blogger it is still on-line in its entirety.

Jedburgh
09-10-2006, 04:24 PM
Jamestown Foundation, 8 Sep 06: A Breakdown of Southern Thailand's Insurgent Groups (http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370121)

Thailand has faced an Islamist secessionist movement since 2001-2002 that has led to the deaths of more than 1,500 people. There have been nearly 400 successful bombings, many more attempted bombings and more than 400 arson attacks. Militants have assassinated more than 600 people. Ten of the 33 districts in the deep south are "plagued by violence" according to the Thai Ministry of the Interior, and the number is increasing. Yet, little is actually known about the insurgents' structure and capacity. To date, there has not been a single credible claim of responsibility, nor have the insurgents publicly stated their goals or political platform. Their unwillingness to disclose any details has worked to their advantage and left Thai intelligence in a quandary. There are a number of insurgent groups working together, and unlike the insurgency in the 1960s to the early-1990s, when groups were sharply divided over their goals and ideology and proved absolutely incapable of working together, today's organizations share a common Islamist agenda and are demonstrating unprecedented coordination and cooperation. No organization is trying to discredit another to build up its own power base...

The Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO)

Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi

Gerakan Mujahideen Islami Pattani (GMIP)

The Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK)

New PULO

Jemaah Salafi

...The preceding groups are responsible for the continuing insurgency in southern Thailand. The past few months have seen repeated coordinated bombing campaigns by these insurgents, such as an operation in June that involved more than 70 bombs, an operation on August 1 and the most recent operation on August 31 that targeted at least 20 commercial banks in Yala province. Coordination between the groups will continue to evolve as they pursue their shared Islamist agenda.
(group backgrounds at the link)

SWJED
09-24-2006, 10:37 PM
25 September London Times / The Australian - Thais Change Tack on Islamists (http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,20470339-2703,00.html) by Michael Sheridan.


The Royal Thai Army will adopt new tactics against a militant Islamic uprising, following the coup that sent Thaksin Shinawatra, the ousted prime minister, into exile in London last week.

According to sources briefed by the army high command, Mr Thaksin's bungled response to the insurgency in southern Thailand, which has claimed 1700 lives in two years, was a critical factor in the generals' decision to get rid of him.

Military intelligence officers intend to negotiate with separatists and to use psychological warfare to isolate the most violent extremists, in contrast to Mr Thaksin's heavy-handed methods and harsh rhetoric...

Bill Moore
12-31-2006, 04:59 PM
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6221177.stm

"A series of small explosions has left two people dead and at least 20 injured in the Thai capital, Bangkok.
At least six blasts at widely-scattered places occurred within an hour or so as streets were filling up with people ahead of New Year's Eve celebrations.

Our Bangkok correspondent says many Thais suspect the bombs were the work of opponents of the current military government, which forced Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra from office in September."

I hope the assessment by some of the locals that this is the work of opponents to the current government is correct. If it is related to the insurgency in Southern Thailand it would be a significant escalation and expansion of the conflict.

SWJED
12-31-2006, 05:07 PM
... the post that is, not the bombings. I was just reading this post (http://counterterrorismblog.org/2006/12/new_years_eve_bombs_shake_up_b.php) at the Counterterrorism blog by Zachary Abuza:


...The low profile targets at first led me and other analysts that I spoke with to discount the involvement of Muslim militants from the deep south. While I have long argued that they have never taken the option of targeting Bangkok off the table, nor are they ideologically against it, at the time they really don’t need to change their strategy. At this point the insurgents are winning (they certainly are not losing). What the attack seemed to reflect was ongoing elite strife over the 19 September coup. There have been several bombings in Bangkok in the past few years, but all have been linked to elite conflicts, not the insurgency. The higher profile bombing of the Siam Paragon – which this author was in shopping with his children a few hours before the blast – might mean something altogether. Then again, it could be the police or other forces disgruntled with the military’s takeover and simply be an attempt to discredit and destabilize the regime. The police are wildly unhappy about the reforms that the military is going to soon force on the police. Yet one of the bombs was placed at a small police kiosk wounding several police officers.

Officials from former Prime Minister Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai party have denied any involvement in the blasts. But unnamed sources from the Council on National Security told The Nation newspaper that the CNS was considering seizing Thaksin’s assets so that he could no longer destabilize the country.

The southern insurgents clearly have the technical capacity to execute large-scale bombings in Bangkok. They detonate on a daily basis far more powerful bombs than what went off in Bangkok. Yet, to carry out so many bombings would require an infrastructure in Bangkok that few would consider them to have, The bombs were also not like the ones usually employed by southern insurgents, in terms of composition or detonation device...

Bill Moore
12-31-2006, 05:31 PM
SWJED you beat me to it, I just got off the CT Blog. The smoke hasn't cleared yet, so everything falls in the category of speculation, but as this investigation unfolds it definitely needs to be followed. If the police did this it would explain the infrastructure, but Thai police (although they can be rough) aren't in the habit of killing incident Thai civilians. If they did escalate their rift with the Army to this extent, then we have serious security concerns in the Kingdom. If it was the separatists from the South, then it was obviously a warning shot in hopes of getting concessions, or provoking the Thai government into over reacting so they can garner more political support. Numerous third options also exist, but Zachary Abuza is a noted expert on the region, I look forward to his next post and analysis.

Jedburgh
02-01-2007, 11:16 PM
The Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor, 1 Feb 07:

2007 Marks the Key Year in Thailand's Southern Insurgency (http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370241)

January 4, 2007 marked the third anniversary of the outbreak of the current phase of Thailand's insurgency in the southern provinces of Narathiwat, Yala and Pattani. To date, the insurgency has claimed more than 1,900 lives. Many hoped that by this point the adoption of a more conciliatory tone by the government of Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont, which was installed after the army-led coup of September 19, 2006, and changes in government policy would have stemmed the violence. In fact, the opposite has occurred, with assassinations, bombings and arson attacks dramatically increasing post-coup. In Narathiwat, during the weekend of January 13-14, for instance, two bombs wrecked a railway line, a soldier was killed and five others seriously injured in a roadside IED attack and a government official and ice cream vendor were gunned down. In Pattani, a police officer was shot and killed. In Yala, the heart of the insurgency, a fireman and another man were shot dead in separate incidents, while insurgents beheaded a Thai Buddhist and his wife, leaving a note which read: "As long as you don't leave our country Pattani, we will kill all of you crazy Buddhists"...

SWJED
02-20-2007, 08:04 PM
The Jihad in Indochina (http://fallbackbelmont.blogspot.com/2007/02/jihad-in-indochina.html) - The Belmont Club.


A little background research on the insurgency in Thailand's south turned up the little-known fact that it is Southeast Asia's deadliest insurgency. About 1,200 people have been killed in connection with it in the last decade but fully one thousand of those have been since 2004. Like most insurgencies, it has its roots in history; in disputes between the Kingdom of Siam and its Malay neighbor states to the south. It was exacerbated by colonial politics. Even World War 2 played a role when the Muslim Malays of the south requested British help against Bangkok, which had allied itself with imperial Japan.

But things got stirred up again under the impetus of the worldwide Jihadi resurgence in conjunction with an apparent Thai mismanagement of the insurgency. Strongarm tactics were substituted for intelligence gathering, possibly because police preoccupation with corruption undermined any efficiency. In the meantime, a new jihadi cadre began forming in the madrasas of Pakistan. Media reports following up the involvement of Britons of Pakistani origin in the London bombings uncovered the fact that nearly a thousand Muslim of Thai nationality (Patani) were studying in madrasas in Pakistan...

Much more at the link...

Jedburgh
03-17-2007, 12:53 AM
ICG, 15 Mar 07: Southern Thailand: The Impact of the Coup (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_east_asia/129_southern_thailand___the_impact_of_the_coup_web .pdf)

The September 2006 coup in Thailand, despite its damage to democratic development, opened the way for improved management of the conflict in the Muslim South. Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont’s interim government has overhauled some of its predecessor’s worst policies and signalled willingness to address longstanding grievances. But verbal commitments in Bangkok have been difficult to translate into changes on the ground, and relations between security forces and local communities continue to be strained while violence mounts. Thais outside the South have exerted pressure for a return to heavy-handed crackdowns on suspected militants. The government must respond to the escalating attacks, but with care – widespread arbitrary arrests and civilian casualties would only increase support for insurgents....

Bill Moore
03-17-2007, 03:32 PM
The Thai Insurgent’s primary tactical line of operation at this time is terrorism, and since the insurgents are Muslim many quickly want to categorize them as part of the Global Jihad Movement. While there are definitely indications that transnational terrorists are taking an interest in the conflict, it is still by and large a regional insurgency, and the strategy of counterinsurgent should focus on keeping it that way by focusing on a political solution that addresses the specific grievances of the insurgents (destroy their battle cry by taking their cause away). Thailand its allies must avoid rhetoric stating that facilitates pushing the insurgents into the Al Qaeda Network camp, because that type of rhetoric can be turned into propaganda by the transnationals that the West is expanding its war on Islam into SE Asia, which will give the insurgents common cause with the Al Qaeda Network. We already see this rhetoric coming from the AQN, but it isn’t having the effect they desire and it won’t if Thailand finds the right strategy. This is a situation that can become very serious if the counterinsurgent missteps.

Merv Benson
03-17-2007, 04:31 PM
Bill, I am not sure what their objectives are.

They have killed a lot of school teachers and Buddhist. They may have an agenda beyond hatred for education and a desire of Muslim apartheid, but I have not seen them articulate it. I have seen indications that many are based across the border in Malaysia. I have a vague recollection that they may have had ties to Hambali before he was captured which would put them pretty much in the al Qaeda camp.

I don't really see the situation as improved since the coup. If anything their genocide against Buddhist seems worse. Since my daughter and her family are in Bangkok, I have tried to follow the news of events there pretty closely. If someone in the group has evidence that the situation there has improved, that would certainly be welcomed.

Bill Moore
03-18-2007, 01:03 AM
Merv,

I haven't seen much on the unclassified side on Hambali's role in Thailand, other than he was allegedly planning attacks against several Thai Hotels, and maybe the APEC summit. Hambali is as evil and perhaps as good (tactically) as they come. His organization was largely responsible for a number of church bombings in Indonesia, which led to seriously bloody strife between Christians and Muslims. His goal is to create a greater pan-Islamic State that includes most of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Southern Philippines and Southern Thailand, and since he spent a fair amount of time in Malaysia isn't too far of reach to assume he "could" have contacted the insurgents in S. Thailand.

The million dollar question is do the insurgents want anything to do with the transnational movement? Most think they just want to liberate their region from Thailand, but then there rumors of rifts within the insurgent leadership, and if true does that mean there is a more radical faction vying for power?

Unfortunately the situation in Southern Thailand remains in a downward spiral, so your concern is not misplaced. For the most part (if not entirely) the insurgents have focused their attacks in the Southern Provinces. They are getting more effective (but still not anywhere near what I would call good yet). I think they're learning new TTP over the internet, because they still seem to be pretty clumsy compared to insurgents elsewhere who have had hands on training, but if you see a sudden spike in competence, then we can assume there is a reason for it, and I would suspect a training camp where foreigners are providing expert knowledge first hand.

The military wanted to implement a new strategy (more along the lines of a traditional COIN approach, where the focus is a political settlement), but I haven't seen many signs of it in the media yet. This situation deserves to be watched, and I only hope the Thai government reverses the current trends noted.

Jedburgh
03-18-2007, 01:52 AM
They have killed a lot of school teachers and Buddhist. They may have an agenda beyond hatred for education and a desire of Muslim apartheid, but I have not seen them articulate it.

They do not have a "hatred for education" per se. The Thai education system is highly centralized, and as an ethno-religious separatist insurgency (Malay Muslims), they perceive state education as a Thai Buddhist attempt to destroy their cultural and linguistic identity through their children. Targeting of schoolteachers for this specific reason has been common in many ethnic-based separatist insurgencies, i.e. the PKK's campaign in Turkey (before the capture of Ocalan) stands out in this respect.

I have seen indications that many are based across the border in Malaysia

Funny, this is the second time tonight I'm referring to article in the 17 Feb 07 issue of The Economist:

Thailand and Malaysia: In Need of Help to Douse the Flames (http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8706170&logout=Y)

...the treatment of Thai Muslims is a sensitive subject in northern Malaysia, where the country's Islamist opposition is strong. So Mr Badawi will not want to risk providing political ammunition to his opponents.

Co-operation would be a welcome change from the two countries' frequent rows over the Thai south. Mr Thaksin used to accuse Malaysia of sheltering the militants. He was furious when, in 2005, it refused to send back around 130 Thai Muslims who had fled across the border, claiming their lives were in danger.

Since the Thai coup, there have been tensions over a security barrier that the Thai generals want to erect along the border. The Malaysians were miffed at General Surayud's claim that funds were being raised for the insurgency by extorting money from restaurants selling Thai tom yum kung soup in Malaysia....

I have a vague recollection that they may have had ties to Hambali before he was captured which would put them pretty much in the al Qaeda camp.

I highly recommend a read of the May 05 ICG report linked in the first post on the thread (Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_east_asia/098_southern_thailand_insurgency_not_jihad.pdf)), it provides an excellent overview of the conflict.

Merv Benson
03-20-2007, 04:08 PM
Zachary Abuza (http://counterterrorismblog.org/2007/03/wake_up_call_6_months_after_th.php) has a long informative post on the Thai situation at the Counterterrorism Blog:


...

... While the justification and rationale for the coup is still debated, people across the political spectrum placed considerable hope that the Council on National Security (CNS) and the government that they installed would do a better job than the Thaksin administration in stemming the violence.

Yet, the exact opposite has been true: the daily average rate of killing has more than tripled in the past six months, from 1.6 people a day in 2006 to almost four per day. Over 400 people, roughly 19 percent of the 2,100 people killed since January 2004 have died since the coup. Attacks have become more sophisticated and coordinated. Sadly the junta leaders remain oblivious to the reality on the ground and show precious little resolve in dealing with the insurgency, they remain mired in petty political squabbles in Bangkok and blind to the reports from their field commanders.

Besides the dramatic escalation in the number of people killed, there have been six discernable trends since the coup.

...

Second, the attacks have been far more provocative, such as the attack on the minivan. The rate of beheadings has increased: 10 percent of all the beheadings have occurred in 2007, alone. In this year alone, there have already been three attacks on members of royal entourages. While insurgents have stepped up their attacks on police and soldiers, civilians, monks, women (including pregnant women), and children have been killed with appalling frequency. A week ago, insurgents opened fire on a class of 5th graders, leaving one 11-year old in a coma. The following day two female students were gunned down on their way to class. Monks have been targeted as well. These provocative attacks are meant to illicit heavy-handed government responses to further alienate the security forces from the broader Muslim community. While insuurgents have not attacked soft targets out of area, it is on the table. teams were caught in Bangkok in November 2005 and in Phuket in September 2006. It is on the table, yet, unlikely to be emplyed now as their tactics are working: they're winning.

Third, teachers and schools, those vulnerable agents of secularization and assimilation, continue to be prime targets of the insurgents. This has both eroded the social fabric of the region, while at the same time, forced the Muslim population to send their children to the private Islamic schools favored by the insurgents. Insurgents have killed Muslim teachers at government-supported Islamic schools with a mixed curriculum. On 17 March, insurgents struck an Islamic school in Songkhla, killing three boys between 12-14. While they were sending a message to the Muslim community to not send their children to government-supported schools, they were also hoping that many in the community would blame the government or Buddhist vigilantes for the attacks. Which leads to the fourth trend, more sectarian violence and ethnic cleansing. Already, 15 percent of the Buddhist community has fled the region. There have been stepped up threats and more leaflets left by insurgents to intimidate the local Buddhist population to leave.

...

While no group has taken credit for any attack, nor publicly stated their demands, this is not a bunch of nihilistic youths. This is a highly organized, though cellular, movement, with clear command and control. The Barisan Revolusi Nasional Coordinasi and the Gerakan Mujihidin Islamiyah Pattani are able to execute coordinated attacks, near simultaneously, across four provinces on a regular basis. Thai Muslim insurgents have never been more disciplined and united.

Their ideology has also never been so Islamist. The insurgents today are fundamentally different than previous generations. In addition to the broadened targeting of women, children, monks and the de facto ethnic cleansing that has transpired, the Islamist agenda is manifest in other ways. They are not out to win hearts and minds: they are thuggish, brutal, and imposing their values on the community. Over 50 percent of their victims have been fellow Muslims....(Emphasis added.)

...

There is much more. The high number of attacks on fellow Muslims may have been the biggest surprise in this post, but it is consistent with the Taliban nature of the groups and their search for "purification" of Islam along with the religious bigotry toward people of other religions. Abuza is a political science professor at Simmons College in Boston where he teaches Southeast Asian politics.

Bill Moore
03-20-2007, 08:35 PM
Terrorizing one's own is a sound insurgent tactic. The goal is to create a climate of fear and to discredit the State, and eventually create a situation where the population comes to the realization that only the insurgents can protect them, so they feel compelled to opt in with the insurgents.

The counterinsurgent could counter this if he can and will provide adequate levels of protection for the population. Obviously the insurgent isn't trying to win hearts, but rather win control over the population, and coercion works. The Thai government needs to act quickly and stop taking half steps.

I'm only speculating, but based on the tactics the insurgents are using, I don't think they have a popular base of support.

Jedburgh
03-22-2007, 07:55 PM
HRW, Mar 07: Enforced Disappearances in Thailand’s Southern Border Provinces (http://hrw.org/reports/2007/thailand0307/thailand0307webwcover.pdf)

...Abuses by both the militants and the security forces have fueled a deadly cycle of violence over the past three years. The predominant militant group, the National Revolution Front-Coordinate (Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi, BRN-C), has taken advantage of abuses by the Thai security forces to gather support for their separatist cause. On an almost daily basis, the BRN-C’s youth wing (pemuda) and guerrilla units (Runda Kumpulan Kecil or RKK) have carried out shootings, bomb attacks, arson, beheadings, and machete attacks; statistics show clearly the intensity and lethality of their attacks, as well as evidence of a disturbing trend towards more frequent attacks on civilians and civilian objects. A Human Rights Watch report on militant abuses in southern Thailand is forthcoming.

The present report focuses on the practice of the Thai security forces of “disappearing” persons suspected of being militants, or of supporting them, or of having information on separatist attacks. Under international law an enforced disappearance occurs when a person has been arrested, detained, or abducted by government officials or their agents, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of the person’s liberty or to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person. Enforced disappearances invariably violate a number of fundamental human rights, including the right to life; the prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment; the right to liberty and security of the person; and the right to a fair and public trial. “Disappearances” are particularly pernicious as they also cause untold suffering to family members and friends, who never know whether the person they care about is alive or dead....

SWJED
05-27-2007, 07:46 AM
27 May NY Times - Thai Security Chief Vows a Tough Stand Against Muslim Separatists (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/27/world/asia/27thai.html) by Thomas Fuller.


Frustrated by an inability to pacify a Muslim insurgency and concerned about rising dissent toward their rule, Thailand’s generals have chosen a former commando and self-described assassin as their top security adviser.

The appointment this month of the adviser, Pallop Pinmanee, a retired general notorious for his harsh tactics but admired for his survival instincts, appears to be a signal from the military-backed government that its conciliatory approach toward Muslim insurgents in southern Thailand will change.

And recent statements from General Pallop and other leaders herald a repressive turn toward dealing with political dissent as well...

zenpundit
05-28-2007, 01:37 AM
Pallop's loudly announced appointment should be considered " fair warning" to Maylasia and Indonesia which are tolerating the stringpullers and bagmen of the Thai insurgency to operate unmolested. If it continues, there will be Muslim "businessmen" and "imams" in these countries getting their throats cut. Maybe some of their political friends as well.

Thailand has a long history of bareknuckle paramilitarism and also of keeping outside groups ( Khmer Rouge) sharply circimscribed. It sounds like the generals and the King have run out of patience with their southern neighbors.

Bill Moore
05-28-2007, 03:04 PM
We all understand that insurgency is both a military/security and political problem, and trying to solve the problem with either a military or political solution to the exclusion of the other is bound to fail, so I'm cautiously glad to see that Thailand appointed a warrior that will take the fight to the insurgents, but only if he shapes the fight to facilitate a political solution (as they did when they battled the communist insurgents in Thailand). The Thais basically executed their own Phoenix type program. I think that type of program is a required element in any counterinsurgency. The hardcore elements need to either captured or killed, so they can no longer influence the population.

However, I think a word of caution is in order. The Thai insurgents have divisions within their camp, some want a political settlement, while others want a Jihad. An overly strong arm approach could shift the Muslim population in Southern Thailand to support their radicals. Furthermore, a strong arm approach could internationalize the conflict if the insurgents request assistance from their global jihad brothers. This remains a delicate and very important conflict that will require a well thought out strategy involving a strong (yet mostly covert) military approach and a stronger political approach.

Firestaller
05-29-2007, 11:32 PM
You know that Islamic terrorism is a problem in Thailand when Buddhist monks are calling for war.

Bill Moore
05-30-2007, 01:55 AM
Generally passive and believers in the eight fold path, the Thais, Khmer, and numerous other Buddhists have a warrior culture. The insurgents in S. Thailand are trying to provoke a Buddhist response (I mean local Buddhist citizens, not the Thai government) in order to mobilize more Muslims to join their radical movement out of fear, because they will need protection from the Buddhists. So far they have been unsuccessful with the exception of a few minor retaliatory attacks. This is similar to the strategy that the JI used semi-successfully in Indonesia a few years back. I think it is John Robb that refers to this as primary loyalties, which we’re seeing in Iraq. As long as the State remains viable and adequately provides for the people, nationalism can exist above tribalism. If the State falters, then tribes will become the primary loyalty base. That is why a ying and yang approach is required, if you’re all military action (I’ll make you tap out) you’ll facilitate their argument (their narrative) that the State is against them, and they’ll mobilize more to their side. If you don’t take sufficient military action, and you can’t create a secure environment, people will side with the insurgents unwillingly for protection. There are no easy answers to the problem in S. Thailand, but one of the keys is to keep it from escalating if at all possible. It may be too late, it is sort like a forest fire, once it gets so big it creates it own wind that drives the fire.

tequila
05-30-2007, 08:57 AM
You know that Islamic terrorism is a problem in Thailand when Buddhist monks are calling for war.

Certain politically aligned Buddhist religious orders are some of the most hardline elements on the Sinhalese right wing in Sri Lanka. A Buddhist monk assassinated the country's first PM in 1959 over concessions to the Hindu Tamils. They recently formed their own ultranationalist party (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/25/world/asia/25lanka.html?ex=1330059600&en=4fae683a34f372c3&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss). Most Japanese Buddhist Zen Masters were similar in their enthusiastic support for Japanese imperial expansion prior to 1945, complete with proclamations of holy war.

There aren't any religions with clean records that I know of. Except for maybe Scientology --- they just want to make money. :eek:

Tom Odom
05-30-2007, 01:26 PM
Except for maybe Scientology --- they just want to make money

Didn't they win Battleground Earth?

Jedburgh
06-12-2007, 05:16 PM
The Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor, 7 Jun 07:

The Role of Foreign Trainers in Southern Thailand's Insurgency (http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373451)

The first five months of 2007 have seen a dramatic increase in both the lethality and brutality of the Thai insurgency, prompting numerous Thai military officials to suspect the growing presence of foreign trainers. The arrest of an Indonesian on May 19 further raised suspicions. Nevertheless, Thai political leaders, including former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, head of the National Reconciliation Commission Khun Anand Panyarachun and current Prime Minister General Surayud Chulanont, along with the diplomatic community, have all insisted that the insurgency is a purely domestic affair with no foreign linkages. This view is being challenged by a growing body of evidence that shows that Thai officials have begun to speak more openly about the influence of foreigners on the Thai insurgents....
...and this excerpt speaks to the subject of the first post in the thread, threat migration:

...It took insurgents almost two years to develop IEDs larger than five kilograms. This year has already witnessed 15 and 20 kilogram devices used several times a week, causing much higher casualty rates, especially among police and soldiers. Many of the devices are similar to the one found and defused on May 28: a 20 kilogram ammonium nitrate bomb constructed in a fire extinguisher, stuffed with bolts, nuts and pieces of rebar and hidden on the side of the road awaiting an army convoy. The bomb was command detonated, but cell phone detonators are still currently used. Casio watches, which have been used routinely in Iraq, are now also regularly employed in southern Thailand....

Jedburgh
06-15-2007, 01:15 PM
HRW, 14 Jun 07: Thailand: Education in the South Engulfed in Fear (http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2007/06/14/thaila16189.htm)

....Officials in Narathiwat province have been forced to close more than 300 government schools in all 13 districts this week after insurgents killed three teachers on June 11. Two gunmen walked into the library of Ban Sakoh school in Si Sakhon district around noon and shot two female teachers, Thippaporn Thassanopas, 42, and Yupha Sengwas, 26, in the head, abdomen and legs. They died instantly in front of some 100 children, who were playing in front of the library after lunch. Both teachers received warnings before they were killed.

Approximately an hour later, a male teacher was shot dead in a grocery store in Ra Ngae district. Sommai Laocharoensuk, 55, a teacher at Ban Jehke School, was hit six times by AK-47 fire in the head and body. An eyewitness said six gunmen walked into the shop and opened fire on Sommai, who was registering the names of children to be enrolled in his school.

Human Rights Watch said it believed those responsible were separatist militants because of a long pattern of similar attacks on government schools and teachers, along with continuing public threats.

“Insurgents are terrorizing teachers and schools, which they consider symbols of the Thai state,” said Brad Adams, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “These attacks are grave crimes and cannot be justified by any cause.”...

SteveMetz
06-15-2007, 01:28 PM
The Thai Insurgent’s primary tactical line of operation at this time is terrorism, and since the insurgents are Muslim many quickly want to categorize them as part of the Global Jihad Movement. While there are definitely indications that transnational terrorists are taking an interest in the conflict, it is still by and large a regional insurgency, and the strategy of counterinsurgent should focus on keeping it that way by focusing on a political solution that addresses the specific grievances of the insurgents (destroy their battle cry by taking their cause away). Thailand its allies must avoid rhetoric stating that facilitates pushing the insurgents into the Al Qaeda Network camp, because that type of rhetoric can be turned into propaganda by the transnationals that the West is expanding its war on Islam into SE Asia, which will give the insurgents common cause with the Al Qaeda Network. We already see this rhetoric coming from the AQN, but it isn’t having the effect they desire and it won’t if Thailand finds the right strategy. This is a situation that can become very serious if the counterinsurgent missteps.

This was discussed at length following a presentation by Peter Chalk at the June meeting of the RAND Insurgency Board. Peter's take--and he is one of the top experts on terrorism in Southeast Asia--is that the Thai insurgency has almost no "ties" (and I hestitate to use that word since we'd be talking about "Thai ties") to the wider Islamic extremist movement.

Bill Moore
06-16-2007, 01:11 AM
I think Mr Chalk's would have been correct 18 or so months ago, and he still may be, but the rapid evolution of the insurgents' effectiveness without a logical explanation should prompt us to reevaluate what the ground truth is today. Unsurprisingly, there is evidence of TTP migration from the Middle East, which is at least partly (if not largely) due to the world wide web, but the rapid increase in the size of the IEDs, the effectiveness of their ambushes (from rank amatuer to professional), the brutal killings (beheadings, setting bodies on fire, etc.), etc., make me wonder how this somewhat supposedly isolated insurgent group became so capable so quickly? New leadership? More effective fund raising? or outside support/sponsorship?

One factor worth considering is that as an insurgency matures over the years, there is the possibility that diverging opinions over strategy will lead to splinters in the leadership. We could have our eye on the legacy leadership, which is focused on local issues, not a global jihad or caliphate, while simultaneously a splinter group lead by a Young Turk could have reached out to the JI, or directly to ME terrorist groups for support. Then the success of these operations will create a recruiting gravitational pull of less patient foot soldiers from the legacy insurgency to the new radical group.

It is possible that the insurgency has not reached out and remains a fight over local issues, but I would like to see some analysis explaining the insurgents rapid TTP improvement, and then explain the logistics required that must support it. Southern Thailand unlike Afghanistan and Iraq is not a field Ammo Supply Point where there is an abundance of munitions available. I would think they would have to rely largely on battlefield recovery for their weapons and explosives, but the rapid surge in attacks may indicate otherwise.

What I haven't seen or heard of yet is any propaganda released by the insurgents related to a global jihad, but it might be in their best interest to keep that link quiet for the time being.

Bottom line, I think we need to take a hard look with a fresh set of eyes, just to be on the safe side.

Steve Blair
06-16-2007, 01:55 AM
One thing to keep in mind: given the global nature of information, it's quite possible that the Thai group advanced their operational tactics by research and an exchange of information without necessarily signing on to the main AQ goals and objectives. This sort of "brotherly training" was fairly common with terrorist groups in the 1970s and 1980s, and the internet only makes it easier. It's much easier now for information to be shared without any sort of reciprocity agreement (as in "we train your guys to make bombs in exchange for an attack or two in the future or safe houses for our guys in your territory"). Look at the way the various anti-globalization groups share information and tactics without necessarily agreeing on a uniform strategy. I'd expect that the new generation of trans-national insurgents/terrorists would adapt the same information sharing networks.

Perhaps they've been watching the outside situation and borrowed the tactics that they feel have worked there. I'm not saying you're wrong, Bill, just tossing out another set of eyes to look at the situation. Sometimes I think we get too focused on insurgents proper and forget that terrorist groups have their own modes and methods of operation. With the convergence of the two in many trans-national groups I think this only compounds the classification issue.

Mark O'Neill
06-16-2007, 03:00 AM
I attended a seminar last year where we had a group of Thais (Moslem and Buddhist) looking at this issue. Credible, informed figures. All were adamant that it is a 'home grown' issue.

I have been at presentations by Abuza and Gunaratna , where they seemed to be 'spinning up' the potential links. Warning of external ties , and stating that they were suspicious of the number of JI folks that had been in Southern Thailand at various times , when pressed for proof of ties, they conceded that no physical evidence of such ties existed.

I have spoken with Malaysian security figures who, for a number of reasons, are interested in the situation. They insist the problem is a localised one.

Sidney Jones from the ICG (one of, if not the most, credible figures on JI) has expressed doubt about any operational links.

I think there is a real trap for the West (and some Americans in particular, in my experience) to default to associating any insurgents or terrorists who are Moslem in Asia with the JI / AQ nexus. We risk unnecessary conflation.

In many circumstances in SE Asia the fact that insurgents are Moslem is coincidental , rather than germane, to the reason they are rebellious. A lot of these issues are local and pre-date (in same cases, by centuries) 9/11 and / or the rise of AQ in the West's consciousness.

A real risk is that we approach these issues with our usual 'subtlety' of analysis and in doing so inadvertantly drive the development of the associations we fear. Many (if not most) of these issues are best left to the people who 'own' the problem - with our support ,if and when they ask for it. The recently reported successes of Detachment 88 in Indonesia against JI provide an excellent example of how these things can work.

A final observation - it would be naive to assume that insurgents / terrorists in the region do not learn and or get inspiration from various international organisations and web based resources. This is not the same as active partnership etc. Statements such as 'something has to account for their increasing sophistication' are equally ignorant / naive - they suggest a lack of understanding (sub-conscious racism perhaps?) that the insurgents (especially the ones that survive) are smart people who learn fast.

A closing thought. I think we need to pay closer attention sometimes to the background of some of the people spinning up these links. If one makes a living out of beating up the 'global islamic insurgency' theory (for example, through funding for your faculty, think tank, book sales, consultancies etc), it pays to associate all insurgencies being fought by Moslems with AQ, doesn't it? Never mind about the facts, just keep providing support to what people expect to hear to support their viewpoints....

Bill Moore
06-16-2007, 05:08 AM
Mark, your response doesn't address my request for real analysis. Personally I'm very leary of subject matter experts, because it is almost impossible for them to stay current with the rapid changes in our global society. While I respect the vast amount of knowledge they have acquired in their field of study, what happens (as Steve alludes to) is we all fall back on what we know, and if you know legacy insurgent models, you try to make everything fit that model, even you have to push that square peg into the round hole to make it make sense.

1. Thai officer who are expert on the problem? The Thai's behind closed doors readily admit they don't understand what is happening down south, and there are deeply divided opinions on the nature of the conflict the proper strategy to counter it. No one that I know of doubts it is a home grown issue, the issue is whether or not it is evolving into something bigger.


I attended a seminar last year where we had a group of Thais (Moslem and Buddhist) looking at this issue. Credible, informed figures. All were adamant that it is a 'home grown' issue.

Two points on this one, first the Thai military admittedly doesn't understand the problem, nor is there a concensus on the strategy. If there is no concensus, then one man's opinion is just that, one's man's informed opinion. The other point is that the insurgency took off like a rocket "this" year, so the dynamics have changed. Another point, no one who is familiar with the conflict will disagree that it is a homegrown insurgency based on local issues, but the point of debate is whether or not it is evolving into part of something larger?


I think there is a real trap for the West (and some Americans in particular, in my experience) to default to associating any insurgents or terrorists who are Moslem in Asia with the JI / AQ nexus. We risk unnecessary conflation.

I concur, but the flip side of this bit of wisdom is to bury our head in the sand if there is a link. Again, don't over react, I wrote "IF" there is a link.

3. Having spent more than a few months in Thailand and other countries in the region, I for one am not bias or racist. My comment was referring to the rapid escalation of their skills and attacks, not a natural progression. If you look at the terrorist and insurgent groups in the southern Philippines, which has been ongoing for years, and have known ties to the JI, yet have evolved their TTP very little. There are a number of factors that influence this based on culture, the nature of the fight, etc., but it still serves as a reference point for comparison. Why is the Thai insurgency taking off and the Philippine insurgency largely at steady state? What are the differences?


A real risk is that we approach these issues with our usual 'subtlety' of analysis and in doing so inadvertantly drive the development of the associations we fear. Many (if not most) of these issues are best left to the people who 'own' the problem - with our support ,if and when they ask for it. The recently reported successes of Detachment 88 in Indonesia against JI provide an excellent example of how these things can work.

I couldn't agree more, but it would be equally ignorant to ignore a potential link, and if it exists, what does it mean if anything? Detachment 88 has had many successes, but it is too early to tell if they will have a long term impact, because the fundamental issues still remain.

I'll go back to original request. I would like to see some non-bias professional analysis done on this. I think your comments were somewhat biased towards no association, because they were not associated with any facts. Additionally, instead of addressing the questions/concerns, you attacked the messenger with descriptions of naive, racist, etc.

Steve, I concur that are current lexicon describing terrorists, insurgents, transnationals, etc. doesn't answer the mail any more. As I stated on a previous post (maybe months ago), I think our professional vocabulary prohibits our understanding of the current security environment.

I think the answers lie in a detailed analysis of the insurgent leadership, logistic systems, and training methodology. I agree that information proliferation is not necessarily The internet is not exactly wide spread in the villages in Thailand. I know Thailand is advancing, but I recall the old days (not too long ago) where there were a couple of TVs in each village on Saturday night we could gather around with the villagers, drink MeKong whisky and watch thai kick boxing. I don't think it has changed so drastically in rural areas, especially in the impoverished south that the kids have access to the internet, so I "think" the information is passed on my OJT mentors, or they are going to training camps.

Mark O'Neill
06-16-2007, 09:34 AM
G'day Bill,

I have no real problem with most of what you have said. A few points-

1. The seminar I was referring to had no participation by Thai military, participants were civil leaders, moslem scholars, academics and local NGO. I would like to share more with you, but it was conducted under 'Chatham house' rules.

2. The different speed in development that you cite between Thailand and Philippines might be attributed to:

a. the bifurcated nature of the conflict in Southern Philippines - tensions between MILF / ASG , plus the influence of the 'peace process' on the region.
b. Successes by the AFP and the JSOTF, compared to the apparent lack of success to date , at any level, in Southern Thailand.

I whole heartedly agree, more sophisticated analysis is needed.

My concern remains that for many the default setting is jumping to conclusion that are not substaniated by evidence. You only need for one or two the multitude of neo-con polemicists that abound to fasten onto some of this conjecture and policy is unduly, and incorrectly, influenced.

Cheers,

Mark

tequila
08-28-2007, 08:10 AM
Rights Group Documents Brutality of Insurgents in Southern Thailand (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/27/AR2007082701355_pf.html) - Washington Post, 28 Aug.


Separatist militants in Thailand (http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Thailand?tid=informline)'s mostly Muslim southern provinces have stepped up a decades-long, low-intensity insurgency into a wave of brutal bomb attacks, assassinations, machete hackings and, in some cases, beheadings and mutilations in the past 3 1/2 years, an extensive Human Rights Watch (http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Human+Rights+Watch?tid=informline) report said today.

Interviews with witnesses, family members, academics, lawyers, journalists and human rights activists painted a bloody picture of the predominantly ethnic Malay provinces of Pattani (http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Pattani?tid=informline), Yala, Narathiwat (http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Narathiwat?tid=informline) and Songkhla from January 2004 to last month.

Of the 2,463 people killed in attacks during that time, a total of 2,196, or 89 percent, have been civilians. "Violence against civilians is being used by separatist militants to scare Buddhist Thais away from these provinces, keep ethnic Malay Muslims under control and discredit the Thai authorities," said Brad Adams, Asia (http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Asia?tid=informline) director at Human Rights Watch ...

Jedburgh
08-28-2007, 01:07 PM
Rights Group Documents Brutality of Insurgents in Southern Thailand (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/27/AR2007082701355_pf.html) - Washington Post, 28 Aug.
...here's the actual HRW report:

No One is Safe: Insurgent Attacks on Civilians in Thailand’s Southern Border Provinces (http://hrw.org/reports/2007/thailand0807/thailand0807webwcover.pdf)

....Although the militants have claimed the moral high ground for their struggle because of historical and contemporary grievances, their tactics are anything but moral—and their behavior undermines their claims to legitimacy. From January 2004 to the end of July 2007, militant attacks have resulted in more than 2,400 deaths and 4,000 injured people. Civilian casualties constitute nearly 90 percent of this total.

In addition to intentional attacks on civilians, such as assassinations of civilian officials or schoolteachers, bombings aimed at crowded markets or other civilian locations such as commercial banks, restaurants, department stores, or hotels, separatist militants have also been responsible for numerous indiscriminate attacks. In these cases, the attacker uses a means or method that does not distinguish between civilians and combatants, such as a bomb that is set off to harm security units in populated areas without regard for minimizing or avoiding civilian losses....
Full 106 page report at the link.

Jedburgh
09-25-2007, 01:40 PM
SIPRI, 19 Sep 07: Conflict in Southern Thailand: Islamism, Violence and the State in the Patani Insurgency (http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP20.pdf)

When the interface between terrorism, extreme Islamism and violent conflict is mentioned, most people would think immediately of the greater Middle East. Many security experts will also be aware of the existence of groups in Central Asia that seem to fit into the same pattern. Much less well known, however, is the case of southern Thailand, where in three provinces collectively known as Patani an escalating and brutal conflict has claimed over 2000 lives since 2004. The violence has already had important political consequences—the failure of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s government to get a grip on it was one reason for the decision by elements of the Thai military to launch a—successful—coup in September 2006. Despite the military junta’s more conciliatory approach to the insurgents in the South, however, the violence has continued to escalate.

As is so often the case, the origins and motives of the Patani insurgency defy any simple explanation. Political, social and economic tensions—some linked with the Thaksin government’s drive for economic liberalization—are certainly present, as witnessed by the fact that officials, monks and teachers as well as government security forces have been among the targets of attack. The violence in Patani also seems to reflect a resurgence of long-standing separatist sentiments and a rejection of the centralized Thai state, which motivated earlier conflict in the same region, particularly from the 1960s to the 1980s. However, on this occasion there is also clear evidence of the influence of Islamist groups and perhaps of the same type of jihadist ideologies as have motivated the choice of terrorist tactics and indiscriminate violence in other, better-known ongoing conflicts. Another parallel with the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, among others, is that the approaches chosen by the official authorities have not always been well judged to contain the violence. The Thaksin government’s espousal of many tenets of the US-led ‘global war on terrorism’ may have helped to destabilize conditions in the Patani region in the first place, and the increasing use of local militia against the rebels seen in recent months is hardly likely to soothe inflamed religious feelings.

This paper is one of the products of a larger SIPRI research project, Conflict, Islam and the State-Nation: New Political and Security Challenges, kindly supported by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In it, Dr Neil Melvin seeks to unravel these different strands of the Patani conflict and to shed light on its dynamics. He warns that the insurgents are now gaining the upper hand and it will be hard to stop the conflict escalating still further. The case is strengthening, therefore, for the international community to intervene, over and above the expressions of concern that have already come from Thailand’s neighbours....
Complete 48 page paper at the link.

Jedburgh
10-27-2007, 01:21 PM
ICG, 23 Oct 07: Southern Thailand: The Problem with Paramilitaries (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_east_asia/140_southern_thailand___the_problem_with_paramilit aries.pdf)

....Paramilitary organisations and village militias have played significant roles in policing and counter-insurgency throughout Thai history, particularly against communist and separatist guerrillas during the 1970s and 1980s. Over the last decade, these forces have taken on new roles, from controlling refugee camps on the border with Myanmar/Burma to prosecuting the “war on drugs” in 2003. But the most significant expansion has been for the suppression of separatist violence in the South.

The army has tripled the strength of the paramilitary “ranger” force (Thahan Phran) in the South since violence surged in 2004, despite its well-deserved reputation for brutality and corruption. It has made some reforms, particularly in screening recruits, since the 1980s and on the whole is a more professional force than twenty years ago, but serious problems with discipline and human rights abuses remain....
Complete 37 page paper at the link.

Jedburgh
05-29-2008, 07:32 PM
Peter Chalk at RAND, 28 May 08:

The Malay-Muslim Insurgency in Southern Thailand: Understanding the Conflict's Evolving Dynamic (http://rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2008/RAND_OP198.pdf)

Current unrest in the Malay-Muslim provinces of southern Thailand has captured growing national, regional, and international attention due to the heightened tempo and scale of rebel attacks, the increasingly jihadist undertone that has come to characterize insurgent actions, and the central government’s often brutal handling of the situation on the ground. Of particular note are growing concerns that the conflict is no longer purely local in nature but has been systematically hijacked by outside extremists to avail wider transnational Islamist designs in Southeast Asia.

There is (as yet) no concrete evidence to suggest that the region has been decisively transformed into a new beachhead for panregional jihadism. Although there is a definite religious element to many of the attacks that are currently being perpetrated in the three Malay provinces, it is not apparent that this has altered the essential localized and nationalistic aspect of the conflict. Equally, while it is true that the scale and sophistication of violence have increased, there is nothing to link this change in tempo to the input of punitive, absolutist external jihadist imperatives. Perhaps the clearest reason to believe that the southern Thai conflict has not metastasized into a broader jihadist struggle, however, is the fact that there has been neither a migration of violence north (much less to other parts of Southeast Asia) nor directed attacks against foreigners, tourist resort areas (such as Phuket), or overt symbols of U.S. “cultural capitalism.”
Complete 39 page paper at the link.

Jedburgh
08-28-2008, 07:44 PM
ICG, 28 Aug 08: Thailand: Political Turmoil and the Southern Insurgency (http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/getfile.cfm?id=3577&tid=5640&l=1)

....Ending the violence in the Deep South requires more than a military response. Now, with the insurgents on the defensive, is a good time to take decisive steps to address the root causes of the conflict. The political deadlock in Bangkok, however, makes it unlikely that the government will be able to turn its attention to the Deep South any time soon. The longer this is put off, the harder it will become to contain, let alone resolve the conflict.

The insurgency’s lack of a declared political leadership or platform is a major obstacle in the search for a negotiated settlement. Nonetheless, there is much that the government could do unilaterally to address Malay grievances in the realms of education, justice, language, history and economy. But this requires a rethinking on the part of the predominantly Buddhist state, which needs to recognise the distinct ethnic identity of Malay Muslims and find ways of allowing them to be Thai citizens without having to compromise their cultural differences.....

davidbfpo
06-09-2009, 11:29 AM
The insurgency in Southern Thailand rarely gets a mention, although David Killcullen's book uses it as a case study; from the BBC News a mystery shooting, maybe by the Army: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/8090599.stm

davidbfpo

Jedburgh
06-22-2009, 02:53 PM
ICG, 22 Jun 09: Recruiting Militants in Southern Thailand (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_east_asia/170_recruiting_militants_in_southern_thailand.pdf)

While Thai leaders are preoccupied with turmoil in Bangkok, the insurgency in the South continues to recruit young Malay Muslims, especially from private Islamic schools. These institutions are central to maintenance of Malay Muslim identity, and many students are receptive to the call to take up arms against the state. This is not a struggle in solidarity with global jihad, rather an ethno-nationalist insurgency with its own version of history aimed at reclaiming what was once the independent sultanate of Patani. Human rights abuses by the Thai government and security forces have only fuelled this secessionist fervour, and policies that centralise power in the capital have undermined a regional political solution. Changing these policies and practices is essential as the government tries to respond to the insurgents’ grievances in order to bring long-lasting peace to the region.....

Dayuhan
07-02-2009, 10:03 AM
Re this quote from the cited ICG report:

there is much that the government could do unilaterally to address Malay grievances in the realms of education, justice, language, history and economy. But this requires a rethinking on the part of the predominantly Buddhist state, which needs to recognise the distinct ethnic identity of Malay Muslims and find ways of allowing them to be Thai citizens without having to compromise their cultural differences.....

This underscores a key problem in managing the security issues in south Thailand, a problem with analogues in the southern Philippines. In both cases a Muslim minority firmly believes that both the central government and the bulk of the populace (Buddhist in Thailand, Christian in the Philippines) hold a deeply rooted and fundamental prejudice against the Muslim minorities in their countries. Unfortunately, in both cases this perception is to a large degree accurate: the prejudice really is there, and is reflected in policies and actions. This is not a situation that any outside agency is likely to change.

William F. Owen
07-02-2009, 11:01 AM
This underscores a key problem in managing the security issues in south Thailand, a problem with analogues in the southern Philippines. In both cases a Muslim minority firmly believes that both the central government and the bulk of the populace (Buddhist in Thailand, Christian in the Philippines) hold a deeply rooted and fundamental prejudice against the Muslim minorities in their countries. Unfortunately, in both cases this perception is to a large degree accurate: the prejudice really is there, and is reflected in policies and actions. This is not a situation that any outside agency is likely to change.

Having lived in Thailand and spoken at length to the Thai Army about the "problem in the South" one of the major obstacles is the senior leadership of the Thai Army and how Thai culture views problem solving.

If there is one insurgency that could be ended with 24 months hard work, the one in the South of Thailand is it.

Jedburgh
12-17-2009, 01:23 PM
ICG, 8 Dec 09: Southern Thailand: Moving Towards Political Solutions (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_east_asia/181_southern_thailand___moving_towards_political_s olutions.pdf)

....the southern insurgency continues unabated, claiming more than 3,900 lives during the last six years. While sweep operations launched in mid-2007 temporarily curtailed violence, intensifying attacks in 2009 show the rebellion against Thai rule has not been extinguished. The June attack on Al-Furqan mosque was an alarming sign of deepening communal tension and steadily deteriorating relations between Muslims and Buddhists. The government has made little progress in addressing political grievances or alleviating the sense of injustice among Malay Muslims. Its inability to hold security forces accountable for human rights abuse feeds into the narrative of “unjust” Thai rule and provides more fuel for the ethno-religious struggle. The failure to arrest and prosecute perpetrators of the mosque attack has become another symbol of injustice and inevitably a rallying cry to attract new recruits.

Political solutions should be seriously pursued as a way to end this deadly insurgency. The government’s rhetoric of development and justice needs to be translated into policy and practice. Development projects should be implemented transparently and with grassroots participation to ensure they address real needs rather than going into unwanted projects or the pockets of those managing them. Investigation and prosecution of security forces accused of abuses should be expedited. The foundations of peaceful engagement are already in place, should the government wish to pursue dialogue with insurgent representatives. If it is committed to this route, there are plenty of ideas to bring to the negotiation table to encourage compromise from the insurgency. Hope rather than fear should be the spirit of engagement. Dialogue with insurgent movements elsewhere in the world has not often led to separate states splitting off but exploring a new governance structure for the South could help stem the mounting death toll.

Bob's World
12-18-2009, 01:03 PM
I suspect that the only solution to S. Thailand is a political one. The Thai government must make the same bold step that the American government did when it passed the civil rights act. It must concede that it treats this segment of the populace injustly, and make true steps to right that wrong.

To merely "enforce the rule of law" among a segment of the populace that percieves strongly that the law is unjust as applied to them, is to make the same mistake that King George made when he sent his Navy and Army to Boston. It is quite likely to push a subversive movement into full-blown insurgency, or push what is an insurgency among a radical fringe into the mainstream.

The security forces of S. Philippines and Thailand can shape conditions, but these matters can only be truly resolved in Manila and Bangkok.

Jedburgh
04-16-2010, 05:34 PM
Lowy Institute, Apr 10: Confronting ghosts: Thailand’s shapeless southern insurgency (http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=1265)

This monograph analyses the changing nature of the insurgency in Thailand’s southern border provinces and the inability of the Thai Government to understand and deal with it. It analyses new dimensions of the conflict, and considers the extent to which the insurgency is a coherent movement. In addition, the monograph also critically examines the response of the Thai state to the insurgency. Taken together, these two analytical threads allow us to address the questions of why and how the insurgency morphed in the direction it did, and what this portends for both counterinsurgency efforts and the state of affairs in Thailand more generally. In brief, four arguments are made:

• First, despite the discernible religious hues in insurgent discourse and language today, today’s insurgency remains fundamentally based on earlier localist narratives, goals and motivations.

• Second, the nature of the insurgency itself has changed from the hierarchical and structured struggles of the past that were mostly led by an ethnic Malay political and religious elite to the fluid and shapeless organisational structure of a ‘new’ insurgency that as yet lacks clear, negotiable political goals.

• Third, although there may be agreement among groups involved in the insurgency as to what might be the broad objectives of the movement (in fact, there might even be disagreement on this count), each may have different opinions as to how to proceed to achieve them.

• Finally, tackling the insurgency on both military and political counts will pose an even greater challenge for the Thai Government because of its inability to make significant headway in its counterinsurgency effort with properly calibrated responses.

Schmedlap
05-16-2010, 04:42 PM
Michael Yon is in Thailand right now, live tweeting his observations of lots of gunfire. A lot of shooting and probably hundreds killed in the past two hours. This sounds like the two sides are not longer messing around...



This report 30 dead 232 injured. I would tend to expect this number to skyrocket after the heavy fire tonight.... http://bit.ly/9aVko5 12 minutes ago (http://twitter.com/Michael_Yon/status/14107093485) via Facebook

...

Completey quiet. Maybe they are collecting dead and wounded. That was some heavy fire even by war standards.... http://bit.ly/brPRE7 30 minutes ago (http://twitter.com/Michael_Yon/status/14106175263) via Facebook

...

Now is quiet. Total silence. Must be many casualties. Thousands of rounds just fired. http://bit.ly/a2UrEl 38 minutes ago (http://twitter.com/Michael_Yon/status/14105745119) via Facebook

...

Heavy fire distant and close. Automatic fire. Machine guns now firing. http://bit.ly/925KVd about 1 hour ago (http://twitter.com/Michael_Yon/status/14105207679) via Facebook

...

Grenade. 2x grenade. small arms. 3x grenade. 4x. heavy 5x heavy small arms. very close cracking by my. very... http://bit.ly/dDvP1t about 1 hour ago (http://twitter.com/Michael_Yon/status/14105069132) via Facebook

...

Explosions 2x. 3x. Sounds like grenades. Guess is that Army/Police are being hit by M79. (Total guess.) 4x... http://bit.ly/dq5x6t about 1 hour ago (http://twitter.com/Michael_Yon/status/14104982804) via Facebook

...

I think a lot of people just died or are bleeding now. Prayers for Thai people tonight. It's on. http://bit.ly/9xeL4c about 1 hour ago (http://twitter.com/Michael_Yon/status/14104813547) via Facebook


See his twitter feed for more (http://twitter.com/Michael_Yon). About 40 or so similar tweets in just the past hour. Sounds like a donnybrook.

Bagre
10-27-2011, 12:50 PM
In the Libyan insurgecy involved many al Qaeda fighters and mercenaries from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh and other Islamic countries. Can not exclude the participation of Malay separatists. In one of the posts Libyan spokesman Musa Ibrahim said about the arrest of 17 mercenaries, including several Europeans and a resident of the Asian countries (not name the country). Islamists have stolen a lot weapons from depots Libyan Army. Now this weapon can occur anywhere - in Egypt, Palestine, Somalia, Afghanistan, India and Sinkiang. Do you think it possible the emergence of "veterans" of the Libyan's war and Libya's weapons stolen in southern Thailand?

Bagre
10-28-2011, 12:09 PM
Also the chief of Libyan islamic fight group (LIFG) and the commander of Tripoli Abd al Hakim Balhaj was arrested in 2002 in Malaysia and was transfered from malay special forces to CIA in Bangkok.

Fuchs
03-01-2013, 05:14 AM
Thailand, insurgents sign first ever agreement to start peace talks (http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-News-Wires/2013/0228/Thailand-insurgents-sign-first-ever-agreement-to-start-peace-talks)

Good luck.

Bill Moore
05-13-2013, 06:54 AM
The Strange Thai Insurgents Who Like Sorcery and Get High on Cough Syrup

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/05/the-strange-thai-insurgents-who-like-sorcery-and-get-high-on-cough-syrup/275614/


The distance from local problem to universal nightmare can vanish without warning: In Boston, that interval was as brief as twelve seconds. Awareness of the Pattani insurgency in Western governments today is limited to a tiny number of intelligence analysts and Southeast Asia hands. Among those few, there is a shared attitude of wary unease: We don't have the resources to figure out what's really going on, and we don't think it's hooked up with a global terrorist group -- yet . But any morning we may turn on the news and suddenly find that all our assumptions were disastrously wrong.


Analysts and intelligence officials of several nations scratch their heads at the inability of global extremist groups to lure the militants of the Thai south into their family. But the Pattani insurgency, in its very aloofness, may offer lessons to anyone seeking an elusive Unified Theory of Jihadism. For the Pattani rebels, as for so many others who use religion as a rallying cry, Islam is a symbol more than a set of beliefs. If that weren't the case, how could this uprising be permeated by such thoroughly un-Islamic practices as sorcery, narco-trafficking, butchery of innocents, and Coca-Cola cannibalism?

Bill Moore
05-25-2014, 09:09 AM
Another coup in Thailand leave many shrugging their shoulders saying we have seen this before in Thailand's history, the next one will take us up to 20 coups. This is the norm there, so why should we even care?

First, the U.S. is attempting to increase its influence in the region to preserve its strategic economic and security interests and this event will challenge that effort while simultaneously creating an opportunity for China to increase its influence. Second, Thailand could be perceived as the enlightened democratic domino in Indochina that could help assert gentle pressure on Burma, Laos, and Cambodia to transform their repressive and corrupt regimes. While Malaysia remains a valued partner and has been moderate politically, their drift towards implementing Sharia Law will degrade the human rights for all those who are not Muslim in Malaysia, which indicates Indochina is drifting in a direction counter to our interests. Third, however slim the chance at the moment, the potential for civil war in Thailand exists which would not only be a humanitarian disaster, it would significantly threaten our interests in the region.

We need to think strategically and act in a way that manages the three concerns listed above along with many more to best protect our interests over time. Knee-jerk decisions based on our bureaucratic process to disengage will almost certainly disadvantage us in the long run. Sadly our bureaucratic system limits our strategic flexibility. Our foreign policy is both enabled (soft power) and severely restricted by our national values. The laws our Congress has enacted based on our values forces our diplomats and military to respond with little thought by imposing limitations on our military engagement with Thailand, and could result in coercive diplomacy as we push the military to rapidly reinstate what we believe lawful government to be. This creates an asymmetry between us with China and other competitors who are still willing to deal with the devil himself to pursue their interests. Over time this erodes China's influence with populace in the nation's their engaging, so it is in their interest to see a non-democratic government they can influence with investment.

China's approach could create an opportunity for us to leverage our soft power, but if the solution we push for is based our perception of legitimacy, which may not have much do with legitimacy in the eyes of all Thais we'll have lost an opportunity to assert leadership in the region that is respected. In 2006many Thais welcomed the military coup due to the serious rift in Thai society the government created through excessive corruption. Obviously that rift still exists, and the so called democratic government that followed only exasperated the problems creating a situation where the military either felt compelled to intervene to protect their national interests, or because they saw it as opportunity to seize power. Either way the government the military replaced had failed, and we had a hand in pushing for democracy before they were ready.

Today I suspect many Thais will both embrace and oppose the coup, just as many would oppose either of the two major political parties assuming political power again. Legitimacy for all is a pipe dream at this point, and this is why some analysts have gone as far as predicting a civil war within Thailand if the social-political rift isn't resolved soon. This is hard for those of us who been going there for decades, but the political divides are deep and the people are mobilized so it would be a mistake to assume it isn't in the realm of the possible. It also isn't unprecedented, since Thailand did have to deal with a communist insurgency at one point.

No one can predict how this will unfold over time, but important things to watch are: the Thai military’s plan to transition back to civilian rule (time span and methodology); the U.S. and China’s response to the situation; how the bordering nations respond over time (will they feel less pressure to reform); and most importantly how will the Thais resolve their political differences?

Bob's World
05-25-2014, 03:19 PM
Bill,

I suspect many of these countries are working through what one could call "phase II sovereignty." In other words, they are experiencing the natural growing pains of their hard-earned post-colonial sovereignty much like a young United States did not so very long ago. Hopefully they avoid pitfalls we fell into resulting in a horrific civil war. But I do believe we need to be very careful to appreciate that any solution they sort out for themselves will likely be superior to any solution approved by US policy makers and overly shaped by our interventions of any sort.

I hope we remember that what the US really stands for is not "democracy" but "self-determination." (and a Coup is not self-determination any more than the removed government was democracy).

I hope we can appreciate that influence in the region is much more important and valuable than control of political outcomes for the advancement US interests.

I suspect that the best approach is one that is not too judgmental, and that appreciates that the cultures of this region and their expectations of governance are far different than our own. I think we need to have the humility and flexibility to work with whoever is in power, regardless of how they got there; and then work with that government to help them get to a self-determined form of governance that works for as much of their population as possible, without leaving any of the population feeling like they have no legal means of redress.

China will, however, have growing influence in this region as well. The super power (regional or global) who balances the quest for influence over their urge for control will likely win that contest in the long run. In general I suspect these relationships will become much more balanced than the polarity driven by our Cold War strategy; with the US being the security partner of choice, while China offers more economic opportunities.

davidbfpo
05-25-2014, 03:47 PM
My knowledge of Thailand is minimal, but each time the BBC have reported on events in Bangkok there is a reference to the tensions between the city's middle classes, who support one side and the rural populace who support another. Is this a an urban -v- rural conflict, rather than one over ideology? Maybe not, just between politicians.

I'd forgotten there is a history the miltary doing this:
Thailand's armed forces have staged at least 12 coups since the end of the absolute monarchy in 1932.

There has been a power struggle since Ms Yingluck's brother, Thaksin Shinawatra, was ousted by the military as PM in 2006. Mr Thaksin and Ms Yingluck have strong support in rural areas but are opposed by many in the middle class and urban elite.

The latest unrest began last year, when anti-government protesters embarked on a campaign to oust Ms Yingluck. An election was held in February but was disrupted and later annulled by the judiciary.
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-27553029

Dayuhan
05-26-2014, 01:30 AM
I expect that many ordinary Thais do support the coup, mainly because they are sick of the disruption and constant conflict. Whether that support lasts, of course, will depend on when and how civilian rule is returned. One difference from other recent Thai coups is the nature of the monarchy. The King has little structural power in Thailand, but enjoys enormous respect and power of persuasion, and he has played a key role in resolving other coups and domestic conflicts. King Bhumibol has been in place since the 1940s, meaning that for most Thais he has been a lifetime presence. He's now very old and in questionable health; he may or may not have the ability to force a resolution and it is not clear that the authority he enjoys will be passed on to a successor.

I do not think either the US or China has any meaningful role to play in the resolution: the Thais are and have always been extremely independent. They will trade with anyone, they will make security deals as it suits them, but they are not about to shape their own politics to suit anyone else.

I don't see the US being able to play the "China Threat" card to gain influence in Thailand, because the Thais don't see China as a threat. We saw a sharp division in the recent ASEAN Summit, a division that's been there for a long time but which becomes ever more evident. Vietnam and the Philippines see China as an immediate threat, Malaysia and Indonesia are on board with that to a lesser extent. Singapore stays neutral, while Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar heve no interest in an adversarial relationship with China. The closing communique from the recently concluded summit doesn't even mention China, despite prodigious effort from Vietnam and the Philippines.

One thing I've noticed is that unlike Latin America, where communist revolutions metamorphosed into left-of-center mainstream political parties, communist revolutions in the Philippines and Thailand were either completely suppressed (Thailand) or marginalized (Philippines). While the left-of-center parties in Latin America have a spotty record (as do their opponents), they do provide voters with a meaningful choice. In the Philippines and Thailand you have what might be called pseudo-democracy, with regular electoral exercises offering a non-choice between or among elite factions with little or no ideological or policy distinction. That of course yields a great deal of cynicism and frustration and opens the door for charismatic pseudo-populist demagogues with no agenda beyond their own power and prosperity.

A coup is not going to solve the problem posed by indistinguishable elite factions competing for personal advantage in a patronage-dominated system. I think it's likely that the factions will make a pretend peace and agree on a transition just to get the generals back in the barracks, at which point the game will begin all over again. Civil war seems less likely to me than a paralyzing routine of rallies and strikes leading to another military intervention. but many things are possible.

Long term, I don't know what the solution is, and I'm not sure anyone else does either. Clearly evolution is needed, but political evolution has been largely aborted by the dominance of elites that fight each other, but join together to protect the status quo that supports their privileges.

This article comes from a somewhat left perspective and is a bit chaotic, but makes some useful points about Thai domestic politics:

http://www.prachatai.com/english/node/2694

Bill Moore
05-26-2014, 03:46 AM
I do not think either the US or China has any meaningful role to play in the resolution: the Thais are and have always been extremely independent. They will trade with anyone, they will make security deals as it suits them, but they are not about to shape their own politics to suit anyone else.

This is true, but both China and U.S. will respond to the challenges and opportunities presented by this event to pursue their own interests.


I don't see the US being able to play the "China Threat" card to gain influence in Thailand, because the Thais don't see China as a threat.

I never said or came to close to implying that we could or should, that isn't the point of this discourse. The principle point is China will be more flexible in their response, while our options will be severely restricted by our laws, which could give China the ability to gain more influence with Thailand, while U.S. influence is reduced.


In the Philippines and Thailand you have what might be called pseudo-democracy, with regular electoral exercises offering a non-choice between or among elite factions with little or no ideological or policy distinction. That of course yields a great deal of cynicism and frustration and opens the door for charismatic pseudo-populist demagogues with no agenda beyond their own power and prosperity.

I think the Thai military would agree with you, their leaders have on more than one occasion called the Thai government a false democracy. I suspect they're more than a little frustrated with us blindly embracing the concept of democracy while ignoring the realities of how it is playing out.

Dayuhan
05-26-2014, 09:13 AM
This is true, but both China and U.S. will respond to the challenges and opportunities presented by this event to pursue their own interests.

They will, but I don't see either gaining or losing much. The Thais will do business with both but will keep policy independent of both. I wouldn't expect them to be taking sides in any disputes, or to allow themselves to be pulled into anyone's camp, no matter how the current situation shakes out.


I never said or came to close to implying that we could or should, that isn't the point of this discourse. The principle point is China will be more flexible in their response, while our options will be severely restricted by our laws, which could give China the ability to gain more influence with Thailand, while U.S. influence is reduced.

Maybe I misinterpreted this comment:


China's approach could create an opportunity for us to leverage our soft power

As above, I don't think either the US or China really has much influence on Thailand, if we define influence as the ability to shape policy decisions to one's own advantage. I don't think the current situation will change that.


I think the Thai military would agree with you, their leaders have on more than one occasion called the Thai government a false democracy. I suspect they're more than a little frustrated with us blindly embracing the concept of democracy while ignoring the realities of how it is playing out.

Certainly they are frustrated, but I don't think they are really all that frustrated with "us"... in fact I don't think "we" are much of a factor at all. The frustration largely stems from the reality that while a long-term military government is not something they want or feel capable of managing, every time they send power back to civilians the same thing happens. US influence has not been a major factor in the timing of returns to civilian rule. In past coups the monarchy has played a greater role than the US in assuring a rapid return to civilian rule. That may be changing, if this article has it right:

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/25/thailand-coup-king-adulyadej-junta-senate

There's going to be a lot of watch and see going on, because many parties have interests and very few have meaningful influence. From the US I'd expect to see the usual boilerplate statements urging a rapid return to civilian rule, backed up by very little action, if any.

Bill Moore
05-27-2014, 07:10 AM
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/27/us-thailand-politics-idUSBREA4P00M20140527

Thai army gets down to work on economy, stifles dissent


"We are very firm on our strategy when it comes to anti-coup protesters," said deputy army spokesman Winthai Suvaree. "If they break the law, we have to detain them. If they don't go home by 10 p.m. curfew time, we must take them in."

He said the army had found a number of weapons in raids around the country in recent days.

"Most of these appear to belong to those linked to the 'red shirt' movement," Winthai said, referring to supporters of ousted Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra and her brother, former premier Thaksin Shinawatra, who is at the heart of the long-running crisis in Thailand and was also deposed by the military, in 2006.

An army ranger was killed on Monday in Trat province, southeast of Bangkok near the Cambodian border, in a clash during a raid on suspected pro-Thaksin activists. Authorities seized weapons and detained suspected activists late last week in the northeast, a Thaksin stronghold.

If they're caching weapons, they're at least considering an armed uprising of some sort. The military is moving aggressively to consolidate power and "supposedly" has endorsement from the King. If for some reason that proves to be a false claim I suspect all hell will break lose.

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/05/26/thai-king-endorses-coup/9587641/

Thai coup leader: 'It's no use' to protest


After the speech, the general took only two questions from reporters — about plans for a new administration.

Asked if he would appoint a new prime minister, Prayuth replied gruffly: "Don't ask about something that hasn't arrived. It's already in the plans. Take it easy. There will be one."

Asked when elections would be held, Prayuth said that could happen when the crisis ends. It "depends on the circumstances," he said. "I don't have a schedule … quickly as possible. That's enough."


Now the New York Times unhelpful melodramatic spin taking words out of context, which is the norm for the NYT.

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/27/world/asia/thailand.html?_r=0

After Coup, General Vows to Create A ‘Genuine Democracy’ in Thailand


Thailand’s military junta said Monday that it would stay in power “indefinitely” and that its rule had been endorsed by King Bhumibol Adulyadej, the monarch for nearly seven decades who has semi-divine status in the country.

Bill Moore
05-27-2014, 07:55 AM
http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/burmese-politicians-comment-thai-coup.html

Burmese Politicians Comment on Thai Coup


“In Thailand, once the country’s situation returns to normal, the army gives power back to the people. In Burma, it’s been different,” the NLD member said.

She urged the Burmese government, as chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), to respond quickly to the Thai military’s takeover last Thursday.

“They still have failed to do so. I think they have delayed their response because of the army representatives in Parliament,” she said. Twenty-five percent of seats in the Burmese legislature are filled by unelected military representatives.

http://theconversation.com/muted-response-to-thai-coup-hints-at-other-nations-limited-options-27100

This piece captures many key points succinctly.

Muted response to Thai coup hints at other nations' limited options


Behind the scenes, however, things are rather more complex. States in southeast Asia are acutely aware of the ways in which developments in one of them can have sudden and dramatic knock-on consequences across the region. The seismic economic and political events of the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis are still etched firmly in the mind.

Within ASEAN, a division is growing between the more developed, globalised and liberally oriented ASEAN states and those that are underdeveloped and authoritarian. Indonesia and the Philippines have rather different perspectives on events in Bangkok than Vietnam and Myanmar.

davidbfpo
06-07-2014, 11:51 AM
On Thursday the military announced it would set up "reconciliation centres" across the country to organise entertainment for the public and encourage cooperation with the new government, the Wall Street Journal reported (http://online.wsj.com/articles/thai-military-looks-to-boost-nations-spirits-1401972499).

The conciliatory tone represents a partial U-turn on the new rulers' previous hardline approach, which included detaining former leaders to "give them time to think", and the introduction of a law barring gatherings of more than five people. The army also imposed a 10pm to 5am curfew, and warned Thais again using social media "to provoke", as "it's not good for anyone".
Now the 'carrot':
Thailand's military is trying to win hearts and minds following its controversial military coup by dressing attractive young women in army outfits and asking them to sing, dance and salute to the public. Female Thai soldiers have also been spotted singing from the backs of military trucks on the capital's streets.
Link{:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/thailand/10880669/Thailands-military-rulers-dispatch-glamorous-army-girls-to-win-hearts-and-minds.html
http://i.telegraph.co.uk/multimedia/archive/02933/bangkok-camouflage_2933388b.jpg

Bill Moore
06-08-2014, 04:59 AM
David,

Since its Thailand there is no guarantee those are actually women. Long time travelers to Thailand will understand. ;)

JMA
06-08-2014, 05:42 AM
David,

Since its Thailand there is no guarantee those are actually women. Long time travelers to Thailand will understand. ;)

Yes, got look out for the Adam's apple... which those necklaces seem to cunningly hide.

Bill Moore
06-08-2014, 08:41 AM
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/To-John-Kerry-America-needs-a-better-understanding-30235269.html

To John Kerry: America needs a better understanding of Thailand


A core principle in Thai culture is "face". The issue of face in Thai culture is not amenable to reason. It may be hard to comprehend this in the West, but to us here, it became perfectly clear that for both opposing sides, face had become a higher priority than the fate of their nation.

I believe that the General did the one thing that could allow the opposing camps to retreat without losing face. He chose between incurring the wrath of the international community and saving his country from a civil war. The minute he made this decision, he started to work on a credible plan to return Thailand to a state of a functioning elective democracy.


I do not ask that America refrain from condemning this coup. Indeed, I myself do not approve of coups, and I applaud America for making its fundamental stance immediately public. Nor do I ask that America reconsider the suspension of aid, or other sanctions. These things are necessary because we need a deterrent, should the General not be true to his word, or should other, more power-hungry individuals seek to hijack the process.


What I ask is that you seek out, digest and act on a complete, detailed briefing about the situation on the ground. I ask that the power and influence of the United States be used in a way that helps Thailand in its journey towards a more enlightened governance. I ask that you work through diplomats who understand what is going on the ground, to become as well informed as possible, and (behind the scenes if necessary) you attempt to facilitate, rather than obstruct the future of this country.

Highlights are mine

davidbfpo
11-03-2014, 04:02 PM
The insurgency in Southern Thailand must rank as one of the most obscure and on SWC too.

Caught this via a Tweet from IISS and I noted:
The Thais have drawn on two classic models of COIN – from French military officer David Galula and Britain’s Sir Robert Thompson – to develop their own approach.

I'd missed that there was a new book The Thai Way of Counterinsurgency byDr. Jeff Moore; a recent IISS discussion features him and is the podcast at the end:http://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voices/blogsections/iiss-voices-2014-b4d9/november-4b85/the-thai-way-of-counter-insurgency-35d3#.VFebnWTL91E.twitter

davidbfpo
08-18-2015, 07:31 AM
Two helpful articles on the bombing in Bangkok:http://www.vox.com/2015/8/17/9164963/bangkok-bombing-what-we-know

http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/whats-behind-thailands-deadly-bomb-blast/?

davidbfpo
08-30-2015, 10:53 AM
An Open Democracy article, which is of interest, but has IMHO been overtaken by events:https://www.opendemocracy.net/alistair-denness/bombs-in-bangkok-how-will-thailand-military-junta-react

From the BBC a report which starts with:
Police in Bangkok have charged a man in connection with the bomb attack that killed 20 people in the Thai capital nearly two weeks ago. Officers say the suspect, who was charged with illegal possession of weapons, was involved in the attack. However, they say he is not the man seen on CCTV footage leaving a bag at the Erawan Shrine before the explosion.
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-34101309

Last night on Twitter attention was drawn to the discovery of a pile of reportedly badly forged Turkish passports and the possible Uighur links, not to terrorism, but enabling refugees to travel.

Bill Moore
08-31-2015, 06:34 AM
Last night on Twitter attention was drawn to the discovery of a pile of reportedly badly forged Turkish passports and the possible Uighur links, not to terrorism, but enabling refugees to travel.

Not sure what this comment means, but this is clearly terrorism. The motivation behind the attack still remains unknown to the media. However, even media reporting points out that two apartments have been raided, and both contained bomb making materials indicating the potential for several additional attacks.

The Chinese claimed the Uighurs Thailand sent back were enroute to Syria to join ISIL, but apparently provided no evidence. However, some Uighers have been associated with Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups in Afghanistan, so while we can't trust China, their claim isn't out of the realm of the possible.

If the attack is a revenge attack due to the forced repatriation of the Uighurs or the mistreatment of the Rohingans trying to immigrate from Burma it would highlight the risks associated with the current global migration crisis. Much of it driven by the current crisis in Syria and Iraq. Perhaps it is being viewed as a crisis due to the coinciding with the economic crisis. Resulting in a right wing backlash in parts of Europe and the U.S. (due to Latin American migrants). Perhaps it is due to the perceived threat a large number of foreigners with very different cultures present to the countries taking on tens of thousands of migrants? Regardless, migration in many parts of the world ranging from Australia, Thailand, Europe, and the U.S. is now seen as a crisis that will likely result in more violence against migrants, and the raise the potential for revenge attacks. I don't see this problem going away anytime soon.