The Taliban collection (2006 onwards) [Archive]

Jedburgh

10-04-2006, 10:27 PM

...and this just in from CRG:

...An explosion on 4 October took place near the Army House in Rawalpindi and was followed on 5 October by the discovery of three rockets near the parliament building in the capital Islamabad.

Previous bombings and security incidents in these cities have been related to opposition to President Gen Pervez Musharraf within the military and intelligence agencies and from Islamic extremist groups. Although there has been speculation that Baluchi militants were involved in the latest incidents, Baluchi rebels have not tended to operate outside of Baluchistan. Meanwhile, the incidents do not fit with Islamic extremists' usual modus operandi. Several additional factors support the assessment that these incidents may be linked to elements within the military and intelligence services who wish to send a warning to Musharraf to express their increasing disillusionment:

* Islamabad and Rawalpindi have strong security measures in place, making militant infiltration difficult.

* The two incidents were well planned, showing tactical sophistication and apparent knowledge of Musharraf's movements.

* They coincided with Musharraf's highly controversial efforts to sideline and replace a corps commander.

Opposition to Musharraf

Musharraf has recently returned from a trip to the US, during which he launched his controversial autography and made highly critical comments about elements within the military. In addition, the president on 5 October appointed new 10 Corps Commander Lt-Gen Salahuddin Satti as Chief of General Staff (CGS) at the General Headquarters (GHQ). These developments have increased speculation that Musharraf's political and military support base might be becoming increasingly disillusioned with the personalised nature of his rule.

There have been three assassination attempts against Musharraf and one against his close associate Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz. In December 2003, two assassination attempts were carried out against the president in quick succession in Rawalpindi. They were initially linked to Islamic extremists, but subsequent investigations revealed links to elements within the military and intelligence services.

Rawalpindi and Islamabad incidents

The explosion in Rawalpindi's Ayub Public Park (1.3 miles (2km) from Musharraf's residence) appears to have been caused by a rocket. The following day, bomb-disposal experts defused three rockets that were found less than half a mile (1km) from the national assembly and were
aimed towards the building. The rockets were attached to mobile (cell) phones to enable remote launching, and were positioned in woods near to the diplomatic enclave, providing an opportunity to target several buildings in the area. This area has high security measures in place because of the presence of the national assembly, several government ministries, the prime minister's office and the president's office. Musharraf was addressing a press conference in the area at the time of the discovery.

Nobody has claimed responsibility for the incidents, which are likely to be linked. The authorities have provided little information apart from these basic facts...

RTK

10-04-2006, 11:01 PM

Let them into the government, show their asses or do something stupid the people don't like, and then they'll get voted out.

That's democracy.:D

Uboat509

10-05-2006, 12:28 AM

Let them into the government, show their asses or do something stupid the people don't like, and then they'll get voted out.

That's democracy.:D

Then how do you explain Ted Kennedy and John Murtha?

SFC W

Jedburgh

10-06-2006, 08:19 PM

The Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor, 5 Oct 06:

Pakistan's Peace Deal with Taliban Militants (http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370153)

...Anticipating the "bright future," Pakistan set out to build bridges to the Taliban. The September 5 peace deal is the first major step in this direction. Musharraf is now painting the Taliban as a popular resistance movement. On September 11, he told an audience in Brussels: "The center of gravity of terrorism has shifted from al-Qaeda to the Taliban," which "has its roots in the people" (Dawn, September 12). The Afghan government, however, was quick to reject his revisionist view, dismissing the Taliban as "a creation of Pakistan" (The Nation, September 13). Musharraf's thinking on the Taliban, however, does not square with his policies. In Kabul, he asked the Afghan government, "Let's fight the Taliban together" (Daily Jang, September 11). Yet, why does Musharraf make peace with the Taliban if he wants to fight them?

These contradictions reflect Musharraf's desire for Pakistan to be seen as a frontline state in the war on terrorism, which left it $20 billion richer by 2003. Most recent estimates, which have been widely circulated in the Pakistani media, show that Pakistan has cashed in $50 billion (half of its GDP) in grants-in-aid, soft loans, debt write-offs, debt-rescheduling, preferential terms of trade, selective investment and remittances between 2001 and 2006. While Islamabad is realigning its strategic interests with the resurgent Taliban, it certainly does not want to lose billions of dollars either, which have continued to flow in its direction since 9/11. Hence, Islamabad stands by the Taliban and fights them too.
...and, for a different perspective, from the International Relations and Security Network:

Pakistan Toys with New Strategy on Border (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=16758)

...Pakistan's military president General Pervez Musharraf has embarked on a new strategy designed to chip away at the Taliban insurgency by standing down the army and seeking to win the hearts and minds of the country's North Waziristan tribal agency, which borders Afghanistan.

The deal, announced earlier in September, has seen the some 80,000 Pakistani military troops deployed in North Waziristan reduce their profile and allow some local militia forces to take over the manning of some checkpoints in the area. The deal has also seen the release from custody of some tribal militants captured during the Pakistani military's recent operations in the region.

Reports also say the local tribal leaders have reciprocated by pledging to lower their profile as well, and to ensure that Taliban forces do not infiltrate the border from Afghanistan.

Musharraf believes that by standing down military troops and working toward reconstruction and development in the area, the tribal population - traditionally sympathetic to the Taliban - could shift its loyalties and work towards securing the border area...

Jedburgh

10-07-2006, 12:44 PM

6 Oct 06 Telegraph: Nato's top brass accuse Pakistan over Taliban aid (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/10/06/wafghan06.xml)

...The cushion Pakistan is providing the Taliban is undermining the operation in Afghanistan, where 31,000 Nato troops are now based. The Canadians were most involved in Operation Medusa, two weeks of heavy fighting in a lush vineyard region, defeating 1,500 well entrenched Taliban, who had planned to attack Kandahar city, the capital of the south.

Nato officials now say they killed 1,100 Taliban fighters, not the 500 originally claimed. Hundreds of Taliban reinforcements in pick-up trucks who crossed over from Quetta – waved on by Pakistani border guards – were destroyed by Nato air and artillery strikes.

Nato captured 160 Taliban, many of them Pakistanis who described in detail the ISI's support to the Taliban.

Nato is now mapping the entire Taliban support structure in Balochistan, from ISI- run training camps near Quetta to huge ammunition dumps, arrival points for Taliban's new weapons and meeting places of the shura, or leadership council, in Quetta, which is headed by Mullah Mohammed Omar, the group's leader since its creation a dozen years ago.

Nato and Afghan officers say two training camps for the Taliban are located just outside Quetta, while the group is using hundreds of madrassas where the fighters are housed and fired up ideologically before being sent to the front...

Merv Benson

10-07-2006, 04:13 PM

There is ample reason to question Pakistan's deal with the tribal leaders and considerable evidence that it has helped the enemy. It is hard to say whether this AP story (http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/world/AP-Pakistan-Taliban-Arrests.html?_r=1&oref=slogin) in the NY Times is evidence of Pakistan responding to the criticism or attempting to look like it is.

Police acting on a tip raided several militant hide-outs in southwestern Pakistan and arrested 48 suspected Taliban who had arrived in small groups from Afghanistan, police said Saturday.

The arrests were made during the past 24 hours in Quetta, the capital of southwestern Baluchistan province, said Wazir Khan, the city police chief.

However, no important Taliban figures were among the detainees, he said. They were being questioned to determine the purpose of their presence in Pakistan.

...

The last quoted paragraph may say something about the sincerity of the Pakistan effort. What the story does not say is whether the tribal leaders were responsible for the information leading to the arrest or whether the arrest show the tribal leaders are in violation of their agreement.

Jedburgh

10-14-2006, 03:36 PM

USIP, Oct 06: Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate (http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr176.pdf)

Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the neighboring regions would all benefit from a recognized open border between the two countries. Such a border would clarify that all Pashtuns have rights as citizens of one or another state and would enable them to communicate, trade, and develop both their economy and their culture in cooperation with one another. Such a settlement would strengthen democracy in both states and facilitate both Pakistan’s access to Central Asia and Afghanistan’s access to the sea. It would lessen domestic ethnic tensions and strengthen national unity in both states. It would, however, require difficult internal changes in both countries, a reversal of the hostility that has predominated in relations between the two governments for sixty years, and credible international guarantees.

A major challenge to such objectives is the Islamist insurgency on both sides of the border. In 2005 Musharraf responded to charges that the Taliban were engaging in cross-border activity by proposing to fence and mine the Durand Line, a solution reminiscent of the policies of Israel and Uzbekistan. As in Central Asia and the Middle East, such a solution will not work for many reasons. International political and military officials in Afghanistan, as well as counterinsurgency experts, agree that the key to strategic success is disrupting the Taliban’s command and control, mainly in Quetta and Waziristan, not wasting resources on the impossible task of blocking infiltration by easily replaceable foot soldiers across snow-capped mountains and trackless deserts. Fencing would further isolate the border region and create an additional obstacle to its economic development.

SWJED

04-06-2007, 08:43 AM

Afghanistan: The Other War (http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/afghanistan604/) - 10 April on PBS Frontline.

Inside an underground bunker in a secret location in Kabul, soldiers from an international military force monitor daily attacks from the Taliban, which has re-emerged this year as a major threat to Afghanistan's weak national government. The bunker is manned by members of the small NATO force now in charge of countering a growing insurgency there, as the United States shifts many of its own combat troops to Iraq. In "The Other War," FRONTLINE/World correspondent Sam Kiley confronts the reality of the West's struggling campaign in Afghanistan, with exclusive access to the NATO command in Afghanistan and provocative reporting from the front lines in the run up to a major offensive the Taliban has promised this spring.

tequila

04-11-2007, 11:22 AM

Watched part of this last night. Very enlightening, especially the segment on the Canadian PRT in Nuristan. Hard to believe that they could not even repair more than 3 water pumps for the village. At the end of the effort, NATO boards the choppers and flies away, leaving the village completely at the mercy of the Taliban. One wonders at the lack of resources available for the mission there.

tequila

09-25-2007, 01:40 PM

Taliban must be involved in peace process: Defence Minister (http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hIKdyDINSX6rnCg7-i0ovSv03FHg) - AFP 25 Sep.

Afghanistan's Islamist Taliban militia will have to be involved in the country's peace process, Defence Minister Des Browne told delegates at the Labour Party conference.

Browne also echoed comments made by the head of the British Army General Richard Dannatt, who said in June that Britain faced a "generation of conflict."

"In Afghanistan, at some stage, the Taliban will need to be involved in the peace process because they are not going away any more than I suspect Hamas are going away from Palestine," Browne told delegates at a fringe meeting late on Monday.

"But in my view, those who convene that process are entitled to say there are some basic parameters that people ought to apply to their engagement ..."

goesh

09-26-2007, 04:16 PM

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20990358/

"165 insurgents reportedly killed in Afghanistan
Two battles takes heavy toll on fighters, U.S.-led coalition statement says"

Rex Brynen

09-26-2007, 04:36 PM

Afghanistan's Islamist Taliban militia will have to be involved in the country's peace process, Defence Minister Des Browne told delegates at the Labour Party conference.

Interesting stuff--I had a not-for-attribution conversation with a senior UK official in the spring on this issue, and was told in no uncertain terms that the government was dead-set against dialogue with Taliban elements. Indeed, I was rather taken aback with the vehemence with which the view was expressed.

I wonder if its a MoD/FCO split, a Blair/Brown difference, a change over time, or whether my interlocutor was expressing a personal view as government policy.

tequila

09-26-2007, 04:53 PM

One wonders how much of this is related to current strains in Afghan politics (http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=14420468).

Karzai's continued replacement of former Northern Alliance and associated former mujahidin/warlords/commanders in both the provinces and in the central government has largely gone unnoticed and unremarked upon. That a lot of the replacements are semi-Westernized Popolzai Pashtuns like Karzai himself is significant, and increasingly the Tajiks and Uzbeks are feeling marginalized. A real showdown is brewing and we had better be ready.

Jedburgh

01-17-2008, 05:21 PM

RFE/RL, 17 Jan 08:

....Salaam, a powerful local commander who has brought some 300 militia fighters to the side of the Afghan government in northeastern Helmand Province, even gave the U.S. ambassador tactical advice on how to prevent the Taliban from attacking the strategic Kajaki hydroelectric dam, which is about 25 kilometers from Musa Qala.

In an exclusive interview with RFE/RL's [URL=http://www.azadiradio.org/en/]Radio Free Afghanistan (]Former Taliban Commander Advises US Ambassador[/URL) on the sidelines of the talks, Salaam said the international community must understand that residents of Musa Qala blame British forces for allowing the Taliban to seize their town in February 2007.

He says that is because of a deal brokered by the British in 2006 under which local militia fighters were disarmed and then expected to prevent the Taliban from moving back into the area (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2006/11/the_taliban_return_t.php).....

Rex Brynen

03-23-2008, 08:01 AM

The Globe and Mail has an excellent series of video interviews with 42 rank-and-file Taliban fighters in the Kandahar area. The series (which has just started) can be seen here (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/talkingtothetaliban).

S-2

03-27-2008, 02:17 PM

An excellent series, btw. Graeme Smith relies upon Tom Johnson of the Naval Post-Graduate School for some of his expertise. Here's Johnson's latest-

The Taliban Insurgency and an Analysis of Shabnamah (Night Letters)- NPS (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/27/opinion/27kaplan.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1)

Jedburgh

04-03-2008, 03:43 PM

2 Apr 08 testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Strategic Chaos and the Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan:

LTG (R) David Barno (http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/Bar04022008.pdf)

....In the command and control arena, the US three star HQ which I commanded, based in Kabul – a HQ which built a comprehensive civil-military counter-insurgency plan tightly linked to our embassy led by Ambassador Khalilzad -- has now been dis-established. In late 2006, NATO assumed the overall military command of Afghanistan. Our senior American military HQ – now a two star organization -- is located at Bagram air base, a ninety minute drive north of Kabul. Its geographic responsibility under NATO comprises only Regional Command East – territory representing less than one quarter of the responsibilities which the same US HQ at Bagram held in 2004. Its immense capabilities to oversee a broad counter-insurgency fight all across southern Afghanistan – much as it did in 2004 – in my judgment are being under-utilized.

The enemy in Afghanistan -- a collection of Al Qaeda, Taliban, Hezbi Islami, and foreign fighters – is unquestionably a much stronger force than the enemy we faced in 2004. There are many reasons for this change, but it is -- I am afraid -- an undeniable fact. And of course this enemy extends and in many ways re-generates within the tribal areas of Pakistan. Recent events there – particularly the worrisome prospect of a new Pakistani government entering into some sort of negotiations with the Taliban and other terrorist groups in the tribal areas – are developments which give cause for grave concern.....
Seth Jones (http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/Jon04022008.pdf), RAND

....insurgents have established a sanctuary in neighboring Pakistan. Every major insurgent group – such as the Taliban, Haqqani network, Hezb-i-Islami, and al Qa’ida – has established a command-and-control apparatus on the Pakistani side of the border. Al Qa’ida poses a particular concern because of its international scope. It has a core membership, not counting the Uzbek presence, of several hundred people clustered in such Pakistan tribal agencies as North Waziristan, South Waziristan, and Bajaur. Al Qa’ida takes advantage of other militant groups' networks to operate in settled areas of Pakistan. It has revitalized itself and returned to the operating style it enjoyed prior to 9/11. Leadership is divided among functional shura councils, covering such areas as military, political, financial, and media affairs. Finally, parts of the Pakistan government – especially current members of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI (http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i48/25.pdf)) Directorate and Frontier Corps – continue to provide support to the Taliban and Haqqani network.....
Mark Schneider (http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/Sch04022008.pdf), ICG

....Equally if not more serious, the Afghan Government has not been held accountable to its commitments on disarmament, transitional justice and human rights, and anti-corruption. The creation and demise of the Special Consultative Board for Senior Government Appointments, part of the Compact, deserves special mention—as the very first benchmark and critical to nearly everything else to be achieved in Afghanistan. The commitment was that “a clear and transparent national appointments mechanism will be established within six months, applied within 12 months and fully implemented within 24 months for all senior level appointments to the central government and the judiciary, as well as for provincial governors, chiefs of police, district administrators and provincial heads of security.” Although its members were appointed with much fanfare, the board has never properly functioned, does not have adequate staff or support and is rarely consulted. We fault the Bush Administration, the other embassies, the UN, the EU and NATO for not standing firm on that key systemic reform for transparency, human rights and institution-building.

While effective military action may deny victory to the insurgency—only effective governance will defeat it.

Ken White

04-03-2008, 04:26 PM

...We fault the Bush Administration, the other embassies, the UN, the EU and NATO for not standing firm on that key systemic reform for transparency, human rights and institution-building.or this guy has never tried to herd cats... :rolleyes:

Gotta love 'em. :wry:

Jedburgh

04-16-2008, 07:44 PM

Asia Times, 11 Apr 08: The Taliban Talk the Talk (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JD11Df02.html)

....Afghanistan is about to enter a new phase; for the first time since their ouster in 2001, the Taliban will scale back their tribal guerrilla warfare and concentrate on tactics used by the legendary Vietnamese commander General Vo Nguyen Giap, an approach that has already proved successful in taming the Pakistani military in the tribal areas.

"For the first time, the Taliban will have a well-coordinated strategy under which we will seize isolated military posts for a limited time, taking enemy combatants hostage, and then leaving them," "Dr Jarrah", a Taliban media spokesman, told Asia Times Online in a telephone conversation from Kunar province in Afghanistan.

"This is the second tier of General Giap's guerrilla strategy. The third tier is a conventional face-to-face war. This aims to demoralize the enemy," Jarrah explained. "We have been delayed by rainfall, but you shall see action by mid-April.".....

USA&USMC_COIN_Center

04-23-2008, 01:40 PM

All,

Great Item in this month's Military Review for those interested in Afghanistan:
The Taliban: An Organizational Analysis (http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/MILREVIEW_Taliban_Organizational_Analysis.pdf) by Major Shahid Afsar, Pakistan Army; Major Chris Samples, U.S. Army; and Major Thomas Wood, U.S. Army

The Taliban did not grow out of the dark overnight, nor was it unknown in the Middle East, the region of the world most severely affected after 9/11. Following its emergence in 1994 from madrassas, the Taliban achieved surprising victories over its enemies and assumed rule over much of Afghanistan.2 Simultaneously hailed as saviors and feared as oppressors, the Taliban were an almost mythical phenomenon that seemed to embody the very essence of Afghan cultural beliefs, especially revenge for transgression, hospitality for enemies, and readiness to die for honor. The Taliban knew the Afghan people and their ways and embedded themselves in the complex Afghan web of tribalism, religion, and ethnicity.

Despite their quick overthrow in 2002 by a small coalition of U.S. forces and anti-Taliban groups, the Taliban has not gone away. In fact, today, in the face of thousands of NATO and U.S. troops, a growing Afghan National Army (ANA), and a popularly elected government, the movement’s influence in Afghanistan is increasing. It continues to wage an insurgency that has prevented the new government from establishing legitimacy, and it has created massive unrest in Pakistan. Clearly, it behooves us to know something more about this archaic but formidable enemy.

Read the whole thing. Also posted on the COIN.ARMY.MIL (http://coin.army.mil)AKO and Sharepoint.

Regards,
Major Niel Smith

Norfolk

08-22-2008, 09:57 PM

This actually first appeared on the 20th in another paper:

"Taliban fielded battalion-size force only 10 months after rout, reports say (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/LAC.20080821.AFGHANISTAN21/TPStory/National)", by Murray Brewster, The Canadian Press (in the The Globe and Mail),
21 August, 2008:

OTTAWA -- Taliban militants reportedly amassed a 600-strong fighting force and dragged out bigger weapons only 10 months after being routed by NATO forces in a landmark 2006 battle west of Kandahar, newly released documents have revealed.

More at the link. During the summer of 2006 (OP MEDUSA), coalition forces bagged a Taleban force of some 400-500 men operating in and around Panjwai out of some 2,000 Taleban believed to be in the region. Early on in the operation, a force of some 100 Taleban repulsed a Canadian rifle company (leading a battle group) attempting an "unopposed" river crossing (higher had prevented proper reconnaissance from being performed prior to the attack). The Taleban got very comfortable moving around in such large units of 100 or more in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces, and this led to some coalition forces abandoning far-flung outposts or turning them over to PMC's due to lack of manpower and difficulties in reinforcing or relieving said outposts in contact.

As the article at the link points out, the released DND documents confirm that southern Afghanistan has served as a sort of proving ground for Taleban tactics and operations using company-sized elements, with the potential to operate at battalion-level. With the Taleban increasingly operating in company-sized elements in the East now for some time, might this open the way for battalion-level ops in the not-so-distant future? At Panjwai in 2006, the Taleban got clobbered when they did so, but conditions in the East are considerably different from the South, the generally much closer terrain just for starters (not to mention proximity to refuges and bases in Pakistan).

davidbfpo

08-23-2008, 10:36 AM

Check this on the Kings of War blogsite, from Kings College London War Studies Dept.: http://kingsofwar.wordpress.com/2008/08/22/les-erreursand-how/#comments

Cross-posted on the French troops ambush thread, as it comments on that incident and the wider impact of the Taliban.

davidbfpo

gh_uk

08-24-2008, 10:08 AM

A piece by Jason Burke in today's Observer;

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/24/afghanistan

While clashes in remote Helmand dominate the headlines, another battle is being waged by the insurgents on Kabul's doorstep. There, the Taliban are winning support by building a parallel administration, which is more effective, more popular and more brutal than the government's

Not very cheering, to say the least.

milnews.ca

08-29-2008, 01:26 AM

A piece by Jason Burke in today's Observer;

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/24/afghanistan

Not very cheering, to say the least.

Gee, just in time for this.....
http://uk.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUKISL11326220080828

"Afghan forces took over responsibility for the security of the capital, Kabul, on Thursday, in what is largely viewed as a symbolic move.

Although there are no plans for foreign forces to pull out of the city any time soon, the move is also meant to reflect the growing strength of the Afghan army and police force...."

Cavguy

09-05-2008, 08:08 PM

All,

An interesting conversation was started in my workspace, and I'm interested in the opinion of the larger community.

What insurgent strategy is the Taliban using currently? Some argue that they are using classic Maoist Protracted Popular War, others a vague neo-Maoist approach, a subversive approach or others.

I am currently leaning to a modern version of a Maoist insurgent model from my readings, but defer to the community's expertise.

If we understand their strategy, we can perhaps combat them a little more effectively.

Steve Blair

09-05-2008, 08:16 PM

davidbfpo

09-05-2008, 08:21 PM

The Kings of War wbsite (Wars Studies Dept, Kings College, London) also poses a similar question:

It cites this Canadian article, on a recent ambush: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/LAC.20080905.AFGHAN05//TPStory/Front and a previous comment (again Canadian): http://kingsofwar.wordpress.com/2008/08/28/westmore-out-land-ish/

My own view from this armchair is that the Taliban are relying on wearing down foriegn support for the Afghan government, following the tactics used to end the USSR's support.

davidbfpo

Hacksaw

09-05-2008, 08:30 PM

First, I know I'm not supposed to think the enemy is stupid, but in this case they do seem a bit scitzo...

Anyhow, we can parse it out a little....

Political Wing - used to have one, do they still... yes but underdeveloped and largely underground

External support - yes at least in the form of sanctuary in the FATA, but not a nation-state and it doesn't confer legitimacy accept perhaps amongst Pashtuns... so yes but limited

Focus of attacks on AFG and Coalition forces and infrastructure - IO directed at populace

My SWAG is Phase II protracted, with a goal of transitioning to a subversive strategy but not able to position candidates to win / assume seats of government.

I shall return to building pretty slides boss

reed11b

09-05-2008, 09:24 PM

From what I've read and seen (granted from a sideline view) I'd say they were using a variation of the Mao strategy, with heavy overtones of Ho and Giap thrown in for good measure. Just my opinion, of course.
Wouldn't the religious and tribal aspects of the Taliban make using a communist model problematic? Any similar patterns from the current conflict and the Talibans actions vs the SU and after the SU withdrawal? I would trust those models more personally.
Reed

Entropy

09-05-2008, 09:52 PM

To paraphrase a famous quote, "all insurgency is local." I would argue, therefore, that there is more than one strategy being implemented, depending on the region. I haven't followed Afghanistan closely for a few months now, but it seems to me there is quite a difference between the strategy in the N2K region and down south (Helmand, Kandahar, Oruzgan) to give one example. I won't pretend to know enough about insurgency theory to try to fit each piece into a particular model, so I'll leave that to others to hash out :)

Rex Brynen

09-05-2008, 09:54 PM

What insurgent strategy is the Taliban using currently?

I'm not sure how useful it is to try to understand Taliban strategy in terms of other doctrines—it is rather like asking whether US COIN strategy in Afghanistan is "Russian" or "Israeli."

I think that its a safe assumption that 95-99% of Taliban commanders have never read Mao, Giap, Lenin, Trotsky, Guevara, or Carlos Marighella (etc)--or, for that matter Saint Carl or Sun Tzu. Rather, their strategy and tactics arise fundamentally from the interaction of local social and geophysical conditions, weapons availability, experience with the Soviet occupation and civil war, and more recent learning. There is a real risk of miscasting its strengths, weaknesses, foundations, and implications if understood in other terms.

They will have "read" Muhammad—some aspects of the Prophet's rise to power in Arabia have some insurgent overtones in the early period. However, I wouldn't read much into this, given the very, very, very great differences.

Second, there are some key differences in fighting against an external occupier (as seen in Taliban eyes) and seeking to overthrow a rival domestic power, especially around the way in which one casts issues of legitimacy. (Of course, it depends on whether one is looking at CCP strategy in the 1937-45 period, or 1945-49).

Third, the Taliban probably suffers from far less unity of effort and command than did the CCP.

TheCurmudgeon

09-05-2008, 10:59 PM

Norfolk

09-05-2008, 11:40 PM

In the sense that the Taleban (at least in certain areas of the country, first in parts of the South, and now parts of the East as well) like to build up over time from small guerrilla bands to pseudo-conventional light infantry companies and battalions, then I agree with Cavguy and Steve that they are following a hybrid Maoist/Vietnamese pattern, though in the manner in which they gain and maintain local support, they seem to follow more along the lines of the VC (I use these terms only in a loose sense). For some reason, the Taleban sometimes like to go big when they have amassed the means to do so. Strategically and operationally, of course, they are all about winning the Information War; but tactically, they like to have the capability (though employing that capability somewhat judiciously) to go toe-to-toe, mano-a-mano with their enemy.

Up to a point; if they are restricting themselves to company-level attacks, and no higher, they may well win this war by continuing to avoid physical destruction while still being able to disperse easily enough to control the population while concentrating quickly enough to inflict the death of a thousand paper cuts on the will of NATO countries. I think they may have learned at Second Panjwai in 2006 that operating much above company-level would be too costly and lead to repeated setbacks. Going no higher than company-level lets them elude detection and destruction while still marshalling enough fighting power to do real damage, politically as well as tactically, at their chosen time and place. And to continue growing in strength.

reed11b

09-06-2008, 12:12 AM

I have to agree with Rex that this is not a popular uprising in the Maoist sense. My limited experience in the south and west indicated the average "man on the street" did not like the Taliban any better than they liked the coalition. This is a power struggle by a minority group not a mass popular uprising.

I will go one step further and suggest that to try to use any COIN doctrine outside the two major cities may be a mistake or at least a waisted effort. Certainly you must fight remembering that the ultimate goal is a stable pro-coalition government in place (i.e. don't randomly kill civilians, don't use airpower or artillery when you can do the same job with a more precision tools, don't appear to the locals that your life is worth any more than theirs is). We can certainly loose the war that way but I don't think that you will defeat the Taliban through attempts to win the hearts and minds of the average villager with a well or a road. I think you are going to have to defeat them by crushing, overwhelming force directed against the Taliban leadership.
I would have to disagree almost 100%. What leadership are you going to strike at? Taliban is fueled by out-of-power tribes, not by a charasmatic leadership with over-arching goals AFAIK. COIN may be exactly the way to beat them since while unpopular, they are still funded by "taxing" the countryside. Create security for the countryside, and you sap their support. Find a way to get the disaffected tribes to "buy in" the Kazari goverment and you sap there manpower. The question then is, how the heck do you do that? Wish I had an idea, but I do not.
Reed

reed11b

09-06-2008, 01:11 AM

Curmudgeon, I do agree with your assesment and observations, just not with your stated course of action. Hope that helps clarify.
Reed

TheCurmudgeon

09-06-2008, 01:53 AM

No problem. I am not emotionally wedded to the idea. I do think that COIN has become the panacea for all conflicts and while I am a staunch advocate of it in the right place, I don't think rural Afghanistan is the right place.

You are probably right that there is no charismatic leader ... no Hitler or Stalin to attack, but I don’t see the people of Afghanistan as the center of gravity in the fight in the same way it was in Iraq. I see them more like the townspeople in "The Magnificent Seven". They did not support the bandits (Taliban), they would be happy to see them gone. They live with the Taliban to to survive, not because they believe in the revolution. So if you dedicate your assets fighting the revolution that is not happening, you are not fighting the right war.

As far as the security issue you are right, but it is much more difficult in Afghanistan as the towns are smaller and more remote. Here is where I do see the advantage of paved roads. They allow response in a much quicker and safer manner. Again, the distinction with Iraq must be made. There is no oil revenue. There is no funding source that is going to allow a police station in every town. There is not a tax base and once the donor countires stop paying there will be no way to keep the local tribes on your side.

Not sure there is a military solution to the problems of Afghanistan.

Ron Humphrey

09-06-2008, 05:53 AM

No problem. I am not emotionally wedded to the idea. I do think that COIN has become the panacea for all conflicts and while I am a staunch advocate of it in the right place, I don't think rural Afghanistan is the right place.

You are probably right that there is no charismatic leader ... no Hitler or Stalin to attack, but I don’t see the people of Afghanistan as the center of gravity in the fight in the same way it was in Iraq. I see them more like the townspeople in "The Magnificent Seven". They did not support the bandits (Taliban), they would be happy to see them gone. They live with the Taliban to to survive, not becuase they believe in the revolution. So if you dedicate your assets fighting the revolution that is not happening, you are not fighting the right war.

As far as the security issue you are right, but it is much more difficult in Afghanistan as the towns are smaller and more remote. Here is where I do see the advantage of paved roads. They allow response in a much quicker and safer manner. Again, the distinction with Iraq must be made. There is no oil revenue. There is no funding source that is going to allow a police station in every town. There is not a tax base and once the donor countires stop paying there will be no way to keep the local tribes on your side.

Not sure there is a military solution to the problems of Afghanistan.

Some COIN practices from recent experience will work very well in certain more concentrated areas, more out-lying areas jab and move jab and move while developing "understandings with local leaders and make them and us accountable for those agreements (long and short offer them alternatives (when they tire of the Taleb's again they'll come to you), do whatever possible to work with the Pakistanis on border concentrations hard and relentlessly.

Lot's of time, whole lots of money, little bit of luck and a whole lot of sweat.

William F. Owen

09-06-2008, 06:33 AM

What insurgent strategy is the Taliban using currently? Some argue that they are using classic Maoist Protracted Popular War, others a vague neo-Maoist approach, a subversive approach or others.

I am currently leaning to a modern version of a Maoist insurgent model from my readings, but defer to the community's expertise.

If we understand their strategy, we can perhaps combat them a little more effectively.

Probably not Maoist. Back in the 1990's Ahmad Shah Massoud met with an Australian Journalist who had stuided Mao's writings in China in the 1970's.

(I know the guy and he knows more about Maoist insurgency philosophy than anyone I have ever met.)

He wanted to use the Maoist model against the Taliban. It failed early on because basically, Confucian constructs do not work in Afghan culture.

Why? I really couldn't tell you but I know a man that can.

carl

09-07-2008, 02:16 PM

reed11b

09-07-2008, 02:25 PM

I wonder the right question is being asked. Perhaps we should be asking what insurgent strategy the ISI is currently using?

If the ISI is trying to run the same game on us they ran on the Russians, I don't think there is an ultimate goal beyond Afghanistan in chaos and most any strategy will do.

I find myself nodding my head in agreement. But what are our options w/ Pak? Any funding we pull out the Chinese will be more then happy to replace. Supporting India would do little to help us in A-stan, and other neighbours are either outright hostile (Iran) or have such limited infrastructure as to be of limited assistance. Not being defeatist, just admitting I have no idea what could be done. I would love to hear ideas on this.
Reed

carl

09-08-2008, 09:38 PM

Ultimately, the Pakistanis will have to realize the wishes of the ISI are probably not to the long term benefit of the country. They are the ones who will have to reign them in, or reign the military in, or both. Apparently, much of what drives them is the perceived need to confront India, Kashmir, revenge for past defeats etc; and a weak Afghanistan is a flank they won't have to worry about. So somehow, there has to be a change in that attitude. How we can effect that, I haven't a clue.

It has to be done somehow though because if the de-facto sanctuary that exists in Pakistan isn't removed, I don't see how we can win in Afghanistan.

davidbfpo

09-08-2008, 09:56 PM

Reigning in the Pakistani military and or the Pakistani ISI? Who is going to do this?

IMHO Pakistan's politicians invariably allow the military to decide national security policy - for all manner of reasons and history. The ISI has long followed a policy in line with the military's direction. I'm not immersed in what has happened there recently, but recall it was the decision of a senior prosecutor or judge to call for all ISI's prisoners to be released that prompted Musharraf's declaration of an emergency (on another thread at the time).

The policies followed by the USA and the UK have avoided confronting this question - who decides what the soldiers / spies do? Hence the "stop, go" policies of Musharraf, so well described in the NYT story: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/magazine/07pakistan-t.html?_r=1&ref=magazine&pagewanted=all&oref=slogin

In some respects Afghanistan is a "sideshow" to Pakistan.

I cannot see the Pakistani military changing to our benefit their policy stance; so what can the Pakistani politicians do? Clearly mobilising popular support is easier on "softer" issues and history indicates the public know their politicians are weak - often leading to military intervention.

The solution escapes me.

davidbfpo

Ron Humphrey

09-08-2008, 10:47 PM

In some respects Afghanistan is a "sideshow" to Pakistan.

I cannot see the Pakistani military changing to our benefit their policy stance; so what can the Pakistani politicians do? Clearly mobilising popular support is easier on "softer" issues and history indicates the public know their politicians are weak - often leading to military intervention.

The solution escapes me.

davidbfpo

beyond anyone considering it would seem to come down to making the border region the Pak military's problem rather than diversion. That however may be more readily accomplished by our common enemy there long before we figure out how to accomplish that?

If it all comes down to priorities how do you encourage another countries priorities to come more in line with your own?

Steve Blair

09-09-2008, 01:08 PM

Wouldn't the religious and tribal aspects of the Taliban make using a communist model problematic? Any similar patterns from the current conflict and the Talibans actions vs the SU and after the SU withdrawal? I would trust those models more personally.
Reed

I don't know that you can write off the Giap/Ho model as being simply a communistic model. While the leadership was certainly communist, the framework proved pretty flexible. That and the model itself could be easily lifted and modified to follow any number of settings and/or ideologies. I tend to think it's a mistake to assume that any model is automatically restricted based on the ideology of either those who created it or the leanings of the most famous practitioner. Restrictions or limitations based on social organization (i.e., the Cuban model or aspects of the National Socialist strategy) make more sense to me.

Van

09-09-2008, 01:56 PM

Earlier models of insurgency spend a great deal of time building and preserving a cell structure while establishing a shadow government, a (semi-)legitimate political front, and eventually creating 'no-go' areas within the region. There has to be some form of sanctuary (historically geographical, and often in a different sovereign region) from the beginning, and usually external financial and material support.

AQ has written a new script. Their public statements assert that their plan is that
"NO one should feel safe without submitting to Islam, and those who refuse to submit must pay a high price. The Islamist movement must aim to turn the world into a series of "wildernesses" where only those under jihadi rule enjoy security.", Sheik Abu-Bakar Naji, in "Governance in the Wilderness". Rather than methodicly building up their capabilities, they are trying to disrupt their opponents and move in to the security void. They are not bothering with much in the way of a legitimate political front in the system (like Sinn Fein), but establishing a new political system in vacuums (like the Taliban). Much of this is done exploiting 'wannabes', viral disemination of TTPs, and rather than doing things themselves, encouraging others to do things for them.

What has stayed the same; the need for sanctuaries (although some aspects of traditional sanctuaries have migrated into the internet), and the need for financial and material support. Zakat (Islamic charitable donations mandated by the Koran) is a natural source of income, as they sell themselves as a "holy" cause, and historically, terrorists routinely use conventional crime as income source. I'm not saying AQ is in the opium business, but they would surely be tempted by it, and if their not in it, the 'good Muslims' in the trade have to make Zakat somewhere... Of course, there are many illicit and profitable trafficks in Central Asia, one of the more novel ones being the smuggling of birds of prey (http://www.savethefalcons.org/home.aspx).

I think the AQ model is well suited to a theologically based movement, which explains the departure from the traditional models which were ideologically and politically based.

Cavguy

09-09-2008, 03:10 PM

Earlier models of insurgency spend a great deal of time building and preserving a cell structure while establishing a shadow government, a (semi-)legitimate political front, and eventually creating 'no-go' areas within the region. There has to be some form of sanctuary (historically geographical, and often in a different sovereign region) from the beginning, and usually external financial and material support.

AQ has written a new script. Their public statements assert that their plan is that , Sheik Abu-Bakar Naji, in "Governance in the Wilderness". Rather than methodicly building up their capabilities, they are trying to disrupt their opponents and move in to the security void. They are not bothering with much in the way of a legitimate political front in the system (like Sinn Fein), but establishing a new political system in vacuums (like the Taliban). Much of this is done exploiting 'wannabes', viral disemination of TTPs, and rather than doing things themselves, encouraging others to do things for them.

What has stayed the same; the need for sanctuaries (although some aspects of traditional sanctuaries have migrated into the internet), and the need for financial and material support. Zakat (Islamic charitable donations mandated by the Koran) is a natural source of income, as they sell themselves as a "holy" cause, and historically, terrorists routinely use conventional crime as income source. I'm not saying AQ is in the opium business, but they would surely be tempted by it, and if their not in it, the 'good Muslims' in the trade have to make Zakat somewhere... Of course, there are many illicit and profitable trafficks in Central Asia, one of the more novel ones being the smuggling of birds of prey (http://www.savethefalcons.org/home.aspx).

I think the AQ model is well suited to a theologically based movement, which explains the departure from the traditional models which were ideologically and politically based.

Van,

Great analysis, the kind I was looking for. As to your last - is AQI theology that different in its objective than say communist theology? Insurgents have often said military salvation comes from political conversion of the masses, what new aspect does Talibanistic Islam add to the mix over any other ideology?

Niel

Van

09-09-2008, 04:16 PM

is AQI theology that different in its objective than say communist theology? Insurgents have often said military salvation comes from political conversion of the masses, what new aspect does Talibanistic Islam add to the mix over any other ideology?
Ya' know, the moment I mashed the 'post' button, I had a feeling this would come up.

The short answer is that under communist (or any other political ideology), when you're dead, you're dead. Under a Christian or Jewish theological ideology, there's an after-life, but suicide is a ticket right to the bottom of the eternal cludgie.

With the taliban's flavor of Islam, the desire to live is sinful if it doesn't expressly support Jihad. And if a young man dies in Jihad, his chances for finding romance improve dramaticly. Normally, I'm all about fighting an enemy who is ready to die for his cause, we have the same endstate in mind. These guys take it all the way around the bend.

Hacksaw

09-09-2008, 06:44 PM

Van,

I can see your point as it pertains to the pointy end of the spear, but I'd argue we just be talkin' tactics with regard to the differences.

Van

09-09-2008, 09:11 PM

Hacksaw,
The strategies are fundamentally different. In classic insurgency, you build up a structure in an environment controlled by an existing political structure; AQ's new model is to undermine an existing structure with a barely coordinated/semi-viral organization until it collapses, then move in. At first glance the AQ seems nihilistic, but the apparent nihilism is step 1... At this level, one major difference is that most historic insurgencies had a political campaign but that is optional for Islamic based insurgency, as they do not distinguish between matters of religion and matters of politics.

Islamic aspirations to Caliphate are their 'supreme ultimate' under divine guidance, where communist ideologues were at best useful-idiot true believers. Given that the communist followers were under the impression that they were fighting for workers, equality, etc, there was common ground to undercut the ideology through negotiation. AQ does not allow that; convert and accept the caliphate, or die.

Hacksaw

09-09-2008, 10:01 PM

Van,

Are we talking of the Taliban in AFG, or are we talking AQ and some sort of "global insurgency"? You seem to float between the two.
I know the two are related in some ways but they are not synonymous.

To characterize the AQ ideology (movement if you want) writ large as a Global insurgency would seem to stretch the definition of insurgency beyond its useful purpose. AQ is most at odds with the muslim world most of all. It seeks a fundamental revival that it sees as only possible with the removal of western influence.

Taliban is fighting the newly constituted government, it serves the purposes of AQ, but it can more properly be characterized as an insurgency. However, I don't see why we would deem people who blow themselves up as some new form of insurgency. Rather tactics, despicable in the sense that individuals are manipulated in such a way and certainly a difficult tactical challenge, but don't see how it fundamentally changes the way we think about COIN

09-10-2008, 11:32 AM

However, I don't see why we would deem people who blow themselves up as some new form of insurgency. Rather tactics, despicable in the sense that individuals are manipulated in such a way and certainly a difficult tactical challenge, but don't see how it fundamentally changes the way we think about COIN

I have to agree with Hacksaw here. An analog is the use of Kamikazee attqcks by the Japanese in WWII. Simply another way of attacking ships that required more air defense firepower to blow the plane completely out of the air before it could be flown into a ship.

Now, American perceptions that the Japanese would fight and die to the last person in defending the home islands caused the US to select a different strategic approach to ending the war in the Pacific--use a stand off attack of massive destructive capability rather than storm ashore and fight toe to toe in a conventional way. If all Afghan insurgents/Taleban were also suicide bombers, Van's point about a strategic difference would get more purchase, IMO. However, doesn't appear to be any compelling evidence for seeing the adversary from that point of view.

Ron Humphrey

09-10-2008, 02:11 PM

human beings, whats the difference between IED's,VBIED's, SB's except the preparation and deployment process.

Wouldn't you still want to focus on the Pre-prep and prep phases just the same. It may sound callous but is it not still a reality?

davidbfpo

09-16-2008, 08:18 PM

Might fit elsewhere, but seems appropriate to add here - a report from The (London) Daily Telegraph: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/2971811/New-breed-of-Taliban-replaces-old-guard.html

davidbfpo

Featherock

09-16-2008, 08:32 PM

That's a good story about Taliban motives. I don't know how much you can extend the characterization to all Taliban/ACM, but it's a good corrective to the common notion that the Taliban are motivated first by religion.

Jedburgh

12-23-2008, 02:14 PM

ICOS, 8 Dec 08: Struggle for Kabul: The Taliban Advance (http://www.icosgroup.net/documents/Struggle_for_Kabul_ICOS.pdf)

While the international community’s prospects in Afghanistan have never been bleaker, the Taliban has been experiencing a renaissance that has gained momentum since 2005. At the end of 2001, uprooted from its strongholds and with its critical mass shattered, it was viewed as a spent force. It was naively assumed by the US and its allies that the factors which propelled the Taliban to prominence in Afghanistan would become moribund in parallel to its expulsion from the country. The logic ran that as ordinary Afghans became aware of the superiority of a western democratic model and the benefits of that system flowed down to every corner of the country, then the Taliban’s rule would be consigned to the margins of Afghan history.

However, as seven years of missed opportunity have rolled by, the Taliban has rooted itself across increasing swathes of Afghan territory. According to research undertaken by ICOS throughout 2008, the Taliban now has a permanent presence in 72% of the country. This figure is up from 54% in November 2007, as outlined in the ICOS report Stumbling into Chaos: Afghanistan on the Brink. Moreover, it is now seen as the de facto governing power in a number of southern towns and villages. The increase in their geographic spread illustrates that the Taliban’s political, military and economic strategies are now more successful than the West’s in Afghanistan. Confident in their expansion beyond the rural south, the Taliban is at the gates of the capital and infiltrating the city at will.

Of the four doors leading out of Kabul, three are now compromised by Taliban activity. The roads to the west, towards the Afghan National Ring Road through Wardak to Kandahar have become unsafe for Afghan or international travel by the time travellers reach the entrance to Wardak province, which is about thirty minutes from the city limits. The road south to Logar is no longer safe for Afghan or international travel. The road east to Jalalabad is not safe for Afghan or international travel once travellers reach the Sarobi Junction which is about an hour outside of the city. Of the two roads leaving the city to the north only one – the road towards the Panjshir valley, Salang tunnel and Mazar – is considered safe for Afghan and international travel. The second road towards the north which leads to the Bagram Air Base is frequently used by foreign and military convoys and subject to insurgent attacks......
Complete 40-page report at the link.

milnews.ca

12-23-2008, 05:06 PM

Some highlights from this article (http://www.mg.co.za/article/2008-12-23-inside-the-taliban)....

..."Salar is the new Falluja," said Qomendan Hemmet emphatically. "The Americans and the Afghan army control the highway and 5m on each side. The rest is ours." Salar district in Wardak province lies 80km south of Kabul. The Kandahar-Kabul passing through it is a major supply line for United States and Nato troops. Like the Baghdad-Fallujah road, it is littered with holes from improvised explosive devices and carcasses of burnt-out Nato supply trucks and containers....

Hemmet is a Taliban veteran who started fighting against the Northern Alliance forces in the mid-Nineties, when he was 17. He went into hiding after the capital fell, becoming the commander of the Salar district after the previous leader died three years ago. "Against the Northern Alliance we fought face to face. This war is more difficult, the enemy controls the skies and they have many weapons. Sometimes I am scared. But we yearn for fighting the kafirs [unbelievers]. It's a joyful thing."

Mullah Muhamadi, one of Hemmet's men, arrives wearing a long leather jacket and big turban. "This is not just a guerrilla war, and it's not an organised war with fronts," he said. "It's both. "When we control a province we must provide service to the people. We want to show them we can rule, and we are ready for when we take over Kabul, that we have learned from our mistakes." Muhamadi said his group aimed to carry out about three attacks a week, but they did not always have enough ammunition. "Each area has a different strategy. Here it's attacking the main road, but everywhere in this province the countryside is in our control."

He said the Taliban's main problems were bandits and land disputes, and that in solving them "we win the hearts of the people". "We went from the jihad to the government and now we are in the jihad again. We have learned from our mistakes. The leaders are the same but the fighters are new and they don't want to be like those who ruled and made mistakes."

"I convince them that the Taliban are coming. We use all the facilities we have, our words and our pens to recruit for the movement, in the university, the bazaar and everywhere in the city." The irony is that he is using the freedom of speech provided by the Afghan government. "There is free speech now and we are not scared of the government. We work cautiously, we talk to the people as if we are talking about political and daily issues. The government is too weak to monitor us."

120mm

05-01-2009, 01:26 PM

http://pakobserver.net/200905/01/news/topstories04.asp

Afghan insurgents delink from Taliban
Akhtar Jamal

Islamabad—Afghan insurgents known as “Talilban” are apparently disassociating themselves from more brutal Taliban militants in Pakistan and have even stopped calling themselves as Taliban.

A close study of statements issued by Afghan Taliban showed that for some time they have ceased using the word Taliban and have began calling themselves as “Mujahideen of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.”

According to area experts the move is apparently designed to de-link with brutal Taliban who are getting highly unpopular due to recent atrocious moves and horrifying killings of kidnapped prisoners.

Afghan experts saye that Mullah Omar and his close acquaintances had more than once denounced any action inside Pakistan and had ordered concentration only against “occupation foreign forces.”

More at the link. Very interesting development, and frankly, one I'd expected long before this. Very few places in A-stan are the Taliban well-loved.

jmm99

05-02-2009, 01:34 AM

is it new wine with an old label ? Or, just the same wine and bottle ?

The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_Emirate_of_Afghanistan) was the name given to the nation of Afghanistan by the Taliban during their rule, from 1996 to 2001.

Some links to blogs which seem connected - here (http://en.wordpress.com/tag/islamic-emirate-of-afghanistan/), here (http://sn0wfalcon.wordpress.com/2009/05/01/islamic-emirate-of-afghanistanthe-invaders-of-october-will-meet-the-fate-of-the-perpetrator-of-april-coup-dentate/) & here (http://jihadfields.wordpress.com/2008/10/10/jihad-news-updates-afghan-mujahideen-attacks-on-9th-october/).

milnews.ca

05-02-2009, 07:31 PM

The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_Emirate_of_Afghanistan) was the name given to the nation of Afghanistan by the Taliban during their rule, from 1996 to 2001.

And the term still used by Afghanistan's Taliban in its statements, like this one (http://milnewstbay.pbworks.com/f/Islamic%20Emirate%20of%20Afghanistan.pdf) (.pdf, link to non-terrorist page)

120mm

05-03-2009, 05:52 AM

I wouldn't doubt if the answer isn't "yes" to both questions. It could be various mujahideen separating themselves from Taliban, and it could also be Taliban attempting to relabel themselves. And possibly simultaneously.

It could also be incompetent reporting, as well.

jmm99

05-03-2009, 07:09 PM

e.g., JMM. But below are some Wiki links (which might be used as a start to a lot of Googling). Probably best to keep in mind that Taliban generically means students - so, the "Taliban" are not a monolith.

Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi) (TNSM, English: Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law) - These are the folks in Swat and Buner creating recent news, led by Sufi Muhammad bin Alhazrat Hassan (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sufi_Muhammad) (commonly Maulana Sufi Muhammad (http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=3&id=16588)), and his son in law Maulana Qazi Fazlullah (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maulana_Fazlullah). This group is an offshoot from Jamaat-e-Islami (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jamaat-e-Islami) (Pakistani political party founded in 1941 by Syed Abul A'ala Maududi (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sayyid_Abul_Ala_Maududi)).

All above not to be confused with Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tehrik-i-Taliban_Pakistan) (TTP; Students' Movement of Pakistan) is a mainstream Taliban militant umbrella group in Pakistan, with apparent closer ties to Mullah Omar and UBL. Baitullah Mehsud (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baitullah_Mehsud) is the leader of the pack, which came together ca. 2007-2009.

All of this gets more complicated, as per the following from the last link:

[edit] Leadership dispute
On March 27, 2009, Pakistan's Daily Times reported that Baitullah Mehsud's group was engaged in a dispute with a group lead by Qari Zainuddin Mehsud for control of South Waziristan.[38] The Daily Times described Qari Zainuddin as the "self-appointed successor of Taliban commander Abdullah Mehsud." Both groups had distributed pamphlets leveling accusations against the other groups' leader. Qari Zainuddin stated that Baitullah's group was not practicing jihad because Islam forbids suicide attacks. Baitullah's pamphlet claimed that Qari Zainuddin was a government puppet and a traitor to Islam and to the Mehsud tribe.[38] Qari Zainuddin was reported to have the support of Maulvi Nazir, a senior Taliban leader, and to have allied with the Bhittani tribe.[38]

Note 38 sources to this article (http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\03\27\story_27-3-2009_pg7_20).

Anyway, the "Taliban" are not a monolith - with quite a bit of linking and de-linking in "its" history.

Best I can do from my armchair on a Sunday afternoon.

goesh

05-04-2009, 05:38 PM

"It could also be incompetent reporting, as well. " (120mm)

-or just another opium war

120mm

05-10-2009, 09:47 AM

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article6256675.ece

ONE of Afghanistan’s most wanted terrorists is to be offered a power-sharing deal by the government of President Hamid Karzai as the country’s warlords extend their grip on power.

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who is on America’s “most wanted” terrorist list, is to hold talks with the Kabul government within the next few weeks.

Hekmatyar is the leader of Hezb-i-Islami, which has been fighting Nato troops alongside the Taliban. The hardline group is responsible for many attacks in the eastern and central regions, including the massacre of 10 French soldiers in Sarobi last year. It controls Kapisa province, just 50 miles north of Kabul.

And now the deals can be made. Not too long ago, we were rolling Hezb-i-Islami into the Taliban. Now they used to fight alongside the Taliban. Next thing you know, they'll be allies and Afghani patriots.

davidbfpo

05-10-2009, 01:13 PM

I'd take this report with a large dose of scepticism; is such publicity designed to disable any talks between the Karzai government and Hekmatyr?

There was a recent UK Channel Four report that Kabul was a city under siege; see link: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-1174647/PETER-OBORNE-Back-dark-ages-How-life-Kabul-punctuated-shootings-assassinations-kidnappings-bombings.html The TV report is on this, but may not work outside the UK: http://www.channel4.com/programmes/unreported-world/catch-up

Peter Oborne's despatch reminded me that is Hekmatyr's forces who bombarded Kabul for months during the civil war i.e. before the Taliban's appearance. Hardly encouraging for those who live in Kabul.

I am mindful that one provincial governor was or is Abu Sayyaf, whose name is linked to a terrorist group in the Phillipines (unable to quickly verify from Google search). He too fought against the Soviet supported regime and choose to be loyal to the Kabul government after US intervention.

davidbfpo

jmm99

05-10-2009, 07:16 PM

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulbuddin_Hekmatyar) and his group, according to Peter Bergen, received huge amounts of US aid, and of Saudi aid also:

Author Peter Bergen states that "by the most conservative estimates, $600 million" in American aid through Pakistan "went to the Hizb party, ... Hekmatyar's party had the dubious distinction of never winning a significant battle during the war, training a variety of militant Islamists from around the world, killing significant numbers of mujahideen from other parties, and taking a virulently anti-Western line. In addition to hundreds of millions of dollars of American aid, Hekmatyar also received the lion's share of aid from the Saudis.[21]"

21. Bergen, Peter L., Holy war, Inc. : inside the secret world of Osama bin Laden, New York : Free Press, c2001., p.69

slapout9

09-28-2009, 07:49 PM

Senator Jim Webb was on Face The Nation this weekend and made the comment that Taliban means Guvmint. So I looked it up.......dosen't mean that exactly but the answer is very revealing.

Link 1.
http://www.islam-watch.org/ImranHossain/mini_taliban_factory.htm

Link 2.
http://www.islam-watch.org/ImranHossain/mini_taliban_factory.htm

Anybody know how correct this is or is not?

Ken White

09-28-2009, 09:17 PM

To answer your direct question, a literal translation of Talib or Taleb is "A Person in need (of something)" in Arabic. It is popularly used for 'student.' The normal plural would be 'tullab' in Arabic but the Pashto plural is to add the 'an (Which in Arabic makes it 'two students'). A large batch of Koranic students out of the Paksitani Madrassas became the best organized and the largest of many factions in Afghanistan after the USSR departed. Since they were mostly students and were quite religious, they called themselves the Students; the Taleb An in Pashto. They later became the de-facto government is Afghanistan.

The world Talib is also used for 'seeker,' context dependent, in Arabic, Urdu and Pashto. It's also a popular name for boys in both India and East Africa. Abu Talib was the uncle of Mohammed and the Father of Ali, the founder of the Shi'i sect of Islam.

Webb as he often does opened his mouth before engaging his brain... :wry:

Those links posit some stuff that has been said and / or corroborated by others and refuted by still others. The owners acknowledge they're apostate Muslims. Some of their stuff is over the top but most is sorta reasonable. Viewers choice...

P.S.

David is right below -- I should have clarified that those were Afghan Students out of the Pakistani Schools and that it was an Afghan aggregation. It was supported to an extent and partly funded by Pakistan -- and Saudi interests...

Entropy

09-28-2009, 09:36 PM

It depends on the context the term is used. When most westerners refer to the "Taliban" in the context of the Afghanistan opposition group, they are talking about the "Quetta Shura" which did control most of Afghanistan, was a de facto government (if not de jure) and seeks to regain its former status.

slapout9

09-28-2009, 10:13 PM

davidbfpo

09-28-2009, 11:23 PM

Slap,

Is this why they say there is a good Taliban and a bad Taliban so to speak?

I suspect the concept of the good and bad Taliban has been around for awhile, but has gained momentum intellectually with authors like David Kilcullen and in-country by those double-dealing types who try to split off the good from the bad.

It always amuses me that few outside Afghanistan and those immersed in the country know how many ex-Taliban or ex-Mujh defected before 2001 - notably Abu Sayyaf (sorry unable to readily find a source for this as Google returns the group named after him).

I know of one in-country observer of the Taliban regime who thought their initial practical appeal - bringing law and order - was a smokescreen for their known "radical" views on religion. When they gained local and swiftly wider, not national power, many locals learnt the hard way what Taliban rule meant. That said the ruling elite were Afghans and not "volunteers" from Pakistan.

davidbfpo

tequila

09-28-2009, 11:44 PM

You're thinking of this distinguished Afghan lawmaker (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdul_Rasul_Sayyaf) and noted Friend of bin Laden. Sayyaf was the one who invited bin Laden back to Afghanistan after he got booted from the Sudan.

However Abdul Sayyaf was never a member of the Taliban, a good example of the narcissism of small differences.

rdodson

09-29-2009, 01:08 AM

First, they do not speak Arabic in Afghanistan, and while, like English, there are Arabic terms in Pashtu and Dari, in Pashtu the focal point for the term Talib is student. As used by the Afghani, Talib means student, Taliban is plural for student and they are usually drawn from the Madrassas. Omar's group were in fact his students.....

Western press, as is often the case to make things simple, attribute the term to all insurgents in Afghanistan. This is incorrect. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar has his HIG, and the Haqqani's are rulers of the Haqqani Network. While there is interaction with the groups, each, as noted, is under its own Shura Council.

Mullah Omar leads the Quetta Council, Mullah Bradder the Geri Jangle Council, and we have the Peshawar Council.

Hekmatyar and the Haqqanis operate in the same general area, Omar in the South and Brader in the West.

Entropy

09-29-2009, 01:31 AM

Is this why they say there is a good Taliban and a bad Taliban so to speak?

Maybe so. President Karzai, for example, used to be in Omar's Taliban, but quit when it became too radical. Probably not a good example ;)

Seriously though, I'm don't really know except to say, like others noted, that "Taliban" means "students" and, like anywhere, there is a spectrum of political and religious belief in Afghanistan.

William F. Owen

09-29-2009, 05:41 AM

Hebrew for "Student" is Talmid - not so far off, I would submit.

slapout9

09-29-2009, 11:50 AM

So basically it is students from madrassas that engage in revolutionary/insurgent warfare?

omarali50

09-29-2009, 06:53 PM

So basically it is students from madrassas that engage in revolutionary/insurgent warfare?

It depends. It depends on whatever rules you want to set up for yourself. You may wish to use the term for the taliban regime that existed in Afghanistan and supposedly now operates from Quetta. Or you could follow the example of the locals in the tribal areas of Pakistan and refer to the local Islamist groups (loosely affiliated with the afghan variety, but not necessarily under tight control of Mullah Omar) as taliban. Or you could use it as a semi-pejorative term for all wannabe jihadis all over the world. In India, you can even use the term "Hindu taliban" when you want to attack the Hindutva fascists (they have their own religious fanatics and can be very bloodthirsty, as seen in the massacres in Gujrat state). The Hindutva fascists will then call all their critics "taliban", meaning they accuse them of being islamist sympathizers or fellow travelers....and so on.
What Imran Hossein says about mosques and islamic centers is exaggerated but not totally untrue. All muslims (even all "observant muslims") are certainly not terrorists or even terrorist sympathizers, but orthodox Islam (not just some "misunderstanding of Islam") developed in a time of Islamic supremacy and was closely associated with the rise and success of the early Arab-Islamic empire. The laws and theology that evolved were in line with the needs of that imperial religious state. They are harsh about dealing with apostates (by definition, traitors to the cause) and blasphemers and relegate other religions to subservient status or worse (pagans get it bad, Christians and Jews not so much). They are also big on holy war since you cannot have an imperial state without a motivated imperial army. By the standards of the age, I dont think that caliphate (and we are primarily talking of the peak of the Abbassid caliphate as most of the theology and all the legal codes date from that period) was particularly intolerant. In fact, a very good case can be made that they were remarkably tolerant by contemporary standards (remember, this is the time when European Christians were launching massive genocidal campaigns of forced conversion and purification in Eastern Europe and Scandinavia, not to speak of local actions like the genocide of the cathars, which actually happened well after the Abbasids had said good bye). But no current European state idealizes those actions (or laws like the whipping you could get for not going to church on Sunday in Calvinist Geneva), but Islamist discourse ran into some kind of mysterious brick wall 800 years ago (mongols??) and hasnt moved much since then (not in Sunni lands, the shia are actually more flexible). So if you become an observant Muslim, you dont necessarily become a medieval islamic supremacist because even observant muslims dont usually read and closely follow those legal codes, but you do acquire a general idea that orthodox Islamic law (shariah law) is some sort of beautiful ideal (but one you have never actually consulted). Then one day some moron approaches you in the mosque to convince you that you need to start hating the infidels a bit more; you are not convinced, but he gets you the books and lo and behold, they do actually talk of hating infidels, waging holy war and beating recalcitrant wives. At this point, said observant muslim can either silence his inner fanatic and avoid his new found friend in the mosque (a choice that is far more common than Imran Hossein implies: human beings tend to know which side their bread is buttered, even observant muslims tend to know that) OR he or she can gradually become more and more fanatical and some small but non-trivial subset will start to dream of the lesser jihad....welcome to the shoe bomber.

slapout9

09-29-2009, 09:13 PM

It depends. It depends on whatever rules you want to set up for yourself. You may wish to use the term for the taliban regime that existed in Afghanistan and supposedly now operates from Quetta. Or you could follow the example of the locals in the tribal areas of Pakistan and refer to the local Islamist groups (loosely affiliated with the afghan variety, but not necessarily under tight control of Mullah Omar) as taliban. Or you could use it as a semi-pejorative term for all wannabe jihadis all over the world. In India, you can even use the term "Hindu taliban" when you want to attack the Hindutva fascists (they have their own religious fanatics and can be very bloodthirsty, as seen in the massacres in Gujrat state). The Hindutva fascists will then call all their critics "taliban", meaning they accuse them of being islamist sympathizers or fellow travelers....and so on.
What Imran Hossein says about mosques and islamic centers is exaggerated but not totally untrue. All muslims (even all "observant muslims") are certainly not terrorists or even terrorist sympathizers, but orthodox Islam (not just some "misunderstanding of Islam") developed in a time of Islamic supremacy and was closely associated with the rise and success of the early Arab-Islamic empire. The laws and theology that evolved were in line with the needs of that imperial religious state. They are harsh about dealing with apostates (by definition, traitors to the cause) and blasphemers and relegate other religions to subservient status or worse (pagans get it bad, Christians and Jews not so much). They are also big on holy war since you cannot have an imperial state without a motivated imperial army. By the standards of the age, I dont think that caliphate (and we are primarily talking of the peak of the Abbassid caliphate as most of the theology and all the legal codes date from that period) was particularly intolerant. In fact, a very good case can be made that they were remarkably tolerant by contemporary standards (remember, this is the time when European Christians were launching massive genocidal campaigns of forced conversion and purification in Eastern Europe and Scandinavia, not to speak of local actions like the genocide of the cathars, which actually happened well after the Abbasids had said good bye). But no current European state idealizes those actions (or laws like the whipping you could get for not going to church on Sunday in Calvinist Geneva), but Islamist discourse ran into some kind of mysterious brick wall 800 years ago (mongols??) and hasnt moved much since then (not in Sunni lands, the shia are actually more flexible). So if you become an observant Muslim, you dont necessarily become a medieval islamic supremacist because even observant muslims dont usually read and closely follow those legal codes, but you do acquire a general idea that orthodox Islamic law (shariah law) is some sort of beautiful ideal (but one you have never actually consulted). Then one day some moron approaches you in the mosque to convince you that you need to start hating the infidels a bit more; you are not convinced, but he gets you the books and lo and behold, they do actually talk of hating infidels, waging holy war and beating recalcitrant wives. At this point, said observant muslim can either silence his inner fanatic and avoid his new found friend in the mosque (a choice that is far more common than Imran Hossein implies: human beings tend to know which side their bread is buttered, even observant muslims tend to know that) OR he or she can gradually become more and more fanatical and some small but non-trivial subset will start to dream of the lesser jihad....welcome to the shoe bomber.

Thank you for the explanation, it is very impressive.

davidbfpo

11-27-2009, 08:56 PM

On Monday 23 November Dr Antonio Giustozzi, Research Fellow at the Crisis States Research Centre at the London School of Economics, spoke on his edited book “Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field” (C Hurst & Co, 2009). Described as 'the authority on the Taliban'.

Speech: http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-podcasts/event-webcasts/23-nov-2009-decoding-the-new-taliban-insights-from-the-afghan-field/ (27 mins) and Q&A (37mins). I had a snag as the volume was too low to listen easily.

Dr Antonio Giustozzi is a research fellow at the Crisis States Research Centre at the London School of Economics and has already authored “Empires of Mud” (C. Hurst. & Co, 2009), “Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan 2002-2007” (C Hurst & Co, 2008), and “War, politics and society in Afghanistan, 1978-1992” (Georgetown University Press, 2000). He is currently researching various aspects of governance and politics in Afghanistan and has written several articles and papers on this subject, covering 'warlordism', the formation of the new Afghan National Army, the Afghan insurgency in the 1980s and state building. He previously served in the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (2003-4).

Entropy

11-28-2009, 09:23 PM

All,

I thought I would highlight this since it is open source and to ensure wide dissemination (http://allthingsct.wordpress.com/2009/11/28/new-taliban-magazine-has-article-calling-for-taking-foreigners-hostage-as-prisoners-of-war/). The Quetta Shura Taliban, in one of their publications, advocates capture operations of coalition troops and foreign civilians. More at the link and here (http://allthingsct.wordpress.com/2009/10/09/abu-walid-al-masri-renews-his-links-with-the-taliban/).

Steve the Planner

11-28-2009, 09:34 PM

Entropy:

The Taliban run such an effective PR and media operation.

I was particularly intrigued by the glossy and photo-filled "In Fight" Magazine, which I, at first misread as "In Flight" magazine, conjuring up odd images of a snappy regional airline which they could use to move fighters and hostages around on---airline snacks? a menu?

That article, however, indicates that from now on they want to keep the hostages local. I guess their won't be any airline snacks?

Steve

PS- Please burn this article after reading it. None of us contemplating a triptique for that lovely destination want our wives and kids to see it.

davidbfpo

02-10-2010, 01:58 PM

Revealing the inner workings of the Taliban from its earliest days, a new autobiography by a senior former member, Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, throws extraordinary light on the people who are fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, co-editors of My Life with the Taliban, a memoir by the former ambassador to Pakistan.

Link: http://frontlineclub.com/events/2010/02/understanding-the-taliban.html with a podcast of the launch meeting.

Amazon link: http://www.amazon.com/Life-Taliban-Abdul-Salam-Zaeef/dp/1849040265 (no reviews on site, there are others elsewhere). Just found Ahmed Rashid includes a sharp review, at Point 6, in a wider comment on the situation: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/23630

davidbfpo

02-28-2010, 04:07 PM

I am sure SWC have discussed the Taliban in many ways, but possibly not under this heading.

SWC member Melissa Payson co-authored an article 'The Taliban Are Still Here to Stay' here:http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-02-16/the-taliban-are-here-to-stay/

Melissa has worked both sides of the Durand Line and was last working in North Waziristan.

Just a few quotes:
The only real solution to both nations’ existential crises is to engage directly in politics that are local, tribal, and perpetual. With the clock ticking rapidly for NATO to deliver stability in South Asia, success will depend on a paradigm shift in the West’s ability to grasp and act upon this.

Point 1:
First, the local. Both NATO forces and the Afghan government are meant to follow the current Marja battles with a governance strategy of winning over Taliban commanders and fighters and engaging villages in economic reconstruction projects.

Point 2:
Engaging directly with the tribal population must be the second pillar in any partnership...Any effective strategy must acknowledge and integrate the permanent staying power and territorial legitimacy of the Pashtuns....

Finally:
Finally, we have to come to terms with the perpetual nature of negotiations with local and tribal populations. A longer time horizon can save us from repeating the mistakes of the past, such as focusing solely on military solutions and attempting to buy off capital elites. To avoid Afghanistan becoming another Vietnam, these will have to continue long after Obama has brought the troops home.

Amidst the "spin" over Marjah, the ambiguities of the "round up" of the Quetta Shura and far more - now the SWC can comment.

Bob's World

03-01-2010, 08:26 AM

I really have a hard time with alarmist statements like "existential threats." Like all forms of name calling, it is designed to cause people to shut down their rational thinking processes and react emotionally instead.

As to the "Taliban being here to stay." That may well be true, but at the same time no call for undue alarm. Afterall, are not "Protestant Christians" here to stay as well? In the 1500s statements like that may have been a great rallying cry for a Holy Roman Empire which employed a Catholic Christian ideology to control its populace. But most would probably agree that Protestants were a necessary evil, and have evolved considerably over the years. They are here to stay, but they are not an "existential threat." to anybody.

I think most analysts have their noses to close to these problems, both in time and space, to see them clearly. We need to do a better job of stepping back and gaining clearer, more rational perspectives.

Entropy

03-05-2010, 12:39 AM

Frontline came out with a new episode on the "Taliban" (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/talibanlines/?utm_campaign=homepage&utm_medium=bigimage&utm_source=bigimage) (actually they are mostly HiG) which is quite good. An afghan reporter "embeds" with the insurgents in Baglan province and follows and films them on a mission to ambush coalition forces with IED's, RPG's etc. Provides some valuable insight on fighter TTP and motivation. All in all, well worth the time to watch.

davidbfpo

03-05-2010, 06:31 AM

An Afghan journalist's (Najibullah Quraishi) extraordinary 10 days living and filming with an insurgent cell allied with Al Qaeda to sabotage a key U.S./NATO supply route...

Quraishi manages to interview the man in charge of some 4,000 Hezb-i-Islami fighters in the north. His name is Cmdr. Mirwais, a former millionaire businessman who turned to jihad after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. "Jihad has become a duty for all the Afghan nation because the foreign and non-believer countries have attacked us," Mirwais says. "They're getting rid of our religious and cultural values in Afghanistan. They've increased obscenity and want to force Western democracy on our country."

In a telling scene near the end of the film, the local Afghan police seem not to appreciate -- or even to acknowledge -- the extent of the insurgent threat in the north. "Everything's fine," the police chief says. "There's no problem. They've caused some problems, but everything's fine in this area near the main road. It's not a problem."

The film is not available in the UK.

Kiwigrunt

03-05-2010, 08:35 AM

The film is not available in the UK.

Nor down-under.

Entropy

03-05-2010, 01:26 PM

Can you guys get this on youtube? (http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=behind+taliban+lines&search_type=&aq=f)

tequila

03-05-2010, 02:03 PM

Haven't watched it yet, but the interview with the journalist at the website is quite fascinating. The clear divide between the local groups and the "Central Group" under the HiG commander Mirwais represents a real opportunity. The tight links between HiG and al-Qaeda, Pakistani, and IMU fighters is also made clear.

davidbfpo

03-05-2010, 11:27 PM

Can you guys get this on youtube? (http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=behind+taliban+lines&search_type=&aq=f)

Yes, comrade - can be viewed in the UK and will try to watch another day.

OfTheTroops

03-06-2010, 01:10 AM

Its pretty good. It paints a more realistic picture of the insurgent. I love how they fire the RPG so they can get out of the field ( they have to wait until opportunity presents) and then make the false report to their hq that they had killed them all.

Press "d" it doesnt work ....nearing blows "i should kill you"........press "d" .......oh "d" boom

davidbfpo

03-06-2010, 08:58 PM

A very critical review of this new book 'My Life with the Taliban':

In his foreword to Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef’s book, Professor Barnett Rubin of New York University sets the stage for the launch, ostensibly, of a refreshingly authentic work of this inaccurate and revisionist take on contemporary Afghan history.

My Life with the Taliban, written by the former Taliban ambassador to Pakistan, has been praised across the board by the media ‘Afghanologists’ such as Ahmed Rashid and Peter Bergen to academics like Antonio Giustozzi of the London School of Economics, without any critical evaluation....

To those of us who grew up in the NWFP or Afghanistan at the height of US-Saudi-Pakistani anti-Soviet war, the crude lies presented in the account are all too apparent from the get-go, as is the translators-cum-editors’ shallow understanding of the local languages and culture...

(And ends with)My life with the Taliban is a poor narrative by a tainted and poor historian (raavi-e-zaeef). The glorification of the book by authors of repute, impugns their credibility too.

Link:http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\03\05\story_5-3-2010_pg3_6

davidbfpo

04-24-2010, 08:18 PM

Hat tip to Jihadica. This report 'The Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan – organization, leadership and worldview' comes from the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 86 pgs and only skimmed so far.

Link:http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00136/00359_136353a.pdf

The opening paragraph in the summary:
The aim of this report is to get a better understanding of the Taliban movement and its role in the Afghan insurgency post-2001. The approach to this is three-fold: First, the report discusses the nature of the Afghan insurgency as described in existing literature. The second part looks at the organizational characteristics of the largest and most well-known insurgent group in Afghanistan: the Taliban movement (or Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, IEA) led by Mullah Omar. The third and most extensive part of the report analyses the Taliban leadership’s ideology and worldview, based on the official statements of its organization and leaders.

Or shorter:
The primary aim of this report is to examine the Taliban’s official publications and statements in order to get a better understanding of who the “Taliban” are, seen from the insurgents’ own perspective.

The last paragraph concludes:
Lastly, the report discussed the IEA’s attitudes towards negotiations and power-sharing. For the time being, it looks like any attempt to negotiate with the IEA’s leaders directly would serve to strengthen the insurgent movement, rather than putting an end to the violent campaign in Afghanistan. A more realistic approach is probably to try to weaken the IEA’s coherence through negotiating with low-level commanders and tribal leaders inside Afghanistan. The insurgent movement consists of a wide variety of actors, which may be seen as proof of its strength – but it could also constitute weakness if properly and systematically exploited.

JMA

04-27-2010, 04:58 PM

Korangal Outpost.

Gen Stanley McChrystal orders the Korangal Outpost abandoned. Re-positioning he calls it. Is anyone buying that this withdrawal is anything but a defeat?

http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/22/now-entering-the-korangal-valley-the-taliban/

davidbfpo

07-10-2010, 05:33 PM

Worth checking the lengthy review of Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop by Antonio Giustiozzi on:http://zenpundit.com/?p=3471

The last sentence sums it up:
What the reader will get from Giustozzi is a grasp of who the Neo-Taliban are as a fighting force and the convoluted, granular, social complexity of Afghan political life in which the US is attempting to wage a COIN war.

I suppose I better read it now!

40below

07-10-2010, 05:42 PM

Worth checking the lengthy review of Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop by Antonio Giustiozzi on:http://zenpundit.com/?p=3471

The last sentence sums it up:

I suppose I better read it now!

Well, it's not just you guys who are doing it.:D

davidbfpo

07-26-2010, 07:16 PM

Not sure if previous papers in this series have been posted here.

The latest paper 'The Taliban Beyond the Pashtuns' by Antonio Giustozzi and the Abstract states:
Although the Taliban remain a largely Pashtun movement in terms of their composition, they have started making significant inroads among other ethnic groups. In many cases, the Taliban have co-opted, in addition to bandits, disgruntled militia commanders previously linked to other organizations, and the relationship between them is far from solid. There is also, however, emerging evidence of grassroots recruitment of small groups of ideologically committed Uzbek, Turkmen and Tajik Taliban. While even in northern Afghanistan the bulk of the insurgency is still Pashtun, the emerging trend should not be underestimated.

Link:http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/Afghanistan_Paper_5.pdf

Previous papers are on:http://www.cigionline.org/publications/paper-series/234

davidbfpo

08-05-2010, 09:27 PM

A UK Channel 4 TV commentary on a freelance reporter being embedded and later kidnapped by the Taliban:
Channel 4 News has obtained rare film of Taliban fighters on the Afghanistan frontline, including footage of their attacks on US forces. Channel 4 News Chief Correspondent Alex Thomson looks at what the film tells us about the insurgents and their tactics.

The video alas is not working at the moment and yes, often refuses to play abroad.

Link:http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/politics/international_politics/living+with+the+taliban+on+the+afghan+frontline/3734447

davidbfpo

08-16-2010, 08:53 PM

Ahmed Rashid, the respected journalist and author of:
Ahmed Rashid, whose book Descent into Chaos is the definitive work on the Afghan war spoke at IISS (London) on 21st July 2010, on:
addressed the problems associated with talking to the Taliban, regional tensions, the roles played by Afghanistan and Pakistan, the capacity of the Karzai government to win over the non-Pashtun ethnic groups and the problems that can occur with power sharing agreements.

Link:http://www.iiss.org/programmes/afghanistan-security/events/talking-to-the-taliban-the-role-of-afghanistan-prospects-and-portents/

This is a video of the talk and Q&A.

In a follow-up in The Spectator under the headline 'Pakistan's double game in Afghanistan':
A few months ago Hamid Karzai would have been thrilled to have confirmation that American officers are speaking openly about how divisions of Pakistani intelligence are helping the Taleban. But after spending eight years criticising the ISI, he recently decided to cosy up to them. This change is crucial to understanding what is really happening in Afghanistan.

Karzai seems to have given up on the ability of the Americans, the Brits and Nato either to defeat the Taleban or even to talk to them. This is why he has turned to Pakistan and Iran: his own freelance attempt to try to broker a ceasefire with the Taleban which would involve a power-sharing deal.

I like the last sentence, yes pithy:
The mess in Afghanistan has just got messier.

Link to article:http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/all/6172998/increasingly-isolated-karzai-turns-to-pakistan.thtml

davidbfpo

08-21-2010, 07:09 PM

Hat tip to Circling the Lion's Den, who have found this article on Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, with the full title: 'Former Egyptian jihadist predicts Taliban victory' by:
Dr Fadl (real name Sayyid Imam Abdulaziz al-Sharif) was a leading member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, along with al-Qaeda No2 Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri, but recanted his beliefs while serving a life sentence in prison in Egypt. He later criticised the 9/11 attacks as both immoral and counterproductive..

Link:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot.com/2010/08/former-egyptian-jihadist-predicts.html

....12 reasons why the Taliban will win:
1. A successful jihad must be accompanied by a religious reform movement. The religious motivation of the Taliban (as opposed to tribal loyalties or the pursuit of wealth) meets this criterion.
2. The Taliban cause is just, as it seeks to repel foreign occupation.
3. Cross-border tribal bonds with Pakistani Pashtun tribesmen are vital to the jihad’s success; “Loyalty of the Pashtu in Pakistan to the Pashtu in Afghanistan is stronger than their loyalty to their government in Islamabad.”
4. Jihad has popular support from the people of Afghanistan, who provide fighters with support, shelter and intelligence.
5. The nature of the terrain in Afghanistan and the inaccessibility of Taliban refugees make it eminently suitable for guerrilla warfare; “He who fights geography is a loser.”
6. The backwardness of Afghanistan favours the success of jihad. The Soviet experience proved that even a scorched earth policy has little effect on people who are tolerant, patient and have little to lose in the first place. There is little in the way of cultural establishments to be destroyed – Afghanistan’s monuments are its mountains and “even atomic bombs do not affect them.”
7. As the battlefield widens beyond the Taliban strongholds in the south, occupation forces must face increasing financial and personnel losses.
8. Both time and the capacity to endure losses are on the side of the Taliban, who “do not have a ceiling to their losses, especially with regard to lives…”
9. Suicide operations make up for the shortage of modern weapons.
10. After three decades of nearly continuous warfare, Taliban fighters and leaders have the necessary experience to prevail against the occupation.
11. History is also on the Taliban’s side. Despite being world powers, both the British Empire and the Soviet Union failed to conquer Afghanistan.
12. Pakistan’s support of the Taliban provides the necessary third-party refuge and supplies to any successful guerrilla struggle.

Can anyone argue with his logic?

Yes, this could fit in a number of threads, but as OEF-Afghanistan is now really the 'Long War' it deserves exposure in its own thread.

Rodin

08-21-2010, 08:14 PM

It is interesting to note how much western thought, both good and bad, pervades his points. Setting aside the overtly religious notions, were a western author to base a book on those arguments they might justly be accused of orientalism.

From this summary it apears 'Dr Fadl' may be re-imagining jihad as a kind of Islamic way of national resistance.

davidbfpo

08-21-2010, 08:21 PM

I just find that the author, Dr Fadl, was being praised for his writings when countering AQ's version of the Jihad and one can hardly expect his views on the Taliban to be greeted enthusiastically, let alone given greater publicity.

Global Scout

08-21-2010, 10:09 PM

1. What he refers to as a religious reform movement is actually religious based terrorism, where the Taliban are "imposing" their extremely cruel form of Sharia Law (IAW your local warlord who can't even freaking read, much less have a knowledgable grasp of Islamic law). Most importantly, most Afghans don't this form of Sharia law, but they do want the fighting to end, which they may believe a Taliban victory would provide.

2. Unfortunately I can't argue this point, and I bet the vast majority of Afghans see us a foreign occupation force, while we still see ourselves as the cowboy wearing the white hat. Just here to help you little people out. Jihad has a degree of popular support because we are seen as occupiers.

5. “He who fights geography is a loser.” All wars take place in terrain, and while the terrain is challenging, we're not fighting the terrain, we negotiating it. The enemy does enjoy some protection offered by the terrain, but also faces many of the same terrain challenges we do.

6.
The backwardness of Afghanistan favours the success of jihad. Since we're not employing coercive strategy against the people of Afghanistan I'm not sure this is relevant. However, if our vision of victory is modern and stable state, then it is.

7.
As the battlefield widens beyond the Taliban strongholds in the south, occupation forces must face increasing financial and personnel losses. What's new here, but we need to remember that the other side is also taking casualties and is financially strained.

8. Both time and the capacity to endure losses are on the side of the Taliban, who “
do not have a ceiling to their losses, especially with regard to lives…” That is his opinion, but I think every group/nation has a breaking point where they lose the will to fight.

9.
Suicide operations make up for the shortage of modern weapons. Suicide attacks make for good propaganda, but realistically from a military viewpoint just how effective are they? They do not "in military terms" make up for the shortage of modern weapons; however, they're an effective political/psychological weapon.

10.
After three decades of nearly continuous warfare, Taliban fighters and leaders have the necessary experience to prevail against the occupation. Both sides are learning, so while important three decades of warfare doesn't equate to the "necessary" experience required for victory. More than experience is required.

11.
History is also on the Taliban’s side. Despite being world powers, both the British Empire and the Soviet Union failed to conquer Afghanistan. The Taliban didn't defeat the Soviets or the British Empire. The Taliban are a Johnny come lately in Afghanistan history.

12.
Pakistan’s support of the Taliban provides the necessary third-party refuge and supplies to any successful guerrilla struggle.

Sadly this is true, but the winds "seem" to be changing in Pakistan ever so gradually. If Pakistan quits providing support to the Taliban, would the Taliban stand even a remote chance of winning? I see a lot of talk about strategy, seems to me that the strategic center of gravity isn't in Afghanistan, but Pakistan and if we get that right the Taliban will lose.

Dayuhan

08-22-2010, 09:55 AM

Sadly this is true, but the winds "seem" to be changing in Pakistan ever so gradually. If Pakistan quits providing support to the Taliban, would the Taliban stand even a remote chance of winning? I see a lot of talk about strategy, seems to me that the strategic center of gravity isn't in Afghanistan, but Pakistan and if we get that right the Taliban will lose.

I think we lose sight of the real problem when we say that "Pakistan" supports the Taliban. If support for the Taliban were a policy of the Pakistani government, the possibility of changing that policy would be open. It might be more accurate, though, to say that portions of the Pakistani populace, the Pakistani military, the ISI, and other government entities support the Taliban, and the government lacks the capacity to control these portions or to compel them to stop supporting the Taliban. This is a bit more complicated: we may be able to pressure the Pakistani government into changing its policies, but if that government lacks the capacity to enforce its policies it really doesn't matter.

davidbfpo

10-13-2010, 08:42 PM

Amidst a news round up are a couple of paragraphs (shortened), with links, on the state of the Taliban armoury in Helmand, after the Marja fighting:

Have you ever wondered what an insurgent’s gun locker looks like? The New York Times has for some while been looking at what weapons the Taliban and associated groups have at their disposal, how they equip themselves, and what each might tell us about their ability to function as a fighting force. The area of Marja, in Helmand Province...captured 26 firearms – of which twelve were variants of the Kalashnikov, eight were fifty-year-old bolt-action assault rifles, four were variants of the PK machine gun, and two were semi-automatic pistols...

According to the New York Times, the weapons collected – and in particular the presence of a growing number of ancient bolt-action rifles in the regions – fit a broader pattern which suggests arms supply issues may well be starting to affect militant groups’ attack capabilities – though at the same time, the report stresses that an apparent decline in the prevalence of assault rifles should not be taken to indicate a dramatic drop in the availability of all types weapons across Helmand.

The report’s author also draws attention to the repairs carried out on a number of the captured weapons – repairs that, while certainly hindering their overall accuracy, render them usable nevertheless. A testament to their owners resourcefulness or, again, to increasingly limited supplies? The answer, it is suggested, probably lies somewhere between the two...

..Old they may be, but together they have helped some of the poorest and least well-equipped forces in the world stand up to one of the biggest, best funded and most technologically sophisticated armies ever seen.

Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/security_briefings/121010?utm_source=feedblitz&utm_medium=FeedBlitzEmail&utm_content=201210&utm_campaign=0

davidbfpo

10-13-2010, 08:57 PM

Hat tip to Circling the Lion's Den:
The latest report from the Institute for the Study of War on the Haqqani network in Eastern Afghanistan is a tour de force by author Jeffrey Dressler. The Haqqani Network: From Pakistan to Afghanistan explains how this formidable fighting organisation, based on two generations of fighters, has become the most dangerous element of the Afghan Taliban.Ends with:
Dressler's report is full of facts and details and essential reading for anyone who wants to follow the military campaign.

Link:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot.com/2010/10/understanding-haqqani-network.html

Report, as yet un-read:http://www.understandingwar.org/files/Haqqani_Network.pdf

carl

10-13-2010, 10:38 PM

David:

The article from Open Democracy was mostly a rewrite of one a long series of works C.J. Chivers has done over at the NYT regarding Taliban weapons and weapons use. They are very good.

Regarding this quote from the Open Democracy piece:

"eight were fifty-year-old bolt-action assault rifles"

Bolt action assault rifles! Will wonders never cease. The NYT story said "bolt action rifles." That wasn't dramatic enough for Open Democracy I guess.

JMA

10-14-2010, 03:13 PM

Amidst a news round up are a couple of paragraphs (shortened), with links, on the state of the Taliban armoury in Helmand, after the Marja fighting:

Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/security_briefings/121010?utm_source=feedblitz&utm_medium=FeedBlitzEmail&utm_content=201210&utm_campaign=0

Before we get shot away and turn the Taliban into some over hyped mythical super human force as a result of the above I suggest rather than read into that how well the Taliban are performing given poor weapons against best equipped forces in the world today (US and Brit) see it as an indication of how poorly the tactical approach from ISAF has been. The more I learn about the Taliban the more I agree with Fuchs that in this war soldiering standards among ISAF are dropping precipitously to the extent when they come against a competent enemy in the near future or in the next war they will be in for a nasty surprise.

davidbfpo

10-14-2010, 09:40 PM

The headline from an article in The Australian, which struck me as different, but started to wonder when I read one cited source:

The best Taliban commanders are dead or captured. Their men are harried and subject to constant attack and betrayal. They are under-equipped, overwhelmed and demoralised. In a word, the Taliban are losing....

"The Taliban are broken and defeated here," Ahmed Wali Karzai, the brother of the President and the south's most powerful Afghan leader, told The Times yesterday.

"They are in a miserable state. Their best commanders are all dead and their fighters run here and there. Their casualties are high and they can barely fight."

Link:http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/taliban-on-verge-of-collapse-nato-and-afghan-officials-believe/story-e6frg6so-1225935962365

Or The Washington Post, by retired General Keane after a two week visit:
First, most commanders with whom he spoke said they are encountering Taliban who want to stop fighting and reintegrate into Afghan society. "That's a big deal," he said.

Second, "There's evidence of erosion of some of the will of the Taliban. We pick it up in interrogations, and we also pick it up listening to their radio

traffic and telephone calls in terms of the morale problems they're starting to have."

Link:http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/11/payoff-seen-in-afghan-surge/

Both reports up via a previously un-heard UK website, which in a comment added this:
Three thousand captured or confirmed killed in pre planned raids over 90 days, thats new.

Citing an article in The Daily Telegraph, not yet id'd.

Is this "spin" or a reality the usual media recoil from? Reading a "boots on the ground" perspective provided by http://blog.freerangeinternational.com/ I wonder.

davidbfpo

10-15-2010, 08:38 PM

Speaking in London, at RUSI, today General Petraeus, two selected paragraphs:
the US general, who was answering questions at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London, denied that there had been a change of tactics away from trying to win over the population as part of a “counter-insurgency” strategy and towards a targeted “counter-terrorism” strategy.

He said the increase in targeted attacks was part of a general “civilian-military” strategy that also included increasing the capacity of the government to provide services and trying to persuade the Taliban to defect, as part of what he described as a “comprehensive” approach.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/8066718/General-David-Petraeus-special-forces-eliminate-300-Taliban-and-al-Qaeda.html

The full speech is not yet on the RUSI website, will add a link when available.

JMA

10-15-2010, 10:29 PM

Or The Washington Post, by retired General Keane after a two week visit:

Link:http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/11/payoff-seen-in-afghan-surge/

Gen. Keane states the blindingly obvious (quote below) and one is left wondering why it has taken years for this action to be taken?

"Support zones are up in the mountains, where they use villagers to help hide their weapons caches. Safe havens are up there, too, usually away from everybody, and we are denying them the use of those. We are interdicting and disrupting their operating areas, which had a tendency to focus on the roads quite a bit, and we're interdicting what they're doing there."

davidbfpo

10-18-2010, 09:07 PM

After the post above with the title 'Taliban on verge of collapse, NATO and Afghan officials believe' comes report by the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office:
http://www.afgnso.org/2010Q/ANSO%20Quarterly%20Data%20Report%20(Q3%202010).pdf

The first paragraph:
The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban) counter-offensive is increasingly mature, complex and effective. Country-wide attacks have grown by 59% while sophisticated recruitment techniques have helped activate networks of fighters in the North where European NATO contributors have failed to provide an adequate deterrent. Some provinces here are experiencing double the country average growth rate and their districts are in danger of slipping beyong any control. Clumsy attempts to stem the developments, through the formation of local militias and intelligence-poor operations, have served to polarise communities with the IEA capitalising on the local grievances that result. In the South, despite more robust efforts from the US NATO contingents, counter-insurgency operations in Kandahar and Marjah have similarly failed to degrade the IEA's ability to fight, reduce the number of civilian combat fatalities or deliver boxed government.

The report has graphs and maps - worth a browse.

Hat tip to Circling the Lion's Den.

anna

11-25-2010, 09:14 PM

The fact is:
the Talian IS winning!
Taliban fighter have more support in the public that ISAF.
Under the Taliban, there was order, now there is chaos caused by western forces.
You do the math!

You guys can post any interview or article with this Gen. or that politician.
All are liars, all trump their pro-invasion view and dismiss reality.

Soon, the west will run out of money and steam. Just look at Europe right now, at time of this posting.

The us and a is bankrupt, prints money at time of this post.

"Allies" departing from Afghanistan, Canada will stop fighting in a few month (will keep approx. 1000 personal there, most ast trainers).

There is a new war on the horizon.
Nobody will have the time, resources and money to keep going in Afghanistan.

JMA

11-26-2010, 12:35 AM

There is a new war on the horizon.

OK, so who will it be this time?

davidbfpo

12-01-2010, 11:08 PM

A short briefing paper by the London-based Quilliam Foundation, starts well IMHO, but tails off in the recommendations:http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/images/stories/pdfs/al-qaeda-taliban-briefing.pdf?dm_i=JI3,BIVF,2Q5RQ7,WFU2,1

Jedburgh

12-23-2010, 09:10 PM

SWP, 23 Dec 10: Escalation in the Kunduz Region: Who Are the Insurgents in Northeastern Afghanistan? (http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2010C33_sbg_wmr.pdf)

Although approximately 5,000 US soldiers were transferred into Northern Afghanistan in the first half of 2010 and there have been initial military successes, the intensity of the insurgency in the Kunduz region has not diminished. Instead, there has been a continuing escalation of violence there in recent months. The unabated strength of the insurgency is based primarily on highly diversified leadership and logistical structures. The insurgency in the northeast consists of several groups, which follow different strategic objectives, but maintain close tactical cooperation. The main groups are the Afghan Taliban, the Islamic Party of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Additional groups include the Haqqani Network and al-Qaeda. It is important to assemble precise information about the ideological and strategic characteristics of these groups as only then can effective military action be taken and only then can decisions be made about which groups must be approached as negotiation partners.

carl

12-23-2010, 09:48 PM

Jed:

This may be off topic but that photo of Santa's demise is GREAT!

SWJ Blog

02-14-2011, 10:02 PM

Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Changing Face of Uzbek Militancy (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/02/alqaeda-the-taliban-and-the-ch/)

Entry Excerpt:

Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Changing Face of Uzbek Militancy
by Jeffrey Dressler and David Witter

Download the Full Article: Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Changing Face of Uzbek Militancy
(http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/676-dressler.pdf)

Although Uzbek militants have been active in Afghanistan and Pakistan since the late 1990s, little attention has been paid to these fighters. Principally, the Islamic Movements of Uzbekistan—formed in 1998 by Toher Yuldashev and Juma Namangani—is the main organization which organizes and directs these militants. The group’s main focus has always been ousting Uzbek President Islam Karimov in favor of installing an Islamist regime. Over the past several years however, the IMU has strengthened its ties with the likes of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, focusing not just on northern Afghanistan but internationally as well—a particularly troubling development that has managed to fly under the radar.

The IMU has maintained close ties with the Taliban and al-Qaeda since the late 1990s, meeting with Taliban officials and Osama bin Laden in 1997 and later, agreeing to set up a base of operations in northern Afghanistan while Yuldashev resided in Kandahar with Taliban senior leadership in 1998. In exchange for using northern Afghanistan as a launching pad into the central Asian states, the IMU provided militants to the Taliban to battle the Northern Alliance, led by Ahmed Shah Massoud. In 2000, the group was designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, who noted the group’s close association with al-Qaeda. After fighting losing battles with invading U.S. forces in the north and east in 2001, the IMU relocated to South Waziristan in Pakistan where it reconstituted, partially shifting its focus to assist a clan of Waziri tribal militants in fighting against the Pakistani government.

Download the Full Article: Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Changing Face of Uzbek Militancy
(http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/676-dressler.pdf)

Jeffrey Dressler is a analyst focusing on Afghanistan and Pakistan security dynamics at the Institute for the Study of War (http://www.understandingwar.org/) in Washington, DC. David Witter assists with research at ISW and is the author of the ISW Backgrounder, “Uzbek Militancy in Pakistan’s Tribal Region.”

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Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/02/alqaeda-the-taliban-and-the-ch/) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

SWJ Blog

02-18-2011, 01:50 PM

Negoitiating with the Taliban (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/02/negoitiating-with-the-taliban/)

Entry Excerpt:

Conflict resolution and peace negotiations will be highlighted over the coming months as the United States begins a shift in President Obama's comprehensive counterinsurgency plan towards transition. Here is one empirical study that is of significant note.

Negotiating with the Taliban: The Timing and Consequences of Settlements in Foreign Power COIN Wars (http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/WebJournal/Article.aspx?ArticleID=63)
by Andrew J. Enterline and Joseph Magagnoli

The emergence of a negotiated settlement as the goal of the American-led allied military mission in Afghanistan raises several questions: How likely is a negotiated settlement with Taliban insurgents? How long will it take to conclude negotiations with the Taliban? What is the likely long-term byproduct of negotiating with the Taliban? How close will the post-settlement facts on the ground be to American goals in Afghanistan? How will the recent strategy change in OEF influence negotiations and the resulting short- and long-term consequences? We investigate these questions by exploring patterns of negotiations between foreign powers and insurgents in COIN wars during the twentieth century. Our analysis serves as a probe of the aforementioned policy questions, such that we are merely querying the historical record to gain an understanding of how counterinsurgent armies fared in negotiations with insurgents. This probe provides a foundation from which to develop a theory of COIN negotiations that we intend to pursue subsequently.

Much more at The Culture & Conflict Review (https://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/WebJournal/Default.aspx)

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SWJ Blog

03-23-2011, 10:00 AM

Beating Back the Taliban (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/03/beating-back-the-taliban/)

Entry Excerpt:

Beating Back the Taliban (http://m.rand.org/commentary/2011/03/14/FP.html) by Dr. Seth Jones, Foreign Policy / RAND. BLUF: "Despite all the political hand-wringing in Washington over the war in Afghanistan, it's the Taliban who are now on the defensive on the military battlefield. Indeed, there is a growing recognition among senior Taliban leaders that they are losing momentum in parts of southern Afghanistan, their longtime stronghold. This is more than the normal winter lull of senior Taliban fighters migrating to Pakistan: The Taliban have definitively lost territorial control in parts of Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, and other southern provinces."

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SWJ Blog

04-15-2011, 11:00 AM

U.S., Taliban Not Ready For Peace Talks (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/04/us-taliban-not-ready-for-peace/)

Entry Excerpt:

U.S., Taliban Not Ready For Afghanistan Peace Talks (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/14/us-taliban-not-ready-for-peace-talks_n_849083.html) by David Wood, Huffington Post. BLUF: "... prospects for peace talks seem remote, and international diplomats and others say any actual settlement is years away."

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SWJ Blog

05-11-2011, 12:31 PM

Are The Taliban And Al Qaeda Allies? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/05/are-the-taliban-and-al-qaeda-a/)

Entry Excerpt:

Are The Taliban And Al Qaeda Allies?
by Paul Overby

Download the Full Article: Are The Taliban And Al Qaeda Allies? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/756-overby.pdf)

"In my view" should preface every statement here. It is likely the situation in Afghanistan is understood perfectly by no one, certainly not I. So I present these remarks as a prolegomenon or an extended suggestion to which others may compare their own thoughts. Any figures, for instance, are approximate. I combine references to some of my favorite books with personal experience garnered from a total of about two and a half years on the street as an independent observer in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the first nine months of which are described in my book Holy Blood (http://www.amazon.com/Holy-Blood-Inside-View-Afghan/dp/0275946223/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1305115046&sr=8-1).

Download the Full Article: Are The Taliban And Al Qaeda Allies? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/756-overby.pdf)

Paul Overby went to Peshawar independently in 1988 to witness the struggle of the Afghan Freedom Fighters; spent 6 months talking to exile Afghans; finally, for a brief moment, fought alongside the mujahideen in the hills of Kunar. In 1993, Holy Blood (http://www.amazon.com/Holy-Blood-Inside-View-Afghan/dp/0275946223/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1305115046&sr=8-1) was published. That same year he returned to visit the major commander Mullah Naqeeb in Kandahar (and helped push start his Mercedes) and interviewed Ahmad Shah Massoud in Kabul. Since late 2007 he has made four trips to AfPak for a total of 20 months. Talking to hundreds of people on the street, staying as a special guest of his old friend Governor Sayed Fazlolah Wahidi in Kunar, and interviewing a few important figures, his goal was to understand the American position in Afghanistan and to find Osama--whom he tentatively placed in the Yarkhun Valley.

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SWJ Blog

06-19-2011, 05:00 PM

Headway in Taliban Talks Months Off (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/06/headway-in-taliban-talks-month/)

Entry Excerpt:

Re:

Karzai Announces Peace Talks with Taliban (http://www.voanews.com/english/news/Karzai-US-is-Talking-to-Taliban-124125629.html) - VOA
Karzai: US in Peace Talks with Taliban (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/war-zones/9-dead-after-attack-on-afghan-police-facility/2011/06/18/AGvFSBaH_story.html) - WP
Lashing Out, Karzai Says US Talking to the Taliban (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/19/world/asia/19afghanistan.html?ref=world) - NYT
US Contacted Taliban about Afghan Peace Deal (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-afghanistan-attack-20110619,0,2501911.story)- LAT
Karzai: US in Peace Talks with Taliban (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13821452) - BBC
As Karzai Confirms Taliban Talks, Attack in Kabul Kills 9 (http://ap.stripes.com/dynamic/stories/A/AS_AFGHANISTAN?SITE=DCSAS&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT&CTIME=2011-06-18-14-15-46) - AP
Afghan Leader Says US in Contact With Taliban (http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2011/06/18/world/asia/international-us-afghanistan-talks.html?ref=world) - Reuters
US Ambassador Responds to Karzai’s Criticisms (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/20/world/asia/20afghanistan.html?ref=world) - NYTGates: Headway in Taliban Talks May be Months Off (http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20110619/ts_nm/us_usa_afghanistan_taliban;_ylt=Au0sXdGlS6znL60c4q 1ORMQBxg8F;_ylu=X3oDMTMxNjM1bWttBGFzc2V0A25tLzIwMT EwNjE5L3VzX3VzYV9hZmdoYW5pc3Rhbl90YWxpYmFuBHBvcwMy MARzZWMDeW5fcGFnaW5hdGVfc3VtbWFyeV9saXN0BHNsawNoZW Fkd2F5aW50YWw-) - Reuters. BLUF: "It could be months before efforts to broker a peace deal between the Afghan government and the Taliban bear fruit, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates said in an interview aired on Sunday."

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SWJ Blog

06-29-2011, 10:33 AM

The Third Way of COIN: Defeating the Taliban in Sangin (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/06/the-third-way-of-coin-defeatin/)

Entry Excerpt:

The Third Way of COIN (http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/moyar-3rdway_in_sangin_jul2011): Defeating the Taliban in Sangin by Dr. Mark Moyar, Orbis Operations.

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SWJ Blog

07-16-2011, 01:40 PM

Soldiers Told Not to Shoot Taliban Bomb Layers (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/07/soldiers-told-not-to-shoot-tal/)

Entry Excerpt:

Soldiers Told Not to Shoot Taliban Bomb Layers
by Andy Bloxham
The Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/8626344/Soldiers-told-not-to-shoot-Taliban-bomb-layers.html)

BLUF. British soldiers who spot Taliban fighters planting roadside bombs are told not to shoot them because they do not pose an immediate threat, the Ministry of Defence has admitted. They are instead being ordered to just observe insurgents and record their position to reduce the risk of civilian casualties.

A key part of the MoD’s counter-insurgency theory holds that it is more important to win over civilians by not killing innocent people than it is to eliminate every potential insurgent.

Much more at The Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/8626344/Soldiers-told-not-to-shoot-Taliban-bomb-layers.html)

This matter appears on The UK in Afg thread, posts 760-763: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7644&page=39

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davidbfpo

07-21-2011, 09:54 AM

A slim BBC News report:
Two Britons suspected of fighting for the Taliban have been arrested by British armed forces in Afghanistan, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has said. The MoD said the pair, who it said "claim to be British nationals", have been detained.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-14230458

The Daily Telegraph has some more detail, although unclear whether detained in Herat or Helmand:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8651650/British-Taliban-fighters-arrested-in-Afghanistan-terror-raid.html

In June 2009 there was a short-lived flurry of articles about a dead Taliban fighter being found with an Aston Villa tattoo:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/5538176/Taliban-fighter-found-with-Aston-Villa-tattoo.html

After the flurry it all went quiet.

There have been other stories about British accents being overheard and allegations that bodies were blown up in extremis situations (where removal was not possible) to hinder identification, a grenade in the mouth IIRC.

After 2001-2002 although not on my front-line radar Jihadi propaganda has not been overflowing with footage of British-born fighters or other signs. We have of course had the 'Tipton Taliban' and others who ended up in Guantanamo Bay.

I shall watch and wait for any more information.

Bob's World

07-21-2011, 11:26 AM

davidbfpo

07-21-2011, 06:17 PM

The NYT article has a potentially important two sentences:
Under NATO guidelines, most individuals detained by allied forces are released or transferred to the Afghan Authorities within 96 hours.

Britain has a national policy of detaining people longer than 96 hours in exceptional circumstances, particularly when authorities think they can get information to protect their forces or the Afghan population.

Link:http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2011/07/21/world/asia/international-us-afghan-britain-arrests.html?_r=1&ref=world

I will reply to Bob's post another time.

Tukhachevskii

07-22-2011, 11:35 AM

Damien Lewis, Bloody Heroes (www.damienlewis.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=61&Itemid=75), bases on of his Muslim combatant characters on a "British" Jihadi, known as Ali Al-Africani by his comrades. Apparently the book was based on primary sources and narrates the early invasion of Afghanistan.

Tukhachevskii

07-22-2011, 11:41 AM

This topic touches a concept we've been tossing around at work of "Identity"

The general gist is that everybody possesses multiple "identities", and that those identities have some personal hierarchy, and that there is also essentially a cut line above which are identities one is willing to die for, and below not.

So, as example one may identify by their gender, region, profession, nationality, family status, race, ethnicity, hobbies, music likes, etc, etc.

The culture one lives in shapes a general "norm" in any given community. Our theory is that in the modern information age those "norms" are evolving far more rapidly than in the past, and there are going to be far more individuals within a community who adopt a family and hierarchy of identifies that are outside that norm.

For example, a third generation French citizen living in Paris may come to prioritize their Algerian heritage above their French citizenship.

Or a British citizen who feels strongly against the UK's policy toward Afghanistan may come to prioritize his support for those who he or she feels his country wrongly oppresses.

Over the past several years the establishment writes such events off as some sort of mental disorder, and say that someone has been "radicalized." This is a natural tendency of governments to write off such individuals as being either somehow crazy or corrupted by some powerful external force. We think it is much more a simple fact that people have free will, and are free thinking and in an age where they are exposed to so much more information have a broader range of choices that they will naturally make.

So, these men may well be British nationals, but it would be an interesting conversation to dig into how they identify, how they prioritize those identities, and how their identifies evolved to the ones that bring them to their current situation.

Just something to consider.

Bob

Can't believe I actually like something you've written:D. But I have to add that the concept of "multiple identites" isn't something that one can comfortably confine to the "information age" (whatever that is, sounds like a fuzzy concept to me). What the present age does do, IMO, is increase the number of competing systems of normalisation outsdie to those one normally finds within a given system of normalisation (or culutre, or discipliniary practie or knowledge/power /regime of truth, take your pick). But one also has to counter-ballance that argument with the pervasive role of a particular political ideology (liberalism) in creating a morally relativistic and anti-patriotic (in the sense of relatvising the relationship between citizen and state) climate which permits rival normative ecosystems the ability to flourish and undermine pre-existing societal norms. The division between traitor and patriot has become so blurred as to make treason actually acctractive, if not nonsensicle (for instance). Foucualt and Bordiue have some better (i,.e., more cohenrent) stuff to say on the matter this was just my hash up.

davidbfpo

08-02-2011, 08:11 AM

After a small flurry the BBC reports both released from UK custody, on 29th July:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-14367282

Bob's World

08-02-2011, 10:36 AM

After a small flurry the BBC reports both released from UK custody, on 29th July:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-14367282

Perhaps the bigger story is that two were detained, presumably because they were in the wrong place at the wrong time; and released, presumably because they were not doing anything wrong.

This happens dozens of times a week in Afghanistan. Often in a person's own home in the middle of the night.

We all know how we would feel if our own local police force kicked our front doors in in the middle of the night and dragged us out of our homes in cuffs in front of our neighbors to take downtown for questioning, only to be released and sent home a few days or weeks later. That is a gross violation of justice under the rule of law and grounds for a successful lawsuit. All the more so if that act is perpetrated by some foreign military force.

Night raids have indeed reduced the number of Taliban team leaders and squad leaders on the battlefield. That is a good thing in terms of disrupting the guerrilla, counter-guerrilla operations, counter-insurgent operations. As to the effect on the larger conditions of insurgency, those underlying perceptions of discontent among the greater populace that fuels the movement and motivates people to tacitly or actively support the insurgency?? Mostly it makes them worse.

Within Afghanistan it is primarily a resistance insurgency (OK, all the "smart" guys like to point out that it is a rural rather than urban insurgency, which while true is largely irrelevant to effective operational design other than directing where one's counterinsurgent operations should be focused) The critical distinction is understanding that in Afghanistan it is a resistance, and that the harder one surges against a resistance, the harder it surges back. Also that one cannot defeat, but can only suppress, a resistance so long as the overarching revolutionary insurgency is alive and well.

The revolutionary insurgency is the torch held by the leadership of the various factions of the Taliban leadership that are primarily taking sanctuary in Pakistan. This is the highly political aspect of the insurgency that must be resolved for stability to occur. Focused counter-guerrilla operations at this level can help as a supporting effort; but the main effort must be political and must be focused at GIRoA.

A bit off task, but the rolling up and release of a couple of Brits highlights a major disconnect in our approach to understanding and addressing the problem of Afghan stability. Frankly the fastest path to stability is for the intervening force to simply leave and let natural selection take place. The problem being (as is always the problem) we fear that we, the outsiders, will not approve of what nature provides. Nothing is more stable than nature.

Ask: Are we empowering nature, or are we enabling an unnatural, and therefore unsustainable, solution designed primarily to suit our wants, needs, and concerns as we have defined them???

davidbfpo

08-18-2011, 06:29 PM

Hat tip (again) to Circling the Lion's Den for a pointer to an article on tribal dynamics, money and the Taliban:
...the incident has embarrassed the Quetta Shura’s leadership and humiliated its military council’s chief." It has also led to serious tensions between the Noorzai and the Taliban leadership which will not easily be swept under the carpet. Somewhere in the background of all this is the growing realisation amongst many Afghans that the insurgency is deteriorating into a warlord-led free-for-all, prompting memories of the terrible period in the early 90s. Then, Afghan turned on Afghan and much of Kabul was destroyed.

The Afghan tribes have always proved to be the undoing of wannabe rulers of the country. Once again it looks like the same old same old.

Link to original article:http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/08/17/exclusive-a-feud-splits-afghanistan-s-taliban.html

Link to pointer:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot.com/2011/08/taliban-falls-out-with-influential.html

davidbfpo

09-09-2011, 01:36 PM

My title. Hat tip to FP Blog on Mullah Omar's latest epistle, which starts with:
In a lengthy message on the occasion of the Eid al-Fitr holiday released last week under Mullah Mohammad Omar's name, the fugitive Taliban leader used a mix of "jihad-light" bravado and toned-down political rhetoric to express his group's position on key issues, as part of a push to influence public opinion that has garnered a variety of reactions from different Western and South Asian quarters.

Yet despite the hype among AfPak watchers, the message is more a reflection of an emerging dual-track strategy that promotes Omar as a credible interlocutor while masking his flaws, and is directly tied to the NATO decision to end its military engagement in Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

The new narrative, most certainly inspired by the various covert layers of mentoring (including non-Afghan) enjoyed by Mullah Omar's Quetta Shura, not only provides insight into Mullah Omar's public-relations strategy, but also aims to deflect attention from Taliban weaknesses, all while trying to bolster the group's possible future negotiating position.

Ends with;
Given the Afghan experiences of the last three decades, it will take a lot more than just an adjustment in tone and rhetoric on the part of Mullah Omar to move the so-called reconciliation process forward, and end the current round of conflict in Afghanistan.

Ah yes, the author is a former Afghan diplomat.

AdamG

09-11-2011, 04:44 PM

Letting us know they're still in the game.

As the world geared up to remember the Sept. 11 terror attacks, a powerful Taliban truck bomb exploded at a U.S. military base in Afghanistan late Saturday, wounding 77 American soldiers and killing five Afghan civilians, including a three-year-old girl.

The attack came shortly after the Taliban issued a statement vowing to send American forces "to the dustbin of history."

In the statement, the Taliban also promised to keep fighting U.S. forces until all American troops leave Afghanistan, but they denied any involvement in the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on the United States.

http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/TopStories/20110911/afghan-suicide-attack-american-base-110910/

davidbfpo

09-16-2011, 07:47 PM

The successful conviction in Manchester, Northern England, of Munir Farooqi, Matthew Newton and Israr Malik, highlighted once again (as if more proof was needed) the existence of the dark connection between Britain and the war in Afghanistan. A former Taliban fighter who had returned to Manchester after being picked up on the battlefield not long after the U.S. invasion by Northern Alliance forces, Farooqi ran a recruitment network in Northern England that fed an unknown number of fighters to the fight alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan. What was most striking about the case, however, was the way it exposed the method by which recruitment cells operate in the United Kingdom, following a model that is likely emulated elsewhere in the west.

How effective was / is this method?
It remains unclear exactly how many people Farooqi was able to persuade to go and fight in Afghanistan. One estimate published in the local press said some 20 people had been sent over, A figure that seems quite low for an operation that could have been going on for as long as eight years. However, this small number likely reflects the reality of how large the actual number of British citizens being persuaded to go and fight really is.

Link:http://raffaellopantucci.com/2011/09/14/the-british-trail-to-the-afghan-jihad/

SWJ Blog

01-05-2012, 10:46 AM

You Can’t Play Chess When the Taliban is Playing Poker (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/you-can%E2%80%99t-play-chess-when-the-taliban-is-playing-poker)

Entry Excerpt:

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Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/you-can%E2%80%99t-play-chess-when-the-taliban-is-playing-poker) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

SWJ Blog

01-12-2012, 08:30 AM

Is the U.S. coming to terms with the Taliban? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/is-the-us-coming-to-terms-with-the-taliban)

Entry Excerpt:

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SWJ Blog

01-19-2012, 11:44 AM

The Fog of Peace: The Delusion of Taliban Talks (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-fog-of-peace-the-delusion-of-taliban-talks)

Entry Excerpt:

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davidbfpo

02-03-2012, 08:46 PM

A broad review of the situation in Afghanistan by the BBC, Why Taliban are so strong in Afghanistan, with a focus on the Taliban, prompted by the "leaked" NATO / ISAF report, which is on this link:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=15080

I read this assessment:
The harsh reality is that an increasing number of Afghans are turning to the Taliban, having grown mistrustful of Nato and Afghan forces.

By contrast Circling The Lion's Den cites a July 2010 opinion poll:
The issue of whether or not the Taliban is growing in popularity is open to question. A report published by the Asia Foundation in November, Afghanistan in 2011: A survey of the Afghan People, found that support for the Taliban among Afghans has steadily declined in recent years. It found that 82 per cent of those surveyed back reconciliation and reintegration efforts with insurgent groups. The number of people who said they sympathized with the aims of the Taliban had dropped to 29 per cent compared to 40 per cent in 2010 and 56 per cent in 2009.

However, a lack of security was identified as the biggest problem in the country by 38 per cent of those polled, followed by unemployment and corruption. Seventy-one per cent of respondents said they feared travelling from one part of the country to another. Most of these problems can easily be placed at the door of the Karzai government and the Taliban can play upon its promises to restore order in the country. The survey was conducted among 6,348 adults in July 2010 in all of Afghanistan's 34 provinces, excluding some dangerous areas.

Link:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot.com/2012/02/pakistan-aiding-taliban-can-it-be-true.html

tequila

02-03-2012, 09:51 PM

davidbfpo

02-14-2012, 06:18 PM

Hat tip to Circling the Lion's Den for this report, note the source is the Taliban's website and maybe not a place to visit:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot.com/2012/02/taliban-defence-minister-died-in.html

An alternative website is:http://jihadology.net/2012/02/13/new-statement-from-the-islamic-emirate-of-afghanistan-regarding-the-martyrdom-of-its-deputy-distinguished-personality-and-honorable-mujahid-al-haj-mulla-ubaydah-allah-akhond/

Opening paragraph:
The Taliban yesterday confirmed that its former defence minister....Shaheed Mullah Obaidullah Akhond ... during the Islamic Emirate had died nearly two years ago in a Pakistani prison. Their website says that he was detained on 3 January 2007 by the Pakistani government in Balochistan, but that little was heard from him after that. Only in the last few days did his family receive news from Pakistan that he died in prison in Karachi due to "heart complications" on 5 March 2010.

Closing paragraph:
Was he seen by the Pakistanis as one of the old guard around Mullah Omar, whose outlook did not suit Pakistani interests any longer? Although he was one of those who began to reorganise the Taliban once it had fled into exile in Pakistan, it is possible that he favoured negotiations to end the conflict. He was close to Mullah Barodar, who was also arrested by the Pakistanis, some say because Barodar was also in favour of negotiations with the Karzai regime. If his death was natural why was it covered up by the Pakistanis for so long? Any more information would be appreciated.

This is all very odd IMO. Whose jail? I understand ISI has it's own custody facilities. Why no leaked news? The questions are plenty. Answers few.

Makes one wonder if recent negotiations, which included his release along with others, led to the family being notified. Hardly likely to endear ISI to the Taliban or was he just a casualty of war?

Dayuhan

02-15-2012, 01:22 AM

I think one of the things the last ten years has re-taught us is that popularity is largely irrelevant in the wider case (especially of the sort done by polling firms in war zones), though certainly it can sway individuals - what is more important is control, either through military coercion or overriding popular legitimacy.

I'd think a simple calculation of who's most likely to win would trump either popularity or attempts at control. Nobody wants to be one of those who supported the losing side when the dust settles, for good reason... so people will stay on the fence, try to avoid antagonizing any armed force in their neighborhood, and lean toward whoever they think will win. Survival is a powerful motivator.

SWJ Blog

06-14-2012, 05:20 AM

Reconciliation with the Taliban: Fracturing the Insurgency (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/reconciliation-with-the-taliban-fracturing-the-insurgency)

Entry Excerpt:

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davidbfpo

07-11-2012, 09:54 AM

An odd newspaper story citing an unnamed veteran Taliban fighter, except the interviewer was Michael Semple, an accomplished ex-UN diplomat in Afghanistan until expelled by Karzai:
Any Taliban leader expecting to be able to capture Kabul is making a grave mistake. Nevertheless, the leadership also knows that it cannot afford to acknowledge this weakness. To do so would undermine the morale of Taliban personnel. The leadership knows the truth – that they cannot prevail over the power they confront...It would take some kind of divine intervention for the Taliban to win this war...At least 70 per cent of the Taliban are angry at al-Qaeda. Our people consider al-Qaeda to be a plague that was sent down to us by the heavens...To tell the truth, I was relieved at the death of Osama [bin Laden]. Through his policies, he destroyed Afghanistan. If he really believed in jihad he should have gone to Saudi Arabia and done jihad there, rather than wrecking our country.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/9391093/Taliban-We-cannot-win-war-in-Afghanistan.html

There is a bit more on the original publisher's website:http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/politics/2012/07/preview-michael-semple-interviews-senior-member-taliban

AdamG

07-27-2012, 03:14 AM

Once seen as uneducated thugs, the Taliban are producing dangerous new fighters who use the latest digital technology to plan and publicise attacks against NATO and Afghan forces, analysts say.

The militants recently released a video of a June 1 attack on a US military base in the eastern province of Khost, on the border with Pakistan, showcasing far more developed techniques to plan the assault than previously thought.

The footage shows the fighters, in military uniforms, being briefed by their commander using a model and satellite images of the target, Forward Operating Base Salerno.

http://news.yahoo.com/generation-tech-savvy-taliban-fighters-005759901.html?_esi=1

Fuchs

07-27-2012, 03:46 AM

See, that's what I have warned about for years.
This small war turns average people into stupid people.

These videos show that they have real skills and technical knowledge," a Western official told AFP.

Only a decade ago, speaking almost admirably of "real skills and technical knowledge" would have referred to something like an armoured brigade doing sharp manoeuvres over 150 km in a matter of hours, executing near-textbook combined arms attacks without briefing or planning merely on a commander's order by radio.*

Nowadays, looking at a map, loading a truck with explosives and executing a two-stage platoon attack appears to qualify.

I have observed similar stupidity even in regard to air forces (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.de/2012/04/sead-and-fair-weather-opposition.html) (I wasn't able to express my disgust and concern accurately, though).

It appears as if standards and expectations concerning opfor are in free fall.

*: I have occasionally been playing some online games for recreation during the last years, and I can assure you that ad hoc, self-organised gamer teams with guys in the 16-38 year range are capable of tactical planning that's better by an order of magnitude than mentioned in the report - with multiple tactics for multiple maps and dismissing many quite advanced and well-articulated plans in the process.
They even use dedicated tactical briefing software (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9INbTqPlUVg) and voip teleconference software for it, fusing gamers from three continents into a team.
Such gamers should be considered the lower end in tactical skills, not anything like "real skills and technical knowledge", of course.

davidbfpo

08-04-2012, 09:32 PM

Hat tip to Circling The Lion's Den for the pointers to two studies, the first on ' Haqqani Network Financing: The Evolution of an Industry' for CTC @ West Point by Gretchen Peters:
Her groundbreaking study shows in some detail how this remarkable Afghan clan has been able to build up unique cash-generating business enterprises to finance its very effective campaign against the Karzai government and its Western allies. From its base in Pakistan's North Waziristan - where it exists with the blessing of the ISI - the Haqqanis have created a mafia-like empire that now stretches across Pakistan and into the Gulf.

Link to report:http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/CTC_Haqqani_Network_Financing-Report__Final.pdf

Secondly, from a rather unusual angle IMO:
The European Asylum Support Office has published a report on Afghanistan aimed at providing information to support government officials who assess asylum applications from Afghan nationals....gives an overview of Taliban strategy for the recruitment of fighters......Many interesting little nuggets in this report which also contains a very detailed bibliography.

Link to report:http://www.statewatch.org/news/2012/jul/easo-report-taliban-recruitment.pdf

Link to Circling The Lion's Den:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot.co.uk/

davidbfpo

09-11-2012, 09:35 PM

As yet unread RUSI Report:
With the Western military draw-down in Afghanistan drawing closer, attention now turns to the shape of the post-2014 political settlement. Some form of accommodation with the Taliban will be required for a stable and secure Afghanistan....presents the findings of discussions with senior Taliban figures, suggesting that the Taliban and the international community may in fact have reconcilable positions.

This paper works to draw out the Taliban's views on three key issues:

International terrorism and the Taliban’s links with Al-Qa’ida and other armed non-state actors
The potential for a ceasefire
Parameters for conflict resolution and continuing presence of US military bases.

There is a short podcast too:http://www.rusi.org/publications/other/ref:O504A22C99538B/

Kiwigrunt

09-13-2012, 10:00 PM

"Beware of Taliban bearing gifts of moderation." (http://www.defenceiq.com/air-land-and-sea-defence-services/articles/beware-of-taliban-bearing-gifts/)

JMA

09-14-2012, 01:29 AM

"Beware of Taliban bearing gifts of moderation." (http://www.defenceiq.com/air-land-and-sea-defence-services/articles/beware-of-taliban-bearing-gifts/)

Outstanding article!

Glad that somebody has his eyes open

davidbfpo

09-14-2012, 09:05 AM

Hat tip to Circling the Lion's Den for providing the comments by the official Taliban to the RUSI report:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot.co.uk/2012/09/further-indications-taliban-wants-to.html

in July, the Taliban wasted no time in characterising Semple's contact as "mentally insane" for suggesting that many Taliban supporters regarded al-Qaeda as a "plague".

This time, the four unnamed Taliban figures interviewed say that the organisation's leadership and base deeply regret their past association with al-Qaeda and that they would obey a call by Mullah Omar to renounce any links and prevent them operating on Afghan soil. They are even willing to allow US forces to stay on Afghan soil under certain circumstances......

....in a statement issued to mark the 11th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban reiterated its attitude towards al-Qaeda: "The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan once again clarifies to the entire world including America that we are neither a threat to anyone nor will we let our soil be used to harm anyone. It is our due legal and religious right to defend our homeland and establish in it an Islamic system and we shall continue with our sacred struggle and Jihad against the invaders until we attain this right and we sincerely believe in being victorious in achieving this ambition and defeating the enemy."

The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan strongly condemns this malicious and strictly propaganda based report of the said think-tank and declares it has no plans of prolonging the American invasion of Afghanistan even for a single day. Our religion, national interests, national pride and values forbid us from making such illegitimate deals or agreeing to the continuation of invasion or accepting their revolting presence due to fear and our own safety. We believe that this report by the so called think-tank, based on the opinions of a few anonymous faces, is fabricated and consider it the direct work and move of the intelligence circles prepared for its people and for raising the moral of its defeated troops.

Dayuhan

09-14-2012, 12:57 PM

Outstanding article!

Glad that somebody has his eyes open

I pretty much agree with what he says: I don't think the Taliban are moderate in any way, and I don't think they've any interest in negotiation or compromise, except as a charade intended to move them closer to winning.

What I missed in the article was any clear sense of what the author thought should be done. He wrote previously on the subject here:

http://www.defenceiq.com/air-land-and-sea-defence-services/articles/how-to-win-in-afghanistan-a-lesson-in-nation-build/

How to win in Afghanistan: A lesson in nation building

On this subject I find myself agreeing with him less. His version of the core question:

The dilemma here is patent: How to nation build in a country that largely doesn’t need electricity, is tribal, and regards foreign intervention as hostile? How to win the approbation of diverse tribal populations that spend as much time feuding with each other as they do any centralised authority in Kabul?

I'm not sure the dilemma really is how to nation-build or win approbation. I'd have to ask why we feel the need to nation-build or win approbation.

Certainly it makes sense to evaluate the Taliban honestly, but I don't think failure to evaluate the Taliban honestly is at the core of the difficulties in Afghanistan. That place to me is occupied by unrealistic goals: the perceived "need" to build a nation in a place that is not a "nation" as we understand the term, and the desire to leave behind a government recognizable to Americans as a functioning democracy. I don't think those objectives were ever realistic or necessary, and I can think of no straighter road to failure than the adoption from the outset of unrealistic and unnecessary goals.

If we assume that nation-building and winning approbation are the goal, then maybe the author's recommendation (agricultural development) makes sense. I suspect, though, that the ends need re-evaluation more urgently than the means.

JMA

09-15-2012, 01:23 PM

I pretty much agree with what he says: ...

Im sure the author will be absolutely delighted to hear that...

What I missed in the article was any clear sense of what the author thought should be done.

Well that is probably because the article was a counterpoint to the one mentioned in the text. So his argument was plain and simple ... don't trust the Taliban.

...but, hey, don't let that stop you from putting a few hundred words together to express what you think should be done.

Give it a try...

Dayuhan

09-16-2012, 12:29 AM

Im sure the author will be absolutely delighted to hear that...

I'm sure my approval means as much to him as yours, which is to say nothing at all.

Well that is probably because the article was a counterpoint to the one mentioned in the text. So his argument was plain and simple ... don't trust the Taliban.

"Don't trust the Taliban" is an easy enough thing to say, and not quite rocket science... has anyone proposed that we should trust the Taliban? I'd add "don't trust the Karzai Government", "don't trust the Pakistanis", and possibly a few others.

I'd be interested to hear your opinion of the other cited article by the same author, the one in which he offers a prescription. This one:

http://www.defenceiq.com/air-land-and-sea-defence-services/articles/how-to-win-in-afghanistan-a-lesson-in-nation-build/

...but, hey, don't let that stop you from putting a few hundred words together to express what you think should be done.

Give it a try...

I've never made any secret of what I think should have been done. I think the effort should from the start have focused entirely on finding and destroying the Taliban and AQ, with no effort at all to govern or to build a nation, beyond providing opportunity for Afghans to figure out for themselves what they wanted as a government. Once the finding and destruction was deemed adequately done I think we should have left, while we still had the upper hand, with a simple message: don't make us come back. I don't think we ever needed to install democracy or build a nation in Afghanistan. We needed to assure that whoever ended up governing after we left knew that attacking us or sheltering those who did would bring inevitable and awful consequences.

We didn't do that, of course, and the policy that was adopted has backed us into a corner from which I can propose no attractive exit. If "winning" means transforming the Karzai regime into a functioning government, we've set the bar for a win in a very unrealistic place. It's a bad place to be and we shouldn't have put ourselves there.

I don't think anyone is proposing negotiations or a settlement because they trust the Taliban. I see it as a device to contrive some sort of superficial settlement that could give an excuse for a (not very) face-saving exit. It's not a great way out, but what's better? As long as the Taliban have sanctuary in Afghanistan they can be suppressed but not fully defeated. As long as US forces in Afghanistan are large enough to require supply through Pakistani territory, leverage on Pakistan is limited, and even if forces were reduced to a level not requiring that support it's not clear that Pakistan would be willing or able to shut down sanctuary.

It's just a bad place all around and the best way to manage it would have been to not get into that situation in the first place. Too late for that, obviously. Sooner or later we will withdraw, with or without a face-saving strategy. The place will probably fall to pieces. Maybe next time round we'll be smarter.

In short, I don't think we should be looking for better ways to install governments and build nations, I think we should be looking for strategies that don't involve installing governments and building nations.

Bob's World

09-16-2012, 11:44 AM

I've never made any secret of what I think should have been done. I think the effort should from the start have focused entirely on finding and destroying the Taliban and AQ, with no effort at all to govern or to build a nation, beyond providing opportunity for Afghans to figure out for themselves what they wanted as a government.

Dayuhan, on this I agree on all but one point: Why do you include the Taliban on your target list?

I suspect if we would have been even a little bit more savvy on the nature of Afghan culture and Pashtunwali, that we could have worked a deal with Mullah Omar regarding his AQ guests that would have resolved much of this before it ever really began. That is equally true of what President Clinton did/failed to do prior to 9/11 and what President Bush did/failed to do after.

We have made this all about us as we choose to understand and define the problems on our terms. But of course, as you well realize, it isn't about us at all. Nor is it about Islam. We brought this to the people of Afghanistan and dragged them into our world. Now they are making us deal with theirs.

A lot of bad understanding and bad decisions have been compiling for over a decade now. There is no graceful way to walk away from that. Now we worry more about our grace, and our honor. This is one where need to just swallow our pride and walk away. The reasons we use to justify why we must stay were never accurate, so there is no reason we should allow them to hold us there any longer. That is one comment that Clint Eastwood probably got about right in his conversation with a chair the other day.

Fuchs

09-16-2012, 11:57 AM

I pretty much agree with what he says: I don't think the Taliban are moderate in any way, and I don't think they've any interest in negotiation or compromise, except as a charade intended to move them closer to winning.

We can't tell any different about the U.S., right?
It's not like the state Department would go into negotiations with Afghan central governance and (fake) democracy as mere bargaining chips.

The U.S. overthrew a government on the cheap, chased all its actual enemies from the country.
That's usually when wars end. Mission accomplished, time to go home.

But then the extremism showed and the real war only began. Chasing the enemy from power and out of the country? Not enough. Extremists want more. A puppet state with a puppet government, that's needed! Not just any puppet government, but one of a specific model. And it must not include the political arm of the defeated enemy in any way.

Seriously, who's more extremist in Central Asia?
The Taliban are at least fighting at home.

Moreover, this entire conflict may be rested on a similar confusion about what the other side wants as the Vietnam War.
The Americans believed in the 60's that red Vietnamese were the spearhead of Communist world revolution, intent on pushing the first domino piece.
Meanwhile, the actually quite nationalist North Vietnamese wanted to re-unite their country and believed the Americans wanted indirect, imperialist rule over Vietnam - all of it.

I dare you to tell me there's no similar major misunderstanding floating in and about Afghanistan.

JMA

09-16-2012, 01:18 PM

I'm sure my approval means as much to him as yours, which is to say nothing at all.

touche

"Don't trust the Taliban" is an easy enough thing to say, and not quite rocket science... has anyone proposed that we should trust the Taliban? I'd add "don't trust the Karzai Government", "don't trust the Pakistanis", and possibly a few others.

No, you are missing the point again.

The US is about to cut-and-run once again. Precedent indicates that the US politicians will attempt to cover their withdrawal through some sort of negotiation process real or bogus.

So the message should go out to the US government and those supplying troops to ISAF that, yes by all means pull out of Afghanistan, but don't try and sell the world a crock in the process.

davidbfpo

09-16-2012, 01:22 PM

Bob Jones just posted in part:
There is no graceful way to walk away from that. Now we worry more about our grace, and our honor. This is one where need to just swallow our pride and walk away. The reasons we use to justify why we must stay were never accurate, so there is no reason we should allow them to hold us there any longer.

How to extricate ourselves is clearly on the political agenda and Bob is right that creating a message to explain this is causing agony in the "corridors of power". After over a decade of "the mission is to confront AQ and ensure Afghanistan is not used as a base to launch attacks from", how do our politicians explain to the domestic electorate, those who gave support (including the nations who have left ISAF already) and those who have watched without commitment?

Just to remind readers "the mission" explained remains the same, here is the UK Defence Secretary a few days ago:
The ultimate measure of success must be the extent to which we can leave Afghanistan in a state that will continue to deny its territory to international terrorists.....Even if we had achieved nothing lasting, every year that goes by keeping the bombers at bay, keeping them off our streets, is a significant achievement in itself. But we have clearly built the basics of a future that will deny the space of Afghanistan to those who would seek to harm us.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9542466/Philip-Hammond-British-troops-could-withdraw-from-Afghanistan-before-2014.html

First step I would argue is being truthful to oneself. Time to ditch "the mission is".

There is no popular support now for "staying the course" and so supporting the Karzai / Kabul regime. Boredom, expense, deaths and injuries all have a part at home.

Bill Moore

09-16-2012, 05:02 PM

Posted by Bob's World

Dayuhan, on this I agree on all but one point: Why do you include the Taliban on your target list?

Ditto

We have made this all about us as we choose to understand and define the problems on our terms. But of course, as you well realize, it isn't about us at all. Nor is it about Islam. We brought this to the people of Afghanistan and dragged them into our world. Now they are making us deal with theirs.

Well said, we created a false narrative that made the Taliban the center of our effort in Afghanistan, and in the meantime took our eye off the bubble (AQ) for several years. We conflated to different issues, and in so doing created several additional challenges that frankly made us look foolish to much of the world.

A lot of bad understanding and bad decisions have been compiling for over a decade now. There is no graceful way to walk away from that. Now we worry more about our grace, and our honor. This is one where need to just swallow our pride and walk away. The reasons we use to justify why we must stay were never accurate, so there is no reason we should allow them to hold us there any longer. That is one comment that Clint Eastwood probably got about right in his conversation with a chair the other day.

Honor does and should matter. Honor can't be measured and assessed, but it is a factor that influences decisions people make on all sides of this conflict that has much more influence than economic factors (nation building). In our case it partly defines who we as a nation because it constrains our behavior. Excluding AQ, it seems all players involved are trapped by their honor on an intractable course that has no meaningful end. Hindsight is always 20/20, but ideally we wouldn't commit to courses of action that put our honor at risk. We should have never tied our honor to armed nation building.

As you implied, it is somewhat difficult for any politician at this point to say oops we got this one wrong. It would go entirely against the narrative we created. I suspect the only hope for disengagement from nation building to diplomatic engagement and assistance is to gradually change the narrative over time, which it appears we're doing.

Dayuhan

09-16-2012, 10:18 PM

Dayuhan, on this I agree on all but one point: Why do you include the Taliban on your target list?

I suspect if we would have been even a little bit more savvy on the nature of Afghan culture and Pashtunwali, that we could have worked a deal with Mullah Omar regarding his AQ guests that would have resolved much of this before it ever really began. That is equally true of what President Clinton did/failed to do prior to 9/11 and what President Bush did/failed to do after.

I include the Taliban because the rule should have been (IMO of course) that those who attack us or those who shelter those attackers will face awful and inevitable consequences. Of course the Taliban should have been - and were - given a chance to turn over bin Laden and his group voluntarily. I see no reason why savviness of Afghan culture or Pashtunwali needed to be an issue there. It is always good to understand others, but there are also times for making ourselves understood. This was one of them. I think if we'd cast our mission purely and explicitly as revenge, a concept well understood in that part of the world, and made it clear that we'd be out of there as soon as our business was finished, we'd have had an easier time.

Of course nobody knows where the path not taken would have led, and I could be wrong.

Dayuhan

09-16-2012, 10:25 PM

No, you are missing the point again.

The US is about to cut-and-run once again. Precedent indicates that the US politicians will attempt to cover their withdrawal through some sort of negotiation process real or bogus.

The US has belatedly realized that it's pursuing a pointless effort with slim to zero chance of achieving the inflated objectives posed by mission creep. Efforts to reverse that policy are in progress. If that's "cut-and-run", so be it. What would we have them do, bang their heads against that wall for another decade to demonstrate persistence?

Yes, there will probably be some effort to prop up some kind of (not very) face-saving resolution. This is not unique to the US, nor will it surprise anyone.

So the message should go out to the US government and those supplying troops to ISAF that, yes by all means pull out of Afghanistan, but don't try and sell the world a crock in the process.

No, you are missing the point again.

They aren't trying to sell anything to the world... why would they? They only need to sell it to the American voter, and the American voter is perfectly willing to buy the crock. They want to get out of there, and any charade that creates a justification for getting out of there is good enough

carl

09-16-2012, 10:59 PM

I see no reason why savviness of Afghan culture or Pashtunwali needed to be an issue there. It is always good to understand others, but there are also times for making ourselves understood. This was one of them.

Good point. Sort of like what Napier told the people who were complaining that the suppression of suttee was not respectful of a different culture. I believe he said more or less you go ahead and follow your cultural practice, and if you do we will follow ours which will be to kill you. We sort of did that but didn't go far enough.

But as you say, we will never know. And it is a pretty big distortion of the concept of sanctuary to say they couldn't give up AQ.

carl

09-16-2012, 11:32 PM

I was reading some of the articles in this thread and figure we actually have a lot to work with on the negotiation front.

First, it appears that some of the high ups in Taliban & Co realize they can't take over the country even when we bug out.

Second, they don't like AQ and wish they would go away.

Third, one thing Taliban & Co and the Afghans have in common is they both hate the Pakistanis.

Fourth, some of the higher ups in Taliban & Co are talking up the possibility of negotiations. It doesn't matter much if they will turn out to be really serious about it or if it just a ploy, it is something that can be exploited.

In the RUSI article, the id's of the people interviewed can be easily accerned (sic) but those guys are still alive. So maybe there is some genuine support for negotiations of some kind. Even at MO's level, maybe.

Sixth, though the Haqqanis profess fealty to MO, there seems to be some uncertainty if that will be the case in actuality.

Seventh, MO is a critical person.

So it seems there are a lot of potential avenues to pursue to cause dissension in the ranks over there. I don't know exactly how to do it but these guys don't seem all that certain and united.

The most critical thing would be to somehow, someway (and I don't know how) to get them physically away from the Pak Army/ISI. But maybe that wouldn't work because MO is too deep in the ISI pocket to ever come out.

So that leads to bumping off MO. Can he be replaced or is his personage so important that if he were killed, the Taliban & Co and Pak Army/ISI nexus would unravel and the thing would turn into a confused mess?

There are things that can be exploited. The bigger question is can we, the US led by our betters inside the beltway, exploit these things. I am not hopeful, recalling how we were had by a shopkeeper from Quetta and continue to be had by the sahibs in 'Pindi.

Fuchs

09-16-2012, 11:41 PM

Third, one thing Taliban & Co and the Afghans have in common is they both hate the Pakistanis.
(...)
Seventh, MO is a critical person.

Questions;
Whom do you mean with "Pakistanis"? The government of Pakistan? ISI? Army? People? Pakistani Taliban?

Whom do you mean with Taliban & Co.? Afghan Taliban? Pakistani Taliban? All Taliban? Leaders, zealots, supporters, mercs?

MO = Mullah Omar? What do you mean with "critical"? If he's hiding as UBL did, doesn't that mean he's cut off from comm? How is a central figure "critical" if the Taliban are scattered over two countries, often in segments at mere platoon strength with a charismatic local leader (AFAIK)?

carl

09-17-2012, 12:16 AM

Questions;
Whom do you mean with "Pakistanis"? The government of Pakistan? ISI? Army? People? Pakistani Taliban?

Whom do you mean with Taliban & Co.? Afghan Taliban? Pakistani Taliban? All Taliban? Leaders, zealots, supporters, mercs?

MO = Mullah Omar? What do you mean with "critical"? If he's hiding as UBL did, doesn't that mean he's cut off from comm? How is a central figure "critical" if the Taliban are scattered over two countries, often in segments at mere platoon strength with a charismatic local leader (AFAIK)?

By Pakistanis I mainly mean the Pak Army/ISI. I wonder though if when the Afghans/Taliban think of what is done to them, they make the distinction. They are pretty smart though so I suspect they might.

I use Taliban & Co because I mean all of the above.

The sense I got from the articles I read is that Taliban & Co all at least profess fealty to Mullah Omar (MO). That was especially apparent in the RUSI article. Also he is the acknowledged head of the Quetta Shura and the various policies that are promulgated by them I believe get some of whatever influence they have because they have his imprimatur. And Taliban & Co, or at least large parts of it, are a hierarchical organization. They could not have remained intact for as long as they have under the pressures they have been subject to unless that hierarchy were strong. As far as I know, none of the local organizations say they are fighting on their own. They all say at least, they owe fealty to Taliban and to MO. What they say is important. So MO is critical.

If he were hiding like UBL was, he wouldn't be important. But is he hiding like UBL was? UBL was being kept on ice by the ISI and had no importance. They gave him up when it was convenient.

I don't think MO is on ice. He is too important to the Pak Army/ISI. They use him and need him, and he them. Whether Taliban & Co is spread over two countries is neither here nor there. People communicate.

Ken White

09-17-2012, 04:04 AM

A lot of bad understanding and bad decisions have been compiling for over a decade now.Nixon's panel on Terrorism in response to the attacks in Munich provided a road map -- but he got busy with domestic politics; Ford's hands were tied; Carter's handling of the Tehran Embassy seizure was disastrous; Regan blew it with Lebanon; Bush 41 decided to pay later; Clinton bombed or attacked four sovereign countries to no avail, Bush 43 let his Christian charitable instincts overrule his duty to the nation; Obama started by presenting an apology to the world's supreme hagglers who will rapidly exploit the slightest sign of weakness and he's gone down hill since...

That's four decades of flawed ME / Islam policy.
There is no graceful way to walk away from that. Now we worry more about our grace, and our honor. This is one where need to just swallow our pride and walk away...It's not honor or pride -- those are understood in the ME if less so here in the west, those folks would understand and accept that but they're smart enough to know that's not the reason -- it's domestic political pressures. Venal, stupid, self and party over national interests... :mad:

The Intel Community insists they had no 'actionable' intelligence prior to the attack; I note our ambassador to the UN who I believe works in New York is overruling the Libyans by insisting that the attack on the Consulate in Benghazi was not planned. :eek:

Sheesh. All that US domestic political foolishness as a driver let's those who wish and their fellow travelers know they can get stupid with no repercussions. :(

Crass stupidity. Bill Moore's got it right: "..it is somewhat difficult for any politician at this point to say oops we got this one wrong. It would go entirely against the narrative we created..."

He also said " I suspect the only hope for disengagement from nation building to diplomatic engagement and assistance is to gradually change the narrative over time, which it appears we're doing." I hope that's right -- but I'm terribly afraid it is not -- the foreign policy establishment in both parties have different priorities but both have really bad messianic complexes... :rolleyes:

Bob's World

09-17-2012, 08:40 AM

Ken,

No arguments here. I highlighted the past 10 years, but yes, this has indeed been a slippery slope that we have been advancing along for quite some time.

Speed and slope are increasing, as are our narrative rhetoric and reactive actions aimed at the symptoms that challenge the "logic" of our framework of understanding, our self-serving narrative, or our invasive approaches to mitigate the problems.

The "victim mentality' that government is apparently working so hard to nurture among the populace is equally rampant across the government itself. Personally, I have a hard time seeing the attraction of playing the victim. It is a tactic of the weak. It is a mindset adopted by addicts of every ilk. They cannot accept the reality of their destructive behavior, so they play the victim to the effects caused by their very actions.

The US needs to ask itself, "what is it we are addicted to, and what must we change about ourself to break this cycle"?

That will very much run counter to our current victim-based narrative, but as you point out, how we got here is perhaps one of the most bi-partisan "success" stories of recent times. I only half-joke when I say that the first step for governments faced with such challenges, at home or abroad, is to undergo a 12-step program. Some hard truth in a circle of plastic chairs in some community center or church basement would take us a great deal farther down the road to success than any other options I've heard discussed.

It's easy to blame/lash out at AQ, or ideology, or the Taliban, or the ISI or Saddam or any other such "threat." But it is when we get honest with ourself that we turn the corner. All addicts have a "narrative," and as a prosecutor working with felony drug users listened to literally thousands of them. They are all variations on a theme of blaming anything and everything except their self. I also noticed that those who turned the corner and began to make true progress all adopted a new narrative that was also a variation on a theme of self-responsibility.

That used to be the American theme, one of self-reliance and personal responsibility. It still is for most Americans, most Pashtuns as well... .but we appear to be trying to quash that spirit at home and abroad.

JMA

09-17-2012, 09:23 AM

I'd be interested to hear your opinion of the other cited article by the same author, the one in which he offers a prescription. This one:

http://www.defenceiq.com/air-land-and-sea-defence-services/articles/how-to-win-in-afghanistan-a-lesson-in-nation-build/

My position was clear from the outset. The jump from striking out after 9/11 at the AQ and their hosts the Taliban to nation building for Karzai was an error. A costly error.

There are those who have the time to discuss just how badly the US has got this nation building wrong - or how it should have been approach - and good luck to them. The next US Administration in a few months or in four years comprising with a new set of "smart guys" will wipe the slate clean and start again from scratch ignoring the past. The cycle will repeat and continue.

I am more concerned - given my area of interest - just how badly the military - both US and Brit - have got the campaign wrong. Once again it is those at the coal face - below the rank of Lt Col - who pay the price. Tragic.

Dayuhan

09-17-2012, 09:39 AM

The US needs to ask itself, "what is it we are addicted to, and what must we change about ourself to break this cycle"?

I understand the point, but I also think that assuming that all bad things that happen are simply a reaction to things we did, and that all can be made well if we just change our behaviour, is every bit as seriously flawed as the assumption that we are devoid of all responsibility and are simply victimized by bad people that we must kill. Both extremes are overly self-obsessed, whether we see ourselves as innocent victim or as responsible for all that happens to us, we're adopting a narrative with us at the core. Whether we see the solution as "strike back and kill them all" or as "if we're nice to them, they will be nice to us" we assume that the solution starts and ends with us.

Both these narratives are excessively simplistic, one dimensional, and fail to consider the possibility that we are neither a central causative factor nor a key element to solution in many of these situations.

Not everything that involves or affects us has to be all about us.

Bob's World

09-17-2012, 10:07 AM

D,

You have a bad habit of translating any statement made by someone else as their all-inclusive position on a topic.

I never said this was all our fault. But I think you agree that agendas aimed at "fixing" others are not the best approach. I stand for a program of being honest as to our own contribution to causation, working to fix ourselves, and then only applying a supporting effort to that of mitigating the actions of others who seek to exploit any perceived vulnerabilities.

We have the balance of this equation inverted, IMO.

Fuchs

09-17-2012, 10:37 AM

Obama started by presenting an apology to the world's supreme hagglers who will rapidly exploit the slightest sign of weakness and he's gone down hill since...

http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2012/aug/31/mitt-romney/mitt-romney-said-barack-obama-began-his-presidency/
http://static.politifact.com.s3.amazonaws.com/rulings%2Ftom-pantsonfire.gif

Ken White

09-17-2012, 02:34 PM

http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2012/aug/31/mitt-romney/mitt-romney-said-barack-obama-began-his-presidency/
http://static.politifact.com.s3.amazonaws.com/rulings%2Ftom-pantsonfire.gifconstitute a refutation of my statements. ;)

The real problem with your great find is that, while accurate, it is a western interpretation of events. The supreme hagglers who inhabit the Middle East all inherited Ta'arof from the Persian Empires and thus grasp not the crux of a statement but the meaning they wish to ascribe to that statement. IOW "what the President really meant" -- or said -- is not important, the use they choose to make of it is important. These are folks who do not place price tags on merchandise they intend to sell so they cannot be pinned down with ANY specificity. Accuracy in the telling or usage is never an issue...

Further, consider that the Newspaper truth-sorters all play with words like so many lawyers or economists... :D

Fuchs

09-17-2012, 07:41 PM

https://i.chzbgr.com/completestore/12/9/5/9Lx_4w1A30CT3aXJ9VUbSQ2.jpg

;)

Dayuhan

09-17-2012, 10:45 PM

The real problem with your great find is that, while accurate, it is a western interpretation of events. The supreme hagglers who inhabit the Middle East all inherited Ta'arof from the Persian Empires and thus grasp not the crux of a statement but the meaning they wish to ascribe to that statement. IOW "what the President really meant" -- or said -- is not important, the use they choose to make of it is important. These are folks who do not place price tags on merchandise they intend to sell so they cannot be pinned down with ANY specificity. Accuracy in the telling or usage is never an issue...

The problem with this of course is that any words can be twisted. A Middle Eastern leader who wants to be aggressive can cast apologetic words as weakness to be exploited. He can also cast truculent and aggressive words as threats that require response. If an American leader tries to calibrate statements to avoid any possible misinterpretation or twisting of meaning, that leader won't be able to say anything at all, because anything said will be twisted.

Actions, in the long run, speak louder than words. We can say that we intend to meddle as little as possible in the internal affairs of ME nations. A lot of people won't believe it, but if the actions consistently support the words, over time the credibility of those who twist the words will be reduced. We can also make it clear in both word and action that while much is negotiable, the fate of those who attack us or shelter those who do is not.

In general I don't like the idea of laying down red lines or declarations of what we will or will not tolerate... too often hey invite testing, and there are few things worse than laying down a red line you aren't willing to enforce. On exception would be the red line on attacking us. That's not something to haggle over.

Dayuhan

09-18-2012, 01:34 AM

I never said this was all our fault. But I think you agree that agendas aimed at "fixing" others are not the best approach. I stand for a program of being honest as to our own contribution to causation, working to fix ourselves, and then only applying a supporting effort to that of mitigating the actions of others who seek to exploit any perceived vulnerabilities.

I agree that we should not try to "fix" others... whether they be antagonists or allies/neutrals with ways other than ours. I'd extend that to specifically include the folly of "countermeddling": meddling designed to reverse or compensate for the impact of past meddling.

Honesty as to our own contribution to causation requires... well, honesty. Declaring 9/11 to be a "backlash" against American provocation is in no way honest, but it's something we often hear. It's not an issue that will ever present 100% clarity, but all perspectives need skepticism and critical evaluation.

If we're talking about how to "fix" ourselves, we have to first assess what's broke, and then what we want it to be, and then what has to be done to get it there. All of those are complicated questions that require detachment from fixed assumptions and consideration of multiple perspectives.

Ken White

09-18-2012, 02:03 AM

The problem with this of course is that any words can be twisted.True -- but there are those that absolutely revel in all such twisting as opposed to those that merely do it on occasion for temporary advantage... :wry:
Actions, in the long run, speak louder than words...Indeed.
...We can also make it clear in both word and action that while much is negotiable, the fate of those who attack us or shelter those who do is not.True also. In that, consistency would be advantageous however consistency is not a hallmark of American foreign relations. :o

While I agree with what you say, there are those who apparently do not. That disagreement percolates and causes the inconsistency and a concomitant reluctance to allow the Intel folks to properly suss out the unkindly intentioned or the various forces and agencies of the US Government to respond rapidly and forcefully. A mixed message is often worse than no message...

Bill Moore

09-18-2012, 09:36 AM

Posted by Ken,

It's not honor or pride -- those are understood in the ME if less so here in the west, those folks would understand and accept that but they're smart enough to know that's not the reason -- it's domestic political pressures. Venal, stupid, self and party over national interests...

I think honor and pride have much more to do with determining our decisions than you give these values/emotions credit for. Some, perhaps many, politicians are weasels that don't have a sense of honor or any other traits associated with good character, but at least they're aware that a significant portion of American people still have a sense of honor and they'll play to that. So honor either affects their decision making directly if they have a sense of honor, or indirectly if they play the honor card for votes.

Honor is highly valuable fortifying character and giving one strength to make the right call under extreme adversity. It is also an essential element of our national identity, but admittedly it seems to be eroding with the growing sense of entitlement and pleasure seeking in our populace. Honor and pride also has the negative aspect of reinforcing stupid when we make stupid decisions, because quitting is seen as dishonorable, so we try harder (not change our strategy, just surge more effort into the same strategy), which digs us in even deeper. We create our own quagmires, and while it sounds contrary to our accepted definition of courage, real moral courage now would be admitting what can and can't be done. Somewhere in course of events we cross the line where staying because we're scared to change course due to how it will be perceived is more cowardly than staying on the same course. The Powell doctrine may not be realistic, but we should be able to modify it in a way that allows us to engage in a way where we don't own the problem after the decisive combat operation is accomplished that neutralizes the immediate threat, or at least we don't tie our national honor and pride to a mission that is not an essential U.S. interest. Some fights we have to win, others we don't, but we need to a supporting narrative for those we don't have to win because it isn't our fight to win to make that acceptable to the American people.

Posted by Bob's World

Speed and slope are increasing, as are our narrative rhetoric and reactive actions aimed at the symptoms that challenge the "logic" of our framework of understanding, our self-serving narrative, or our invasive approaches to mitigate the problems

Agreed, but we have time to change our narrative and change our course. The new policy should reflect our strength and wisdom while rejecting the notion we need to use our military and economic might build nations in our image around the world.

davidbfpo

09-20-2012, 12:53 PM

Watching Afghanistan I'd noted the suicide bomb attack on Afghan women in Kabul, but failed to read on. This FP Blog article starts with this attack, by HIG or Hezb-i-Islami a militant group led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and moves onto the wider context:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/19/so_much_for_the_good_war?page=full

The ever pragmatic Hekmatyar is a weather vane, indicating the trajectory of the conflict in Afghanistan and the ever shifting domestic and regional power game. His role in the Sept. 18 bombing shows that the insurgents have the upper hand, their fight against the United States and Kabul government will continue, and Afghanistan is headed toward a messy, full-scale civil war.

davidbfpo

03-21-2013, 11:37 PM

An interesting reflective article by a Reuters correspondent, which pulls together different factors and just about fits here!

A taster:
Yet in a week where the United States has gone through a bout of soul-searching about the Iraq war, history matters. Were the assumptions that led to the Afghan war also wrong from the start?

A new book by Vahid Brown and Don Rassler, “Fountainhead of Jihad, The Haqqani Nexus: 1973 to 2012” adds to that history by focusing on the Afghan group that actually did have the closest ties to al Qaeda – the so-called Haqqani network.

As I wrote here, the book has unearthed primary sources to show that the patriarch of the Haqqani network, Jalaluddin Haqqani, had as much influence on al Qaeda as the Arab fighters had on him – providing them with support and an Afghan safe haven during the jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989.

Link:http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/2013/03/20/was-the-afghan-war-wrong-from-the-start/

davidbfpo

09-07-2013, 01:02 PM

I know the Pakistani detention of Taliban and other Afghan militant leaders has appeared before, but cannot recall which thread they are in! Nor doe the names listed below "rings any bells". Somehow I doubt their (ISI) imprisonment has been that rigorous, more like "guests within walls".:wry:

Pakistan has announced the release of seven Taliban prisoners in a bid to help the Afghan peace process.....At least one former senior militant was among the men freed "in order to further facilitate the Afghan reconciliation process", said a foreign ministry statement.....The foreign ministry statement named those freed on Saturday as Mansoor Dadullah, Said Wali, Abdul Manan, Karim Agha, Sher Afzal, Gul Muhammad and Muhammad Zai.....Some 26 Taliban detainees have been freed during the past year, it added.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-23999752

SWJ Blog

01-31-2014, 02:42 AM

Report Shows Afghans Overwhelmingly Against Taliban Rule (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/report-shows-afghans-overwhelmingly-against-taliban-rule)

Entry Excerpt:

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SWJ Blog

03-28-2014, 01:30 PM

Pakistan Taliban Agrees to Ceasefire to Help Afghan Allies (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/pakistan-taliban-agrees-to-ceasefire-to-help-afghan-allies)

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SWJ Blog

07-22-2014, 01:34 AM

As US Draws Curtain on Combat Role, Taliban Plans Patient Comeback (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/as-us-draws-curtain-on-combat-role-taliban-plans-patient-comeback)

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SWJ Blog

10-23-2014, 04:31 AM

Taliban Are Rising Again in Afghanistan’s North (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/taliban-are-rising-again-in-afghanistan%E2%80%99s-north)

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davidbfpo

11-12-2014, 08:09 PM

Wayback in 2012 Posts 15 & 16 refer to a book edited by Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, 'My Life with the Taliban'.

Today they won the Michael Howard prize, awarded by Kings College London:
Alex Strick Van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn have been awarded the Sir Michael Howard Excellence Award, for their book, An Enemy We Created: The Myth of the Taliban/Al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan, 1970-2010 (Hurst and Oxford University Press, 2012). Alex and Felix are both PhD students in the Department based in Kandahar City in Southern Afghanistan, where they are undertaking research on their respective PhD theses. Alex and Felix are at the forefront of developing our understanding of the Taliban movement. They translated and edited Mullah Zaeff’s memoir, published as Abdul Salam Zaeff, My Life in the Taliban (Hurst and Oxford University Press, 2010), and currently are developing an archive of Taliban documents which will be placed online for researchers the world over to use.

Link to archive project:http://www.anenemywecreated.com/An_Enemy_We_Created/Welcome.html

Link to Kings announcement:http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/news/newsrecords/smhaward.aspx

blueblood

11-20-2014, 05:27 PM

A statement this week from Sartaj Aziz, Pakistan's national security advisor to the BBC saying : "Why should America's enemies unnecessarily become our enemies?" may have further added to this mistrust.

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-30105416

I find it incredibly surprising that post Abottabad, Americans still end up getting played by Pakistani army and ISI.

davidbfpo

11-27-2014, 08:26 PM

Thirty one smaller threads referring to the Taliban have been merged into this thread today. Those left alone appear to deserve to be 'stand alone'.

davidbfpo

11-27-2014, 08:33 PM

The author of this article in The International Journal Stability of Security and Development is Michael Semple, once the EU's Irish expert on Afghanistan and the Taliban, now an academic @ Queens, Belfast:http://www.stabilityjournal.org/article/view/sta.eh/246

Abstract:
Reacting to corruption and oppression in the Kandahar of 1994, the Taliban is seen as working with Sunni clerics to foster a shariat movement for advancing economic justice and (corporal) punishment. Before long, the organization began substantially rewarding joiners, arming for jihad, and resisting international forces in Afghanistan. Now, with less foreign resources to fight the Taliban, the Kabul central government has unfinished business with its still-robust challengers. In the face of recent modernization in sectors such as education and media, the author details three plausible scenarios for the Taliban to maintain its core shariat mission. One scenario is for the Taliban to re-secure (through continued force) its initial goal, viz., overall state power to promote and enforce shariat across urban as well as rural areas. Another possibility projects Afghanistan as operating a dualist system of separate zones, one for the Taliban’s ‘liberated territory,’ the other for the rest of Afghanistan as governed by Kabul. Achieving scenario three would be formidable: it posits that Taliban leaders may be persuaded that their armed jihad has run its course and can profitably be disconnected from the Middle East’s broader Islamic conflict. Conceivably, then, through accommodations with a shariat-accepting Kabul government, Taliban might be able to win buy-in for peace from its own military and its own fighting priests with their strong ties to Afghan communities in Pakistan.

I expect many here will wish that by 2024 Afghanistan will be a distant memory and a land of "milk & honey".:wry:

AdamG

04-21-2015, 01:59 AM

This is *not* from THE ONION NEWS NETWORK

Mashaal Radio has published a report stating that Daesh and Taliban group have announced Jihad against each other.

Nabi Jan Mullahkhil, police chief of southern Helmand province has told Mashaal Radio during an interview that he has received documents in which both the terrorist groups have announced Jihad against each other.

Mashaal Radio which is related to Azadi Radio quotes Mullahkhil as saying when the matter of peace talks between government and Taliban comes into discussion some intelligence agencies make new groups to keep the war ongoing in Afghanistan.

http://www.khaama.com/isis-taliban-announced-jihad-against-each-other-3206

davidbfpo

04-21-2015, 04:55 PM

AdamG,

Given the character of Afghan society that is byzantine in its intrigues and relationships an accusation of ISIS activity can hardly come as a surprise. Cast your memory back to the period between the post-Soviet exit to the victory of the Taliban (backed by Pakistan) Afghanistan was wracked by a bloody civil war.

Whether a ANP chief in Helmand Province is the most reliable source is a moot point. If you were engaged in an insurgency and under pressure from the Taliban, what better way to try and entice old allies to give you support?

blueblood

04-21-2015, 05:49 PM

Not surprising. ISIS has been poaching Taliban and TTP commanders for quite some time. Recently 5 TTP commanders pledged allegiance to ISIS including the spokesperson Shahidullah Shahid. It was rumoured that 4 of them came back to TTP.

omarali50

04-21-2015, 07:47 PM

If there really is such a thing as ISIS in Afghanistan (i.e. if it is not just a deniable front for the Haqqanis or their masters) and it gets into a turf fight with the Haqqanis and the Taliban then we will have an interesting experimental demonstration on our hands: a chance to see what counts for more? Ideological purity or state sponsorship? (I vote for state sponsorship, but if regional states fall into serious disrepair, then I vote for ideological purity).

davidbfpo

04-23-2015, 03:57 PM

The Soufan Group's contribution:http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-the-islamic-state-of-khorasan/

davidbfpo

07-30-2015, 05:48 PM

Today there's a variety of commentaries after the Taliban finally announce their leader died sometime ago, two years maybe and in a presumably comfortable villa in a Pakistani city, Quetta and Karachi being mentioned.

A selection made by Shashank Joshi (RUSI):https://shashankjoshi.wordpress.com/2015/07/30/after-mullah-omar/

He includes IMHO the best expert, Michael Semple:http://www.politico.eu/article/the-mullah-omar-myth-taliban-leader-death-afghanistan-politics/

The Soufan Group:http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-the-death-of-mullah-omar/

On Twitter Ali Soufan pointedly remarked so much for technical intelligence, Mullah Omar has been dead for two years and oh for a reliable human source.

This the thread on Afghan politics, which includes talking to the Taliban (by the Afghan state and IIRC ISAF):http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=21567

There is an older thread just on the Taliban:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5299

Just what it means for Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Taliban is a moot point.

davidbfpo

07-31-2015, 12:35 PM

Hardly a surprise that WaPo reports:
In early 2011, then-CIA Director Leon Panetta confronted the president of Pakistan with a disturbing piece of intelligence. The spy agency had learned that #Mohammad Omar, the Taliban leader who had become one of the world’s most wanted fugitives after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, was being treated at a hospital in southern Pakistan. The American spy chief even identified the facility — the Aga Khan University Hospital in Karachi....

Link:https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-intelligence-had-suspected-that-mohammad-omar-was-ill-in-pakistan/2015/07/30/9eed3b84-36e1-11e5-9d0f-7865a67390ee_story.html

davidbfpo

07-31-2015, 03:40 PM

It must be the week to say leaders are dead:
Chief of the Haqqani militant network and father of Sirajuddin Haqqani, Jaluluddin Haqqani, died almost a year ago of natural causes and was buried in Afghan province of Khost, according to reliable sources among the Afghan Taliban.While news of Jalaluddin Haqqani's death had been making rounds for almost a month now, multiple credible sources in Taliban confirmed today that he had died of illness almost a year ago.
The militant group has not officially given out a statement over Haqqani's demise yet.
Sources, however, say Sirajudin Haqqani, Jalaluddin's son, has been running the militant network for over a year now, ever since his father's illness.Link:http://www.dawn.com/news/1197598/jalaluddin-haqqani-is-dead-say-taliban-sources

The Haqqani group was (is) noted as a very capable insurgent group and were loyal to Mullah Omar. Their name appears on many threads and there is an old (2011) RFI thread on them:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=10387

omarali50

07-31-2015, 09:19 PM

so the multibillion dollar intelligence agencies of the West did not know this till yesterday? isnt that interesting?

davidbfpo

09-25-2015, 08:26 PM

A column by an Indian SME and ex-RAW insider. The full title being:
Don’t Blame The ISI
It didn’t create the Taliban. The elected government of Pakistan didLink:http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/dont-blame-the-isi/

It starts:
Some commentators have described the late General Hamid Gul as the father of the Taliban. Gul was no doubt the most virulent anti-Indian face among all ISI chiefs.
But it is not true that he created the Taliban, which was the brainchild of General Naseerullah Babar, Benazir Bhutto’s interior minister during her second tenure as prime minister (1993-96). Benazir did not trust the ISI. She tried to cut it down to size by firing Gul during her first tenure (1988-1990) for the ISI’s failure to oversee mujahideen operations to capture Jalalabad after the 1989 Soviet withdrawal.

davidbfpo

10-16-2015, 07:54 PM

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CRcWIFOW0AAVfHu.png

120mm

11-19-2015, 09:31 AM

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CRcWIFOW0AAVfHu.png

I'm not sure if this will link correctly here, but both Abdur Rahman Khan and the Soviets understood geopolitical reality.

Abdur Rahman Khan resettled Pashtuns in key areas where they a) conducted genocide and ethnic cleansing against the Hazara and b) provided a presence in every district, which lines were redrawn to provide "divide and conquer" in geographically defensible areas.

The Soviets attacked the drainage basins to depopulate these areas and drive them into more easily managed cities.

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/afghanistans-watersheds-relevance-instability-north-zoran-pavlovic?trk=pulse_spock-articles

Headwaters in the Central Highlands

Rivers always have relevance, but that significance varies based on their geographic context. In countries like Colombia, for example, many rivers are navigable and serve as transportation avenues through or around physical barriers. In countries like Afghanistan they are the opposite; the rivers there are the physical barriers to movement. Their importance, however, is indisputable in regard to agriculture, which directly relates to Afghanistan’s (ethnic) population distribution, peoples’ livelihoods, resource use, and the country’s overall (in)stability.

That a significant number of major rivers have headwaters in the higher elevations of the country’s Central Highlands—in Bamyan, western Maidan Wardak, and western Ghazni Provinces—in proximity to each other often escapes attention. Control over this area, at least in theory, would allow control over Afghanistan’s lifeblood, if the group who controls it is powerful enough. Hence, this is an important issue when considered in the context of ethnic politics and regional stability.

More at the link.

davidbfpo

01-22-2016, 08:15 PM

A CFR InfoGuide Presentation on The Taliban that starts with:
The Taliban has outlasted the world’s most potent military forces and its two main factions now challenge the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan. As U.S. troops draw down, the next phase of conflict will have consequences that extend far beyond the region.
Link:http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/taliban/p35985?cid=soc-twitter-in-taliban_ig-012116#!/

http://i.cfr.org/content/ips/assets/taliban/Afghanistan-Deadly-Transition-Taliban-InfoGuide-CFR.png

omarali50

01-22-2016, 11:50 PM

Meanwhile across the border (and yes, they are exactly the same movement)

http://brownpundits.blogspot.com/2016/01/more-collateral-damage-in-bacha-khan.html

davidbfpo

05-07-2016, 01:41 PM

A lull maybe here, but the Taliban have 'not gone away' and there are some posts on their recent activity elsewhere.

This article via AP is to say the least not good news. It starts with:
A shadowy, Pakistan-based militant faction is on the rise within the Taliban after its leader was appointed deputy and played a key role in unifying the fractured insurgency. The ascendency of the Haqqani network, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization, could significantly strengthen the Taliban and herald another summer of fierce fighting in Afghanistan. The firepower it brings to the Taliban was shown by a Kabul bombing last month that killed 64 people, the deadliest in the Afghan capital in years, which experts say was too sophisticated for the insurgents to have carried out without the Haqqanis.

Link:http://bigstory.ap.org/urn:publicid:ap.org:e6b913936ff14b769e39695f77be3b 55

Even more amazing is that the story relies upon a tape recording of a meeting where Sirajuddin Haqqani addresses a leadership meeting. Now would the Haqqani's associate ISI want that in the public domain?

davidbfpo

10-18-2016, 07:22 PM

My title based on an article from The Guardian, which starts with:
The Taliban and representatives of the Afghan government have restarted secret talks in the Gulf state of Qatar, senior sources within the insurgency and the Kabul government have told the Guardian.Who would try to stop this? According to a:
A western official in Kabul said a spate of arrests by Pakistani security forces of senior Taliban officials suggests Pakistan’s intelligence agencies are trying to “re-establish control over the process”.A familiar tactic. Plus GIRoA denying the talks have happened.
Link:https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/18/taliban-afghanistan-secret-talks-qatar

davidbfpo

10-24-2016, 10:14 AM

A FDD map tells so much. From:http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/taliban-drones-film-attacks-afghanistan-161023061347421.htmlhttp://www.aljazeera.com/mritems/Images/2016/9/15/135a7779bcce40b8981f51eb7dc1180f_6.jpg

davidbfpo

01-31-2017, 10:18 PM

Yet another think tank paper to read one day, with a renowned SME and a Kings War Studies professor:
This new RUSI Briefing Paper explores the new Taliban leadership landscape and, within this, the potential for restarting peace talks.

Based on interviews with Taliban personnel the paper argues that there is substantial discord within the group and in particular, that the new Taliban emir, Maulawi Haibatullah Akhundzada, has failed to exert his authority.Link:https://rusi.org/publication/briefing-papers/ready-peace-afghan-taliban-after-decade-war

davidbfpo

02-22-2017, 09:10 PM

Hat tip to WoTR for this short article on talking with the Taliban and a way to make peace:https://warontherocks.com/2017/02/insurgent-peace-making-a-new-approach-to-end-the-war-in-afghanistan/

SWJ Blog

11-18-2017, 07:51 PM

Afghan Officials: Islamic State Fighters Finding Sanctuary in Afghanistan (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/afghan-officials-islamic-state-fighters-finding-sanctuary-in-afghanistan)

Entry Excerpt:

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This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

davidbfpo

05-11-2018, 04:18 PM

A lengthy article by Professor Theo Farrell, ex-Kings War Studies, partly based on his first-hand research with ISAF and the Taliban. IT appears on WoTR from an affiliated website.

He opens with:
Insurgencies are famously difficult to defeat, yet the Afghan Taliban have proven especially so. Accounts of Taliban resilience have focused on both the deficiencies of Western efforts and the Afghan state and on Pakistani support for the Taliban. These accounts fail, however, to reveal the full picture of how the Taliban have been able to survive. Drawing on original field research, this article explores how the Taliban’s success has been shaped by factors internal to the insurgency, namely, the social resources that sustain it and the group’s ability to adapt militarily.

(He ends with) In the end, ramping up the U.S. military effort in Afghanistan risks reenergizing the Taliban’s sense of purpose and uniting a movement that may be beginning to unravel. If the United States is not careful, it could end up bombing its way to defeat in Afghanistan.

Link:https://tnsr.org/2018/05/unbeatable-social-resources-military-adaptation-and-the-afghan-taliban/

davidbfpo

06-06-2018, 02:26 PM

This post will be cross-posted in the thread on ANSF performance.

A report from the probably independent Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) on the recent attack on Farah city. It opens with:
An attack on Farah city had long been feared. For years now, the Taleban have been taking control of the provincial capital’s outlying districts and inching their way towards the central hub. For a few days in mid-May, it looked as though the Taleban were about to take Farah city, which would have been their most significant military triumph since capturing Kunduz for two weeks in 2015. Their strategy of consolidating control over rural areas then digging in at a provincial centre’s outskirts before launching an attack appears to be an increasing trend. While they lost the battle in Farah on this occasion, the Taleban still pose a serious threat to the area. AAN co-director Thomas Ruttig together with Ali Mohammad Sabawoon, Rohullah Soroush and Obaid Ali unpack the attack and its aftermath.
This is the first of two dispatches examining the recent attack on the city of Farah. This first dispatch focuses on the attack and its aftermath. The second contextualises the attack in light of post-2001 developments in Farah.

It ends with:
With regards to Farah, the fact that the Taleban were only pushed back to positions just outside the provincial capital from where they started their attack means that new attacks can be expected. Farah is only one example for a situation that prevails in at least a quarter of Afghanistan’s provinces.
Link:https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/surrounding-the-cities-the-meaning-of-the-latest-battle-for-farah-i/

davidbfpo

10-22-2018, 07:02 PM

Long ago Pakistan detained a significant Afghan Taliban figure, although some contest his importance and via Twitter there is a story:
Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, co-founder of the Afghan Taliban, popularly known as “Mulla Baradar” has been finally released from jail in Pakistan.
Link:https://www.thenews.com.pk/amp/383844-mulla-baradar-released-from-pak-jail

He was detained in 2010, alas the posts about this cannot be found - the search function fails.

davidbfpo

01-03-2019, 08:29 PM

Spotted via Twitter yesterday:
Taliban insurgents have detonated a powerful bomb near a major military base in Afghanistan's southern Kandahar province, killing at least five soldiers and wounding six others.

The attack happened Tuesday night in the volatile Maiwand district, where Taliban rebels dug a two-kilometer tunnel into the Afghan National Army base and planted the explosives. A security official requesting anonymity confirmed the details to VOA on Wednesday.

A Taliban spokesman, Qari Yousaf Ahmadi, claimed its "tactical explosion flattened" the army base and killed at least 40 security forces, though insurgent claims are often inflated.
Link:https://www.voanews.com/a/taliban-tunnel-bomb-hits-afghan-army-base-italian-troops-survive-insider-attack/4725499.html and a little on:https://www.rferl.org/a/five-afghan-soldiers-killed-in-taliban-attack/29688268.html

I don't recall previous attacks using this approach; a tactic that requires skill, patience and dedication IMHO. Hence a new thread.

Note there are some recent posts on underground warfare between Israel and it's enemies on the IDF thread.

Bill Moore

01-05-2019, 07:46 PM

Spotted via Twitter yesterday:
Link:https://www.voanews.com/a/taliban-tunnel-bomb-hits-afghan-army-base-italian-troops-survive-insider-attack/4725499.html and a little on:https://www.rferl.org/a/five-afghan-soldiers-killed-in-taliban-attack/29688268.html

I don't recall previous attacks using this approach; a tactic that requires skill, patience and dedication IMHO. Hence a new thread.

Note there are some recent posts on underground warfare between Israel and it's enemies on the IDF thread.

David,

Tunneling as a military tactic has been around for a while, but this is the first time I recall the Taliban using it.

See: https://spartacus-educational.com/FWWtunnelling.htm

On the Western Front during the First World War, the military employed specialist miners to dig tunnels under No Man's Land. The main objective was to place mines beneath enemy defensive positions. When it was detonated, the explosion would destroy that section of the trench. The infantry would then advance towards the enemy front-line hoping to take advantage of the confusion that followed the explosion of an underground mine.

Soldiers in the trenches developed different strategies to discover enemy tunnelling. One method was to drive a stick into the ground and hold the other end between the teeth and feel any underground vibrations. Another one involved sinking a water-filled oil drum into the floor of the trench. The soldiers then took it in turns to lower an ear into the water to listen for any noise being made by tunnellers.

There are some documentaries online the topic if you do a search. The U.S. Army is beginning to identify subterranean as its own domain, one we need to learn to operate in and hopefully dominate.

davidbfpo

01-26-2019, 09:13 PM

An update, even slightly optimistic, on the talks involving the Taliban; citing an ICG expert:
This has the potential to start the first serious peace process to end one of the biggest wars in the world. It’s monumental news, but we’re still at the early stages...We know the agreement has four parts: ceasefire, counter-terrorism, troop withdrawal, and intra-Afghan negotiations. Sequencing and timelines remain tricky.
Link:https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/26/afghanistan-war-us-taliban-talks-verge-breakthrough

omarali50

02-01-2019, 10:23 PM

An update, even slightly optimistic, on the talks involving the Taliban; citing an ICG expert:
Link:https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/26/afghanistan-war-us-taliban-talks-verge-breakthrough

I had a few random (very pedestrian and expected) thoughts on this topic https://www.brownpundits.com/2019/02/01/afghanistan-exit-to-chaos/

Bill Moore

02-02-2019, 07:30 PM

I had a few random (very pedestrian and expected) thoughts on this topic https://www.brownpundits.com/2019/02/01/afghanistan-exit-to-chaos/

Based on general principles I think you basically nailed it.

Without knowing ANYTHING about the various layers of secret planning and execution going on right now, just on general principles (losers donÂ’t get to dictate terms, winners are not bound by promises they made, Trump is an ignorant conman, etc) this is not going to end well. There WILL be blood.

Beyond the obvious corruption on the US side there is the issue of ideological incompetence; the US is neither a capable imperial power, nor an innocent spectator with no interest in meddling in far away countries. And somehow its processes are so designed that it is easier to waste a 100 billion per year than it is to sit back and figure out what the aims are, where the carrots and sticks are most likely to work and now to apply them.

Our problem is not staying power, few nations can match the U.S.'s political will, means, and endurance to commit to enduring conflicts like these. I know the common misperception is we don't have staying power, but show me another nation that intervenes in the affairs of other nations with the tenacity that we do?

I find it hard to imagine that this could end up as a US Â“winÂ”. As a US citizen, I will be happy if it does, but I am not holding my breath.

I think our President could use some mentoring on leadership. Sometimes a bitter pill goes down a lot easier with the right words. Not everyone can be a Churchill or Regan, but no one should spew out national security policy decisions by Twitter. This behavior is absurd for a national leader. He needs to understand the sacrifice thousands of Americans and our allies have made in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. Then it will become clear he owes those who sacrificed more than a policy by Tweet. He owes them an explanation and his sincere gratitude for their sacrifice. The blame for the poorly conceived policy does not belong to those doing the fighting.

The President’s instincts may be right. Withdrawing may well be the right decision since all these adventures were in pursuit of unrealistic policy aims that wasted trillions of dollars. This great distraction (I’ll clarify) and diversion of resources allowed more serious threats to our nation to expand elsewhere. I now question LTG McMaster’s claim the answer to our problems (for terrorism) is not the 0’Dark Thirty response. Maybe it is the best response to prevent attacks on the homeland. You kill those planning to execute without committing a tremendous amount of resources to transform foreign cultures. Gen Mattis’s claim we have to build while we fight should also be suspect. This approach resulted in significant mission creep, a creep that exceeded our means and accomplished little. This is what I mean by distraction and diversion of resources. We should have, a should continue to employ forces to kill al-Qaeda and ISIS. I know the counter-argument, what happens if you leave? We’re leaving and whatever facade of stability we think we created will probably fall apart anyway. At the end of the day, the locals have to sort out the power arrangements.

There is a very uncomfortable moral hazard associated with pulling out. I don’t think there is a way to withdraw without pulling the rug out from our partners feet. They put everything at risk to support us on the assumption we would stand by their side. With our current immigration policies and bitterly divided political parties, it is unlikely we will offer them an alternative home. Once again we face with no good options, just less bad ones. On the bright side, this could be a catalyst to bring our political parties together when it comes to foreign policy. What principles we stand for as Americans seemed to be increasingly questioned around the world, and maybe within our own borders. We need Congress to perform its balancing role more than ever.

omarali50

02-03-2019, 01:22 AM

Major Amin, an observer with far more local knowledge than me, has some thoughts on the Afghan defeat negotiations..

https://www.brownpundits.com/2019/02/03/the-last-hurdle-to-afghan-peace/

davidbfpo

02-05-2019, 12:44 PM

Michael Semple, the author of this article is well-known for his knowledge of Afghanistan and the Taliban - which led to his expulsion a few years ago. So IMHO worth reading.

His last two paragraphs:
The default position for the Taliban leadership would be to let talks drag on for a while and then double down on the strategy of jihad until victory by launching a spring offensive. However, what has changed since Khalilzad launched his peace initiative in October 2018 is that more Taliban have come to contemplate an end to the war and even some senior figures have concluded that this can only be achieved by compromise. Afghanistan is still probably a long way away from a peace deal. But the shift in Taliban calculus is a helpful foundation for the next stage of peacemaking.
Link:https://theconversation.com/afghanistan-the-tensions-inside-the-taliban-over-recent-us-peace-talks-110734? (https://theconversation.com/afghanistan-the-tensions-inside-the-taliban-over-recent-us-peace-talks-110734?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20 for%20February%205%202019%20-%201227411296&utm_content=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20f or%20February%205%202019%20-%201227411296+Version+A+CID_341df5b45f546f1620e5c3 b711a1559a&utm_source=campaign_monitor_uk&utm_term=the%20tensions%20within%20the%20Taliban%2 0movement)

Curious that Taliban fighters are using Facebook, have phones and issue their chants via Whatsapp.

davidbfpo

02-24-2019, 08:16 PM

A commentary by Hamid Hussain, a regular SWC contributor.

“There is nothing further here for a warrior. We drive bargains; oldmen’s work. Young men make wars and the virtues of war are the virtues of young men; courage and hope for the future. Then old men make the peace. The vices of peace are the vices of old men; mistrust and caution. It must be so”. Prince Feisal (Sir Alec Guinness) to T. E. Lawrence (Peter O’Toole) in Lawrence of Arabia.

From: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pZdLM2ENld8
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pZdLM2ENld8)
In the last few months, a new window opened in the seventeen years old war in Afghanistan. There was breakthrough with first serious efforts of direct negotiations between United States (U.S.) and main militant group Taliban. It was President Donald Trump’s announcement of withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan that got the ball rolling. He made this decision without consulting any other government agency. Pentagon, intelligence community and State Department view rapid withdrawal as a recipe for disaster. Trump appointed former U.S. envoy to Afghanistan and an Afghan-American Zalmay Khalilzad nick named Zal to spearhead this effort. Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar worked as intermediaries and a bridge between Taliban, Pakistan and Americans.

Negotiations between Taliban and Unites States are only one dimension of a complex conflict. Taliban’s strategy is simple in its execution. It used its committed cadre of fighters and support structure in Pakistan to escalate violence to a level to achieve two goals. First to sow enough fear and uncertainty among Afghans that will undermine the efficiency and to some extent legitimacy of the government. Another objective is to convince fellow Afghans that without giving them a share in power and economic pie, Afghans will never see peace. Initially, behind the scene, questions were raised by Americans whether Taliban are a unified entity to work with. Taliban responded by announcing a three days ceasefire during Eid festival. There were no attacks all over the country proving their point that they have a firm command and control system and all fighters follow the leadership. When United States announced troop withdrawal plan, Taliban thought that by directly negotiating they will get the credit and fulfil one of their objectives of forcing foreign troop withdrawal. This will help them to carve out a much larger share in power after American withdrawal.

Another factor was intense pressure on Taliban from Pakistan and Arab countries. Agreeing to direct negotiations with Americans, Taliban placated both parties and if no agreement is reached, they can claim that they entered in negotiations with good faith and put the blame of failure at American doorstep. From U.S. point of view, there is a narrow window of about six months. Domestic troubles of President Trump will take a sharp turn with completion of special prosecutor Robert Mueller’s work. In addition, presidential campaign will start in the fall of 2019 and these two factors will suck all the oxygen in White House. Like many other foreign policy issues, Afghanistan will also recede in the background.

Things are also moving very fast for Taliban. Transition of an armed group from war to a political process is a challenging period. Consensus among core leadership, sorting out friction between fighting commanders on the ground and political operatives of the movement and most importantly a convincing message to the foot soldiers about what is the meaning and concrete shape of victory. Compromise is a completely different animal than total victory.

It is at this junction that armed groups split into factions. There is some friction among senior members of Taliban leadership on policy issues. One example will give a glimpse of these Byzantine intrigues. In December 2018, Taliban shadow governor of Helmand Mullah Abdul Manan Akhund who was a strong opponent of negotiations with U.S. was killed in a drone strike. Events moved very fast after his demise on the negotiations front that raises the question whether someone from inside tipped the Afghan or American intelligence. His control of a large share of Helmand’s opium crop and his rivalry with Taliban leader Mullah Haibatullah Akhund adds to the confusion surrounding his death. On the political front, some old hands like Tayyab Agha faded and Sher Muhammad Abbas Stanakzai has emerged as public face of Taliban in negotiations. He is facing his own challenges from political operatives and military commanders of Taliban movement.

Taliban initially agreed to travel to Pakistan to meet Pakistani officials. However, when Afghan public opinion turned against them accusing Taliban being Pakistan’s proxies, Taliban declined to come to Islamabad citing travel problems. Signature on a piece of paper for American troop withdrawal is the easiest part. Real landmines on the road to peace are agreement on ceasefire, transition, involvement of Afghan government in the process; buy in from Afghan power brokers and role of neighbouring countries especially Pakistan and Iran. Even if this Herculean task is achieved, the real elephant in the room is who is going to subsidize the Afghan state?

Taliban will sign on any document as they think that after the departure of American troops, with dominant military muscle they will dictate their terms on Afghans opposing them. Some even argue that there is no need to negotiate and risk internal division as Americans are going anyway whether there is an agreement or not. What happens after American withdrawal is anybody’s guess? Even if Taliban decide not to use violence, insistence on Shariat based constitution and restrictions on women and civil liberties now enjoyed by Afghans will bring them in conflict with many groups. With such deep ideological divisions, instinctive use of violence is the next logical step that will plunge the country into another cycle of fratricide.

Anyone trying to read tea leaves in the muddy waters of Afghanistan has been disappointed time and again. The issue is not limited to Taliban and United States but there are several regional and international actors who have a vote on this subject. More importantly Afghan individuals, groups and factions will drive events. Currently, Afghan power brokers are in a state of rapid re-alignment. Afghan government sees itself as a big loser as so far it has been excluded from the negotiations process. Zal periodically briefs high Afghan officials on the pace of negotiations but it is not enough to allay their fears. On the other hand, Russia also kept Afghan government out of the talks it sponsored in Moscow. President Ashraf Ghani is trying to shore up his position. On internal front, he has announced convening of a grand assembly of tribal leaders in March and bringing in his inner circle experienced street fighters who served as interior ministers and head of Afghan intelligence agency National Directorate of Security (NDS). The list includes Hanif Atmar, Amrullah Saleh and Asadulah Khalid. On external front, he is appealing to the Europeans for support. However, on both fronts, he is vulnerable. Tribal leaders will defect to who offers them more money and leave them alone in their tribal fiefdoms.

Europe is facing its own serious problems of Brexit as well as rise of right-wing political parties. There is no desire to spend European treasure in the black hole of Afghanistan.

Political competition is rapidly evolving into a zero-sum game. One can now see evolution of factions that includes members of current government under President Ashraf Ghani, former President Hamid Karzai and his close confidants, members of old Northern Alliance and regional strongmen. This gives option of defection to every Afghan player and history of Afghanistan is full of these volte faces. The most damaging effect of this exercise is erosion of nascent and already shaky national instruments of security. Army, police and intelligence agencies are now riddled with fear, suspicion and mistrust. Individual members of these organizations will drift towards sub-national identities for survival.

Any future national structure that will emerge after American withdrawal will be on very shaky grounds. The real wild card in this game is young generation of Afghans who grew up after 2001 especially in urban centres with access to information. Eighty four percent of twenty-seven million Afghans are under the age of forty. Fate of Afghanistan will be determined by this group and time will tell if they organize to a level where they can pull their own elders from the brink of another cycle of civil war or pick a gun and join their respective political, ethnic or sectarian group.

There is lot of euphoria generated by photo sessions of gatherings in Qatar and Moscow. However, one needs to be realistic and never lose sight of harsh and painful facts on the ground. If we rewind the clock, we will see that a similar assorted set of Afghans was gathered in Taif; Saudi Arabia and had to be put in a prison for a night to agree to the mundane issue of who would be their spokesperson. In another round, all were pushed inside the most holy building of their religion; Ka’aba where they swore that they will stop the bloodshed and signed on their most holy book Quran. When they came back to their homeland, they brought the destruction that surpassed the punishment inflicted by Soviet Union on Afghans. This is reality, rest is our own imagination.

davidbfpo

02-24-2019, 08:18 PM

U.S. is currently spending $42 billion a year in Afghanistan. Everyone including Taliban are benefiting from this largesse. Once this tap is closed and American restraints on local and regional players are removed then everybody and his cousin will rush in and I’ll leave it to the imagination what it means? Machiavelli gave us warning about such situations that “in a divided country, when any man thinks himself injured, he applies to the head of his faction, who is obliged to assist him in seeking vengeance if he is to keep up his own reputation and interests, instead of discouraging violence”.
Rivalry between Saudi Arabia and UAE on one and Qatar on the other side also had an impact on Afghan dialogue process. Initially, venue of talks was in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. When Saudi Arabia and later UAE pressured Taliban to also include Afghan government in the process, Taliban deftly used Arab division to its own advantage. They declined to attend meetings in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Qatar quickly filled the gap by arranging meetings in Doha pitching to the Americans that Doha already has Taliban office and not insisting to Taliban to include Afghan government.
United States found it more useful and productive to use Arabs to work on Pakistan rather than attempting old formula of direct incentives and arm twisting. Pakistan is in a very difficult economic situation and therefore more vulnerable diplomatically. An element of self-interest is also involved. They have realized the grave danger of proxy war and its negative fallout for Pakistan with a quick American withdrawal. Now Pakistan is doing everything for free for Americans as they see this exercise as self-interest. Saudi Arabia and UAE and to a lesser extent Qatar have picked up the tab.
Current civilian government of Prime Minister Imran Khan has ceded foreign policy as well national security to the army. This is what army brass has been advocating for decades telling the politicians to concentrate on economy and governance and leave the national security and foreign policy to the army. The prayers of generals have been answered. Afghan policy and negotiations with Americans are dictated by a general principle accepted by army brass, articulated by late General Muhammad Zia ul Haq and quoted in John Persico’s biography of CIA Director William Casey. In 1983, Zia told Casey that ‘being a friend of the United States was like living on the banks of a great river. The soil is wonderfully fertile, but every four or eight years the river changes course and you may find yourself alone in a desert’.
If Afghanistan is faced with another round of violence, the winds of instability will invariably start to blow east of the Durand Line. This will have significant social, political and economic fallout for Pakistan. 2019 is different than 2001 and Pakistan has certain advantages as well as new vulnerabilities in 2019. Now, Pakistan army is in control of border area. Regular army and paramilitary force Frontier Scouts (FS) are manning border posts, control all major population centres as well as roads. Thanks to American financial support a decade ago, FS is equipped and trained and manning defensible positions. The army’s decision to fence the border seems now very prudent as it may provide some firewall.
On the negative side, army was blindsided by deep anger among tribesmen. Sudden emergence of a grassroots organization Pushtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM) gave voice to grievances of not only tribesmen but large number of young Pushtun students and professionals found a voice. Poor handling by army and some irresponsible statements from some PTM members widened the gulf and now a lot is needed to bridge the gap. In fact, Pushtun youth of both Pakistan and Afghanistan who advocate non-violence can be the bridge of peace between two countries. Expectations should be modest and a reasonably functioning central Afghan government that allows some economic activity and keeps violence below a certain threshold that it does not affect day to day activities then people should be satisfied with this outcome.
The most clear and present danger is covert wars staged from Afghanistan. Everyone is angry and blames others for their misfortunes forgetting their own role in the blood-soaked saga of the last four decades. If everyone succumbs to their basic instincts, then they will see covert operations as a cheap option to address their pressing security concerns. The possibilities for destruction are endless and can be done very cheaply. It takes years to build a school or a hospital and train staff with large human and economic investment. However, you can bring down the whole building in less than five minutes using explosive costing less than $100. A bullet costing few pennies can take the flame of life from a teacher or a doctor that took two decades of education.
U.S. using Saudi and Emirati connections in the border territory to support Baluch of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran to run covert operations in southern areas of Iran. Israelis will invariably join this party in view of recent close cooperation with Saudis and Emiratis in security and intelligence fields. Angry Afghans giving shelter to Pakistani Taliban as well as Baluch militants to pay back Pakistan in its own coin. Iranians using it as a staging ground to thwart Saudi encroachment in its backyard in Baluchistan.
Russia attempting to create a cordon sanitaire in northern Afghanistan to keep the winds of chaos away from vulnerable Central Asian Republics as well as its soft underbelly in Chechnya and Dagestan. India preferring to fight the battle inside Afghanistan to prevent establishment of safe havens of Kashmiri militants and avoid the re-run of the bad movie of 1990s.
China’s ill thought policy of mass incarceration of Uighur Muslims and attempts to completely erase their Muslim identity has opened a very fertile soil for trouble. Uighur orphans can find many step-fathers in the killing fields of Afghanistan that can keep China busy chasing shadows for decades.
If restraint is not shown then in this zero-sum game, everyone will suffer in the long run even of they achieve some temporary success. Former CIA director Richard Helms quoted in Bob Woodward’s The Secret Wars of CIA very correctly pointed that, “Covert action is like a damn good drug. It works, but if you take too much of it, it will kill you”. Everyone engaged in this exercise needs only to care about the welfare of their own people and not doing a favour to the other party. They will need wisdom of Solomon, patience of Job and mercy of Jesus to change the trajectory of history from violence to peaceful co-existence and need to reflect on Liddell Hart’s definition of success, “Victory in the true sense implies that the state of peace, and of one’s people, is better after the war than before”.
‘It is well that war is so terrible, or we should grow too fond of it.’ General Robert F. Lee