Next Small War

[Strickland]

If Daniel Ortega is successful in assuming control/power in Nicaragua, and then seeks a military/political/economic alliance with Venezuela and Cuba, it is likely the US would become an active interested party. This alliance would further destabilize Mexico, and potentially emboldened Chavez to seek an expanded role and intervention in Colombia and Brazil. All of this would be intolerable to US interets.

[DDilegge]

That said - Castro's death will be a wild card in this equation and most certainly draw our attention to Cuba. Anyone want to dare a call on this scenario?

[NDD]

Couple of observations from the TAOR:
1. Chavez and Colombia - he wouldn't dare and there is no way to get a foothold. The Colombians will go the other way just because he is Venezuelan. Colombia has made tremendous progress in the last 4 years - unfortunately, the reporting of it is being lost in the bigger global picture. The ROI is paying huge dividends, but there is an election on the horizon and all that could change with one stuffing of the ballot box. The next step in Colombia is to either re-elect Uribe or elect someone just like him, there are several candidates. I never thought I would say it, but Colombia is on the fast track to becoming the most stable democracy in the region.
2. Brazil will never fall into a Chavez or Ortega-led fold. Brazil isn't really a Latin country and they are looking for a seat at the Big Table, not regional coalitions.
3. Personally, I see Mexico in the same boat as Brazil. What happens in the US has a far larger impact on Mexico than anything in Central or South America.
4. South America does not follow Central America or the Carribean's lead. Case in point - Che's foco fiasco.

Much more concerning to me is Chavez' new love for ME shady characters and Venezuela's membership in OPEC. If Chavez gets desperate enough, I doubt he will hesitate to swing even further that way for help. And we've all seen what happens when you let the AQ virus in.

The tri-border area is also concerning, mostly due to a complete lack of any real state presence.

If Ortega does re-gain control, I think he will be mostly a nuisance, much like Chavez. And like Chavez, the risk of him looking to the ME for support could become real.

I would hope that even idiots like Ortega and Chavez could see what will happen to them if it comes to pass.

[NDD]

As for the next small war, I am hoping for an insurgency in Iran. Pipe dream I know...

[aktarian]

As for the next small war, I am hoping for an insurgency in Iran. Pipe dream I know...

Insurgency in one of the largest oil exporters and state that lies at Hormuz Straits would be a bad thing. Specially since shi'ias in Gulf Arabs could get drawn in.

[NDD]

Insurgency in one of the largest oil exporters and state that lies at Hormuz Straits would be a bad thing. Specially since shi'ias in Gulf Arabs could get drawn in.
Another 30 years of their antics would be a worse thing. Just my opinion and my dream.

Largest oil exporters to whom?

[Strickland]

We should remember that the US is largely responsible for the Iranian situation due to its role in the overthrow or Mossadeq, and support of the Shah.

[aktarian]

Another 30 years of their antics would be a worse thing. Just my opinion and my dream.

A state is more responsive to threats and can be influenced by other means (economics mostly) than some non-stae group. And stable state has an interest in long term development while country in anarchy doesn't.



Largest oil exporters to whom?

Globaly. If they stop exports (or limit them) there will be shortage of oil on market which will drive prices up, including for US.

[NDD]

We should remember that the US is largely responsible for the Iranian situation due to its role in the overthrow or Mossadeq, and support of the Shah.
Negative, the Brits did that. Yes, we helped, but it was mostly them. And that is what happens when you try to nationalize somebody elses hard work.

I don't think anything would have turned out much different if he had remained in power. The Islamists would have come for him eventually.

[NDD]

A state is more responsive to threats and can be influenced by other means (economics mostly) than some non-stae group. And stable state has an interest in long term development while country in anarchy doesn't.



Globaly. If they stop exports (or limit them) there will be shortage of oil on market which will drive prices up, including for US.I am not advocating threatening an insurgent group in Iran - I am advocating supporting them.

Yes, prices would go up short term. In the medium/long term, Iran cannot afford not to sell. I doubt they have been saving for a rainy day.

I am all for destabilizing the ME with a very few exceptions. It never has been all that stable anyway and the status quo gets a lot of people killed.

There are rooms that simply cannot be cleared. Sometimes you have to throw a grenade in and close the door and move on.

[aktarian]

I am not advocating threatening an insurgent group in Iran - I am advocating supporting them.

That will lead to civil war which woun't be over soon. Unlike Taliban and Saddam Iranian mullahs aren't as hated as those two were. They are unpopular but not hated so much. So they could count on support of parts of population, specially if people see this civil war as orchestrated from outside.



Yes, prices would go up short term. In the medium/long term, Iran cannot afford not to sell. I doubt they have been saving for a rainy day.

It isn't necessary that they wouldn't want to sell, it could be that they couldn't. Iranian oil infrastructure would be damaged. Either in fighting itself or loosing side would destroy as much as they could out of spite. Short term disaster, medium term bad thing and who knows about long term.



I am all for destabilizing the ME with a very few exceptions. It never has been all that stable anyway and the status quo gets a lot of people killed.


And if you destabilise it can you be sure people friendly to you will come on top? Say you topple Saudi regime. Are you sure young, pro-western factions will come on top? It can be that even worse regime will come out.

Or do your eally want shaking up Bahrain so that majority shi'ia gets in power? So that Iranains might get foot in another door?

You know, democracy is good concept but sometimes it brings up somebody you don't like. Just ask Algerians. ;)



There are rooms that simply cannot be cleared. Sometimes you have to throw a grenade in and close the door and move on.

I think that if you want a true change you have to let people do it themselves. Everything that is put in from outside runs the risk of rejection. Oh it works sometimes, but not most of the times. set up conditions for it but then let the people do it themselves.

[NDD]

Everything you say are indeed very possible scenarios. And then again there are many others.

Sometimes you have to engage and see what happens.

[zenpundit]

For those interested, two highly respected military thinkers Thomas P.M. Barnett and John Robb are engaged in a public debate on their blogs over Robb's Iraq op-ed in the NYT.

http://www.nytimes.com/glogin?URI=http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/15/opinion/15robb.html&OP=3f647698Q2FMlxgMZ6Q5BqV66AQ22MQ22EEQ2FM)EM)Q2FM 6Q7DS3S63M)Q2FV6ggQ3CYA.F

http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/archives2/002471.html

http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2005/10/the_opensource_.html

Start of a discussion between 4GW and PNM camps. I have a thread started on my blog for comments as well.

[aktarian]

Everything you say are indeed very possible scenarios. And then again there are many others.

Sometimes you have to engage and see what happens.

Starting a war and hoping for the best doesn't sound like a good strategy. you should prepare for the worst case scenario and expect things could go evn worse than that. ;)

Regarding Iran best policy is not to meddle and let things change by itself. Put in checks so that regime can't do much damage and be prepared to deal with new generations without too much focus on the past. If change comes from within it will be much more comprehensive and accepted by population than anything imposed from outside.

[NDD]

For those interested, two highly respected military thinkers Thomas P.M. Barnett and John Robb are engaged in a public debate on their blogs over Robb's Iraq op-ed in the NYT.

http://www.nytimes.com/glogin?URI=http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/15/opinion/15robb.html&OP=3f647698Q2FMlxgMZ6Q5BqV66AQ22MQ22EEQ2FM)EM)Q2FM 6Q7DS3S63M)Q2FV6ggQ3CYA.F

http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/archives2/002471.html

http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2005/10/the_opensource_.html

Start of a discussion between 4GW and PNM camps. I have a thread started on my blog for comments as well.
Thanks for the links!

[NDD]

Starting a war and hoping for the best doesn't sound like a good strategy. you should prepare for the worst case scenario and expect things could go evn worse than that. ;)

Regarding Iran best policy is not to meddle and let things change by itself. Put in checks so that regime can't do much damage and be prepared to deal with new generations without too much focus on the past. If change comes from within it will be much more comprehensive and accepted by population than anything imposed from outside.
Your opinion. Mine differs. Checks? Without teeth to back them up? Look at the attempted checks on their nuke program now - they aren't even speed bumps.

Yes, internal change is better. Unfortunately, it rarely occurs with external impetus. I noticed you are from Slovenia, would your countrymen rather the US had meddled in 1939 as opposed to letting things change by themselves until 1941?

[NDD]

I couldn't disagree more with John Robb if I tried.

[CPTAUSRET]

Your opinion. Mine differs. Checks? Without teeth to back them up? Look at the attempted checks on their nuke program now - they aren't even speed bumps.

Yes, internal change is better. Unfortunately, it rarely occurs with external impetus. I noticed you are from Slovenia, would your countrymen rather the US had meddled in 1939 as opposed to letting things change by themselves until 1941?

I am with NDD, on this one.

Terry

[M. J. Dougherty]

ALCON,

It is my believe that the growing trend in insurgent campaign (shor/mid-term objectives) strategies is to generate as much chaos and anarchy as possible. By creating an environment of "intractable conflict" insurgents are capable of strategically deterring intervention into "lawless areas." While the long-term objective remain control or dominant influence over people, territory & resources, the near term imperative requires insurgents to pre-empt foreign intervention by more powerful states.

In regards to ensuring friendly power acends to control of a new and emerging state, it is risky option. However, the one lesson that insurgent groups have learned is that they cannot compete with powerful organized states with overwhelming strategic (economic & military resource with superior information dissemination /control) capabilities.

If one looks at the various conflicts in South & SE Asia, they do not seem to make too much sense, particularly with respect to the radom patterns of violence. But when viewed in the context of destablizing societies, particularly in Indonesia, and exasperating ethnic, religious, social or economic tensions, there is some evidence fo insurgent intent to bring down the government rather than overthrow it.

[aktarian]

Your opinion. Mine differs. Checks? Without teeth to back them up? Look at the attempted checks on their nuke program now - they aren't even speed bumps.

Well, then you need to put some teeth in your attempts.

And I believe that Iranian regime is realistic. I don't think they will start nuking the area as soon as they get nukes so even if they get nuke they will be responsible with it and be subject to detterance.



Yes, internal change is better. Unfortunately, it rarely occurs with external impetus. I noticed you are from Slovenia, would your countrymen rather the US had meddled in 1939 as opposed to letting things change by themselves until 1941?

I'm sorry but I don't quite understand what you are saying here. Are you saying that if I wish that US would start taking more active role in Europe in 1939 instead of going to war in 1941? If so it's difference between meddling in internal affairs (such as starting wars) and making an alliance with state.

[Steve Blair]

One of the biggest problems with dealing with a borderline theocracy like Iran is that while the current regime may be realistic, there is no guarantee that the following one will be.

[Strickland]

Negative, the Brits did that. Yes, we helped, but it was mostly them. And that is what happens when you try to nationalize somebody elses hard work.

I don't think anything would have turned out much different if he had remained in power. The Islamists would have come for him eventually.

Eisenhower's biographer, Dean Acheson, and the CIA would all disagree, but yes, the momentum to get rid of Mossadeq came from the Brits. Kinzer's latest book clearly demonstrates the role of the US and CIA in Iran before turning our attention to toppling the regime in Guatemala.

To say that an Islamist Regime would have eventually come to power regardless of western interference in internal Iranian politics, and the brutality of the Shah and the Savak is an empty assertion.

We need to remember that the Iranians hold elections for president, unlike the Saudis or Pakistanis. They have a more democratic process that our allies in Jordan and Egypt.

[NDD]

Eisenhower's biographer, Dean Acheson, and the CIA would all disagree, but yes, the momentum to get rid of Mossadeq came from the Brits. Kinzer's latest book clearly demonstrates the role of the US and CIA in Iran before turning our attention to toppling the regime in Guatemala.

To say that an Islamist Regime would have eventually come to power regardless of western interference in internal Iranian politics, and the brutality of the Shah and the Savak is an empty assertion.

We need to remember that the Iranians hold elections for president, unlike the Saudis or Pakistanis. They have a more democratic process that our allies in Jordan and Egypt.
How is it an empty assertion? What would have stopped them?

The Ayatollah Kashani helped put Mossadeq into power, they were already players in Iran even back then.

[NDD]

Well, then you need to put some teeth in your attempts.


In my attempts to what?

[NDD]

Eisenhower's biographer, Dean Acheson, and the CIA would all disagree, but yes, the momentum to get rid of Mossadeq came from the Brits. Kinzer's latest book clearly demonstrates the role of the US and CIA in Iran before turning our attention to toppling the regime in Guatemala.

To say that an Islamist Regime would have eventually come to power regardless of western interference in internal Iranian politics, and the brutality of the Shah and the Savak is an empty assertion.

We need to remember that the Iranians hold elections for president, unlike the Saudis or Pakistanis. They have a more democratic process that our allies in Jordan and Egypt.
Mossadeq's removal was about Anglo-Iranian Oil - later BP. Mostly a Brit problem.

[aktarian]

One of the biggest problems with dealing with a borderline theocracy like Iran is that while the current regime may be realistic, there is no guarantee that the following one will be.

One more reason not to trigger an insurection to topple it. ;)

[aktarian]

In my attempts to what?

Not you as an individual but you as US. Sorry for not being clear.

If current atempts to pput check on Iranian troublemaking are toothless US should put more teeth into it.

[Robal2pl]

Hi evryone,
I think that Iran will not be a place of next small war , if we're talking about insurgection or guerilla warfare. Even if US will try to support something like this, there will be very small popular support if we mean pro - US, pro - democracy movement. (I suspect that only very small student groups would support ). This only will make current goverment more supported by people, you know why radical movements managed to gain so much poular support and managed to overthrow Shah. I think that Iran will be likely at war, because of its WMD program, but i don't think that there will be even ground war. I expect a series of air raids, to destroy installations.

Robal2pl

[Steve Blair]

One more reason not to trigger an insurection to topple it. ;)

But in this case you have no guarantee that the "legitimate" follow-on to the current regime will be practical.

I would also point out as an aside that it's not just the U.S. that needs to monitor Iran's programs. There are other nations that have (or should have) an interest in such things.

[aktarian]

But in this case you have no guarantee that the "legitimate" follow-on to the current regime will be practical.

It depends on who next guys are. If it's just new geenration of mullahs it will be same. If it's young non-clerical leadership they woun't play by religious rules.

Of course this doesn't mean they will be friendly to West but they woun't be hostile either.



I would also point out as an aside that it's not just the U.S. that needs to monitor Iran's programs. There are other nations that have (or should have) an interest in such things.

I think they do. And Iran isn't hostile to others same way as it's toward US or Israel.

[Tom Odom]

Gents,

Small wars as defined by the USMC are already taking place. Darfur , Sudan has seen US airlift transporting my old friends, the Rwandan Patriotic Army, as peacekeepers. The "small war" in the Congo has claimed more than 3 MILLION dead since 1997; periodic flare ups are routine. Zimbabwe is headed toward the abyss; look for bloodletting there in the near to mid term.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict morphs and bubbles as it has since the mid-1930s. I fervently hope that we stay out of that one. Distance and balance are our only friends in that long struggle.

Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria are all candidates for a fiction writer's potential best seller on turmoil. Such fiction would hardly be a stretch.

I won't go into Iraq; the schisms before the war are there after the war. They will be there when we leave.

Those are my regions: Asia, South Asia, Latin America, Eurasia all have their flarepoints.

The commonality between small wars to me has always been they only surprise policy makers; the locals and others who know the regional issues can usually see them coming.

Best
Tom Odom

[GatorLHA2]

As for the next small war, I am hoping for an insurgency in Iran. Pipe dream I know...

It already has according to an Israeli News Site DEBKA.

"October 15, 2005, 6:23 PM (GMT+02:00)

Ethnic Arabs in oil-rich Khuzestan have been waging an insurgency against Tehran for most of this year. In September, a series of blasts halted oil transfers from onshore wells.

Iran accusing UK of setting bombs in Market (http://debka.com/)"

[NDD]

It already has according to an Israeli News Site DEBKA.

"October 15, 2005, 6:23 PM (GMT+02:00)

Ethnic Arabs in oil-rich Khuzestan have been waging an insurgency against Tehran for most of this year. In September, a series of blasts halted oil transfers from onshore wells.

Iran accusing UK of setting bombs in Market (http://debka.com/)"
I saw that as well. I can understand not wanting to admit any internal issues and keeping face, but the Brits? LOL

[NDD]

One more reason not to trigger an insurection to topple it. ;)
Perhaps not trigger it, but I would have no problem supporting it if it broke out spontaneously.:)

[Martin]

Can someone explain to me the necessity of this question in this context?

By itself, a question of whether we rather be challenged by a crazy regime or a realistic one may be interesting.

In reality it seems IMO to have more to do with timing and their demise. Whether or not Iran is realistic, or a potential successor is, we, including Israel, is facing a threat in regard to their WMD program and continued sponsoring of terrorist groups. They seek our destruction and their own rise. Their realism only change their tactics and the timing according to their capabilities.

The idea, the perverted thinking has to change.

It is quite obvious that they will not succeed in international competition as they are today. Let them continue exporting terrorism and destabilize the region. So do we rather wait for them to become desperate as their oil lessens in importance? Or do we rather give them a 300 Megaton bargaining chip right away? If they don't succeed in acquiring a nuclear bomb now it'll be something else the next time. Nuclear bombs don't kill people, people kill people.

It seems we're discussing whether to put two rounds in the chest or in the head.

Time will distribute death as it always has, something will inevitably come after the current regime and what is allowed during the presently hostile regime will blossom. The culture has to change.

Martin

[Merv Benson]

Recent reports from Nuevo Laredo and Aculpoco suggest that the Zeta narco terrorist and other drug gangs are fighting turf battles that the government is unable to respond to. In Nuevo Laredo the combat has been open at times and the latest surviving chief of police has made it clear that he does not intend to enforce the rule of law when it comes to the drug war. A report today, that you can check on my blog, indicates several murders in Aculpoco including high police officials. At this point the Zetas control more real estate in Mexico than al Qaeda controls in Iraq. These guys are also targeting law enforcement officals in the US. They are already a paramilitary force with training received back when they were in the Mexican army.

Recently the US and the State of Texas have beefed up law enforcment in the Laredo area, but I would not recomend going across the Rio Grande for adult beverages.

While I agree that Chavez is a potential adversary, I think any conflict with him would be more conventional. He has real assets he has to protect.

[aktarian]

Perhaps not trigger it, but I would have no problem supporting it if it broke out spontaneously.:)

If it's open support it will allow regime to rally people around the flag and allow them to portrait insurgents as foreign mercenaries.

[M. J. Dougherty]

ALCON,
I have been having some difficulty following this threat, but I have yet to see anny comments about the small wars occurring in the arc of conflict from Bangladesh to the Phillipines.
If there is one place that small wars could lead to a larger conflict between China and the U.S. it is in this volatile reagion so vital to U.S. long term interests and security strategy.

[SDSchippert]

It (insurgency in Iran) already has according to an Israeli News Site DEBKA.

"October 15, 2005, 6:23 PM (GMT+02:00)

Ethnic Arabs in oil-rich Khuzestan have been waging an insurgency against Tehran for most of this year. In September, a series of blasts halted oil transfers from onshore wells.

Iran accusing UK of setting bombs in Market (http://debka.com/)"

That's DEBKA, my friend. Rather large pinches of salt required.

Two cents.

[Strickland]

Gents,

Small wars as defined by the USMC are already taking place. Darfur , Sudan has seen US airlift transporting my old friends, the Rwandan Patriotic Army, as peacekeepers. The "small war" in the Congo has claimed more than 3 MILLION dead since 1997; periodic flare ups are routine. Zimbabwe is headed toward the abyss; look for bloodletting there in the near to mid term.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict morphs and bubbles as it has since the mid-1930s. I fervently hope that we stay out of that one. Distance and balance are our only friends in that long struggle.

Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria are all candidates for a fiction writer's potential best seller on turmoil. Such fiction would hardly be a stretch.

I won't go into Iraq; the schisms before the war are there after the war. They will be there when we leave.

Those are my regions: Asia, South Asia, Latin America, Eurasia all have their flarepoints.

The commonality between small wars to me has always been they only surprise policy makers; the locals and others who know the regional issues can usually see them coming.

Best
Tom Odom

I thought the USMC defined Small Wars as operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation.

-- Small Wars Manual, 1940

It appears as if many of the previous responses refer to conflicts that are limited in size or scope, and thus improperly labeled Small Wars.

[zenpundit]

Any comment or analysis of the ongoing riots in France ?

I see ( at leastgiven MSM reports) an insurgent operation there remarkably like the intifada launched after Sharon visited the Temple Mount.

French citizens are now demanding the army be called out and are even raising the idea of militias to counteract the gangs of rioters/arsonists

[DDilegge]

While not on our (U.S.) radar screen - i.e. U.S. intervention, the French Muslim riots may well be a harbinger of the future "internal small war" - at this time too much a political hot potato to even mention in official circles and mainstream media.

Unlike past small wars with an adversary confined to particular countries we are now facing a threat that has made inroads across the globe. Nothing new here – except that now many countries who felt insulated from being on the receiving-end of a 9-11-like attack or otherwise attacked by Islamist extremism now have to rethink their over-tolerant policies.

Simply being against the war in Iraq offers no safety-net and many western countries are waking up to the fact that simply being western is a “good enough” reason for being targeted. Go figure…

[Martin]

Sir, DDilegge, France has for some time recognized that they are threatened, regardless of their stance on Iraq. I remember that even at Strasbourg airport they had FAMAS carrying MPs patrolling. They have also made public announcements to this effect.

What I find curious is that there's an ambiguity in deciding who the enemy is. I think the naming of the war (GWOT) is a reflection of an inability to define the threat. So instead of saying something as politically incorrect and bottomless as that it's a war against evil (NK is not Islamic), we say terrorism.

I think we’re not having an official discussion about whether or not we’re at war with Islam partly out of political correctness (yuck) and out of fear that the power of defining this war will move from the US government to those who can scream the loudest. Reciprocally the Islamic extremists would find themselves with more scared recruits and we would have to broaden our definitions on just who it is we’re fighting, until it comes full circle.

We are today far from united in how to combat this threat – an outwardly focus that seems diluted from the fact that people put it into so many different contexts, whether each and everyone are correct is not “clear”. What if we’d have to ask who it is who bears responsibility for what?

So we say that they hate our way of life, and sure they do, and the Europeans in their (ahem, our… as I am regrettably European) delusional vision of moral and intellectual grandeur laughs at such a simplistic explanation. I think people need and deserve a better context to put it in than that, and unless it is explained well, they will create or search for that context elsewhere.

The west may not be at war with Islam, but in failing to understand the people behind the headline of “terrorist threat”, even those who are content to passively give the nod, of course it is unlikely France will identify them. Of course you must be crazy and extreme and dumb if you’re not shouting Vive La Republic at the Champs Elysees. Or maybe their politicians simply don’t understand the orientation of their people, much less the disenfranchised who come from yet more different backgrounds, with much different experiences. Cloudy vision, diluted focus, half-strength blows. EU constitution anyone?

Yes, I do think this is alluding to the future. But I don't think the agitators understand what will happen when the people redefine the threat picture themselves, including as allies criminal organizations concerned about their money, and the state with its military forces.
What China would do in such a case could be interesting to ponder...

I hope that made sense, and please correct me and tell me if I should rather be quiet. I really don't want to step where I shouldn't, and this is about as far as I go.

Martin

[Tom Odom]

Folks,

France's current problems stem from the end of its colonial empire, especially the loss of Algeria which Frenchmen of the day considered to be an extension of European France rather than a mere colony. France ruled its colonies by making the locals nominal French citizens, especially the upper classes. Britain in contrast used indirect rule as much as possible without the fiction of handing out British passports. The exception to that was in the loss of India when Britain did extend citizenship to "Indians" (Indians and Pakistanis) who wanted to leave.

In France's case and under French method, it became very easy to get that French passport if things were not going well in one's native country (colony). In graduate school at the Naval Postgraduate School in 1981, we had to read Franz Fanon's book, Wretched of the Earth[ viewed as something as a fundamental platform for anti-colonial wars. Fanon was one of those upper strata Algerians who was nominally French and who then found himself excluded from both "real" Algerians and "real" Frenchmen. His book is not an easy read because it is an emotional cry, not a logical discussion.

In my 15 years as a FAO, it was quite common to meet Africans who had one foot in Africa and one foot in France. The same is true in North Africa for Tunisians, Algerians, Moroccans, etc. As the decades have passed, the numbers of such quasi immigrants have steadily increased. They never truly integrate into France's social structure and France has allowed that to continue. Right wing politics in France have largely been driven by this alien body; in 1988 during the French elections for President, I was on OP duty with a number of French soldiers in Sinai. Discussions on the election were hot and heavy and the right wing candidate promised Draconian measures if he were elected. He was not. But the French senior officer on duty actually got on the UN radio network and put out a net call to all French observers bemoaning the defeat. Think about that one...

Since then French policy has been accomodation, wise in some ways and foolish in others. France has been sitting on a tinder box of discontent among the immigrants and among those who would support a large scale crackdown. The rise in tensions ampong the Muslim population and the GWOT seem to have acted as the necessary spark.

Other countries in Europe (and the US!) have similar issues. Belgium is an extension of the Congo, Rwanda, and other francophone Africa. Germany has long had a large Turk population. The US has its own illegal immigrant crisis.

The real challenge for France is going to be containing the current violence without pouring gasoline on the fire. I have read reports suggesting premeditated organization to the violence. Certainly that is possible if not absolutely probable. This has been brewing for some time. But I would also say that you should not underestimate the capacity for spontaneous violence in these populations. In Zaire, le pillage was an art form.

best
Tom

[DDilegge]

Grand V sent this link along to a Sep. 2005 article in Proceedings - The Impending Collapse of Arab Civilization (http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NI_0905_Arab-P1,00.html) by Lieutenant Colonel James G. Lacey, U.S. Army Reserve. Excerpt follows:

"... A lot of the evidence that Huntington presents for his theory of civilizational war makes more sense when viewed through the prism of the collapse of Arab civilization. Global maneuvering that Huntington interprets as preparations for a new round of world conflict are in reality the spontaneous adjustments that other societies are making in reaction to the collapse of a neighboring civilization. By accepting that we are facing the collapse of Arab civilization we can, for the first time, create a grand strategic concept for success. We no longer have to engage in a war against terrorism, which is a method of fighting and not an enemy. Additionally, we now have a strategic explanation for what is going on that does not make Islam the culprit. Hence we do not have to fight a religious war to win."

"The grand strategic concept that provides the best chance of success is the one that served us so well in the Cold War—containment. No matter what else we do we must position ourselves to contain the effects of the complete collapse of Arab civilization. Already 10 percent of the French population is from Muslim North Africa. Europe's ability to assimilate a larger flood of economic refugees is questionable. And mass migration is just one effect a total collapse will have. Containment will mean adopting and maintaining difficult policy choices..."

[Tom Odom]

I found the paper interesting and in some regards refreshing. Most refreshing was that he did not hesitate to adresss Bernard Lewis's work in cautionary terms. Lews is/was the archbishop of the NeoCon "church" and should be viewed accordingly.

It was interesting that he offered the strategy of containment as an alternative to preemption. Those of us who date back to the Cold War will recognize that alternative immediately. And certainly containment of a collapsing region is an alternative, albeit I would suggest one increasingly hard to even mount in today's information age. One defacto case of containment was Somalia in the early 1990s. I say defacto because it was containment based on disinterest. The widespread use of the video camera and satellite communications unhinged that disinterest. Another case of containment was the Western reaction to the Rwanda genocide; in that case the West's containment of the tragedy lasted until the Rwandan rebels won the war and the killers joined me in Zaire.

My issues with the paper are rooted in 2 areas: the definition of Arab and a limited view of history. Most who Arab watch--including other Arabs--define an Arab as one who speaks Arabic as a native tongue. using that defintion, we have the broadest and most inclusive group possible. But it is a LARGE group and it contains any number of peoples each with their own local political and ethnic identity, so large in fact that to apply a label of Arab civilization to all is indeed a reach. Coupled with that is his use of history; to suggest a polyglot civilization has declined based on modern statistics is another stretch. Put simply what appears bad today is a probable improvement from what was 100 years ago.


Best

Tom

[Ironhorse]

That is an excellent article, an interesting viewpoint, and correctly challenges a few sacred cows that have been left un-BBQ'd for too long. However, I do find it exceptionally difficult to have it both ways, as it were -- a very convincing argument for containment (Tom Odom's points well taken, too) but with the ju-jitsu of "Reverse the tide when and where we can" thrown in for good moral measure at the end.

Benevolent interdiction? The political science and international relations theorists can have a good time slotting that one in to the continuum. I have some concern that it would undermine the strategy that is advocated.

[Tom Odom]

A related op-ed in today's NYT by Richard Haass entitled "is there a Doctrine in the house?" is worth reading. http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/08/opinion/08haass.html?th&emc=th

Best

Tom

[M. J. Dougherty]

ALCON,
Does anyone agree that there is a distinct disconnect between how U.S. military doctrine defines war and how our advesaries define war?

[Jedburgh]

A related op-ed in today's NYT by Richard Haass entitled "is there a Doctrine in the house?" is worth reading. http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/08/opinion/08haass.html?th&emc=th
Interestingly enough, the op-ed you linked essentially talks to the same issues that Stephen Biddle did in his paper published at SSI back in April: American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB603.pdf)

It is hard to escape the paradox: Iraq, a classic war of choice, has constrained the administration's choices in its second term. Choices are further constrained by tax cuts, extravagant spending and the absence of a policy to reduce American dependency on imported oil. The result is that the United States is moving - haltingly and reluctantly, but inexorably - toward a more pragmatic and multilateral foreign policy appropriate to the era in which we live.

...whereas the costs of strategic ambiguity were relatively modest for the first 2 years of the War on Terror, the campaign in Iraq is now rapidly increasing the financial, human, and strategic opportunity costs of leaving basic choices unmade. Perhaps the most important of these ambiguities concerns our end-state goal for countering terrorism: should we insist on reducing this threat to a level as close to eradication as we can manage, or should we tolerate greater terrorist violence as a quasi-permanent condition?

[Bill Moore]

Does anyone agree that there is a distinct disconnect between how U.S. military doctrine defines war and how our advesaries define war? M.J.

M.J.

I think your question is one of the most important ones put forward on this forum, and the essence of understanding our enemy, which is key if we want to attack his strategy instead of his fielded forces.

I find that it is hard for us to play the role of the red cell when we war game various courses of actions. I think most of us, even though we try to avoid doing so, are forced to use mirror analysis, which I define as seeing ourselves when we look at the enemy. I think we frequently assume the enemy has our values, uses western logic in his decision making (remember game’s theory?), etc. It is hard to overcome years of training indoctrination and to apply our vocabulary (our thinking tools) outside of its intended use.

Not only does our non-western enemy think about war differently, I think our non-western enemy has a distinct advantage in that there is not as much separation between the political and the military, so they understand the concept of the total war better (military is truly tied into political objectives), while I think our military is focused on staying in its lane and destroying the enemy’s fielded forces, which puts us at a distinct disadvantage.

When Bin Laden declared war on America, what did he mean by war? When President Bush declared war on terrorism mean what did he mean? Are they symmetrically opposed definitions? I don’t think so….

[aktarian]

Does anyone agree that there is a distinct disconnect between how U.S. military doctrine defines war and how our advesaries define war? M.J.

M.J.

I think your question is one of the most important ones put forward on this forum, and the essence of understanding our enemy, which is key if we want to attack his strategy instead of his fielded forces.

I find that it is hard for us to play the role of the red cell when we war game various courses of actions. I think most of us, even though we try to avoid doing so, are forced to use mirror analysis, which I define as seeing ourselves when we look at the enemy. I think we frequently assume the enemy has our values, uses western logic in his decision making (remember game’s theory?), etc. It is hard to overcome years of training indoctrination and to apply our vocabulary (our thinking tools) outside of its intended use.

Not only does our non-western enemy think about war differently, I think our non-western enemy has a distinct advantage in that there is not as much separation between the political and the military, so they understand the concept of the total war better (military is truly tied into political objectives), while I think our military is focused on staying in its lane and destroying the enemy’s fielded forces, which puts us at a distinct disadvantage.

When Bin Laden declared war on America, what did he mean by war? When President Bush declared war on terrorism mean what did he mean? Are they symmetrically opposed definitions? I don’t think so….

There is one more thing, which is a bit different. One of level. When we classify conflicts as LIC/MIC/HIC we look from our perspective.

Take Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. For Soviets that was LIC, for Afghans it was life-or-death struggle, and due to resources commited HIC.

Which IMO means that those who see this as LIC, and as such not terribly important to national interests, are more likely to give up after reaching some threshold than those who see it as HIC and as such extremly important to national interests.

[Robal2pl]

I have a question : what is Your opinion about situation in former USSR?
I think that possible areas of confilct (includnig small wars) in western part of former USSR are :
1)Baltic States : conflict beetwen russian minrity and Latvian/Lithuanian/Estonian majority
2) Belarussia : the confilct is possible when Lukaszenko regime will fail or his leadershib will be close to end
3) Ukraine : I think tahat state of crisis can occur. pepole can be dissapointed after "Orange Revolution" , because current leadership is not able to solve basic problems. Also, Russia will support pro-Moscow political groups (mostly in DonBas industrial area) wich can lead even to civil war. (there was such possibility year ago)


Robal2pl

[zenpundit]

I think the chances for widening conflict are far greater in the Transcaucasian region and Southern Russia. Too many micronationalities in Daghestan and Georgia who can be agitated into taking up arms - Ossetians, Ingush, Kalmyks, Abkhazians, Mingrelians...

I would not rule out clashes within Ukraine though between nationalistic, Uniate, Western Ukrainians and Eastern, Orthodox, Russophile Ukranians being egged on by local nomenklatura-mafias

[GorTex6]

Venezuela prepairing to wage 4GW against the US (http://www.vcrisis.com/index.php?content=letters/200509091152)

[Strickland]

Venezuela prepairing to wage 4GW against the US (http://www.vcrisis.com/index.php?content=letters/200509091152)
My original post on this thread asserted that Chavez's Venezuela could be the scene of a Small War in the future. With sympathetic segments or organizations in Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, and Nicaragua, Chavez could become a larger threat or irritant than Castro ever was to us in the past. He could also enable a dying Castro to try to fulfill his revolutionary desires with one last gamble in Central or South America.

[M. J. Dougherty]

ALCON,
Thanks for the outstanding feedback! Currently I am working on a thesis that the "chaos" stategy of Jemaah Islamiyah in SE Asia is to achieve victory by denying us decisive victory. How? In my opinion, one of the more important lessons of Korea and Vietnam for potential U.S. adversaries is that the average American is not interested in fighting a war without a clear moral issue- a pure cause that will justify the bloodshed & destruction of major sustained combat operations that result in decisive victory, defeated and complient enemy, and a American interests clearly achieved.
JI is employing a strategy that leverages inherent instabilities of the SEA reagion to maintain a relatively high level of violence and social discord. When opportunities (such as the tsunami, Mollukus, the '98 financial crisis) to create an environment that is difficult for a U.S.-led coalition or UN to justify a prolonged intervention to restore stability. Just look at the restricitions and risk assessments that occured in just sending the hospital ship and medical aid. As the credability and legitmacy of governments erode, capital flight destroys the economy and countries collapse bring even more social upheaval and violent competition.
In a grand strategic sense, SEA is just as important if not more so to U.S. long-term interests as the Mid-East oil. More than 60% of maritime shipping passes trought the Straites of Mulacca; Korea & Japan get 80% of their oil through here; China's oil consuption needs are expected to increas 40% by 2015 and they need to secure this route as well; one-third of the world computers are maunufactered here and over half the worlds computer chips, the list goes on ad naseum.
A hostile entity (Islamic Caliphate) based in Indonesia could have serious consequesnces for U.S. long-term security interests and might even spark future Chinese intervention.

[CPT Holzbach]

In my opinion, one of the more important lessons of Korea and Vietnam for potential U.S. adversaries is that the average American is not interested in fighting a war without a clear moral issue- a pure cause that will justify the bloodshed & destruction of major sustained combat operations that result in decisive victory, defeated and complient enemy, and a American interests clearly achieved.
I recommend reading an article in the Nov/Dec issue of Foreign Affairs, if you havent seen it already, entitled "The Iraq Syndrome" by John Mueller. It addresses this very issue.

[NDD]

I recommend reading an article in the Nov/Dec issue of Foreign Affairs, if you havent seen it already, entitled "The Iraq Syndrome" by John Mueller. It addresses this very issue.
Interesting. Iraq is now a "war"? This would appear to me to be purposeful mis-characterization by political elements in the US that is gaining traction.

[AdamG]

That said - Castro's death will be a wild card in this equation and most certainly draw our attention to Cuba. Anyone want to dare a call on this scenario?

I will, but first -




I find that it is hard for us to play the role of the red cell when we war game various courses of actions. I think most of us, even though we try to avoid doing so, are forced to use mirror analysis, which I define as seeing ourselves when we look at the enemy. I think we frequently assume the enemy has our values, uses western logic in his decision making (remember game’s theory?), etc. It is hard to overcome years of training indoctrination and to apply our vocabulary (our thinking tools) outside of its intended use.

Not only does our non-western enemy think about war differently, I think our non-western enemy has a distinct advantage in that there is not as much separation between the political and the military, so they understand the concept of the total war better (military is truly tied into political objectives), while I think our military is focused on staying in its lane and destroying the enemy’s fielded forces, which puts us at a distinct disadvantage.
.

Bingo! Someone gets it.

To answer the original question, we have to remember that Cuba has been suffering from a drought for the last decade, the military has been on a shoestring budget for even longer and the people have been tasting capitalism ever since tourism brought foreigners in on a regular basis.

1. Castro succumbs to old age and his brother Raul becomes a walking dead man. There is a period of mourning and much-emoting, while Raul puts the armed forces on their highest-capable war footing and warns the US against any Imperialist moves (realistically, this is as much to protect himself as to protect Cuba).

2. Chavez immediately echoes Raul's warnings, pledging all manner of aid if Cuban sovereignty is violated. Backs it up by moving F16s and/or MiG-29s to Havanna and NE Cuban coast.

3. Raul and whatever Generals are the top contenders for the throne are involved in a brief stare-down resembling the three-way climax at the end of the Good, the Bad and the Ugly. Raul dies, probably from a bomb but the majority of Cuba doesn't have a problem with it - think Ceausescu's end.

4. The Generals' factions duke it out in Havana (Chavez and China have their favorites, which may not be the same person). The wild card is the Miami families.

5. The US has to sit on it's hands, leaving Spain and Canada to be the credible peacemakers (both of which send naval units under a UN mandate). The drama in Havanna lasts for a week, after which Cuba emerges as a quasi-democracy: they like US tourist dollars, but they're not as close to Chavez as he'd like (unless by a stroke of luck 'his' guy comes out on top).

6. Donald Trump is on a flight down there before the last barrel cools. Havana vacation packages from LA, Dulles and Newark become the hottest tickets to get.

[GorTex6]

........... Havana vacation packages from LA, Dulles and Newark become the hottest tickets to get.

.....that stash of Cohibas will lose value overnight! :(

:D

[GorTex6]

China Trains Venezuelan Commandos (http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htsf/articles/20060120.aspx)

[Strickland]

Dont the Chinese get a TON of oil from Iraq and Iran?

[GorTex6]

Saddam bribed China with oil deals (http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20041011-115320-2205r.htm)

Big Shift in China's Oil Policy (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/12/AR2005071201546_pf.html)

The Iraq war helped bolster Beijing-Tehran relations (http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2005/08/16/2003267963)

Clue? (http://www.defensetech.org/archives/002110.html)

[Strickland]

Considering how much oil we get from mexico, canada, and produce domestically, I am always amazed at how many think we are draining the middle east of its oil reserves.

[DDilegge]

Big Shift in China's Oil Policy (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/12/AR2005071201546_pf.html)

Wall Street Journal 25 Jan. Commentary - Oil for Missiles (http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110007866) - Our friends the Saudis make friends with the Chinese.


It was no coincidence that Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah this week chose China for his first official trip outside the Middle East since acceding to the throne in August. With five agreements signed during the visit, including a pact for closer cooperation in oil, natural gas and minerals, the two countries are laying the foundations for a strategic relationship that challenges U.S. interests.

Humiliated by their dependence on Washington for survival in the wake of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the Saudi royal family has long been seeking to forge closer ties with Beijing in the hope of reducing their dependence on the U.S. The Saudis began moving in this direction even before the first Gulf War, secretly negotiating a deal with China in the mid-'80s to purchase CSS-2 ballistic missiles. That was an affront to the Reagan administration and its policy of preventing the proliferation of ballistic missiles. But the Saudis risked American ire because they saw Iran, Iraq and Israel all armed with ballistic missiles and did not want to be left out. In return, China won hard currency for the missile sale, as well as diplomatic relations with Riyadh in a snub to Taiwan.

Since 9/11, and the American public's backlash over the fact that the majority of the hijackers were Saudi nationals, Riyadh's search for a new strategic partner has assumed fresh impetus. China, for its part, is importing ever increasing amounts of oil from the Gulf to fuel its rapidly expanding economy. That has prompted a degree of paranoia over "energy insecurity." Beijing military strategists worry that, because they lack America's "blue water" navy, the country is potentially vulnerable to a U.S. blockade of oil shipments from the Gulf to China.

Hence the mutual interest in a closer relationship demonstrated during King Abdullah's three-day visit, which ended yesterday. For all the headlines about the agreements he signed with President Hu Jintao on issues such as energy cooperation and double taxation, it's a safe assumption that strategic issues were also on the agenda away from the bright lights of the media. Saudi Arabia's CSS-2 missiles are now obsolescent and Riyadh would welcome modern Chinese models as replacements. For Beijing, that offers a useful ###-for-tat should Washington agree to further large arms sales to Taiwan. But it would come at the price of violating China's commitment to adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime, which seeks to control international transfers of ballistic missile technology...

[Merv Benson]

China's recent increase in the need for oil has made the Persian Gulf an area of greater strategic importance. The same could be said for India. It is not surprising that China and the Saudis could find some trade of mututal interest. But if the Saudis are after missiles, the threat that they would most likely want to address is the one from Iran. What is not clear is why China does not recognize that Iran's nukes pose an indirect threat to their flow of oil, since Iran has threatened to shut down the Straights of Hormuz. It is in China's interest to cooperate with the US and the EU 3 in eliminating that threat through peaceful means, because if peaceful means fail, they will feel the impact whether or not they participate.

I think the Russians have a different strategic interest and they benefit both from selling technology to Iran as well as a disruption in the flow of oil since they are net exporters. That is why they are unlikely to be helpful.

[Strickland]

This is why the US asked both the Indians and Chinese if they would like to participate in the coalition for OIF. Just imagine if they had agreed to participate. If you read Barnett's book, he makes the argument that we are fighting in Iraq in part to ensure that both these emerging global markets continue to receive the energy resources they demand for continued growth.

[GorTex6]

Unrestricted Warfare (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0971680728/sr=1-3/qid=1138537191/ref=sr_1_3/104-2195226-8745523?%5Fencoding=UTF8)

Free Copy ( http://www.terrorism.com/documents/TRC-Analysis/unrestricted.pdf)

the book has recently drawn the attention of both the Chinese and Western press for its advocacy of a multitude of means, both military and particularly non-military, to strike at the United States during times of conflict. Hacking into websites, targeting financial institutions, terrorism, using the media, and conducting urban warfare are among the methods proposed. In the Zhongguo Qingnian Bao interview, Qiao was quoted as stating that "the first rule of unrestricted warfare is that there are no rules, with nothing forbidden." Elaborating on this idea, he asserted that strong countries would not use the same approach against weak countries because "strong countries make the rules while rising ones break them and exploit loopholes . . .The United States breaks [UN rules] and makes new ones when these rules don't suit [its purposes], but it has to observe its own rules or the whole world will not trust it."

[Strickland]

Perhaps we as a nation face potential major conventional wars with North Korea, Iran, China, and Cuba-Venezuela due to our inability to successfully prosecute small wars?

Since 1979 we have pursued a confused policy with Iran that includes NO diplomatic relations (NO embassy), seizure of Iranian assets within the US (several billion dollars), and the tanker wars; however, have allowed the Iranians to continue as the largest state sponsor of terror, and failed to punish their primary beneficiary - Hizbollah for the murder of hundreds of Americans to include the 1983 Beirut bombings. Furthermore, we allowed tens of thousands of Iraqi Shiites to be murdered by Saddam following the 1991 uprisings out of a fear that the Iranians would somehow gain unwanted influence. All throughout this period, our allies - the French, Germans, Japanese, Italians, and South Koreans continued to increase economic ties with the Iranians.

As for the North Koreans, we continue to maintain some half-assed cease-fire with them that needs to end as the first step to any agreement. The North Korean Regime may be the largest state sanctioned criminal enterprise (perhaps Mexico), engaging in drug-trafficking and counterfeiting as primary economic enterprises. Through the years we have tolerated their seizure of the USS Pueblo, and the shooting-down of a USN aircraft killing 31. Over the past decade, the presence of 37,000 US troops within South Korea has become a significant source of tension between the ROK and US, and perhaps the single largest destabilizing source on the peninsula aside from Kim himself. The Kim family has been given 53 years (1953) to establish a cult of personality within North Korea, and thus further strengthen their absolute control. As with US policy toward Iran, our policy here is as confused. As with the Iranians, it is insane for the US to beat the war drum about nukes from N Korea getting into terrorist hands when in fact we have not made every effort possible to account for all the nuclear or biological weapons of the former Soviet Union.

In South and Central America, the US has pursued the War on Drugs since 1971, yet cannot stem the flow on illegal drugs from Mexico, Colombia, Guatemala, Panama, Peru, or Bolivia. For decades, we have attempted to assist the Colombians through a limited application of SOF and billions of dollars of aid. What has this achieved? FARC remains in control of significant portions of Colombia, now receives external support from Venezuela, and at one time was ceded a portion of the country by the Colombian president. We must decide once and for all what our policy in Colombia will or should be. In the end, regardless of which course of action we choose, we must be able to secure our borders. This continues to be a source of embarrasment for us in Iraq and Afghanistan, as we ask the Saudis, Jordanians, Syrians, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Pakis to secure their borders. If we cant do it, why should be assume any other nation can?

Before we go off planning the next great war with China, how about we get the USN to focus on keeping the Straits of Malacca and South China Sea open to trade and free of pirates and terrorists? That seems like a more reasonable request.

In the end, if I had vote as to where we should fight the next small war, I would argue Mexico, with Lebanon as first runner-up.

[Stratiotes]

Amen to that, Major.

Instead of nation-building and trying to teach soldiers how to be cops for the world police force, perhaps we should have had them policing and protecting our own borders. It is, ostensibly, the job of the military to be our national defense - rather than somebody else's national defense.

[Brian B]

Would wholeheartedly agree on Mexico (the whole border area) being the site for the next Small War. The more things that come to light as to what's taking place there with illegals and drug trafficking make it a more likely spot every day. It would take a great deal of coordination between Homeland Security and Defense to make it happen. Given the difficulties in Iraq between State and Defense, if those are any indication, I'd hope that we're figuring out the way to make them work together in such an endeavor. Not to mention, the legal questions that would need answered and obstacles overcome.

[M. J. Dougherty]

ALCON,
I am troubled by the what appears to be a complete lack of understanding among U.S. senior political and military leadership with respect to the strategic context of future war. There appears to be little appreciation that nonstate adversaries today are shaping the strategic environment for a conflict they anticipate decades in the future. U.S. leadership is fixated on the crisis de jur and lacks any meaningful plans for any threat other than China.
The coming conflict(s) in SE Asia are predicated on the most intractable of issues: ethnicity, religion, resource wars and perceptions of relative deprivation. Currently we see the states of SE Asia growing more unstable as internal conflicts, crime, corruption and growing disparity between the haves & have nots erode confidence in national and local level government. These instabilities can not be solved by short-tem "quick-fix" military deployments or military aid to corrupt and inefficient governments.
Anybody have comments?

[Martin]

Anybody have comments?Yes, borne out of your post, but not related to it enough to hijack the thread.

On the other hand, I would really like to hear a more detailed take on SEA, if you ever have the time and desire to expand on your post.

Take care,
Martin

[Bill Moore]

While their are continued problems in SE Asia, I think it is a bit extreme to assume that it is the location of the next war. South America and Africa continue to be much closer to a hot war than SE Asia. Parts of SE Asia have suffered from poverty for years (Myanmar, Cambodia, Philippines, etc.), but the situation has not worsened. Thailand, Malysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Vietnam (in the initial stages) have experienced economic miracles. Indonesia recently reached a peace setlement in Aech, and they had several recent successes against the JI. Thailand is having some political arrest currently with the situation concerning the PM. That will probably be resolved before the year is over. They also have an insurgency in the south, but it is largely restricted to the south, and it isn't new (the intensity of the fight is new, but not the insurgency). The Philippines continues to suffer from gross corruption, a communist insurgency, large areas of lawlessness, and a Muslim separatist movement, but that has been been standard fare in SE Asia for years. I to would like to hear more on what impending threat you see.

[M. J. Dougherty]

Based on my research and pattern trend analysis, there is significant potential for the next small war to develop in SEA, a region of significant value to U.S. long-term and vital national interests. While not as quick to adapt, JI spent more than 10 years (prior to 9/11) quietly developing strategic and organizational depth. They also fostered the development of a loose and often overlooked alliance of Muslim insurgent groups known Rabatatul Mujahideen that stretches from Bangldesh to the Philippines and Austrailia. Many of the recent fighters captured in Thailand identified themselves as Rabitatul Mujahideen. This has resulted in a slowly rising level of violence that reduces basic human security and increases social angst. The operational objectives of JI are to maintain a level of instability based on ethnic, religious and social instability. One of the more interesting effects of JI attacks is the negative economic impacts they have had on the local and national economies. In one interview, Abu Bakr Bashir identified the Indonesian economy as a primary target of jihadist activities, which once undermined will create a chaotic environment and fracture social cohesion. Violence Futhermore, although a relatively neutral environment, JI wants to shape the strategic environment to a more favorable one by polarizing society into two groups Muslim Indo-Malay and non-Muslim/non Indo-Malays. Indonesia is the key objective of this campaign. While a peace settlement has been reached in Ache, I predict within a year, 18 months at the most, new wave of violence and insurgent activity will break out.

[GorTex6]

Chavez Turns to Iran on Military, Uranium (http://www.washtimes.com/national/20060410-123504-8592r.htm)

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is seeking to deepen ties with Iran, with discussions on holding joint military exercises and obtaining uranium, according to Bush administration officials.
Hamas also is talking to Caracas about sending representatives to Venezuela to raise money for the militant group's newly elected Palestinian government.
But relations with another ally, Russia, have soured over a deal in which Moscow is selling 100,000 AK-47s to Venezuela. The South American country was counting on receiving new rifles, but Russia has shipped a number of refurbished models, prompting Caracas to halt the deal, the U.S. sources said.
Mr. Chavez's continuing efforts to cozy up to Iran are of increasing concern inside the Pentagon and State Department.
Mr. Chavez yesterday threatened to expel the U.S. ambassador, after accusing the diplomat of provoking tensions, according to reporters in Caracas. The threat came two days after pro-Chavez demonstrators tossed eggs, fruit and vegetables at Ambassador William Brownfield's car and the State Department warned Venezuela that it faced consequences if it did not protect the U.S. envoy.

[Strickland]

In response to the 77th comment to this thread, reference comment #1 written October 14, 2005.

[GorTex6]

In response to the 77th comment to this thread, reference comment #1 written October 14, 2005.

Just keeping the topic alive (this assumption has been looming in my head since jan/feb 2005-see my views on China)

U.S. aircraft carriers head to Caribbean (http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/national/1152AP_Carrier_Deployment.html)

ABOARD THE USS GEORGE WASHINGTON -- An aircraft carrier strike group moved into the Caribbean this week to begin two months of naval exercises in what the U.S. military hopes will be a show of its commitment to the region.

The deployment by the USS George Washington group will also focus on threats such as drug and human trafficking, according to the Miami-based U.S. Southern Command, which oversees military activities in Latin America.

Brig. Gen. Kenneth J. Glueck Jr., the Southern Command's chief of staff, called the tour an "opportunity for us to touch base with our partner countries."

He added: "There's no other symbol of American power like the carrier."

Members of the strike group, led by the nearly 1,100-foot long Nimitz-class carrier, made their first port stops Monday and Tuesday. The USS Stout, a destroyer, stopped in Curacao, while the USS Underwood, a frigate, docked in Cartagena, Colombia.

The military has dismissed allegations by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez that it is planning an invasion of his country. But analysts say the show of force sends a signal to Chavez and other Latin American leaders about U.S. strength.

[GorTex6]

Chavez Begins Training Civilian Militia (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/18/AR2006041801304.html)


CARACAS, Venezuela -- President Hugo Chavez constantly warns Venezuelans a U.S. invasion is imminent.
Now he's begun training a civilian militia as well as the Venezuelan army to resist in the only way possible against a much better-equipped force: by taking to the hills and fighting a guerrilla war.
Supporters of the president, a former paratroop commander, are increasingly taking up his call. Chavez wants 1 million armed men and women in the army reserve, and 150,000 have already joined, surpassing the regular military's force of 100,000. Now Venezuelans are also organizing neighborhood-based militia units for Chavez's Territorial Guard.
Critics of Chavez say the real goal of the mobilization is to create the means to suppress internal dissent and defend Chavez's presidency at all costs. Thousands of Territorial Guard volunteers _ housewives, students, construction workers _ are undergoing training, earning $7.45 per session.

[GorTex6]

AP (http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/ap/fn/3920101.html)

CARACAS, Venezuela — Venezuela's oil minister said Thursday that he backs the idea of selling oil in euros instead of U.S. dollars, a proposal also supported by fellow OPEC member Iran.

"Iran has an initiative that we support. They are going to start to do oil transactions in euros," Oil Minister Rafael Ramirez said in an interview with state television.
Selling oil in euros would in theory boost world demand for the European currency at the expense of the dollar.
Analysts have said the proposal is highly unlikely to materialize but could in theory have serious consequences for the U.S. economy by undermining the value of the dollar and diminishing its status as the currency used in central-bank reserves.

Last nail in the coffin. Venezuela is next.......

(US currency floats because it is backed by US military power)

[GorTex6]

BBC (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/5033768.stm)

On Tuesday, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez said Russia planned to build two munitions plants in the country.
Moscow has already signed a deal to supply Venezuela with 100,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles.
The move is likely to worry the US, which regards Mr Chavez as a destabilising influence in the region.
In May, the US State Department banned arms sales to Venezuela because of concern over its contacts with Iran and Cuba and what it called Venezuela's lack of support for counter-terrorism efforts.

'Defend every street'

Mr Chavez made his announcement during a visit to Ecuador to sign a series of energy deals.
"The Russians are going to install a Kalashnikov rifle plant and a munitions factory," he said. "So we can defend every street, every hill, every corner."

.....

[sgmgrumpy]

Couple of observations from the TAOR:
1. Chavez and Colombia - he wouldn't dare and there is no way to get a foothold. The Colombians will go the other way just because he is Venezuelan. Colombia has made tremendous progress in the last 4 years - unfortunately, the reporting of it is being lost in the bigger global picture. The ROI is paying huge dividends, but there is an election on the horizon and all that could change with one stuffing of the ballot box. The next step in Colombia is to either re-elect Uribe or elect someone just like him, there are several candidates. I never thought I would say it, but Colombia is on the fast track to becoming the most stable democracy in the region.
2. Brazil will never fall into a Chavez or Ortega-led fold. Brazil isn't really a Latin country and they are looking for a seat at the Big Table, not regional coalitions.
3. Personally, I see Mexico in the same boat as Brazil. What happens in the US has a far larger impact on Mexico than anything in Central or South America.
4. South America does not follow Central America or the Carribean's lead. Case in point - Che's foco fiasco.

Much more concerning to me is Chavez' new love for ME shady characters and Venezuela's membership in OPEC. If Chavez gets desperate enough, I doubt he will hesitate to swing even further that way for help. And we've all seen what happens when you let the AQ virus in.

The tri-border area is also concerning, mostly due to a complete lack of any real state presence.

If Ortega does re-gain control, I think he will be mostly a nuisance, much like Chavez. And like Chavez, the risk of him looking to the ME for support could become real.

I would hope that even idiots like Ortega and Chavez could see what will happen to them if it comes to pass.


Wednesday, July 26, 2006; Posted: 11:06 a.m. EDT (15:06 GMT)
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/americas/07/26/chavez.russia.ap/index.html

Start breaking out the Jungle Fatigues!:mad:

[slapout9]

The fact that Columbia is on our side now and has made incredible progress in the drug war is due largely to your friendly folks at the DEA. Who for security reasons will never get the credit they deserve for doing what was thought to be mission impossible.

[SWJED]

Tom Regan of the Christian Science Monitor (http://www.csmonitor.com/) did his round-up of the news today on Colombia - FARC Rebels Still Undermine Peace Effort (http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0725/dailyUpdate.html). His online column regularly covers a topical issue and links to all the recent news and background / reference material. I find it useful - check it out.


The killings last week of more than a dozen rural woodcutters in a rural region of Colombia mark the most recent move by the left-wing Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) "to exploit the power vacuum left by the demobilization of 32,000 right-wing militiamen."...

But the Colombian military is not without its successes. Deutsche Presse-Agentur reports a military spokesman announced Monday evening the capture of a high-ranking rebel chief with the nom de guerre "King Kong." Carlos Ipia Dizu is the head of the 6th Company of the FARC and is best known for his kidnapping of three Germans in 2001. One of the men escaped and the other two were eventually released. BBC provides an overview of the conflict, including the US role in the region...

US and Colombian officials have often accused Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez of aiding the FARC by not providing touger security along the border of the two countries. The Colombian army says the FARC has many bases just across the Venezuelan border which it uses as places of refugee when under heavy military attack...

[slapout9]

Crockett and Tubbs are back on the beat this Friday so everything will be OK.

On a more serious note I am afraid the success of the drug ops pushed them across the border. I suspect this happened because we finally were allowed to extradite drug dealers from Columbia instead of just collecting Intell on them. Don't think Hugo Chavez will let us do that. What a shame he should be the first one on the list.

[Watcher In The Middle]

Here's a little background:


Bolivia's autonomy referendums signal rightist backlash

On Sunday, the Amazonian states of Beni and Pando voted overwhelmingly in favor of more autonomy from the socialist government of Evo Morales.

Link to the article (http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0603/p06s01-woam.html)

Now, this makes four of the five lowland provinces which have now all voted OVERWHELMINGLY for Autonomy: Pando, Beni, Santa Cruz, and now Tarija. The only (partially) lowlands province not yet voting for autonomy is CHUQUISACA, which is split.

Here's A Provincial Map of Bolivia (http://www.aguabolivia.org/situacionaguaX/Riego/mapas/mapapol.htm)

Most of Bolivia's oil (some, but primarily gas) production is all based in the lowlands, and that's where the real money is. Bolivia's socialist government of Bolivia's first indigenous president, Evo Morales has been making a concerted attempt to move most of the revenue obtained from the developing hydrocarbon based industries into his Socialist oriented projects, most of which are not in the lowlands areas where the hydrocarbons are being obtained. So this is more than just a right/left issue, it's actually more of who in Bolivia is going to benefit from the growing hydrocarbons revenues.

Problem is, this is affecting all sorts of other players. You have good ole Hugo Chavez stirring up the pot on behalf of his good buddy Evo Morales, but the people he is causing pain for are in places like Argentina and Brazil who are neighbors to Bolivia, and who are the primary natural gas customers of Bolivia.

Argentina on the South (directly adjacent to Tarjia province, who has the approx. 85% of the gas reserves, and Santa Cruz has virtually all the rest (10.6%+/-), which is also directly adjacent to Brazil).

Here's another wikipedia link (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bolivian_Gas_War)

It's looking like the uplanders vrs. the lowlanders, with the Socialists being upland, and the opposition being down low.

This is partially why both Brazil and Argentina both aren't quite so "open arms" with Hugh Chavez. Story goes that when Evo Morales nationalized the Natural Gas business in 2006, the Bolivian government arbitrarily broke a number of existing contracts for natural gas, and much of this occurred at the urging of Hugo Chavez. Don't make friends doing stuff like that, and the paybacks can be hell. Evo looks to be finding that reality out right about now.

Anyway, this will be a fun one to watch, and in our own back yard.

[Watcher In The Middle]

Bolivia on the Brink - Evo Morales leads his country toward disintegration or civil war

Dated: Tuesday, September 16, 2008

IT BECAME clear long ago that President Evo Morales's attempt to import Hugo Chávez's model of authoritarian socialism to Bolivia had polarized his country along ethnic and geographic lines -- risking its disintegration, or civil war. Rather than compromise, Mr. Morales only intensified his efforts to force through a new constitution concentrating power in his own hands and privileging highland indigenous communities at the expense of the rest of the country. The result is that Bolivia stands at the brink of a civil conflict that could destabilize an entire region.

One of the five provinces that have rejected the president's policies is now occupied by the army under martial law after fighting that has killed as many as 30 people in the past few days. Militants on both sides are resorting to force. In the province of Santa Cruz, anti-government demonstrators have sacked and occupied government offices.

Link to Washington Post Editorial (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/15/AR2008091502702.html)

The real problem is that there looks to be some things in common with Northern Ireland - both sides have a whole list of grievances going back, and back, and back. And nobody's letting go.

This one has some real consequences, as it really could effect Peru, Chile, and especially both Argentina and Brazil. For example, both Argentina and Brazil would ideologically be more in alignment with President Evo Morales ideology, except for the fact that he's already made a point of sticking it to both Argentina and Brazil over energy, particularly arbitrary increases in natural gas prices. In fact, there's some thought out there that both Argentina and Brazil find it much easier to deal with the governors of the five lowlands provinces than the national government of Evo Morales.

And, Hugo Chavez is of course sticking his big nose in - he's actually threaten to intervene militarily in Bolivia on the side of Evo Morales, except he's got no direct access. But I'm sure that mouthing off put him in good stead with all the neighbors.

Going to get ugly.