COIN Companies

[William F. Owen]

Gentleman and others.

I would welcome opinions and ideas of what an "Infantry Company" trained and configured for COIN operations would look like and how it might differ from a "Full Spectrum/Conventional" Infantry (EG: SBCT?) Company.

I'm not asking for a train set of TOE, but rather manning, organisation and training - IF such a thing was considered necessary - eg, a three star tells you to design one.

I ask this as I am still chipping away at the best-practice approach for infantry employment, in COIN operations.

[SteveMetz]

Gentleman and others.

I would welcome opinions and ideas of what an "Infantry Company" trained and configured for COIN operations would look like and how it might differ from a "Full Spectrum/Conventional" Infantry (EG: SBCT?) Company.

I'm not asking for a train set of TOE, but rather manning, organisation and training - IF such a thing was considered necessary - eg, a three star tells you to design one.

I ask this as I am still chipping away at the best-practice approach for infantry employment, in COIN operations.


I guess I would say there would be less difference at the company level than higher. Perhaps some organic intel capability and training to integrate appropriate "plug and play" modules--translators, PRTs, various SF type things, more snipers, etc. More training with nonlethals and robotics.

[William F. Owen]

I guess I would say there would be less difference at the company level than higher. Perhaps some organic intel capability and training to integrate appropriate "plug and play" modules--translators, PRTs, various SF type things, more snipers, etc. More training with nonlethals and robotics.

I concur. This suggests that either we are looking at Task/Threat Organised Battle Groups, and/or the same at the Company level. However this implies a requirement to have existing trained and raised specialist groupings reading to plug into the Company hub.

Not sure about non-lethal. I think "less lethal" may be possible/useful and may be a product of training rather than purely technology. Potentially "non-lethal" is a Pandora's box with strategic implications.

[SteveMetz]

Not sure about non-lethal. I think "less lethal" may be possible/useful and may be a product of training rather than purely technology. Potentially "non-lethal" is a Pandora's box with strategic implications.

Nonlethality (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB231.pdf)

[William F. Owen]

Nonlethality (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB231.pdf)

Thanks for that. I'll read in full over coffee (and when new printer cartridge is re-supplied) , but skipping to the recommendations and the scope of non-lethal technologies, I still hold to my recently gained scepticism of non-lethal technology. I applaud the intent, but see problems with delivery and "effect". Is non-lethal is the ultimate EBO weapon?

I do not wish to de-rail this thread, so on full reading, I'll either send a PM or start a new thread.

[MattC86]

. . . is for a new thread. I don't recall seeing nonlethality being discussed here in depth before, and I'd like to see some of the council's opinions on it.

Back to the subject at hand - Dr. Metz referred to "plug-and-play" capabilities, suggesting a standardization of the infantry company to be able to accommodate such external capacities. To me, that sounds like a further extension of the MAGTF concept from the larger scales (MARDIV/Air Wing, RCT, even MEU) down to company-level, except with armor or other support packages being replaced with intel, civil affairs, and SF type capacities.

I remember Ken arguing that GP infantry forces are capable of a lot of small-unit or "special" missions that we tend to associate with Ranger or other such specialized formations, and I'm wondering if typical infantry companies already don't operate closely with these sorts of external bu associated capabilities attached for particular missions.

Regards,

Matt

[selil]

I would welcome opinions and ideas of what an "Infantry Company" trained and configured for COIN operations would look like and how it might differ from a "Full Spectrum/Conventional" Infantry (EG: SBCT?) Company.


My personal opinion from outside the business of the Army is that at the "unit" company/squad level the unit for COIN should look a lot like a standard conventional "unit". The differences I see are in additional resources or cross-trained resources. I don't think that medical or other "peace" cross training missions would be primary changes but secondary considerations.

I'm not sure why there has to be a tension between COIN operations and conventional military operations. I'm not sure when we will see the next "conventional" war (if such ever existed), or when we will see the next trench warfare, island warfare, or other type of tactical situation. I can point to a current insurgency or two. In some ways aren't the disaster relief, peace, and drug interdiction operations currently trained for helpful in COIN?

[William F. Owen]

I'm not sure why there has to be a tension between COIN operations and conventional military operations. I'm not sure when we will see the next "conventional" war (if such ever existed), or when we will see the next trench warfare, island warfare, or other type of tactical situation. I can point to a current insurgency or two. In some ways aren't the disaster relief, peace, and drug interdiction operations currently trained for helpful in COIN?

...and that Selil, is the itch I can't quite scratch!! - which is why I predicated the question on a mythical three Star saying "design me something!"

[selil]

...and that Selil, is the itch I can't quite scratch!! - which is why I predicated the question on a mythical three Star saying "design me something!"

I would say drop all the way back to vision/mission/objectives of the Army then. If you re-make it, do it with an objective and goal oriented approach.

There has to be a document out there that has the learning objectives for every military operational specialty and the basic/boot training requirements. Build from the education side what your objectives are and create a new system entirely that is integrated to the mission.

If anybody wants that done give me oh... $800K or so and unlimited access to training materials and I'll have it done in a year.

[slapout9]

#1 Wilf, Rob Thornton wrote a good article a while back about just a Company. He let us review it here first. I don't know if he ever got it published but you may want to PM about it. It was very good stuff and not just because I helped with a small portion of it on Undercover/plain clothes Police stuff:)

#2 Agree on Less-Lethal vs Non-Lethal as far as weapons go. Almost anything can end up being lethal if used improperly.

[Sabre]

I'm not sure when we will see the next "conventional" war (if such ever existed), or when we will see the next trench warfare, island warfare, or other type of tactical situation. I can point to a current insurgency or two.

One of the "lessons learned" that I heard plenty while growing up was how the military is always "preparing for the last war", rather than the next, and yet here we are, with some analysts saying that we will never fight another "conventional war" again. Some said that after WWI, I believe. Ditto WWII. And yet, noticeably, Gulf Wars I and II still required some armored attacks.

It turns out that the enemy will adapt to strengths (well, the dangerous ones will). Right now, the insurgency is a good way to fight a certain type of military, thus it is used by our enemies, and thus we have the emphasis on COIN. But if we become very adept at defeating insurgencies, then our enemies will simply opt for a different method of conflict, perhaps something more "conventional". There are severe limits on resources, and how much time we have to train...

Which is the long way of saying that I agree with some on this board, that a COIN Infantry company should look much like a... "normal" infantry company.
*Although*, I would argue that may run counter to some other discussions, since if you are in the "distributed ops" environment, squads and platoons may be forced to operate outside of mutual support, and thus the company's GPMG's and heavy weapons may end up habitually attached to the platoons/squads, with the attendant training, logistical, and employment problems.

[shark11]

I would look at the distrubed operation platoons the Marine Corps experimented with in Afghanistan. Every time I think about a COIN squad, platoon or company...it ends up look like an SF ODA or a Marine Advisor Group. At a minimum I think a infantry unit tailored for COIN should be baed on the following.

1. Light and Mobile
2. Culture and Language Capable
3. Proficient in Combined Arms
4. Trained in IO, HUMINT, and advanced combat lifesaving
5. Have Civil Affairs, Designated Marksman/Sniper and Engineer Cabability
6. Trained and equipped with the best small arms and comms we can give them.
7. Various instructor skills, marksmanship, tactics, combat lifesaving, etc.


Again, you can see how this starts to like and ODA.

[Sabre]

Yes, USMC Distributed Ops and the ODA make sense for much of what happens in COIN, but almost any insurgency worthy of the name should be able to scrape together 50+ guys to eat up a 12-man unit. From what I recall, in most cases there had to be constituted quick-reaction forces (a la Mike Force, etc) of company-size or greater.
...and there are always point targets that have to be defended, so I still think that an infantry company of 3 (or 4) rifle platoons (which can be split into 12-man units), with a heavy weapons platoon is the answer - the heavy weapons can defend a point target or two, or be a platoon-sized QRF. One of the companies in the battalion can be the company-sized reaction force.

Language proficiency would be a real-bear to actually get out to the "line" troops. Realistically, that may be a "bridge too far", given the usual amount of training time that we actually have to work with - and that assumes that we will know up front exactly which language we'll need.
A very limited vocabulary and a basic cultural understanding may be more realistic.
Becoming proficient at all of the tasks that an 12-man unit must have to be more or less self-contained is daunting enough even without that (i.e., patrolling, calling in supporting fires, combat lifesaving, intel and IO, basic combat engineering, sniping, etc etc).

[Richard W]

William F. Owen:

As you know the Portuguese fought a very long and largely successful counter insurgency in their African Empire for almost two generations. Their Army was very, very poor. The Portuguese turned this poverty into a virtue. They deployed lightly armed and equipped infantry companies. These companies could foot patrol into a target area as a unit. They were not road bound. The company could actually move as a unit cross country.

These companies were very hard to interdict. Essentially they could go where ever they wanted to. The insurgents had great difficulty developing secure "liberated areas".

The French Colonial Parachute Battalions had the same concept during the Algerian war. Eventually the British followed a similar pattern during the Malaysian Emergency (See Faber Shoot to Kill).

I think it would be wise not to try and turn an Infantry Company into a combined arms task force with many different skills and a lot of equipment. On the other hand it may be wise to place it under the operational control of a Special Forces Detachment.

100 Man Foot Company for Counter Insurgency

1. Headquarters Squad with 4-man reconnaissance patrol

2. Infantry Platoon x 3

A. Platoon Headquarters: 3-men

B. Rifle Squad x 3: 9-men

Please note that there are no organic support or service personnel or vehicles. The strength of the company is its ability as a unit to move on foot at night across any type of terrain without a lot of motors and squealing tracks; and at teh same time to be easily picked up and transported great distances by aircraft or truck. I suggest that the support personnel as in the WWII Special Service Force be grouped into a separate unit. Finally such a unit would be operating besides more heavily armed and mounted companies.

Regards

Richard W

[Eden]

If you assume that the ideal COIN company would have to:

*be able to defend itself against any reasonable threat for a limited period
*be able to match the enemy's mobility over rough terrain for extended periods
*be able to bring to bear selected 'non-military' expertise as required
*possess superlative reconnaissance skills

then I believe the organizational question (number of men, number of sub-units, types of weapons, etc) becomes almost trivial. The real questions become:

*How do I retain those things which give me an edge in combat (dominant firepower, night vision, better communications, etc) while remaining agile enough to outmaneuver or pursue the enemy?
*What required skills can be imparted to infantrymen in a reasonable amount of time, and which will have to be provided from outside the unit?

Solutions generally fall into three areas: training, technology, and logistics.

The training bit is not easy, but it is simple. We have more than enough experience and historical example to compile the specialized skills that would come in handy for your typical COIN effort. Some of these could be 'organic' to the unit (simple tracking, interrogation, or forensic techniques, for example). Others, such as civil engineering, contracting, language, would probably have to be provided by either experts in the headquarters squad, attachments, or reachback.

I'm not a big believer in technological solutions, but technology is our big advantage in the asymmetric fight, and needs to be exploited in COIN. The danger is in projecting too far out - "all we need is cold fusion in a thimble to make this work" - but we don't need to go all "Starship Troopers". Lighter, better batteries, for instance, or more bandwidth, or a reliable translation program, are all within reach.

All this ties into logistics. We are still woefully roadbound. In Iraq this is less of a problem than it is in Afghanistan. Frankly, I don't have any solutions in my back pocket or I'd share them. The fact is, once our infantry jumps off the helicopter they almost immediately become immobile compared to the enemy we face. The only way we can force him to fight is to surround him or surprise him. The latter seems to be inordinately difficult, while the latter requires more troops than we have avaialable. So solving the problem of how to keep the boys in batteries, water, food, and ammo, without tying them to helicopter landing zones or putting 120 pounds on their backs, seems to me a much more important issue than any question of organization.

[Richard W]

Eden:

That was nicely put.

Regards

Richard W

[glaw]

All,

This has been a big subject at CGSC. According to FM 3-0 (2008) full spectrum operations consist of offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations conducted simultaneously. According to FM 3-24 (2006) COIN is a combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations. I wouldn't think of it as COIN operations or "conventional operations". For example, an infantry company could be deployed in Ar Ramadi, with two platoons conducing offensive operations in one part of the city and another platoon conducting stability operations in the other part of the city. All of it being COIN Operations.

glaw

[ODB]

A lot of the thought has to be to stop relying on the Army to provide so much. Stick me in a village with bare necessities and let me live like the locals. Too many of us have gotten use to "luxury" items. If I'm doing the right thing many of my needs will be supplied by the locals. Then my only logistical requirements can come by parachute in the middle of the night. Those items should be what I need to help the locals, not pamper myself. If creating COIN companies then they would need to realize what "snake eaters" really are. Ever had camel?:D Taste like chicken.....not really!

[William F. Owen]

If creating COIN companies then they would need to realize what "snake eaters" really are. Ever had camel?:D Taste like chicken.....not really!

Not just tasted but eaten camel! I have tasted road-kill hyena, as prepared by one of the medics from Unit 669. - who then said "wow you really are dumb. We didn't think you'd do it!

[ODB]

Not just tasted but eaten camel! I have tasted road-kill hyena, as prepared by one of the medics from Unit 669. - who then said "wow you really are dumb. We didn't think you'd do it!

Road kill possum is mighty tasty after many days without food, still remember the rule. Snap it hard three times, whatever doesn't fall off is good to eat.

[Distiller]

Good post #14, to remember Malaya, Portugese Africa, Rhodesia, &c.

I'm affraid this look back tends to be too romantic, boy-scout and action movie type romantic.

And when ordered to build a unit, I have to ask for what mission. Rural? Urban? The real deal, or "hearts and minds" stuff?

Generally, these days I would go irregular. Recruiting people of suitable and theatre-compatible racial/tribal/cultural background, either in the theatre itself, or from the huge pool of economic and political refugees that is available in the West. Exploiting racial, tribal and social conflicts. Led by visually compatible members of special forces with special education.
Pose as business men, workers, tourists, local security, the new gang in town, &c.

The whole outfit organised flat. Trooper - Section Leader - Company Leader. No status games and a minimum of "Sirs". No real uniforms, blending in with locals.
The size of the section maybe 8 men (not different from a regular squad), the company maybe 15 to 20 sections. But the section here is more important, the company more a paper unit. The sections would avoid "coming home" when in theatre.

Logistics support by buying stuff, other stuff by FedEx or DHL. (I'm not joking, FedEx is in Iraq since 2003. A lot of stuff can be delivered commercially - very low profile).
In more rural areas GPS-parachutes.
For mobility take a taxi, or buy something.

Two huge advantages a Western COIN unit has are ISR and precision stand-off fire power (which is important in case a hundred Pashtuns decide to have your scalp).
That makes the question of weapons a little secondary, for some missions a concealed PDW might be enough.
Otherwise it depends heavily on the ops environment, but blending in would be important, like:
For rural areas AK47/103 (optionally with UGLs), one or two marksman rifles like a M110, a PKM, some MGL, maybe a Javelin, hand grenades, plus some night-vision equipment. Basically no different than light inf.
For urban areas low profile is even more important -- silenced SMGs, low caliber LAWs, maybe some unusual and expensive high-tech toys like guided LAWs and unmanned sensors, &c.

[Richard W]

Distiller:

You posted in part:

"I'm affraid this look back tends to be too romantic, boy-scout and action movie type romantic."

I reply: And what do you expect with a new Indiana Jones movie coming out?

Regards

Richard W

[Distiller]

Distiller:

You posted in part:

"I'm affraid this look back tends to be too romantic, boy-scout and action movie type romantic."

I reply: And what do you expect with a new Indiana Jones movie coming out?

Regards

Richard W

:)

Didn't mean to criticize the look back. For rural and bush COIN/CT ops all the lessons from places of the last 60 years (maybe going back further to the Philippines of 1902ff, or Deutsch-Südwestafrika) are still valid. And I too like to read all the stories from Angola and Rhodesia and such.

But the environment has drastically changed. I guess these days it's far more likely to operate in a suburban slum or a run-down city like Beyrouth. Afghanistan or the Saharan desert are NOT the typical ops areas of the future, I'm affraid.

[Richard W]

Distiller:

I think your comments are spot on. Please keep them coming.

Regards

Richard W

[Sabre]

Two huge advantages a Western COIN unit has are ISR and precision stand-off fire power (which is important in case a hundred Pashtuns decide to have your scalp).
That makes the question of weapons a little secondary, for some missions a concealed PDW might be enough.



As awe-inspiring as Western ISR and precision ADM's may be, they have very real limits, and I have heard of plenty of actions where an SOF team was in trouble and it either wasn't available, or couldn't be brought to bear effectively (for a variety of reasons). So, in such a case, there still needs to be a robust force package for extraction, close enough to respond quickly. Which means CAS, helos, and possibly a rifle platoon or company reaction force, and all of this will require security...

Please forgive a comment from the peanut gallery, but I just couldn't let that one slip by...

[VMI_Marine]

Sabre,
Couldn't agree more, and I'm one of the guys who is supposed to call in that precision standoff firepower. I think our reliance on close air support in the two current wars is a potential vulnerability that the bad guys have not learned to fully exploit yet.

[Distiller]

Sabre,
Couldn't agree more, and I'm one of the guys who is supposed to call in that precision standoff firepower. I think our reliance on close air support in the two current wars is a potential vulnerability that the bad guys have not learned to fully exploit yet.

Actually I didn't mean CAS, but more artillery or mortars like the Dragon Fire.
You'll never have enough CAS for all the squads in contact with the enemy.
But it sure is true that the reliance on CAS is dangerous.

[anotherguy]

...What about deployment duration? Once you have the skills sets trained up and boots on the ground, how long do you want to keep your COIN company in place? It is impossible to fully replace a relationship with the indigenous people that has been developed over a 12 month deployment and hard won through shared victories and losses no matter how big or small.

[Fuchs]

...What about deployment duration? Once you have the skills sets trained up and boots on the ground, how long do you want to keep your COIN company in place? It is impossible to fully replace a relationship with the indigenous people that has been developed over a 12 month deployment and hard won through shared victories and losses no matter how big or small.

That relationship doesn't require the full company.

Redundancy & rotation helps.
Always have two to four officers in a meeting, including a representative of a higher level (Battalion, for example).
Sometimes, one or two can be missing because they're not deployed. But the meetings would always be attended and if possible the delegation be lead by at least one officer with several months experience.

A disconnect might still occur when units get moved to another region in the theatre, though.

[shark11]

Sabre,
Couldn't agree more, and I'm one of the guys who is supposed to call in that precision standoff firepower. I think our reliance on close air support in the two current wars is a potential vulnerability that the bad guys have not learned to fully exploit yet.

I agree but I think our biggest shortfall is not effectively using CAS in a COIN enviorment. I worked with one FAC who had it down....he used every bit of intelligence available to use his air assets and recorded all of his observations. These observations were of great use to me in fusing it with my work.....it was lethal, we ran a handful of devasting CAS missions together....sadly, the other two FACS I worked with were not nearly as adept and contempt on flying around and waiting for it to hit the fan......

You have to be proactive in all aspects of COIN and any warfare for that matter.

Also nice to see another SOCNET APO member on this forum.

[bikewrench8541]

I really like Distillers post on this topic.
However in a real world situation it would be hard to get past anyones command these days it seems.
Also can I get an oorah Socnet brothers.;)

[Randy Brown]

Thanks, Bikewrench8541, for casting my attention back to Distiller's remarks. At risk of taking out of context his point about urban-ops being the future rule, rather than the exception, I wanted to share a completely random connection you just inspired--to a 25 JUN Salon.com article that seems to be as much about video game design as it is about Bushido (http://www.salon.com/tech/htww/2008/06/25/naoe_kanetsugu/index.html). I point it out here because I like the anecdote, and the punchline-quote reminds me of those dojo days, when my Army cadet buddies and I carried our Little Red Books of Sun Tzu in our left cargo pockets.

First off, here's Mr. Distiller's quote:

:)
For rural and bush COIN/CT ops all the lessons from places of the last 60 years (maybe going back further to the Philippines of 1902ff, or Deutsch-Südwestafrika) are still valid. And I too like to read all the stories from Angola and Rhodesia and such.

But the environment has drastically changed. I guess these days it's far more likely to operate in a suburban slum or a run-down city like Beyrouth. Afghanistan or the Saharan desert are NOT the typical ops areas of the future, I'm afraid.

Now, here's the samurai story from Salon.com, which relates what author Andrew Leonard describes as "one of the greatest samurai disses of all time":


Kanetsugu was a successful military leader who served as chief councilor to Uesugi Kagekatsu, the daimyo of one of the major clans of the period. In 1600, the Uesugi clan was feverishly building up its defenses in preparation for a showdown with Ieyasu. Ieyasu became suspicious at all the military hustle and bustle and sent a messenger to Uesugi Kenshin demanding an explanation.

Kanetsugu replied: "While citified samurai busily collect tea implements, country samurai gather arms for war."

[reed11b]

Intelligance gathering training. Look at the current DOD program to have law enforcement personel supplant US troops in Iraq. That type of training would support a COIN unit well. Better electronic survielance resources (at a lower echelon) would be helpful too. beyond that, the original suggestion of leaving open slots for plug and play assests (interpreturs, Civ affairs, engineers, etc.) is very valid.

[reed11b]

perhaps some english majors as well since we infantry types obviously can not spell.
Reed