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View Full Version : The USMC in Helmand (merged thread)



Wildcat
04-29-2008, 02:23 PM
Early this morning, 24th MEU rolled into Helmand Province in force, using helos and Humvees to seize the Taliban-controlled town of Garmser.

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/04/28/world/main4053148.shtml


U.S. Marines in helicopters and Humvees flooded into a Taliban-held town in southern Afghanistan's most violent province early Tuesday in the first major American operation in the region in years.

Several hundred Marines, many of them veterans of the conflict in Iraq, pushed into the town of Garmser in predawn light in an operation to drive out militants, stretching NATO's presence into an area littered with poppy fields and classified as Taliban territory.

U.S. commanders say Taliban fighters have been expecting an assault and have been setting up improvised explosive devices in response. It wasn't known how much resistance the Marines would face in Garmser, where the British have a small base on the town's edge but whose main marketplace is closed because of the Taliban threat.

The assault in Helmand province - backed by U.S. artillery in the desert and fighter aircraft in the sky - is the first major task undertaken by the 2,300 Marines in the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, which arrived last month from Camp Lejuene, North Carolina for a seven-month deployment. Another 1,200 Marines arrived to train Afghan police.

Wildcat
04-29-2008, 08:54 PM
Further updates on the offensive in Helmand.

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,353044,00.html

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21134540/vp/24368412#24368412

Galrahn
05-02-2008, 07:21 PM
There is a remarkable lack of coverage on this issue, the European press is doing a good job though, probably because it is in the British zone.

For all the discussion regarding the possibility of Marines deploying Afghanistan, now that they are there and on the offensive, I've seen only reporting, and virtually no analysis from the US observers, although a few of the British blogs are doing an excellent job.

Ron Humphrey
05-03-2008, 12:23 AM
There is a remarkable lack of coverage on this issue, the European press is doing a good job though, probably because it is in the British zone.

For all the discussion regarding the possibility of Marines deploying Afghanistan, now that they are there and on the offensive, I've seen only reporting, and virtually no analysis from the US observers, although a few of the British blogs are doing an excellent job.

Military analyst on TV who should ,who shouldn't: should they be briefed should they not, where exactly do we expect the major networks to get any kind of real feedback thats in a form that they understand comfortably. And along with that comes the lack of sufficient insight on how to spin it to their purposes:wry:

SWJED
09-05-2008, 10:32 PM
Musa Qala (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/09/musa-qala/)
Adapting to the Realities of Modern Counterinsurgency
by Thomas Donnelly and Gary J. Schmitt, Small Wars Journal

Musa Qala (Full PDF Article) (http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/96-donnelly.pdf)


This SWJ article is an excerpt from a forthcoming American Enterprise Institute study on the war in Afghanistan and NATO’s future.

The town of Musa Qala is, in many ways, a typical Afghan market town. “I saw no obvious concessions to modern living,” reported James Holland of his spring 2008 visit to Musa Qala.


In fact, I was reminded of a picture book of ancient Persia I had as a boy. I suspect the scene would not have appeared unfamiliar to Alexander the Great, who passed through here in 329 B.C. My first sight of Musa Qala was of a gray, sprawling mass that far side of a 200-year wadi [or river bed]. It was raining, the skies were leaden and the concrete and mud-built building appeared monochrome and somber.
The town sits on the Musa Qala River, an often-dry tributary of the Helmand River, the geographic feature – along with the Highway 1 ring road that ties Afghanistan together and connects the capital, Kabul, to the rest of the country – which defines Helmand province. It also links the ring road and lowland Helmand to the mountains of central Afghanistan. It is the last stop before the town of Baghran, in the northernmost tip of Helmand and near the border with the rugged Oruzgan and Daikundi provinces, which has been a Taliban redoubt since the initial U.S. invasion.

The town also gives its name to Musa Qala District, but two other factors contribute to it real importance: it is the hometown of the Alizai tribe, Helmand’s largest Pashtun group – though the tribal politics are devilishly complex: the Alizai are comprised of six major clans, but are a sub-tribe of the Noorzai, which is one of the five major tribes that make up the Durrani Pashtuns, one of the two main Pashtun grouping in the Afghan-Pakistan border regions; altogether there may be as many as 400 clans among the Pashtun peoples. Musa Qala is also a crossroads in the opium trade. And these two factors – tribal politics and the drug trade – are linked.

davidbfpo
09-06-2008, 11:14 AM
Excellent article and a good find. Whether it will work is a moot point. May return with comments another time. Did the defecting local Taliban leader bring any fighters with him or later? What national / international aid for the locals has arrived since?

Note the role of the Danish and (tiny) Estonian contingents alongside those normally in the foreground.

davidbfpo

Danny
09-07-2008, 04:02 AM
At least during the battle for Musa Qala, no fighters materialized. In my post:

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2008/01/14/our-deal-with-mullah-abdul-salaam/

I linked this from the Times:

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article3174835.ece

Saying:


There was no uprising. When Afghan, British and US units closed in on Musa Qala last month, Mullah Salaam stayed in his compound in Shakahraz, ten miles east, with a small cortège of fighters, where he made increasingly desperate pleas for help.

“He said that he would bring all the tribes with him but they never materialised,” recalled one British officer at the forefront of the operation. “Instead, all that happened was a series of increasingly fraught and frantic calls from him for help to Karzai.”

So there you have it. One of my major problems with this whole deal. It is a pitiful substitute for the awakening, and if you cannot bring fighters with you, then you're nothing more than a shyster.

tequila
02-19-2009, 11:01 PM
U.S. Marines find Iraq tactics don't work in Afghanistan (http://www.mcclatchydc.com/homepage/story/59479.html)


... The men of the 3rd Batallion, 8th Marine Regiment, based at Camp Lejeune, are discovering in their first two months in Afghanistan that the tactics they learned in nearly six years of combat in Iraq are of little value here — and may even inhibit their ability to fight their Taliban foes.


Their MRAP mine-resistant vehicles, which cost $1 million each, were specially developed to combat the terrible effects of roadside bombs, the single biggest killer of Americans in Iraq. But Iraq is a country of highways and paved roads, and the heavily armored vehicles are cumbersome on Afghanistan's unpaved roads and rough terrain where roadside bombs are much less of a threat.


Body armor is critical to warding off snipers in Iraq, where Sunni Muslim insurgents once made video of American soldiers falling to well-placed sniper shots a staple of recruiting efforts. But the added weight makes Marines awkward and slow when they have to dismount to chase after Taliban gunmen in Afghanistan's rough terrain.


Even the Humvees, finally carrying heavy armor after years of complaints that they did little to mitigate the impact of roadside explosives in Iraq, are proving a liability. Marines say the heavy armor added for protection in Iraq is too rough on the vehicles' transmissions in Afghanistan's much hillier terrain, and the vehicles frequently break down — so often in fact that before every patrol Marine units here designate one Humvee as the tow vehicle.


The Marines have found other differences:


In Iraq, American forces could win over remote farmlands by swaying urban centers. In Afghanistan, there's little connection between the farmlands and the mudhut villages that pass for towns.


In Iraq, armored vehicles could travel on both the roads and the desert. Here, the paved roads are mostly for outsiders - travelers, truckers and foreign troops; to reach the populace, American forces must find unmapped caravan routes that run through treacherous terrain, routes not designed for their modern military vehicles.


In Iraq, a half-hour firefight was considered a long engagement; here, Marines have fought battles that have lasted as long as eight hours against an enemy whose attacking forces have grown from platoon-size to company-size.

...

"Hopefully we have not become wedded to the vehicles," White said, a reference to the MRAPs, which currently are required for every patrol. "We have to set the standard operation procedure for how to do this. This not Iraq."


Two of my best friends from SOI were killed last week with 3/8. All I want is to get away from the driving-around-in-circles boredom here in Anbar and get into the real fight. That's pretty much all the grunts around here talk about.

Ken White
02-20-2009, 01:10 AM
I don't know how many posts here have in essence pointed out that little in Iraq can be transferred to Afghanistan -- but there have been a bunch...

Nor do I know how many posts here have bemoaned that fact that US Forces cannot seem to learn from the lessons of others -- but there have been a bunch...

Sigh. :(

George L. Singleton
02-20-2009, 01:19 AM
Please accept condolences on the loss of your two young Marine Corp friends KIA last week.

A quote in your excellent posting today:
American forces must find unmapped caravan routes that run through treacherous terrain, routes not designed for their modern military vehicles.

The Afghan Army/national government/or the National Geographic/Geodedic survey of Afghanistan...terrain maps or plats...should be of some help to you Marines to map out and plan routes of travel off the establishe roads.

QUESTION: Have you gone onto the Internet; selected a sector to look at from satellite view on your computer and then tried to use that satellite viewed overview to plan or test plan unique land routes? Just a thought.

Stay safe, hope you get into the type of action you indicate you want, and that God always has His hand on your shoulder.

Danny
02-20-2009, 01:38 AM
I too and sorry for the loss of your SOI buddies. I have a Marine son and I know how you all feel about sitting in the desert. My son wasn't because he was in Fallujah 2007. But doesn't want to go back. Marines don't want to waste time.

I have been rebuked for linking my own posts so I won't do that on this one issue (I discussed this report on my own blog). But I will send one link your direction, and the moderators will just have to chill about it. I don't get much traffic from SWJ anyway, so that isn't the point.

The link I am sending your direction concerns what may be in my estimation the most important thing you will see coming from Afghanistan on TTPs. Remember your SOI / MCT, they report says. Iraq has allowed us to become tactically sloppy. The only place you will find this PPT presentation is Michael Yon's site and mine (the down side is, I suppose, that you need Powerpoint to view it). I discussed this with Michael Yon and we both wanted this to get the maximum exposure possible.

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2009/02/12/marines-taliban-and-tactics-techniques-and-procedures/

As for the initial report to which you point, I am concerned too about trying to implement Iraq tactics in 'Stan. Satellite patrols, for instance, will be useless. Body armor, for instance, needs to be lighter. We have discussed this.

But chasing the Taliban around is not the answer. We need more troops to secure the human and rural terrain.

Best, HPS

ODB
02-20-2009, 02:39 AM
All I want is to get away from the driving-around-in-circles boredom here in Anbar and get into the real fight. That's pretty much all the grunts around here talk about.

Where is the "real" fight you so seek?

Condolences on the loss of brothers.

Ken: Looks like I'm the one who needs a new shine on my boots this time.:D

ODB
02-20-2009, 02:46 AM
Their MRAP mine-resistant vehicles, which cost $1 million each, were specially developed to combat the terrible effects of roadside bombs, the single biggest killer of Americans in Iraq. But Iraq is a country of highways and paved roads, and the heavily armored vehicles are cumbersome on Afghanistan's unpaved roads and rough terrain where roadside bombs are much less of a threat.

Based off who's statistics? Seems to me that is just as much a threat, buddy of mine was the only survior in the vehicle and he landed 50 feet away with the turret.....

They are just as much a threat in Afghanistan.....
Iraq/Afghanistan IED comparison (http://www.dodbuzz.com/2008/12/12/900-ied-attacks-a-month-in-iraq-and-afghanistan-metz/)

gh_uk
02-20-2009, 08:26 AM
According to an ISAF document (FOUO) on Wikileaks (dated 14 Jan 09), Afghanistan saw a 27% in increase in IED incidents in 2008 (from previous year), and a 29% increase in casualties resulting from IEDs - making them the single largest cause of casualties in 2008.

http://wikileaks.org/w/images/Afghan-sec-2008.jpg

Full pdf presentation here (http://wikileaks.org/leak/nato-afghan-metrics-2008.pdf).

COMMAR
02-25-2009, 08:39 AM
I don't know how many posts here have in essence pointed out that little in Iraq can be transferred to Afghanistan -- but there have been a bunch...

Nor do I know how many posts here have bemoaned that fact that US Forces cannot seem to learn from the lessons of others -- but there have been a bunch...

Sigh. :(


Did you read the whole article or did you just draw a conclusion off yet another poorly titled article that was looking for a name to draw readers in.

B/c had you read the article it was already known to the Marines that tactics were going to vastly different in A'stan prior to them deploying.

However the article is mostly about how the Marines were equipped, equipped for Iraq instead of A'stan. B/c HEY, what do ya know, they were trained & equipped to go to Iraq until about 2mths b4 they actually left & found they only had 2mths to get ready for A'stan.

They then had to retrain, but their gear was already allocated, so they had to make due.



Your comment was that "US Forces hadn't learned the lessons other forces."

Thats funny b/c the 2 COIN programs that were intiated by USMC's Task Force 2/7 starting in April of '08, of Focused District Development (FDD) Program & the In-District Reform (IDR) Program, were called 2 of the most successful in the country in the last 7yrs.

Both Programs designed SPECIFICALLY for those Provinces in A'stan, not borrowed fr/ Iraq.



So again the Article was NOT about the Marines having the WRONG STRATEGY for A'stan but the wrong Equipment, which was unpreventable due to time constraints.

Ken White
02-25-2009, 05:18 PM
Did you read the whole article or did you just draw a conclusion off yet another poorly titled article that was looking for a name to draw readers in.

B/c had you read the article it was already known to the Marines that tactics were going to vastly different in A'stan prior to them deploying.And if you had read what I said instead of playing 'Ready, Shoot, Aim' you'd realize that I was pointing out two things -- neither of which was an attack on the Marines of which I was one before you were born:

- Afghanistan is not Iraq. TTP must be modified -- that was directed at many here and the civilians in the Think Tanks and anyone who has not been to both countries who have suggested the two are similar.

- US Forces means 'we' -- all the US Armed Forces. Not just the Marines; If I'd meant Marines, I'd have said Marines.

We are badly parochial. The Army won't adopt a lot of smart things Marines do, the Marines won't accept that the Army might do something right. The Air force and Navy are just as bad. Some of that is normal and healthy, an excess is not. There are of course exceptions and there is no doubt we are better about cross feed today than we were when the Marines replaced 1/82 in Fallujah in 2003. We need to learn and adapt from each other. We're getting better, we need to get better yet.

If you perceived any of that as an attack on the Marines, you need to get your eyeball recalibrated.
So again the Article was NOT about the Marines having the WRONG STRATEGY for A'stan but the wrong Equipment, which was unpreventable due to time constraints.Nor did I say it was. If you want to get defensive, your call -- do it with me in the future, please shoot at what I say instead of addressing what you want to think I said.

ODB
02-25-2009, 07:37 PM
This has been debated, redebated, reguritated, and debated again. LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6646&highlight=weight+combat+gear) No one is going to tell someone else how to suck that egg. Bottom line, politics and public opinion have driven that train off the end of the bridge to nowhere and it's still going. Until commanders are willing to assume risk, we will have to figure out ways to make things happen.

If you checked the article I linked in my above post, the main threat is not all that different. When entire vehicles are being blown to hell in Feb in Afghanistan it tells the enemy is changing. Afghans historically do not fight through the winter months, but guess what they are this year. So we can play the who is outfitted properly with what equipment and what training game all day long. Bottom line, you go to war with what you got, not with what you wish you had. I'm not going to say it, aw hell.......TRAINING. Does not matter what country, basics are basics and they apply no matter where you go to fight.

Lastly what are the statistics of gun shot wounds/deaths vs IED wounds/deaths? If I was a betting man, I'd bet a paycheck IEDs are winning in Afghanistan. Answered my own question here OEF Database (http://icasualties.org/OEF/Default.aspx)

Did the leg work

US Deaths
IED - 183
Small arms fire - 84
RPGs - 61

Total CF Deaths
IED - 329
Small arms fire - 122
RPGs - 80

jmm99
02-25-2009, 08:01 PM
(from the McClatchy article)
U.S. troops also are frustrated by the different rules of engagement they must operate under in Afghanistan. Until Jan. 1, U.S. forces in Iraq operated under their own rules of engagement. If they saw something suspicious, they could kick down a door, search a home or detain a suspicious person.

But in Afghanistan, they operate under the rules of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, of which U.S. troops are part. Under those regulations, only Afghans can search buildings and detain people.

Since the Law of War, as seen by most NATO nations, tends to follow the path taken by the Eminent Jurists report (discussed in this thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4921&page=10), posts 188-190), there might be more "one hand tied behind the back" in Astan than in Iraq.

On the other hand, US Forces (including USMC) might not find the ROEs a practical problem - adapt, improvise, overcome, etc. So, are the NATO ROEs part of the problem ?


If they are as classified as ours, discussion would have to be limited.

Teufel
02-28-2009, 09:56 PM
Afghans historically do not fight through the winter months, but guess what they are this year.


The Afghans are not fighting this winter. I just got back from that area and the activity went down considerably from the summer time. Just because they reduce their activity does not mean they stop however.

ODB
03-01-2009, 01:37 AM
The Afghans are not fighting this winter. I just got back from that area and the activity went down considerably from the summer time. Just because they reduce their activity does not mean they stop however.

From my boys there and the numbers here:

Jan-Feb 2008 = 8 US Deaths

Jan-Feb 2009 = 29 US Deaths

There is more to it than just them ramping up in the winter months, there are also 10,000 more service members this year than this time last year. It does have my boys thinking as they have been hit hard already and at the time of the year when it is realatively calm. Big country a lot depends on what part your in as well. Been some years since I set foot in Afghanistan, but been following it closely as I'm sure my focus will be shifted from OIF to OEF soon.

Teufel
03-01-2009, 02:08 AM
[QUOTE=ODB;67481]From my boys there and the numbers here:

Jan-Feb 2008 = 8 US Deaths

Jan-Feb 2009 = 29 US Deaths
QUOTE]

I would like to see the numbers for August and July 2008 compared with 2009 as I think enemy activity and CF/ANSF deaths are up in general and not specific to the winter. I was in the Helmand and Farah provinces so I can only speak to those areas. From what I saw all the big timers take off to see their families or take a break during the winter and some of the local players keep some level of activity up.

ODB
03-01-2009, 02:30 AM
I would like to see the numbers for August and July 2008 compared with 2009 as I think enemy activity and CF/ANSF deaths are up in general and not specific to the winter. I was in the Helmand and Farah provinces so I can only speak to those areas. From what I saw all the big timers take off to see their families or take a break during the winter and some of the local players keep some level of activity up.

Historical statistics here OEF Fatalities (http://icasualties.org/OEF/Default.aspx)

Jul-Aug 2008 = 31 US Deaths

Total CF for those months = 76

Historically CF
Jan-Feb 02 = 22
Jan-Feb 03 = 11
Jan-Feb 04 = 13
Jan-Feb 05 = 4
Jan-Feb 06 = 18
Jan-Feb 07 = 20
Jan-Feb 08 = 21
Jan-Feb 09 = 48

All the data is at the above linked site.

TROUFION
03-01-2009, 12:38 PM
it's been a long time since I've posted for many different reasons. mainly didn't have anything worthwhile to say. Also, I've been busy. Currently I am on a staff in southern afghanistan and have a good view of what is going on. I cannot cover too much here but what I can say is that the two articles (the first posted by tequila & the mcclatchy article) are not the whole story.

Unclass version- the Coalition and Afghan forces have upped the anti for fighting in the winter. If you had stats on the number of insurgents kia this would be shown. But it is not about body counts.

We are not 'winning' yet but we are doing good things. The tactics, well this is my favorite quote: 'afghanistan is a place where the land fashions the people, it is also a place where the land and the people should fashion the military operations.' Most of the folks fighting this fight 'get it.'

As for the ROE issue, McClatchy had it wrong. There was, and in some circles still is, a miss understanding of the ISAF ROE. This has and is being corrected through training. The ROE is designed to help increase Afghan lead operations and to reduce collateral damage. There are some issues between the various nations who have 'national caveats' but they can be worked with through good planning. Bottomline our guys can enter buildings if they need to, we are not limited in our right to self defense. We just prefer to have the Afghans do it, it is their country after all.

-T

Cavguy
03-01-2009, 11:33 PM
it's been a long time since I've posted for many different reasons. mainly didn't have anything worthwhile to say. Also, I've been busy. Currently I am on a staff in southern afghanistan and have a good view of what is going on. I cannot cover too much here but what I can say is that the two articles (the first posted by tequila & the mcclatchy article) are not the whole story.

Unclass version- the Coalition and Afghan forces have upped the anti for fighting in the winter. If you had stats on the number of insurgents kia this would be shown. But it is not about body counts.

We are not 'winning' yet but we are doing good things. The tactics, well this is my favorite quote: 'afghanistan is a place where the land fashions the people, it is also a place where the land and the people should fashion the military operations.' Most of the folks fighting this fight 'get it.'

As for the ROE issue, McClatchy had it wrong. There was, and in some circles still is, a miss understanding of the ISAF ROE. This has and is being corrected through training. The ROE is designed to help increase Afghan lead operations and to reduce collateral damage. There are some issues between the various nations who have 'national caveats' but they can be worked with through good planning. Bottomline our guys can enter buildings if they need to, we are not limited in our right to self defense. We just prefer to have the Afghans do it, it is their country after all.

-T

I know Nancy Youssef, the author of the article, and she's pretty conscientious. If you have a factual correction/modification for her article, I can email it to her.

Niel

jmm99
03-02-2009, 01:18 AM
for the clarification on the ISAF ROEs. Stay safe. :)

Teufel
03-02-2009, 02:42 AM
As for the ROE issue, McClatchy had it wrong. There was, and in some circles still is, a miss understanding of the ISAF ROE. This has and is being corrected through training. The ROE is designed to help increase Afghan lead operations and to reduce collateral damage. There are some issues between the various nations who have 'national caveats' but they can be worked with through good planning. Bottomline our guys can enter buildings if they need to, we are not limited in our right to self defense. We just prefer to have the Afghans do it, it is their country after all.

-T

I really can't blame Ms Yousef. While she does have her own agenda, as does any reporter, I think she was reporting on what she saw and heard. When I was in Afghanistan I saw that the average Marine and Soldier on the ground was convinced that they could not enter buildings and felt that they were limited in their ability to engage known enemy forces. Whether or not this is really the case, that is what the reality on the ground was. The problem is that this misunderstanding existed at a level well above the platoon level. At least it did when I was there. The Marines recently transitioned to ISAF ROE from OEF ROE and it is normal for there to be some confusion. I am glad to hear that this is being addressed now.

ODB
03-02-2009, 02:53 AM
Unclass version- the Coalition and Afghan forces have upped the anti for fighting in the winter. If you had stats on the number of insurgents kia this would be shown. But it is not about body counts.

Never been a big numbers guy in the past, however they do tell a story, as I am starting learn (without a statistics class, yet). In this case there are many things to gain from numbers, the increase in IED numbers and CF deaths. Agreed there are underlying circumstances to both. The biggest being CF numbers have increased as have the number of operations. A quieter number is the IED one. Not just the number of IEDs but also the types, how they are being initiated, built, etc... The lessons from Iraq are flooding into Afghanistan, no doubt the fighters as well. Throw in the growing (size) of the safe haven in Pakistan and the dynamics change immensly, in a short period of time.

NATO is an animal of itself.....

TROUFION
03-02-2009, 05:50 AM
The issue is not with the veracity of the reporting I am sure that Ms. Yousef reported what she was told. From my vantage she always seemed a straight shooter. However what she did get wrong, and what the Marines on the ground needed training in was the actual ROE.

"But in Afghanistan, they operate under the rules of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, of which U.S. troops are part. Under those regulations, only Afghans can search buildings and detain people."-McClatchy News.

This statement is incorrect, though I have no doubt that it came from reliable sources, it is just that they were misinformed.

Truth-The 2/7 Marines operated under OEF rules and the SPMAGTF-A Marines operate under ISAF, the rules are different.

The rules appear (and are) cumbersome. They are difficult for all ranks to grasp. BUT once the training is in place and conducted the issues are reduced.

Note that many of the Marines in theater now were training for Iraq upto in some cases 2-4 months prior to coming here. This caused some issues with the baseline training. ROE was one of those issues.

The bottom line is this nothing gets in the way of our right to self defense. If hostile intent and or act is identified our forces can deal with it approriately. If that means detaining a person or entering a building without ANSF present they can do so. HOWEVER, we mitigate this by trying very hard to integrate all our actions with the ANSF.

The ANSF and Government of Afghanistan are the future, we endevour to train them; work with them; and integrate all our actions with them at every opportunity.

-T

Ken White
03-02-2009, 07:25 AM
Stay alert. ;)

davidbfpo
04-10-2009, 12:16 PM
Just out and not seen yet, a book on the battle for Musa Qala by an embedded journalist with the UK forces and a review piece: http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/2009/04/operation-snakebite.html

davidbfpo

davidbfpo
04-11-2009, 02:00 PM
Missed this UK Channel 4 Dispatches programme, where Stephen Grey is the reporter and includes several interviews with UK Army officers - mainly those at the top: http://www.channel4.com/programmes/dispatches/episode-guide/series-6/episode-4

Hopefully this link to the TV programme will work outside the UK, as Rex and a few others have found links don't: http://www.channel4.com/programmes/dispatches/catch-up

davidbfpo

Valin
07-07-2009, 02:03 PM
Asia Times (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KG04Df03.html)
Ali Gharib


WASHINGTON - After months of planning and putting pieces in order, aspects of the new United States strategy in Afghanistan are beginning to be concretely implemented - including a surge of troops and attempts to curtail the poppy trade that allegedly funds insurgents.

But some aspects of the new strategy are lagging behind, and questions linger about the feasibility of winning by concentrating new US forces in Afghanistan's south and east, where the Taliban has largely established full control.

On Thursday, 4,000 US Marines made their way by helicopter into Afghanistan's enormous Helmand province, a Taliban stronghold in the south where poppy cultivation runs rampant.....

IntelTrooper
07-07-2009, 05:52 PM
Good for them... As an influential malik once told me, a meeting can have the highest quality food, the best accomodations, and the most important people attending, but without chai it is meaningless.

mhusband
07-08-2009, 04:16 PM
I was sooo tired or chia by the time I left. But it is good for conversing with local nationals and safer than drinking a glass of water.

goesh
07-08-2009, 05:14 PM
- an armed Peace Corps, well, I guess it could be worse somehow, not sure how though....its just the notion of gunfire and tea that bothers me when the grunts are conditioned on beer and soda and engaging - I just can't see them digging irrigation canals for instance or herding goats to generate warm fuzzy feelings amongst the people- I mean, what exactly are they supposed to do besides drink tea? Is, ah, seeking non-personal engagement with the taliban a part time job here or what? I sure hope this doesn't turn into a cluster F

50Bravo
08-04-2009, 01:40 PM
I saw the video at this address:
http://www.breitbart.tv/valley-of-death-nbc-news-crew-captures-major-firefight-inside-afghanistan/

Asked a recent Old Grad to whom I am related what he saw wrong and he said:
their fire was uncoordinated. they seemed to just be shooting. the squad leaders should have been directing fire on targets. suppressing fire is all well and good when it is asked for, but otherwise you end up in a situation like they did where they need to break contact because you cant sustain. the psg should have been on that instead of firing his own weapon.

for starters, if i knew an ambush was coming i wouldn't be waiting in the ducking alamo in downtown al-bhull####ville. it makes a great target, god forbid they have a mortar and know how to use it. i would need to see a map but id have made a show of running away, and hit em at night in or around town somewhere.

my saw gunners wont be emptying drums of ammunition at nothing, not twice anyway...

I added the following observations for his consideration and benefit:

If you are reasonably sure that there are bad guys in that hamlet you:

1. identify escape routes and put squad sized ambushes on those paths the night before, say 0300 or so.

2. using your whiz bang tech gps gear, you locate ambush sites precisely and then lay mortars in on the ambush positions to cover the squads retreat if they get more business than they can handle.

3. Whatever else you do, you show up at the hamlet at BMNT, not just in time for brunch, come on! Surprise is a dish best served at daybreak, not brunch.

4. PSG is doing video instead of helping PL direct the action shame on both

5. None of the marines in the video can see a target so by firing, they are telling enemy precisely where THEY are but enemy is not located. Your people should not be firing unless they have a target (exception- ambush that you are giving or receiving) also wasting ammo that they may need as you point out. There is even one Hue re-enactment where the guy sticks his weapon up over the wall and just hoses down the planet.

6. There ought to be another platoon or a company saddled up and ready to dance for just such situations so they can get behind em. if not, you move the platoon out and flank em or, if terrain won't permit, withdraw and hope they chase you.

That way your main body drives them into the ambushes in confusion instead of lollygagging up the hill in broad daylight so the bad guys can make an orderly retreat or set up their defenses.

Why send a platoon to hit and run. This did NOT work in Irag and didn't in Vietnam either. If you are going hunting in rough terrain, plan on staying and set up blocking positions first... or send in a smaller force and have a rifle co. saddled up to drop in behind the assholes once they engage and then smoke em.

If the hamlet is controlled by the Ban, then take it and hold it or set up camps outside... or relocate hamlet.
don't expect locals to support you if you can't protect them with either local militia or troops. if they don't want that protection then they are Ban symps and need to be relocated or dealt with otherwise.

remember, just because they aren't for the govt doesn't mean they are against you. not truly a binary situation.

so endeth the sermon.

We would appreciate other observations since said Old Grad will be there next year!

Ken White
08-04-2009, 02:45 PM
That was really bad. Way, way too much just popping caps. Excessively long bursts on the 249s will destroy them sooner than necessary, aside from the waste of ammo. Firing them essentially offhand is of no value. I saw two Grenadiers launch 40mm rounds with no clue where they might land, a number of riflemen firing multiple shots in rapid succession almost certainly really unaimed, at least one firing an M4 on full auto which is pointless...

Those folks definitely need some training. I can never understand why leaders allow that kind of loose and pointless firing. We don't do the basics well at all and our lack of fire discipline is the prime indicator. In defense of that unit, same thing occurs all the time and did in other wars. Control of fire is not one of our strong points; we waste a LOT of ammo...

Not enough info on the tactical situation to say much on that aspect, though I agree with most of what you say as generically good.

goesh
08-04-2009, 04:16 PM
- all points missed by the general Public, unfortunately - Obama made it clear this was where the war needed to be fought so my take is its a shot of PR, the good fight,quasi cool for arm chair soldiers in front of their flat screens safe at home, especially the guy spraying over the wall, they're left with maybe 20% of their ammo and the villagers chalk it off as another American loss -

Rank amateur
08-05-2009, 12:37 AM
1) Do they have enough manpower to do what was suggested?
2) Why do you say "None of the marines in the video can see a target?" Reporter said they identified fire from 5 pairs of bad guys, hit several.
3) Village was cleared with no casualties. I'm not sure Obama was responsible, but it doesn't seem like a bad thing to be responsible for.

Kevin23
08-05-2009, 01:11 AM
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/26/world/asia/26marines.html

It appears that the Taliban's tactics and strategy of fighting the US/NATO/Afghan government forces is evolving to become more coordinated than ever before. In a way the Taliban is becoming more advanced in the way they fight then the insurgency in Iraq. However like the article said they lack alot of the heavy explosives that the insurgency in Iraq had. Which if they happen to do could cause more problems then they already are know for US/NATO forces as well as for the government in Afghanistan.

Cavguy
08-05-2009, 04:36 AM
1) Do they have enough manpower to do what was suggested?
2) Why do you say "None of the marines in the video can see a target?" Reporter said they identified fire from 5 pairs of bad guys, hit several.
3) Village was cleared with no casualties. I'm not sure Obama was responsible, but it doesn't seem like a bad thing to be responsible for.

I'm always loathe to judge from my armchair far away, but the fire discipline didn't seem to be there relative to a unit w/500 engagements. Of course, this is a 3 min video covering an hour of combat. I was surprised to see the M4 "Pray and Spray" above the wall a few times. A lot of rapid semi-auto fire, which isn't good for accuracy. Fine if you have to suppress, and I couldn't judge the volume of incoming fire. I did think that SAW gunner was liberal with the whole 3-5 sec burst concept. When added to the other video posted a few weeks ago (ambush along a road), I am a little concerned that the mounted concept of OIF (always near vehicle, and on the roads) may teach bad habits for A-Stan regarding fire discipline, ammo conservation, and fire/maneuver.

As I pointed out to Bill though, there was a good NYT article a few months ago about a well executed deliberate ambush by our guys on the Taliban.

Again, hard to make sweeping judgments from short video clips.

Niel

50Bravo
08-05-2009, 04:36 AM
I was less concerned about the manpower versus mission thing than the fact the force they did have did not appear to be well employed, was not using fire discipline, locating themselves where an 81 could do some serious damage etc. They never had the initiative. They were targets the whole way.
I guess the armor changes the way you approach that.

If they "cleared" the hamlet it only stayed clear for about 30 minutes after they left. If you rae taking ground, hold it. If you are hunting bad guys then there are better ways than walking into a situation where they chose the time and place to engage you.

Two more points:
an associate pointed out that they carry lots of gear. I don't see how you move quickly or quietly with all that gear, let alone the armor. I wonder if the tactics are not being dictated by the amount of gear they drag around.

finally, I don't believe that inconclusive engagements like this bear to our advantage. When they can engage us and break it off when they choose (as was the case here-that platoon had no chance to pursue), they are learning how we fight and we are simply weeding out the less competent ones. In a sense we bred a better insurgent. If we have the initiative, we can engage when it is decisive for the units involved and when we can inflict substantial casualties. If we do that, they don't get better with each engagement but when we let them make that choice we are just a teaching vehicle

William F. Owen
08-05-2009, 04:47 AM
I'm always loathe to judge from my armchair far away, but the fire discipline didn't seem to be there relative to a unit w/500 engagements. Of course, this is a 3 min video covering an hour of combat.

I have no credentials to judge what I see based on experience and I concur with armchair judgements, however....

I think the men were aware of being filmed. I think they engaged in certain forms of behaviour based on that. The presenters comments strongly indicated he did not understand what he was seeing, and my guess is a very minor contact was dressed up to make it look like a big fire fight. (in the case of Blackwater videos from Iraq, no contact at all can be made into WW3)

The "behaviours" you see replicated in numerous, "in action videos" are not necessarily effective actions.

Ken White
08-05-2009, 05:14 AM
He, 50Bravo, I mean -- but they aren't, that's Co B, 1-26 Inf of 3d Bde, 1st Inf Division, US of A Army. Same Unit that had the film clip of the kid with the boxers standing at the parapet... :D

Numbers of casualties don't tell you much. As many rounds as the US side fired, many of which were unnecessary, they were bound to have hit something. He said inaccurate fire because there were a number of scenes of firing that could not possibly have been accurate. Like the grenade launched blind over the wall and the 20 round bursts from SAWs -- offhand.

I passed that link to a serving leader of bods (Thanks from he and I, 50Bravo) who plans on using that clip for a 'How not to do it' training aid for his troopies. :wry:
3) Village was cleared with no casualties. I'm not sure Obama was responsible, but it doesn't seem like a bad thing to be responsible for.How in the world did Obama get into this? :confused:

Cavguy
08-05-2009, 05:22 AM
He, 50Bravo, I mean -- but they aren't, that's Co B, 1-26 Inf of 3d Bde, 1st Inf Division, US of A Army. Same Unit that had the film clip of the kid with the boxers standing at the parapet... :D

Numbers of casualties don't tell you much. As many rounds as the US side fired, many of which were unnecessary, they were bound to have hit something. He said inaccurate fire because there were a number of scenes of firing that could not possibly have been accurate. Like the grenade launched blind over the wall and the 20 round bursts from SAWs -- offhand.

I passed that link to a serving leader of bods (Thanks from he and I, 50Bravo) who plans on using that clip for a 'How not to do it' training aid for his troopies. :wry:How in the world did Obama get into this? :confused:

I posted it to company command and a few BCKS forums. Will see if anything develops, esp. on company command.

Ken White
08-05-2009, 05:42 AM
Joe, knowing a camera is about, can be prone to ham it up a bit... :D

Like you, not enough to judge except that fire discipline has long been one of my pet peeves. We do not train it well...

MikeF
08-05-2009, 08:02 AM
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/26/world/asia/26marines.html

It appears that the Taliban's tactics and strategy of fighting the US/NATO/Afghan government forces is evolving to become more coordinated than ever before. In a way the Taliban is becoming more advanced in the way they fight then the insurgency in Iraq. However like the article said they lack alot of the heavy explosives that the insurgency in Iraq had. Which if they happen to do could cause more problems then they already are know for US/NATO forces as well as for the government in Afghanistan.

Just b/c they thought they saw it all in anbar...I dealt with the same problem with an IA unit from Ramadi assuming it was the worst ever battle...Their assumptions led to a high casualty rate for that battalion...I hope the Marines learn a bit faster...

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/50-few.pdf

v/r

Mike

50Bravo
08-05-2009, 01:24 PM
I went back and listened again to the vid and those who correctly identified these guys as Army are correct. I mistakenly id'd them as Marines... my apologies to the USMC. I have been assured that no Marine would evah do that.

NeoConn0311
08-05-2009, 02:49 PM
In watching the video I agree that fire discipline was lacking especially for the 249 and 203 gunners. I was always taught that movement without fire was suicide and fire without movement was a waste of ammo. I do not want to monday morning quarterback the situation but the fight seemed to serve no purpose and there appeared to be no attempt to close with and kill/capture the enemy fighters.

In regards to the amount of gear that our troops carry today it is often being dicatated from the rear and on high. Our infantry is no longer light and in fighting irregular forces we have placed ourselves at a disadvantage by reducing our ability to move quickly or quietly. I always attempted to shed gear but our politicians concern for our troops and their need to be seen supporting us by getting us the armour that we need meant I would wear front, rear, and side SAPI plates all day everyday. Our leaders in the field shoud determine what our troops need not politicians on the campaign trail.

Boot
08-05-2009, 11:10 PM
My question is more of a equipment one. Wouldn't long rifles (M-16A4?) and longer barreled SAW's serve the Army or Marine Corps better in the open terrain of Afghanistan?
Yes they seemed to have fire discipline issues and the leadership didn't seem to control the fight, but OTOH, its hard to discern what is going on from this vantage point.

Ken White
08-06-2009, 12:24 AM
My question is more of a equipment one. Wouldn't long rifles (M-16A4?) and longer barreled SAW's serve the Army or Marine Corps better in the open terrain of Afghanistan?(a) They aren't high speed and low drag... :D

(b) The goal of the US army, I'm firmly convinced, is to have just one uniform type, one weapon type, one radio/comm type and one vehicle type for all units, all missions, all terrains, all climatic conditions... :rolleyes:

Oh, and to further the interests of uniformity and to finally kill all aspects of General Purpose Design (GPD. Motto: "An Army of one." No one knew that's what they were really after...) they want All Systems Synchronized.

Also, no one will be authorized ANY hair...

Kiwigrunt
08-06-2009, 12:36 AM
The goal of the US army, I'm firmly convinced, is to have just one uniform type, one weapon type, one radio/comm type and one vehicle type for all units, all missions, all terrains, all climatic conditions... :rolleyes:


How about just having one type of mission, one type of terrain, one type of climate and one type of enemy? How simple would life be?:p


Also, no one will be authorized ANY hair...

Now that would avoid hair-raising situations....:D

Ken White
08-06-2009, 12:38 AM
How about just having one type of mission, one type of terrain, one type of climate and one type of enemy? How simple would life be?:p ...Now that would avoid hair-raising situations....:Dbe lurking. Fer gawd's sake, don't give 'em any ideas... :D

IntelTrooper
08-06-2009, 12:58 AM
be lurking. Fer gawd's sake, don't give 'em any ideas... :D
Everyone knows, the most disciplined soldiers can stop facial hair growth at will. They shave every day anyway because it's the rules, and never get razor burn.

Ken White
08-06-2009, 02:23 AM
'Go' pills before you rotated. Windburn and chapped face indeed... :D

tankersteve
08-06-2009, 02:35 AM
I know these guys pretty well. I was their O/C at NTC back in January 2008. They were a good company with a very good commander. They were definitely the cream of the crop in the battalion. However, I too was dismayed by some things in the video, particularly the M203 blind over the wall.

One thing it is hard to train at places like NTC is these sustained firefights. We really tried to do this and by the time we did the next A'stan rotation at NTC, there was a method to 'surge' the OPFOR for lengthy (over 15 minutes - usually 45-60 minutes) firefights.

Niel, the nice ambush was also conducted by these guys - just days after an IED along a trail killed a brand new replacement troop. They have taken some hard licks but they also delivered some.

The reporter, Richard Engel, has shot a lot of video with these guys. He has been embedded over the course of the year for several weeks at a time, from what I can tell. In one series, they maneuvered a platoon as bait and came into contact. While engaging the Taliban with mortars, they had a fratricide against one of their own (from the mortars). You could see the frustration/pain on the face of the commander when he got the report.

I agree that the performance wasn't the best. An interesting point may be turnover in leadership. I am pretty sure the platoon leader didn't go through the train-up at NTC. It is possible the platoon sergeant didn't either. With injuries, a 36-man Army infantry platoon can pretty quickly look like less than 2 squads of Marines. I doubt they have more than 2 full squads plus weapons squad to maneuver with at this point.

Also it didn't seem like much more than a squad was involved with this mission. What were the rest doing? Probably holding the fort back at their platoon COP. This is some amazing terrain and movement at night is pretty hazardous, especially when burdened with all the crap they are required to carry. With the enemy having fantastic ISR, it is hard to get to a vantage point over them. They know where we are and attack when they think they may have an advantage. If we put out ambushes anywhere near a village, the Taliban will probably know and just not show up.

I am not sure where the Korengal valley fits into the big picture but I am sure that Viper Company, and the rest of their battalion, is an economy-of-force. They don't have the manpower to hold all the valley, so they kick out these patrols to keep the enemy from getting established close to their COP. It isn't pretty, but it seems to be all they can manage at this point.

Tankersteve

slapout9
08-06-2009, 03:03 AM
(a) They aren't high speed and low drag... :D

(b) The goal of the US army, I'm firmly convinced, is to have just one uniform type, one weapon type, one radio/comm type and one vehicle type for all units, all missions, all terrains, all climatic conditions... :rolleyes:

Oh, and to further the interests of uniformity and to finally kill all aspects of General Purpose Design (GPD. Motto: "An Army of one." No one knew that's what they were really after...) they want All Systems Synchronized.

Also, no one will be authorized ANY hair...

You can see the new stuff this Friday....Delta 6 Accelerator suits:eek:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uI36HkpftDc

Ken White
08-06-2009, 03:08 AM
No two of 'em in the same uniform... :D

slapout9
08-06-2009, 03:09 AM
No two of 'em in the same uniform... :D


:D:D:D spilled my drink over that one.

JarodParker
08-06-2009, 04:01 AM
4. PSG is doing video instead of helping PL direct the action shame on both


In the PSG's defense I don't think he was actively filming video from a hand-held camcorder. The reporter said about the footage being from a helmet mounted cam. I believe that makes a big difference.

JarodParker
02-13-2010, 03:10 AM
Some are touting this as the possible turning point for the Afghan campaign. Not sure if that's the expectation among the military inner circle or if this is just pundit talk and media hyperbole.
Telegraphing of intentions so civilians can flee, dug-in enemy, IED's and booby-traps, indigenous forces mixed in... sounds like Fallujah 3.0
Fallujah 3000 insurgents in a city with population of 425,000
Marjah 400-2000 insurgents in a town with population of 85,000 (Disclaimed: Wiki stats)

Marines push 'The Breacher' against Taliban lines (http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100211/ap_on_re_as/as_afghan_the_breacher)

Nato begins major Afghanistan offensive (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8513665.stm) (Video & Map)

US Marines, Afghan troops attack Taliban-held town (http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100213/ap_on_re_as/as_afghanistan)

Marine commanders say they expect between 400 to 1,000 insurgents — including more than 100 foreign fighters — to be holed up in Marjah, a town of 80,000 people in Helmand province. Marjah is the biggest southern town under Taliban control and the linchpin of the militants' logistical and opium-smuggling network.

Bob's World
02-13-2010, 05:55 AM
Marjah isn't a town.

Marjah is an area with a network of irrigation canals built by US AID in the 50s. Picture flying over Iowa or central valley's of California more than a town.

But with each farm a walled compound. Densely populated, and the heart of the Poppy growing region.

Entropy
02-13-2010, 02:20 PM
BW is completely correct. If you go to google maps and search "marjeh Afghanistan" and zoom in to the big green area in the desert you'll get an idea of the region and terrain.

jcustis
02-13-2010, 05:45 PM
It's notable that LtCol Brian Christmas, CO of 3d Bn 6th Marines, is the son of LtGen George Christmas, company commander in 2/5 during the fight to regain Hue in '68.

I can only imagine the stories the younger Christmas will have to recount to his father when he gets home.

jcustis
02-13-2010, 05:59 PM
Moderator's Note copied here from another thread

I'm hearing rumblings of heliborne assaults being used to support shaping operations for the attack to clear mission of Marjah.

Those would have good utility for avoiding IED-sewn areas on the way to key terrain objectives, and there's good reason to trust the inserted force can sustain itself relative to the threat until a more deliberate clearance mission can be executed to get to the maneuver elements. They'd seal off ratlines by establishing a traffic control/vehicle checkpoint, or total barrier plan.

jcustis
02-13-2010, 06:05 PM
Moderator's Note copied here from another thread


If history is any guide, Taliban fighters typically withdraw, leaving a host of hastily constructed IEDs behind that have become more powerful over the years. Large-scale withdrawal is usually followed by pockets of fierce resistance from limited groupings of fighters while small IED emplacement teams and teams of fighters harass perimeter forces with small arms fire and RPGs.40

The quote above is from the backgrounder article posted to the SWJ Blog post about Marjah.

Has anyone seen a breakout of unit organization that the various Taliban forces have employed, and the command and control methods employed (besides the obvious reliance on FRS type radios).

We saw them employ 30 5-man teams against one of the COPs (can't remember if it was Wanat or Keating)), but how does that shake out against their normal command structure and fighting organization? Do they just mob about aboard motorcycles and small pickups, or is there some semblance of team and squad organization for the fighters.

Danny
02-13-2010, 07:03 PM
Fallujah never had that many residents. It simply isn't big enough.

Firn
02-13-2010, 07:07 PM
Moderator's Note copied here from another thread


I'm hearing rumblings of heliborne assaults being used to support shaping operations for the attack to clear mission of Marjah.

Those would have good utility for avoiding IED-sewn areas on the way to key terrain objectives, and there's good reason to trust the inserted force can sustain itself relative to the threat until a more deliberate clearance mission can be executed to get to the maneuver elements. They'd seal off ratlines by establishing a traffic control/vehicle checkpoint, or total barrier plan.

The coalition should have been able to mass enough ressources to implement this approach and to make it hopefully work. As we already discussed in this thread, great parts of the territory should facilitate the use of inserted elements, be it observation or fighting/blocking forces.

We will see how this works out well.


Firn

Entropy
02-13-2010, 07:09 PM
Jcustis,

I seem to remember there is some stuff at CALL on that, but am unable to check right now. It's also important to note that organization could be quite different between Nuristan and the south, but I don't have any ready info on that either. This may be useful (http://www.michaelyon-online.com/images/pdf/the_eagle_went_over_the_mountain.ppt) (PPT) if you haven't seen it already.

jcustis
02-13-2010, 07:13 PM
Fallujah never had that many residents. It simply isn't big enough.

Just about every reference, from CPA census stats, to other online sources, run the population pre-2003, from 425-470K+.

Firn
02-13-2010, 07:16 PM
The long and straight open ground created by the irrigation channels or ditches and the dust roads might greatly facilitate the isolate and control part of the operation.

Firn

jcustis
02-13-2010, 07:24 PM
Moderator's Note copied here from another thread


The coalition should have been able to mass enough ressources to implement this approach and to make it hopefully work. As we already discussed in this thread, great parts of the territory should facilitate the use of inserted elements, be it observation or fighting/blocking forces.

We will see how this works out well.


Firn

One likelihood is that even though several aircraft were massed, many of them were reserved for mass casualty CASEVAC. They would be tagged for missions in the shaping phases, but reserved once things kicked off.

There are still operations occurring in other parts of the area of operations, so the number of MEDEVAC aircraft remains a finite entity. Assets might merely be located further forward, but the number available remain the same.

jcustis
02-13-2010, 07:26 PM
Jcustis,

I seem to remember there is some stuff at CALL on that, but am unable to check right now. It's also important to note that organization could be quite different between Nuristan and the south, but I don't have any ready info on that either. This may be useful (http://www.michaelyon-online.com/images/pdf/the_eagle_went_over_the_mountain.ppt) (PPT) if you haven't seen it already.

Its' been a while since I sat down with that one. Thanks for a hour-long read today.

davidbfpo
02-13-2010, 10:56 PM
I was reading some of the UK media reports AM and made these notes (could n't get a working link to SWC then).

From the:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7226187/Helicopter-armada-heralds-Afghan-surge.html


Two hours before dawn the first Chinooks swept low over the Taliban district capital of Showal disgorging a force of British, Afghan and French troops signalling “D-Day”, the start of Operation Moshtarak.


It is estimated the enemy strength, which at its highest point reach 300 fighters, may have shrunk to less than 100 with a number melting away from the area before the attack began.Quite a contrast from earlier figures.


The task force is supported by artillery firepower from all points of the compass. From Camp Bastion, 15 miles away to the north..Camp Bastion being the main UK FOB since 2006, so close to the Taliban controlled town.


Moshtarak means “together” in Dari and (my emphasis)for the first time ISAF troops will be working shoulder-to-shoulder with equal numbers of Afghan security forces.

The BBC:
The symbolism is potent - the offensive involves British, some European and US forces, as well as about 2,500 Afghan military personnel, one of the largest Afghan contingents to be used in such assaults.

From:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8500903.stm

Firn
02-14-2010, 07:08 AM
An Update on the fighting by the NYTimes (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/14/world/asia/14marja.html?hpwl).

As expected part of the forces are inserted by helicopter, using well sited walled compounds as part of blocking positions and as springboards.


As helicopter wheels touched soil, the aircraft filled with whoops, and the Marines stood and bolted for the tail ramp.

They moved briskly. Within minutes, the first Marines of Third Platoon were entering compounds to the landing zone’s north, checking for enemy fighters and booby traps. The rest of the platoon followed through the gate.


Firn

jcustis
02-14-2010, 07:35 AM
It's unlikely IMO that these knuckleheads will be slipping away from this one. so what are the odds that they are just withdrawing to a central point? And to think that I'll miss the sitreps as I head of to 30 days in the Stumps

S-2
02-14-2010, 11:41 AM
It's unlikely IMO that these knuckleheads will be slipping away from this one.

I fear that the taliban in this area are comprised of a variety of differing elements. Foreigners and key commanders have probably split to preserve themselves. According to NYT, IIRC, the shadow district governor was captured from a vehicle in Kandahar heading to points unknown (Kandahar? Arghandab? Pakistan?). Many of the local farmers ARE taliban fighters according to Jeffrey Dessler in his ISW report.

They'll play innocent and do their family thingy for the present. I can easily foresee no big battles but an insurgency to test the resilience of the ANP and Afghan administrators once things appear "pacified".

There's no real incentive for the taliban to make some heroic last stand at the Alamo. Who's got the endurance and can we peel away enough of the local fighter/farmers to transition out of the current opium/economic cycle overtime? Can the ANP and Afghan civilian administrators live up to the bargain and be solid contributors? THEY WILL BE TESTED in a myriad of threats and inducements to buckle.

Guess we'll see over time. Hope we're flexible at the operational and strategic levels. Hope we're willing to quash any hints of corruption and incompetence and not "go along to get along" with the Karzai clique.

davidbfpo
02-14-2010, 12:55 PM
A mass of comments on the operation, I am mindful that most of the press reporting is from Kandahar FOB and only a few journalists are "on the ground".

Abu M commends three reports:http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2010/02/marja-analysis.html

FRI has an excellent piece on the role of SOF:http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=2671

I note in one photo of a USMC unit being addressed before the operation there was a handful of ANA in the photo and one article cites a ratio of 2 US: 1 ANA. Sorry from afar too much "spin" and others refer to the bulk of the Afghan presence are 1900 newly arrived ANP (ANCOP).

JarodParker
02-15-2010, 04:55 AM
The mistaken killing of 12 Afghan civilians prompts U.S. apology (http://news.yahoo.com/s/mcclatchy/3426634)

The use of the rockets has been suspended pending a "thorough review" of the incident, the U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force said in a statement.

According to Dawood Ahmedi , a spokesman for the provincial governor of Helmand, 27 insurgents were killed so far, with five wounded and 11 arrested. The advancing force has uncovered 5,500 lbs of explosives.

Some folks have been inquiring about what ISAF plans to do with the poppy fields in the area but I haven't heard a definitive response. I would think eradication would be a deal breaker for the average Afghan farmer.
Also the phrase "clear, hold and build" seems to be en vogue again... which reminded me of Gen McMaster. Anyone know where he's assigned to these days?

Hacksaw
02-16-2010, 02:26 PM
the mistaken killing of 12 afghan civilians prompts u.s. Apology (http://news.yahoo.com/s/mcclatchy/3426634)


some folks have been inquiring about what isaf plans to do with the poppy fields in the area but i haven't heard a definitive response. I would think eradication would be a deal breaker for the average afghan farmer.
Also the phrase "clear, hold and build" seems to be en vogue again... Which reminded me of gen mcmaster. Anyone know where he's assigned to these days?

tradoc

Firn
02-18-2010, 09:07 AM
Hard to know if there is some substance behind the catchy headline (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/18/world/asia/18marja.html?ref=global-home) of the NYTimes. They report sporadic instances of decent marksmanship by the opponents.

Other than that the military part seems to go well. The bridgeheads/outposts created by the heli-inserted troops are getting linked up.

Firn

JarodParker
02-19-2010, 09:44 PM
I thought some of you might find this interesting, espcially since jcustis was aking about TTP...

US Marines seize Taliban headquarters, IDs, photosStory (http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100219/ap_on_re_as/as_afghanistan)


After a fierce gunfight, U.S. Marines seized a strongly defended compound Friday that appears to have been a Taliban headquarters — complete with photos of fighters posing with their weapons, dozens of Taliban-issued ID cards and graduation diplomas from a training camp in Pakistan.

Firn, maybe "instances of decent marksmanship" were a result of the fighters attending the University of the Taliban extension classes for the working mujahadeens.

Jedburgh
02-19-2010, 10:06 PM
CSIS, 18 Feb 09: The Afghan Test Bed in Marjah: Key Tests of Victory are Still Months and Years Away (http://csis.org/files/publication/100218_afghan_test_bed_marja.pdf)

The fighting in Marja is important. It challenges the Taliban on its home ground and will provide visible evidence that it cannot hold an area it has dominated for years and one whose drugs play an important role in its financing. The Marja offensive will test the President’s new strategy, and show whether a population centered strategy can work. At the same time, this means that “winning” involves far more than tactical victory, and that the aftermath of the fighting will be much more important than the immediate outcome of the battle.....

....This means that the core phases of the struggle for Marja (and Helmand) will play out over at least another year and probably much longer. It is one thing to make initial gains when so many ISAF and Afghan resources are concentrated in a small area. It is another thing to show that these gains can be sustained for years in an area that has been a Taliban stronghold. More importantly, ISAF and the Afghan government may have little more than the current campaign season to show that the new strategy can credibly succeed outside the Helmand River area, and do so on the scale necessary to win the country and the war....

S-2
02-20-2010, 01:20 PM
I think opium is planted in the fall and harvested in the spring. If so, I hope this is a controlled harvest and, while we're not in the business of buying, purchased en toto by us.

Last crop I'd think with all the government in a box waiting to go. There are plenty of provinces near opium-free. See Pg. 2 of UNODC's Opium Survey-

Afghan Opium Survey 2009-UNODC (http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_opium_survey_2009_summary.pdf)

Now Ali district, including Marjah, needs to moving in that direction.

davidbfpo
02-21-2010, 08:26 PM
Been offline for a few days and puzzled slightly at the two AFP photos on this BBC report:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8527266.stm

The armour look like German-made Leopards, which to my knowledge are deployed by only two ISAF nations in Afghanistan: the Canadians (in Kandahar) and the Danes (in Helmand).

Can anyone confirm what they are? I'm not familiar with the Stryker profile.

Ken White
02-22-2010, 01:20 AM
Both have 2A4s and 6s but the Camouflage is different, the Canadians also have some bar armor and I believe they now have the L55 gun in country.

William F. Owen
02-22-2010, 07:27 AM
Both have 2A4s and 6s but the Camouflage is different, the Canadians also have some bar armor and I believe they now have the L55 gun in country.
Kudos on your recognition skills Ken. I was just reaching for my "small boys guide to modern armour...."

Why on earth the UK has not deployed armour, I just do not know. One of the things I think I didn't quite realise was how much of a war winner MBTs are if correctly employed in irregular warfare.

Now it may well be that the desired think is a 120/105mm fire control stabilised main gun with TI sighting, but in most sensible terms that takes you to some sort of big AFV.

Firn
02-22-2010, 09:03 AM
Why on earth the UK has not deployed armour, I just do not know. One of the things I think I didn't quite realise was how much of a war winner MBTs are if correctly employed in irregular warfare.

Now it may well be that the desired think is a 120/105mm fire control stabilised main gun with TI sighting, but in most sensible terms that takes you to some sort of big AFV.

I'm pretty sure that most would like that sort of over-watch. The terrain in many parts of Afghanistan seems to be actually very suitable for tanks, especially in the southern regions. IIRC the Canadians published something rather positive about their experience with their in Afghanistan.

Still it takes of course many resources to push them into the fight and keep them in it.


Firn

davidbfpo
02-22-2010, 11:15 AM
The use of armour, notably MBT, has appeared before, wayback in 2008: from the Canadian Army Journal, Winter '08:Canadian Armour in Afghanistan and on this link: http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/2008/05/canadian-armour.html

davidbfpo
02-22-2010, 12:09 PM
A long comment article on the campaign, amidst the optimism is this vignette which illustrates luck is important, just imagine if it had not been present:


At dawn on the third day of Operation Moshtarak, I watched alongside a small huddle of soldiers as the Taliban’s flag was hurled down from a disused crane in Showal, the small town that was the capital of its shadow government, and replaced with the national ensign. It had been there for almost two years.

Within hours, the news spread, and a stampede of generals and politicians ensued, which culminated in the arrival of Gen Stanley McChrystal, the American military commander, the Afghan governor of Helmand and the defence and interior ministers.

We only discovered two days later that, within 20 yards of where the crowd gathered, lay an unexploded 20kg IED, but for now it appears that luck is with the Nato forces.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7289943/Afghanistan-Traces-of-hope-in-Helmand.html

Fuchs
02-22-2010, 12:36 PM
Kudos on your recognition skills Ken. I was just reaching for my "small boys guide to modern armour...."

long gun, front turret armour with triangle shape = A6M or A6
short gun, front turret armour with triangle shape = A5
short gun, boxy turret: A1 to A4That's for the German versions - the export versions usually either look similar to A4 or A6.


Can anyone confirm this location for Marjah?
31°31′N 64°07′E

It appears to be a meaningless, extremely small settlement which has only marginally more population density than the heavily compartmentalized fields surrounding it. It's hardly a village, yet some report speak of a city.

edit1:
A "Marjeh" is supposed to be near 33N 65E, but there's nothing noteworthy either.

edit2:
I looked at many maps and still cannot find it. Some articles refer to Marjah as in the south of Helmand. Where?
http://www.afghana.com/GetLocal/Afghanistan/Provinces/Pics/Helmand.JPG

edit3:
This map shows Marja at the coordinates I mentioned first - hardly a real village.
http://www.understandingwar.org/files/Helmand_Province_main.jpg

Entropy
02-22-2010, 04:05 PM
Fuchs,

"Marjeh" is extensively mis-reported in the press, but it isn't suprising - place names are frequently confusing in Afghanistan. There are two Marjeh's - there's the small, dispersed village located at the coordinates you gave, and there's the Marjeh agricultural area which is the name given to one of the major irrigation projects built in the 1950's (the other is Nad-i-ali). This old map may help explain things (http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/jah/89.2/images/cullather5b.jpg)- you can see the two planned areas which have since expanded beyond their original boundaries (as can be seen on google earth imagery).

Your coordinates are roughly in the northern central part of the Marjeh area. Plug in your coordinates to google earth and look for the green agricultural areas. The big block of green to the south is all part of "Marjeh" as well as a smaller area to the northeast. The large agricultural area further northeast is Nad-i-ali. Again, you can compare the old map linked above to modern satellite imagery to give you an idea of the area and where things are.

So this operation is not in any single city or town or village - it's really covering the span of the Marjeh agricultural district.

Entropy
02-22-2010, 04:23 PM
Here's another old map that gives an even better idea. It's copied from this 1970 Farm Survey (http://www.scottshelmandvalleyarchives.org/docs/fes-71-02.pdf), which is hosted on Richard Scott's website (http://www.scottshelmandvalleyarchives.org/intro.html), the one American who probably knows this area better than anyone else.

BTW, I think it's rather pathetic that I after 9 years of war, I still have to rely on 40 year old maps to show basic geography.

Fuchs
02-22-2010, 04:44 PM
Ah, an agricultural district with a lousy centre.
The terrain offers an unlimited choice of routes of approach and it should be quite easy to seal off the area with a moderate troop strength because of the open terrain surrounding it.

The news reports sound as if the action was directed against a major settlement, some articles even speak of a 80,000 inhabitants city.

It seems that the reporting is quite messed up.

I still wonder how Afghanistan can feed, cook and heat for itself with this little agriculture and no forests or coal production to speak of.

Entropy
02-22-2010, 06:04 PM
Fuchs,

Some additional info and maps can be found here (http://www.talibantaxi.com/marjeh.html).

Firn
02-22-2010, 06:04 PM
There are certainly several reasons why "the largest operation yet" was directed at this area. The terrain (http://maps.google.com/?ie=UTF8&ll=31.54109,64.15741&spn=0.464648,1.356812&t=h&z=10) is one of them.

It is rather impressive how much those green zones stand out on the satellite maps of Helmland. Given the high number or persons (especially children) per household the population densitiy is certainly much higher than one would guess accustomed by western standards.


Firn

Bob's World
02-23-2010, 01:15 AM
The fields are currently knee-deep mud and water; the roads and built up areas are thick with complex and often massive IEDs; all intersected by canals; and every home a small fortress as likely to contain a family as it is fighters. Wide open fields of fire with hundreds of meters between cover.

If you have a mental picture of an urban fight, feel free to adjust your picture.

Firn
02-23-2010, 08:25 AM
The fields are currently knee-deep mud and water; the roads and built up areas are thick with complex and often massive IEDs; all intersected by canals; and every home a small fortress as likely to contain a family as it is fighters. Wide open fields of fire with hundreds of meters between cover.

If you have a mental picture of an urban fight, feel free to adjust your picture.


True enough. But on the other hand it offers quite some advantages. As Fuchs wrote, "the terrain offers an unlimited choice of routes of approach and it should be quite easy to seal off the area with a moderate troop strength because of the open terrain surrounding it."

The peculiarities of the area with the long, straight roads flanked by the canals and walls should make it also easier then in most green zones of Helmland to cut it up and isolate parts of it. The heli-inserted troops could quickly get a firm hold and do their part in this operations.

There is also now little hope for the enemy to escape. It is hard to say if the announcement of this operation decreased or increased the number of enemy fighters in this area.


Firn

Tukhachevskii
02-23-2010, 10:21 AM
Been offline for a few days and puzzled slightly at the two AFP photos on this BBC report:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8527266.stm

The armour look like German-made Leopards, which to my knowledge are deployed by only two ISAF nations in Afghanistan: the Canadians (in Kandahar) and the Danes (in Helmand).

Can anyone confirm what they are? I'm not familiar with the Stryker profile.

Apparently the French are also sending their Caesar wheeled 155mm howitzers http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htart/articles/20090712.aspx


... whilst the Dutch are deploying their "panzer howitzers" (actually German made PzH2000) http://www.eucom.mil/english/FullStory.asp?art=%7BBADB1E93-8411-468D-AEAC-E4C8D701CF85%7D

Steve the Planner
02-23-2010, 05:03 PM
From the articles I have read, the Battle seems to have secured major population centers, but much of this place remains out of our reach.

Rajiv Chandrasekaran's coverage of the arrival of the town's newly appointed Mayor---the government in a box---sound like the box has yet to be filled or sealed:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/22/AR2010022201660.html


He arrived in Marja aboard a Marine MV-22B Osprey helicopter with a contingent of Marine officers and a small retinue of tribal elders who have been living in other parts of Helmand province. He was on the ground for about two hours, not venturing more than 100 yards from where his aircraft landed. He did not travel to the site of the new municipal center the Marines plan to construct, less than a half-mile away.

But, behind that is his more telling story about the Mayor behind the Mayor---Karzai's "chosen man" for the area:

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/90785856-1e99-11df-b259-00144feab49a,dwp_uuid=f39ffd26-4bb2-11da-997b-0000779e2340.html


A key challenge for the stabilisation team and Marine commanders will be transforming Zahir, who does not hail from Marjah and knows few people there, into an influential local figure. Helmand provincial governor Gulab Mangal selected him for the post largely because he is a friend, but in meetings of tribal elders before the operation, he was primarily a backbencher.

The man with the most sway in Marjah is Abdul Rahman Jan, the former police chief in Helmand. His officers in Marjah were so corrupt and ruthless – their trademark was summary executions – that many residents welcomed the Taliban as a more humane alternative.

Although Jan, who has extensive ties to narcotics traffickers, was removed from his post in 2005 after pressure from the British government, which was then about to send forces to Helmand, he remains close to Karzai.

Jan injected himself into discussions with tribal leaders in the run-up to the current operation. US and British diplomats say they think he will seek to influence the shape of the future Marja government and police force, in an effort to protect his interests in the area.

“Karzai wants A.R.J. to be the guy calling the shots in Marjah, not Haji Zahir,” said a western diplomat familiar with the issue. “That makes building an effective, stable government there a very challenging proposition.”

So much for the "government in a box."

Did somebody say that the reason the military is involved in this stuff only because no one else is? Ditto

davidbfpo
02-26-2010, 11:51 PM
Two rather laudatory articles as General Sir David Richards tours Afghanistan: a general report:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7325525/General-Sir-David-Richards-Taliban-thought-we-were-on-run-but-the-tables-have-turned.html and an article around an interview:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7326145/General-Sir-David-Richards-Forces-reach-turning-point-in-Afghanistan.html

On the strategic front very different opinions see the "round up" thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9718

I note the speculation on how many Taliban commanders were thinking of reconciliation.

jcustis
02-27-2010, 05:55 PM
A key challenge for the stabilisation team and Marine commanders will be transforming Zahir, who does not hail from Marjah and knows few people there, into an influential local figure. Helmand provincial governor Gulab Mangal selected him for the post largely because he is a friend, but in meetings of tribal elders before the operation, he was primarily a backbencher.

It's really this sort of stuff which, if true, really alarms me since it cuts against just about everything that I thought we we trying to understand about Afghanistan. If the Helmand governor delivers decent governance to the people of the province and its districts, and what he says matters, then all's good and well. But if the residents of Marjeh and similar locales could care less about central government because it cannot deliver on essential services and merely doles out benefits via patronage, leading folks to weather much of live alone, then we will have to do twice as much work to bring anyone under the fold.

This goes back to my head-scratching over just what we are trying to accomplish when there are pretty strong arguments against hoping to synch a centralized government structure in with pretty resilient and independent tribal structures that are already taking care of themselves in ways they know how to do best.

It also makes me wonder what the back story is on this guy, and what other reasons there are (besides the Helmand Governor connection) for him to be THAT GUY who is purportedly right for the job.

My last deploy, we had a town on the edge of the Arab belt on the fringe of the Kurdish patch in Ninevah Province. Bulayj was a relatively sleepy town by that time, with not much in the way or insurgent pockets that could really influence anything. The town had a mayor, but he lived in a town several dozen miles to the north, and he rarely visited anymore, despite his official position, due to a fear of violence. So we had a sheikh to deal with, and he was all about pointing a finger at Maj Mohammed, the police chief, who in turn would offer a slight smile and such his teeth when the topic of the sheikh came up. Meanwhile the band played on, and the shopkeepers sold their wares and the black market benzine peddlers doled out portions from rusted drums on the fringe of town.

Makes me wonder if we need less of governors and mayors in some of these corners of the world, and would do better thinking along the lines of CEOs and COOs. After all, don't we routinely complain about politicians as generally being unable to influence our personal bottom line?

Firn
02-27-2010, 07:44 PM
Makes me wonder if we need less of governors and mayors in some of these corners of the world, and would do better thinking along the lines of CEOs and COOs. After all, don't we routinely complain about politicians as generally being unable to influence our personal bottom line?

More political power (autonomy) and direct democracy at a lower level for sensible political entities like villages, valleys and the like might help in specific circumstances. Afghanistan seems to be a mosaic which doesn't create a picture. Isolated villages with a history of expecting and getting very little to nothing from Kabul or the next city are hard to rule from it.

Firn

Entropy
02-28-2010, 12:58 AM
It's really this sort of stuff which, if true, really alarms me since it cuts against just about everything that I thought we we trying to understand about Afghanistan.

Unfortunately it is true. The history of the governorship of Helmand province is a good example. I think the top-down appointment of provincial, district and sub-district leadership hasn't worked out too well.

Steve the Planner
02-28-2010, 04:38 AM
jcustis:

I came to the conclusion about two months ago that the only viable way forward would be some form of provisional management like Brit provincial governance.

Maybe it is through UN, or NATO, but it has to be, in many areas, not local. Local may come later, but not on schedule.

That is the only effective way to stabilize and improve things consistent with US objective s and schedules.

It means US or foreigners as administrators in many of these places, and not just as advisers, and short-tour passersby. Maybe they can work themselves out of a job later, but not right away.

The rest is just window dressing--pretending that Karzai can do it, or that the US civilians have a plan.

As Rajiv's artcile said, the real power is the drug-dealer-backed police chief. He can bring ruthless justice of the same kind that led the folks to the Taliban in the first place.

It's a very sad situation.

I find it interesting that, at the same time as Afghanistan is still ship without a rudder, Iraq is just going through birth pains. Others think its bad, but, aside from the routine risks and dangers of that area, its their start.

But they were no more ready to start in 2006 than the Afghans are now. Byan Jabr running the death squads, etc...

The plan and action has to match the circumstances.

Bob's World
02-28-2010, 07:41 AM
jcustis:

I came to the conclusion about two months ago that the only viable way forward would be some form of provisional management like Brit provincial governance.

Maybe it is through UN, or NATO, but it has to be, in many areas, not local. Local may come later, but not on schedule.

That is the only effective way to stabilize and improve things consistent with US objective s and schedules.

It means US or foreigners as administrators in many of these places, and not just as advisers, and short-tour passersby. Maybe they can work themselves out of a job later, but not right away.

The rest is just window dressing--pretending that Karzai can do it, or that the US civilians have a plan.

As Rajiv's artcile said, the real power is the drug-dealer-backed police chief. He can bring ruthless justice of the same kind that led the folks to the Taliban in the first place.

It's a very sad situation.

I find it interesting that, at the same time as Afghanistan is still ship without a rudder, Iraq is just going through birth pains. Others think its bad, but, aside from the routine risks and dangers of that area, its their start.

But they were no more ready to start in 2006 than the Afghans are now. Byan Jabr running the death squads, etc...

The plan and action has to match the circumstances.

Marjah doesn't need "fixed" though. We need to resist the urge make things more effective, make things more like us (ok, that's a bit of an oxymoron, but you know what I mean).

All we need to do is enable local solutions. Enable the development of governance that enjoys populace-based legitimacy. To impose "effective Westerners" would be, IMO, a disaster of the highest order. In fact, if I were a Taliban commander I would PRAY that the coalition attempted such a tact, as it would ensure I had a steady supply of rank and file fighters for my unit.

We need some things we are not too good at:
1. Patience
2. Willingness to cede control of outcomes
3. Astuteness to avoid being overly manipulated by the current government.
4. Ability to overcome our fears of what would happen if the current challengers to that government made inroads.

Even flying Karzai appointees in in USMC aircraft makes me cringe...the strategic communications of that are so hard to overcome. Far better to wait until the man could drive in in a small convoy of white hilux's with an ANA or ANP escort. Even better wait until the local siystem of Shuras could apoint their own governor.

General Nick is pushing hard to do the right things in the right ways, but we have the iniertia of good intentions that we must overcome first.

Steve the Planner
03-01-2010, 01:18 AM
Bob:

Right. There are fifty ways to do things.

I just got rung up for my volunteer shift in Haiti (through American Planning Association/UN Habitat). Does that require a westerner, or just a western assistance?

I am sure my UN ground support and framework will be from Nairobi(UN Habitat HQ, or someone (lots of locals) with a compatible face and language), and will be locally inter-connected, along with the links to all the other efforts.

But you can't ask a local administrator who has no budget, cell phone, or bicycle to make any big effects alone.

I have a pick of the Roads Shop outside Samarra from 2008. Not a truck, a backhoe or a stick of furniture left. And lots of Americans pointlessly hammering on the Salah ad Din DG Roads for why he wasn't getting the roads up and running, and making big budget execution goals happen.

So we grabbed folks with helicopters and D-9s to help him get done what he needed done. Adding fun to it, he could not be seen with US mil without getting shot, so we had to do a lot of going-between. But that's one way to solve a particular problem in a particular circumstance.

Every time I show that pic to planners. they say: So that's why everything was all screwed up!

It ain't gonna work if it just can't work. We have a very bold civilian transformation mission in Afghanistan, and a tight schedule.

Patience and duration are the real key, but that doesn't match the mission and schedule.

While Zahir is still ordering tea cups, the time will pass.

For all I know, the refugees from Marjah, some who have ben in Kabul for years, might have kids coming back from Graduate Management School in Switzerland, and are ready to re-build the place (with family opium wealth), if security returns.

So, what's a viable way through that gets somewhere to outr schedule and goals (that isn't a complete waste of effort).

Bob's World
03-01-2010, 04:22 AM
Marjah is not a disaster area, it is part the most affluent region of Afghanistan. It has simply not been under GIROA governance, but has been under the Taliban.

The Coalition was, and will continue to be a great help with the security efforts; but what governing is required there does not in any way justify a preemption of legitmate local authority. Particularlly when one understands the effects such actions have in stregthening the support to the insurgency among the populace.

What we do need to keep an eye to is mititigating to the degree possible actions by the new governance to dip their own fingers into the substantial Poppy profits from the region for personal rather than collective gain; or to "resolve" land disputes by evicting current owners of premium land and replacing them via the "friends and family" program.

To install a Western governance to resolve such land disputes based on the "facts" that could be presented in a hearing would be a PR, and therefore strategic, disaster.

As Jesus said, "Give unto Ceaser, that which is Ceasar's."

To parphrase, "Leave unto the Afghans, that which is Afghan."

Steve the Planner
03-01-2010, 07:52 PM
Bob:

That's the rub.

First, you create security.

Then, return stability.

Which returns the population, which then has to deal with the stability system put in place and get past it to establish some level of self-rule and representation.

If what is coming in in the stability phase is to linked to too many other bad actors, or non-locals, how do the locals get rid of them later?

How does one hand the transition, fast and effective, without a provisional structure that is, on its face, temporary, and allows restoration of post-conflict local engagement that will be sustainable and improved?

If the g.o.b. gobs up the works, the result will not meet the mission objective.

Steve

jcustis
03-01-2010, 08:25 PM
Which returns the population, which then has to deal with the stability system put in place and get past it to establish some level of self-rule and representation.

If what is coming in in the stability phase is to linked to too many other bad actors, or non-locals, how do the locals get rid of them later?

How does one hand the transition, fast and effective, without a provisional structure that is, on its face, temporary, and allows restoration of post-conflict local engagement that will be sustainable and improved?

And therein lies one of the reasons why I scratch my head. Once you've got stability and the population back, so long as essential services are turned back on (were they ever there at all???), does it truly require a local governance component that may turn corrupt and untidy? What if the services came, and the people continued to go on living live as they saw fit.

You see (and I'm using my oustide voice hear again), this goes precisely back to the Sanctuary Denial thread we were kicking around some while ago. Why were the Taliban in Marjeh, and why did the people allow them to dwell among them? Was it coercion/co-option, tribal, familial, or simply "I hear you my brother," support?

Has anyone seen the answer to those questions? Have those questions even been asked. We really need to peel back that layer before we assume that a government in the box is really going to resolve the pure root causes of acceptance of the Taliban. Too often in that corner of the world we continue to assume that the people comply because they are afraid...it ain't always that simple.

Steve the Planner
03-01-2010, 08:37 PM
jcustis:

How do the locals see us? What-if any- problem do they have for which we bring a valuable solution?

Unfortunately, the Taliban was there because they were less ruthless that the Police Chief, and it was a prosperous little poppy-based rural economy that didn't ask for much, or get much.

We brought danger, destruction, and the possible return of the bad guys. Next, we want to bring something of value, instead.

What is it?

Dayuhan
03-02-2010, 03:14 AM
A key challenge for the stabilisation team and Marine commanders will be transforming Zahir, who does not hail from Marjah and knows few people there, into an influential local figure.

That's quite a challenge... I have to wonder how exactly we expect the stabilization team and Marine commanders to "transform" an outsider into an insider. Even more, I have to wonder why we insist on handing our people that sort of challenge in the first place. Is there no way that we could have convinced the Karzai government to appoint someone local, or even to allow a local council of elders to select their own candidate? Do we not have that sort of influence, or are we not using it?


How do the locals see us? What-if any- problem do they have for which we bring a valuable solution?

They probably see us as foreign invaders, conquerors, and occupiers, because - let's not kid ourselves here - that's what we are.

It's likely that they also see our "government in a box" as a bunch of carpetbaggers imposed by Kabul, protected by an occupying army, and intent on governing for their own interests and those of their sponsors. This assessment would also be pretty reasonable under the circumstances.

Possibly I'm overly pessimistic, but I can't say it sounds like a recipe for success.

I notice that our discussions of the acceptability of governance tend to revolve around our own perceptions of what constitutes quality governance, and around the assumption that what we call "good governance" will be accepted regardless of who is doing the governing. What if acceptability is less a function of performance than of source? What if foreign or foreign-sponsored governance is seen as a priori unacceptable, regardless of performance? What is there is a fundamental suspicion of and hostility toward foreign-supported centralized government? People who have never experienced good governance are likely to see central government not as a potential benefactor but as an assumed oppressor. It seems we've decided that we have to counter that perception by imposing central government and demonstrating its benefits, which may not be a task we can actually accomplish. Might it not have been easier to adopt a less Kabul-centric system in the first place?

Again, I may be overly pessimistic, but I suspect that our decision to impose a centralized government may prove to be a major obstacle to accomplishing our objectives in Afghanistan, and that it will not be an easy decision to reverse.

Steve the Planner
03-02-2010, 03:27 AM
Dayahun:

In a nutshell.

Two articles:

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/02/world/asia/02marja.html

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2134199c-2571-11df-9cdb-00144feab49a,s01=1.html

The NYT story points out that VP Khalili, a Hazara, spoke in Dari, to an uncomfortable audience that only half understood him.

The FT article adds:

"Mr Khalili, speaking to a crowd of residents who sat on the ground in a dozen even rows, said the Afghan government would “exhaust all avenues to bring peace and security”.

“We will stay, we will fight with all our forces, we will defend you,” he said. “We will be next to you, shoulder to shoulder.”

But scepticism towards the government runs deep among many Afghans, and many see the police in particular as a corrupt and predatory organisation. Some in Marjah are also angry about the damage to homes and fields caused during the fighting."


So, that big challenge remains. Is this GoB thing going to work if the central gov is just going to send "the regular suspects," and not really get down on the ground and play.

Of course, the big paradox right now is about the poppy crop in the field, which everyone is dependent on for their livel-hood. Are we going to destroy it? If not, are we going to let them market it to the Taliban poppy trade system?

These folks aren't evil drug dealers, just farmers dependent on that crop in the field for their survival. How we deal with that will be the pivot point.

Dayuhan
03-02-2010, 06:15 AM
I've seen the articles, but they don't answer two questions:

First, what kind of decision making process leads to a situation where the US has to expend lives and resources to clear Marjah so the Governor of Helmand can appoint his buddy - who isn't even from Marjah - to run the place? Possibly I'm missing something here, I certainly hope so... but isn't this the kind of crony rule that's likely to undermine everything we're trying to accomplish? Is there nothing that could have been done to at least assure that the local administrator would be from the area, ideally appointed with the approval of the local elders?

Second, would the appointment of an outsider as administrator be acceptable to the populace in any event? I ask because in the tribal society in which I live the chance of an outsider surviving as an externally imposed local administrator would be nil. Even if he had a halo floating over his head, turned water into wine and called down manna from heaven, an outsider appointed to such a position would be tossed out of the province before he got to warm his chair: the people here ask little and expect less of government, but they do insist that they be governed by their own. "Us and them" is a fairly basic human impulse, and I'm wondering to what extent that same expectation applies in a place like Marjah, and whether the appointment of a governor who owes his position to an external patron rather than to the approval of the local populace is not going to compromise the entire effort from the start.


Of course, the big paradox right now is about the poppy crop in the field, which everyone is dependent on for their livel-hood. Are we going to destroy it? If not, are we going to let them market it to the Taliban poppy trade system?

I agree that it would be silly to destroy the crop; it would make more sense to buy it, and to try to convince people to shift to other crops, though those crops would probably be have to be bought at a premium for some time to make the transition sustainable. If growing poppies is more profitable than growing grain or vegetables, people will grow poppies.

The cynic in me guesses that poppy farming will simply carry on as before, with some adjustments in the direction of the cash flow.

Firn
03-02-2010, 08:52 AM
Another article (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/01/world/asia/01marja.html?ref=asia) from the NYTimes.


“They told us, ‘We’ve been at this eight years and we’ve heard a lot of promises,’ ” Colonel Newman said. “From a human standpoint, I can’t say I blame them. Trust is earned, not given. We’ve got to provide.”

Most of the Afghans in the meeting, he added, had been fighting the Marines in recent days.

I also feel that we promised too much and set the bar too high in relation to our efforts.

...


But the bad reputation of the Afghan police forces, in particular, along with the spotty performance of Afghan forces in Marja, suggest that the work and the spending of billions of American dollars to date had not achieved anything like the desired effects.

The Afghans in the meeting with the colonels were blunt. “They said: ‘We’re with you. We want to help you build. We will support you. But if you bring in the cops, we will fight you till death,’ ” Colonel Newman said.

The plan is to bring in the cops; already they are arriving at American-built outposts.

....




And so a complex and difficult strategy was evident on the ground.

Even while the Marines continued securing Marja and its environs, Colonel Newman was ordering a shift to engagement: paying Afghans for damage to their homes and shops; holding meetings with elders to discuss development contracts that can be started quickly; and putting Afghans to work at quick projects, including clearing brush, digging canals and providing gravel to outposts to keep down dust and mud.

Simultaneously, the Marines were signaling that the Afghan police units coming to Marja were not like the past officers, whose arrogance and corruption left behind a reservoir of animosity and disgust. The message was simple: The new police officers are different men; give them a chance to earn your respect.

I really feel for the guys in the fight. It seems that they are trying very hard to do the right things, but also have to stick out thier neck to defend the indefensible (ANP, crony outsiders or Afghan foreigners).

...


The first phase of the campaign for Marja was ending. Captain Karabin had paid aggrieved shop owners $300 to $500 each for their losses to the Afghan Army’s looting.

So began the complicated campaign of engagement. It is a race for Afghan government competence and a contest for respect and for trust, in a place where all are in short supply.

A race in which you have to promise for and rely on people which are not under your control, are also seen as foreigners and often work or better rob for their pockets. :mad:


Firn

Entropy
03-02-2010, 01:42 PM
I shared all the concerns voiced by Dayuhan.

Imagine, for instance, the US federal government came in and appointed a new Mayor for Chicago - some person from Texas. What would his/her chance be of prevailing against the Chicago machine? Yet we expect this strategy to work in Marjeh?

And, for the record, I hate the term "government in a box," which, I think, shows a profound ignorance of what government is. Government isn't some good that can be packaged and delivered.

Firn
03-02-2010, 02:39 PM
I shared all the concerns voiced by Dayuhan.

Imagine, for instance, the US federal government came in and appointed a new Mayor for Chicago - some person from Texas. What would his/her chance be of prevailing against the Chicago machine? Yet we expect this strategy to work in Marjeh?

And, for the record, I hate the term "government in a box," which, I think, shows a profound ignorance of what government is. Government isn't some good that can be packaged and delivered.


In short, if the governance is corrupt and crony, at least let it be a local corrupt and crony one. At least in this case the marines and the West don't have to vouch for robber barons from abroad and get afterwards blamed for doing so. I fear that the Kabul connection will rob this success and fertilize again the ground for the opponents.


Firn

Dayuhan
03-03-2010, 06:05 AM
In short, if the governance is corrupt and crony, at least let it be a local corrupt and crony one.

Absolutely. A certain amount of corruption and cronyism is realistically inevitable. If tne government is local, even more if it's selected by or at least approved by a local shura or similar process, it's a lot harder to blame the outcome on oppressive foreigners from kabul or America.


I fear that the Kabul connection will rob this success and fertilize again the ground for the opponents.


One imagines a Taliban propagandist smiling in anticipation....

jcustis
03-03-2010, 06:42 AM
And, for the record, I hate the term "government in a box," which, I think, shows a profound ignorance of what government is. Government isn't some good that can be packaged and delivered.

You know what? You're right, and expression or not, that is a remarkably stupid way to describe it. :wry:

Firn
03-03-2010, 12:57 PM
One imagines a Taliban propagandist smiling in anticipation....

The tragedy lies in the simple truth that the governmental horse not only refuses to learn to drink, but even milks us instead. Milk beats water, I guess.


Firn

Infanteer
03-03-2010, 03:10 PM
Why were the Taliban in Marjeh, and why did the people allow them to dwell among them? Was it coercion/co-option, tribal, familial, or simply "I hear you my brother," support?

Perhaps the problem is viewing the "Taliban" as something separate from "the people"? Perhaps the Taliban existed in Marjah (and everywhere else) because they are, to any degree, of the people?

Bob's World spoke of two insurgencies - a revolutionary one (Quetta Shura) that views itself as a legitimate replacement for Karzai's government, and a reactionary one which is localized resistance to both foreign forces (to a larger degree) and northern suzerainty (to a lesser degree). Every village has its own "insurgency" for its own reason - police robbed them, ISAF destroyed their fields, mullah preaches a good line about the duties of expelling infidels, airstrike killed some villagers, it's the Pashtun thing to do, etc, etc. In essence, there are hundreds of small, reactionary insurgencies going on at the same time. The overarching revolutionary insurgency is the glue that binds these together. It takes all these grievances and turns them into "The Taliban" and can supply them with some extra horsepower. The best term for this I've seen is a "Pashtun Intifada".

Apply that to Marjah (or Panjwayi, or Arghandab, or Kunar) and you'll probably get your answer of why the Taliban were allowed to exist in the area.

My 2 cents.

Steve the Planner
03-03-2010, 05:21 PM
I could pur salt in the wounds with this latest AP missive on the driug finds, and what to do with them,

http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hwbPJ16R9UZ0fvm5QmNixFsMifEwD9E713G00

But the point is the "Government in a Box" crap, when applied, looks like a profound Achilles Heel. Is it going to be Clear, Hold, Build, or just the regular grass mowing, and come back in two years?

I'm still stuck with this notion that something "provisional" has to be worked out to make the "hold, build" part work to, first, establish effective control, and second, create stabilization, and third, incorporate and transition to local control---rapidly, effectively, and over and over.

Haven't seen that yet.

A Relief news report indicated there were some 4,000 families recorded as refugees from the fighting, waiting to come home---those are the "people" of Marjah. That's maybe 25,000 people. So how do we deal with them?

Dayuhan
03-04-2010, 02:23 AM
The tragedy lies in the simple truth that the governmental horse not only refuses to learn to drink, but even milks us instead. Milk beats water, I guess.


Perhaps the tragedy lies in our belief that we could create a government that would do anything but milk us and manipulate us for the benefit of the individuals who are doing the governing. What did we expect to happen?


And, for the record, I hate the term "government in a box," which, I think, shows a profound ignorance of what government is. Government isn't some good that can be packaged and delivered.

It is a pretty appalling term, even more so because the idea is nothing new... who can forget the prelude to the Iraq war, and all the talk about "installing a democracy"?

As long as we fame our thinking with the assumption that an effective nation, a state, or government can be built, through some sort of arcane engineering method, we're going to keep running up against the same problem over and over again.

jcustis
03-04-2010, 07:19 PM
Perhaps the problem is viewing the "Taliban" as something separate from "the people"? Perhaps the Taliban existed in Marjah (and everywhere else) because they are, to any degree, of the people?

Perfect point. We tend to miss little details like that all the time...

tequila
03-04-2010, 09:36 PM
Nice post, Infanteer - but I'd argue that the situation you describe is not Pashtun specific but covers many insurgencies throughout history. Even the NLF in Vietnam encompassed many non-Communist elements --- the Communists provided the leadership and the organization, but most VC fighters were not Party members and did not aspire to be. Certain religious elements came into play there as well, as sects and groups (e.g. the Hoa Hao) suppressed by the Diem government went over to the NLF.

"Village" insurgencies of this type should not be regarded as really dangerous to the GIRoA, and their "accidental guerillas" are better reconciled than fought. However, I think it's a stretch to identify these groups as the same as the Taliban. They may ally with Taliban fighters to fight ANSF or NATO forces, and ambitious local commanders might transit to the full-time pros, but the vast majority will not leave their own areas and are more interested in local control and security than kicking the foreigners out, much less advancing Mullah Omar to Kabul. These fighters can be flipped or reconciled if local control can be established.

OfTheTroops
03-04-2010, 10:23 PM
Today while listening to the Tipping Point by Gladwell http://books.google.com/books?id=MMlxzMNkE_0C&lpg=PP1&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q=&f=false my hope was rekindled for a second. The insurgency/ counterinsurgency seems to be related to the contagiousness of the message again. Isnt bringing "democratic human rights basd government supposed to catch like the plague and spread like the inkspot? Why is it not? Are we not finding the right "connectors" to spread the hope of our grand experiment or is it too complex to adapt and spread?

Steve the Planner
03-05-2010, 12:54 AM
Are these folks Taliban taliban, or just local folks opposed to the provincial and national government they have seen to date?

You can't "flip" opponents to provincial and national ineffectiveness and corruption by given them that very same thing. You become the enforcer of that which they oppose. (Well discussed on many threads here).

Sp, how does a tailored and successful approach emerge from the post Marjah 3 that is positive and sustainable while the past two Marjah's failed?

What is it that connects, takes root, AND is consistent with our goals?

Gladwellian success processes are driven by things that catch on and add value. No?

OfTheTroops
03-05-2010, 01:06 AM
I am only in the early chapters but he uses examples of hushpuppy shoes, syphillis, "white flight" and Yawning and how they infect and spread their "success"? So they did not have to be value positive. It seems a Republic/democracy should spread as easily as Communism or religious fascism. You just have to infect the right people with it. It seems this type of reasoning led to our cautious optimism for establishing beacons of Democracy.

Bob's World
03-05-2010, 04:29 AM
I am only in the early chapters but he uses examples of hushpuppy shoes, syphillis, "white flight" and Yawning and how they infect and spread their "success"? So they did not have to be value positive. It seems a Republic/democracy should spread as easily as Communism or religious fascism. You just have to infect the right people with it. It seems this type of reasoning led to our cautious optimism for establishing beacons of Democracy.

but not so much for going against the flow.

Ideology is like that canoe, that enable one to go with the flow of where the populace naturally wants to go. But to attemp to employ an "ideology canoe" to go against the natural flow of the populace is not so easy.

So the insurgent (or the UW actor) can simply provide conoes. Offer an ideology that is mere promises. The government/counterinsurgent (or the FID actor) must actually perform. Promises must be matched with action.


You see the same effect in politics. (oops, insurgency IS politics) If times are good, bad leaders get re-elected. If times are bad, good leaders often get voted out in favor of a leader who may not be as good, but who offers the people what they want to hear.

Infanteer
03-05-2010, 02:29 PM
"Village" insurgencies of this type should not be regarded as really dangerous to the GIRoA, and their "accidental guerillas" are better reconciled than fought. However, I think it's a stretch to identify these groups as the same as the Taliban. They may ally with Taliban fighters to fight ANSF or NATO forces, and ambitious local commanders might transit to the full-time pros, but the vast majority will not leave their own areas and are more interested in local control and security than kicking the foreigners out, much less advancing Mullah Omar to Kabul. These fighters can be flipped or reconciled if local control can be established.

Roger, but they are a concern in that as long as they exist, IEDs are emplaced, checkpoints are attacked and locals are coerced. If left unchecked, then they do turn into that force that marched on Kabul in the mid '90s.

As to whether they are Taliban or not, the best description I saw was viewing them as "Subway chains" - independently owned and operated by local entrepreneurs with resources, messaging and an image provided from corporate HQ. A pissed off guy will get his cousins together and shoot at the ANP, calling himself the "Taliban". The mid-level guy will get wind of this, go to these locals, give him some stuff and some guidance and let him run his show. So what if he isn't interested in re-establishing the Emirate right now - if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, it's probably a duck.

I try not to use the word "Taliban" too much when talking with locals. Once, when I asked, I got the young students from a Mosque brought to me. The word still carries it's legitimate religious connotations down here at times. I use the word "insurgent", "stranger", "foreigner" or "enemy" (dushman) based on who I am talking to.

Anyways, I digress - Marjah anyone?

Firn
03-05-2010, 03:07 PM
Roger, but they are a concern in that as long as they exist, IEDs are emplaced, checkpoints are attacked and locals are coerced. If left unchecked, then they do turn into that force that marched on Kabul in the mid '90s.

As to whether they are Taliban or not, the best description I saw was viewing them as "Subway chains" - independently owned and operated by local entrepreneurs with resources, messaging and an image provided from corporate HQ. A pissed off guy will get his cousins together and shoot at the ANP, calling himself the "Taliban". The mid-level guy will get wind of this, go to these locals, give him some stuff and some guidance and let him run his show. So what if he isn't interested in re-establishing the Emirate right now - if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, it's probably a duck.

I try not to use the word "Taliban" too much when talking with locals. Once, when I asked, I got the young students from a Mosque brought to me. The word still carries it's legitimate religious connotations down here at times. I use the word "insurgent", "stranger", "foreigner" or "enemy" (dushman) based on who I am talking to.

Anyways, I digress - Marjah anyone?


Agreed. Sadly there are a lot of things which can and does piss many Afghans off, which the ANP ranking probably high on many lists. The article I quoted stated that many of the people in this meeting played a fair part in the insurgency. I do not know if they really think that they were acting "justly" when confessing that they attacked the ANP and that they will do so again, but chances are they feel this way.

If I would be a villager who has to plant poppy to sustain his family I would be pissed off if some corrupt cop would steal my money to enrich him and his gang of outsiders. Democracy is not very helpful when it brings people (and "foreign" Afghans) into power which do not protect me, allow those gangs to operate or even support them.

When many suffer under this corrupt regime and social, military and political support exists among the population for guys willing to bomb the ANP or shoot at the ANA or the guys supporting them, we have almost ideal conditions for an ideology and organization which, as Infanteer said before, could organize and align those forces in a way which already enabled it to control almost all Afghan territory.


Firn

Steve the Planner
03-06-2010, 04:16 PM
The sad tale of the new mayor's background.

Sounds like "government out of the box"

New Afghan chief in Marjah has criminal record

http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gnpg6zMIpuZeYbHXyrDvfUUfqHAAD9E976HG0

jmm99
03-14-2010, 11:57 AM
As I write, the current feed from the SWJ Blog is Marines Gone Rogue or Leading the Fight? (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=95004#post95004), linking to a 3-page article (interesting read) at the WP, At Afghan outpost, Marines gone rogue or leading the fight against counterinsurgency? (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/13/AR2010031302464.html?hpid=topnews)

Based on the map:

1060

the Marines are securing the western stretch of Highway 1 in the map inset (including Marjah).

Some do not like the Marines' approach:


But the Marines' methods, and their insistence that they be given a degree of autonomy not afforded to U.S. Army units, also have riled many up the chain of command in Kabul and Washington, prompting some to refer to their area of operations in the south as "Marineistan." They regard the expansion in Delaram and beyond as contrary to the population-centric approach embraced by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, and they are seeking to impose more control over the Marines.

The U.S. ambassador in Kabul, Karl W. Eikenberry, recently noted that the international security force in Afghanistan feels as if it comprises 42 nations instead of 41 because the Marines act so independently from other U.S. forces.

"We have better operational coherence with virtually all of our NATO allies than we have with the U.S. Marine Corps," said a senior Obama administration official involved in Afghanistan policy.

All of that reminds me of ca. 45 years ago and comments re: CTZ I in general and USMC CAP in particular.

Comments by the more informed ?

Regards

Mike

Steve the Planner
03-14-2010, 03:37 PM
I believe we are back to the strategies vs. tactics issues for the 41 (or 42) different international parties, each with their own fleeting AO and mission.

If I was told to be west of Kandahar (but not Kandahar), how would I view what is important, where to be, and what to do?

Those no man's lands around delaram/nimruz have importance to the west of Kandahar area as the backstop in the whackamole game about to start with the Kandahar operation.

Somewhere west of Helmand is the limit of Pashtunistan, and the start of Iranistan. So is that a good place to set the western marker?

The Marines know damned well that this is Marjah 3, and know that if they just do what the others have done (go into Helmand until relieved), the results will be the same.

Assuming there is a big picture, how does what they are doing fit into it?

I didn't read anything in that WP article that explained why they are doing what they are doing, or how what they are doing is inconsistent with the mission they were assigned.

It was all just about Kandahar (somebody else's very tough next mission).

The corollary WP article on the increased problems in Kandahar could have been combined to ask whether there was something in what the Marines are doing that could inform and support the build up to Kandahar.

Another article last week criticized the US recent abandonment of Zabul (last year's place of the week). It might have been interesting to compare the Marines' serious commitment not to do that to the west, and for the often "lost-and-found" Helmand province.

These reporters are certainly better at analysis than others, but the scarcity of them, and the limited US press coverage in general, sure leaves a lot to be desired in terms of understanding the strategy.

Steve the Planner
03-14-2010, 04:08 PM
Mike:

From a 1/15/2010 post in "Fixing Intel..." re: Delaram:

"I have a composite map of provinces and districts in Afghanistan and Pakistan which I use to follow events in all these places. The one I use shows the district of Delaram in Farah,with an asterisk that Afghanistan does not formally accept the transfer of Delaram from Nimruz to Farah.

Despite the asterisk, the Census Bureau clearly shows the transfer of the 20,000 residents from Nimruz to Farah four years ago, so somebody accepts it.

Anyway, I wiki-ed the two provinces. For Nimruz, the wiki provincial boundary map includes Delaram in Nimruz, but doesn't list Delaram as one of its districts, nor its component population.

For Farah, it does not show Delaram as one of oits districts or the population of Delaram in its component counts.

Both wiki cites claim to use the 2005 Census, but, probably because the changed circumstance didn't conform with their data transfer, Delaram just disappeared.

Farah/Nimruz, like Uruzgan/Daykundi is one of those places of recent changes. 1970's era maps for Nimruz show it extending up to include Lash-e Juwayn (adjacent to Iran and now a part of Farah), so both provincial boundaries have changed by one hundred miles or more.

When there is not much development/administration going on, these "minor" changes and discrepancies don't seem to matter, but become very important if you want to do something like plan and extend government services.

Particularly, if a place like Delaram, adjacent to Washer and Nad Ali districts in Helmand, is only a short hop (so to speak) from places like Now Zad. Great to have a "hole in the wall" or nonexistent district nearby if you are traveling off-the-record."

So much for wiki-knowledge.

Steve

Firn
03-14-2010, 05:48 PM
It is difficult to comment this without having been there, but...



'Mullahpalooza tour'

The result has been a degree of experimentation and innovation unseen in most other parts of the country. Although they account for half of the Afghan population, women had been avoided by military forces, particularly in the conservative south, because it is regarded as taboo for women to interact with males with whom they are not related. In an effort to reach out to them, the Marines have established "female engagement teams."

Made up principally of female Marines who came to Afghanistan to work in support jobs, the teams accompany combat patrols and seek to sit down with women in villages. Working with female translators, team members answer questions, dispense medical assistance and identify reconstruction needs.

Master Sgt. Julia Watson said the effort has had one major unexpected consequence. "Men have really opened up after they see us helping their wives and sisters," she said.

This seems to be sensible and puts very likely the women in the corps to better use. It is not a new idea, but sometimes just looking around helps and trying hard to do the good stuff helps. I'm pretty sure that it wasn't easy to get this plan going.



The Marines have sought to jump into another void by establishing their own police academy at Camp Leatherneck in Helmand instead of waiting for the U.S. military's national training program to provide recruits. The Marines also are seeking to do something that the military has not been able to do on a national scale: reduce police corruption by accepting only recruits vouched for by tribal elders.

"This is a shame culture," said Terry Walker, a retired Marine drill instructor who helps run the academy. "If they know they are accountable to their elders, they will be less likely to misbehave."

This is an approach with both risks and rewards. In our current situation the potential rewards seem well worth the risks.


Firn

Sylvan
03-28-2010, 07:11 PM
Every 6 months you will see the next great offensive to win in Afghanistan.
In a complete coincidence, every 6 months a new marine force rolls in with a new commander convinced his regiment is going to have the battle that joins ranks with Iwo Jima and Guadacanal.
I remember the battle of Garmshir.
Then the Battle of Nad Ali.
And now the battle of Marjah.
Lots of press, lots of prep, more reporters than taliban. A few casualties and 6 dead Taliban.
6 months later we will have the next great battle.
Yawn.
Regimental offensives are a waste of resources and time
But platoon level patrols and the daily shura with the babas doesn't make for headlines, and certainly doesn't make marine colonels into generals.
Call me jaded.

Jedburgh
05-04-2010, 03:37 PM
ICOS, 3 May 10: Operation Moshtarak: Lessons Learned (http://www.icosgroup.net/documents/operation_moshtarak.pdf)

NATO‟s Operation Moshtarak, launched in February 2010 in Helmand province, was the first deployment after the beginning of the much-debated surge of 30,000 additional US troops. It was billed as the largest military operation since the invasion of 2001. The planning for the operation emphasised the needs of the Afghan people, and the importance of winning hearts and minds as part of a classic counterinsurgency operation. However, the reality on the ground did not match the rhetoric. Welcome improvements in the size and conduct of military operations were undermined by a lack of sufficient corresponding measures in the political and humanitarian campaigns.

This report reviews the local perceptions of the operation from more than 400 Afghan men from Marjah, Lashkar Gah and Kandahar, interviewed by the International Council on Security and Development (ICOS) in March 2010.

Steve the Planner
05-04-2010, 05:25 PM
Jed:

Regrettably, that has been my understanding all along.

If "hearts and minds" is the target in the now-third military effort in Marjah, the proof of concept is not in the 2-3000 stragglers who braved the onslaught to protect their homes or other interests (good or bad), but in the stabilization and sustainability of a secure and functioning Marjah for all of its 28,000 residents, most of whom wisely fled from the predictable dangers.

That is the materially different measure for a successful military tactic or mission, and a viable process that can produce success in the war, as presently defined.

My version remains that some form of effective provisional occupation government (Afghan, UN, ISAF, NATO, US, EU, Swazi, Uighar?) must first be established, with full protection and stabilization as the first goal. Local transfer is secondary, but only after stabilization under provisional occupation.

Obviously, this dumb idea is not on anybody's agenda. So.....

Steve

Bob's World
05-09-2010, 08:46 AM
There are some "armchair snipers" coming out of the woodwork to take shots at operations in Marjah these days. Many of those who are the most quick to criticize are also those who have the least to offer in terms of understanding the nature of insurgency, the nature of the threat in Aghanistan, and the nature of the operational design being implemented by GIROA and the Coalition.

It was well understood going into Marjah that initial operations to create access for GIROA to extend governance to the newly formed District of Marjah would be challenged in many and evolving, ways throughout the summer, particularly as the Poppy harvest concludes and and migrant farm workers are present and available to take on Taliban funded cash work as well. Such is the nature of resistance insurgency and Southern Afghanistan.

Meanwhile the expansion of security and provision of good governance continues to grow very much on schedule with what was expected going in. Bottom line, operations in Marjah are on track and on schedule, and I challenge anyone who thinks otherwise to bring their credentials with them to the table if they feel compelled to take a postion counter to that. They are intitled to their opinions, but opinions are relative.

Meanwhile, focus is shifting to a much more complex problem and environment in Kandahar and the surrounding rural areas. This does not mean that Marjah is over by any means, only that there is much more work to do and as the surge grows the Coalition, the Coalition and Giroa are expanding the areas they are working to influence this summer.

Steve the Planner
05-09-2010, 02:03 PM
Bob:

The issue is: How to define the problem, mission, goal?

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports on May 3, 2010:

http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=89003


"Over the past two weeks about 100 families have left Marjah in Helmand Province, and sought refuge in the provincial capital Lashkargah, according to aid workers.

“People are fleeing from Marjah out of fear and insecurity,” Ahmadullah Ahmadi, president of the Afghan Red Crescent Society (ARCS) office in Helmand, told IRIN.

“The Taliban are harassing people. Their war is not over but has just started,” said Ghulam Farooq Noorzai, provincial director of the refugee affairs department, adding that they were using civilians as human shields in sporadic attacks on Afghan and foreign forces.

Noorzai said his department had registered the return, to the Nad Ali District of Helmand which includes Marjah, of 974 families over the past two months, but that over 2,800 families were still in Lashkargah. "


Marjah is only won when at least 20,000 of its stable population has returned, is functioning in a normal, secure manner (whatever that means).

Any other measure only demonstrates that we can kill the patient to cure the disease, and destabilize others, drive insurgency through tens of thousands of displaced young men with no other future, and wait to see what happens next.

We won the battle for Marjah 3, but "we" can't win the war, either in Marjah, Helmand or Afghanistan if the "price" of victory is so high on the people of Marjah. When does fair, legitimate, and reasonably effective governance accepted by the people get established?

Want to hold a jirga with Marjah residents? Go to Lashkar Gah and Nad Ali (where the majority of Marjah's population have been refugees since February).

It is just starting, and a long way from a measurable result among "the people."

Stability is easily measured by traffic, trade, relatively free movement, tax collection willingly flows to government/community, and an economy no longer solely dependent of COIN/FID handouts (or the Taliban taxes).

When the majority of the population has returned, commerce and civil life has stabilized, and is beginning to develop sustainable self-governance, we should put a thermometer in the patient to judge recovery.

My opinion.

Steve

PS- I knew that Baghdad was returning to some reasonable stability in June 2008, simply by driving around town in an unmarked old Buick watching street life and trade return. Danger was, and remains high, but "stability" (albeit at security levels unacceptable to some) was returned. (This while Mosul, Diyala and many other places were still in open and activity danger.)

What is the corollary measure from Marjah?

Bob's World
05-09-2010, 03:10 PM
Seasons are so important here. If something is a 2 on a scale of 1-10 for violence in February, all things being the same, it is likely to be a 6 or 7 in July. It's not the weather, it is the harvest of Poppy, the availability of unemployed workers and available TB cash, and the nature of resistance insurgency (i.e., they fight us because we are here, and when we "surge", guess what? More of us are here!)

I would simply encourage everyone to not sweat the day to day swings, to understand the natural surge of violence in summer, and to recognize that starting Afghan-style governance from scratch is a slow process. Better measures can be taken beginning in November than now. Everyone in the know, knew it would be a bumpy ride. Now that the ride is bumpy is no reason to get off.

But I do agree, that you don't need a platoon of PhDs to know if you are in an insurgency, just walk down the street and you will know.

JMA
05-09-2010, 03:41 PM
Seasons are so important here. If something is a 2 on a scale of 1-10 for violence in February, all things being the same, it is likely to be a 6 or 7 in July. It's not the weather, it is the harvest of Poppy, the availability of unemployed workers and available TB cash, and the nature of resistance insurgency (i.e., they fight us because we are here, and when we "surge", guess what? More of us are here!)

So who has decided to leave the poppies in the loop? There lies a significant part of the problem.

Bob's World
05-09-2010, 05:06 PM
Poppy decisions belong to GIROA.

But on a fundamental human level, its probably impossible to bring violence AND economic ruin to a man's house, and earn his trust and support at the same time.

Poppy can wait, there are bigger fish to fry in the near term.

MikeF
05-09-2010, 05:17 PM
Poppy decisions belong to GIROA.

But on a fundamental human level, its probably impossible to bring violence AND economic ruin to a man's house, and earn his trust and support at the same time.

Poppy can wait, there are bigger fish to fry in the near term.

What about the illegal taxation and financing of opium by the TB. Do we interdict or is that a serparate issue?

Bob's World
05-09-2010, 05:29 PM
Obviously the Opium pipeline is complex, and it is a multi-billion dollar business that all kinds of fingers are jammed deeply into. This won't be resolved overnight, and it also is neither the cause nor the cure for the insurgency.

We need to set our Puritanical value system on the shelf for a few months and pragmatically focus on what we need to focus on to produce the effects we need to achieve.

Besides, most of the guys who own the crops are share croppers, with the land owners living in the cities. Key is to engage poppy-related targets in a manner that doesn't alianate your target audiance (the populace); and that hinders insurgency. Mostly in going after dope though I think you just mess with the big business drug guys, and who know's what kind of dunghills that could kick open. The TB goes door to door and collects what it needs.

Anyway, I think drugs and corruption both are bad, but also are neither one particularly material to immediate COIN effects. To focus on them is to be distracted from things that are much more important.

MikeF
05-09-2010, 05:48 PM
Obviously the Opium pipeline is complex, and it is a multi-billion dollar business that all kinds of fingers are jammed deeply into. This won't be resolved overnight, and it also is neither the cause nor the cure for the insurgency.

We need to set our Puritanical value system on the shelf for a few months and pragmatically focus on what we need to focus on to produce the effects we need to achieve.

Besides, most of the guys who own the crops are share croppers, with the land owners living in the cities. Key is to engage poppy-related targets in a manner that doesn't alianate your target audiance (the populace); and that hinders insurgency. Mostly in going after dope though I think you just mess with the big business drug guys, and who know's what kind of dunghills that could kick open. The TB goes door to door and collects what it needs.

Anyway, I think drugs and corruption both are bad, but also are neither one particularly material to immediate COIN effects. To focus on them is to be distracted from things that are much more important.

Well said. Is what I put in bold universally understood? It seems to be of big significance.

Jedburgh
05-10-2010, 04:44 PM
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 6 May 2010: The Meaning of Marjah (http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/hearing/20100506/)

BG John Nicholson (http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2010/NicholsonTestimony100506a.pdf)

Frank Ruggiero, Dept of State (http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2010/RuggieroTestimony100506a.pdf)


Recorded Hearing (http://www.senate.gov/fplayers/CommPlayer/commFlashPlayer.cfm?fn=foreign050610&st=5400)

Steve the Planner
05-11-2010, 01:16 AM
Some might not agree with the logic, but it represents much collective wisdom, not inconsistent with a lot of other knowledgeable folks like Dorronsoro:

http://www.kforcegov.com/Services/IS/NightWatch/NightWatch_10000148.aspx


Comment: One BBC commentator described the Taliban statement as "part of a sophisticated propaganda campaign.…" Readers should tire of such blather. The Taliban already have begun to surge attacks in Kandahar. It is not propaganda.

In this they are buoyed by the American and Afghan failure to secure Marjah. It is just too insignificant for the Afghan government to waste its assets on. Old hands knew that about Marjah before the US attack. Its capture was not a centerpiece or a turning point. Whoever said it contained 80,000 people never looked at the satellite imagery.

It was pretty much a waste of time and energy, unless as part of a larger campaign to impose and sustain positive control of Helmand Province. The salient evidence that such a larger plan does not exist is the quick change of focus to Kandahar, a geographically, socially, economically and ethnically different target.

If the maneuver forces cannot stay and cannot be back filled with competent home defense forces, the result of a large scale offensive is no different from the many smaller scale operations in past years. NATO forces can win every battle, but still lose the war and the country.

On the outside looking in, the US command looks muddled. There simply are not enough forces to create a security environment in which nation-building has a chance. The single most important lesson of past counter insurgencies is that no farmer will plant a single seed unless he is confident he will live to see that seed bear fruit. The US and Afghan government cannot provide such a guarantee at this time, but the Taliban can.

davidbfpo
08-08-2010, 10:01 AM
With a sub-title:
Three years after he first travelled to Musa Qala, Nick Meo returns to Afghanistan and finds a town fearful that Nato's war is not going well, and dreading what may happen when they leave.

A lengthy article and some key phrases:
Insurgent control begins just a few miles from the town centre...Many of the attacks are thought to be paid for by drugs barons who flourish in the opium-rich region. Their business thrives when it is lawless and they want the foreign soldiers out.

Corporal Vincent Song, who is based next to the governor's compound, was appalled at the semi-secret meetings taking place there, as ex-Taliban fighters drink tea with the governor. "I don't agree with it at all. These are people who are trying to kill me," said Cpl Song, 21, from Washington, who joined up two years ago to fight terrorism. "So many of my brothers have died here. I hate the thought that the governor is meeting the Taliban."

A man identified to The Sunday Telegraph as a Taliban sympathiser, a mullah who attends meetings called shuras to find out what the marines are saying to the Afghans, insisted that the war would get worse before it got better.
"The police arrest the wrong men when bombs go off, and the foreigners kill innocent civilians," he said. "Then their cousins and friends want revenge and join the insurgency. "More clashes create more war, and the Taliban will not do deals to end the war. They want power again in all of Afghanistan. They have tasted its delights before and they want them again."

Says it all IMHO.:wry:

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/7931823/Afghanistan-despatch-If-Nato-pulls-out-too-early-there-will-be-civil-war-again.html

jcustis
08-08-2010, 07:54 PM
"They have tasted its delights before and they want them again."

...and is important that we take heed as we try to move forward. If the carrot does not produce the results desired, the answer is not always more carrots.

tequila
09-15-2010, 01:44 AM
New America Foundation report on Helmand province (http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/helmand.pdf). Some really interesting stuff on local power dynamics in here. Not an optimistic report at all.

Another one on Zabul and Uruzgan. (http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/zabuluruzgan_0.pdf)

davidbfpo
11-18-2010, 10:25 PM
Hat tip to FRI for this initial report:
Marjah is still being called “the most dangerous place in Afghanistan” by embedded media which is, in my professional opinion, not true. I’ve just returned from a three day trip into Marjah after being lucky enough to catch a ride with the CO of Regimental Combat Team 1, Col Dave Furness who was taking a road trip to visit his battalions in the field. There is too much information from that trip to post in one sitting so the first dispatch from the trip will cover Marjah.

Link:http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=3734

Some of the photos are different, psyops = nails. Look yourself.

The comments and the author's replies are worth a read too.

Jedburgh
01-11-2011, 12:06 PM
ISW, 5 Jan 11: Counterinsurgency in Helmand: Progress and Remaining Challenges (http://www.understandingwar.org/files/Afghanistan_Report_8_web.pdf)

...It has been nearly eighteen months since comprehensive counterinsurgency operations began in southern and central Helmand in July 2009. The progress that has been achieved throughout these areas is notable. The insurgency has suffered important losses in Helmand. USUS, coalition, and Afghan forces have established security in many parts of southern and central Helmand, which has enabled significant portions of the population to assist in supporting Afghan governance. Yet, a number of challenges remain—a reminder that the fight is not yet over.

The progress in southern and central Helmand demonstrates that counterinsurgency can work in Afghanistan if adapted properly for the conditions in each province. This report offers a detailed assessment of counterinsurgency efforts in Helmand province since the summer of 2009. The report analyzes the coalition’s progress along five primary lines of effort: security; Afghan National Security Forces development; counternarcotics; governance; and reconstruction and development....

davidbfpo
03-09-2011, 11:33 PM
Catching up after a gap and KOW recommends a HBO documentary, broadcast 23rd February, made by a British journalist, Ben Anderson:
I watched the HBO documentary, The Battle for Marjah, last night and would recommend anyone interested in Afghanistan to see it. It is a fairly depressing tale. A Marine company is dropped into what appears to be the middle of a field outside Marjah. They quickly attract the attention of local villagers and others, but are unsure of how to act as they can’t distinguish friendlies from insurgents. Exposed and vulnerable from all sides, the Marines are, somewhat predictably, ambushed. They take cover as best they can, fight back and find refuge in a place that might offer a little more protection than the barren field, namely an inhabited house. The original residents are told to go elsewhere and the house is used as a base to hit back at the attackers. Yet the sense of vulnerability is still acute, as the new base is totally surrounded and could easily be breached.

Within a few days of grueling battle, the Marines actually make it into Marjah’s centre where they, having painstakingly ‘cleared’ the area, proceed to ‘hold’ and to ‘build’. The holding and building only last so long though, because the clearing appears to have been less than definitive and the company keeps losing Marines in firefights and explosions – and with it much of the morale generated during the clearing phase. Forced to retreat, and unable to get either the local or central government ‘out of the box’, the progress initially made seems to be unravelling. Despite an apparent lull in violence, the local population is angry at the instability that the offensive has wrought and seem to have preferred Taliban rule, if only for its predictability. The local security forces are too weak to take over and replicate that sense of predictability, so a local militia is recruited. Problematically, this ‘Home Guard’ are not at home at all, but from another region of Afghanistan, and there are signs of distrust and tension, never mind incompetence. Suffice to say that the final step, the ‘transition’ phase cannot proceed as planned. The documentary ends on a very downbeat note, suggesting that all of the Marines’ hard work and sacrifice seems to have produced much less than initially hoped for. Certainly, this offensive did not ‘break the back of the Taliban’, nor was it ‘decisive’ or a ‘turning-point’ in the campaign as promised by heads of state and senior commanders.

The documentary resonates with much of the fairly pessimistic coverage of the Afghan war and is definitely worth watching in full.

The article has a long critique of Tom Ricks too:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2011/02/hbo-on-marjah-bing-west-on-afghanistan/

Link to HBO (not available in the UK alas):http://www.hbo.com/documentaries/the-battle-for-marjah/synopsis.html#/documentaries/the-battle-for-marjah/synopsis.html

Anyone able to comment on the programme? Plus pointers to if it has appeared elsewhere for non-US viewers! Thanks.

Update: this HBO programme appears to be a re-titled edition of a BBC-TV Panorama documentary, which focussed on Sangin, not Marjah (thanks to a JMA posting on the UK in Afg thread and a link to YouTube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6A6AJteEwdg

TDB
06-04-2011, 08:32 AM
Catching up after a gap and KOW recommends a HBO documentary, broadcast 23rd February, made by a British journalist, Ben Anderson:

The article has a long critique of Tom Ricks too:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2011/02/hbo-on-marjah-bing-west-on-afghanistan/

Link to HBO (not available in the UK alas):http://www.hbo.com/documentaries/the-battle-for-marjah/synopsis.html#/documentaries/the-battle-for-marjah/synopsis.html

Anyone able to comment on the programme? Plus pointers to if it has appeared elsewhere for non-US viewers! Thanks.

Update: this HBO programme appears to be a re-titled edition of a BBC-TV Panorama documentary, which focussed on Sangin, not Marjah (thanks to a JMA posting on the UK in Afg thread and a link to YouTube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6A6AJteEwdg

Here's a link to the documentary on the Channel 4 website so U.K residents can wathc it http://www.channel4.com/programmes/dispatches/4od#3142827

jcustis
06-04-2011, 04:41 PM
There is an Afghan in those Free Range International photos who is the most brightly shining example of a man working to help that country. Despite the unmistakable dark skin, he wears a medium reg haircut and is pretty fit (there was speculation among some circles that he had served beside SF teams in the early years of OEF). At first I had a tad bit of difficulty pegging his nationality, and thought he might be from Latin America.

When I first met him, he was supporting Enhanced Mojave Viper exercises as a trainer, controller, and evaluator. I'm not sure whether he was a contractor from our CAOCL, or working some other support requirement, but I typically saw him in the box, headset on, making notes and observing the interactions between Marines and the role players. When the battalion leadership gathered for the final exercise review, he provided a synopsis of our performance across the cultural interaction skills.

He started out speaking in fluent Pashto, and then transitioned to fluent English, where he thanked us for performing well during the exercise, taking up the mission, etc., etc., etc. He also thanked us on the behalf of his people, and implored us to keep an open mind when we got on the ground.

Fast forward seven months to I think Sept 2010, and I ran across him at a Regional Security Shura in Garmsir, where he was serving as Col Furness's linguist. We had a nice chat during a break, and although I cannot recall the everything we talked about, I can definitely remember that his passion for trying to help his country move forward burned just as brightly.

davidbfpo
06-04-2011, 06:31 PM
TDB posted:
Here's a link to the documentary on the Channel 4 website so U.K residents can watch it http://www.channel4.com/programmes/d...es/4od#3142827

Thanks. It is not the Panorama programme I thought it was, but the same reporter, Ben Anderson, working for Channel 4 this time.

TDB
06-05-2011, 08:42 AM
TDB posted:

Thanks. It is not the Panorama programme I thought it was, but the same reporter, Ben Anderson, working for Channel 4 this time.

Ah I clicked the link, saw his face and assumed it was this one. Bravo's Deadly Mission, I was surprised not to see it up for a bafta.

davidbfpo
08-20-2011, 07:42 PM
From my "armchair" a good article by Tim of FRI, maybe very tactical, but has some snippets of note.


The only thing the local people of southern Helmand are concerned about, when it comes to Marines, is that they are going to leave soon. They would much rather see them stay - This is is told to me everywhere I go, and I go just about everywhere in this Province.

Earlier on:
An ANP commander pointed out a village where his men have hit 3 IEDs in as many weeks and each time the villagers poured out with AK’s to start a firefight. So, a few nights later the Marines blow a controlled det on the road to simulate an IED hit and when the villains rushed out with their flame sticks they met what we lovingly call the ‘L shaped ambush’.

Anyway the link:http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=4352#comments

Thread title changed 2nd October 2011 to reflect next post.

davidbfpo
10-02-2011, 10:08 AM
A long BBC report after three weeks being with the USMC, which opens with:
After 10 years in Afghanistan, foreign troops can claim successes in the notorious province of Helmand - but a vicious guerrilla war still rages in the Upper Gereshk valley, which US marines are in the process of handing back to British forces.

Captain Andrew Terrell deployed here with the Royal Marines 40 Commando in 2007 and:
not a lot has changed. The situation is no better. The people here are not fed up with the fighting, they've not reached the limit of what they're willing to accept from the Taliban. It's easier for them to move out of the area and hope it settles down, but they don't look much further than tomorrow.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-14897977

From the tone I'd expect a film report to appear, but nothing is shown on the link.

davidbfpo
01-15-2012, 01:27 PM
When I read this passage I stopped and AFAIK this has not been in the public domain before:
The result was a thankful population and, because “for the Taleban, losing people is not an issue but losing face is very important”, 400 Taleban defectors.

There are other comments on this operation, mainly background on the commanders influence approach:http://www.scotsman.com/news/uk/ministry_of_defence_is_systematically_incompetent_ says_former_general_1_2057051 and http://www.scotsman.com/news/kenny_farquharson_lost_prize_in_fight_for_afghan_h earts_1_1362194

Bill Moore
01-15-2012, 07:21 PM
Tequila, thanks for the link. Found pages 9 and 13 of particular interest, but in the end I think this quote sums it up.


It is best, in Helmand, to look at the situation in terms of normal human motivation, rather than as a clash of ideology, religion, or ethnicity.

However, this may not impact the overall situation in the country. The presence of foreign forces has skewed the debate; in Washington or London, much more attention is given to “strategic interests” and “global terrorism” than to local grievances and concerns.

davidbfpo
01-18-2012, 12:20 PM
I'll echo Bill's comment and thanks to Tequila. I'd missed the NAF report on Helmand and wonder if anything has changed since September 2010, in Helmand for the locals.

Citing Bill now and if we had concentrated on:
local grievances and concerns and the principle of reducing harm to the locals, would we have achieved our objectives in Helmand and Afghanistan?

I know we have attempted to look back at Iraq in the past, then looked around at other conflicts, both active and potential. If we adapted the principles of local issues first and reducing harm to the local populace would that satisfy our strategic objectives?

Or returning to the Imperial practice in the ungoverned spaces of punitive action and leaving promptly having delivered a message.

Ken White
01-18-2012, 11:12 PM
Or returning to the Imperial practice in the ungoverned spaces of punitive action and leaving promptly having delivered a message.However, properly conducted that was, is and can be very effective far more times than not...

davidbfpo
03-03-2013, 02:45 PM
A short NYT article on the declining USMC presence and their replacement by:
the Afghan National Army has grown, to almost four brigades with more than 16,000 soldiers...

Link:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/03/world/asia/marines-quit-afghan-province-feeling-the-war-was-worth-it.html?pagewanted=2&smid=tw-share&pagewanted=all

As a DoS veteran of Afghanistan remarked this week:
Helmand Province only has 3% of the population, why the UK & USA made such a large commitment there is not easy to understand.

former_0302
03-04-2013, 02:04 AM
A short NYT article on the declining USMC presence and their replacement by:

As a DoS veteran of Afghanistan remarked this week:

As a matter of pure conjecture, I'd guess it was because the Marine Corps wanted into Afghan, and the Army said something along the lines of "Great--we already own all this battlespace, and we're not giving it up, and we don't really want you around us, so where can we send you? Hey, the British could use some help in Helmand!" Or something to that effect.

Bill Moore
03-04-2013, 02:53 AM
There was another post on the blog a few months ago that explained our leadership wanted the Marines to secure the population in Kandahar, but the Marines chose not to follow this order/advice(?) and struck out on their own into Helmand. One can speculate all day on why they did this. Did their leadership want a mission that had a higher probability of success, so they could support the never squeaking Marine propaganda wheel (look at our success)? Did they believe they could better secure Kandahar by securing the routes into Kandahar? Who knows, but it seems incredible if true they decided to follow their own strategy. We keep talking about the value of whole of government, coalition operations, but we need to get our joint operations straight first.

Seems every nation, every service, SOF, and each government agency is to a large degree pursuing their own strategy. While this won't generate synergy, it may quite by accident overwhelm the Taliban by confusing the hell of them.

former_0302
03-04-2013, 08:46 AM
There was another post on the blog a few months ago that explained our leadership wanted the Marines to secure the population in Kandahar, but the Marines chose not to follow this order/advice(?) and struck out on their own into Helmand. One can speculate all day on why they did this. Did their leadership want a mission that had a higher probability of success, so they could support the never squeaking Marine propaganda wheel (look at our success)? Did they believe they could better secure Kandahar by securing the routes into Kandahar? Who knows, but it seems incredible if true they decided to follow their own strategy. We keep talking about the value of whole of government, coalition operations, but we need to get our joint operations straight first.

Seems every nation, every service, SOF, and each government agency is to a large degree pursuing their own strategy. While this won't generate synergy, it may quite by accident overwhelm the Taliban by confusing the hell of them.

I can't vouch for your first point, nor argue with your second. However, having been to both Iraq and Afghanistan with USMC units, and having seen very few soldiers in either theater, I'd submit that if your first point is true, the reason for it is probably related to why Anbar was mostly Marine territory in Iraq as well.

carl
03-04-2013, 02:48 PM
In one of the books I read about Helmand, I think "Little America", it said the reason the Marines went into Helmand was because their leadership wanted place where the large number of Marines going would all be under Marine control. Helmand was the the only place available that was empty enough of other US forces whereby they could do that. Which is what former_0302 said.

And it further illustrates Bill's point that unified command is something we can't do at all. I thought unified command was the bedrock of small war fighting and if you didn't have unified command you were wasting your time? That is one thing all those much maligned small wars theorists said. But we never did it. For that matter unified command is vital in big war fighting too. I hope we remember how to do it before we get beat in the next big war.

davidbfpo
03-04-2013, 07:21 PM
I too have read explanations for the USMC deployment to Helmand, politely but firmly pushing the UK & partners aside.

Yes, unity of command - even within the US military - appears to be lacking. What our enemies made of this and the ANSF is a moot point.

What I do not understand is why first the UK, then the USA decided Helmand Province was more important than Kandahar Province. Helmand has only 3% of the Afghan population. Yes the Canadians had a small battle group there and much later, I suspect in the surge, a Stryker Brigade went there.

jcustis
03-18-2014, 10:16 PM
A little late David, but Helmand produced something on the order of 25% of illicit drugs coming out of AFG.

davidbfpo
03-19-2014, 12:24 AM
A little late David, but Helmand produced something on the order of 25% of illicit drugs coming out of AFG.

Jon,

Poppy growing was not cited as a reason for the 2006 decision to send UK troops to Helmand, which was intensely political. The UK IIRC was in fact given the 'lead' responsibility for drugs in the whole country when tasks were shared out years before. I may have added posts on this on the UK in Afghanistan thread.

On another thread there are posts on open source reporting of poppy production, which went up in Helmand - although I cannot recall when this increase happened.

Understandably the UK in Helmand did not seriously pursue poppy production, which would have added to the insurgency and as events in 2006 proved it was quite easy to mobilise against an intruder - even if with a GIRoA label.
Not every UK element agreed with this "hands off" stance and some destroyed the poppy product (name lost).

davidbfpo
11-12-2014, 03:13 PM
Maybe the final operational post on this episode in USMC history. I cite a WaPo article on the logistics of exiting. Here is one thing left behind (as did the UK):
The Marines decided to leave 420,000 bottles of water, which if lined up end to end would stretch for more than 50 miles.

Link:http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/marine-pullout-offers-preview-of-what-us-leaves-behind-for-afghan-troops/2014/11/10/e1e53c00-636c-11e4-bb14-4cfea1e742d5_story.html?

I do wonder if anything was moved overland to Karachi (which is subject of a thread on OEF logistics).