Afghan National Army update [Archive]

Ron Humphrey

05-09-2008, 05:37 PM

Stumbled upon this (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JE09Df01.html) earlier today. On the mark, though much has improved since my 2003-2004 ANA experience. Interesting to note that the ANA STILL cannot unilaterally funciton in terms of CAS and log support, though I understand that some progress has been made toward an independant Afghan rotory wing aviation contingent.

where the author suggests that the ANA need to be tested soon. Although they are being tested on a daily basis to place them in a situation right now which demanded they stand alone against AQ and the other groups would probably be a bad idea and might just be what they would hope for.

Unlike Iraq the Afghans have not had 30+ years of established military experience as a group in whatever form that may have been. They are literally building ground up a military designed to do much more than any of their parts have done in recent memory.

The Taliban however have been a governing military recently and despite the fact that they were such a bad one doesn't change the comparison. I'm afraid if we try to push too hard with the ANA we run the risk of a much longer possibly insurmountable setback for them which would cost more than any small scale successful efforts might be worth right now.

Now recognizing that there are probably factors or facts that I'm unaware of are there any thoughts on whether this might be the case or not.

Anthony Hoh

05-10-2008, 10:40 AM

Now recognizing that there are probably factors or facts that I'm unaware of are there any thoughts on whether this might be the case or not.

Ron,
I think its time to let the ANA work more independently. "We" are doing things that unintentionally stifle the growth of the ANA. For example, it is common knowledge that the ANA are challenged logistically. However the process of "Afghanization" is fuzzy when it comes to fixing logistics. It has led two key players in Afghan assistance (CSTC-A and ISAF) into a true dichotomy. CSTC-A is focused on raising an independent self sustaining ANA/ANSF. ISAF in its process of Afghanization rightfully does missions jointly with the ANA. However this creates a problem, ISAF cant always wait for the ANA to get fuel, ammo, etc... because of issues with the ANA supply system. So ISAF "gifts" mission essential items to the ANA. Now CSTC-A is trying to coach, teach, mentor the ANA to make their supply system work. However, thier supply system never has to work, because ISAF is willing to gift supplies to get the job done. I ask you, if you were the Afghan commander on the ground how would you think resupply worked? You order it through your supply chain, or when I really need something the foreigners give it to you?

The ANA will never grow until we back out and let them learn it the hard way. You cant give an Army the hard lessons of poor logistics, it has to be discovered. I treasure the tactical experience of my Afghan counterparts, on the ground they can slug it out with the best of them. However when it comes to logistics for the ANA tough love is good love, and IMO the ANA are not getting enough of it.

In Service,
arh

Tom Odom

05-10-2008, 02:07 PM

Ron,
I think its time to let the ANA work more independently. "We" are doing things that unintentionally stifle the growth of the ANA. For example, it is common knowledge that the ANA are challenged logistically. However the process of "Afghanization" is fuzzy when it comes to fixing logistics. It has led two key players in Afghan assistance (CSTC-A and ISAF) into a true dichotomy. CSTC-A is focused on raising an independent self sustaining ANA/ANSF. ISAF in its process of Afghanization rightfully does missions jointly with the ANA. However this creates a problem, ISAF cant always wait for the ANA to get fuel, ammo, etc... because of issues with the ANA supply system. So ISAF "gifts" mission essential items to the ANA. Now CSTC-A is trying to coach, teach, mentor the ANA to make their supply system work. However, thier supply system never has to work, because ISAF is willing to gift supplies to get the job done. I ask you, if you were the Afghan commander on the ground how would you think resupply worked? You order it through your supply chain, or when I really need something the foreigners give it to you?

The ANA will never grow until we back out and let them learn it the hard way. You cant give an Army the hard lessons of poor logistics, it has to be discovered. I treasure the tactical experience of my Afghan counterparts, on the ground they can slug it out with the best of them. However when it comes to logistics for the ANA tough love is good love, and IMO the ANA are not getting enough of it.

In Service,
arh

Tony,

Great post. Continual problem with any kind of assistance. Have to let the recipent skin their knees as they learn to walk and then hopefully run

Best

Tom

Ron Humphrey

05-10-2008, 09:36 PM

Ron,
I think its time to let the ANA work more independently. "We" are doing things that unintentionally stifle the growth of the ANA. For example, it is common knowledge that the ANA are challenged logistically. However the process of "Afghanization" is fuzzy when it comes to fixing logistics. It has led two key players in Afghan assistance (CSTC-A and ISAF) into a true dichotomy. CSTC-A is focused on raising an independent self sustaining ANA/ANSF. ISAF in its process of Afghanization rightfully does missions jointly with the ANA. However this creates a problem, ISAF cant always wait for the ANA to get fuel, ammo, etc... because of issues with the ANA supply system. So ISAF "gifts" mission essential items to the ANA. Now CSTC-A is trying to coach, teach, mentor the ANA to make their supply system work. However, thier supply system never has to work, because ISAF is willing to gift supplies to get the job done. I ask you, if you were the Afghan commander on the ground how would you think resupply worked? You order it through your supply chain, or when I really need something the foreigners give it to you?

The ANA will never grow until we back out and let them learn it the hard way. You cant give an Army the hard lessons of poor logistics, it has to be discovered. I treasure the tactical experience of my Afghan counterparts, on the ground they can slug it out with the best of them. However when it comes to logistics for the ANA tough love is good love, and IMO the ANA are not getting enough of it.

In Service,
arh

I understand what your saying and agree in large part , I guess my greatest concern is how we determine what the best way is to let them skin their knees without getting them cutoff, or amputated because they didn't know how to clean the wound correctly. I hope you get where I'm coming from. (it may be a bad analogy)

Thanks for everything you do and keep up the good work.

negotiator6

05-11-2008, 05:58 PM

Date: March through August 2003
Place: Gardez, Paktia Province, Afghanistan (with travel throughout Khwost & Ghazni Provinces)

At that time, the ANA was just in the process of standing up. There was a compound for training between the OGA and US Army PRT compound..some of you know the area.

The problems at that time was "tribal"...which seems to be a non-unifing entity both in Afghanistan, Iraq and having just returned from Southern Sudan with the Sudan People's Liberation Army/SPLA..a common thread of systemic challenges, that being "tribalism".

That said, and back to the issue of the ANA..If the soldiers who represent the ANA identify with a united Afghanistan and its government, be it evolving everyday..then perhaps the ANA can be a unifing force against radical Sunni Islam represented by the Taliban.

On the other hand, if the ANA represents factions of tribal members who identify with their tribe..by language, custom and religion, then the idea of a united ANA with a common enemy will be a "bridge too far.."

The current focus on small company size commando type units who can move, shoot and communicate without too much coalition assistance...who know the terrain..who know the enemy will provide perhaps a better opportunity to defeat the enemy based on the phrase.."no thy enemy better than I know myself.."

Salaam/RH

Jedburgh

06-30-2008, 01:08 PM

27 Jun 08: United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces (http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/United_States_Plan_for_Sustaining_the_Afghanistan_ National_Security_Forces_1231.pdf)
....Despite achievements in Afghanistan, security threats and corruption remain major impediments to overall development. The security environment continues to be fluid, demanding continual reexamination and assessment of requirements. The 2001 Bonn Agreement established the goal of a 50,000-person ANA and a 62,000-person ANP. The Bonn II Agreement in December of 2002 expanded the ANA target end-strength to 70,000 personnel. Since the Bonn Agreements and the international declaration of the Afghanistan Compact in 2006, security conditions have evolved, with a resurgence of activity by insurgents and anti-government elements. Consequently, in May 2007, the international community’s Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) approved an increase to 82,000 authorized ANP. Similarly, with the endorsement of the JCMB on February 5, 2008, the authorized ANA force structure increased to 80,000 personnel, with an additional 6,000 allotted for the trainee, transient, hospital, and student account.

The long-term ANSF posture potentially may include a more robust Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC) capability and a larger army. Additional analysis, study, and consideration must be given to the security environment, sustainability of the force, and available financial support for such efforts.....

Jedburgh

12-13-2008, 12:42 AM

CSIS, 7 Jan 09: Winning in Afghanistan: Creating Effective Afghan Security Forces (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090106_ansf.pdf)
....any effective counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan must build up strong Afghan security forces, and the use them to both defeat the enemy and create the level of security that is a critical prerequisite for governance and development. So far, however, this effort lags badly behind the need.

It has been badly mismanaged and underfunded in the past, and many of the lessons of Iraq and other recent wars were ignored. Seven years after the invasion of Afghanistan, neither the Afghan National Army (ANA) or Police (ANP) force is capable of standing on its own. Afghan military forces are still reliant upon NATO forces for leadership, logistics, and air support in combat. The development of the ANA and ANP continues to be severely under-resourced both in terms of advisors and funds.

While the ANA is more capable than the ANP, both must improve dramatically before they can take the lead in Afghan security and it is far from clear that such progress can be made in time to avoid a major further deterioration in the security situation.....

Rex Brynen

12-19-2008, 12:59 AM

An interesting post recently over at Afghanistan Shrugged (http://afghanistanshrugged.com/2008/12/17/illum-ilum-where-for-art-thou.aspx), on both the perils of centralized/remote battlespace control and (US) command attitudes to the ANA, from an ETT Team Chief.

This is a habitual problem here. US commanders conducting massively centralized operations, not giving the guys on the ground the freedom of maneuver. To prevent a house from maybe being hit by an 8 pound canister we let four guys who have been shooting rockets at us get away, to fight another day . This makes no sense.

In addition these US commanders treat the ANA like disposable heroes and idiots. Can you even imagine some foreign commander telling your local poilce and army what they can and can not do. Battlespace owner does not make them the Lord Govenor of Afghanistan.

More at the link above.

Ken White

12-19-2008, 01:34 AM

reed11b

12-19-2008, 05:54 AM

to the norm and we do not normally micromanage like that.

I really would like to say that.

Unfortunately, right now I'm too disgusted at the fact we never learn and we kill people unnecessarily through arrant stupidity like that to say much of anything.

We used to be able to just turn off the radio and ignore them and I've done that numerous times. Now, with the eye in the sky, the troops are screwed and the rear area staffs win...

Sad. Really, really sad.

While I have not been high enough in the command structure to speak from personal experience, my scanning of military writing supports what you say Ken, and possibly more relevant in this case, it is also one of the BIG mistakes the Soviets made in there misadventures in Afghanistan. Makes me think that you are correct in your assertion that it all comes down to training and HR policies for promotion and retention. Perhaps someday...
Reed

Old Eagle

12-19-2008, 01:34 PM

We're not talking about a U.S. unit 100 miles away micromanaging a subordinate unit, they were in effect jerking the ANA bn. The sooner that the ANA can get its own enablers, the better. Then get them used to using their own stuff rather than being dependent on our temporary, high-tech stuff.

Illum, for God's sake!

Rob Thornton

12-19-2008, 04:25 PM

You know - given some of the distances - even parachute flares, 203 illum and hand held 57 or 60mm illum would have been helpful. If we are not going to provide enablers to our partners, then we have some choices to make:

1) do it all ourselves, and delay their development while generating further risk
2) let our partners twist, lose faith and trust in us and generate further risk
3) accept some risk and provide some enablers for the our partner
4) do as OE said and provide them with some enablers - either by introducing it into their system, providng them the materiel and training, or a combination of both.

1 & 2 are non-starters. While the clear CMD guidance needs to come from on high, the 06 and 05 are key implementers to seeing it through. A combination of 3 & 4, with the goal of seeing it institutionalized in their systems seems to be the way to go.

A good blog, I hope Vampire 06 keeps it up.

Best, Rob

Ken White

12-19-2008, 04:43 PM

the ANA has or we are giving them some 60s. That was my first thought. They will ignore risk averse US Commanders desires.

The second and more scary thought was that a distant TOC could or WOULD curtail locally planned and called for Illlum. That is totally scary. It's borderline criminal IMO.

Delegate indeed. Trust your subordinates. Way to build loyalty and competence...

The link Rex provided also highlights another issue that my son surfaced after his last trip to Afghanistan; treatment of the ANA by higher US Hq. The US troops that go out with the ANA on the ground work well and get along with them -- Bn and higher too often and obviously with some exceptions seem to ignore their existence and / or don't treat them very well. How to win friends and influence people...

Sad on many counts.

jkm_101_fso

12-19-2008, 05:09 PM

the ANA has or we are giving them some 60s. That was my first thought. They will ignore risk averse US Commanders desires.

Insha'llah

The second and more scary thought was that a distant TOC could or WOULD curtail locally planned and called for Illlum. That is totally scary. It's borderline criminal IMO.

Believe it. I had it happen to me in Iraq many times. It all depends on who it's for and why. In '06, my MiTT had two M119s (plus crews) attached on our little patrol base, a long, long way from any flagpoles. The IA we supported asked for fires often. This is what I found, trying to clear said fires:

US, TIC=No problem; US, non-TIC=Req. Clearance. IA TIC=Maybe. IA, non-TIC=Grab a Snickers.

Of course, this was a few years ago.

BL, If illum CFF was for CF, usually was a go. If it was for IA...not so much.
I won't even go into what it took to fire HE.

I've heard the you-might-hit-a-house-with-a-canister line before, too. Very often, actually. I just lied and sent up a different grid, DF & QE to BDE. No one knew but me, and the extremely grateful Iraqi Army Soldiers that could now see who was emplacing the IED/who shot at them. I figured if I accidently destroyed a house with a canister (which is unlikely), the angry Iraqi would come see me anyway, since my MiTT were the only Americans within 100 miles of them. And if I accidently hurt/killed somebody with a cansiter, I would have dealt with the consequences. I took my chances...seriously, what are the odds?

The link Rex provided also highlights another issue that my son surfaced after his last trip to Afghanistan; treatment of the ANA by higher US Hq. The US troops that go out with the ANA on the ground work well and get along with them -- Bn and higher too often and obviously with some exceptions seem to ignore their existence and / or don't treat them very well. How to win friends and influence people...

Sad on many counts.

Arrrggghhh.:mad:

Ken White

12-19-2008, 05:18 PM

...I've heard the you-might-hit-a-house-with-a-canister line before, too. Very often, actually. I just lied and sent up a different grid, DF & QE to BDE. No one knew but me, and the extremely grateful Iraqi Army Soldiers that could now see who was emplacing the IED/who shot at them. I figured if I accidently destroyed a house with a canister (which is unlikely), the angry Iraqi would come see me anyway, since my MiTT were the only Americans within 100 miles of them. And if I accidently hurt/killed somebody with a cansiter, I would have dealt with the consequences. I took my chances...seriously, what are the odds?Good for you! That's precisely why you get paid more money than SFC Phukaboski does... :D

Unfortunately, unless there's been a change in the Basic Courses since I was around, I suspect that a great deal of effort goes into discouraging that kind of judgmental call. :mad:

We ought to be encouraging it. Then hopefully, when some folks get to LTC, they won't make overly cautious decisions about things they shouldn't even be involved with. In fairness, obviously, the LTCs wouldn't be behaving that way unless people above them were micromanaging...

Stupidity flows down hill... :(

Entropy

12-19-2008, 06:30 PM

Afghanistan Shrugged is definitely one of my favorite blogs now.

It's interesting and entirely predictable that ISR has become a micromanagement tool. It's too bad. How much longer until we have this:

http://colonialmarines.wikispaces.com/space/showimage/t.jpg

Tom Odom

12-19-2008, 06:40 PM

GORMAN (http://www.dailyscript.com/scripts/Aliens_James_Cameron_May_28_1985_first_draft.html)

Shit.(into mike)
Apone, collect magazines from everybody. We can't have any firing in there.

Whaddaya mean "we" paleface?

Rex Brynen

12-19-2008, 06:47 PM

Off topic, but damn I love that movie.

Entropy

12-19-2008, 09:12 PM

Off topic, but damn I love that movie.

Me too!

Bob's World

01-03-2009, 12:11 PM

Here is the question that makes me scratch my head about what we are doing in regards to the ANA:

1. Given that the Afghan militia/populace has a long history of being able to defeat any conventional army that invades their territory;

2. The current threat in the country, based on that same militia/populace, has been able to defeat or frustrate the two greatest conventional armies of recent times;

3. Why are we trying to build a second string version of such a conventional capability to use against that threat when history proves such a force cannot prevail?

It just seems to me, that if the militias of the Northern Alliance supported by a few SF and Combat Controllers and the USAF could handle the Taliban, that we would be better served by reinforcing that proven militia system, supplementing with advisors and air support as needed.

I ask this as much talk of "surging" in Afghanistan fills the media. Seems to me the smarter tact would be a massive reduction of forces, and let the Afghans get back to being Afghans. (and letting our efforts to take down Bin Laden's gang go back into the shadows where they can continue their girm, and quiet business of avenging the attacks of 9/11 and shutting down his his ability to wage UW to incite the populaces of the middle east).

Ski

01-03-2009, 12:55 PM

It's the age old blunder of mirror-imaging, Bob.

We did with the South Vietnamese Army, and we are doing it again with the ANA. We think that if we can just build their Army to look like ours, and if they can train just like ours, then we will have succeeded.

Of course, we will have failed, because as soon as we leave, all the fancy new equipment, spiffy new training, and the sweet new uniforms are going to be forgotten about. Except for the equipment, that will be used until it is no longer serviceable.

Bill Moore

01-03-2009, 05:28 PM

Posted by BW, Why are we trying to build a second string version of such a conventional capability to use against that threat when history proves such a force cannot prevail?

You have a brother in arms on this topic. Long before 9/11 I was bemused at our efforts to force our doctrine and TTP upon the foreign security forces we were training. There are several factors that contribute to this:

- Arrogance to the extreme

- Inability or unwillingness to study, analyze, discuss host nation's security force culture and how it drives their organization, doctrine, and TTP. (Radical changes usually don't work, you have to find ways to gradually tweek their ways of doing business).

- Even our Special Forces are too conventional as supported by LTG Boykin in his relatively new book, "Never Surrender", thus the reason they had to form new special operations units. SF has been conventionalized since the early 80s due to its leadership embracing everything army from standards, to tactics, to training management, whether it was applicable or not, we just couldn't quite break out of the big army one size fits all mold. There is much to be said about creating a new OSS like service, but like most things it is easy to talk about, very, very hard to do.

- We tend to blindly assume our doctrine is the best (goes back to arrogance) for any type of threat. Yet it has been demonstrated again and again that our doctrine is not the end all, be all, to winning irregular fights. Sometimes I think we're pushing snake oil on our friends.

Bemusement aside, how do we change our military culture to fix this problem? From an economic point of view if we did fix it we could potentially save billions of dollars and make a greater impact. Since SOCOM is working on the Security Force Assistance Doctrine maybe this issue should be addressed:

- How to assess host nations Security Force needs.

- How to collaboratively (with HN) develop a program of instruction that is culturally acceptable. (Some of their doctrine and TTP may be seriously flawed, but you don't address that by telling them to do it our way, they must come to that realization on their own, helped along by the constant mentoring of their advisors. What did you do? What did the enemy do? How can we do better? Sketch it out on paper or in the dirt (don't make a stinking power point slide), then when they are ready show how we might approach it).

Advising takes patience, a lot of patience, and a lot of give and take. You should be learning as much, if not more, than the troops you are working with. We will not improve our capacity to effectively train, advise and assist by simply producing more (industrial era mindset) advisors.

Ken White

01-03-2009, 06:12 PM

100% agree. I really think that ought to be a Blog entry.

Ski and Bob's World are also correct..

Sad.

Bill Moore

01-03-2009, 08:28 PM

Ken,

Good point, but I need to flush it out. Bill

Entropy

01-03-2009, 10:48 PM

3. Why are we trying to build a second string version of such a conventional capability to use against that threat when history proves such a force cannot prevail?

It just seems to me, that if the militias of the Northern Alliance supported by a few SF and Combat Controllers and the USAF could handle the Taliban, that we would be better served by reinforcing that proven militia system, supplementing with advisors and air support as needed.

Those are good questions and speak to how much things have changed since 2001 and the original invasion. Here's a recap of some of the history for why we're where we are today:

The Taliban in the 1990's grew in popularity and hence power and influence, in no small measure because of the chaos and perpetual warfare that was caused (in many Afghani eyes) by the warlordism following the collapse of the Soviet withdrawal. Even though most Afghans, even the Pashtuns, thought the Taliban were way too extreme, at least they enforced the peace, were relatively uncorrupt, and ended the Warlord's abuse and dominance of the populace.

Fast forward to 2001 - we allied with many of these same warlords to defeat the Taliban, but we were quite cognizant of the Afghan concern about a return to the bad old warlord days. We worked hard to keep them on a short lease and one of the first priorities after the Taliban defeat was the demobilization of these private Armies. The DDR effort was viewed as a critical component to keeping the Taliban from returning since it was believed all those private armies would return to their old, internecine warfare which would provide the fertile ground for the Taliban's rebirth, just as it did in the 1990's. We were also very aware that these warlords held few loyalties to anyone and that AQ could use it's influence and money to buy favor with some, at least temporarily. Anyway, the DDR efforts is where most of the resources for Afghanistan went in those first couple of years and was quite successful (and necessary, in my view).

So what then? We understood that DDR would create several problems. First is the thousands of MAM's who used to fight for a living and grew up depending on warlord patronage. What to do with them in a nation with no infrastructure, economy or work? The second problem was the very real need to develop some kind of security and police forces since literally none existed and bad things tend to happen with a power or security vacuum. To solve those two problems we took the most obvious choice (to us) which was to channel much of that manpower into a national Army and Police force. Needless to say, the first iteration didn't work very well. Meanwhile, the Taliban were planning their comeback in the central mountains north of Kandahar and over the border in Pakistan. Those early failures at creating security forces combined with insufficient coalition forces to provide adequate security, greatly aided the Taliban return because there was a power vacuum in many parts of the country (and again, part of the decision to maintain a limited footprint in Afghanistan wasn't unsound - planners were worried about appearing like another Soviet invasion and were cognizant of the general Afghan distrust of foreign powers). Once the Taliban got its legs back after the kick-in-the-face it got in 2001-2002, it expanded into those very rural ungoverned areas until about 2006 when it was able to make bigger moves.

Anyway, that is a VERY rough and loose telling of what happened, but I hope it's clear enough. With 20/20 hindsight we might have been better served by putting resources into, and strengthening, the tribal networks and local leadership which had suffered under both the Taliban and AQ, instead of attempting to convert the warlord armies into a national army/police force. I say "might" because that would have been a huge challenge given our complete lack of knowledge about local power structures. We did, finally, begin doing some of that work a few years ago in some areas but it was (and still is) under-resourced and too little, too late. We also made mistakes through complete ignorance of the local tribal power structures and ended up caught in the middle of age-old local conflicts which created enemies we didn't need to create.

So the "helping the tribes" alternative might have been better than what we actually did, but in the end, even with 20/20 hindsight, I don't see any easy solutions to the problems we faced after the invasion.

Like you, I do not have a warm-and-fuzzy about the entire enterprise of building centralized political and military structures in Afghanistan - I can't think of anyplace where this strategy would be more difficult, except maybe parts of Africa (a continent I'm way too ignorant on). So I don't hold much hope our efforts will succeed in the way that we hope and intend. With US support, the Afghan government can muddle along, but once that is gone it will probably be back to same-as-it-ever-was Afghanistan.

Hopefully, if we are smart, we will realize this likelihood (or at least the possibility) and take measures to hedge against this future to both soften the blow and to provide for continued US influence and protection of US interests. Foresight in South Asia hasn't exactly been an strong point for America, so I will remain as cynical as ever. But I'm just an intel weenie, so I should probably keep my mouth shut about policy.

jmm99

01-03-2009, 11:15 PM

....and letting our efforts to take down Bin Laden's gang go back into the shadows where they can continue their girm, and quiet business of avenging the attacks of 9/11 and shutting down his his ability to wage UW to incite the populaces of the middle east

although I expect many novenas to St. Jude will be necessary to see that plan become practice.

PS: Bill Moore - did you mean "flesh out" (the post), rather than "flush out" ? No need to respond - I think I'm getting a bit punchy.

Ken White

01-03-2009, 11:18 PM

While I agree with you and with Bob's World on the possibility of major failure of a future Afghan government and its institutions and with the description of the path that got us where we are today -- and decry the effort to build an Army like our own to the maximum possible extent that is in fact not only ego but ignorance driven (most of the US Army knows very little about how other Armies are organized or train; too many do not care...), I think we all should recall the diplomatic effort that brough NATO to Afghanistan -- a very good diplomatic coup for us.

Good diplomatically but bad militarily for unity of command, overall flexibility and decision making reasons -- since NATO nations are helping with the training and equipping, I suspect that decision also significantly impacted the ANA design as a western Army clone. People like what they're comfortable with...

I also seem to recall there was much upset by some NATO Foreign Ministers at the thought of paying and equipping Warlords...

Bob's World

01-04-2009, 12:59 AM

A lot of good discussion on this. Not too late to change gears, but I suspect what we will see is just harder effort at the same program.

When I look at a country like Afghanistan I can't help but see the comparisons on this topic to a young America that was EXTREMELY nervous about forming a national Army to fight the British, and essentially disbanded it as soon as that threat was resolved. We too are a militia nation, where every able bodied man was required by law to own his own weapon and be a member of the militia (thus the wording in the Constitution "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.")

Yet we have suppressed the militias, forced a centralized army, and collected a lot of arms from the people...

One more example of where we need to do a better job of understanding more completely the culture, capabilities, and requirements of the people we choose to support, and then helping them to be as good as possible at being that, with the opportunity to evolve; rather than trying to force a revoloution of thinking and action to be just like we are today.

On a related topic I was thinking the other day about "principles" and "values" and what the difference is, and how we can be a nation of values without coming across as a bunch of "better than thou" a-holes when we engage other cultures. What I came around to is that a principle is a core standard or belief, and that when one applies a judgement to that principle, or "values" it, it becomes a value. So, "All men are created equal" is a principle; but how we vauled that principle in 1776 is very different than how we value it today.

So, for engagement, I decided that we need to:
1. Stand on Principles, (here are core beliefs that we think are important)
2. Hold Values (here is how we in Amereica assess and apply this principle, and this is the standard we hold ourselves to)
3. Withhold Judgement (we don't expect you to have the same values, but know that we will be persistent about about the principle for continued engagement).

Ken White

01-04-2009, 01:53 AM

A lot of good discussion on this. Not too late to change gears, but I suspect what we will see is just harder effort at the same program.but we don't do gear changes well... :(So, for engagement, I decided that we need to:
1. Stand on Principles, (here are core beliefs that we think are important)
2. Hold Values (here is how we in Amereica assess and apply this principle, and this is the standard we hold ourselves to)
3. Withhold Judgement (we don't expect you to have the same values, but know that we will be persistent about about the principle for continued engagement).Can also agree with that -- but I suspect that many in the US are not willing to do number 1. A great many will also get slippery and go the "do as I say, not as I do" route with respect to number 2. Human frailty abounds...

I think that being persistent about principle will be construed by those that wish to do so as us being judgmental even if we are not. People tend to look for reasons not to do things that they know should be done.

IOW, you're right -- but I'm not sure how many of your fellow Americans including some august members of our esteemed government are prepared to do as you suggest. I also think, based on a lot of furrin travel since 1947 that we have been really unpopular with the rest of the world during that entire period with ups and downs along the way. We were more despised during Viet Nam than today and while it goes in cycles, it is pretty consistently distrustful of our motives.

My point is that any strategy(ies) which we develop should consider that fact -- and I have no doubt it is a fact -- and be prepared to deal with the reaction. It should also consider the strong probability that no matter what we do overseas, not only will many abroad object just because it's us but also about 30% of US voters will object strenuously (almost invariably on party or ideological grounds). Neither of those things is, literally, a war stopper but both can have significant impact.

Said strageties should also consider that we Americans have a collective short attention span and an impatient national psyche. Whatever one wishes to do would be better accomplished in less then three years; less than two would be even more better...:wry:

Bill Moore

01-04-2009, 03:39 AM

Bill Moore - did you mean "flesh out" (the post), rather than "flush out" ? No need to respond - I think I'm getting a bit punchy.

flesh out: to make fuller or more nearly complete.

flush out: to expose or chase from a place of concealment.

Why can't either, or both in combination be correct? I want to flush out my paper more to better expose my ideas. I want to flesh out my paper more to to flush out the hidden ideas that are not noticable in its in current form?

Of course you're right, but I couldn't resist responding:D

jmm99

01-04-2009, 03:48 AM

BW
So, "All men are created equal" is a principle; but how we valued that principle in 1776 is very different than how we value it today.

So, for engagement, I decided that we need to:

1. Stand on Principles, (here are core beliefs that we think are important)

2. Hold Values (here is how we in Amereica assess and apply this principle, and this is the standard we hold ourselves to)

3. Withhold Judgment (we don't expect you to have the same values, but know that we will be persistent about about the principle for continued engagement).

No problems with 1 - I'd think of "All men are created equal" as a theory, until it is reduced to practice. But, whether a concept is called a principle or theory, that concept can become a belief even though never reduced to practice. An example is the end state of Communism in M-L theory, which was never reached because they never got beyond the Dictatorship of the Workers (which morphed to the Dictatorship for the Workers, and then to the Dictatorship for the Dictators).

No problems with 2 - I'd call this step the reduction of the theory to practice, but we are saying the same thing (I think). Again applying the priniciple (BW) that "All men are created equal", your history is correct that "how we valued that principle in 1776 is very different than how we value it today." In fact, there was a difference of opinion as to what that principle meant in terms of how it was valued (BW) in 1776 and before.

Now I digress briefly. On May 18, 1652, the governing body of Providence & Warwick (1/2 of Rhode Island) enacted a statute providing for abolition of slavery (http://books.google.com/books?id=U0oWAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA997&lpg=PA997&dq=warwick+1652+May+18+slavery&source=web&ots=woDJKyQl0_&sig=T1i_isfQ_lsSxbl1w_MpGL6leRs&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result#PPA997,M1). The rest of the future state (whose economy relied more heavily on chattel slavery) was not about to adopt such a statute. That division presaged the greater national division of the next 3 centuries.

Nonetheless, this action by these Rhode Island Reds (several ancestral to my wife - which partially explains her attitude :D) began the abolitionist thread which extended, in fits and starts, to the present - where, if nothing else, the principle that "All men are created equal" was vindicated at the presidential level.

Now, my digressive point is that the principle "All men are created equal" was not seriously in dispute. J.C. Calhoun adhered to that principle, but you can be assured that how he valued that principle (that is, how he reduced the theory to practice) was far different from how Barrack Obama or I value that principle.

In school, I skimmed through the Slave Cases Reports (texts of all US cases involving slaves). There was a case from the early 1800's in one of the Deep South states where the defendant (white) argued that he could not be prosecuted for manslaughter because the victim (black) was not a human being. The court (in long opinions) divided, with the majority holding that yes, indeed, an African-American was a human being. No doubt, the defendant believed that "All men are created equal" - his definition of "man" was the limiting factor (which was his valuation of the principle).

Turning to step 3 (quoting it again, but adding the words for the principle to be valued):

3. Withhold Judgment (we don't expect you to have the same values, but know that we will be persistent about the principle "All men are created equal" for continued engagement).

Now, so happens that Xistan (absolutely essential to the national strategic interests of the US) is firmly committed to chattel slavery; and happens to have a foreign minister who is a direct descendent of J.C. Calhoun and inherited all of his legal and political skills - his gg-grandfather having left S. Carolina after the War of Division.

He says, "COL Jones, I understand exactly what you are telling me about the principle that "All men are created equal". As you can see here, that principle is inscribed in our constitution. Now I also realize we value that principle a bit differently than you USians. But your ROEs here state you will withhold judgment about valuation and, furthermore, that we can expect continued engagement so long as we accept that principle. We, of course, as you can plainly see right here, accept that principle. Now, we need an ODC, 3 ODBs, 12 ODAs and your super aviation group for insertion and extraction. When can we expect them ?"

What does COL Jones tell President Obama ?

Yup, it's a variation of the "Can we kill the shepherd boy" hypothetical.

jmm99

01-04-2009, 04:03 AM

than to engage in verbalistics with a Moore. Point conceded to you.

The mind picture I got from "flush out" was one of the old castles where the privies were built into the walls with chutes to the outside - and where they did "flush out" stuff.

I guess you had to take care if you pulled sentry duty and had to patrol the lower walls. :eek:

Ken: I imagine that pulling that duty was involved in one of your early deployments. Can you tell us what precautions you took - or were you too busy looking for unicorns. As you well know, they existed in those bygone days. :D

Ken White

01-04-2009, 06:38 AM

Ken: I imagine that pulling that duty was involved in one of your early deployments.Actually, my early deployments long pre-date Castles. By the time they came along, I was a senior NCO and got the Lawyer Clerks to do that sort of stuff, they excelled at it, BTW. Had an affinity for it, some said.Can you tell us what precautions you tookAs I said, beneath my pay grade but I do recall the Lawyer Clerks loved to wear sharkskin suits... - or were you too busy looking for unicorns. As you well know, they existed in those bygone days. :DOf course they did exist -- but I never hunted 'em, they smelled like dead fish and were to be avoided IMO. there were strange, backward clans and septs who liked to hunt them for some odd reason (and allegedly still do...). Probably they put up with the smell to kill them for their horns which were sold to the Lawyer Clerks as eating the horn, ground to fine particles and sprinkled on the quiche was supposed to endow the one who ate it with honesty, benevolence, intelligence and compassion. Another of those myths... ;)

davidbfpo

01-04-2009, 12:46 PM

Greg Mills observations did appear on an earlier thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2686&highlight=greg+mills

His book on Afghanistan is: 'From Africa to Afghanistan: With Richards and NATO to Kabul', by Greg Mills, publisher Wits University Press in 2007. Excellent pre-deployment read, accepting it is dated; the author is a South African analyst and writes very well.

The USA may regard NATO's agreement to take on a direct role in Afghanistan as a diplomatic success I am not convinced West European publics see Afghanistan as necessary for national security. I will stop as my viewpoint has appeared before.

I wonder how the direct personal observation of Afghanistan, in particular the ANA and ANP, by Europeans or others who have served there, e.g. Italian conscripts in Herat, has worked - for the good or bad? In the UK our troops who have served, mainly professional, but a good number of reservists, rarely comment in the media on such issues.

I had thought policy aside one reason why the ANA option was pursued was the re-deployment to Iraq of the mainly US SOF; so the militia option simply could not be used as the "boots on the ground" were elsewhere.

Comments from a faraway armchair.

davidbfpo

(Title chosen after the recent exchanges, a lighter moment).

Bob's World

01-04-2009, 01:14 PM

Turning to step 3 (quoting it again, but adding the words for the principle to be valued):

Now, so happens that Xistan (absolutely essential to the national strategic interests of the US) is firmly committed to chattel slavery; and happens to have a foreign minister who is a direct descendent of J.C. Calhoun and inherited all of his legal and political skills - his gg-grandfather having left S. Carolina after the War of Division.

He says, "COL Jones, I understand exactly what you are telling me about the principle that "All men are created equal". As you can see here, that principle is inscribed in our constitution. Now I also realize we value that principle a bit differently than you USians. But your ROEs here state you will withhold judgment about valuation and, furthermore, that we can expect continued engagement so long as we accept that principle. We, of course, as you can plainly see right here, accept that principle. Now, we need an ODC, 3 ODBs, 12 ODAs and your super aviation group for insertion and extraction. When can we expect them ?"

What does COL Jones tell President Obama ?

Yup, it's a variation of the "Can we kill the shepherd boy" hypothetical.

I'd say "Mr. President, we have a tremendous opportunity here, both to advance the rights of people everywhere as individuals, but collectively as sovereign nations by taking this deal that is important to our own security as well.

He'd probably say "Yes, but I'll pummel them with visits by my Sec State who will talk of democracy, womens rights, and freedom of slavery as they currently exist in the US and call them evil if they reject our values "(wait, that was his predecessor who kept doing that). No he'd say: "Ok Bob, I know where you are coming from, but explain this to me and make it good, because the one audiance tougher than the one you're talking to right now, is the one I'm going to have to address when I announce this deal."

So I'd walk him through my three points; How America leads best by example, not fiat backed by force of arms or cash; remind him of our own growth as a nation in regards for civil rights and how these things are too important to rush too quickly, but we won't be able to help this populace evolve if we aren't there engaging with them, and if we piss them off with our judgments so that they stop listening.

You have to try.

JMM, I feel as strongly about this as anybody. While my particular branch of the Jones Clan broke from its Quaker roots upon migrating to Oregon in 1852, the previous generations, from arrival in Philly in 1711, to pioneering down the east coast helping to settle colonies in North Carolina and Georgia (then over growning concerns about the institutions of Slavery and the growing liklihood of war), in the late 1820s moving up to Ohio and S. Michigan were pure Quaker. We were key players in the underground railroad as it flowed up through Cincinnati and Cass County Michigan. (A google search of William "Nigger Bill" Jones brings up a great story of an unarmed Quaker Farmer alone and on foot, confronting a squad of armed and mounted Kentucky Slave owners on a lonely Michigan country road that had a group of recaptured slaves in chains behind them. Short version, he held them up until help could arrive, disarmed the leader, put the whites in chains and the slaves on the horses and led a grand parade into town where the whites were tossed in to the jail. Soon released (and pissed), the made a federal case of the whole situation, which combined with another case went to the Federal District Court in Detroit resulting in what we all know of it as "The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850."

These type of changes are hard business, and require men and women of character and courage within the populace to lead the efforts for change. We can't order it from DC.

davidbfpo

01-04-2009, 07:29 PM

An excellent article on the strategy in Afghanistan, touches upon ANA and ANP and cites a podcast by Stephen Biddle, which I'd not heard of: http://kingsofwar.wordpress.com/2009/01/01/more-on-afghanistan-strategies/#comments.

The Biddle link is to a Time article, pre-Xmas: http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1866326,00.html

The comments are especially telling - between a US Army officer and the author (a UK academic). the US Army officer, known as 'Old Blue' comments on: http://billandbobsadventure.blogspot.com/

davidbfpo

jmm99

01-04-2009, 08:26 PM

Seems we are beginning not to be separated by a common language. The idea of principle (theory) and valuation (actual practice of same) is beginning to grow on me.

Theorists can argue until the cows (or unicorns) come home on the "meaning" of a principle. Valuation (actual practice) is a reality, which can be accepted or rejected, but at least there is something tangible to bite on.

My wish is for a POTUS who would be willing to be laid on the line (privately); and lay it on the line to the public - straight. Kind of the concept of ODA sessions (pre- & post-), maybe.

The rest of the thoughts that come to mind (unicorn horns, lawyer clerks, Quakers and English castles) are best handled by PM - owed to you, Ken and David. Have to see if cc:s are possible on PMs - killing 3 unicorns with one stroke - so to speak.

Just took a break from 1-1/2 inches of briefs (good briefs) for a Case Evaluation Hearing that I'll have to decide tomorrow and how many $ (if any) to award. No result in mind, which will have to await the attoneys' answers to my questions. At the end of which, I may want a unicorn's horn - but for insertion purposes.

Cheers.

Jedburgh

01-11-2009, 01:46 AM

MR, Jan-Feb 09: Sentinels of Afghan Democracy: The Afghan National Army (http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20090228_art006.pdf)
....The numerous articles and reports written on the Afghan Army tend to focus on specific aspects of the organization and paint partial, skewed, sometimes negative or sometimes overly optimistic pictures of it. Even though former NATO Supreme Commander General James L. Jones testified that "the Afghan National Army is the most successful pillar of our reconstruction efforts to date," it is clear that a tremendous amount of work remains to be done. This article offers a holistic picture of the army's progress since its formation in November 2002. It looks at the history of national armies of the Afghan state and the Afghan army's parameters (beginning and desired end state), provides a snapshot of the current Afghan "military balance," and offers insight into the Afghan army's training and operational performance.....

davidbfpo

05-12-2009, 10:57 PM

This undated You Tube item on the ANA by two US soldiers, with very direct comments has appeared on the Uk blogsite and comes from The (UK) Guardian newspaper, which I only rarely check: http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/2009/05/different-realities-5.html

davidbfpo

jcustis

05-13-2009, 10:47 PM

Anyway, that is a VERY rough and loose telling of what happened, but I hope it's clear enough. With 20/20 hindsight we might have been better served by putting resources into, and strengthening, the tribal networks and local leadership which had suffered under both the Taliban and AQ, instead of attempting to convert the warlord armies into a national army/police force. I say "might" because that would have been a huge challenge given our complete lack of knowledge about local power structures. We did, finally, begin doing some of that work a few years ago in some areas but it was (and still is) under-resourced and too little, too late. We also made mistakes through complete ignorance of the local tribal power structures and ended up caught in the middle of age-old local conflicts which created enemies we didn't need to create.

So the "helping the tribes" alternative might have been better than what we actually did, but in the end, even with 20/20 hindsight, I don't see any easy solutions to the problems we faced after the invasion.

I'm just coming to this thread, but as a guy who's looking at the road ahead in terms of his own boots on the ground, I am curious about this snippet.

entroy, what does the effort of strengthening tribal networks and local leadership mean to you? Can you point to any examples? For that matter, what are tribal networks anyway?

I have heard that term used often, but in many different contexts and I'm not sure it isn't more than just a buzz-word to me at this point, but I need to understand before I get deeper into shaping some personal PME.

And on Bob's World's point...it would seem to me from the armchair that although we pushed the Taliban back kinetically, with militia-based allies, the civil fabric was not targeted effectively, on top of the warlordism issue. So do you think that we should be investing in building smaller, militia capacity. If so, is that a means towards the larger end of central government stability? I'm not sure I can see where those two efforts could ever run at parallel purposes and in synch.

Jedburgh

05-28-2009, 08:55 PM

RAND, 28 May 09: The Long March: Building the Afghan National Army (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG845.pdf)
Background and Purpose

The Afghan National Army (ANA) is seen as a sine qua non for security in Afghanistan. The recent resurgence of the Taliban, operating out of bases in Pakistan and parts of Afghanistan, underscores the threat to the Afghan government and the importance of the army in stemming this insurgency and providing for Afghanistan’s future security. Efforts to rebuild the ANA have been going on for about six years, and judgments about its progress have been mixed.

This monograph offers an assessment of the progress of the ANA to date. It draws on a variety of sources, including in-country interviews with U.S., NATO, and Afghan officials; data provided by the U.S. Army; open-source literature; and a series of public opinion surveys conducted in Afghanistan over the past three years.

Assessment of the Afghan National Army

Our assessments pertain to following areas:
manpower, infrastructure and equipment
training
operational proficiency
public perceptions of the army.

IntelTrooper

05-28-2009, 10:19 PM

RAND, 28 May 09: The Long March: Building the Afghan National Army (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG845.pdf)
Excellent study. Thank you for posting this!

Xenophon

05-29-2009, 03:08 AM

US, TIC=No problem; US, non-TIC=Req. Clearance. IA TIC=Maybe. IA, non-TIC=Grab a Snickers.

In '08 it was more like US TIC=No problem; US non-TIC= req. clearance. IA TIC, no Americans present= No chance in hell. IA, non-TIC=Get the hell off of our net.

To support our IA in a TIC situation where we were not present, we had to go there, report US TIC, then request support. We were more than happy to do so, but still.

Old Eagle

05-29-2009, 01:31 PM

Tony Cordesman has a rather extensive study over at CSIS, also.

Now one of you smart guys can link it.

Jedburgh

05-29-2009, 01:52 PM

Tony Cordesman has a rather extensive study over at CSIS, also.

Now one of you smart guys can link it.
Post #8 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=62157&postcount=8) near the beginning of this thread linked to a 7 Jan 09 version of that product. Of course, Cordesman is always updating his reports, and there is now a 27 May 09 version (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090527_cordesman_winning_afgha_web.pdf).

davidbfpo

08-29-2009, 09:21 PM

SWJ daily News has an item headlined 'Sight of Dead Girl at the Gates Sparked a Bloody Mutiny', which upon closer reading refers to a UK detachment embedded (OMLT) with an ANA platoon in a FOB and after a local child is killed the ANA, all bar one, desert: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/Afghanistan/article6814206.ece

The Royal Irish turn up in what seems like a few seconds (to main FOB). They are shattered and have the haunted, lost look of betrayal. Only one Afghan soldier has remained loyal. Jones (FOB OiC) is amazed by how quickly the Taleban have been able to exploit the killing of the 12-year-old girl.

Note the story is undated and is taken from a newly published book on the UK Airborne Brigade's time in Helmand in 2007-2008 IIRC.

davidbfpo

George L. Singleton

08-29-2009, 09:40 PM

And the odds are the Taliban killed the 12 year old girl and then lied to create the mutiny and desertion.

davidbfpo

09-01-2009, 01:42 PM

(hat tip to Schmedlap) Taken from: http://www.esquire.com/print-this/afghanistan-war-stories-0809

One reason the war has not gone as the United States has wished is that many tasks are exceptionally difficult and complex. Take security development. The United States is creating Afghan government forces essentially from scratch. This requires thousands of American trainers and mentors and demands a huge collection of functioning and compatible arms and military materiel, enough for what could in time become nearly four hundred thousand armed men in the uniform of the nation being built around them. This is an extraordinary chore.

An even harder task is finding those hundreds of thousands of young Afghan men, fit and honest and willing to serve, and enlisting and training them to perform.

And if these soldiers are to become something more than the foundation for future armed gangs, then they will need committed and uncorrupted senior officers to lead them in a reasonably efficient and reliable way. Creating such a force would be hard to do in, say, Ukraine.

In Afghanistan, aside from the fact that there are multiple ethnicities and an ongoing war, there is another catch: All of these men, the clay of professional units, are to be drawn from a society in which a small fraction of the men can read.

milnews.ca

09-23-2009, 12:47 PM

Interesting question posed at the US Army/USMC COIN Centre Blog here (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/blog/blogs/coin/archive/2009/09/22/does-literacy-really-matter-to-the-afghan-army.aspx):
On the surface you would say “of course it does,” but what if your countrymen are 75% illiterate and what if your fellow soldiers are 90% illiterate? Then what do you do? Can a force possessing this level of reading skill or the gross lack thereof be trained in anything but basic infantry skills?

If we are going to equip, train, and fight alongside the Afghanistan National Army, -- then how can they operate for the long term as an Army if they cannot read? The enemy has shown that they can operate without this “critical” skill. How? Their tactics are in small groups, usually attacking on very familiar ground, with weapons that are man-portable and simple to operate.

The Afghan Army must instead operate complex weapons, weapons-systems and equipment that in most regards becomes somewhat difficult or impossible to operate without the skill of reading. They must take the fight to the enemy, the Taliban, wherever they may be throughout Afghanistan. How do you get there with your 500 man unit, how do you plan, how do you coordinate, and which road do you take if most of your force cannot read? Do you disagree? .... (More on link)

My view:
1) More literacy = better army.
2) It's going to be a long, uphill battle teaching literacy skills as well as military ones.
3) Literate in which language?