Afghan National Army (ANA) thread [Archive]

SWJED

05-02-2007, 08:21 AM

2 May NY Times - As Funding Increases, Afghan Forces Range From Ragtag to Ready (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/02/world/asia/02kabul.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slogin) by C. J. Chivers.

... These wildly contrasting glimpses of Afghanistan’s security forces illustrate the mix of achievements and frustrations that have accompanied international efforts to create a capable Afghan Army and a police force after decades of disorder and war. They also underscore the urgency behind the renewed push to recruit and train these units, which is now under way with an influx of equipment and training approved by the Bush administration last year.

Yet, even after several years of efforts to create new army and police units, it remains difficult to fully assess their readiness. Some units, especially in the army, are motivated and much better equipped than any Afghan forces were five years ago. Others, especially in the police, remain visibly ragtag, underequipped, disorganized, of uncertain loyalty and with links to organized drug rings.

American officials say it will take at least a few years before most of the Afghan forces become more ready and reliable, and perhaps a decade before they are capable of independent operations. But they also say that the resources and plans are now in place to make such ambitions possible.

These ambitions are important because American military officials say a principal element of any Western exit strategy from Afghanistan will be to create competent national security forces. Such forces are regarded as necessary to contain, and eventually defeat, the Taliban insurgency that expanded in 2006, and to provide stability in regions where the government’s influence remains weak...

Vic Bout

05-09-2008, 04:09 PM

Ron Humphrey

05-09-2008, 04:37 PM

Stumbled upon this (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JE09Df01.html) earlier today. On the mark, though much has improved since my 2003-2004 ANA experience. Interesting to note that the ANA STILL cannot unilaterally funciton in terms of CAS and log support, though I understand that some progress has been made toward an independant Afghan rotory wing aviation contingent.

where the author suggests that the ANA need to be tested soon. Although they are being tested on a daily basis to place them in a situation right now which demanded they stand alone against AQ and the other groups would probably be a bad idea and might just be what they would hope for.

Unlike Iraq the Afghans have not had 30+ years of established military experience as a group in whatever form that may have been. They are literally building ground up a military designed to do much more than any of their parts have done in recent memory.

The Taliban however have been a governing military recently and despite the fact that they were such a bad one doesn't change the comparison. I'm afraid if we try to push too hard with the ANA we run the risk of a much longer possibly insurmountable setback for them which would cost more than any small scale successful efforts might be worth right now.

Now recognizing that there are probably factors or facts that I'm unaware of are there any thoughts on whether this might be the case or not.

Anthony Hoh

05-10-2008, 09:40 AM

Now recognizing that there are probably factors or facts that I'm unaware of are there any thoughts on whether this might be the case or not.

Ron,
I think its time to let the ANA work more independently. "We" are doing things that unintentionally stifle the growth of the ANA. For example, it is common knowledge that the ANA are challenged logistically. However the process of "Afghanization" is fuzzy when it comes to fixing logistics. It has led two key players in Afghan assistance (CSTC-A and ISAF) into a true dichotomy. CSTC-A is focused on raising an independent self sustaining ANA/ANSF. ISAF in its process of Afghanization rightfully does missions jointly with the ANA. However this creates a problem, ISAF cant always wait for the ANA to get fuel, ammo, etc... because of issues with the ANA supply system. So ISAF "gifts" mission essential items to the ANA. Now CSTC-A is trying to coach, teach, mentor the ANA to make their supply system work. However, thier supply system never has to work, because ISAF is willing to gift supplies to get the job done. I ask you, if you were the Afghan commander on the ground how would you think resupply worked? You order it through your supply chain, or when I really need something the foreigners give it to you?

The ANA will never grow until we back out and let them learn it the hard way. You cant give an Army the hard lessons of poor logistics, it has to be discovered. I treasure the tactical experience of my Afghan counterparts, on the ground they can slug it out with the best of them. However when it comes to logistics for the ANA tough love is good love, and IMO the ANA are not getting enough of it.

In Service,
arh

Tom Odom

05-10-2008, 01:07 PM

Ron,
I think its time to let the ANA work more independently. "We" are doing things that unintentionally stifle the growth of the ANA. For example, it is common knowledge that the ANA are challenged logistically. However the process of "Afghanization" is fuzzy when it comes to fixing logistics. It has led two key players in Afghan assistance (CSTC-A and ISAF) into a true dichotomy. CSTC-A is focused on raising an independent self sustaining ANA/ANSF. ISAF in its process of Afghanization rightfully does missions jointly with the ANA. However this creates a problem, ISAF cant always wait for the ANA to get fuel, ammo, etc... because of issues with the ANA supply system. So ISAF "gifts" mission essential items to the ANA. Now CSTC-A is trying to coach, teach, mentor the ANA to make their supply system work. However, thier supply system never has to work, because ISAF is willing to gift supplies to get the job done. I ask you, if you were the Afghan commander on the ground how would you think resupply worked? You order it through your supply chain, or when I really need something the foreigners give it to you?

The ANA will never grow until we back out and let them learn it the hard way. You cant give an Army the hard lessons of poor logistics, it has to be discovered. I treasure the tactical experience of my Afghan counterparts, on the ground they can slug it out with the best of them. However when it comes to logistics for the ANA tough love is good love, and IMO the ANA are not getting enough of it.

In Service,
arh

Tony,

Great post. Continual problem with any kind of assistance. Have to let the recipent skin their knees as they learn to walk and then hopefully run

Best

Tom

Ron Humphrey

05-10-2008, 08:36 PM

Ron,
I think its time to let the ANA work more independently. "We" are doing things that unintentionally stifle the growth of the ANA. For example, it is common knowledge that the ANA are challenged logistically. However the process of "Afghanization" is fuzzy when it comes to fixing logistics. It has led two key players in Afghan assistance (CSTC-A and ISAF) into a true dichotomy. CSTC-A is focused on raising an independent self sustaining ANA/ANSF. ISAF in its process of Afghanization rightfully does missions jointly with the ANA. However this creates a problem, ISAF cant always wait for the ANA to get fuel, ammo, etc... because of issues with the ANA supply system. So ISAF "gifts" mission essential items to the ANA. Now CSTC-A is trying to coach, teach, mentor the ANA to make their supply system work. However, thier supply system never has to work, because ISAF is willing to gift supplies to get the job done. I ask you, if you were the Afghan commander on the ground how would you think resupply worked? You order it through your supply chain, or when I really need something the foreigners give it to you?

The ANA will never grow until we back out and let them learn it the hard way. You cant give an Army the hard lessons of poor logistics, it has to be discovered. I treasure the tactical experience of my Afghan counterparts, on the ground they can slug it out with the best of them. However when it comes to logistics for the ANA tough love is good love, and IMO the ANA are not getting enough of it.

In Service,
arh

I understand what your saying and agree in large part , I guess my greatest concern is how we determine what the best way is to let them skin their knees without getting them cutoff, or amputated because they didn't know how to clean the wound correctly. I hope you get where I'm coming from. (it may be a bad analogy)

Thanks for everything you do and keep up the good work.

negotiator6

05-11-2008, 04:58 PM

Date: March through August 2003
Place: Gardez, Paktia Province, Afghanistan (with travel throughout Khwost & Ghazni Provinces)

At that time, the ANA was just in the process of standing up. There was a compound for training between the OGA and US Army PRT compound..some of you know the area.

The problems at that time was "tribal"...which seems to be a non-unifing entity both in Afghanistan, Iraq and having just returned from Southern Sudan with the Sudan People's Liberation Army/SPLA..a common thread of systemic challenges, that being "tribalism".

That said, and back to the issue of the ANA..If the soldiers who represent the ANA identify with a united Afghanistan and its government, be it evolving everyday..then perhaps the ANA can be a unifing force against radical Sunni Islam represented by the Taliban.

On the other hand, if the ANA represents factions of tribal members who identify with their tribe..by language, custom and religion, then the idea of a united ANA with a common enemy will be a "bridge too far.."

The current focus on small company size commando type units who can move, shoot and communicate without too much coalition assistance...who know the terrain..who know the enemy will provide perhaps a better opportunity to defeat the enemy based on the phrase.."no thy enemy better than I know myself.."

Salaam/RH

SWJED

06-17-2008, 11:05 PM

The Problems with Afghan Army Doctrine (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/06/the-problems-with-afghan-army-1/)

By Sergeant First Class Anthony Hoh, US Army; Small Wars Journal Blog

A critically important security transition task that is often a secondary effort is the development of host nation military doctrine. This effort is paramount to the creation of a successful and independent force. When the world’s focus has moved on to other issues, and the coalition advisory effort draws to an end, the Afghan National Army (ANA) security foundation will rely heavily on their doctrine to continue the fight and provide national security and stability. So a few critical questions one must ask is; are we on track with the current doctrine development program? Do we have the right formula for developing doctrine on behalf of the ANA? Is developing doctrine for the ANA the right approach?

Joint Pub 1-02 defines doctrine as the “Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.” It is important to note that this definition of doctrine does not describe doctrine as how the Army wishes to fight, or how it may be able to fight at some point in the distant future. Obviously, doctrine profoundly affects a nation’s military development, but it should not be used too heavily as the catalyst for change in terms of simultaneously trying to quickly modernize an immature force. In the writing of Afghan doctrine we fail to account for Afghanistan’s history, technology, social constructs, and the nature of the threats that its armed forces face. We should no longer attempt to gift the ANA tactical, strategic or operational doctrine. Current ANA doctrine that has been “Afganisized", consists of manuals that have been cut copied and replaced… M4 for M16 or AK, Javelin for RPG. The utility of such an approach remains questionable, when manuals like the 7-8 MTP instruct Patrol Leader’s to submit overlays with route classification formulas. (ANA 7-8MTP TSK# 07-3-2000), suggests the use of soft rounds when clearing staircases (ANA 7-8MTP TSK# 07-3-1000), or describes the use of integrated BOS (Battlefield Operating System) in the ANA 7-20 MTP. In fairness, none of these items are tactically obtuse, far from it. However when taken on the whole they are not part of the “fundamental principles by which these military forces guide their actions”. This doctrine is generally light years ahead of anything that Afghan Army is capable of now or can be in the foreseeable future. To be clear this is not a slight towards the ANA, they can function without map overlays at the platoon level and continual BDE MDMP (Brigade Military Decision Making Process) seminars, they could get by with a few TACSOPs and GARSOP’s (Tactical and Garrison Standing Operating Procedures) that are linked with each other...

Jedburgh

06-30-2008, 12:08 PM

27 Jun 08: United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces (http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/United_States_Plan_for_Sustaining_the_Afghanistan_ National_Security_Forces_1231.pdf)

....Despite achievements in Afghanistan, security threats and corruption remain major impediments to overall development. The security environment continues to be fluid, demanding continual reexamination and assessment of requirements. The 2001 Bonn Agreement established the goal of a 50,000-person ANA and a 62,000-person ANP. The Bonn II Agreement in December of 2002 expanded the ANA target end-strength to 70,000 personnel. Since the Bonn Agreements and the international declaration of the Afghanistan Compact in 2006, security conditions have evolved, with a resurgence of activity by insurgents and anti-government elements. Consequently, in May 2007, the international community’s Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) approved an increase to 82,000 authorized ANP. Similarly, with the endorsement of the JCMB on February 5, 2008, the authorized ANA force structure increased to 80,000 personnel, with an additional 6,000 allotted for the trainee, transient, hospital, and student account.

The long-term ANSF posture potentially may include a more robust Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC) capability and a larger army. Additional analysis, study, and consideration must be given to the security environment, sustainability of the force, and available financial support for such efforts.....

Jedburgh

12-13-2008, 12:42 AM

CSIS, 7 Jan 09: Winning in Afghanistan: Creating Effective Afghan Security Forces (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090106_ansf.pdf)

....any effective counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan must build up strong Afghan security forces, and the use them to both defeat the enemy and create the level of security that is a critical prerequisite for governance and development. So far, however, this effort lags badly behind the need.

It has been badly mismanaged and underfunded in the past, and many of the lessons of Iraq and other recent wars were ignored. Seven years after the invasion of Afghanistan, neither the Afghan National Army (ANA) or Police (ANP) force is capable of standing on its own. Afghan military forces are still reliant upon NATO forces for leadership, logistics, and air support in combat. The development of the ANA and ANP continues to be severely under-resourced both in terms of advisors and funds.

While the ANA is more capable than the ANP, both must improve dramatically before they can take the lead in Afghan security and it is far from clear that such progress can be made in time to avoid a major further deterioration in the security situation.....

Rex Brynen

12-19-2008, 12:59 AM

An interesting post recently over at Afghanistan Shrugged (http://afghanistanshrugged.com/2008/12/17/illum-ilum-where-for-art-thou.aspx), on both the perils of centralized/remote battlespace control and (US) command attitudes to the ANA, from an ETT Team Chief.

This is a habitual problem here. US commanders conducting massively centralized operations, not giving the guys on the ground the freedom of maneuver. To prevent a house from maybe being hit by an 8 pound canister we let four guys who have been shooting rockets at us get away, to fight another day . This makes no sense.

In addition these US commanders treat the ANA like disposable heroes and idiots. Can you even imagine some foreign commander telling your local poilce and army what they can and can not do. Battlespace owner does not make them the Lord Govenor of Afghanistan.

More at the link above.

Ken White

12-19-2008, 01:34 AM

reed11b

12-19-2008, 05:54 AM

to the norm and we do not normally micromanage like that.

I really would like to say that.

Unfortunately, right now I'm too disgusted at the fact we never learn and we kill people unnecessarily through arrant stupidity like that to say much of anything.

We used to be able to just turn off the radio and ignore them and I've done that numerous times. Now, with the eye in the sky, the troops are screwed and the rear area staffs win...

Sad. Really, really sad.

While I have not been high enough in the command structure to speak from personal experience, my scanning of military writing supports what you say Ken, and possibly more relevant in this case, it is also one of the BIG mistakes the Soviets made in there misadventures in Afghanistan. Makes me think that you are correct in your assertion that it all comes down to training and HR policies for promotion and retention. Perhaps someday...
Reed

Old Eagle

12-19-2008, 01:34 PM

We're not talking about a U.S. unit 100 miles away micromanaging a subordinate unit, they were in effect jerking the ANA bn. The sooner that the ANA can get its own enablers, the better. Then get them used to using their own stuff rather than being dependent on our temporary, high-tech stuff.

Illum, for God's sake!

Rob Thornton

12-19-2008, 04:25 PM

You know - given some of the distances - even parachute flares, 203 illum and hand held 57 or 60mm illum would have been helpful. If we are not going to provide enablers to our partners, then we have some choices to make:

1) do it all ourselves, and delay their development while generating further risk
2) let our partners twist, lose faith and trust in us and generate further risk
3) accept some risk and provide some enablers for the our partner
4) do as OE said and provide them with some enablers - either by introducing it into their system, providng them the materiel and training, or a combination of both.

1 & 2 are non-starters. While the clear CMD guidance needs to come from on high, the 06 and 05 are key implementers to seeing it through. A combination of 3 & 4, with the goal of seeing it institutionalized in their systems seems to be the way to go.

A good blog, I hope Vampire 06 keeps it up.

Best, Rob

Ken White

12-19-2008, 04:43 PM

the ANA has or we are giving them some 60s. That was my first thought. They will ignore risk averse US Commanders desires.

The second and more scary thought was that a distant TOC could or WOULD curtail locally planned and called for Illlum. That is totally scary. It's borderline criminal IMO.

Delegate indeed. Trust your subordinates. Way to build loyalty and competence...

The link Rex provided also highlights another issue that my son surfaced after his last trip to Afghanistan; treatment of the ANA by higher US Hq. The US troops that go out with the ANA on the ground work well and get along with them -- Bn and higher too often and obviously with some exceptions seem to ignore their existence and / or don't treat them very well. How to win friends and influence people...

Sad on many counts.

jkm_101_fso

12-19-2008, 05:09 PM

the ANA has or we are giving them some 60s. That was my first thought. They will ignore risk averse US Commanders desires.

Insha'llah

The second and more scary thought was that a distant TOC could or WOULD curtail locally planned and called for Illlum. That is totally scary. It's borderline criminal IMO.

Believe it. I had it happen to me in Iraq many times. It all depends on who it's for and why. In '06, my MiTT had two M119s (plus crews) attached on our little patrol base, a long, long way from any flagpoles. The IA we supported asked for fires often. This is what I found, trying to clear said fires:

US, TIC=No problem; US, non-TIC=Req. Clearance. IA TIC=Maybe. IA, non-TIC=Grab a Snickers.

Of course, this was a few years ago.

BL, If illum CFF was for CF, usually was a go. If it was for IA...not so much.
I won't even go into what it took to fire HE.

I've heard the you-might-hit-a-house-with-a-canister line before, too. Very often, actually. I just lied and sent up a different grid, DF & QE to BDE. No one knew but me, and the extremely grateful Iraqi Army Soldiers that could now see who was emplacing the IED/who shot at them. I figured if I accidently destroyed a house with a canister (which is unlikely), the angry Iraqi would come see me anyway, since my MiTT were the only Americans within 100 miles of them. And if I accidently hurt/killed somebody with a cansiter, I would have dealt with the consequences. I took my chances...seriously, what are the odds?

The link Rex provided also highlights another issue that my son surfaced after his last trip to Afghanistan; treatment of the ANA by higher US Hq. The US troops that go out with the ANA on the ground work well and get along with them -- Bn and higher too often and obviously with some exceptions seem to ignore their existence and / or don't treat them very well. How to win friends and influence people...

Sad on many counts.

Arrrggghhh.:mad:

Ken White

12-19-2008, 05:18 PM

...I've heard the you-might-hit-a-house-with-a-canister line before, too. Very often, actually. I just lied and sent up a different grid, DF & QE to BDE. No one knew but me, and the extremely grateful Iraqi Army Soldiers that could now see who was emplacing the IED/who shot at them. I figured if I accidently destroyed a house with a canister (which is unlikely), the angry Iraqi would come see me anyway, since my MiTT were the only Americans within 100 miles of them. And if I accidently hurt/killed somebody with a cansiter, I would have dealt with the consequences. I took my chances...seriously, what are the odds?Good for you! That's precisely why you get paid more money than SFC Phukaboski does... :D

Unfortunately, unless there's been a change in the Basic Courses since I was around, I suspect that a great deal of effort goes into discouraging that kind of judgmental call. :mad:

We ought to be encouraging it. Then hopefully, when some folks get to LTC, they won't make overly cautious decisions about things they shouldn't even be involved with. In fairness, obviously, the LTCs wouldn't be behaving that way unless people above them were micromanaging...

Stupidity flows down hill... :(

Entropy

12-19-2008, 06:30 PM

Afghanistan Shrugged is definitely one of my favorite blogs now.

It's interesting and entirely predictable that ISR has become a micromanagement tool. It's too bad. How much longer until we have this:

http://colonialmarines.wikispaces.com/space/showimage/t.jpg

Tom Odom

12-19-2008, 06:40 PM

GORMAN (http://www.dailyscript.com/scripts/Aliens_James_Cameron_May_28_1985_first_draft.html)

####.(into mike)
Apone, collect magazines from everybody. We can't have any firing in there.

Whaddaya mean "we" paleface?

Rex Brynen

12-19-2008, 06:47 PM

Off topic, but damn I love that movie.

Entropy

12-19-2008, 09:12 PM

Off topic, but damn I love that movie.

Me too!

Bob's World

01-03-2009, 12:11 PM

Here is the question that makes me scratch my head about what we are doing in regards to the ANA:

1. Given that the Afghan militia/populace has a long history of being able to defeat any conventional army that invades their territory;

2. The current threat in the country, based on that same militia/populace, has been able to defeat or frustrate the two greatest conventional armies of recent times;

3. Why are we trying to build a second string version of such a conventional capability to use against that threat when history proves such a force cannot prevail?

It just seems to me, that if the militias of the Northern Alliance supported by a few SF and Combat Controllers and the USAF could handle the Taliban, that we would be better served by reinforcing that proven militia system, supplementing with advisors and air support as needed.

I ask this as much talk of "surging" in Afghanistan fills the media. Seems to me the smarter tact would be a massive reduction of forces, and let the Afghans get back to being Afghans. (and letting our efforts to take down Bin Laden's gang go back into the shadows where they can continue their girm, and quiet business of avenging the attacks of 9/11 and shutting down his his ability to wage UW to incite the populaces of the middle east).

Ski

01-03-2009, 12:55 PM

It's the age old blunder of mirror-imaging, Bob.

We did with the South Vietnamese Army, and we are doing it again with the ANA. We think that if we can just build their Army to look like ours, and if they can train just like ours, then we will have succeeded.

Of course, we will have failed, because as soon as we leave, all the fancy new equipment, spiffy new training, and the sweet new uniforms are going to be forgotten about. Except for the equipment, that will be used until it is no longer serviceable.

Bill Moore

01-03-2009, 05:28 PM

Posted by BW,
Why are we trying to build a second string version of such a conventional capability to use against that threat when history proves such a force cannot prevail?

You have a brother in arms on this topic. Long before 9/11 I was bemused at our efforts to force our doctrine and TTP upon the foreign security forces we were training. There are several factors that contribute to this:

- Arrogance to the extreme

- Inability or unwillingness to study, analyze, discuss host nation's security force culture and how it drives their organization, doctrine, and TTP. (Radical changes usually don't work, you have to find ways to gradually tweek their ways of doing business).

- Even our Special Forces are too conventional as supported by LTG Boykin in his relatively new book, "Never Surrender", thus the reason they had to form new special operations units. SF has been conventionalized since the early 80s due to its leadership embracing everything army from standards, to tactics, to training management, whether it was applicable or not, we just couldn't quite break out of the big army one size fits all mold. There is much to be said about creating a new OSS like service, but like most things it is easy to talk about, very, very hard to do.

- We tend to blindly assume our doctrine is the best (goes back to arrogance) for any type of threat. Yet it has been demonstrated again and again that our doctrine is not the end all, be all, to winning irregular fights. Sometimes I think we're pushing snake oil on our friends.

Bemusement aside, how do we change our military culture to fix this problem? From an economic point of view if we did fix it we could potentially save billions of dollars and make a greater impact. Since SOCOM is working on the Security Force Assistance Doctrine maybe this issue should be addressed:

- How to assess host nations Security Force needs.

- How to collaboratively (with HN) develop a program of instruction that is culturally acceptable. (Some of their doctrine and TTP may be seriously flawed, but you don't address that by telling them to do it our way, they must come to that realization on their own, helped along by the constant mentoring of their advisors. What did you do? What did the enemy do? How can we do better? Sketch it out on paper or in the dirt (don't make a stinking power point slide), then when they are ready show how we might approach it).

Advising takes patience, a lot of patience, and a lot of give and take. You should be learning as much, if not more, than the troops you are working with. We will not improve our capacity to effectively train, advise and assist by simply producing more (industrial era mindset) advisors.

Ken White

01-03-2009, 06:12 PM

100% agree. I really think that ought to be a Blog entry.

Ski and Bob's World are also correct..

Sad.

Bill Moore

01-03-2009, 08:28 PM

Ken,

Good point, but I need to flush it out. Bill

Entropy

01-03-2009, 10:48 PM

3. Why are we trying to build a second string version of such a conventional capability to use against that threat when history proves such a force cannot prevail?

It just seems to me, that if the militias of the Northern Alliance supported by a few SF and Combat Controllers and the USAF could handle the Taliban, that we would be better served by reinforcing that proven militia system, supplementing with advisors and air support as needed.

Those are good questions and speak to how much things have changed since 2001 and the original invasion. Here's a recap of some of the history for why we're where we are today:

The Taliban in the 1990's grew in popularity and hence power and influence, in no small measure because of the chaos and perpetual warfare that was caused (in many Afghani eyes) by the warlordism following the collapse of the Soviet withdrawal. Even though most Afghans, even the Pashtuns, thought the Taliban were way too extreme, at least they enforced the peace, were relatively uncorrupt, and ended the Warlord's abuse and dominance of the populace.

Fast forward to 2001 - we allied with many of these same warlords to defeat the Taliban, but we were quite cognizant of the Afghan concern about a return to the bad old warlord days. We worked hard to keep them on a short lease and one of the first priorities after the Taliban defeat was the demobilization of these private Armies. The DDR effort was viewed as a critical component to keeping the Taliban from returning since it was believed all those private armies would return to their old, internecine warfare which would provide the fertile ground for the Taliban's rebirth, just as it did in the 1990's. We were also very aware that these warlords held few loyalties to anyone and that AQ could use it's influence and money to buy favor with some, at least temporarily. Anyway, the DDR efforts is where most of the resources for Afghanistan went in those first couple of years and was quite successful (and necessary, in my view).

So what then? We understood that DDR would create several problems. First is the thousands of MAM's who used to fight for a living and grew up depending on warlord patronage. What to do with them in a nation with no infrastructure, economy or work? The second problem was the very real need to develop some kind of security and police forces since literally none existed and bad things tend to happen with a power or security vacuum. To solve those two problems we took the most obvious choice (to us) which was to channel much of that manpower into a national Army and Police force. Needless to say, the first iteration didn't work very well. Meanwhile, the Taliban were planning their comeback in the central mountains north of Kandahar and over the border in Pakistan. Those early failures at creating security forces combined with insufficient coalition forces to provide adequate security, greatly aided the Taliban return because there was a power vacuum in many parts of the country (and again, part of the decision to maintain a limited footprint in Afghanistan wasn't unsound - planners were worried about appearing like another Soviet invasion and were cognizant of the general Afghan distrust of foreign powers). Once the Taliban got its legs back after the kick-in-the-face it got in 2001-2002, it expanded into those very rural ungoverned areas until about 2006 when it was able to make bigger moves.

Anyway, that is a VERY rough and loose telling of what happened, but I hope it's clear enough. With 20/20 hindsight we might have been better served by putting resources into, and strengthening, the tribal networks and local leadership which had suffered under both the Taliban and AQ, instead of attempting to convert the warlord armies into a national army/police force. I say "might" because that would have been a huge challenge given our complete lack of knowledge about local power structures. We did, finally, begin doing some of that work a few years ago in some areas but it was (and still is) under-resourced and too little, too late. We also made mistakes through complete ignorance of the local tribal power structures and ended up caught in the middle of age-old local conflicts which created enemies we didn't need to create.

So the "helping the tribes" alternative might have been better than what we actually did, but in the end, even with 20/20 hindsight, I don't see any easy solutions to the problems we faced after the invasion.

Like you, I do not have a warm-and-fuzzy about the entire enterprise of building centralized political and military structures in Afghanistan - I can't think of anyplace where this strategy would be more difficult, except maybe parts of Africa (a continent I'm way too ignorant on). So I don't hold much hope our efforts will succeed in the way that we hope and intend. With US support, the Afghan government can muddle along, but once that is gone it will probably be back to same-as-it-ever-was Afghanistan.

Hopefully, if we are smart, we will realize this likelihood (or at least the possibility) and take measures to hedge against this future to both soften the blow and to provide for continued US influence and protection of US interests. Foresight in South Asia hasn't exactly been an strong point for America, so I will remain as cynical as ever. But I'm just an intel weenie, so I should probably keep my mouth shut about policy.

jmm99

01-03-2009, 11:15 PM

....and letting our efforts to take down Bin Laden's gang go back into the shadows where they can continue their girm, and quiet business of avenging the attacks of 9/11 and shutting down his his ability to wage UW to incite the populaces of the middle east

although I expect many novenas to St. Jude will be necessary to see that plan become practice.

PS: Bill Moore - did you mean "flesh out" (the post), rather than "flush out" ? No need to respond - I think I'm getting a bit punchy.

Ken White

01-03-2009, 11:18 PM

While I agree with you and with Bob's World on the possibility of major failure of a future Afghan government and its institutions and with the description of the path that got us where we are today -- and decry the effort to build an Army like our own to the maximum possible extent that is in fact not only ego but ignorance driven (most of the US Army knows very little about how other Armies are organized or train; too many do not care...), I think we all should recall the diplomatic effort that brough NATO to Afghanistan -- a very good diplomatic coup for us.

Good diplomatically but bad militarily for unity of command, overall flexibility and decision making reasons -- since NATO nations are helping with the training and equipping, I suspect that decision also significantly impacted the ANA design as a western Army clone. People like what they're comfortable with...

I also seem to recall there was much upset by some NATO Foreign Ministers at the thought of paying and equipping Warlords...

Bob's World

01-04-2009, 12:59 AM

A lot of good discussion on this. Not too late to change gears, but I suspect what we will see is just harder effort at the same program.

When I look at a country like Afghanistan I can't help but see the comparisons on this topic to a young America that was EXTREMELY nervous about forming a national Army to fight the British, and essentially disbanded it as soon as that threat was resolved. We too are a militia nation, where every able bodied man was required by law to own his own weapon and be a member of the militia (thus the wording in the Constitution "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.")

Yet we have suppressed the militias, forced a centralized army, and collected a lot of arms from the people...

One more example of where we need to do a better job of understanding more completely the culture, capabilities, and requirements of the people we choose to support, and then helping them to be as good as possible at being that, with the opportunity to evolve; rather than trying to force a revoloution of thinking and action to be just like we are today.

On a related topic I was thinking the other day about "principles" and "values" and what the difference is, and how we can be a nation of values without coming across as a bunch of "better than thou" a-holes when we engage other cultures. What I came around to is that a principle is a core standard or belief, and that when one applies a judgement to that principle, or "values" it, it becomes a value. So, "All men are created equal" is a principle; but how we vauled that principle in 1776 is very different than how we value it today.

So, for engagement, I decided that we need to:
1. Stand on Principles, (here are core beliefs that we think are important)
2. Hold Values (here is how we in Amereica assess and apply this principle, and this is the standard we hold ourselves to)
3. Withhold Judgement (we don't expect you to have the same values, but know that we will be persistent about about the principle for continued engagement).

Ken White

01-04-2009, 01:53 AM

A lot of good discussion on this. Not too late to change gears, but I suspect what we will see is just harder effort at the same program.but we don't do gear changes well... :(
So, for engagement, I decided that we need to:
1. Stand on Principles, (here are core beliefs that we think are important)
2. Hold Values (here is how we in Amereica assess and apply this principle, and this is the standard we hold ourselves to)
3. Withhold Judgement (we don't expect you to have the same values, but know that we will be persistent about about the principle for continued engagement).Can also agree with that -- but I suspect that many in the US are not willing to do number 1. A great many will also get slippery and go the "do as I say, not as I do" route with respect to number 2. Human frailty abounds...

I think that being persistent about principle will be construed by those that wish to do so as us being judgmental even if we are not. People tend to look for reasons not to do things that they know should be done.

IOW, you're right -- but I'm not sure how many of your fellow Americans including some august members of our esteemed government are prepared to do as you suggest. I also think, based on a lot of furrin travel since 1947 that we have been really unpopular with the rest of the world during that entire period with ups and downs along the way. We were more despised during Viet Nam than today and while it goes in cycles, it is pretty consistently distrustful of our motives.

My point is that any strategy(ies) which we develop should consider that fact -- and I have no doubt it is a fact -- and be prepared to deal with the reaction. It should also consider the strong probability that no matter what we do overseas, not only will many abroad object just because it's us but also about 30% of US voters will object strenuously (almost invariably on party or ideological grounds). Neither of those things is, literally, a war stopper but both can have significant impact.

Said strageties should also consider that we Americans have a collective short attention span and an impatient national psyche. Whatever one wishes to do would be better accomplished in less then three years; less than two would be even more better...:wry:

Bill Moore

01-04-2009, 03:39 AM

Bill Moore - did you mean "flesh out" (the post), rather than "flush out" ? No need to respond - I think I'm getting a bit punchy.

flesh out: to make fuller or more nearly complete.

flush out: to expose or chase from a place of concealment.

Why can't either, or both in combination be correct? I want to flush out my paper more to better expose my ideas. I want to flesh out my paper more to to flush out the hidden ideas that are not noticable in its in current form?

Of course you're right, but I couldn't resist responding:D

jmm99

01-04-2009, 03:48 AM

BW
So, "All men are created equal" is a principle; but how we valued that principle in 1776 is very different than how we value it today.

So, for engagement, I decided that we need to:

1. Stand on Principles, (here are core beliefs that we think are important)

2. Hold Values (here is how we in Amereica assess and apply this principle, and this is the standard we hold ourselves to)

3. Withhold Judgment (we don't expect you to have the same values, but know that we will be persistent about about the principle for continued engagement).

No problems with 1 - I'd think of "All men are created equal" as a theory, until it is reduced to practice. But, whether a concept is called a principle or theory, that concept can become a belief even though never reduced to practice. An example is the end state of Communism in M-L theory, which was never reached because they never got beyond the Dictatorship of the Workers (which morphed to the Dictatorship for the Workers, and then to the Dictatorship for the Dictators).

No problems with 2 - I'd call this step the reduction of the theory to practice, but we are saying the same thing (I think). Again applying the priniciple (BW) that "All men are created equal", your history is correct that "how we valued that principle in 1776 is very different than how we value it today." In fact, there was a difference of opinion as to what that principle meant in terms of how it was valued (BW) in 1776 and before.

Now I digress briefly. On May 18, 1652, the governing body of Providence & Warwick (1/2 of Rhode Island) enacted a statute providing for abolition of slavery (http://books.google.com/books?id=U0oWAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA997&lpg=PA997&dq=warwick+1652+May+18+slavery&source=web&ots=woDJKyQl0_&sig=T1i_isfQ_lsSxbl1w_MpGL6leRs&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result#PPA997,M1). The rest of the future state (whose economy relied more heavily on chattel slavery) was not about to adopt such a statute. That division presaged the greater national division of the next 3 centuries.

Nonetheless, this action by these Rhode Island Reds (several ancestral to my wife - which partially explains her attitude :D) began the abolitionist thread which extended, in fits and starts, to the present - where, if nothing else, the principle that "All men are created equal" was vindicated at the presidential level.

Now, my digressive point is that the principle "All men are created equal" was not seriously in dispute. J.C. Calhoun adhered to that principle, but you can be assured that how he valued that principle (that is, how he reduced the theory to practice) was far different from how Barrack Obama or I value that principle.

In school, I skimmed through the Slave Cases Reports (texts of all US cases involving slaves). There was a case from the early 1800's in one of the Deep South states where the defendant (white) argued that he could not be prosecuted for manslaughter because the victim (black) was not a human being. The court (in long opinions) divided, with the majority holding that yes, indeed, an African-American was a human being. No doubt, the defendant believed that "All men are created equal" - his definition of "man" was the limiting factor (which was his valuation of the principle).

Turning to step 3 (quoting it again, but adding the words for the principle to be valued):

3. Withhold Judgment (we don't expect you to have the same values, but know that we will be persistent about the principle "All men are created equal" for continued engagement).

Now, so happens that Xistan (absolutely essential to the national strategic interests of the US) is firmly committed to chattel slavery; and happens to have a foreign minister who is a direct descendent of J.C. Calhoun and inherited all of his legal and political skills - his gg-grandfather having left S. Carolina after the War of Division.

He says, "COL Jones, I understand exactly what you are telling me about the principle that "All men are created equal". As you can see here, that principle is inscribed in our constitution. Now I also realize we value that principle a bit differently than you USians. But your ROEs here state you will withhold judgment about valuation and, furthermore, that we can expect continued engagement so long as we accept that principle. We, of course, as you can plainly see right here, accept that principle. Now, we need an ODC, 3 ODBs, 12 ODAs and your super aviation group for insertion and extraction. When can we expect them ?"

What does COL Jones tell President Obama ?

Yup, it's a variation of the "Can we kill the shepherd boy" hypothetical.

jmm99

01-04-2009, 04:03 AM

than to engage in verbalistics with a Moore. Point conceded to you.

The mind picture I got from "flush out" was one of the old castles where the privies were built into the walls with chutes to the outside - and where they did "flush out" stuff.

I guess you had to take care if you pulled sentry duty and had to patrol the lower walls. :eek:

Ken: I imagine that pulling that duty was involved in one of your early deployments. Can you tell us what precautions you took - or were you too busy looking for unicorns. As you well know, they existed in those bygone days. :D

Ken White

01-04-2009, 06:38 AM

Ken: I imagine that pulling that duty was involved in one of your early deployments.Actually, my early deployments long pre-date Castles. By the time they came along, I was a senior NCO and got the Lawyer Clerks to do that sort of stuff, they excelled at it, BTW. Had an affinity for it, some said.
Can you tell us what precautions you tookAs I said, beneath my pay grade but I do recall the Lawyer Clerks loved to wear sharkskin suits...
- or were you too busy looking for unicorns. As you well know, they existed in those bygone days. :DOf course they did exist -- but I never hunted 'em, they smelled like dead fish and were to be avoided IMO. there were strange, backward clans and septs who liked to hunt them for some odd reason (and allegedly still do...). Probably they put up with the smell to kill them for their horns which were sold to the Lawyer Clerks as eating the horn, ground to fine particles and sprinkled on the quiche was supposed to endow the one who ate it with honesty, benevolence, intelligence and compassion. Another of those myths... ;)

davidbfpo

01-04-2009, 12:46 PM

Greg Mills observations did appear on an earlier thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2686&highlight=greg+mills

His book on Afghanistan is: 'From Africa to Afghanistan: With Richards and NATO to Kabul', by Greg Mills, publisher Wits University Press in 2007. Excellent pre-deployment read, accepting it is dated; the author is a South African analyst and writes very well.

The USA may regard NATO's agreement to take on a direct role in Afghanistan as a diplomatic success I am not convinced West European publics see Afghanistan as necessary for national security. I will stop as my viewpoint has appeared before.

I wonder how the direct personal observation of Afghanistan, in particular the ANA and ANP, by Europeans or others who have served there, e.g. Italian conscripts in Herat, has worked - for the good or bad? In the UK our troops who have served, mainly professional, but a good number of reservists, rarely comment in the media on such issues.

I had thought policy aside one reason why the ANA option was pursued was the re-deployment to Iraq of the mainly US SOF; so the militia option simply could not be used as the "boots on the ground" were elsewhere.

Comments from a faraway armchair.

davidbfpo

(Title chosen after the recent exchanges, a lighter moment).

Bob's World

01-04-2009, 01:14 PM

Turning to step 3 (quoting it again, but adding the words for the principle to be valued):

Now, so happens that Xistan (absolutely essential to the national strategic interests of the US) is firmly committed to chattel slavery; and happens to have a foreign minister who is a direct descendent of J.C. Calhoun and inherited all of his legal and political skills - his gg-grandfather having left S. Carolina after the War of Division.

He says, "COL Jones, I understand exactly what you are telling me about the principle that "All men are created equal". As you can see here, that principle is inscribed in our constitution. Now I also realize we value that principle a bit differently than you USians. But your ROEs here state you will withhold judgment about valuation and, furthermore, that we can expect continued engagement so long as we accept that principle. We, of course, as you can plainly see right here, accept that principle. Now, we need an ODC, 3 ODBs, 12 ODAs and your super aviation group for insertion and extraction. When can we expect them ?"

What does COL Jones tell President Obama ?

Yup, it's a variation of the "Can we kill the shepherd boy" hypothetical.

I'd say "Mr. President, we have a tremendous opportunity here, both to advance the rights of people everywhere as individuals, but collectively as sovereign nations by taking this deal that is important to our own security as well.

He'd probably say "Yes, but I'll pummel them with visits by my Sec State who will talk of democracy, womens rights, and freedom of slavery as they currently exist in the US and call them evil if they reject our values "(wait, that was his predecessor who kept doing that). No he'd say: "Ok Bob, I know where you are coming from, but explain this to me and make it good, because the one audiance tougher than the one you're talking to right now, is the one I'm going to have to address when I announce this deal."

So I'd walk him through my three points; How America leads best by example, not fiat backed by force of arms or cash; remind him of our own growth as a nation in regards for civil rights and how these things are too important to rush too quickly, but we won't be able to help this populace evolve if we aren't there engaging with them, and if we piss them off with our judgments so that they stop listening.

You have to try.

JMM, I feel as strongly about this as anybody. While my particular branch of the Jones Clan broke from its Quaker roots upon migrating to Oregon in 1852, the previous generations, from arrival in Philly in 1711, to pioneering down the east coast helping to settle colonies in North Carolina and Georgia (then over growning concerns about the institutions of Slavery and the growing liklihood of war), in the late 1820s moving up to Ohio and S. Michigan were pure Quaker. We were key players in the underground railroad as it flowed up through Cincinnati and Cass County Michigan. (A google search of William "Nigger Bill" Jones brings up a great story of an unarmed Quaker Farmer alone and on foot, confronting a squad of armed and mounted Kentucky Slave owners on a lonely Michigan country road that had a group of recaptured slaves in chains behind them. Short version, he held them up until help could arrive, disarmed the leader, put the whites in chains and the slaves on the horses and led a grand parade into town where the whites were tossed in to the jail. Soon released (and pissed), the made a federal case of the whole situation, which combined with another case went to the Federal District Court in Detroit resulting in what we all know of it as "The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850."

These type of changes are hard business, and require men and women of character and courage within the populace to lead the efforts for change. We can't order it from DC.

davidbfpo

01-04-2009, 07:29 PM

An excellent article on the strategy in Afghanistan, touches upon ANA and ANP and cites a podcast by Stephen Biddle, which I'd not heard of: http://kingsofwar.wordpress.com/2009/01/01/more-on-afghanistan-strategies/#comments.

The Biddle link is to a Time article, pre-Xmas: http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1866326,00.html

The comments are especially telling - between a US Army officer and the author (a UK academic). the US Army officer, known as 'Old Blue' comments on: http://billandbobsadventure.blogspot.com/

davidbfpo

jmm99

01-04-2009, 08:26 PM

Seems we are beginning not to be separated by a common language. The idea of principle (theory) and valuation (actual practice of same) is beginning to grow on me.

Theorists can argue until the cows (or unicorns) come home on the "meaning" of a principle. Valuation (actual practice) is a reality, which can be accepted or rejected, but at least there is something tangible to bite on.

My wish is for a POTUS who would be willing to be laid on the line (privately); and lay it on the line to the public - straight. Kind of the concept of ODA sessions (pre- & post-), maybe.

The rest of the thoughts that come to mind (unicorn horns, lawyer clerks, Quakers and English castles) are best handled by PM - owed to you, Ken and David. Have to see if cc:s are possible on PMs - killing 3 unicorns with one stroke - so to speak.

Just took a break from 1-1/2 inches of briefs (good briefs) for a Case Evaluation Hearing that I'll have to decide tomorrow and how many $ (if any) to award. No result in mind, which will have to await the attoneys' answers to my questions. At the end of which, I may want a unicorn's horn - but for insertion purposes.

Cheers.

Jedburgh

01-11-2009, 01:46 AM

MR, Jan-Feb 09: Sentinels of Afghan Democracy: The Afghan National Army (http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20090228_art006.pdf)

....The numerous articles and reports written on the Afghan Army tend to focus on specific aspects of the organization and paint partial, skewed, sometimes negative or sometimes overly optimistic pictures of it. Even though former NATO Supreme Commander General James L. Jones testified that "the Afghan National Army is the most successful pillar of our reconstruction efforts to date," it is clear that a tremendous amount of work remains to be done. This article offers a holistic picture of the army's progress since its formation in November 2002. It looks at the history of national armies of the Afghan state and the Afghan army's parameters (beginning and desired end state), provides a snapshot of the current Afghan "military balance," and offers insight into the Afghan army's training and operational performance.....

davidbfpo

05-12-2009, 09:57 PM

This undated You Tube item on the ANA by two US soldiers, with very direct comments has appeared on the Uk blogsite and comes from The (UK) Guardian newspaper, which I only rarely check: http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/2009/05/different-realities-5.html

davidbfpo

jcustis

05-13-2009, 09:47 PM

Anyway, that is a VERY rough and loose telling of what happened, but I hope it's clear enough. With 20/20 hindsight we might have been better served by putting resources into, and strengthening, the tribal networks and local leadership which had suffered under both the Taliban and AQ, instead of attempting to convert the warlord armies into a national army/police force. I say "might" because that would have been a huge challenge given our complete lack of knowledge about local power structures. We did, finally, begin doing some of that work a few years ago in some areas but it was (and still is) under-resourced and too little, too late. We also made mistakes through complete ignorance of the local tribal power structures and ended up caught in the middle of age-old local conflicts which created enemies we didn't need to create.

So the "helping the tribes" alternative might have been better than what we actually did, but in the end, even with 20/20 hindsight, I don't see any easy solutions to the problems we faced after the invasion.

I'm just coming to this thread, but as a guy who's looking at the road ahead in terms of his own boots on the ground, I am curious about this snippet.

entroy, what does the effort of strengthening tribal networks and local leadership mean to you? Can you point to any examples? For that matter, what are tribal networks anyway?

I have heard that term used often, but in many different contexts and I'm not sure it isn't more than just a buzz-word to me at this point, but I need to understand before I get deeper into shaping some personal PME.

And on Bob's World's point...it would seem to me from the armchair that although we pushed the Taliban back kinetically, with militia-based allies, the civil fabric was not targeted effectively, on top of the warlordism issue. So do you think that we should be investing in building smaller, militia capacity. If so, is that a means towards the larger end of central government stability? I'm not sure I can see where those two efforts could ever run at parallel purposes and in synch.

IntelTrooper

05-15-2009, 12:36 AM

From Fox News:
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,520182,00.html

U.S. Probes Whether Afghan Forces Colluded With Taliban in Deadly Attack

Kunar River Valley, Afghanistan — A pre-dawn attack by the Taliban that killed three American soldiers and six other coalition troops earlier this month is raising new questions about many of the Afghan soldiers who were supposed to be fighting shoulder-to-shoulder with them.

I knew SSG Vile, and I'm not sure which Latvians were involved but I worked closely with two of the OMLTs. I'm feeling a little ill.

Jedburgh

05-28-2009, 07:55 PM

RAND, 28 May 09: The Long March: Building the Afghan National Army (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG845.pdf)

Background and Purpose

The Afghan National Army (ANA) is seen as a sine qua non for security in Afghanistan. The recent resurgence of the Taliban, operating out of bases in Pakistan and parts of Afghanistan, underscores the threat to the Afghan government and the importance of the army in stemming this insurgency and providing for Afghanistan’s future security. Efforts to rebuild the ANA have been going on for about six years, and judgments about its progress have been mixed.

This monograph offers an assessment of the progress of the ANA to date. It draws on a variety of sources, including in-country interviews with U.S., NATO, and Afghan officials; data provided by the U.S. Army; open-source literature; and a series of public opinion surveys conducted in Afghanistan over the past three years.

Assessment of the Afghan National Army

Our assessments pertain to following areas:
manpower, infrastructure and equipment
training
operational proficiency
public perceptions of the army.

IntelTrooper

05-28-2009, 09:19 PM

RAND, 28 May 09: The Long March: Building the Afghan National Army (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG845.pdf)
Excellent study. Thank you for posting this!

Xenophon

05-29-2009, 02:08 AM

US, TIC=No problem; US, non-TIC=Req. Clearance. IA TIC=Maybe. IA, non-TIC=Grab a Snickers.

In '08 it was more like US TIC=No problem; US non-TIC= req. clearance. IA TIC, no Americans present= No chance in hell. IA, non-TIC=Get the hell off of our net.

To support our IA in a TIC situation where we were not present, we had to go there, report US TIC, then request support. We were more than happy to do so, but still.

Old Eagle

05-29-2009, 12:31 PM

Tony Cordesman has a rather extensive study over at CSIS, also.

Now one of you smart guys can link it.

Jedburgh

05-29-2009, 12:52 PM

Tony Cordesman has a rather extensive study over at CSIS, also.

Now one of you smart guys can link it.
Post #8 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=62157&postcount=8) near the beginning of this thread linked to a 7 Jan 09 version of that product. Of course, Cordesman is always updating his reports, and there is now a 27 May 09 version (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090527_cordesman_winning_afgha_web.pdf).

davidbfpo

08-29-2009, 08:21 PM

SWJ daily News has an item headlined 'Sight of Dead Girl at the Gates Sparked a Bloody Mutiny', which upon closer reading refers to a UK detachment embedded (OMLT) with an ANA platoon in a FOB and after a local child is killed the ANA, all bar one, desert: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/Afghanistan/article6814206.ece

The Royal Irish turn up in what seems like a few seconds (to main FOB). They are shattered and have the haunted, lost look of betrayal. Only one Afghan soldier has remained loyal. Jones (FOB OiC) is amazed by how quickly the Taleban have been able to exploit the killing of the 12-year-old girl.

Note the story is undated and is taken from a newly published book on the UK Airborne Brigade's time in Helmand in 2007-2008 IIRC.

davidbfpo

George L. Singleton

08-29-2009, 08:40 PM

And the odds are the Taliban killed the 12 year old girl and then lied to create the mutiny and desertion.

davidbfpo

09-01-2009, 12:42 PM

(hat tip to Schmedlap) Taken from: http://www.esquire.com/print-this/afghanistan-war-stories-0809

One reason the war has not gone as the United States has wished is that many tasks are exceptionally difficult and complex. Take security development. The United States is creating Afghan government forces essentially from scratch. This requires thousands of American trainers and mentors and demands a huge collection of functioning and compatible arms and military materiel, enough for what could in time become nearly four hundred thousand armed men in the uniform of the nation being built around them. This is an extraordinary chore.

An even harder task is finding those hundreds of thousands of young Afghan men, fit and honest and willing to serve, and enlisting and training them to perform.

And if these soldiers are to become something more than the foundation for future armed gangs, then they will need committed and uncorrupted senior officers to lead them in a reasonably efficient and reliable way. Creating such a force would be hard to do in, say, Ukraine.

In Afghanistan, aside from the fact that there are multiple ethnicities and an ongoing war, there is another catch: All of these men, the clay of professional units, are to be drawn from a society in which a small fraction of the men can read.

milnews.ca

09-23-2009, 11:47 AM

Interesting question posed at the US Army/USMC COIN Centre Blog here (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/blog/blogs/coin/archive/2009/09/22/does-literacy-really-matter-to-the-afghan-army.aspx):

On the surface you would say “of course it does,” but what if your countrymen are 75% illiterate and what if your fellow soldiers are 90% illiterate? Then what do you do? Can a force possessing this level of reading skill or the gross lack thereof be trained in anything but basic infantry skills?

If we are going to equip, train, and fight alongside the Afghanistan National Army, -- then how can they operate for the long term as an Army if they cannot read? The enemy has shown that they can operate without this “critical” skill. How? Their tactics are in small groups, usually attacking on very familiar ground, with weapons that are man-portable and simple to operate.

The Afghan Army must instead operate complex weapons, weapons-systems and equipment that in most regards becomes somewhat difficult or impossible to operate without the skill of reading. They must take the fight to the enemy, the Taliban, wherever they may be throughout Afghanistan. How do you get there with your 500 man unit, how do you plan, how do you coordinate, and which road do you take if most of your force cannot read? Do you disagree? .... (More on link)

My view:
1) More literacy = better army.
2) It's going to be a long, uphill battle teaching literacy skills as well as military ones.
3) Literate in which language?

omarali50

09-23-2009, 06:57 PM

Cross posting from another thread: Seriously committing to training, arming and supporting the ANA is the way to go, but it doesnt look like there is any clarity about this in the US command (in fact, it increasingly looks like the US is flailing about without a strategy). Fixing Karzai's regime is the other priority. Even using less than perfect means to do so. But first you have to know what you want. I am having some doubts about this part and if those doubts are correct, that means everything else will fail. I hope to be proved wrong...

IntelTrooper

09-23-2009, 07:43 PM

My view:
1) More literacy = better army.
2) It's going to be a long, uphill battle teaching literacy skills as well as military ones.
3) Literate in which language?

Probably literacy in Dari, since that is the official language of the government (another source of consternation when the Kabulites get sent into Pashtun areas to "straighten things out").

davidbfpo

09-24-2009, 10:16 PM

An interesting article on the ANA, with some historical points only a historian or an expert would know: http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/stevecoll/2009/09/legitimacy-and-the-afghan-army.html#entry-more

davidbfpo

davidbfpo

09-28-2009, 12:53 PM

Posted on another OEF thread: A variety of links and some will be cross-posted on other threads i.e. ANA & ANP. Not in order of priority.

1) Britain calls for mini-surge in Afghanistan to help train army. Of note is the claim the UK can deploy only 3k of the 9k troops in Helmand and that the ANA now have 8k deployed in Helmand (which I simply find incredible) http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle6851607.ece

2) http://www.captainsjournal.com/ has some amazing reports on the ANA and ANP. This is the longest, citing many sources (many on SWC I'm sure) and covers both the ANA and ANP: http://www.captainsjournal.com/2009/...national-army/

3) A Canadian OMLT veteran (from Kandahar Province) on the ANA, including literacy, training and more: http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/

davidbfpo

Lomed

12-04-2009, 07:58 PM

We so often hear American politicians call for expanding the ANA.

Ok, great, but how?

I read this the other day and wanted to gauge people's thoughts: http://www.defpro.com/daily/details/457/

I was particularly struck by the following:

We have been struggling in Afghanistan primarily because of weak Afghan leadership, in the ANA and even more so in the ANP. Although there are many competent commanders in the ANA, more are needed, especially in the event of rapid growth. As a recently published CSTC-A report has stated, “The most significant challenge to rapidly expanding the Afghan National Security Forces is a lack of competent and professional leadership at all levels, and the inability to generate it rapidly.”

Growing the ANA too fast will result in poorly trained, less effective units on the battlefield. Lacking adequate leadership, ANA soldiers are much more likely to engage in criminal activity. Corruption and AWOLs will increase, and the reputation of the ANA will decline, as more allegations of abuse against the Afghan people surface. With poorly led, quickly manufactured units, the chances increase of ANA units breaking and running on the battlefield—it has happened before with a few brave advisors preventing disaster. Collaboration with the enemy could also increase. Worst-case scenario - entire formations could switch sides, as ANA units have occasionally done throughout Afghanistan’s history, a point ANA officers shared with the author in confidence. These problems are, indeed, a recurrent theme in the history of counterinsurgency. As Moyar noted in his recent New York Times article, “Past counterinsurgents who tried to expand under similar conditions, like the British in Malaya (1948 to 1960) and the Salvadorans (1980 to 1992), discovered that too many inexperienced officers took command and the experienced officers were spread too thinly. In addition to fighting poorly, badly led troops usually alienate the population by misbehaving and they often desert or defect.”

Agree? Disagree? Is there a better plan out there?

Fuchs

12-04-2009, 08:16 PM

The German army rebuilt since 1955, had access to many war-experienced officers and still had serious leadership shortcomings till the early 1960's.

The German level of expectation was certainly much higher, but it's plausible that quick expansion on a mildly competent & small basis is 'difficult'.

It helps to adapt expectations, doctrine and employment.
The ANA can easily be more competent than the Taliban which have no superior training opportunities and a higher enemy-caused attrition rate.

I have doubts about the utility of an expansion and its probability of success, of course. On the other hand; I think the whole AFG adventure has left the track of reason in 2002.

davidbfpo

12-04-2009, 09:06 PM

I have merged several old, small threads into this main thread and added the question posed today. Looked through the OEF-Afghanistan list to do this and it is likley that within other threads the ANA do appear.

Old Eagle

12-05-2009, 05:35 PM

As several of you know, I was part of the initial defense reform in Afgh. I guess my first question now is why are we re-learning or re-documenting issues that were identified from the get-go?

Expansion of the ANA hinges on two major issues:

Faster is not necessarily better. The initial bureaucratic solution to the "faster" issue is usually to cut training time -- Reduce basic training to 4 weeks instead of six or whatever. As others have already pointed out, more untrained soldiers don't contribute to the long-term solution. Similarly, investments in leadership training, to include literacy classes, although costly in terms of train-up time, ultimately pay huge dividends.

No Afghan force on the drawing boards now is sustainable financially without outside assistance. In fact, that's kind of a way of life in Afghanistan. When I explained to one of our Afghan interlocutors that the force we developed had to be sustainable after we left. His question was who would pay for the Army once the Americans left. The truth of the matter is that the Afghan military has been dependent on external support for decades, and that has now become the new normal. It is unlikely that this will change.

For the past 7 years, we have approached the good-fast-cheap conundrum by opting for fast and cheap, then wondering why things aren't good.

Fuchs

12-05-2009, 06:03 PM

This is where economy comes into play.
Let's forget monetary budgets for a while and think of a country like Afghanistan instead.

Let's think of Pharaoh-time Egypt.

How were they able to complete huge construction projects and why were others not able to do so?

The answer is agricultural productivity/efficiency. Only relatively small share of the population had to work as farmers. The combination of Nile water, fertile Nile mu and intense sun made the Nile valley very fertile.
More accurately in the special case of Egypt: A quite low percentage of national working hours had to be devoted to farming in order to sustain (feed) the population.

This freed man-hours for other activities, such as producing goods for export (to get import wares like wood), pay servants of the king/state (administration), feed craftsmen, work on huge construction projects - and waging war.

The key variable is the % of available working hours that need to be devoted to sustenance and the % of available working hours lost due to poor weather (Nile floods, Afghan winter).

100% minus these two percentages yields the % of other activities (crafting, trading, guarding/fighting, administering) and inactivity (unemployment, underemployment, 'wasted' time).

I'm quite sure that the economy of Afghanistan could sustain the necessary army strength (let's say 200,000-500,000 competent warriors), and even much more during the winter.

The state is not able to harness the power reserves of the country, to free enough % of national working hours for itself. That's the problem.

Just look at the unemployment rate - all those unemployed men could just as well stand guard with a uniform and an AK instead. They get fed either way, after all - or else they would quickly disappear from the statistic estimate.

jcustis

12-05-2009, 06:29 PM

We so often hear American politicians call for expanding the ANA.

Ok, great, but how?

I read this the other day and wanted to gauge people's thoughts: http://www.defpro.com/daily/details/457/

I was particularly struck by the following:

Agree? Disagree? Is there a better plan out there?

I have no first-hand experience with Afghan Security Forces, but when I think of expansion in the Iraqi context, it makes me think of the need to build enough capacity to sustain a force afield in the face of so many soldiers away on leave.

Leave was always an incredibly important aspect of an advisory effort, because the troops simply had no way to get money home to family. If you had a largely-Shiite formation built out of family men from Najaf and points east, but you were posted to the Syrian-Jordan border area, you were faced with tremendous challenges. That was always the hidden facet of the stats on how many security force elements we had grown. That, and their state of readiness always seemed to be in contention.

I have seen first-hand what it looks like when a training/advisory effort is cobbled together with too few resources, and little thought applied to the small details. For example, during my second deployment to OIF, after the invasion, I had to contend with Shewani Specialized Special Forces at Camp Korean Village who had no documents on them beyond a over-sized postage stamp of an ID, had not been paid in months, and no one from higher HQ knew how many I had in my AO...because they had no accurate idea how many had been sent to me! Add to that the fact that many of these overweight, lazy fellows were from Basra and would justas soon shoot an Arab teenager forrock-throwing, and it was a mess.

Fast forward to Sahl Sinjar Airfield just south of Thari al-Ghara in northwestern Iraq, during my last deploy, and the formations of predominantly Kurdish (formerly Peshmerga) forces we interacted with, and you can see a remarkably capable military force with a decent blend of discipline, equipment standards, and tactical prowess. IIRC, there were still Arabs within some of the ranks of those mostly Kurdish units, as well as pure Peshmerga forces that had come down from Kurdistan. Security in those areas frequented by the Kurds was very good. In the areas frequented by the mixed units, the security was not comparable.

For the most part, formations built around regional realities are probably the best way to go, instead of trying to fight against the dynamic of leave issues, and the ethnic and sectarian tensions in an area of operations where troops born and raised elsewhere operate.

The notable units are always going to be the ones with the strong-willed, competent leaders. We have got to perfect the business of assisting the HN in screening these men for that capacity, or do it for them outright, I think. Having been a colonel "before the war" has garnered many of these charlatans a meal ticket, but a pain in the ass for the coalition. There is a danger, of course, from the 2nd and 3d order of effects if the wrong guy is selected and he just plain out doesn't mesh with the local political/social/religious landscape, but from about everything I have seen concerning ANA/ANP performance, we have got to keep the corruption down first and foremost. Accomplishing that while simultaneously reducing the number of leaders who have their own agenda to line a pocket or two is very difficult, but not impossible.

I agree with Bob's World whole-heartedly on the matter of not trying to build too much in our image, and I do believe that working along the militia system has merits, but they still have to have competent leaders who can work and manage COIN (true COIN since it is their backyard) and get it done.

Getting it all started is easy, but keeping it on course, through troop rotations, component command strategy shifts, resource allocation issues, etc., is the hardest part. I have slowly warmed up to the idea that perhaps we (in the big Army-Marine Corps sense) shouldn't be involved at the tip of that spear any longer. Perhaps this is one effort where we could afford to contract it out (say perhaps to a reputable company that can pull the right resumes, like MPRI), establish longer periods of performance than what any one MiTT could ever offer, and hold the winning vendor to delivering on time and to standard. This model is used for security assistance training in other areas of the world, and old-school mercenaries have built successful formations in the past with a few suitcases full of cash, so perhaps it stands to work in Afghanistan.

Most important, we need to start to plan for the next 5-10 years, not just around the corner, and come to grips with what Old Eagle highlighted...we will have to subsidize this effort for a long time to come because the government cannot.

We need someone (or a team of similar dudes) like this guy: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friedrich_Wilhelm_von_Steuben

I've got quite a few more thoughts on this subject, but I need to read up a little further on some of the studies out there from RAND and CSIS.

davidbfpo

12-05-2009, 08:25 PM

Lomed,

A good catch this:
I read this the other day and wanted to gauge people's thoughts: http://www.defpro.com/daily/details/457/

An excellent article, with the good and the bad, from the "cutting edge" to the logistical "tail" with a series of recommendations. Curious that the locals will prefer a poor ANA unit to a professional ISAF unit.

The external key factor is Afghan political will and I suspect many here think that is elusive. We can hardly improve the ANA without that will; unless we revert to renting "warlords".

Would the Afghan state and ANA accept expatriate officers and NCOs in command? Whether from ISAF members or contractors. A modern equivalent, modified from historical examples across the Durand Line i.e. the para-military Frontier Corps.

That practice might create time for some of the Defpro recommendations.

jmm99

12-05-2009, 09:00 PM

The ANA is not my field - I was more interested in the linked article, Reforming the ANP (which to swipe from Dr Zhivago: "It certainly needed reforming.").

Other than my snarky thought (8 years; and we now realize the need for reform ?), I do have a serious question for you Soldiers and Marines out there.

Why does the ANA need Brigades and Corps ?

I count roughly 35 provinces - a 1K Bn per province = ~ 35K effectives (if, a big if, all are present). If concentration of mass is needed, form regimental combat teams for a specific purpose.

Regards

Mike

jmm99

12-06-2009, 10:26 PM

indirectly from a SF LTC, and this article, Corrupt, untrained, underpaid, illiterate: the forces waiting to take over (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/Afghanistan/article6945912.ece):

From The Sunday Times
December 6, 2009
Marie Colvin in Kabul
.....
Lieutenant-Colonel Todd Goehler is the head of a 12-man training team that since July has been mentoring Charlie kandak — Afghan for battalion — in Kabul’s capital division.

Goehler, a 24-year veteran of the special forces, described a disastrous situation that differed dramatically from the official projections. “They have been putting Band-Aids on this for a while,” he said.

On paper, Charlie kandak is one of six battalions in the brigade covering the 14 districts of Kabul and outlying areas. In reality, he revealed, only one other exists. Two kandaks are only at 30% capacity and are consequently not deployable. The final two are still “in the training pipeline”.

Decrepit Russian barracks at Kabul international airport have been earmarked for their arrival. The buildings lack running water and all the electrical fittings have been stripped. At any given moment, 20% to 30% of the 600 soldiers on Charlie kandak’s roster are absent without leave. In the Afghan army, a soldier can be missing for up to 60 days before any action — other than the suspension of his pay — is taken.

Illiteracy is high: 70% of inventory receipts are signed with a thumbprint. This engenders corruption because a soldier who cannot read has no idea what he has just confirmed receipt of.

So, in Kabul province, there are 2 Bns at roughly 450 effectives each (quite a bit less than the 1K/Bn that I posited). Add 2 Bns at 30% capacity (slightly under 150 effectives each); and 2 Bns at 0% capacity (in "training"), and we have a Brigade - perhaps, we might call that the Capital "Brigade". Any resemblence to the ROK Capital Division (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capital_Mechanized_Infantry_Division_(Republic_of_ Korea)) would be purely fictional.

But, the Brigades and Corps probably present a nice-looking PowerPoint slide.

-------------------------
That snark having been said of the ANA Kabul defenders, the ANP are far worse - from the same article:

While offering the prospect of hope, this was an isolated example: the army remains in poor shape. However, it is a well-oiled machine compared with what could be seen of the Afghan police force last week. Station three [in Kabul - JMM] should have had some of the best policemen in the city. The neighbourhood is home to more than 30 foreign companies, a university and two ministries.

Habibzani, the deputy, spelt out the problems. He had graduated from the Kabul police academy, but he could barely support his family of five on an officer’s salary of $200 (£120) a month.

The $120 paid to the lowest ranks meant the force attracted those who had no other possibilities — and needed the three meals a day that come with the job — but also meant they felt no guilt about demanding bribes.

A key aspect of the US strategy is to make working for the state more attractive than taking the Taliban’s shilling. Yet there was no sign of the wage increase to $165 that the government had announced. Meanwhile, the Taliban pay $220 a month.

Habibzani said 90% of the police could not read or write. Abdullah Fattah, a police trainer standing with him in the gloom of the hallway as black cables dangled uselessly from the ceiling, said police received five months’ training. “They start from such a low level. I need five years,” he said. “With all the attention of the international community, maybe three years minimum.”

No wonder that Sen. Levin's mantra of a primary focus on ANA and ANP training seems to have had little purchase at the WH. Doubling -X gives you -2X. Note that the present Kabul police situation is after Karzai stripped up to 700 police from several provinces (Kunduz article at this post (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=87831&postcount=39)).

Interesting article.

Mike

Bob's World

12-07-2009, 04:10 PM

One of the largest problems hindering the development of an effective ANA is extreme fear of "militias" by US policy types.

So instead of building a military security force that is recruited, trained, and employed in their own local areas (perhaps even in a mobilized status with the clear recognition that they revert to a drilling, reserve status once the crisis is contained); we instead recruit from one side of the country with the intent to ship the newly minted national soldiers to another side to operate. To put it mildly, this is problematic and completely out of touch with the cultural realities of these people.

So, my one recommendation for getting the ANA up and moving: Drop the "mini-me" national army approach, and go with something much more like the National Guard. Militia is not a dirty word.

Jedburgh

02-18-2010, 01:46 PM

NPC, 22 Jan 10: Build-up of Afghan security forces ill advised (http://www.peacebuilding.no/eng/content/download/103092/417270/version/8/file/NorefPBrief_LurasAfghanJan10.pdf)

A well-functioning government is a prerequisite for any successful counter-insurgency strategy and good governance is unlikely to be established in Afghanistan any time soon. As a consequence, the plans for the build-up of the ANSF must be adjusted. This build-up is not only an exit strategy; it is a cover for a “graceful exit”, serving a perceptual function in western publics. But in counter-insurgency theory a disconnect between governance and security is anathema. The end-state projection of 400,000 soldiers and police is unsustainable and ill-adapted to Afghanistan’s socio-economic and political foundations. Furthermore, the continued growth of centralized and corrupt security forces could very well lead to increased resistance. The ANSF – like any armed force – is in dire need of a credible and motivating cause, simply to avoid disintegration.....

davidbfpo

03-06-2010, 12:01 AM

Sorry, I could not leave the previous headline alone after this headline 'Afghan army to accept former Islamic militants Islamic militants are being brought into the Afghan National Army through a back door recruitment scheme'.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7376046/Afghan-army-to-accept-former-Islamic-militants.html

Reconciliation and integration. Watch & wait.

davidbfpo

03-20-2010, 09:34 PM

The think tank ICG will be issuing a report on the ANA in the next two weeks. Placed here as a reminder.

Sylvan

03-28-2010, 07:22 PM

The ANA is a tajik dominated organization built around the bones of the Northern Alliance.
We are trying to win a Pashtoon population with an Army built of tajik leadership and a disporportionate Hazara enlisted force.
1. The ANA does not fight and will not fight. They do Battalion level operations planned and advertised weeks in advance. Guaranteeing no results but minimum casualties.
2. The ANA are there to collect money. No matter what we supply them with, they will never be ready. No trucks? Give them trucks. No UAHs? Give them UAHs. No NATO weapons? give them NATO Weapons. Next they will ask for MRAPs. Then they will ask for 2000 Helos. This attitude is from the MoD down. Lets face it, the minute the ANA admit to being up to the task, we pull out with our money. They know this. They will ALWAYS have an excuse not to fight. The ANA outnumbers the Taliban 3-1 and is better trained, equipped and resourced. Yet McCrystal's assessment still excuses their complete lack of bravery due to, "A poverty of resources" Bull####.
3. ANP is 1/3rd the size but takes 3 times the casualties. Also killing 10X the Taliban. Much less mentorship, much less resources, but are actually pashtoon. ANA and MoD keep telling us we can't trust them but that is so all money gets pumped to the MoD side. Proof is in the pudding. ANA doesn't do ####.

Cut the ANA in half, and use those forces to create a viable ABP, which is critical and ignored both in the IGoA and in McCrystal's assessment.

Sylvan

03-29-2010, 11:31 PM

Moderator's Note: Copied from the ANP thread as the article linked covers ANA too.

Here is an article by Sean Naylor, also from this past summer.http://www.afji.com/2009/07/4231017/

90% of local complaints about police in my AO turned out to be false. Amazing how an Afghan will walk up and make a claim, and Westerners instantly assume its the god's honest truth.

Rex Brynen

06-10-2010, 03:51 PM

CSIS

Reforming ANSF Metrics (http://csis.org/files/publication/100609_ANSF.reporting.reform.pdf)
By Adam Mausner

June 10, 2010

The CM system does not provide an accurate picture of ANA capabilities. At best, it provides a snapshot of the resources that have gone into a unit's manning, equipping, and training. Moreover, the overly-quantitative CM system provides little information about how a unit will actually perform in the field. MNSTC-I ran into similar problems with its ORA system for the Iraqi Army. While many within the US military feel that the CM system needs to be reformed or replaced, there is little consensus as to what its replacement should look like. This memo lays out the framework for a more accurate system.

Fuchs

06-21-2010, 06:09 PM

Some flavours of self-defeating behaviour are kind of funny.

http://defensetech.org/2010/06/18/big-bucks-lure-crack-afghan-troops-to-private-security-firms/

Private security companies working under Defense Department contracts in Afghanistan are siphoning off some of the best and brightest from that country’s security and police forces, Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee says.
...

davidbfpo

06-26-2010, 10:17 PM

JMA

06-26-2010, 10:31 PM

This link appeared elsewhere and only noted the content - USMC in Helmand on their erstwhile ANA comrades: http://marinecorpstimes.com/news/2010/06/marine_ana_062110w/

There's also points in this UK paper: http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Appraising_Moshtarak.pdf

If the successful withdrawal of ISAF forces is premised upon a handover to a competent AMA then quite honestly the whole exercise is on a hiding to nothing. Surely there must be a plan B in the offing?

40below

07-08-2010, 08:14 PM

I must admit that I have heard noting vaguely positive about the ANA in terms of discipline and operational performance. If you have please tell.

I was there in 2009 when they were just starting to stand up the ANA in RC South and have them do their own patrolling, taking the lead while ISAF acted as support for the first time. They're not as good as the generals would like you to believe; they're not as awful as you might have heard. One of the big things was getting them used to a logistics/fire support chain that worked. They could be out in the field and radio back for supplies and they would get them, and the same with support. Apparently those things don't come naturally to Afghans, so the ANA was reluctant to perform / had no experience with complicated or extended missions or patrols. But I understand quality varies greatly across the board.

The soldiers and OMLT folks said they were making progress, but when you start at zero, there's a long way to go. The image of the ANA in my mind was one morning at CNS where Afghans were on the range being trained on brand-new AK-74s. It was the first time they had ever fired NOT on full auto and the first time they were expected to hit what they were aiming at, and the results were pretty dismal. They could have used those targets for another week, they weren't suffering a lot of wear and tear.

40below

07-08-2010, 10:06 PM

I actually have some photos from that range session. It was the Brits who were doing the training and as it continued, they got less supportive and more annoyed. The poor Afghans were terrified.
http://sphotos.ak.fbcdn.net/photos-ak-snc1/v2580/227/55/599384677/n599384677_1532266_3571805.jpg

davidbfpo

07-15-2010, 07:57 PM

Hat tip to the UK blogsite Circling the Lion's Den for catching this:
If you want to read how the US is unable to assess the capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces and how top-rated ANSF units don't have the capability to sustain independent operations, you might want to read the latest report from the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. You can find it

Report link:http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR%20Audit-10-11.pdf

(Unable to quote from report due to a fault loading it here).

huskerguy7

07-17-2010, 04:53 PM

Cut the ANA in half, and use those forces to create a viable ABP, which is critical and ignored both in the IGoA and in McCrystal's assessment.

I agree. The ANA is large enough-134,000 soldiers. People say it needs to be 200-250 thousand to succeed, but I disagree. Look at how many troops there were in Vietnam for a population that was significantly smaller than Afghanistan's. Didn't work out, did it?

In my opinion, once the troop number reaches a certain amount, numbers become less of an impact. Instead, all what matters is what the troops are doing.

There are some nice brightspots in the ANA. Not only is it praised by Afghan's, but the ANA Commando Kandaks are quite effective.

davidbfpo

07-17-2010, 05:14 PM

Huskerguy (in part said):
There are some nice brightspots in the ANA. Not only is it praised by Afghan's, but the ANA Commando Kandaks are quite effective.

Attested to by Free Range International blogsite:
There is much more American military activity around Jalalabad including flying columns of the varsity Afghan SF with their American advisers who use Toyota trucks just like their Afghan colleges. These small, fast, powerful formations are by far the most effective joint US/Afghan effort of the war and the only example of real embedded (as opposed to co-located) training currently being done with the Afghans.

(text accompanying photo)Afghan Commandos with embedded American SF pause for a radio check outside their base in Jalalabad. They are heading towards the Southern Triangle which contains Taliban units who operate day and night and have driven the Afghan Security Forces out for the time being. Local traffic always stops well short of the Afghan Commandos who enjoy an excellent reputation among the Afghan population but have pretty strict force protection standards.

Link:http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=3289

huskerguy7

07-17-2010, 05:30 PM

Huskerguy (in part said):

Attested to by Free Range International blogsite:

Link:http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=3289

I just finished an article about the ANA Commandos and was truly surprised (it will be available next week) with what I encountered. Not only are they training in advanced conventional battlefield skills and maneuvers, but recently (as of May 2010), some Commandos have undergone some intense counterinsurgency oriented training that focuses on a population-centric approach.

Link: http://www.ntm-a.com/news/categories/army/672-afghanistans-first-special-forces-team-graduates?lang=

huskerguy7

07-20-2010, 04:59 PM

huskerguy7

07-26-2010, 10:35 PM

Recently, I've published some material on my blog (http://www.student-view-world.blogspot.com/) that may be of interest to the SWJ community. I had the opportunity to research different parts of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and talk to people familiar with the subject. In the end, 7 different articles were produced. They are listed below.

-The ANA: How Big Should it Be? (http://student-view-world.blogspot.com/2010/07/afghan-national-army-how-big-should-it_19.html)
-The ANA: The Importance of Air-Transportation Capabilities (http://student-view-world.blogspot.com/2010/07/afghan-national-army-importance-of-air.html)
-Afghan Commandos: Elite Forces Ready for Action (http://student-view-world.blogspot.com/2010/07/afghan-commandos-elite-forces-ready-for.html)
-The ANA: A Melting Pot of Different Backgrounds (http://student-view-world.blogspot.com/2010/07/afghan-national-army-melting-pot-of.html)
-The ANA: Struggling with an Ineffective Supply System (http://student-view-world.blogspot.com/2010/07/afghan-national-army-struggling-with.html)
-The ANA: The Importance of Mentors (http://student-view-world.blogspot.com/2010/07/afghan-national-army-importance-of.html)
-The ANA: Dr. David Kilcullen's Thoughts (http://student-view-world.blogspot.com/2010/07/afghan-national-army-dr-kilcullens.html)

Unlike many blogs, these "posts" are longer, offer more information, and a bit of analysis. Also, they are researched and sources are cited/hyperlinked.

Anybody who is following the situation in Afghanistan would enjoy these posts.

Enjoy:D

JMA

08-02-2010, 01:37 PM

Yup, Taber's Flea page 93 says exactly that: ""How would the police themselves be secure where even military patrols were not?"

The context, which we both will agree is all-important, was the national police program in Vietnam in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The advisors to that program were the Michigan State group led by Wesley Fischel (later unjustly persecuted by Ramparts and others). Their model was the Michigan State Police - a very good domestic police unit then and now; but not a paramilitary, gendarmerie type unit trained and equipped to fight irregulars; and led by Os and NCOs competent in that field.

Now, what you would do is tell me how to bring my cops up to RLI standards. :)

Cheers

Mike

The key comment is "How would the police themselves be secure where even military patrols were not?"

I assume that the thousands of ANA and ANP (police) are being fed into areas /provinces where things are somewhat more quiet and there is ethnic compatibility?

We hear of figures of hundreds of thousands of Afghan troops and police and is anyone sure that they are holding their own anywhere?

I know very little about police work and have less interest. I know enough to realise that for the police to operate anywhere near effectively there needs to be general peace and very little if any insurgent activity. The Taliban need to keep the activity level no more than where it is all but impossible for normal police work to be carried out. Then they tie the troops down and confine the police to their bases.

davidbfpo

08-06-2010, 08:41 PM

Yes, a "spin" article, but it has its moments. Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7926376/Force-for-change-the-women-of-the-new-Afghan-army.html

JMA

08-09-2010, 09:13 AM

I just finished an article about the ANA Commandos and was truly surprised (it will be available next week) with what I encountered. Not only are they training in advanced conventional battlefield skills and maneuvers, but recently (as of May 2010), some Commandos have undergone some intense counterinsurgency oriented training that focuses on a population-centric approach.

Link: http://www.ntm-a.com/news/categories/army/672-afghanistans-first-special-forces-team-graduates?lang=

Well that is all good and well but the true test comes when they are tested in battle... on their own.

Not sure how these guys are selected? The trick is surely to select only those who have a proven combat record so as to not risk wasting all the time, energy and cost of training someone who may not rise to the challenge in combat?

Then again all this said. This training they have undergone, is it proven tactics that work against the Taliban? Or is it the standard US/Brit type training which has not proved to be successful this far?

Ken White

08-09-2010, 07:09 PM

...is it the standard US/Brit type training which has not proved to be successful this far?I doubt you're in a position to accurately make such an assessment. While I have no doubt that UK/US training is not as good as it should be -- I constantly rattle on about poor US training -- I also have little doubt that on an individual and small unit basis they are way ahead of most of their opponents.

I suggest that the training and the prescribed employment are two quite different issues. Had you written "...the standard US/Brit employment which has not proved to be successful this far." I would agree.

That's not a semantic quibble. By knocking the training -- on which you do not have detailed knowledge -- you're focusing attention on something that may need a tweak but is not terribly bad. The employment of those troops, however trained, is bad. It is the major issue and the item that needs attention. :eek:

It is also an item that, rightly or wrongly, will get little attention -- as there is no perceived urgent need for it to be fixed.

jmm99

08-09-2010, 07:23 PM

comes up with over 3000 hits. The Wiki, ANA Commando Brigade (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ANA_Commando_Brigade), seems a bit dated. BLUF is that Astan ANA "Special Forces" come from ANA Commando personal who come from ANA personnel. The ANA Commando personal get a 12-week "Ranger" training and then an 18-week OJT with US SF - per the Wiki.

The Wiki has about 5200 of the ANA Commando types, which works out to about 8 Astan villages per each commando (based on 40K Astan villages from Kilcullen). The article, Afghanistan’s First Special Forces Team Graduates (http://www.ntm-a.com/news/categories/army/672-afghanistans-first-special-forces-team-graduates?lang=), does not give the number in the class - how many villlages can a US SF team (ODA) handle under ideal, mediocre and poor conditions ?

A couple of "maybe" and "perhaps" quotes from this "PA" article:

They are trained to handle any combat situation.

If true, remarkable.

In the Special Forces course, the Commandos’ primary focus moves away from the battlefield toward helping villages build and maintain stability. While most ANA missions are designed around a short-term goal, such as clearing insurgents from an area, the Special Forces Commandos mission is one of long-term support, acting as a go-between for village elders and district leadership. This strengthens the “population-centric” approach to the counterinsurgency.

If true, not so remarkable - an implementation of 3-24.

But, where does that “population-centric” approach fit into the article's prior eight paragraphs extolling the virtues of the ANA Commando Brigage in the "enemy-centric" and "leader-centric" approaches (with a listing of "direct action" operations).

The thrust I suppose is that the ANA SF Commando personnel (all ___ of them) can walk and chew gum at the same time. Which, if true, would make COL McCuen happy as he strums his harp, since he recognized the need for congruent political and military efforts.

A bit south of 12 months until 1 Aug 2011 to see what happiness is truly wrought.

Regards

Mike

JMA

08-09-2010, 09:01 PM

I doubt you're in a position to accurately make such an assessment. While I have no doubt that UK/US training is not as good as it should be -- I constantly rattle on about poor US training -- I also have little doubt that on an individual and small unit basis they are way ahead of most of their opponents.

I suggest that the training and the prescribed employment are two quite different issues. Had you written "...the standard US/Brit employment which has not proved to be successful this far." I would agree.

That's not a semantic quibble. By knocking the training -- on which you do not have detailed knowledge -- you're focusing attention on something that may need a tweak but is not terribly bad. The employment of those troops, however trained, is bad. It is the major issue and the item that needs attention. :eek:

It is also an item that, rightly or wrongly, will get little attention -- as there is no perceived urgent need for it to be fixed.

I will go with the recommended change in terminology you suggest, let it be "...the standard US/Brit employment which has not proved to be successful this far." then.

huskerguy7

08-10-2010, 03:06 AM

Well that is all good and well but the true test comes when they are tested in battle... on their own.

Not sure how these guys are selected? The trick is surely to select only those who have a proven combat record so as to not risk wasting all the time, energy and cost of training someone who may not rise to the challenge in combat?

Then again all this said. This training they have undergone, is it proven tactics that work against the Taliban? Or is it the standard US/Brit type training which has not proved to be successful this far?

First off, several Kandaks do operate on their own. In fact, some plan and conduct their own operations. They're way ahead of their counterparts in the ANA and ANP. Worrying about their reliability is only wasting energy in my opinion.

Second, (as it says in my article), most are chosen after their basic training. The training staff watches for soldiers that demonstrate leadership, respect, teamwork, and success. In my opinion, I think this is the best way to obtain the soldiers. Why? If you continue to pull and relocate combat veterans from regular ANA kandaks, then how do you expect to produce an experienced army?

Third, the training that they go through is meant to make them mirror (for the most part) US Army Rangers. This gives them the skills to fight efficiently in combat. It's just a matter of adapting these skills to combat the Taliban.

So far, the ANA Commandos have mainly conducted HVT hunts along with a few assaults on small Taliban groups. However, they are slowly performing more COIN duties and operations.

But, where does that “population-centric” approach fit into the article's prior eight paragraphs extolling the virtues of the ANA Commando Brigage in the "enemy-centric" and "leader-centric" approaches (with a listing of "direct action" operations).

The thrust I suppose is that the ANA SF Commando personnel (all ___ of them) can walk and chew gum at the same time. Which, if true, would make COL McCuen happy as he strums his harp, since he recognized the need for congruent political and military efforts.

I am also anxious to see how these SF soldiers who have been trained on COIN perform. Will they try to win the "hearts and minds" the ISAF way or Afghan way?

gbramlet

08-11-2010, 10:54 AM

So far, the ANA Commandos have mainly conducted HVT hunts along with a few assaults on small Taliban groups. However, they are slowly performing more COIN duties and operations.

I second that. I see the use of Afghan Commandos primarily in HVI "hunts," area clearance, and search and rescue, but have yet to see any form of COIN operations by them. These are all in & out missions with ABP/ANA following in afterwards for control. I'm curious to see their version of COIN ops, if/when it happens.

JMA

08-11-2010, 07:12 PM

First off, several Kandaks do operate on their own. In fact, some plan and conduct their own operations. They're way ahead of their counterparts in the ANA and ANP. Worrying about their reliability is only wasting energy in my opinion.

Their reliability or other wise is critical to the success of the hand over from ISAF to the Afghan forces. There is absolutely no point in going through the motions of a staged and deliberate transition if these units of the Afghan government collapse in a matter of weeks or months after the hand over.

Second, (as it says in my article), most are chosen after their basic training. The training staff watches for soldiers that demonstrate leadership, respect, teamwork, and success. In my opinion, I think this is the best way to obtain the soldiers. Why? If you continue to pull and relocate combat veterans from regular ANA kandaks, then how do you expect to produce an experienced army?

Selection is a critical aspect especially for such local forces. If they have acquitted themselves well under fire against the Taliban would probably mean they are not Taliban plants and that then have an even chance of actually fighting when in contact with the Taliban. There is a reason "gangs" use the commission of a crime as part of their initiation process as this gets recruits to cross a line and commit themselves irrevocably. This also prevents an influx of recruits attracted by the extra money who may disappear when the time comes for them to fix bayonets and do the business.

This is also a real problem in western armies where people join up to get an education, flying hours or whatever and find it very inconvenient when they are sent off to war.

So in such an environment prior combat experience is essential.

Third, the training that they go through is meant to make them mirror (for the most part) US Army Rangers. This gives them the skills to fight efficiently in combat. It's just a matter of adapting these skills to combat the Taliban.

Lets just be brutally honest for a moment. Training alone does not make the soldier. There are nations who have formidable records of brave military service (the Gurkhas) and others lower down the scale who have surrendered more often than won any battle (don't want to mention any names here).

So you need to accept that, one, training is worthless if there is not a will to fight in the first place let alone the willingness to die if that is what it takes, and two, "adapting these skills" is easier said than done (ask the US military and the Brits). So the two pillars of your success thesis are in fact very weak indeed.

So far, the ANA Commandos have mainly conducted HVT hunts along with a few assaults on small Taliban groups. However, they are slowly performing more COIN duties and operations.

Now lets look at these independent actions against HVTs you talk about in the context of the overall military activity in Afghanistan. 0.001%? How on earth will they and the rest of the Afghan forces be ready to successfully take on the Taliban on their own in 20 years, let alone the 4 years spoken about? Slow is not fast enough.

I am also anxious to see how these SF soldiers who have been trained on COIN perform. Will they try to win the "hearts and minds" the ISAF way or Afghan way?

Don't use the SF title too lightly (I suggest). Real SF soldiers will take exception to being compared to this lot.

jmm99

08-12-2010, 04:39 AM

at Professional Soldiers (http://www.professionalsoldiers.com/forums/index.php) (about as SF as you can get): Commando Training (http://www.professionalsoldiers.com/forums/showthread.php?t=19285&highlight=Afghan+Commando) (linking this NPR article, U.S. Troops Train Afghans To Take Their Place (http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=93490156&ft=1&f=1003)); and 'Incorruptible' Commandos Sign of Hope for Afghanistan's Future (http://www.professionalsoldiers.com/forums/showthread.php?t=23983&highlight=ana+commando).

Cheers

Mike

davidbfpo

08-13-2010, 09:12 PM

Only seen this report on the BBC:
An Afghan National Army operation - initially run independently of Nato - in the eastern province of Laghman went "disastrously wrong", officials say. They say that what should have been a routine "mopping up" operation turned into a "major confrontation" after the Taliban launched an ambush.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-10963556

JM2008

01-18-2011, 10:52 PM

Costly coalition plan to recruit thousands more Afghan forces draws concerns (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/17/AR2011011702058.html?sid=ST2011011703896)

This Washington Post article kind of threw me for a loop. Why would anyone object to setting ANSF and GIRoA up for success against the Taliban or any other possible resurgence of insurgents? I get that it will cost us more money over the next decade. But will it really cost us more than having to put boots-on-the-ground again to help Afghans squash a new insurgency that they are unable to defeat alone? And to the concern that it will take more foreign trainers: why not start filling those trainer billets with battle tested Afghans, even if just in part?

IntelTrooper

01-18-2011, 11:22 PM

If the wrong tool is being used, success won't come with another 100,000 or 1,000,000 of them. We need to revisit how and why we are using the ANSF before we continue churning out more.

SJPONeill

01-18-2011, 11:22 PM

At a guess, I'd say that initial concerns will be based on a 'quality v quantity' argument...the size of the ANA/ANP/ANSF bears little or no relation to how effective they might or might not be against either a conventional or irregular threat and there are already many concerns that the current training programmes are more focussed on producing metrics that support this "irreversible transition" than forces that will be both effective and self-sustaining once the bolster of ISAF disappears...

SteveMetz

01-18-2011, 11:32 PM

JM2008

01-18-2011, 11:51 PM

Inteltrooper,
How would you suppose we use ANSF? I mean the current partnering system seems the most logical to me. And then transitioning to ANSF control as we are in parts of Helmand already seems like the next viable step. The increase isn't in combat troops but in intelligence (done by ISAF now), logistics(a failure of a system that they have now) and engineers (do they have engineers now?). This increase would allow them to eventually step in and do the jobs that we are doing now for them. It just seems logical.

Bob's World

01-19-2011, 12:11 AM

National Guard. A well ordered Militia answering to Provincial Governors that are selected by the people of their Province, rather than appointed by GIROA. A military organization that by design fades back into the populace as the emergency subsides. That is a proven, cost effective solution to this problem.

But then, such a process of picking legitimate governors or securing Afghans with locally recruited, trained, and employed militia is unconstitutional in Afghanistan. Too bad that.

Looked at from an other perspective, I am always leery when such large increases of Tashkils are discussed. Too often in the ANP the District police chief will say all of his Tashkil billets are filled, yet he only has 12 of 75 officers present for duty. The rest are on leave, etc. No, the rest are mere names on paper and he pockets those salaries and uses the same to pay his patron for his position. Similarly he is authorized 20 vehicles, but only 5 are serviceable. The broken ones sit idle in motorpool. Broken vehicles don't burn gas, more money to his personal fund. Ah, but at least he has new AK-47s to arm his men, with 100 being delivered just a year ago. But now only 20 are accounted for, the rest sold to the Taliban for a tidy profit.

What happens if the the West agrees to such a large bump in the ANA Tashkil? I suspect much the same, but only at the national level instead.

Meanwhile, a very effective semi-private operator such as Matiullah Khan in Uruzgan, a COL in the ANP, with some 400 Tashkil billets, uses profits from his security company to arm, motorize, and deploy some 1000 men. Keeping route Bear from Kandahar to Tarin Kowt open; and working across tribal lines throughout Uruzgan as a (relatively, as all things are relative in Afghanistan) trusted broker to resolve disputes and dispense a hard, but just brand of law enforcement. When he goes to Kabul to ask to have his Tashkil expanded to address some of the hundreds of men he funds from his own pocket he is told of course, but that the cost is $50,000. He refuses. A couple weeks later he learns that action has been taken on his Tashkil even though he refused to pay this bribe. It has been cut by some 150 men. This is Afghanistan under the current constitution that vests virtually all patronage in one man.

This is a fixable problem, but we have to be willing to take it on, and so far there has been little appetite (beyond pathetic lecturing) for truly holding Karzai to task to fix the disaster of a constitution that make all of this not only possible, but legal.

Fuchs

01-19-2011, 12:21 AM

This plan only makes sense if one of two conditions hold:

1) We believe the Afghan forces will eventually have more success than NATO forces in militarily defeating the Taliban;

or

2) We believe the Afghan forces can do at least as well as NATO forces and we are willing to pay the $12 billion a year bill forever.

I disagree on both.

1) There is a great cost associated with the use of Western forces, and this factors into the consideration. The ANA does not need to be "more successful" (or less unsuccessful). Success is on the plus side, while costs are on the minus side. ANA has a smaller minus side, thus it doesn't need to offer as much on the plus side.

2) The first part is a repeat of the first point and I already commented that. The $ 12 billion are NOT cast in stone. The influx of $$$ created this unnaturally high pay level for Afghan mercenaries, it will dwindle once the influx of $$$ is reduced. Afghan mercenaries could in 2015 cost a third or fifth as much as today if we reduced Western influx of $$$ to two or three $ billion/yr.

JM2008

01-19-2011, 01:12 AM

National Guard. Now that makes sense.

Too often in the ANP the District police chief will say all of his Tashkil billets are filled, yet he only has 12 of 75 officers present for duty. The rest are on leave, etc. No, the rest are mere names on paper and he pockets those salaries and uses the same to pay his patron for his position.

Yes this is a big issue among the ANP but is a much smaller issue within the ANA. That is IMO due to the fact that we are partnering with the ANA. With the ANP we are simply using PMTs who go to those districts a couple days a month (up to a week in troubled districts) and then beyond that the ANP are left on their own. First, the ANP should not be used to "fight" the insurgency. That is more the role of the ANA.

The biggest problem that I see when looking forward in Afghanistan is the fact that the constitution does not allow the government to collect taxes from Afghans. If we are going to encourage GIRoA to rework its constitution then we need to have a look at this too. But the explanation that I was given when I was told this was that it was against Islam to tax muslims?

Fuchs

01-19-2011, 01:20 AM

I didn't hear about such a constitution article yet, but there are different ways for state income anyway; tariffs, selling concessions, confiscate, state-owned businesses, fees.

IntelTrooper

01-19-2011, 03:10 AM

National Guard. Now that makes sense.

I pretty much agree with everything COL Jones said and would go on to say that the American battlespace owners should only be supporting the ETTs/PMTs/ODAs/etc. who would be permanently embedded advising their particular element.

With the ANP we are simply using PMTs who go to those districts a couple days a month (up to a week in troubled districts) and then beyond that the ANP are left on their own. First, the ANP should not be used to "fight" the insurgency. That is more the role of the ANA.

The ANP are a complete and total disaster. We don't have a clear idea of what they are supposed to be doing and neither do they. In the meantime, they victimize every one in sight. Provide elements in the ANA with law enforcement powers to work in tandem with combat operations. Once an area has been legitimately cleared and held, we can start figuring out what we need to do as far as law enforcement. And it needs to be a local solution.

jcustis

01-19-2011, 05:38 AM

The new troops would round out the Afghan security forces with more military intelligence units, engineers, logisticians and other specialists, according to U.S. military officials. Looks like we are trying to model them in our own image, and violating a pretty decent rule of what to avoid

Through war games and modeling, coalition officials landed on a low-end estimate of 352,000 Afghan security forces needed by October 2012. If the Afghans meet goals to curb high desertion rates among soldiers and police, the foreign donors would agree to raise the total to 378,000, U.S. officials said. As others have said, we just need to do a whole lot better working to improve the capacity of the ones we have. That is, of course, once we figure out exactly where they are, get them to the area where they are supposed to be aligned, and make them actually work either fighting the fight, or policing their assigned AO. There remains too much fleecing and graft going on, beyond any sort of "supplemental" corruption that we saw in Iraq.

"We actually could cut police training from six weeks to three and train twice as many, but we didn't do that," the senior U.S. military official said. "That's the range that gets you both quantity and quality." I've never understood the methodology followed to the training, and who came up with this "range" of quality and quantity. Quantity is great, if you want to bully your way into the market and strong-arm the locals. Quality doesn't need that quite as much.

By late summer, the army and police must begin recruiting if they are to aim for these higher targets, so "we're only about seven months out from having to hire people," the military official said.

...

JM2008

01-20-2011, 12:06 AM

Provide elements in the ANA with law enforcement powers to work in tandem with combat operations. Once an area has been legitimately cleared and held, we can start figuring out what we need to do as far as law enforcement. And it needs to be a local solution.

I agree with that idea too. I think that this would allow us to effectively partner with the ANP without the need for more troops.

I never understood the reliance on national police anyway. It wouldn't even work in the US. We have national law enforements entities but the vast bulk of the police work is done at the local level by either sherrif or city police. Maybe there is a reason that I have missed but it just doesn't make sense.

Fuchs

01-20-2011, 04:02 AM

jcustis

01-20-2011, 04:23 AM

I know it doesn't work in AFG either, but using a national instead of local police is at times a necessity.

Local officials should be avoided in countries with subtle corruption problems because such officials become too often corrupt.

National officials can reduce the problem, unless the problem is an overt (and large) one. In that case I have to ask why set up a police in the first place? It does no good.

In Afghanistan, the temptation of corruption would be curbed if the local tribe influenced the police because they were from that area. They would also fight harder, and be less inclined to fleece the locals, since they have to go home on leave at some point.

The counterpoint to this is that yes, local leaders might be more able to bribe the police to secure the release of a detainee, or the local police might be more inclined to look the other way or otherwise tacitly support the local insurgent.

We have already picked a side in the debate, and it is causing so many logistical and employment issues that it does not make sense to continue with the policy of recruiting officers from out of the area and shipping them off to another district.

JM2008

01-20-2011, 05:32 PM

In Afghanistan, the temptation of corruption would be curbed if the local tribe influenced the police because they were from that area. They would also fight harder, and be less inclined to fleece the locals, since they have to go home on leave at some point.

The counterpoint to this is that yes, local leaders might be more able to bribe the police to secure the release of a detainee, or the local police might be more inclined to look the other way or otherwise tacitly support the local insurgent.

So how do we use local police but have a checks and balances system that deters those local police from taking bribes? Is it that we have a local police force that has embedded Internal Affairs who report directly to the MoI but are not from the area? And have stiff penalties for police who are caught accepting bribes? Maybe a 3 times and your out kind of deal where the first time you are repremanded (maybe even publicly), the second time you are reassigned, and the third time you spend a year in jail and are discharged. But in order to insure that the police are not the target of reprisal from the IA guys, once a police officer is accused of accepting bribes (or other misconduct) they are suspended and an investigation is launched by the MoI through an independant panel.

What are the thoughts on a system like this?

Fuchs

01-20-2011, 06:21 PM

The Lacedaemonians and Republican Romans had an interesting system; two men for every one office. They check & balance each other, you only need to make sure they're not friends and you also need to bear the resulting friction.

Alternatively, use the PRChinese approach: Summary executions of corrupt medium-level officials.

KenWats

01-20-2011, 07:11 PM

Alternatively, use the PRChinese approach: Summary executions of corrupt medium-level officials.

Made me think of a line from The Wire.

"Bunny" Colvin: Middle management means that you got just enough responsibility to listen when people talk, but not so much you can't tell anybody to go __ themselves.

More to the point of the conversation, JM2008's suggestion about Federal IA officers supervising local police kind of reminded me of the "Political Officers" or "Commisars" that the Red Army supposedly had. I'm not pretending to know much about how they were actually employed or their efficacy, but it seemed an interesting parallel.

davidbfpo

11-02-2012, 12:36 PM

Note: I expect there have been posts about the ANA / ANSF elsewhere, notably 'green on blue' but this thread is for the ANA.

So catching up on my reading of Kings of War:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2012/10/willy-wonkas-war/ a hat tip to them for this NYT article:http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/16/world/asia/afghan-armys-high-turnover-clouds-us-exit-plan.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0&smid=fb-share

KoW highlights, citing an Afghan general:
We’re not concerned about getting enough young men,just as long as we get that $4.1 billion a year from NATO.

I found these snippets of note, partly as I cannot recall seeing them of late:
Now at its biggest size yet, 195,000 soldiers, the Afghan Army is so plagued with desertions and low re-enlistment rates that it has to replace a third of its entire force every year....a 3% rejection rate for recruits....in June..there are still no units that American trainers consider able to operate entirely without NATO assistance.....the Army’s desertion rate is now 7 to 10 percent...Put another way, a third of the Afghan Army perpetually consists of first-year recruits fresh off a 10- to 12-week training course.

davidbfpo

12-13-2012, 11:44 PM

The Pentagon released its bi-annual assessment of the war in Afghanistan, which shows security is increasing in populated areas, even if violence is up. The report also shows that only one of the 23 Afghan National Army brigades is capable of operating independently without air or other military support from U.S. or international forces. A senior defense official who briefed reporters at the Pentagon said the "fighting capability" of the Afghan forces and the fact that they carry out independent operations at many levels, even if those operations require coalition support, means they are far more capable than they were.

Link to NYT report:http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/11/world/asia/afghan-army-weak-as-transition-nears-pentagon-says.html?_r=0

Link to DoD report:http://www.defense.gov/news/1230_Report_final.pdf

davidbfpo

03-07-2013, 10:44 PM

An IISS Strategic Comment 'Afghanistan's security transition reaches key point', which covers a number of subjects and is optimistic. This caught my attention as it illustrates bloodily what transition means:
As a result of the ANSF taking the tactical lead in many areas, including those in which insurgents were more active, ANA casualties doubled in 2012 to 1,056. This casualty rate is double that of the other Afghan security forces. While 42% of the 315 NATO fatalities in 2012 were as a result of IEDs, over 80% of ANA fatalities were caused in this way, a stark demonstration of their lower level of counter-IED capability.

Link:http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-19-2013/march/afghanistans-security-transition-reaches-key-point/

Bill Moore

04-13-2013, 07:50 PM

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/13/world/asia/taliban-attacks-afghan-army-unit.html?ref=world&_r=0

Taliban Attack Highly Regarded Afghan Army Unit

According to Afghan security officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity because of the nature of the Taliban victory, the 13 soldiers constituted the entire complement at the checkpost. One police official said that a force of 200 Taliban fighters had opened fire with heavy weapons and finally set the post on fire; most of the deaths were from the flames.

It was one of the bloody insurgent attacks in the current spring offensive that have helped drive the rate of government fatalities to the highest level of the war. Afghan soldiers and police officers are dying at more than double the rate of a year ago, according to military officials.

One of my nagging concerns with the VSO program, Afghanistan Army, etc. is that their successes have been enabled with our fire support and our mobility assets. I assume the claim of 200 Taliban fighter is greatly exaggerated (at least I hope it is), but none the less if the Taliban can mass 40-50 fighters to attack these outposts they'll likely be effective if ASF or ISAF can rapidly provide fire support or quickly deploy reinforcements to the unit in trouble. That gets to another point, how could is their communications architecture to call for help?

Once we downsize and hand over the fighting to the Afghans I suspect we'll many of the VSO successes get rolled back and smaller distributed Afghan security force check points get pulled back into larger fire bases if they're unable to support them adequately. Seems like we have seen this picture before somewhere, maybe several somewheres.

jcustis

04-13-2013, 08:38 PM

Massing that many fighters against an important target is not unprecedented. Our AUP det had a HF unit with a jury-rigged field expedient antenna, but couldn't use GSM tech because there were zero cell towers in the area. The district Governor had a sat phone, but that was the lone device.

Expect to hear much more of the same as we seek a decent interval.

davidbfpo

05-15-2013, 08:43 PM

A NYT report, after being embedded with an Afghan Commando unit:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/15/world/asia/us-special-operations-step-up-in-afghanistan.html?pagewanted=2&_r=0&nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_ee_20130515

The two Taliban attacks within Kabul in 2012 were well covered on SWC, so it is interesting this US SF trainer's comment:
The Afghan Army hadn’t performed that well in two previous tasks....Both counterattacks had to be heavily mentored. It came out O.K. in the end — but only after a lot of prompting from our side.

Now if this the rating given to an elite unit one wonders how basic kandaks fare:
Although the unit based here is considered the most proficient in the country, allied officials said that it conducted 85 percent of its missions unilaterally, but still required coalition support for the other 15 percent.

davidbfpo

05-17-2013, 07:57 PM

As the alliance strategy for drawing down in Afghanistan depends on the ANSF "standing up" finding the attrition rate is over a third is not good news:http://www.emptywheel.net/2013/05/01/even-with-non-validated-afghan-self-reporting-sigar-finds-ansf-falls-short-of-352000-goal/

A UK newspaper report, which I missed in March 2013, based on a British assessment of the ANSF:http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/nato-alarm-over-afghan-army-crisis-loss-of-recruits-threatens-security-as-handover-looms-8555238.html

Hat tip to this subject comes from a blogger's analysis 'What Is the Attrition Rate for Afghan Special Operations Forces?':http://www.emptywheel.net/2013/05/16/what-is-the-attrition-rate-for-afghan-special-operations-forces/

Afghan Special Force size cites merely the authorized number of commandos, not the actual number that were assigned at the time, which, as of late November, 2012, was only 83% of the authorized level.

Now note that the Defense Department stated that 621 new commandos were trained from April through September of 2012. Yet, if we look at the SIGAR data, actual assigned force level dropped from 10,617 to 10,193 in the closest comparable time period (May through September of 2012). Taken together, those numbers suggest that over 1000 personnel disappeared from the ranks during this time period. If we are generous and take this loss of 1000 as representing how many are lost in six months instead of five, we still see an overall loss of 2000 commandos per year. For a force size of just over 10,000, that is an attrition rate of almost 20% a year.

A 20% annual attrition rate in the elite Afghan units, who are reported to be far more reliable, motivated and trained, makes me wonder from afar what the main ANSF attrition rate is.

jcustis

05-18-2013, 12:18 AM

I would not surprised if desertion (aka "vacation") rates exploded once it sunks in that yeah, when we said we were leaving, we meant it.

davidbfpo

06-27-2013, 08:23 PM

From a UK government report, which was spotted today via Twitter and within is an indicator of attrition rates on Table Two: ANSF Attrition Rates and I have only shown the Actual Rate:

ANA: 2.5%
AAF: 0.9%
ANP: 1.5%
Uniformed Police 1.4%
Border Police 1.8%
ANCOP 1.5%

Others may find it helpful:https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/209312/Afghanistan_Monthly_Progress_Report.pdf

davidbfpo

07-02-2013, 05:36 PM

On the separate ANP thread IIRC there are posts on the casualty rate.

Today FP has:
...the Afghan interior ministry announced that 299 police officers were killed and 618 were wounded there in June, the month local security forces officially took the lead on securing the country.

Bob's World

07-03-2013, 03:29 PM

Infanteer

07-08-2013, 01:44 AM

Attrition rates among the ANA are more than anything else an indicator that Afghans in general do not agree with the security construct the West has designed and forced upon them.

ISAF does not implement an operational design and plans designed and prepared by GIRoA and the ANA. We (ISAF) tell them what we think needs to be done, where we think it should be done,and how we think it should be done.

The need for an ANA and the plan for the size of the force and how that force is trained,organized and equipped was also forced upon GIRoA and the ANA by the West.

Bottom line is that the entire assessment of the security problem and current solution to the security problem in Afghanistan is a Western product, based on Western perspectives and designed and implemented in Western terms. Not surprisingly, this solution appears to be as inappropriate as it is unsustainable.

Once ISAF stands down and responsiblity (sovereignty?) finally is relinquished to GIRoA we can expect everything to quickly shrink down to what GIRoA believes is both necessary and affordable. If it is 1/10th of the ISAF perspective I will be very surprised.

But no one should be surprised by the attrition rates among the ANA. These young Afghans, more so than the US military supporting them, are also essentially being sent to a foreign land to fight a conflict they do not neccessarily believe is necessary, within an organization and manner largely inconsistent and incompatible with the context of their culture.

My standard quote on a COIN vs FID mindset below applies. We applied our COIN mindset with predictable results.

Yep.

Funny thing is Kalev Sepp made a list of COIN best practices, and this was one of them:
Indigenous regular armies, although fighting in their own country and more numerous than foreign forces, were subordinate to them. Conventional forces trained indigenous units in their image—with historically poor results.

From:http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/sepp.pdf

The ANA is a poor man's US Army and is completely ineffective at conventional tactics without ISAF forces around. I remember when our OMLT was pulled away and all of the sudden, the ANA needed the most basic, rudimentary supplies to last more than 6 hours away from their base. Now, that begs the question as to whether Afghanistan needs an large Army good at conventional tactics, or whether it needs a more effective paramilitary force with embeds.

davidbfpo

01-24-2014, 04:11 PM

I expect many SWC readers no longer watch Afghanistan closely, but thanks to FP's Situation Report for highlighting a press conference by Lt Gen Milley, of ISAF:
Well, yeah, let me -- as I said, they did very well tactically. So we are transitioning right now from combat advising to functional advising. And what does that mean? So it's -- it's our assessment that the Afghan combat units, kandaks, battalions, companies, really do not need, with very few exceptions, tactical advisers with them on combat operations on a day in and day out basis.

We know that the Afghan battalions and companies can fight. We know they can shoot, move, communicate. They can conduct combined arms operations. We know that all of the maneuver brigades and -- all 24 of them -- are either partially capable, capable, or fully capable. We know that the corps can conduct, plan, coordinate, synchronize, and execute combined arms operation. That's important.

But tactics an army does not make. They have to be more than that. They have to be more than tactics. You have to have -- in order to sustain yourself over time, you have to have institutional systems that are in place where they can, in fact, replenish their forces, they can do personnel management, they can budgeting, they can do intelligence operations, infuse all types of intelligence, where they can train pilots and conduct rotary-wing and fixed-wing operations.

They've got to be able to sustain themselves logistically. They've got to be able to get spare parts and run entire distribution systems, so vehicles and weapons systems and other pieces of equipment don't break down. We've got to get their special operations capabilities, which are very good, but get them up to a very high level. You've got to develop a ministerial-level capability in order to do budgeting and planning and programming and those sorts of things.

...We want to improve their fires. We anticipate that it will be some years before they have a full-fledged capability for counterinsurgency fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, so we want them to have the capability to retain tactical overmatch through the use of indirect fires, through the use of mortars and artillery, and they made a lot of progress on that this past year.

...So right now, they're doing very well at like -- things like basic training and some small unit tactics. But we've got to also work with them to support and build a training management system that works over time without foreign help.

So the big ones -- aviation, ministerial development, special ops, intelligence, medical, C-IED [counter-improvised explosive device], fires -- those piece parts, those systems, those functions we want to shore up here in the next year or so. Some of them may take longer than a year. I think most of them -- medical, counter-IED, fires -- we'll be able to get that progressed pretty well during this year.

All remarks we've heard before, but the transcript has comments on the ANSF successes, with some official stats:http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5355