Force Structure for Small Wars

[SWJED]

Force Structure for Small Wars (http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/05/force-structure-for-small-wars.php) by Andrew C. Pavord, Small Wars Journal


Since 9/11 the armed forces of the United States have paid a steep price to acquire proficiency in counterinsurgency operations. After going through a painful learning process the Army and Marines published the now acclaimed counterinsurgency manual and implemented a new approach in Iraq that is delivering impressive results. It is now a logical time to consider how to redesign combat units to reflect these lessons and prepare for the small wars of the future.

This article will argue that counterinsurgency brigades should be added to the U.S. Army's force structure. Lacking forces specially trained and equipped for counterinsurgency, the Army has fought the war on terror with conventional units adapted to counterinsurgency operations. For most units, the transition from conventional organization and tactics to the very different and challenging tasks of counterinsurgency was traumatic. The costs of poor organization for counterinsurgency, in terms of battlefield mistakes and the misallocation of resources, were substantial. To provide the optimal force for fighting insurgencies the Army should develop Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) that are specifically organized, equipped, and trained for the complex challenges of counterinsurgency operations...

Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Pavord serves in the Virginia Army National Guard. His deployments include Desert Storm as the assistant operations officer of the 372nd Military Police Battalion, Bosnia as Chief of Plans for the 29th Infantry Division, and Afghanistan as Executive Officer of the 3-116 Infantry battalion. He earned a Ph.D in political science from Johns Hopkins University in 1995.

[Cavguy]

I see a few observations here -

First, just because we didn't do well in the past doesn't mean we won't do the same in the future. I don't buy his argument that we will abandon COIN following Iraq/Afghanistan - we don't have the Cold War to run back to. Not that there isn't a risk, but it's unlikely.

Second, I don't get his last recommendation about moving the COIN mission to the Reserve Components.

COIN is by default a long (years long) process. How can the reserve component handle the long deployments implicit in his recommendation? Secondly, there is zero evidence to suggest RC units are better at COIN - I can attest to some experience that they were in many ways worse at COIN. (Plenty of stones to be thrown all around though)

A better argument was put to me today by COL Mansoor - make the guard/reserve the HIC force and keep the active force for COIN in the immediate term. Since we face no imminent HIC threat, ARNG formations should act as our strategic HIC reserve while the active force handles Iraq/Afghanistan in the coming years. Would be more in line with the likelihood of employment and better suited to current strengths.

I'm not sure I like either argument though.

[Ken White]

...
A better argument was put to me today by COL Mansoor - make the guard/reserve the HIC force and keep the active force for COIN in the immediate term. Since we face no imminent HIC threat, ARNG formations should act as our strategic HIC reserve while the active force handles Iraq/Afghanistan in the coming years. Would be more in line with the likelihood of employment and better suited to current strengths.

I'm not sure I like either argument though.emotional arguments for not doing things -- no matter how logical...

I've long (over 30 years) said that a 500K Army should have four Corps (+); each of about eight big 4-5K man Bdes (NO Divisions). One Heavy Corps (that concentrates on training itself plus the two to four more in the ArNG AND the USAR [The ArNG with all the cbt units was a political deal that should be scrubbed, it harms national flexibility and doesn't really do the Guard that big a favor]), two Infantry Corps and one Light Infantry Corps (+ six Parachute Bdes; Eur, Pac and CONUS. Inefficient but strategic entry reach provided no other way at this time). Yes, there is a difference between Infantry and light Infantry -- and the light can include Airmobile even if I don't agree with the concept. If we just have to have a Medium Corps, then scratch the light (and the Airmobile). Only makes sense to tailor the active force for what it must do and put to be needed strength in the RC; we'll likely have more than adequate time to change the structure if the hybrid war period of insability settles down in ten or twenty years.

So give COL Mansoor an Attaboy from me. :D

Oh, and I agreed with the rest of your comment, too...

P.S

The plus in my idea is five active and five RC ACRs... ;)

[Ski]

Numerous interesting comments and thoughts here"

1. RC should not be focused on COIN specifically and neither should the Army. The COIN mission is one measure in decades, not years. While recruting and retention for the ARNG is still high and growing, multiple tours guarantee the slow degradation of the force (something the AC is living with right now).

2. Most importantly, stop creating and changing force structure. It's my biggest pet peeve. Being in the military is hard enough, and creating new organizations just adds to the complexity of the job. Just deploy off the MTOE, attach some medium/heavy truck companies, or create fleets of MRAP's/HMWVV's in theater to fall in on (we've done that already). Commanders and personnel should not have to worry about inactivating and activating when they are back in CONUS or home station. The wars are hard enough - stop adding unneeded complexity into the situation. Like Ken said - wait until a lull, and then change it if needs to be changed.

3. As Field Marshall Nigel Bagnell stated, "over the centuries identifying a nation's future strategic priorities has proved to be a very imprecise art, and as a result peacetime force structures have seldom proved relevant when put to the test of war."

4. The cultural differences between the AC and RC MUST be overcome and at the Major and below level, I truly believe this is the case. The old men and dinosaurs with institutional biases and grudges must pass into oblivion in order to reach the full potential of the entire Army.

5. Shifting combat structure from the USAR to the ARNG to the USAR continues to focus on the wrong problem. Just keep the structure stabilized for a while. Using combat structure out of any reserve component has significant political pressure and risks.

6. The ARNG will never get the HIC mission or the bulk of the heavy forces because the Army uses tank miles to formulate it's OPTEMPO budget. Too much money comes into the AC from this account for them to give it up outright. I think the concept has a lot of merit - I'd use III Corps as the HIC operational reserve, create an ARNG Heavy Corps (2 Divisions+ of HBCT's left) for a strategtic reserve, and use the ARNG IBCT's as an operational force to be used in the Middle East for COIN/SECFOR missions. But again, follow the money...HQDA will never let the bulk of Heavy Forces move into the RC...

Just a few thoughts from an admittedly addled mind...

[AGBrina]

I believe that the U.S. Military had figured out very well how to balance the need for counter-insurgency specialists and conventional combat forces. By the end of the Vietnam era, the Army returned to the concept of the Ranger Battalion, to be used as a more robust supplement to Special Forces. The Special Operations Wings of the Air Force -composed of EC-130s, AC-130s, CH-53s, and a souped-up version of the "Hueys"- offered potent and flexible tactical air and airlift support. Add to these forces an airborne infantry brigade (173d); and the U.S. had a potent unconventional warfare force capable of addressing a wide array of "small war" insurgencies.

Such organizations would be ideally suited for Afghanistan, where there is (at least, there was) plenty of local support for a force aimed at containing and repelling the Taliban.

By themselves, however, counter-insurgency forces would find it impossible to prevail (in fact, unlikely to survive) in Iraq. The U.S.has undertaken to invade and conquer, and to brutally subjugate a people unwilling to accept defeat and occupation. There, a lot of boots on the ground were needed, in order to discourage the greatest percentage of the population from resisting, and to convince them that resistance to the invader was futile. The Americans didn't have the number of conventional troops to do that, in a manner similar to the Soviets in Hungary ('56) or Czeckoslavakia ('68).

Iraq is not counter-insurgency; it is population control! There, we are fighting disaffected segments of a population which is trying to gain independence There, we are quelling a rebellion by the people against foreign occupation, in a manner much like the Israelis are using against the Palestinians. Our success depends upon targeted assassinations, building walls to isolate populations, and pitting one ethnic grouping against another. I would not dignify such tactics by including them in the sphere of "counter-insurgency".

Fighting regular army units of the North Vietnamese Army was more like fighting the Japanese in Burma than fighting Moros in Mindinao. (In the case of I Corps near the DMZ, the battle was more like fighting the Chinese in Korea 1952-53 or the Japanese in the Philippines 1944-45.) That's conventional warfare in rough terrain, where U.S. conventional forces were more suitable than light infantry Rangers or Special Forces-led paramilitary units.

[Cavguy]

I believe that the U.S. Military had figured out very well how to balance the need for counter-insurgency specialists and conventional combat forces. By the end of the Vietnam era, the Army returned to the concept of the Ranger Battalion, to be used as a more robust supplement to Special Forces. The Special Operations Wings of the Air Force -composed of EC-130s, AC-130s, CH-53s, and a souped-up version of the "Hueys"- offered potent and flexible tactical air and airlift support. Add to these forces an airborne infantry brigade (173d); and the U.S. had a potent unconventional warfare force capable of addressing a wide array of "small war" insurgencies.

Interesting assertion. I Am interested as to when this formation was employed in conflict, and validated in counterinsurgency, and what made it superior for that kind of environment. I am unaware of the above formation ever having been employed. Further, how would this unit be able to perform counterinsurgency (by default, getting involved with the people) over such a broad area? As a counetrguerrilla force, you may have an argument, but not counterinsurgency. Two very different missions.


Such organizations would be ideally suited for Afghanistan, where there is (at least, there was) plenty of local support for a force aimed at containing and repelling the Taliban.

Basis for this statement please.


By themselves, however, counter-insurgency forces would find it impossible to prevail (in fact, unlikely to survive) in Iraq. The U.S.has undertaken to invade and conquer, and to brutally subjugate a people unwilling to accept defeat and occupation. There, a lot of boots on the ground were needed, in order to discourage the greatest percentage of the population from resisting, and to convince them that resistance to the invader was futile. The Americans didn't have the number of conventional troops to do that, in a manner similar to the Soviets in Hungary ('56) or Czeckoslavakia ('68).

Ok, now you've gone off target. First, there ARE insurgencies in Iraq. There is a struggle against a legitimate elected government under a constitution. While I agree that some groups (Such as the 1920 Brigades) are purely anti-occupation, to distill the multiple issues in Iraq to such a silly analogy as Hungary of Czech portrays a profound ignorance of what is occuring in Iraq, which differs by province, sect, and other factors.




Iraq is not counter-insurgency; it is population control!

And since when is population control not a fundamental step in COIN? I belive Galula and Trinquier make that very clear.

Let's define COIN:

JP 1-02 and FM 3-24 state:

"Joint doctrine defines an insurgency as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict (JP 1-02). Stated another way, an insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control. Counterinsurgency is military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency (JP 1-02). These definitions are a good starting point, but they do not properly highlight a key paradox: though insurgency and COIN are two sides of a phenomenon that has been called revolutionary war or internal war, they are distinctly different types of operations. In addition, insurgency and COIN are included within a broad category of conflict known as irregular warfare."



There, we are fighting disaffected segments of a population which is trying to gain independence There, we are quelling a rebellion by the people against foreign occupation, in a manner much like the Israelis are using against the Palestinians. Our success depends upon targeted assassinations, building walls to isolate populations, and pitting one ethnic grouping against another. I would not dignify such tactics by including them in the sphere of "counter-insurgency".

This is pure tripe. While there are some elements, (mentioned earlier), there is no singular "rebellion" against occupation. What you have are various groups doing different things with different aims. Polls still show the majority of Iraqis are not for an immediate withdrawal of US Forces.

[Cavguy]

Only makes sense to tailor the active force for what it must do and put to be needed strength in the RC; we'll likely have more than adequate time to change the structure if the hybrid war period of insability settles down in ten or twenty years.

So give COL Mansoor an Attaboy from me. :D


Will tell him.

I still havent stopped thinking about what right should look like.

The whole argument is somewhat academic at the moment anyway. The number of BCT's engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan isn't dropping significantly anytime soon, so there's no slack in the active force to pull any off the line for HIC.

Given that the RC is our "strategic reserve" (morphed into operational reserve today), perhaps we should be training and equipping a Corps of RC for any potential HIC threats.

As I said, still mulling it over.

[Ski]

ARFORGEN does not help the situation either. If you take X amount of units out of the cycle to create a HIC strat reserve, you then speed up the cycle for the remaining units.

[Cavguy]

ARFORGEN does not help the situation either. If you take X amount of units out of the cycle to create a HIC strat reserve, you then speed up the cycle for the remaining units.

Exactly my point. Well said. Discussion is mostly academic for the next 2-3 years at least, for reasons above and several others. The recently redeployed reserve units are the best option for constituting a HIC reserve.

[Ken White]

Numerous interesting comments and thoughts here"

1. RC should not be focused on COIN specifically and neither should the Army. The COIN mission is one measure in decades, not years... Agree with the first part. not so much with the second. Is that historical length of time due to the types of insurgencies and / or the way they were 'fought?' I don't think that decades are required.
2. Most importantly, stop creating and changing force structure. It's my biggest pet peeve...Like Ken said - wait until a lull, and then change it if needs to be changed.True. I watched one unit in the TN ArNG go from a Tank Co to a Chemical Co to a Truck Co -- in the space of four years. While I understand we hired all these civilian 'Force Developers' and they have to do something for job justification, we've gotten ridiculous. Any force structure change ought to be locked in five year increments; miss a window and wait five more years -- with only rare exceptions. That said, I think we need not wait for a lull -- because the system will never allow one to avoid change... :(
3. As Field Marshall Nigel Bagnell stated, "over the centuries identifying a nation's future strategic priorities has proved to be a very imprecise art, and as a result peacetime force structures have seldom proved relevant when put to the test of war."Also true -- and that's why it makes sense to put the heavy stuff in the RC.
4. The cultural differences between the AC and RC MUST be overcome and at the Major and below level...True, prob is on both sides of the fence, just as it is with conventional vs. SOF.
5. Shifting combat structure from the USAR to the ARNG to the USAR continues to focus on the wrong problem. Just keep the structure stabilized for a while. Using combat structure out of any reserve component has significant political pressure and risks.True but in many circumstances, use of the USAR is better for several reasons than is using the Guard.
6. The ARNG will never get the HIC mission or the bulk of the heavy forces because the Army uses tank miles to formulate it's OPTEMPO budget.True on the OPTEMPO today but wasn't true in the past and need not be the way it's done. On the possibility of such a shift you may be correct but I submit the reaction is far more emotional than logical.
... Too much money comes into the AC from this account for them to give it up outright...That, too is by design -- and designs can be changed.
...HQDA will never let the bulk of Heavy Forces move into the RC...Possibly true. A question for Congress to ask is "Why not?" --and they should demand a logical answer that does NOT rely on todays arcane and foolish budget and allotment processes.
Just a few thoughts from an admittedly addled mind...My mind is more addled than yours, so there! :p

[Ski]

Cavguy - the ARNG only has 7 HBCT's left, so the allocation for deployments are limited when looking at the current requirements versus future requirements. Of course, the ARNG could grow back to the 34 BCT's it had three years ago.

Ken

Now you are getting into the true ugliness of it all. Reforming the budgetting "system" and the allocation process will take nothing less than Congressional input, oversight and the capability to crack skulls when required.

Don't understand why you are focusing on the USAR so much - they have zero combat arms capability at present minus a single IN BN and single ATK AV BN. Would take a long time to reconstitute these units from cadre status...2-4 years is my guess. I always hear why using the USAR is better, but never the reasons why - please educate...

As an ARNG armor officer, I would love to see additional growth in HBCT's in the Guard. I just don't expect this'll happen because of too many rice bowls being shattered

[Ken White]

Exactly my point. Well said. Discussion is mostly academic for the next 2-3 years at least, for reasons above and several others. The recently redeployed reserve units are the best option for constituting a HIC reserve.is unlikely; we've got aside from the obvious two theater problem a Roles and Missions review (and IMO this sub thread should be a big part of that discussion) and an upcoming QDR.

However, given the 18 month lag time in the Army's bureaucratic decision cycle (unless it's important to one of the Pachyderms), seems like the time to start discussing it is now...

My belief is that the Roles and Missions review and the QDR should provide the Army some guidance for the future and that the Army then needs to focus on, in order; the flawed personnel system, the flawed training system -- and then on the optimum, logical force structure; all the other stuff will flow from those three items.

There are those who will say I've got it backwards, the first two items I listed flow from the third. Don't think so. The current personnel system was designed to support a type Army (the pre 1940 model). It has had bandaids applied and a random tweak now and then but it is effectively totally obsolete and non responsive to the needs of the Army and the nation. It is in dire need of total redesign and that design needs to focus on providing effective personnel operations and support to what ever the Army of the day happens to look like...

Almost the same thing could be said of training; we have a pre 1940 system with grafts and patches. Most other Armies of any real use provide almost twice the training to new entrants that we do. Why is that? I have been embarrassed many times by US Officers and NCOs who didn't know as much as Brit, Canadian, German and Oz peons. Fix the training and the troops will cope with whatever force structure we throw at them.

ArNG and Reserve force structure needs less change; the Active force can endure change and fight a war at the same time. We did that in WW II, Korea, Viet Nam and we're doing it today. Doesn't make life easier but it can be handled. Be even easier with a functional Personnel system and better training.

[Norfolk]

My belief is that the Roles and Missions review and the QDR should provide the Army some guidance for the future and that the Army then needs to focus on, in order; the flawed personnel system, the flawed training system -- and then on the optimum, logical force structure; all the other stuff will flow from those three items.

There are those who will say I've got it backwards, the first two items I listed flow from the third. Don't think so. The current personnel system was designed to support a type Army (the pre 1940 model). It has had bandaids applied and a random tweak now and then but it is effectively totally obsolete and non responsive to the needs of the Army and the nation. It is in dire need of total redesign and that design needs to focus on providing effective personnel operations and support to what ever the Army of the day happens to look like...

Almost the same thing could be said of training; we have a pre 1940 system with grafts and patches. Most other Armies of any real use provide almost twice the training to new entrants that we do. Why is that? I have been embarrassed many times by US Officers and NCOs who didn't know as much as Brit, Canadian, German and Oz peons. Fix the training and the troops will cope with whatever force structure we throw at them.

ArNG and Reserve force structure needs less change; the Active force can endure change and fight a war at the same time. We did that in WW II, Korea, Viet Nam and we're doing it today. Doesn't make life easier but it can be handled. Be even easier with a functional Personnel system and better training.

Very much agreed on these points, and would be in no position to dispute them anyway. That said, if the HIC role was mostly transferred to the RC, just how long would it take to bring said Heavy forces up to snuff in MCO? Six months? That seems like just painting a big red bull's eye on said forces prior to dispatching them to the war zone. A year? If that were sufficient for a basic grounding in MCO, how could one ensure that the major war they were to be dispatched to would still be ongoing, or even if ongoing, still in a phase in which a major intervention would lead to victory? And, just to throw a monkey in the wrench (as this is most unlikely, but I'm drawing it to try to make a point), suppose an RC HIC force was pitted against a force of near-equal, equal, or even superior fighting quality?

The latter event, as I said, is most unlikely, but it is instructive to ponder the problems that Allied forces faced when fighting an enemy that was, for the most part, still its superior in quality, though in the midst of a precipitous decline in said quality, largely due to the sheer weight of losses suffered in operations in the East. Combined-arms MCO is the most unlikely form of warfare that will have to be faced during the foreseeable future, but it is by far the most difficult to prepare for and to master. It takes not months, not a few years, but several years at least to fully come to grips with, not just "passably", but with real proficiency. The RC manoeuvre brigades sent to ODS did not go into battle, and for good reason. Even with the six months' "grace" period that the Coalition was gifted with by the Iraqis, the RC combat brigades were not up to the job. Arguably, some of the AC units were not fully up to the job, either. Good thing the Iraqis were not up to the job at all.

I fear that there is a tendency in many quarters to overestimate the MCO proficiency of many "Top Tier" Armies, and to underestimate the difficulties of achieving real and thorough proficiency in those regards. It may be that HIC forces - especially Armoured Corps - are not required to make up as much of a proportion of the Active force structure as during the Cold War. One AC Heavy Corps may well be enough. But "Medium" Corps, composed in the main of regular (not Light) Infantry Formations may be more suitable to make up the bulk of the AC force structure, as they can perform in LIC and MIC with barely skipping a beat (if properly led and trained), won't break the procurement budget, and are best suited to most of the tasks that the Army is likely to face anyway. "Light" forces are probably best restricted to dedicated Parachute and Mountain formations, for the most part, and of course SF.

But all that force structure is predicated in the main upon holding to the highest levels of leadership and training. And not least, the substantial reduction of present overeseas committments.:wry: Three "Medium" Corps (along the lines of what Ken seems to be describing), a single Heavy Corps, and several Parachute and Mountain Formations (there seems little reason, other than training funds of course:rolleyes:, for Parachute and Mountain units and formations to not be of the same quality as Ranger Battalions); Airmobile can be handled just fine by regular Infantry Formations, when the need to perform such operations arises.

[Ken White]

... if the HIC role was mostly transferred to the RC, just how long would it take to bring said Heavy forces up to snuff in MCO? Six months?Many variables but basically using today's training methods, from 120 days to 180. With improved training, it could be done pretty well in 90 to 120. With improved and realistic training (not likely, due to a high a casualty rate) in 60 to 90 days.
...just to throw a monkey in the wrench (as this is most unlikely, but I'm drawing it to try to make a point), suppose an RC HIC force was pitted against a force of near-equal, equal, or even superior fighting quality?Probably the same thing that would happen if an active HIC force ran into such an opponent -- all other things being equal they'd get whupped.
... It takes not months, not a few years, but several years at least to fully come to grips with, not just "passably", but with real proficiency.Disagree -- it takes years in peacetime the way most of us now train, in wartime in CONUS, months. Actually in war, it takes weeks to a month or so, individual dependent (see Hoffmeister, B). ;)
...The RC manoeuvre brigades sent to ODS did not go into battle, and for good reason. Even with the six months' "grace" period that the Coalition was gifted with by the Iraqis, the RC combat brigades were not up to the job.Having been directly involved in that fiasco, I regret to say you're incorrect -- the decision not to send them was a dumb political decision by the then CofSA and the DCSOPS at DA -- who famously said "Not in my Army..." The 48th Mech Bde got a Go from the NTC the day before the cease fire -- DA refused to certify them for deployment (a statutory requirement to preclude your concern of unready RC units in theaters) on the basis "the war's over." They were deployment capable and would've done okay -- not great but okay. The Army simply did not want that to happen so it did not (per Ski above and peacetime money flow issues; recall that to this day, the Pentagon has not been at war since 1945).
...composed in the main of regular (not Light) Infantry Formations may be more suitable to make up the bulk of the AC force structure, as they can perform in LIC and MIC with barely skipping a beat (if properly led and trained), won't break the procurement budget, and are best suited to most of the tasks that the Army is likely to face anyway. "Light" forces are probably best restricted to dedicated Parachute and Mountain formations, for the most part, and of course SF. Agreed
...(there seems little reason, other than training funds of course:rolleyes:, for Parachute and Mountain units and formations to not be of the same quality as Ranger Battalions); Airmobile can be handled just fine by regular Infantry Formations, when the need to perform such operations arises.True dat. ;)

[Ski]

Must also pile on about the Desert Storm fiasco. The 48th Brigade was ready to go, and was held up at NTC by the HQDA leadership. Even now there is great reluctance to use ARNG BCT's as "COIN" units, and the 5 BCT's we send to OIF/OEF every year are assigned ####ty SECFOR missions that the AC does not want to get involved in...

As far as creating a RC based HIC Corps - it would take about 90-120 days (if resourced properly) to get them up to speed. Remember that the American Army's Reserve Component has far more combat experience that any other Active Army in the world - minus the UK, Canada, Australia and possibly France. You can argue about what kind of experience they've learned, but just being exposed to the elephant counts a great deal against a force that has not seen combat.

I really like the idea of creating a HIC Corps+ based around III Corps and then the 7 ARNG HBCT's. Keep them out of the misama's of Iraq and Afghanistan at all costs - start flowing the resources into the ARNG so they only take 90 days to get out the door (not hard to do, I've built models with my brethren at FORSCOM and 1st Army that shows it can be done). You now have a mailed fist capable of counterattacking any state based enemy such as Iran, NK, etc...

[ipopescu]

3. As Field Marshall Nigel Bagnell stated, "over the centuries identifying a nation's future strategic priorities has proved to be a very imprecise art, and as a result peacetime force structures have seldom proved relevant when put to the test of war."



I began reading this 2001 book on defense budgets and force structure, Holding the Line, edited by Cindy Williams (currently at MIT, formerly in a high-level position at the Congressional Budget Office.) It is a compilation of the conventional wisdom regarding defense planning for the 2000-2010 period as it was viewed at that time. It seems so incredibly dated, hard to believe it's merely a decade old: the main worry was that the coming 4 trillion budget surplus may mean defense spending would rise over the 2000 level of $300 billion that DoD anticipated for the next five years. The military was said to be worried that in addition to being able to sustain one conventional Major Theater War AND multiple "lesser contingencies" (stability and peacekeeping operations, you know, stuff that doesn't require much attention in terms of dedicated resources), it may not have enough available forces for a SECOND conventional Major Theater War. No talk whatsoever of CT or COIN or irregular warfare, although the contributors (civilian and military professionals alike) proclaim with certitude that they are offering the solutions to move the military form Cold War structure to what's required in the 21st century. The recommendations suggested further cuts in structure, on the grounds that we only really need to win one MTW and do lesser interventions (by which I take to mean everything that's not MTW), so the capabilities for a potential second war could be eliminated. And our "likely" adversaries are so weak that we would surely have some overmatch left anyway, given our technological supremacy.

Thinking about how people who are kind of doing studying and writing about this stuff for a living could be proven so "wrong" (if that's the right word) over such a short period of time, I was left with a renewed appreciation for humbleness and flexibility in all efforts to design the "necessary" forces for coming wars. I fully understand why Ski and Ken talk about too much "creating and changing force structure." Constant reform and adaptation are obviously needed as threats evolve and enemies change, but I'm almost coming to believe that there are some hidden virtues in the much-maligned bureaucratic resistance to changing the way the military works.

[Cavguy]

I began reading this 2001 book on defense budgets and force structure, Holding the Line, edited by Cindy Williams (currently at MIT, formerly in a high-level position at the Congressional Budget Office.) It is a compilation of the conventional wisdom regarding defense planning for the 2000-2010 period as it was viewed at that time.

She also wrote a series of op-eds in the 2000-2001 period that argued the military was overpaid in benefits.

The non-military security studies academics has a terrible track record of their theories panning out. Wolfowitz and Feith are but two examples on the other end of the spectrum.

The fact that the whole community (who gave birth to RAND) sprung up to wargame nuclear war should add suspicion.

Of course, I'm currently enrolled in a graduate security studies program! :eek:

[SteveMetz]

I began reading this 2001 book on defense budgets and force structure, Holding the Line, edited by Cindy Williams (currently at MIT, formerly in a high-level position at the Congressional Budget Office.) It is a compilation of the conventional wisdom regarding defense planning for the 2000-2010 period as it was viewed at that time. It seems so incredibly dated, hard to believe it's merely a decade old: the main worry was that the coming 4 trillion budget surplus may mean defense spending would rise over the 2000 level of $300 billion that DoD anticipated for the next five years. The military was said to be worried that in addition to being able to sustain one conventional Major Theater War AND multiple "lesser contingencies" (stability and peacekeeping operations, you know, stuff that doesn't require much attention in terms of dedicated resources), it may not have enough available forces for a SECOND conventional Major Theater War. No talk whatsoever of CT or COIN or irregular warfare, although the contributors (civilian and military professionals alike) proclaim with certitude that they are offering the solutions to move the military form Cold War structure to what's required in the 21st century. The recommendations suggested further cuts in structure, on the grounds that we only really need to win one MTW and do lesser interventions (by which I take to mean everything that's not MTW), so the capabilities for a potential second war could be eliminated. And our "likely" adversaries are so weak that we would surely have some overmatch left anyway, given our technological supremacy.

Thinking about how people who are kind of doing studying and writing about this stuff for a living could be proven so "wrong" (if that's the right word) over such a short period of time, I was left with a renewed appreciation for humbleness and flexibility in all efforts to design the "necessary" forces for coming wars. I fully understand why Ski and Ken talk about too much "creating and changing force structure." Constant reform and adaptation are obviously needed as threats evolve and enemies change, but I'm almost coming to believe that there are some hidden virtues in the much-maligned bureaucratic resistance to changing the way the military works.

I think there is general agreement that we have a means/ends mismatch in our current defense strategy. But there are always two solutions to such a mismatch: increase your means or diminish your ends. That's the shape the debate is taking now.

I thought the contours were pretty clear at the Heritage Foundation symposium earlier that week that SECDEF addressed on Tuesday morning. One school of thought (led by Heritage and AEI) is that we need a significant increase in the defense budget for about a decade to recapitalize. People like former Senator Jim Talent at Heritage advocate 4% of GDP. People like Toim Donnelly at AEI also support a significant force size increase.

The other argument (expressed very powerfully by Chris Preble of the Cato Institute at the Heritage symposium) is that we need to diminish our commitments. Chris contends that the bulk of our defense spending is actually defending other nations that could well afford to pay for their own security rather than defending Americans. The Stanley Foundation policy brief that Frank Hoffman and I did last year, while not as extreme as the Cato position, also argued that we need to be more circumspect in what we plan and budget for. Specifically, we took issue with the scenarios that are used to justify a force increase post-Iraq and Afghanistan such as the occupation and stabilization of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, or something similar. Frank and I were not sanguine about the threat from terrorist bases in distant lands or uncontrolled nuclear weapons. We just didn't think that long term occupation and attempted social and political re-engineering of flawed states is the most effective way to address these threats.

Basically, we could build a 5 million person force, and missions would emerge to occupy them. What we need to ask ourselves is whether, in this time of mounting economic, environmental, and social challenges, we really want to underwrite the security of other nations who spend much less than we do on their own defense (and I mean on a per capita basis, not in the aggregate).

[Andy Pavord]

I have been out of town so I am a little late to the party. I would like to respond to a couple of points made.

I do not adovocate transferring the COIN mission to the Guard. I suggested that the infantry brigades in the Guard should be transformed to specialize in COIN. I would also like to see a few COIN BCTs on the active force complemented by some Guard COIN BCTs. I am not sure how many. the exact number could be determined by a strategic analysis of the potential need.

My main argument is that COIN and its variants are a specialized form of warfare. The tactics and techniques required to excel in COIN can be best developed in units that specialize in COIN. I therefore believe that the Army should develop a force of COIN BCTs in both the active and the reserve components. However, because of the uncertain nature of the threats that we face I would keep this COIN force structure relatively small. It should be big enough to ensure that tactics and techniques can be developed and tested and yet not so big that it detracts from the regular BCTs. Many politicans are supporting the idea of expanding the army. I would propse that some of this expansion could be devoted to COIN BCTs.

COIN BCTs could serve as the spearhead of the initial phase of either a stabilization campaign (after the high intensity fighting has defeated enemy regular forces) or of a counterinsurgency campaign. They could be allocated to the most critical part of the theater while regular BCTs take on the less critical areas. As the campaign continues, Guard BCTs could be deployed to replace active units.

Break to new subject:

I do not think that we can transfer the HIC mission to the Guard. HIC requires the ability to synchronize very complex systems under very demanding conditions. This takes an incredible amount of practice through high level collective training. Much more practice than Guard units can achieve in the time alloted during a normal drill year. Guard units can get there after mobilization, but it takes time. The nation needs HIC forces that can respond rapidly. Desert Shield is the case in point. I think that the case can be made that Guard units were ready by Feb 1991, but does anybody believe that Guard heavy units could have been deployed by Spt/Oct 1990? Guard heavy units are really part of the nation's strategic reserve. And given the unpredictable state of the world I think that we need them.

Break to the budget situation:

Our nation is going to run a deficit of over $500 billion dollars this year. The international capital markets will simply refuse to continue to fund our debt at this level. We will be forced to reduce spending in the near future. It is unrealistic to expect that defense will escape the budget reductions that are coming. No matter who is elected President, we should expect the defense budget to decrease significantly in the next few years.

The real question is how we will reduce defense spending. The most obvious place to start is Iraq. Shutting down America's particpation in the Iraq war would save lots of money. I am willing to bet that is where the politicians of both parties will start.

But leaving Iraq, even with its huge savings, will not be enough. We are really broke. So the Congress and the President will cut into the existing defense budget. That is where it gets interesting. All the Presidential candidates have promised to increase the size of the Army and Marine Corps. They will be reluctant to go back on those promises. They want to support our troops. So I bet they will go after our weapons and strategic programs. I am not sure if there are enough funds there to pay for the Army and Marine expansion, so they will look for other ways to cut. It will be really interesting to see what they come up with.

The hard truth is that America really has come up against its financial limitations. In the very near term, the capital markets will no longer buy American debt in the quantities required to sustain our defense spending at the current level. And that should scare us all.

[Ken White]

as we now operate but I suggest an AC HIC Corps for that rapid response and at least two ArNG / USAR HIC Corps are quite feasible IF we change the way we train. You say:
"...Guard heavy units are really part of the nation's strategic reserve. And given the unpredictable state of the world I think that we need them."I agree -- and we need more in the RC than we have while the AC will most likely need less for the foreseeable future.

You also mentioned a strategic analysis of need. Good idea. Whether such an analysis could transcend the politics of either COIN units (doubtful IMO) or more HIC in the RC than the AC (possible, barely) remains to be seen.

[Norfolk]

Andy Pavord wrote:



I do not adovocate transferring the COIN mission to the Guard. I suggested that the infantry brigades in the Guard should be transformed to specialize in COIN. I would also like to see a few COIN BCTs on the active force complemented by some Guard COIN BCTs. I am not sure how many. the exact number could be determined by a strategic analysis of the potential need.

My main argument is that COIN and its variants are a specialized form of warfare. The tactics and techniques required to excel in COIN can be best developed in units that specialize in COIN. I therefore believe that the Army should develop a force of COIN BCTs in both the active and the reserve components. However, because of the uncertain nature of the threats that we face I would keep this COIN force structure relatively small. It should be big enough to ensure that tactics and techniques can be developed and tested and yet not so big that it detracts from the regular BCTs. Many politicans are supporting the idea of expanding the army. I would propse that some of this expansion could be devoted to COIN BCTs.

COIN BCTs could serve as the spearhead of the initial phase of either a stabilization campaign (after the high intensity fighting has defeated enemy regular forces) or of a ounterinsurgency campaign. They could be allocated to the most critical part of the theater while regular BCTs take on the less critical areas. As the campaign continues, Guard BCTs could be deployed to replace active units.


What are termed COIN BCTS in your proposals are what are termed Gendarme units in many other countries; either paramilitary police forces (such as the MVD and the old KGB, various European Gendarmeries and Border Guard forces, et al.) who specialize in OOTW, or specialized military police forces (ie. the Carabinieri) who do likewise. In the context of the US Army, this would mean raising a force of several specialist Constabulary/MP Brigades. While there may be an operational niche for a few such formations (perhaps even on a scale of one per Army Corps), a separate and substantial force structure of several or many such BCTs would result in the corresponding loss of GPF forces for medium and HIC missions. As is, even those European powers with the longest and most comprehensive experience of OOTW (including COIN), particularly in the days of Empire, never maintained substantial specialized COIN-type formations within their military force structures. Even the separate paramilitary police forces tasked with the bulk of the day-to-day COIN-type tasks were dwarfed in size by the military establishments they cooperated with.

There seems to be a lingering myth that somehow OOTW in general and COIN in particular not only require quite different skills than MCO, but indeed are somehow more sophisticated and advanced forms of war or conflict than MCO. They are not; they are policing writ large, with a greater or lesser amount and degree of "war" intertwined. They require professional-level (not conscript-level) individual and small-unit leadership, discipline, presence of mind, and fighting skills, along with a mindset of heavily-armed policing instead of War - the majority of the time. The six-month infantry syllabus that Commonwealth Armies have adopted over the past generation is a reflection of the demands of both OOTW (including COIN, and in places as diverse as Sub-Saharan Africa, South-East Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East) and the demands of MCO, and again in places as divsere as Norway and Central Europe during the Cold War, to the hot wars in the Falklands and the Middle East.


I do not think that we can transfer the HIC mission to the Guard. HIC requires the ability to synchronize very complex systems under very demanding conditions. This takes an incredible amount of practice through high level collective training. Much more practice than Guard units can achieve in the time alloted during a normal drill year. Guard units can get there after mobilization, but it takes time. The nation needs HIC forces that can respond rapidly. Desert Shield is the case in point. I think that the case can be made that Guard units were ready by Feb 1991, but does anybody believe that Guard heavy units could have been deployed by Spt/Oct 1990? Guard heavy units are really part of the nation's strategic reserve. And given the unpredictable state of the world I think that we need them.

Rather agreed, although I would have to concede to Ken, Ski, and some other that MCOs performed by RC formations mobilized in 3-6 months would probably get the job done against most opponents; but not against those few opponents who might know what they're doing. As such, the minimum HIC force requirement should include a full-strength AC Heavy Corps, in addition to whatever RC Heavy Corps there may be. I don't see any realistic alternative to maintaining a large RC HIC-force; a Field Army -level force may well be necessary someday (as it was in 1991, and few expected that), and the AC is just not going to be large enough to accomodate much more than a quarter of that. MCO is the master-level of warfare; not to gall those who have to practice it, but COIN is the apprentice-level of war. By this logic, I suppose, minor conventional wars would make for the journeyman-level of war.:wry: Personally, I would be inclined to place ODS and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 into that category.

English-speaking Armies have done decently enough against opponents the likes of Argentina and Iraq in minor conventional wars, but we've had our heads handed to us on a number of occasions by those who had mastered MCO in major conventional wars, Germany in Europe and North Africa especially, though the Japanese handed us some pretty bitter defeats in Asia. To a more limited extent, China gave us a good whuppin' early on in Korea. Happily, we never actually had to take on the Russians in Europe.

As such, it could be argued that English-speaking Armies, the U.S. amongst them, are most comfortable at minor conventional wars against mediocre opponents whom we can out-manoeuvre, out-gun, out-supply, and out-tech. We run into serious trouble either when we're faced with a foe that we can't dispose of quickly - such as in COIN, where the nature of the conflict defies military resolution per se, or when we have to face opponents who have taken the pains to master major conventional warfare. The simple truth is, we're not the best, or even necessarily very good, at either. In time we become just good enough, and then forget soon after the emergency is over...

Raising specialized COIN forces would be unnecessary and counter-productive. Most COIN-related training is part and parcel of thorough initial-entry training, which in turn provides the basis upon which excellence in MCO is based upon (see Ken who's bin' der, dun dat). The remaining, more specialized training that COIN requires is largely something that must be an integral part of officer training and staff college education. Start with the basics, individual and small-unit skills, OOTW (including COIN), and work up through major-unit/formation-level OOTW and minor-unit MCO, and then finish off with major-unit and formation-level MCO training. That's how its done, and been done for over a generation in other English-speaking Armies (check with Wilf on this if you have doubts), and that's what the US has to do since the other English-speaking Armies can't do it the same anymore because of political weakness and indifference at home. No need to consider COIN to be an arcane art-form, with similarly arcane needs.

[Andy Pavord]

How about this?

1 Airborne corp for immediate response/forcible entry
1 HIC Corp with supporting RC forces as Ken Suggests
1 Corp focused on stabilization/COIN with a mixture of active and RC brigades

2 or 3 "Full Spectrum" Corps that would have broader mission lists but not be expected to respond as rapidly as the more specialized corps.

The strategic idea is that the specialized corps would be the first response to situations that fit their mission set. The "full spectrum" corps would then have some time to do more focused training and do whatever reorganization necessary before they deploy.

[Andy Pavord]

In response to Norfolk:

I think we need something heavier than Gendarme or Carbineri. I advocate a motorized infantry formation capable of defeating platoon or company (-) insurgent concentrations.

I do not agree that COIN is the "apprentice" level of war. If it were so easy why are we having so much difficulty with it? We were not able to master it in Vietnam in 64/65 or in Iraq in 03/04.

I do not know if COIN or HIC is more difficult. I do know that they are different. At the Soldier level, many of the tasks are very similar. I would also agree that an attack on a fortified position is a more difficult operation than a cordon and search. However, COIN adds the "police" element and policing is hard. It also adds information operations, political analysis, economic development, etc.

At the battalion staff level the differences are stark. The type of staff functions performed in COIN are radically different than those performed in HIC. For the S2 terain and target analysis is very different from analyzing insurgent networks. For the S3, planning a deliberate attack is very different than planning patrols and coordinating them with information operations. For the S4, supplying a battalion in contact is very different than operating log support for a FOB and supporting reconstruction efforts.

I believe that our force structure needs to recognize these differences. We need a relatively small force that can specialize in COIN in order to develop the tactics and techniques of COIN to their highest level.

[Ken White]

...
I do not agree that COIN is the "apprentice" level of war. If it were so easy why are we having so much difficulty with it? We were not able to master it in Vietnam in 64/65 or in Iraq in 03/04.We had and are having difficulty with it because in both cases we went in wrongly trying to fight a conventional war due to total failure to understand the situation and a massive underestimation of the sophistication of the enemy. Our stupid egos got in the way. Thus, in both cases we made the situation far worse then we needed to and took too much time to adjust. I will give us an attaboy for learning faster this time than we did in Viet Nam.

The solution to that problem is not COIN units or an Advisory Corps -- it is simply better training for that multi purpose forces that we must field.
I do not know if COIN or HIC is more difficult. I do know that they are different. At the Soldier level, many of the tasks are very similar. I would also agree that an attack on a fortified position is a more difficult operation than a cordon and search. However, COIN adds the "police" element and policing is hard. It also adds information operations, political analysis, economic development, etc.Having done both, I'll flatly state that HIC is more difficult. Yes, the skill sets are different but the trauma of HIC, the far higher casualty rates and their effect on unit capability and the planing and logistic effort make COIN appear simple. The skill sets are different, particularly above Co/Trp level but they are not so different that the two skills are irreconcilable. Any Joe or Staff Officer who knows the basics of his job can make the switch without too much difficulty. Those that cannot should seek other employment; combat in either case is not a job for the marginally competent.
At the battalion staff level the differences are stark. The type of staff functions performed in COIN are radically different than those performed in HIC. For the S2 terain and target analysis is very different from analyzing insurgent networks. For the S3, planning a deliberate attack is very different than planning patrols and coordinating them with information operations. For the S4, supplying a battalion in contact is very different than operating log support for a FOB and supporting reconstruction efforts.All true -- and switching between the two has been done in the past and is just necessary.
I believe that our force structure needs to recognize these differences. We need a relatively small force that can specialize in COIN in order to develop the tactics and techniques of COIN to their highest level.Define small... ;)

Problem is total troops available and likely to be available. My belief is that the Army cannot afford that. I emphatically agree we need to retain a cadre of 'experts' and a running school for Advisors and one for COIN practice. Exercises and the MTCs should include COIN scenarios as a matter of course. I believe the units are able to cope with switch hitting at COIN or HIC with minimal adjustment time. With better training, hopefully coming and Outcome based, they'll adapt okay. I'm less sanguine about the ability of those in high places to adapt -- us old guys get set in our ways... :(

[ipopescu]

I think there is general agreement that we have a means/ends mismatch in our current defense strategy. But there are always two solutions to such a mismatch: increase your means or diminish your ends. That's the shape the debate is taking now.

The Stanley Foundation policy brief that Frank Hoffman and I did last year, while not as extreme as the Cato position, also argued that we need to be more circumspect in what we plan and budget for. Specifically, we took issue with the scenarios that are used to justify a force increase post-Iraq and Afghanistan such as the occupation and stabilization of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, or something similar. Frank and I were not sanguine about the threat from terrorist bases in distant lands or uncontrolled nuclear weapons. We just didn't think that long term occupation and attempted social and political re-engineering of flawed states is the most effective way to address these threats.

Basically, we could build a 5 million person force, and missions would emerge to occupy them. What we need to ask ourselves is whether, in this time of mounting economic, environmental, and social challenges, we really want to underwrite the security of other nations who spend much less than we do on their own defense (and I mean on a per capita basis, not in the aggregate).

Steve,

I remember reading last year the excellent brief you and Frank did on ground troops level where you two did some serious damage to the arguments made by Kagan&O'Hanlon in a similar Stanley Foundation paper. Your points were very well taken. It's fairly ridiculous to assume that 100k or 200k more troops would allow the US to successfully invade & perform a successful long-term nation-building mission in a place like Pakistan, Iran, or Saudi Arabia.

One point on which I have some doubts on is to what extent you can count on allied contribution to provide extra manpower for multilateral operations.
Frankly, outside the ones that were in Iraq, I don't really see any other NATO members or non-Nato allies being able to provide significant troops for any scenario that's not on their borders. It doesn't look to me like they have either the will or the capability to do so. I mean, if they can't even do more for a fairly clear cut "moral" case like in Afghanistan, I find it very unlikely to believe that they will do so in any scenario I can think of. Local allies, yes, Northern Allies proved very useful, but that situation seems rather unlikely to be easily replicable in other places; and they of course come with their share of problems such as unreliability, corruption, incompetence, etc. In short, I share your (and Frank's) skepticism regarding the suitability of dealing with failed states through regime change + nation-building, but if you do decide to do it, than I believe we shouldn't really count on much extra help by others - IMO "multilateralism" is sometimes an excuse for people who want to do those missions but don't want to pay for them.

Having said that, I nevertheless disagree rather strongly with the last point in your post regarding the disproportionate level of US investments in maintaing world peace and security. I don't actually think that's wrong, but it's just that it leads to a cure that in my opinion is worse than the disease. It's a great talking-point to argue that the US shouldn't "subsidize" other countries, but at the end of the day I don't think we are willing to, say, abandon Afghanistan just because we feel that the French or the Germans won't do their fair share. International Relations academics love to bitch about "the free rider" problem and about the US providing "public goods" when others ought to do more as well, but at the end of the day I think it's a much bigger problem if you don't take care of a security issue that affects you just because others are also reaping the benefits of your actions. Maybe I'm just having too pessimistic an opinion of Europeans, but having grew up in Europe, well, I have my reasons for it :D

Ionut

[William F. Owen]

the Army has fought the war on terror with conventional units adapted to counterinsurgency operations. For most units, the transition from conventional organization and tactics to the very different and challenging tasks of counterinsurgency was traumatic. The costs of poor organization for counterinsurgency, in terms of battlefield mistakes and the misallocation of resources, were substantial. To provide the optimal force for fighting insurgencies the Army should develop Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) that are specifically organized, equipped, and trained for the complex challenges of counterinsurgency operations...

Everything I can see, suggests that this is utterly correct. What is more, I see it as pretty simple to re-configure a COIN structured force to go kill armoured vehicles, either dismounted or in protected mobility, or even get them to employ stand-off fires against the appropriate target sets. This is not 1944, or even 68.

Simple as it is, (and I think it is) we will never do it. :(

[Eden]

I am always a little bit mystified by those who say, in effect:

Having Conventional units do COIN is a hugely difficult transition, but a unit organized, trained, and equipped for COIN should be able to pick up conventional warfighting without too much trouble...

Now that that is off my chest, I would like to hear if anybody out there thinks it would make sense, in any current or future COIN situation, to take an approach that was common among imperial forces in the last century. That is, to build an indigenous army from scratch - as we are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan - with American officers and NCOs serving as commanders and small unit leaders, rather than advisers.

Most of the 'Imperial' forces that policed the various colonial empires were 'native' troops with European leaders, some of which became famous and highly effective fighting forces.

I know, I know, there are a multitude of problems with this approach...but we don't seem to be having a great deal of success with any others

[Tom Odom]

Now that that is off my chest, I would like to hear if anybody out there thinks it would make sense, in any current or future COIN situation, to take an approach that was common among imperial forces in the last century. That is, to build an indigenous army from scratch - as we are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan - with American officers and NCOs serving as commanders and small unit leaders, rather than advisers.

It worked relatively well for the Brits and to a lesser degree the French and other colonial powers in a colonial setting. The Sultan of Oman used retired SAS and other Brit officers for Oman's military. That said, examples in a non-colonial setting are rare, especially today. The modern state that says it will take another countries soldiers as its military leaders is hard to find.

I still see our tendency to recreate ourselves as our biggest issue; armies develop from the unit up over time. So called "jump starts" replicating structures we have in place, especially when it comes to headquarters and training establishments are bad investments of our money, our time, and most importantly our Soldiers.

Tom

[Ski]

The myth of strategic speed has raised it's head again.

It really doesn't matter how fast you move from CONUS/Home Station to a developing theater of operations. Moving an Armored/Heavy Corps is going to take a LOT of time, and it doesn't matter if it's from the AC or the RC or a combination of both. These forces are going to have to be moved by ship because of the weight and sheer cube size of equipment in a Heavy Corps. It's going to take weeks to get the bulk of the force someplace in the globe, and while you might use APS stocks to get a BCT or two into theater, the bulk of heavy forces are still going to take time to get into theater.

That's why have Marines, the 82nd and to a lesser extent the 101st. They can get on the ground quickly and at least act as a show of force against an opposing heavy force. The Navy and Air Force really can do a lot of damage to an enemy that decides to mass his units (yes, I'm actually giving them credit).

As Cavguy stated - this is a discussion that has to take place after Iraq. The force (AC and ARNG) are being used at too high of a rate to allow the establishment of the AC/ARNG HIC Heavy Corps + for the foreseeable future.

[Ski]

As a long time 50A officer (with relevant experience in theater), it's the biggest problem we've had since the beginning of both conflicts.

The organization is the base of the pyramid - mess that up and the top of the pyramid has a lot of trouble standing on its own.





I still see our tendency to recreate ourselves as our biggest issue; armies develop from the unit up over time. So called "jump starts" replicating structures we have in place, especially when it comes to headquarters and training establishments are bad investments of our money, our time, and most importantly our Soldiers.

Tom

[ipopescu]

The non-military security studies academics has a terrible track record of their theories panning out. Wolfowitz and Feith are but two examples on the other end of the spectrum.

The fact that the whole community (who gave birth to RAND) sprung up to wargame nuclear war should add suspicion.

Of course, I'm currently enrolled in a graduate security studies program! :eek:

Yeah, the current state of that academic field is rather deplorable. That's one reason why I'm preparing to enter it: weak competition.

On a more serious note, I currently see two general ways of arguing about planning for force structure.

1. You can start from the premise that there is an ends-means mismatch, and that we need to better match our goals with our resources . And on the one side you get the people who argue that foreign policy objectives should not include regime change + nation-building operations in anything but the most extraordinary circumstances. The "Iraq is an anomaly, and a disaster, and we won't do it again" school of foreign policy. This implies that we could, and should, lower our "ends" side of the equation to match our current means. And on the other hand the ones who envision large increases in defense spending and force structure to be able to deal with failed states by occupying and nation-building them. That's my caricature of what the underlying premises are for the Conventional vs. Irregular/Coin debate people are talking about.

2. Another way of looking at it is to believe, as, IMO, Frank Hoffman, Nate Freier and others who write about hybrid challenges do, that there is something intrinsic to the nature of future warfare (because of technology, globalization, US superiority in conv. warfare, etc.) which does not so much depend on the reasons why you went to war. Both state and non-state actors will use these hybrid tactics, mixing and matching modes of warfare to cause the greatest harm in that particular situation. Thus you won't have regular vs. irregular, but ever more innovative mixes of the two. Hezbollah is a prime example of this. Hence, you need flexible forces who can switch quickly from one to the other.

I think one way to look at this, in Clausewitzian terms, is a debate between people who are focusing more on the logic of war (1) and its grammar (2)

[Eden]

2. Another way of looking at it is to believe, as, IMO, Frank Hoffman, Nate Freier and others who write about hybrid challenges do, that there is something intrinsic to the nature of future warfare (because of technology, globalization, US superiority in conv. warfare, etc.) which does not so much depend on the reasons why you went to war. Both state and non-state actors will use these hybrid tactics, mixing and matching modes of warfare to cause the greatest harm in that particular situation. Thus you won't have regular vs. irregular, but ever more innovative mixes of the two. Hezbollah is a prime example of this. Hence, you need flexible forces who can switch quickly from one to the other.

I think one way to look at this, in Clausewitzian terms, is a debate between people who are focusing more on the logic of war (1) and its grammar (2)

I would caution those who believe the above statement that chosen 'modes of warfare' can not be entirely de-linked from the desired ends. Ends, in other words, sometimes dictate the means. Moreover, there are always non-military factors (culture, politics, economics, etc) which impact on an adversary's ability to 'mix and match' modes of warfare.

And referring to Clausewitz on this forum is like jumping into the lion's den with a pork chop around your neck.

[ipopescu]

I would caution those who believe the above statement that chosen 'modes of warfare' can not be entirely de-linked from the desired ends. Ends, in other words, sometimes dictate the means. Moreover, there are always non-military factors (culture, politics, economics, etc) which impact on an adversary's ability to 'mix and match' modes of warfare.

I agree, and in fact I did not mean to imply that "modes of warfare" can be divorced from the desired ends. I actually agree with Eliot Cohen, Fred Kagan and others who argued that one of the big errors of the RMA and Network Centric Warfare discourse was precisely a separation of war from its political objectives. I'm sorry if my choice of words was inadequate.

All I meant to say was that it seems to me some people believe that the conduct of future wars will be mainly determined by the ends we seek (with the implication that if we don't get involved in wars of occupation - which we shouldn't- there is no need to improve irregular/COIN capabilities; Jeffrey Record made the argument for a Cato paper a while ago), while others, as Secy Gates said this week, think that US adversaries (state and non-state) will use attempt irregular/asymmetric and hybrid means of warfare against the United States not just in prolonged wars of occupation, but in most contingencies.


And referring to Clausewitz on this forum is like jumping into the lion's den with a pork chop around your neck.
I readily admit that my understanding of Clausewitz is limited and most certainly a work in progress, but I am hoping that trying to improve it by making such references where I think appropriate, and waiting on people smarter than me to correct me if I'm wrong, is not terribly inconvenient for the members of this forum.

[Daniel.Kushner]

I very much enjoyed the essay but I'm having difficulty envisioning the linguistic or cultural elements of these specialized COIN units. Certainly such units in Iraq would be significantly more effective if they spoke fluent (or even more) Arabic and understood the subtleties of Arab or Kurdish culture or even the intricate differences between Shi'ism and Sunnism. This education would be less useful for units sent to the Pashtun Pashto-speaking regions of Afghanistan. I suppose my question is, considering we can't be certain where we might next be involved in counterinsurgency operations, are you suggesting some sort of generalized cultural education (and what would that entail?) or a series of parallel intensive classes, where for example some soldiers could choose to specialize in various Arab cultures and the dialects of the Arabic languages, while others might choose to study in greater focus Spanish and the various Latin American cultures, or are you suggesting that we follow both veins?

[William F. Owen]

I am always a little bit mystified by those who say, in effect:

Having Conventional units do COIN is a hugely difficult transition, but a unit organized, trained, and equipped for COIN should be able to pick up conventional warfighting without too much trouble...


This all hinges on what you believe defines "COIN" and "Warfighting" in terms of the tactical and operational functions that define force structure and development. - if indeed they do!

Does a COIN Brigade need less artillery? Probably. So you have to make sure you can bolt on credible artillery when needed. Same with armour. As concerns infantry, good protected mobility and ATGWs would seem to have merit for war fighting. I suggest the training would follow suit, or at least it did in the British Army in the 1980's.

[Randy Brown]

On the M-day side, I currently work and play on an ARNG Infantry BCT staff here in the American Midwest, so Povard's arguments toward COIN-focused BCTs are of great professional interest and even potential application.

Povard suggests on page 1 of his article that:


A counterinsurgency brigade should have the capability to defeat insurgents and to conduct stability operations. A core combat force of three to five infantry battalions, equipped with armored patrol vehicles, would specialize in security and small unit combat operations. One to three heavy companies backed by an artillery battery would provide the firepower to destroy insurgent concentrations. Organic human intelligence teams, engineers, and civil affairs teams would provide the capacity to find insurgents, rebuild infrastructure, and develop political institutions. Training detachments would give the brigade the capacity to recruit, train, and equip local forces to perform security tasks. The brigade staff would be experts in counterinsurgent tasks such as human intelligence, political analysis, reconstruction, and procurement. Every member of the brigade will be proficient in counterinsurgency tactics, cultures, and languages.

Obviously, this seems to tend toward the “heavy” side of the three BCT models (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brigade_Combat_Team), and also toward a top-down, God’s-Eye-View of force structure. Admittedly, I’m coming at the topic from the opposite directions: “light” and focused at the "grassroots" brigade level.

Given that the Army’s transformation to modularity supposedly also created the ability to swap out and add organizational parts as needed, I’ve been using Povard’s article to locally instigate some water-cooler professional development, posing the following question: How would you suggest re-configuring and/or equipping a hypothetical IBCT structure to optimize COIN capabilities?

Note that:

There are two organic infantry (light) battalions in an IBCT.
Armored Security Vehicles (ASV) exist only in the BSTB’s military police company.
Engineer capability in an Infantry BCT is also located in the BSTB, as one company of light engineers (Sappers).
Recon, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RISTA) capabilities reside in a HMMWV-based cavalry squadron. As my Cav buddies often remind me, they no longer offer on-call recon-in-force capability.

Further, note that our IBCT has recently deployed multiple rotations of Embedded Training Teams (ETT) to Afghanistan (http://www.taskforcephoenix.com/). As such, it theoretically has a cadre on which to build organic advisor-mentor capability.

So, all that said, what are your thoughts on how to theoretically re-organize and/or equip an IBCT to optimize COIN capabilities, given the missions discussed by Povard?

[Fuchs]

I'm not sure that small wars in general require a different force structure, such wars are often necessary tests for the normal forces.

Occupations otherwise require a lot of different qualifications than usual warfare and my opinion on this is that both the civil as the military services should have a reserve, to be mobilized for such duties if it's the nation's policy requirement that the national institutions should be capable to occupy foreign countries.

Such a mobilization would inadvertently create (potentially problematic) manpower shortages at home concerning policemen, economists, construction engineers, intelligence agents and diplomats.

It might be a good idea to keep such a mobilized force para-military instead of real military; the standing forces could do the combat jobs. It should be able to defend itself, though.

[Ski]

If we use Afghanistan and Iraq as examples, then Small Wars most certainly have and use unique force structure.

[Ken White]

in all wars; true in WW II, Korea, Viet Nam and Desert Storm. It should. To not do so is to fail to adapt to METT-TC.

There is absolutely no way to design a force that will fit all requirements; the structure is designed for ease of personnel use and equipping; commanders have to modify to get the job done. Not a problem.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I throw this out as grist for the mill. The original concept was to design a brigade combat team not for COIN, but for rear area operations. It morphed into a form or hybrid.

It is bound to upset about everyone. First, it creates a non-combat arms element that is a terrain manager. That alone should piss-off most of you. Second, it is based around the idea that COIN is broken into two elements. The SOF who are the terrorist hunter/killers and the stability forces that are performing what I term State Building activities. It leaves the traditional elements to fight the traditional wars without trying to force them into being the catch all for every possible mission.

Whether we can afford to create the brigades is a separate matter. It is only the concept that I was concerned with.

[Ski]

If this was the case, that would be dandy.

The problem is that commanders have not be trusted to shape their organizations - they are forced to reorganize based off the DMD and DMETL.




in all wars; true in WW II, Korea, Viet Nam and Desert Storm. It should. To not do so is to fail to adapt to METT-TC.

There is absolutely no way to design a force that will fit all requirements; the structure is designed for ease of personnel use and equipping; commanders have to modify to get the job done. Not a problem.

[Randy Brown]

I throw this out as grist for the mill. The original concept was to design a brigade combat team not for COIN, but for rear area operations. It morphed into a form or hybrid.

I very much appreciated reading your white paper exploring the possibilities inherent in a Rear Area, Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction Brigade. The document addresses some of the organizational stuff that's also come up in coffee-room conversations here, as we've informally played with the blue-sky task organization and/or equipping of an IBCT to pursue a hypothetical and generic COIN mission.

Sez this armchair IBCT commander:

I want more military police for security, and detainee ops.
I want more engineers, both for route-clearance and infrastructure missions.

Thanks again for the document!

[TheCurmudgeon]

Thanks for the comments.

While I take full and complete credit (or blame) for the document it is really the result of ten months of conversations with members of my small group at CGSC as we discussed current issues in Iraq and how to avoid them in the future by having an immediate follow-on capability.

In addition to not discussing the SOF/COIN connection in hopes of not limiting the concept to that realm, I also did not mention that the intent would be to make many of these either multi-compo or national guard brigades since much of the capability found in this organization is just as applicable in a civil disaster CONUS as long as the security forces are used in a non-federalized status.

[Andy Pavord]

I like Curmudgeon's paper. I agree with his discussion of how this type of brigade would be used. What I am not sure about is whether the core of this type of brigade should be infantry of MP. I lean toward infantry for a couple of reasons. I envision a situation where small unit combat is still fairly common and where the brigade needs the capability to defeat up to a company minus of insurgents. MPs are really only trained to handle squad level engagements (although I know they have done far more than that in Iraq). I also think the unit needs mortars which MPs do not have. (this may be a bias from my experience in Afghanistan).

The answer may be a hybrid unit with a mix of MPs and infantry. It could be a flexible mix depending on the situation. Lord knows that every unit commander wants more MPs.

I agree completely with the description of the need for specialized experience in the headquarters staff. Integrating training, reconstruction, policing and other functions is difficult. Developing the political sensitivity in commanders takes training and expereince that is different from preparing and leading in high intensity conflict. I understand the point made by others that the military is a demanding profession and that those who take up the calling must be flexible and able to learn to execute new tasks under the most demanding situations. And there is plenty of evidence that many units have suceeded in doing this over the years in many different campaigns. My point is that learning on the fly and experimentation on the ground is not the optimal condition. We need at least a few brigade and battalion staffs that have thought this stuff through before they are in the middle of the fight. That will produce the best results.

[Andy Pavord]

I also want to second Ski's idea that unit commanders need more power to shape their own force structure. I think that we are way too biased in favor of making things easier for planners and budgeteers by enforcing a one size fits all industial era mentality. We should give unit commanders a mission and the resouces and let them experiment.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Thanks for you comments. In trying to use “off-the-shelf” units as much as possible and trying not to interfere with the army’s plan to have 48 BCTs by not fighting for assets that would be necessary to fill those units.

You are absolutely right that the unit has no mortar or anti-armor capabilities. It would take a modified weapons company with three assault platoons and one “mortar platoon” made up of three standard mortar sections to build the assets required to fill the gap. One of these companies would be added to each MP BN. The question then comes up as to whether to add Q-36 or some other counter fire detection capability. I understand there is a fairly good sonic system out there somewhere that is more akin to what I may want. Again, I am out of the “off-the-shelf” capability. These modifications could be corrected during the concept validation phase.

[Sabre]

The solution to that problem is not COIN units or an Advisory Corps -- it is simply better training for that multi purpose forces that we must field. Having done both, I'll flatly state that HIC is more difficult. Yes, the skill sets are different but the trauma of HIC, the far higher casualty rates and their effect on unit capability and the planing and logistic effort make COIN appear simple. The skill sets are different, particularly above Co/Trp level but they are not so different that the two skills are irreconcilable. Any Joe or Staff Officer who knows the basics of his job can make the switch without too much difficulty. Those that cannot should seek other employment; combat in either case is not a job for the marginally competent.All true -- and switching between the two has been done in the past and is just necessary.

Problem is total troops available and likely to be available. My belief is that the Army cannot afford that. I emphatically agree we need to retain a cadre of 'experts' and a running school for Advisors and one for COIN practice. Exercises and the MTCs should include COIN scenarios as a matter of course. I believe the units are able to cope with switch hitting at COIN or HIC with minimal adjustment time. With better training, hopefully coming and Outcome based, they'll adapt okay. I'm less sanguine about the ability of those in high places to adapt -- us old guys get set in our ways... :(

At the risk of resurrecting a thread... I think that there is an important element being overlooked in this discussion - the actual combat portion of the "learning curve" which we seem, in spite of so many peering into a crystal ball, to inevitably encounter.

In high intensity combat, you can screw things up sufficiently badly that you could conceivably lose an entire BCT in a matter of days or hours. COIN can be a much more forgiving in that respect. Sure mistakes in COIN cost lives, and perhaps a political setback or two (i.e., some trooper strays outside of the rules of engagement), but won't cost you a 4,000 man brigade in less than a week.

Another point is that (fumbles while opening can of worms) we can at least make wide use of contractors in a COIN environment, for security, training of local nationals, etc.. Sure, everyone loves to hate contractors, the media especially, but they can be utilitzed, in certain roles, for COIN, while we darn sure couldn't count on much contractor augmentation for a high-intensity conflict.

Why would we organize all of our HIC units into the reserves/National Guard, adding an additional 60/90/180 days required to "train up" to the 30 or so required for deployment? We may as well not have any HIC capability at all, if require the better part of a year to employ it. Besides, deployments and deployment schedules are (ultimately) determined by politicians, who often have little appreciation for capabilities. This is in a world were a crisis can pop out of the murky darkness of the future with alarming speed. So, in the event of a crisis requiring HIC units, and the active Army is only COIN units, you will have a COIN unit thrown in, whether we like it or not. "Snapping in" heavy weapons units at the last minute is a well known recipe for disaster in a HIC.

(...and how are we forgetting that we needed HIC forces to kick in the door in Iraq?)

[Ken White]

...
Why would we organize all of our HIC units into the reserves/National Guard...Who suggested that? I did not -- though I do think a slight majority of the overall number of heavy BCTs should be in the RC.
adding an additional 60/90/180 days required to "train up" to the 30 or so required for deployment?Sixty plus the 30; 90 days total should be more than adequate. The problem heretofore has not been lack of capability but the reluctance of the active Army to certify ARNG combat units for deployment for a variety of reasons.
...and the active Army is only COIN units, you will have a COIN unit thrown in, whether we like it or not. "Snapping in" heavy weapons units at the last minute is a well known recipe for disaster in a HIC.

(...and how are we forgetting that we needed HIC forces to kick in the door in Iraq?)Agree -- and again, not at all what I suggested.

[reed11b]

Who suggested that? I did not -- though I do think a slight majority of the overall number of heavy BCTs should be in the RC.Sixty plus the 30; 90 days total should be more than adequate. The problem heretofore has not been lack of capability but the reluctance of the active Army to certify ARNG combat units for deployment for a variety of reasons.Agree -- and again, not at all what I suggested.

Amen to the recognition of the political aspect of the NG certifications on OIF-I. I disagree w/ the HBT's in the NG however. The upkeep cost difference between an active HBT and NG HBT is not particularly great. There is also limited large training areas available in many states. IBT's make a better cost saving and dual-role option for the NG.

[Ken White]

I disagree w/ the HBT's in the NG however. The upkeep cost difference between an active HBT and NG HBT is not particularly great.Cost is not the issue, manning strengths are the problem.
There is also limited large training areas available in many states.True but there are other States, mostly out west, that have plenty of room. There are a lot of politics in what type of Guard units are where and that can be rectified (Heh; Congress willing, of course...).
IBT's make a better cost saving and dual-role option for the NG.True for the Guard; my question is which is best for the nation.

[Entropy]

Just wanted to inject that the Air Guard has undergone a lot of significant changes as part of brac in the last few years. One of the biggest changes was a significant loss of ANG "HIC" capability through the loss of combat aircraft. To me this makes sense - an F-16 wing, for example, is of limited use to a governor. A big focus for the ANG now is DGS - the ground station exploitation from UAV's, U-2 and other aircraft.

On the reserve side, the trend is toward "associate" units where reserve units are colocated and partially integrated with active duty units. The reserve is now, for all intents and purposes, an operational and not a strategic reserve.

[Ken White]

~90% funded by the USG only to serve the States?
Just wanted to inject that the Air Guard has undergone a lot of significant changes as part of brac in the last few years. One of the biggest changes was a significant loss of ANG "HIC" capability through the loss of combat aircraft. To me this makes sense - an F-16 wing, for example, is of limited use to a governor.I suggest the the sheer cost of todays fighters to replace those F-16s (And F-15s) plays a part. Pointing out that F-16s are of little use to a Governor is just sugar coating reality.
A big focus for the ANG now is DGS - the ground station exploitation from UAV's, U-2 and other aircraft.I suspect that will accelerate. It should. Hopefully, they'll get a handle on the stress factor.
On the reserve side, the trend is toward "associate" units where reserve units are colocated and partially integrated with active duty units. The reserve is now, for all intents and purposes, an operational and not a strategic reserve.As, IMO, the Army Reserve should be while the ARNG remains a strategic reserve. The mid-80s movement of all Cbt units away from the USAR was a bad deal for the nation.

[reed11b]

but a great deal for the NG. I certainly would have never "gone guard" w/o there being actual deployable combat units w/ first rate equipment in it. What do you think the advantage of having BCTs in the reserve over the NG would be BTW?
Reed

[selil]

Just want to point out that the Army and Air National Guard units are the only force that has all of the law enforcement and military powers in one entity available for use up to and trumping the FBI for international conflict to fight cyber warfare. Whew...

When you look at all of the entities that want to do it, they all have legal restrictions, that make them nearing on almost impossible to act in the capacity of offensive cyber warfare.

Now capability. That may be something else. And, there are a few sticky issues involving international law and treaties. SO, force structure for small wars follows patterns far beyond trigger pullers.

[reed11b]

but I retract my earlier statements. I re-read the whole thread from the beginning, and in the context of who should be involved in long-term fights and who should be involved in the "kick-off", I must say that a RC HBTs do make a great deal of sense. This would also allow for increased focus on training for both the AC and RC since the majority of the downtime upkeep would be taken over by technicians and contractors. grrr not only do I never get away w/ sloppy posts around Ken, sometimes I even have to admit I was wrong. Thanks a heap. :D
Reed

[Entropy]

~90% funded by the USG only to serve the States? I suggest the the sheer cost of todays fighters to replace those F-16s (And F-15s) plays a part. Pointing out that F-16s are of little use to a Governor is just sugar coating reality.

Never said they were only to serve the states but regardless it doesn't make much sense to me to have too many combat aircraft like F-16's in the guard. If there's an argument for keeping fighters in the Guard I'd love to hear it.

I don't see aircraft cost being a primary factor since the fighter fleet is only expected to decline by around 15% over the next 15 years which should be offset easily by UAS'. The primary factor, IMO, are O&M costs and the continuing trend in both the Navy and Air Force to consolidate airframes to a few bases as a cost saving measure. This is also the logic behind the reserve associate units.


I suspect that will accelerate. It should. Hopefully, they'll get a handle on the stress factor.

Yeah, these units will be 24/7/365 operations once they all get up and running which will be nice for Guard bums but could take some adjustment from the traditionals. The advantage, of course, is there are no operational deployments.

Anyway, I don't want to hijack the thread further, but it's interesting to compare how the different services are making changes to the Guard/Reserve.

[Ken White]

Never said they were only to serve the states but regardless it doesn't make much sense to me to have too many combat aircraft like F-16's in the guard. If there's an argument for keeping fighters in the Guard I'd love to hear it.Given the number of combat aircraft available and the even smaller number likely to be available, it doesn't make much sense -- if we had the big numbers we had in the 1945-95 period it would.
I don't see aircraft cost being a primary factor since the fighter fleet is only expected to decline by around 15% over the next 15 yearsThat doesn't track. As of Sep 07, the figures were:
730 F-15
1,245 F-16 (incl 270 F-16 ADF for AirNG fighter interceptor mission)
378 A10 (last number I heard)
______
2,353

vs.

183 F22 (last number I heard)
1,763 F35 (last number I heard)
_____
1,946

That's a 17% drop if all goes well -- but that's really academic and it is around 15%. My point would be that even that 2007 number is vastly different than the 1987 figures... :D
which should be offset easily by UAS'.True.
Anyway, I don't want to hijack the thread further, but it's interesting to compare how the different services are making changes to the Guard/Reserve.the services all have vastly different roles and missions so there should be a difference -- a big difference...

[Ski]

The National Guard has combat force structure because it is considered the militia of the nation - expanded to the ANG once flight became possible. It's Constitutional Law and that alone means the Guard is going to have the bulk of Reserve Component combat force structure.

I can get into some of the force structure, training and readiness changes of the Army Guard later today or this week, depending on available time. Christ knows I've spent the last five years of my life getting the ARNG working through Modularity, ARFORGEN and earlier this year, the new Pre-Mob Training cycle. Also have worked on the "Comprehensive Review" that was just signed by the FORSCOM Commander which really is the nuts and bolts of getting a much better trained, manned, and ready ARNG integrated into the Operational Reserve.

Gots to get to CGSC now...

[Ken White]

The National Guard has combat force structure because it is considered the militia of the nation - expanded to the ANG once flight became possible. It's Constitutional Law and that alone means the Guard is going to have the bulk of Reserve Component combat force structure.'considered.' That word raises the question "by whom?"

Your statement is correct by Statute, not by the Constitution; what Congress renders, it can unrender. NGB slickly got all that myth bought by a succession of Administrations and Congresses over the last 100 years or so. I spent a lot of my 18 years of DAC time working some of the issues and with the Guard, plus I've been there, KY Gd at 16 and SC Gd later. Nothing I've written is a knock on the Guard, it is what it is and it's okay as it is -- and will get better...

In any event, it is simply my opinion that transfer of all combat units in the RC to the Guard was a mistake -- whether it was an error or not, it's unlikely to be changed. Certainly nothing I write will bring that about...

[selil]

'
Your statement is correct by Statute, not by the Constitution; what Congress renders, it can unrender. NGB slickly got all that myth bought by a succession of Administrations and Congresses over the last 100 years or so. I spent a lot of my 18 years of DAC time working some of the issues and with the Guard, plus I've been there, KY Gd at 16 and SC Gd later. Nothing I've written is a knock on the Guard, it is what it is and it's okay as it is -- and will get better...


I think Ken you may be partially right which suggests... I can't pull it off the top of my head but I believe from the Korean War, there may be a few Supreme Court decisions, as to the Constitutional nature of the guard. I believe, though don't know what to search for, that there was a SCOTUS decision in the Kennedy era too. There has been a lawsuit also brought by a couple of governors in the last few years.

Sorry I'm being vague but this is far afield of my area of expertise but becoming of increased interest as to the realities, legal, and political implications of increased use of the Guard for non-traditional missions.

[selil]

This is the only thing I could find regarding the National Guard by the court system as the militia from 1988. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940DE2D81731F934A35751C1A96E9482 60&n=Top%2FReference%2FTimes%20Topics%2FSubjects%2FG% 2FGovernors%20(US)

[Ken White]

I think Ken you may be partially right which suggests... I can't pull it off the top of my head but I believe from the Korean War, there may be a few Supreme Court decisions, as to the Constitutional nature of the guard. I believe, though don't know what to search for, that there was a SCOTUS decision in the Kennedy era too. There has been a lawsuit also brought by a couple of governors in the last few years.

Sorry I'm being vague but this is far afield of my area of expertise but becoming of increased interest as to the realities, legal, and political implications of increased use of the Guard for non-traditional missions.I'm pretty sure I am. Check Title 32, USC Sec 101 Definitions -- in total, that is a slick statute designed to give the constitutional veneer to the Guards self adoption of the 'Militia' mantle but just skimming the definitions can give you a feel for the reality. The Constitution emphatically does not describe the Militia in terms applicable to the modern National Guard.

Most of those decisions you mention were from cases aimed at decreasing Federal Control of the Guard for many reasons, war, simple overseas deployment training in peace time, movement of equipment (and units), activation and inactivation of units and such like while enhancing the role of the Governor in an effort to keep the Guard more focussed on State missions or in the form the State wanted as opposed to that dictated by the Feds and NGB. Most failed on the simple logic that the Feds fund 90% of the net costs. A few succeeded on the basis that Title 32 says the Guard is the 'Militia.' None had any significant effect on what I said.

On the non-traditional missions, not sure what you mean but essentially, when the Guard is under State control, they can do whatever State Law says is legal. Obviously, if they're Federalized, Posse Comitatus and other laws apply. The Reserve is always Federal so they don't get the exception and State cover.

[Ken White]

This is the only thing I could find regarding the National Guard by the court system as the militia from 1988. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940DE2D81731F934A35751C1A96E9482 60&n=Top%2FReference%2FTimes%20Topics%2FSubjects%2FG% 2FGovernors%20(US)
having worked the Central American training issues back at that time -- roads in Honduras, mostly -- IIRC, the intial ruling was overruled on Appeal (mostly because it interfered with ArNG deployments to the REFORGER Exercises in Europe). In any event, Overseas Deployment Training (ODT) at Fedral direction continued without a hitch into the mid-90s when it got hit with funding cuts.

Note in the linked article that the 8th Circuit found for the Governor and the 1st Circuit had earlier found for the Feds. I don't recall the sequencing but I do know that ODT kept going.

[120mm]

If we go back to some of the foundational documents, "the militia" is generally described as "all able-bodied men between the age of 18-55". Basically, if you fit the above description, you IS the militia.

Now, where is my assault rifle and my banjo???:)

The Guard is a federally-embodied force, cut to the mythical control of the respective states.

[Ski]

Also look at the Dick Act for additional info.

There is legal linkage between the Consitution and the Guard - it's been established, there are many years of precedent.

The Army Reserve was created for medical personnel right a few years before WWI. Their role has morphed and expanded, just like the Guard's.

[Ken White]

...There is legal linkage between the Consitution and the Guard - it's been established, there are many years of precedent.many years -- like the 105 since the Dick Act was passed and the many changes to Title 32 since that time to cement the 'relationship.' :D. The previous 116 show no linkage at all. I'm fully aware of all the arguments but the bottom line is that the Guard is the Militia by Statute, not IAW the Constitution -- and I'm not arguing with or disparaging that or the Guard, it's just a matter of fact and it should be no big thing.
The Army Reserve was created for medical personnel right a few years before WWI. Their role has morphed and expanded, just like the Guard's.Also true... ;)

[selil]

many years -- like the 105 since the Dick Act was passed and the many changes to Title 32 since that time to cement the 'relationship.' :D. The previous 116 show no linkage at all. I'm fully aware of all the arguments but the bottom line is that the Guard is the Militia by Statute, not IAW the Constitution -- and I'm not arguing with or disparaging that or the Guard, it's just a matter of fact and it should be no big thing.Also true... ;)

Ken it may not say in the Constitution "National Guard" the SCOTUS seems to read it that way. There is no right to privacy in the Constitution but the SCOTUS and even rabid Roberts says it is inherent in the forgotten 9th amendment. Framers intent is more than the words on the page and SCOTUS interpretation is a big deal. To be honest I don't like the militia interpretation as being the Guard as it erodes the personal protection/revolution aspects in the second amendment.


ETA: Can you tell I'm Jeffersonian versus Adams adherent? LOL

[Ken White]

Ken it may not say in the Constitution "National Guard" the SCOTUS seems to read it that way...it does not track with my observation or experience. I think we're making an issue where none exists. The Constitution does not define the Militia; The Dick Act and Title 32 say the Militia is the NG. There is no SCOTUS decision of which I'm aware that changes this Law LINK (http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/311.html) or corroborates your statement.

OTOH, this law LINK (http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=170453) may be subject to challenge in the future but based on most prior Court decisions, I suspect it'll remain the law...

I'm not at all sure what the issue is here??? :confused:

[selil]

No issue on my part. Just a different view point. From mine I'm trying to identify an entity in the government that has domestic as well as foreign powers, legal authority to enforce laws, can span the width and depth of military missions and law enforcement missions, has access to all of the tools and gizmos necessary, and not require a substantive over haul of the current law base.

[Ken White]

No issue on my part. Just a different view point. From mine I'm trying to identify an entity in the government that has domestic as well as foreign powers, legal authority to enforce laws, can span the width and depth of military missions and law enforcement missions, has access to all of the tools and gizmos necessary, and not require a substantive over haul of the current law base.My suspicion is that you're going to run into a Title 10 / Title 32 disconnect. The Guard can do all that in its own state (or in another State with the concurrence of both Governors and NGB) but has to be in Federal service for the foreign bit, thereby losing some of their State powers...

Shame no water is involved; then the Coast Guard could fit the requirement. :D

[120mm]

To be honest I don't like the militia interpretation as being the Guard as it erodes the personal protection/revolution aspects in the second amendment.

ETA: Can you tell I'm Jeffersonian versus Adams adherent? LOL

Too bad we don't have a "giving the high five" emoticon, because I'm doing that with you, right now.

I "believe" the Commonwealth of Virginia constitution, as well as The Federalist Papers define "the militia" as basically everyone who is able.

It also falls in line with certain community traditions of universal communal service.

And there is no doubt in my mind that Amendment Two was designed at least partially as a foil to the power of the state. It was truncated when they condensed the 14 original amendments into 10 for marketing reasons, at least if my undergrad-level American History memory doesn't fail me....