Insurgent Operations in Kandahar Province

[Entropy]

A Violent Impediment:the evolution of insurgent operations in Kandahar province 2003-07 (http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a793324547~db=all)

Abstract
Theorizing about Taliban operations in Afghanistan has its limits and it is possible that Kabul-centric strategies do not adequately address the unique circumstances of each region in the country. How exactly has the Taliban gone about attaining its objectives in Kandahar province and how have those approaches evolved since 2002? And how have the Taliban adapted to coalition forces' attempts to compete with the insurgency and stamp it out? The answers to these questions are critical in the formulation of any counterinsurgency approach to Afghanistan.

[davidbfpo]

A Taliban 'who dares wins' attack and hundreds of prisoners at liberty: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/2131235/How-Taliban-sprang-450-terrorists-from-Kandahar%27s-Sarposa-prison-in-Afghanistan.html

The last few paragraphs, from a Canadian need to be read:

Yesterday Canadians reacted with dismay at seeing their prison project in ruins.

"The message this attack sends is that the insurgents can act with relative impunity even into downtown Kandahar," said Colin Kenny, the head of the Canadian senate's committee on security and national defence, and a campaigner for more Nato troops to join the Afghan mission. The other message it sends is to the insurgent rank and file: if you get captured, we'll get you out."

[davidbfpo]

An embedded UK reporter, with US NG unit; who fall victim to an IED on a road near Kandahar en route to Helmand: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/3223963/Afghanistan-The-night-I-was-killed-in-action-by-a-Taliban-ambush.html

Accompanying video indicates how confusing post-explosion the attack was.

For an armchair observer a nunber of questions arise, notably why move at night? Nore, a moment of silence for the one KIA, 37yr NYState NG.

davidbfpo

[Schmedlap]

When I read your question, I thought it was naive. Then I read the article and now I'm wondering the same thing. Here's why...
They had no night-vision goggles or flares, and some were standing in the beams from their vehicle headlights. Heavy machine-guns and grenade-launchers were hammering furiously in what the Americans call suppressive fire, to keep the enemy's heads down.
I remember the first and last time that I was the patrol leader of a mission and neglected to have my men bring night vision goggles. It was 8 years ago, in the Florida phase of Ranger School, and it was a well-earned reason for them to recycle me. I'd be curious to know 1) is this report accurate, regarding the lack of NVG's? and 2) if so, why didn't these guys have NVG's? I'm not sure if it matters whether their unit simply didn't have any or whether their patrol leaders didn't think they needed them - neither reason is good - but this strikes me as either bizarre or as sloppy reporting. How would a unit, 7 years into the Afghan conflict, not bring NVG's on a patrol whether it is day or night? On the other hand, if they were relying on their headlights, then I guess it is probable that they didn't have NVGs. I can think of no other sane reason to flip on white lights immediately after being ambushed.

I regularly check the Honor the Fallen (http://www.militarycity.com/valor/honor.html) webpage to see if any of my friends show up on the list. I just saw PFC Dimond (http://www.militarycity.com/valor/3773262.html)'s information posted yesterday. RIP.

[Uboat509]

For an armchair observer a number of questions arise, notably why move at night?

I can't speak for Afghanistan or this unit but for our part we did our best not to let the enemy dictate things on the battlefield. It would not take the enemy long to figure out that they could move safely at night if we never did. Besides which, we are taught from basic on that the American Army owns the night and for the most part that is true.

As for the lack of NVGs, I can't say for sure but my bet is that they had them but they never got them out once the fighting started. NVGs can actually be a huge pain in the butt to use effectively in a fire fight and you still won't see as well as you can with white light. Add to that the fact that this unit did not appear to be all that well trained, what with standing in their own headlights and firing a lot of rounds, apparently at nothing, and you get a pretty good idea of why the reporter never saw any NVGs come out.

SFC W

[Ken White]

You have to move at night -- if you don't, the bad guys will and one should strive at all costs to not let the other side control the tempo or be the initiator of action. Thus there is every reason to move at night and a strong incentive to avoid stasis.

There is, based on that article, little question in my mind that the unit involved was not well trained and did not perform well. American units in general are in fact trigger happy and we do fire far too promiscuously and easily -- penalty of having an overabundance of ammunition and the myth of 'suppressive fire' * .

Yes, NVG are a pain but they have great value, however, one can operate at night without NVGs, many forces have done that for thousands of years and those that did / do it well train to do so (even if you have NVG; what happens if you're out long enough to run out of batteries...), it's not difficult and one can see at night.

* As a MOH and two Navy Cross holder once said "...suppressive fire only suppresses if it is accurate fire..."

[patmc]

My platoon provided convoy security in northern Iraq, and we usually travelled at night in an attempt to give the Iraqis better use of the roads during the day. Our convoys travelled with white lights, since it was pretty clear to the enemy which of the 20-25 veh convoy were US guntrucks, and which were TCN cargo trucks. It also let us spot IEDs. We always had NVG's in our vehicles though, but only used them during security halts when we cut our lights.

I find it hard to believe that any US unit in CENTCOM AO would not have NVG's. If they don't, their commander and S4 need to get to work. If they chose not to bring them, the leadership accepted too much risk. Its always better to have something and not use it. I even kept the NBC pro-suit in my bag in the trunk, knowing the .0001% chance I would need it, it was there.

[davidbfpo]

Thank you all for the explanations for driving at night - as described here - and the other comments for my armchair understanding.

davidbfpo

[ODB]

First let me say this is my opinion based on this side of the story, the author's perspective.

All the things that stand out in my mind come down to two things training and discipline or if you want to call it what it is "leadership". The first red flag in mind is the driver apologizing ahead of time for having never driven the vehicle before. There is absolutely no reason he should not have drive the vehicle before and the first time he does is in a combat situation, way to go leadership. Another red flag is soldiers standig in the head light beams. Absolutely nothing wrong with utilizing white lights but you'd never catch me standing in the head lights. Hey bad guys here I am, look at me. Absolutely many soldiers and units are horrendous when it comes to fire control and fire discipline. This goes back to many of my rants in other posts in how we do not train this enough. POSH training, safety training, and mandatory screenings take priority in todays Army, even during a time of war. I won't touch the NVD issue because too many uknowns and who knows if they weren't using them or if they didn't have them, or if some used them and some didn't.

Just a few things that stuck out to me.

Just somethings that struck me

[Uboat509]

In fairness to the unit I don't know when this event took place but I do know that certain vehicles were hard to come by for the purposes of training, particularly for the ARNG. There just weren't enough of them to go around and most of those were in theater. A few were available for RA training but not many and a suspect that it would have been hard for those ARNG units to get them. That in no way excuses some of the other jackassery that apparently transpired.

Ken Said

Yes, NVG are a pain but they have great value, however, one can operate at night without NVGs, many forces have done that for thousands of years and those that did / do it well train to do so (even if you have NVG; what happens if you're out long enough to run out of batteries...), it's not difficult and one can see at night.

I did not mean to imply that NVGs were not valuable or that this unit did not need to be employing them. I was only offering a possible reason why they were apparently not using them.

SFC W

[Ken White]

...I did not mean to imply that NVGs were not valuable or that this unit did not need to be employing them. I was only offering a possible reason why they were apparently not using them. SFC Wjust amplifying on what you and Schmedlap said and reminding some that one can also operate at night without NVG -- but you gotta train to do that...

[Ken White]

An embedded UK reporter, with US NG unit; who fall victim to an IED on a road near Kandahar en route to Helmand: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/3223963/Afghanistan-The-night-I-was-killed-in-action-by-a-Taliban-ambush.html
davidbfporaised by several at this LINK (http://www.blackfive.net/main/2008/10/if-you-are-in-t.html). As usual, the first blush report is perhaps a bit overdone and as the dust settles, a bit more usually comes out. Without being there at the time, hard to say what's right...

[Entropy]

Ken,

I read that piece over at Blackfive yesterday too. Even given their tendency to put a certain slant on things, I think they've raised a lot of legitimate questions about the article.

[Ken White]

"Even given their tendency to put a certain slant on things."

Masterful!!! :cool:

Still, as you say, there are questions. Truth's probably somewhere in between -- it usually is... :wry:

[William F. Owen]

I read that piece over at Blackfive yesterday too. Even given their tendency to put a certain slant on things, I think they've raised a lot of legitimate questions about the article.

The problem is while most of us can read the two versions, and get the drift of what actually happened, UK media is just about incapable of accurately reporting from the front line or even the rear. The need to "entertain" and sensationalise, is mind boggling. The levels of inaccuracy and invention are now at a serious level, and that leaves the general public, very poorly served.

[Entropy]

The problem is while most of us can read the two versions, and get the drift of what actually happened, UK media is just about incapable of accurately reporting from the front line or even the rear. The need to "entertain" and sensationalise, is mind boggling. The levels of inaccuracy and invention are now at a serious level, and that leaves the general public, very poorly served.

I don't read the UK media all that frequently now, but when I do, I get the same impression you describe here. When I actually lived in the UK about ten years ago I remember it as you describe. Sadly, it seems nothing has changed.

[davidbfpo]

Reporting from Afghanistan can be poor, often clearly dependent on press releases and guided tours. There have been several superb examples of reporting, such as the BBC TV hour long documentary on a Guards company with ANA troops (there was a post here) and the reports by Sean Langan (who was kidnapped earlier this year).

Even more remarkable, although made with massive help, was the multi-part documentary on a group of Royal Marines in training and then on active service.

I'd also mention the superb US reporting on isolated units in Eastern Afghanistan; grimly realistic and a couple of threads here.

davidbfpo

[William F. Owen]

There have been several superb examples of reporting, such as the BBC TV hour long documentary on a Guards company with ANA troops (there was a post here) and the reports by Sean Langan (who was kidnapped earlier this year).

Even more remarkable, although made with massive help, was the multi-part documentary on a group of Royal Marines in training and then on active service.


I know some is good. However the overall standard is low basically because the media have no idea what they are looking at.

The RM doco was interesting but some of what was shown, was out of sync to the commentary added afterwards, and what went un-said was often of more interest, and failure to address these issues, could arguably mislead the public.

[Ott]

I was the commander of the PMT that QRFed for CPL Diamonds team. I got there soon after the IED strike. Every one of them that I saw had NODs on. It was his first time driving outside the wire in a Cougar since it was a brand new vehicle in theater and they had spent the last week at KAF training on the vehicle. There was a couple headlights on, but one was so the medic could treat the men in the CCP and a civillian vehicle that had been abandoned next to the road. I haven't seen his video, but I imagine initially they were traveling with white light and didn't shut off their lights immeidately. They were in shock a bit since hundreds of pounds of explosives had just gone off around them and one of their men had been killed but their reactions were nonetheless completely proffessional. The reporter is a tremendous douche who tried to sensationalize the story. He also flat out lied in the article, as my medic made him a Priority C not an A, and a KIA would never be an A anyway.

[davidbfpo]

Ott,

Thank you. first-hand professional knowledge puts the reporter to shame.

davidbfpo

[Uboat509]

In hindsight I am withdrawing my earlier criticism. I was not there and one agenda driven article with a short video should not be the basis on which I make judgements. That is actually one of my rules and I broke it anyway. Bad SFC! :mad:

SFC W