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RTK
05-23-2008, 12:39 AM
Had an interesting seminar with Don Vandergriff this morning and thought of the following question:

Does OODA change in a COIN environment or advisory role through a language barrier? Do the O's transpose each other? Does it morph into something else; like Orient-Observe-Reorient-catalog-Decide-Act?

Ken White
05-23-2008, 12:43 AM
You made my head hurt. I gotta go get a bourbon and think about that one...

Stan
05-23-2008, 06:47 AM
Had an interesting seminar with Don Vandergriff this morning and thought of the following question:

Does OODA change in a COIN environment or advisory role through a language barrier? Do the O's transpose each other? Does it morph into something else; like Orient-Observe-Reorient-catalog-Decide-Act?

Hey Ryan !
As both a training development manager and having served in various advisory capacities with both language and cultural barriers, Orient-Observe-Reorient-Engage works best for me. The trouble with Orient (requiring the need for Reorient) is a Western mind set... the tool kit we're sent to the field with worked well in the classroom, but theoretical approaches are barely adequate and will never replace good ol' experience.

Regards, Stan

William F. Owen
05-23-2008, 10:33 AM
Does OODA change in a COIN environment or advisory role through a language barrier? Do the O's transpose each other? Does it morph into something else; like Orient-Observe-Reorient-catalog-Decide-Act?

If it does then you shouldn't be using it. Having discussed it face to face with Bill Lind, I am as sceptical as ever. OODA is not Core Functions. That's a weakness and I have yet to see why anyone would teach it. I see lots of the examples of OODA use but none validate it is a useful process.

Question: How does understanding the OODA loop make you a better chess player or fox hunter?

Eden
05-23-2008, 01:24 PM
Except at the most tactical, trivial level, the OODA loop is not a useful tool in wars such as we are fighting in Afghanistan or Iraq. Things move at such a glacial pace, for one thing. For another, the successful practitioner needs to learn to ignore much of the white noise generated by an insurgency. Trying to orient or reorient every time you receive a stimulus may seem wise, but it actually only leads to friction, exhaustion, inconsistency, and failure.

A very wise commander once told us planners our jobs was to reduce the number of decisions he had to make during an operation.

Hacksaw
05-23-2008, 01:48 PM
Just a couple of days ago, I was sitting with a State Department (S/CRS) Planner discussing some new approaches they are considering/trying to find money to field. These included modular planning teams, HN Gov/t embeds, and PRT like organizations for the "long haul". All interesting but not relevant, what was relevant was an approach to the planning process that they intend to employ...

one in which no one (but the plan) is in charge and that it will be a self-adjusting mechanism amongst a team of peers (I think I got that mostly right). Well you can imagine my head spinning (think Linda Blair), as I struggled to keep a straight face and open mind. Well can't say that at that moment either I or my uniformed partners were able to wrap our minds around that little State Department "pearl".

But as I considered it further.... So long as the plan wasn't botched from the beginning (not perfect just good), then this might actually be a stroke of brilliance. The State Department contribution is by nature long-term (10-40 years). Their plan more than any other could use a little built-in bureaucratic non-sense to keep them from chasing their tail with every change in the wind direction. Having an engineered impediment to deviations is not only OK, but desired.

Now I'd sure like to see one of those good enough, self-syncronizing plans! Never quite crossed that threshold except in a game of monopoly.

Live well and row...

Ken White
05-23-2008, 04:16 PM
Leading to the obvious point is that everyone is not a John Boyd -- or a fighter pilot -- and what works for one guy in one place may not be best for everyone everywhere.

Boyd was an intuitive fighter jock. Military forces tend to have two types of people who fight, deliberate and intuitive. Intuitive fighters are born, not made. The good news is that very effective deliberate fighters at all levels can be made through decent education and / or training. The US Army for many reasons and the Marines to an only slightly lesser extent encourage a deliberate approach to combat, thus the deliberate guys far outnumber the intuitive guys. My personal belief is that intuitive is better but I understand and accept the need for the deliberate types (and admit they're beneficial in slowing the intuitive types down from time to time ;) ).

The problem is that since most males are competitive, they'll opt to try anything that might give them an edge in any competition. This tacitly encourages the adoption of the latest fads -- and 'techniques' or methods -- and that engenders the use of said ideas. The intuitive guy will very quickly accept, modify and / or reject what doesn't work; it takes the deliberate type more time (and frequently, effort) to do that, sometimes far longer, individual dependent. Occasionally a mediocre idea will become so embedded in some minds that it cannot be dismissed... :(

The OODA syndrome is an example of this. Widely adapted and adopted because it makes sense. It's also popular because most people instinctively actually do that sort of assessment in any new situation, perhaps with different words in a different order -- if they even think of it that way. Boyd just codified and simplified it for popular consumption. It is of some value but it is emphatically not a panacea or the only way to operate. Everyone cannot apply the facets in that sequence in all circumstances and most people will vary on the speed at which they can apply the process. Thus, I submit it's a good theory, worth knowing and understanding but it is not and should not be a guiding principle. I think the OODA process and variations should be taught as A way to assess and operate but it should be emphasized that it is not a dictated methodology and alternatives should also be discussed.

Having advised elements in two Armies in the far east and mideast and having done the COIN thing on three continents, I can say that I've used variations on the theme countless times -- even before Boyd enunciated it. Thus to RTK's good question, in all seriousness and with absolutely no sarcasm, I come up with:

- It depends on the situation.

- It is up to the individual to develop a personal view or method of the application.

- Be careful what you codify, it may become dogma.

CommoChief
05-23-2008, 04:42 PM
Ken White is correct, not everyone can be John Boyd. Maybe OODA is more useful in allowing a staff to assist in battlefield prep vs a squad leader or PL in contact.

RTK
05-23-2008, 07:14 PM
Question: How does understanding the OODA loop make you a better chess player or fox hunter?

I'm interested in the answer to this one.

I'm not a Boyd fan or proponent of OODA. I threw that out there as a "what if" more than anything. I, like many of you, don't think OODA has any place within the tactical level on the ground. It's been a while since I was on here a bunch and figured to dive back into the pool with a cannonball on this.

I like the answers.

Steve Blair
05-23-2008, 07:30 PM
Don't really care about foxhunting, but chess is another matter.

I think OODA was just Boyd trying to apply what he knew about air combat to every possible tactical situation...which means there are many instances and circumstances where it doesn't work. In other instances it's just putting a fancy title on something that people have been doing more or less automatically for some time. A good chess player can see moves ahead...in essence (to use Boydian speak) getting inside his opponent's OODA loop by anticipating counters to his moves and then planning his own counters to those counters or setting traps based on those possible counters. Understanding OODA stuff isn't going to make you a better chess player in and of itself, but good chess players already do a version of OODA (as do most wargamers), and this is especially noticeable in timed games. With the added (if somewhat artificial) time limit component added, the player who can get inside the strategy of his opponent and either break it or bend it in a favorable direction, and can do so faster than his opponent, has a great advantage.

Standard wargamers also do this sort of thing, although here it's often a matter of throwing an opponent off balance by using either space (if possible) or multiple thrusts to confuse a defense. It can be a bit harder here (at least in non-blind games) because everything's on the table and in plain view (and some of the restrictions in chess are missing), but good players still tend to move in that direction.

I'm not saying that all this is Boydian OODA stuff at its finest (since I tend to agree that pure OODA may only be possible in air combat...and even then I have some doubts), but it is certainly an application of some (or most) of the OODA elements.

slapout9
05-24-2008, 12:23 PM
Hi Ryan, a long time ago they used to teach Police Officers an acronym for pursuit driving called SIPDE. S stands for Scan/Search, I stands for Identify, P stands for Predict, D stands for Decide, E stands for Execute/Evade. I always thought that might be better than OODA. OODA seems to leave to much out just be fast??? To me fast dosen't help if you are wrong. My early morning thoughts anyway. Slap


PS glad you are back.

selil
05-24-2008, 02:24 PM
Hi Ryan, a long time ago they used to teach Police Officers an acronym for pursuit driving called SIPDE. S stands for Scan/Search, I stands for Identify, P stands for Predict, D stands for Decide, E stands for Execute/Evade. I always thought that might be better than OODA. OODA seems to leave to much out just be fast??? To me fast dosen't help if you are wrong. My early morning thoughts anyway. Slap
PS glad you are back.

Please excuse the BLOG SPAM but here is an article (http://selil.com/?p=31) I wrote back the early 1990s about SIPDE and SPA when I was teaching traffic safety. It is written for motorcycle riders but all of the mechanics are there.

LINK (http://selil.com/?p=31)

Lostcomm
05-24-2008, 03:23 PM
Just a couple of days ago, I was sitting with a State Department (S/CRS) Planner discussing some new approaches they are considering/trying to find money to field. These included modular planning teams, HN Gov/t embeds, and PRT like organizations for the "long haul". All interesting but not relevant, what was relevant was an approach to the planning process that they intend to employ...

one in which no one (but the plan) is in charge and that it will be a self-adjusting mechanism amongst a team of peers (I think I got that mostly right). Well you can imagine my head spinning (think Linda Blair), as I struggled to keep a straight face and open mind. Well can't say that at that moment either I or my uniformed partners were able to wrap our minds around that little State Department "pearl".

But as I considered it further.... So long as the plan wasn't botched from the beginning (not perfect just good), then this might actually be a stroke of brilliance. The State Department contribution is by nature long-term (10-40 years). Their plan more than any other could use a little built-in bureaucratic non-sense to keep them from chasing their tail with every change in the wind direction. Having an engineered impediment to deviations is not only OK, but desired.

Now I'd sure like to see one of those good enough, self-syncronizing plans! Never quite crossed that threshold except in a game of monopoly.

Live well and row...

I always have to remember when dealing with folks from DoS that the metrics they use for success is "dollars spent."

William F. Owen
05-24-2008, 07:01 PM
Don't really care about foxhunting, but chess is another matter.

Fox hunting is essential experience if one finds oneself hunting peasants, villains and poachers!



Standard wargamers also do this sort of thing, although here it's often a matter of throwing an opponent off balance by using either space (if possible) or multiple thrusts to confuse a defense. It can be a bit harder here (at least in non-blind games) because everything's on the table and in plain view (and some of the restrictions in chess are missing), but good players still tend to move in that direction.

As a war gamer myself, I just see OODA as a description of one possible process. Wrong observation and all falls down. As it does with one wrong action and the process does not give you any indicators as to how to judge your "orientation" or understanding. It only seems to explain why smart people do good things. It does not help train soldiers or officers that I can see.

Surferbeetle
05-24-2008, 09:50 PM
Please excuse the BLOG SPAM but here is an article (http://selil.com/?p=31) I wrote back the early 1990s about SIPDE and SPA when I was teaching traffic safety. It is written for motorcycle riders but all of the mechanics are there.

LINK (http://selil.com/?p=31)

Sam,

I took the MSF course and don't remember the acronyms taught but SPA (Search, Predict, Act) is easy to remember and makes intuitive sense (I enjoyed your blog article). I call it 'spider sense' in that most times I am not thinking, instead while riding I am usually in the 'zone' so when my spider sense goes off it's time to act (in 70K miles I have failed to keep the rubber side down once and fortunately God was kind to me on that one). In the field things are the same, often times I don't know the reason why right away I just know that things are 'off' and it's time to act right now. What I do find helpful is IPB = Intelligence Prep of the Battlefield = know all about Dodge before entering Dodge and know how to exit Dodge = intel drives maneuver. The other thing I find helpful is having some young soldiers on my team, their reaction times are often better than mine while I like to think that my experience/education is better than theirs...thus the whole team work thing.

Regards,

Steve

selil
05-24-2008, 10:15 PM
The original IPDE acronym was first taught back in the 1950s traffic education. I believe the author that came up with it was Dr. White (I'd have to go back and check). Jeff Cooper used a version of it when he did his whole "code" thing. Code white, code red, etc.. when attempting to keep from being code white when you should be more aware. As Slapout mentioned a version of SIPDE is used for EVOC, and I have even ran across a version of it used for scout training in the Marine Corps.

Steve Blair
05-25-2008, 05:35 PM
As a war gamer myself, I just see OODA as a description of one possible process. Wrong observation and all falls down. As it does with one wrong action and the process does not give you any indicators as to how to judge your "orientation" or understanding. It only seems to explain why smart people do good things. It does not help train soldiers or officers that I can see.

You'll also notice in my reply that I said pretty much the same thing.
I'm not saying that all this is Boydian OODA stuff at its finest (since I tend to agree that pure OODA may only be possible in air combat...and even then I have some doubts), but it is certainly an application of some (or most) of the OODA elements.

Elements of OODA can be useful for training, especially if you use it as a stepping stone to further discussion and/or analysis. It isn't the "one ring" of training by any means. It is A process, but not THE process, and good training presents it as such. If it gives someone a starting point, even to question its validity, then it's helped train someone. You may not like it, and that's fine. I'm not a convert to OODA or 4GW stuff, but I do see where discussion of it is helpful and positive...so long as it's presented as one alternative among many.

zenpundit
05-27-2008, 04:34 AM
Hi Wilf,

You wrote:


As a war gamer myself, I just see OODA as a description of one possible process.

The OODA Loop is a model of cognitive processing, there are indeed many other models. Boyd's OODA fits well with assumptions of (the entirely unrelated) Dual Processing theory in cognitive psychology. It also fits with some models relating to long term memory function.


Wrong observation and all falls down.

I think Boyd would have agreed. Poor perceptions equate to faulty assumptions which could then lead to poor decisions.


As it does with one wrong action and the process does not give you any indicators as to how to judge your "orientation" or understanding.

Disagree here. Wrong actions are learning experiences, though in war sometimes these experiences are not survivable ones. When your actions do not lead to the results that your assumptions led you to expect, it's time to re-check your premises and your observations.


It only seems to explain why smart people do good things. It does not help train soldiers or officers that I can see.

It can also explain why inobservant, highly ideological or just plain dumb people do foolish things.

As for training, OODA is useful as a teaching tool to get people to start to pay attention to their own thinking (metacognition (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metacognition)) and the thinking of others. Why do we have the preconceived notions that we do ? Why are we ignoring inconvenient facts staring us in the face?

Can you go through OODA as a conscious, step by step process ? Sure, if you have the luxury of time for calm reflection but your brain most likely does the OODA steps with a high degree of fast-processing automaticity (http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v5/psyche-5-05-tzelgov.html).

The OODA Loop is a map, not the territory.

William F. Owen
05-27-2008, 06:12 AM
@ Why do we have the preconceived notions that we do ? Why are we ignoring inconvenient facts staring us in the face?

@ Can you go through OODA as a conscious, step by step process ? Sure, if you have the luxury of time for calm reflection but your brain most likely does the OODA steps with a high degree of fast-processing


@ I'd say that's cognitive dissonance and I'd go with Festinger on that. Sure we can use OODA to show with the Army brought an bad piece of equipment, or did something dumb, but why use OODA? What does it tell us that normal observation and use of empirical evidence does not? If is a good analytical tool?

@ The problem is People use OODA as doctrine. I had a UK one-star try and tell me how his formation planning cycle was a 24hr OODA loop. - so he patently didn't understand it. More to the point, and IMO, the idea that you can be "inside the other guys OODA loop" is neither useful or correct. It implies that speed is an end in itself and this is wholly false. Speed only serves your purpose in that it creates surprise. Speed of process is merely that. Speed of bad process creates defeat. If you learn and adapt faster, then great, but you must not die while doing it.

If you are telling me that the OODA loop is just one of many loops used to describe various processes then OK, but it is not the Core Functions, which is how people want to try and use it, and no where near as inherent to true military doctrine.

Fuchs
05-27-2008, 02:11 PM
I considered the OODA loop as a reminder for everyone in uniform about the importance of speed or other actions than merely movement, agility, adapting to circumstances and the ability to perform better than an adversary by doing so. Plus some minor ideas.

You can learn quite the same of some martial arts.
(Quick reaction, counter attack), cause him to lose stability, exploit the imbalance.

snapperhead
06-12-2008, 02:54 PM
You are batting down strawmen Wilf.


but why use OODA?

Strawman (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strawman). You don't "use" OODA in the manner you are talking about. As zenpundit has already point out it is part of a knowledge gathering, thinking, and doing process. You are already doing it right now.


What does it tell us that normal observation and use of empirical evidence does not?

Equivocation fallacy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equivocation). Boyd modelled the loop originally on the scientific process. So it is empirical. You are equivocating.



If is a good analytical tool?

Strawman (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strawman). Analysis is inherent to thinking and part of a person's orientation process. It isn't an analytical tool. Analysis is inherent to the person doing the thinking. It says nothing about the OODA loop.


More to the point, and IMO, the idea that you can be "inside the other guys OODA loop" is neither useful or correct. It implies that speed is an end in itself and this is wholly false.

From what premises are you drawing that conclusion? How do you go from:

(p1) A person is operating inside another person's OODA loop.
(c1) Therefore speed is an end in itself.

I'm missing the extra premise you left out. Perhaps you can illuminate the unstated premise.


Speed only serves your purpose in that it creates surprise. Speed of process is merely that. Speed of bad process creates defeat. If you learn and adapt faster, then great, but you must not die while doing it.

I have no idea what you are on about here. Definitely a strawman though as the OODA process is exactly that. If you get it wrong you are stuffed. That is one of the main points behind it. To try mess with the opponent's OODA loop.


If you are telling me that the OODA loop is just one of many loops used to describe various processes then OK, but it is not the Core Functions, which is how people want to try and use it, and no where near as inherent to true military doctrine.

Strawman and No True Scotsman (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No_true_Scotsman) fallacy.

Try again.

Ski
06-12-2008, 06:54 PM
"Orient-Observe-Reorient-catalog-Decide-Act"

As soon as you reorient, you've started the cycle over again. The one issue I have with the OODA Loop - and I talked with Lind about this, because I thought it nullified the OODA Loop - was what happens when things happen so slowly that you are spinning around in your own OODA Loop that you become disoriented. I think that's a real problem, as Eden stated - these kinds of wars move glacially.

If we can't orient properly, the OODA Loop is useless.

Fuchs
06-12-2008, 07:17 PM
"Orient-Observe-Reorient-catalog-Decide-Act"

As soon as you reorient, you've started the cycle over again. The one issue I have with the OODA Loop - and I talked with Lind about this, because I thought it nullified the OODA Loop - was what happens when things happen so slowly that you are spinning around in your own OODA Loop that you become disoriented. I think that's a real problem, as Eden stated - these kinds of wars move glacially.

If we can't orient properly, the OODA Loop is useless.

What you call "spinning around" should be nothing else but keep watching the situation instead of to lean back or go on vacation.
You don't need to change your actions if nothing has changed and if you still think that your action is appropriate.

OODA is really more about being better by higher tempo and reaction than it is an interesting theory.

We could as well discuss about the importance of unit speed for pursuit operations to be able to get ahead of the enemy and block his withdrawal.
If properly discussed, we'd find as much applicability of the idea to other situations as for OODA.

Ski
06-12-2008, 07:57 PM
It's not just about speed. That's the biggest fallacy of the OODA Loop.

You have to orient correctly and observe correctly before you can decide and then act. If you don't have perfect observation - and this is why I think the OODA Loop is not very relevant in 4GW/COIN - it doesn't work.

Fuchs
06-12-2008, 08:42 PM
It's not just about speed. That's the biggest fallacy of the OODA Loop.

You have to orient correctly and observe correctly before you can decide and then act. If you don't have perfect observation - and this is why I think the OODA Loop is not very relevant in 4GW/COIN - it doesn't work.

OODA is primarily about war, and war knows no perfect observation.

William F. Owen
06-13-2008, 10:04 AM
(p1) A person is operating inside another person's OODA loop.
(c1) Therefore speed is an end in itself.

I'm missing the extra premise you left out. Perhaps you can illuminate the unstated premise.


So how do you know you are "inside the enemies OODA Loop"? Because you are just doing something faster? That may only become apparent when you actually see the result of your actions, - which rarely if ever happens.

Speed is only relevant in performing actions the enemy is seeking to interdict or over match. How does performing operations faster than an enemy you are unable to detect gain you benefit?

A successful operation may take ours of slow stealthy movement and deception activity, to generated the required level of surprise. In that time you may be totally reactive to enemy action, but still be able to operate, as his many quickly generated operations are not effective - for a vast number of reasons! - none of which are to do with the OODA loop.


It's not just about speed. That's the biggest fallacy of the OODA Loop.

You have to orient correctly and observe correctly before you can decide and then act. If you don't have perfect observation - and this is why I think the OODA Loop is not very relevant in 4GW/COIN - it doesn't work.

I concur, except I'd extrapolate that to all forms of conflict. As Clausewitz so well explains, it's about operating in the utter absence of perfect observation!

snapperhead
06-13-2008, 12:09 PM
You are equivocating (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equivocation) the mental "speed" of the OODA loop with temporal real-world "speed." One can observe the world, think about it, and react faster than the enemy without necessarily being fast in a physical sense. Especially if the enemy is carrying out their "quickly generated operations" under false observations and false mental images of the world created by the friendly side.

wm
06-13-2008, 12:44 PM
You are equivocating (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equivocation) the mental "speed" of the OODA loop with temporal real-world "speed." One can observe the world, think about it, and react faster than the enemy without necessarily being fast in a physical sense. Especially if the enemy is carrying out their "quickly generated operations" under false observations and false mental images of the world created by the friendly side.

Your command of the world of informal fallacies, as demonstrated here, here, (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=49780&postcount=21) and here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=49856&postcount=27) is pretty impressive. Why not go here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1441) and tell us more about yourself?

Ski
06-13-2008, 12:48 PM
Fuchs - you are correct, but Boyd also talks about friction, and how it affects the OODA Loop. The more successful side is able to reduce friction to get a clearer observation, while the losing side is usually unable to reduce friction and becomes confused and cannot observe well.

William F. Owen
06-13-2008, 02:39 PM
You are equivocating (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equivocation) the mental "speed" of the OODA loop with temporal real-world "speed." One can observe the world, think about it, and react faster than the enemy without necessarily being fast in a physical sense. Especially if the enemy is carrying out their "quickly generated operations" under false observations and false mental images of the world created by the friendly side.

I assume this refers to my "equivocating" so I'll jump in.

I am in no way confusing the issue of mental (cognitive) - and I'll spare you the Wiki LINK- speed with "real world" EG: procedural or physical.

If the enemy you are observing are not doing anything, then why is there an imperative to conduct any of your activity faster?

How did the British Army get inside the IRA's OODA loop or even the Argentine Armies?

I have watched a Command Staff produce a set of detailed orders that were rendered utterly irrelevant, but OP reports 20 mins later - by an enemy who totally unaware they were under observation!

If you want to talk about the OODA loop in terms of chess, then OK. If you want to try an apply it to a Theatre or Formation Level operation in a complex and restricted environment with multiple actors it falls apart pretty quickly.

Fuchs
06-13-2008, 02:49 PM
Wilf, it's a common problem that we lack modern examples of competent forces fighting each other with most factors balanced.
That's when many concepts could make a difference although they were irrelevant in many known examples.

Imagine the Argentinians had had a battalion with MT-LBs and PT-76's. The could have attacked from one direction - British foot-mobile army might have adapted. Before they adapted, the Argentinians could have mounted, withdrawn and attacked somewhere else again. Again, again, again. They'd never have encountered reserves, but would have had local superiority again and again.

The Argentinians were neither capable enough nor had they the necessary vehicles on the island.
We are simply lacking good examples.

William F. Owen
06-13-2008, 03:24 PM
Imagine the Argentinians had had a battalion with MT-LBs and PT-76's. The could have attacked from one direction - British foot-mobile army might have adapted. Before they adapted, the Argentinians could have mounted, withdrawn and attacked somewhere else again. Again, again, again. They'd never have encountered reserves, but would have had local superiority again and again.


Not sure about the detail, but I see where you are going and you are exactly right. What you are talking about demonstrates the to the core functions in a very clear way. Thank you.

snapperhead
06-14-2008, 10:37 AM
I assume this refers to my "equivocating" so I'll jump in.

I am in no way confusing the issue of mental (cognitive) - and I'll spare you the Wiki LINK- speed with "real world" EG: procedural or physical.

If the enemy you are observing are not doing anything, then why is there an imperative to conduct any of your activity faster?

How did the British Army get inside the IRA's OODA loop or even the Argentine Armies?

I have watched a Command Staff produce a set of detailed orders that were rendered utterly irrelevant, but OP reports 20 mins later - by an enemy who totally unaware they were under observation!

If you want to talk about the OODA loop in terms of chess, then OK. If you want to try an apply it to a Theatre or Formation Level operation in a complex and restricted environment with multiple actors it falls apart pretty quickly.

Once again, it is a strawman that the OODA is some normative top-down model that prescribes that a group of people should act in a certain way (as in act faster, or apply it as an operational art). Do some people in the military do this? Yes you are quite right, they do. But they have drawn the same caricature of the model. Once again, it is a model, an inference to best explanation, that purports to describe an individual and opponent's process of information gathering and thinking. From that model you can then draw your own normative conclusions, which Boyd and others have done. The OODA isn't some hive-mind, queen-bee, decision making process. Certain parts of the OODA -- cultural aspects, ops orders, and commanders intent -- have "hive mind" like aspects, nevertheless it isn't a process you can apply top-down like some templated IPB. Once again, Zenpundit's comments is the best explanation of what it is.

Fuchs
06-14-2008, 12:49 PM
I recommend Chet Richards if anybody wants to discuss OODA in a very theoretical and comprehensive way.

I myself consider it as a tiny mosaic piece in military art, not worth much attention.
I've always had the feeling that a significant part of its prominence stems from the desire of Americans to have had a great military art theoretician as well.

William F. Owen
06-14-2008, 02:10 PM
it is a model, an inference to best explanation, that purports to describe an individual and opponent's process of information gathering and thinking. From that model you can then draw your own normative conclusions, which Boyd and others have done.

I agree. This is correct, but this is not how 99% of people use and attempt to apply it - which is exactly my point.

Bill Lind's Manoeuvre Warfare Handbook explicitly states OODA as being part of MW Doctrine. - in that you have to understand it to be a practitioner.

IIRC, Naveh also makes a big deal of the OODA loop, in that he also believes it useful in the same way Lind does. As I said elsewhere I am away from my Library, so I can't check.

selil
06-14-2008, 02:31 PM
I recommend Chet Richards if anybody wants to discuss OODA in a very theoretical and comprehensive way.

I myself consider it as a tiny mosaic piece in military art, not worth much attention.
I've always had the feeling that a significant part of its prominence stems from the desire of Americans to have had a great military art theoretician as well.


That just reads pretty nasty no matter how I look at it. Fuchs you can't even give Americans the credit that they have ONE great military theoretician?

William F. Owen
06-14-2008, 02:48 PM
That just reads pretty nasty no matter how I look at it. Fuchs you can't even give Americans the credit that they have ONE great military theoretician?

America has Robert Leonhard, who is about the finest military theorist alive today and also the least recognised. IIRC, Colin Gray is also a US Citizen.

I profoundly disagree with Bill Lind, but he is prolific and vastly influential, though not really a military thinker or theorist, in a way I understand.

In sharp contrast Boyd is likewise vastly influential, and I can never work out why. :)

ericmwalters
09-30-2008, 04:41 PM
I think I've captured all the relevant complaints about the OODA Loop concept and hope to publish a series of postings here and in the other OODA Loop thread (they'll be mirroring each other for starters) to hopefully lend some clarity to the issue, at least WRT how we in the Marine Corps intended to deal with it. That said, the concept is grossly misunderstood, mistaught, misapplied, and misused...and weeding through all that is going to be difficult. But separating all that chaff to get the germ of the wheat should be productive, if nothing else but to cast some light on what the issues behind the OODA Loop concept really are. Like any other concept, OODA has uses in situations best suited for it--and it is irrelevant in others or just plain dangerous in the hands of the unskilled. It's very difficult to make generalities regarding the concept outside of situations/scenarios. But I'll make that attempt. You'll find, however, that in a philosophical/conceptual disagreement I'll quickly "go to ground" in specific scenarios and situations, both to illustrate what I think your qualms are and what I think the proper understanding and utility of the concept is.

As an intelligence officer, I have a particular interest in the concept/model from a practical standpoint in designing intelligence architectures, systems, techniques and procedures, and in training Marines. How the OODA Loop concept helps me do this is something I probably won't get to for some time, because I've got to lay a helluva lot of conceptual foundation/groundwork to establish before I get there.

The complaints I see in the threads revolve around two areas:

The validity of the OODA Loop Concept
The utility of the OODA Loop Concept.

If you don't buy the validity of the concept, you generally don't think much of its utility. Even if you buy the validity of the concept, you may still think it's not terribly useful from a practical standpoint.

My Particular Bents and Biases on the Subject:

First, I am a "German School" Maneuver Warfare advocate for reasons established in other threads that I won't repeat here. I was also an armor officer with a light armored vehicle battalion commander in my tank battalion at one time (he retired a three-star general)--he was pretty big on deliberately designing shorter decision cycles with no compromises made on quality of judgments, even though mistakes were generally tolerated. But more to the point, I also learned "Soviet School" MW when in grad school--I got fairly engrossed in Soviet tactical cybernetic theory (what they termed "Troop Control" theory) which had very much of a mirror concept to the OODA Loop. Interestingly, the Soviets spent a huge amount of effort on the "Orientation" piece, trying to simultaneously shorten the time required to achieve it and increase the quality of the understanding to be achieved in that phase. Most of my judgments on the utility of OODA Loop theory is going to be founded on Soviet School MW practice, although there is quite a bit of German School MW utility as well. I'll cover both, but the German School applications appear relatively squishy in comparison.

Secondly, I was and still am a big fan of MW influences in commercial hobby historical wargame design and development. There have been a number of efforts to model OODA loop processes for various historical periods, but the "German School" MW applications of C2--decentralized command to facilitate tighter OODA cycle time--has been the most problematic to model. So far the most successful effort I have seen (but still not the most perfect) is the Tactical Combat Series (TCS) games (http://www.multimanpublishing.com/theGamers/tcs.php)published by The Gamers and Multi-Man Publishing. Repeated play of these games--which are overwhelmingly focused on WWII, naturally--provides some compelling insights into what is theoretically (and practically) possible with the concept in ground warfare at the tactical level. There are other titles and game design systems that also do a good job, but a little more abstractly which makes them harder to visualize what is happening and accept some of the game outcomes. I'll get into that as well much, much later--probably at the end of my discussion.

Lastly, there are limitations and issues regarding the OODA Loop concept, and my interest here is to increase the understanding of what those truly are as opposed to what many perceive them to be. I may not be convincing enough as much depends on your particular background and desires. But it's worth a shot. If anything, if you fail to agree with how I lay this out, at least you understand why I'm thinking in the way that I do...and if we agree to disagree, it's because we're coming at the idea with widely differing assumptions borne from widely different experiences.

ericmwalters
09-30-2008, 06:16 PM
If you are familiar with my posts in discussion threads elsewhere, you can perhaps better appreciate why I used the terms I did in the title.

Instead of plunging into Osinga's description of Boyd's concepts of the OODA Loop and "fast transients," I thought I'd start with the foundational MW theory as Marines understand it and work backwards. That way I can uncover the issues regarding validity and utility one onion layer at a time so we maintain some coherence in approach and cohesiveness in discussions. We'll eventually cover everything mentioned so far (and I expect a good deal more besides), but it's a very large subject and it must be tackled in layers. Each layer is going to build on the other layers.

Like theology, we've got to start with some foundational beliefs. There's a lot of reason and logical edifices that are erected, but none of that means much if you don't buy into the basics.

MW Essential Premise #1: Speed and Focus are two characteristics of successful operations in an environment of uncertainty.

What does this mean? While these are not the only two characteristics needed for success, these are the two characteristics that discriminate the MW style from other styles. Additionally, there is a belief that these characteristics are necessary (but not sufficient) for success in an uncertain environment. If the environment is relatively static and certain, then these characterstics may not play such a significant role. Siege operations (whether on a tactical, operational, or possibly even a strategic scale) would seem to put much less emphasis on achieving relative speed advantages and on focusing on a particular thing at the same time--at least until the "assault upon the works!" Ideally, a successful siege never gets that far--the place surrenders/succumbs before then.

MW Essential Premise #2: In such struggles, both sides are adapting to the situation in an attempt to undermine the enemy--the side that executes the faster and "good enough" transients will eventually beat the side that is slower, even if those transients are "near-perfect."

What does this mean? Again, the situation is uncertain. Neither side knows as much as is desired and the grappling is part of the learning experience. To borrow Clausewitz's wrestling metaphor (the two-struggle or Zweikampf), it isn't the hold alone that wins the match, it's the moves leading up to the decisive and match-winning hold. And it's the moves in relation to each other. Which one is better? Which one is faster? There is some sort of accommodation between speed and quality--faster alone is not enough (and can actually be dangerous if the action is flat wrong). Perfect quality is not enough if executed too late and pre-empted or dislocated by the moves of the opponent (to use Leonhard's characterizations).

MW Essential Premise #3: Weapons, organizations, techniques, procedures, concepts of operation, and training to accomplish these must be oriented towards achieving higher quality "fast transient" actions when confronted with such situations.

What does this mean? If additional hitting power (strike) or force sustainment/survival (protect) cabilities are purchased at the price of speed and focus to gain leverage/advantage (maneuver), then the force is potentially off-balance vis-a-vis an opponent who enjoys better speed and focus and can leverage these to advantage. MW interpretations of history (and possibly narrow selection of examples--we can talk about those) are that, given the dilemmas regarding balancing strike/protect/maneuver capabilities, one is better off putting more initial emphasis on maneuver over strike and protect, given an uncertain situation.

MW Essential Premise #4: Where agility and action quality in executing "fast transients" have been historically seen as important and improvements made in weapons, organizations, techniques, procedures, concepts of operations, and training to accomplish these have been made, the explicit intent to design all aspects of military command and control around this idea is a relatively recent occurrence.

What does this mean? Command and control--in all its components and aspects--is to be explicitly designed to execute fast transients. What differentiates German School and Soviet School MW is how command and control is designed to achieve it; each reflects differing requirements, restraints, constraints, and compromises made between tempo and quality. German School MW uses Boyd's decision cycle as its means of explanation/analysis, whereas Soviet School uses a similar conceptual device but with different emphases in the subcomponents.

My next post will catalogue and investigate the challenges to these premises before we move on. Once that is done, we'll delve into the Bill Lind and the USMC interpretions of the OODA loop and the various challenges to the validity and utility of the concept.

ericmwalters
10-04-2008, 04:37 PM
To recap:


MW Essential Premise #1: Speed and Focus are two characteristics of successful operations in an environment of uncertainty.

What does this mean? While these are not the only two characteristics needed for success, these are the two characteristics that discriminate the MW style from other styles. Additionally, there is a belief that these characteristics are necessary (but not sufficient) for success in an uncertain environment. If the environment is relatively static and certain, then these characteristics may not play such a significant role. Siege operations (whether on a tactical, operational, or possibly even a strategic scale) would seem to put much less emphasis on achieving relative speed advantages and on focusing on a particular thing at the same time--at least until the "assault upon the works!" Ideally, a successful siege never gets that far--the place surrenders/succumbs before then.

So here are the quibbles/challenges to this idea and the USMC Maneuver Warfare doctrinal responses:

Challenge: Speed alone is not enough. Even speed with focus means little if the focus is misdirected and/or speed only is in a single spurt and cannot be sustained.

Response. MW/OODA Loop theory has no argument with this particular challenge, but nevertheless maintains that an uncertain environment puts a premium on capabilities to enjoy greater speed of action/response than one’s opponent and the ability to focus that action effectively. The theory does not encourage reckless speed in a number of instances:

MCDP 1 Warfighting says (pages 62-64):


In a military sense, there is more to speed than simply going fast, and there is a vital difference between acting rapidly and acting recklessly. With time we must consider the closely related factor of timing….Making maximum use of every hour and every minute is as important to speed in combat as simply going fast when we are moving….A good tactician has a constant sense of urgency. We feel guilty if we are idle. We never waste time, and we are never content with the pace which events are happening….We employ speed and use time to create tempo. Tempo is not merely a matter of acting fastest or at the earliest opportunity. It is also a matter of timing—acting at the right time.

Additionally, MCDP 1 argues (pages 65-66


As with all things in war, speed is relative. Speed is meaningful militarily onlyl if we are acting faster than the enemy. We can do that either by slowing the enemy or by increasing our own speed.

To be consistent, superiority in relative speed must continue over time. It is not enough to move faster than the enemy only now and then because when we are not moving faster, the advantage, the initiative, passes to him. Most forces can manage an intermittent burst of speed but must then halt for a considerable period to recover between bursts. During that halt, they are likely to lose their advantage. We realize that we cannot operate at full speed indefinitely, and the challenge is to be consistently faster than the enemy.

I’d like interject here that most of the complaints I’ve read in the threads are about acting so fast that no good judgments are possible. Nobody is talking about the other half of the way to win the OODA Loop contest, which is by slowing the enemy down. If you think your force is going too fast to effectively understand what it’s doing before it does it, then there’s the other option of getting the enemy to slow down to the point where this is less of a risk to your force.


Challenge: An overemphasis on speed/tempo in this sense means there is little provision for times when it is best to wait for the situation to develop out of uncertainty.

Response: The MW/OODA Loop is designed to help us concentrate on building capacity for speed/tempo and focus in execution of operations. There is a difference between the German and Soviet schools on how this works in planning, which we’ll have to cover in the future. But USMC MW theory admits that knowing when to act—and when not to—is part of the speed/focus emphasis. Again, from MDCP 1 Warfighting (pages 64-66):


Timing means knowing when to act, and equally important, when NOT to act [Emphasis in the original—EMW]…If our concept of operations involves a diversion, we need to allow time for the diversion to take effect. If we have laid an ambush for the enemy, we need to give the enemy time to fall fully into the trap. If a situation is still forming, we may want to develop it further before we commit to a course of action….Decisive action is our goal, and it must be timed to occur at the proper moment. There are times to act, and there are other times to set the stage and wait.

As has been said, simply using speed and focus is no panacea for effective thinking. Discrimination in application matters--and practice/experience in doing so is essential.

ericmwalters
10-06-2008, 01:03 AM
To recap:


MW Essential Premise #2: In such struggles, both sides are adapting to the situation in an attempt to undermine the enemy--the side that executes the faster and "good enough" transients will eventually beat the side that is slower, even if those transients are "near-perfect."

What does this mean? Again, the situation is uncertain. Neither side knows as much as is desired and the grappling is part of the learning experience. To borrow Clausewitz's wrestling metaphor (the two-struggle or Zweikampf), it isn't the hold alone that wins the match, it's the moves leading up to the decisive and match-winning hold. And it's the moves in relation to each other. Which one is better? Which one is faster? There is some sort of accommodation between speed and quality--faster alone is not enough (and can actually be dangerous if the action is flat wrong). Perfect quality is not enough if executed too late and pre-empted or dislocated by the moves of the opponent (to use Leonhard's characterizations).

Challenge: If the OODA Loop concept was originally designed to explain how the F-86 could generate a higher and better tempo in “fast transients” against a MiG-15 in a Korean War era dogfight, is it still relevant/valid in understanding missile versus aircraft engagements?

Response: I would argue it certainly is. This is very clear if we look back to Vietnam War surface-to-air missile engagements—Randy “Duke” Cunningham knew exactly when to put his F4 into a steep dive when one of those “flying telephone poles” would come up to greet him. Timing was everything; the advantage the pilot had was he knew how the missile would react—after all, missiles had no brain. So if the pilot understood the guidance system, the pilot knew the missile G-loading characteristics (which were usually more than what humans could tolerate), the pilot knew the characteristics of his own aircraft, he could devise a response based on what he knew the missile was capable of.

Certainly as guidance systems and missile performance has improved, this has gotten harder and harder to do. Certainly the OODA Loop as ONE of a number of analytical lenses would help to paint the problem. Still, aircraft countermeasures against missiles (whether inherent to the aircraft or from other aircraft executing SAM suppression missions) are aimed at lengthening the missile engagement OODA Loop to the point where the pilot can effectively react and negate the threat. If we need to get into specifics here, we can, certainly…even if we are talking about theoretical scenarios.

But just an example, Missile Warning gear is intended to alert the pilot that a missile is in the air, giving him the option to divert or abort (or press on). In other words, it provides an “earlier” observation than he might otherwise get, leaving him more time for “orientation” and “decision” and “action.” “Wild Weasel” missions flying support for strike packages have a number of options that can be described in OODA terms. Is this the ONLY way to express what is going on? Certainly not. There are a number of other tools that are necessary to understand what is happening, what can be done, etc. Especially for the air defender, there’s a lot of game theory/queuing theory going on before the engagement so that decisions can be made in split seconds. Is that an application of the OODA Loop concept? One can argue it either way. On the one hand, some will say that “orientation” and “decision” times must be cut to an absolute minimum, so automated/algorithmic solutions are sought. On the other hand, some might argue that the OODA loop as the maneuver warfare advocates portray it is pretty much useless in such scenarios. Okay. This is a technical argument—I think the OODA concept applies, but I’d readily concede you won’t find any discussion of “reconnaissance pull,” “commander’s intent,” and “mission tactics” in this. Roger. But given what we have talked about regarding maneuver warfare, this would be seen as a relatively arcane discussion compared to the “larger” issues regarding command and control of larger units on the ground. That’s where most the arguments come in.

ericmwalters
10-06-2008, 01:05 AM
Challenge: What makes us think the OODA Loop concept—if we believe it works to explain single entity versus single entity conflict—can apply to understanding aggregates of entities fighting aggregate of entities?

Response: This is perhaps the most important question regarding the applicability of the OODA Loop. Certainly a number of thread posters have expressed doubt about this. So this deserves a lengthier response.

We’ve already talked about the wrestler analogy—this is perhaps most akin to air combat maneuvering. A single decisionmaker pitted against another single decisionmaker. I need to elaborate a bit here, because Wilf and others have brought up chess players as an analogy—where does application of the OODA Loop work for chess?

I’d ague it doesn’t. For the simple reason that chess play is regulated by turns. Each side will ALWAYS get to react to the move of the opponent’s last move. There are no possibilities to get in two moves instead of just one. I get a move, you get a move. So the pace/tempo of the game is regulated by the rules.

Now, it’s been brought up that, given timed moves, a player that exhibits superior OODA capabilities should be able to apply this to win. True, but irrelevant to OODA loop implications that I’ll get into in a bit. Sure, expert players can “orient” and “decide” better and faster. But the issue is ultimately about quality of the moves. The players (or the tournament) decide ahead of time how long the chess clock limits are. Those limits never change. And the question comes down to quality of decisions made in that never-changing time limit. I just don’t think this equates to war very well.

Now, for those familiar with Ed Glabus and Aegis Corporation’s old InfoChess game, elements of the OODA are introduced. It’s a double-blind game with the ability to buy Information Operations capabilities. It’s very possible in that game that the opponent won’t get to execute his move when it’s his turn, particularly if he’s the victim of a successful Electronic Attack (EA) mounted by his opponent. But this is relatively rare—most of the issues in InfoChess involve quality of the moves. Players are bent on deception and operations security versus intelligence and counterintelligence most commonly. Even in InfoChess, there is still that pacing function. Sure, you have a better shot at getting into two moves to the opponent’s one given a successful EA operation, but this is an example of lengthening the enemy’s OODA Loop and not tightening your own and dealing with the consequences of that.

Maneuverists do talk a good bit about chess masters. But mostly it’s about expertise—and how that expertise means that true experts take much less time to orient and decide. That’s why MW is so difficult. You need experts—and you need to develop them. The maneuverists argue that the results are worth the cost. If you disagree with that—that the U.S. military cannot grow that many experts—then the argument is pretty much over. You and the “German School” maneuverists have different assumptions and value systems; you aren’t going to be able to agree on anything. However, you may have something in common with the Soviet school, more on that later.

Anyway, back to the issue at hand--

An understanding of OODA Loop theory, developed from F-86 versus MiG-15 dogfights, explains much regarding why some ACM matchups in Vietnam worked the way they did. And Boyd certainly applied this understanding to E-M theory, which revolutionized how we design and evaluate fighter aircraft. Okay. If somebody wants to attack that idea, I’d welcome it. But let’s assume for a minute that this is true. What makes Boyd make the leap into other realms of war, particularly those involving larger formations?

Most of the maneuverists will point to how basketball players play basketball. Or soccer players play soccer. Or hockey players play hockey. Or so on. Sure, offensive/scoring ability counts, defensive skills count, but being able to manipulate the tempo of the game is something each team strives to achieve. In “blowout” games, usually it’s pretty clear the winning team completely dominated the opposition, being able to pre-empt, dislocate, and disorient the other team. Those maneuverists, such as John Schmitt, will explain this effect in OODA Loop terms. IN such instances, Schmitt points to the lateral communication between the team members—the coach is unable to influence much of the play from the sidelines compared to other games such as American football or baseball. The game is in the hands of the players. These kinds of games show recon-pull in action. When gaps or holes in the defense are found, players naturally gravitate to it/exploit it without waiting for someone (like the coach or the team captain) to tell them.

The question is whether you can believe that this analogy will hold for larger aggregates of units in violent competitions where there are higher levels of uncertainty.

Both the German and Soviet school advocates will concede that this holds—the OODA Loop is applicable in such instances. The difference between them is with regard to where the experts are. For example, to use the basketball analogy—do I have a team that’s played several seasons together? If I do, the players are able to decentralize command and control and implement “recon pull” to immediately exploit discovered gaps. The commander doesn’t have to explicitly direct such exploitation. Soviet school pretty much assumes you have a “pick up”/”back lot” basketball team—team members don’t know each other, implicit communication is at a minimum, and so on. So there’s much more emphasis put on preparation—speed and focus is achieved through better planning BEFORE the operation, as opposed to German school which depends on speed and focus occurring DURING the operation.

So the basic question that differentiates the two schools boils down to this: do you have people that can make independent decisions? If you believe that can’t happen at lower levels—such independence is reserved for senior levels—then you are a Soviet school advocate. If you think you can grow that kind of effective independence at low levels, then you’ll lean to the German school.

Commercial wargaming provide some potential insights. My favorite system to explore this is the MMP/The Gamers Tactical Combat System. In this game, players have to write operations orders with sketches in order for units to conduct operations. You must designate objectives, provide control measures (where to move, what unit boundaries are, etc), and so on. The interesting thing about the game system is that units don’t obey orders as soon as they get them. A number of variables come into play. The first (and some say the most important) variable is how quickly the inherent command and control system accepts new instructions. There are other variables, such as whether the formation is currently in contact or is out of contact (better). And so on. Every turn that an new order is levied against a formation, a die is rolled. The player cannot possibly be sure WHEN a formation will accept and then execute a given order. Playing the numerous games in this series leads players to prefer the sides that have the lowest implementation values. In other words, players want to play the side that accepts and executes orders faster. While they can’t predict when orders will be accepted and executed, there is the possibility that one side will accept and execute orders faster than the other side. While there are exceptions on a case by case basis (i.e., occasionally luck will cause the slower unit to execute orders faster than the faster unit), overall the faster implementing side will get the majority of “jumps” on the opponent in conducting operations. This is a huge insight and leads to a depth of understanding regarding how the OODA Loop works in practice.

But this won’t be convincing to a number of people who will want to judge how well this works given historical examples. Maneuverists will point to a number of well-worn examples where shorter OODA cycles (for the German School, this typically involves recon-pull examples) contribute to situations where the enemy’s actions are rendered “too little, too late.”

ericmwalters
10-06-2008, 01:12 AM
Challenge: If one admits that the OODA Loop concept does apply to aggregates of entities fighting aggregates of entities (i.e., it is indeed valid), how can one know that one is being effectively faster in such a context? By the time you detect/see the results of your speed, isn’t it too late to effectively exploit it?

Response: This is another extremely serious question. The kind of answer you get depends on which MW school you belong to—German school or Soviet school.

First of all, Boyd wasn’t the only one who believed the OODA Loop concept applied to aggregates. The Soviets believed much the same thing as articulated in their “Troop Control” algorithms. Their basic equation for Troop Control ran like this: Tcon (Time needed for effective Troop Control) was equal to T1 (time for effective reports to HQ) + T2 (Headquarters functioning, to include direction from higher headquarters) +T3 (time for orders and signals for the headquarters to reach the unit of action. According to the Soviets, C2 was operative if “Tcon (T1 + T2+ T3) + Top (the time it took for the receiving unit to execute) < Tcrit…with Tcrit being the “critical time” or the time within which the operation must be executed to have the intended effect. A great deal of foundation work in this regard was laid out by Altukhov in “Fundamentals of the Theory of Troop Control” in 1984. It’s difficult to say whether Altukhov was influenced by Boyd or not. We just don’t know.

So, given the Soviet algorithm. T1 = Observation. T2 had elements of Orientation and decision contained within. T3 and Top were the “action” elements of the OODA. It is very clear they understood that you had to tighten the Tcon loop to beat the Tcrit parameter.

Here is where the German school diverges from the Soviet school. To the Soviet school, the problem of detecting change in time to effectively take advantage of it is huge. Basically, they admit that it can’t be reliably done—and “reliably” is the operative term. So the focus is on preparation before the operation. Likely outcomes are calculated ahead of time and when conditions roughly approximate the preconditions for one of the options, then that option is chosen and pushed through. Here the idea is that the high command will be ready for certain sets of conditions with a “branch plan” or “sequel” ready for execution. If something unexpected comes up, it isn’t seized upon, even if it appears to be advantageous. That’s just how it is. So if you believe that a command and control system cannot possibly take advantage of the unforeseen in a reliable way, you tend to subscribe to Soviet school MW. The way to deal with uncertainty is to prepare like nobody’s business and execute violently but according to the plan (with all its branches and sequels).

On the other hand, German school embraces uncertainty and expects to “recon-pull” its way through the problem. So the German school adherents also admit that higher headquarters can’t judge the outcomes of actions in enough time to take advantage of them. So what the German school adherents advocate is decentralization—units see local conditions and act immediately, consistent with the higher commander’s intent. Decentralization buys the required speed—the cost is possibly the unity of effort. Commander’s intent is supposed to provide that unity of effort. Sometimes that occurs, sometimes it doesn’t. The criticism against German school MW is basically that you may not be able to rely on commander’s intent to govern initiative. If you don’t have cohesion, if you don’t have practiced experts, then I’d agree that they are right.

Of course, the requirements for expertise and cohesion throughout the system to accomplish this are much higher than it is for the Soviet school. It’s a lot less efficient but judged to be more effective. Like the basketball team, the players move the ball down the court and make the shots—there’s not much the coach can do on game day. His role was getting the team ready to play.

The German school advocates have a number of illustrations to show what they mean—and let’s admit it, these examples are pretty much a “best case” solution set. My favorite is SSgt Ruhbarth on the Meuse in 1940, pretty much pulling Guderian’s river crossing behind him (you can read all about that in Robert Doughty’s excellent book, The Breaking Point). And there are other equally compelling examples. But what is lacking are case studies that show breakdowns in this kind of command and control system. We have no shortage of cases showing the failures of Soviet School Maneuver Warfare (and I can provide those if anyone is interested). But we lack a comprehensive body of cases that show the risks in German school MW. Robert Leonhard tried to suggest one—Guderian’s conduct of the Battle of Yelnia in 1941—but I’d argue it’s not a good case (and I can provide my rationale why to anyone who asks—just send me a Private Message and I’ll send you a paper on it). Yet, I bet there are others. That said, I sense that these cases are illustrating poor applications of the theory rather than flaws in the theory itself. Of course, one might say the same thing about the Soviet school failures.

There are a number of cases that suggest the disadvantages of the German school approach that I will get into later. As far as the Soviet school failures, I would hope these are relatively self evident, but they may not be to some reading this thread. All I will say is that--despite these failures--they were good enough against the Germans and Japanese at the operational level of war to achieve success. This why Soviet School MW (and their understanding of the OODA Loop) is alive and well, even to this day.

There was no way the Soviets could attempt a German school solution. They had too many languages, conscription (even for NCOs) meant only a two to three year obligation, professionals were only to be found in the officer class—and of these, only at the field grade level (if at that) and above. The operative Soviet school problem was the risk that the situation would outrun the plan. They solved that through the echelon concept—basically, units would only be asked to do one thing and one thing only. Once they were done with that one thing, other units would follow them and carry on the fight. Therefore there was a huge emphasis on reconnaissance so units could prepare and plan to do that “one thing” and nothing more. Once units completed their mission, they were “expended.” Nothing further was asked of them. Other units continued the operation.

I’d hope this illuminates the effective challenges to this very key “MW Essential Premise.” Much depends on your particular experiences, studies, biases, and preferences as to whether you buy into Soviet or German school interpretations of the OODA Loop and how to implement it, or reject it altogether.

Teufel
03-29-2009, 07:58 PM
So how do you know you are "inside the enemies OODA Loop"? Because you are just doing something faster? That may only become apparent when you actually see the result of your actions, - which rarely if ever happens.



I was in a squad on squad ambush in Afghanisan once where we suppressed the enemy and manuevered out of the kill zone so quickly that the enemy still believed we were in the kill zone and continued to engage the area they thought we were in while we manuevered on their flanks. They were never able to recover from this mistake and could never really reorient on our forces and figure out where we were and what we were up to until it was too late.

I would say that we were inside their OODA loop because our quick decision making and appropriate actions meant that the enemy was deciding and acting an orientation that was based on observations that were no longer accurate.

stanleywinthrop
03-29-2009, 11:49 PM
The OODA Loop is a map, not the territory.

Worth quoting.

Hacksaw
03-30-2009, 01:35 PM
I think that is a perfect example of OODA loop and also a great example of in which context (tactical decision making that leads to positional advantage) OODA loop makes sense as a tool, but then again I doubt you and your squad weren't thinking about OODA loop in the midst of the action...

I can also recall a (then 3-star later 4-star) general thinking he was inside the enemy's OODA loop (used the term during BUBs) in the midst of a UFL exercise...

Maneuver forces were racing northward, failing to clear UGFs and HARTs/secure LOCs against the best advice of his subordinate commanders, and the Blue Force got its lunch ate (BADDD with three Ds). Having recently returned from Korea and in which my last task was to work with the OPFOR CDR, it was painfully obvious how the situation would unfold. I thought it would be a great lesson learned for a senior leader that speed does not equal operational tempo.

Hence, I was greatly saddened when the same individual made the same error the next year:( and horrified when they were subsequently named to command that theater:eek:

IMHO, OODA is best left as a tactical level mental construct...

Live well and row

William F. Owen
03-30-2009, 01:45 PM
I would say that we were inside their OODA loop because our quick decision making and appropriate actions meant that the enemy was deciding and acting an orientation that was based on observations that were no longer accurate.

So, you did something for which the enemy was unprepared, and even if they had been prepared, they failed to recognise the change in conditions. That IS the definition of "Surprise." Do we need the OODA to describe the utility of Surprise?

OK, let's assume we do. How would you apply that to trying create Surprise, as part of a Combat Estimate? I can't see a way it can be done, but my life would be a lot easier if someone could show me how!



IMHO, OODA is best left as a tactical level mental construct...

OK, so how do I then I apply it in a practical way?

Bob's World
03-30-2009, 01:56 PM
OODA also reinforces a very narrow, fighter pilots metric of success, of being able to deliver ordanance on the enemy while denying him the opportunity to do the same to you; all with little consideration for how your actions to create such a situation may be impacting the larger environment in which you are operating and contributing to the overall desire/motivation of otherwise passive bystanders into being active participants in your ultimate demise.

Such a perspective could lead an out-going President to boldly proclaim as a defining measure of his term of office that the nation had not been attacked.

True enough, though it overlooks completely the fact that a free willed enemy may have been quite happy with the continuing success from the first attack and had no intent to launch another; or

The impact of the family of "attacking and avoiding attack" engagement might be having accross the environment to create new opponents and to raise the motivation of others to join in ones ultimate demise.

This type of fighter pilot singular focus of purpose is dangerous when applied in a much more complex environment than just two planes rolling through the air shooting at each other. Not saying its a bad concept, just that it has dangerous limitations and does not add very much to the intelectual process of solving complex problems.


Be wary of the ideas of those who have achieved cult status (CVC, Boyd, Kilcullen, etc); that you don't inadvertantly defeat a very good concept by ascribing too much meaning to the same.

Steve Blair
03-30-2009, 02:42 PM
Be wary of the ideas of those who have achieved cult status (CVC, Boyd, Kilcullen, etc); that you don't inadvertantly defeat a very good concept by ascribing too much meaning to the same.

I'm not so much wary of the ideas, but the followers and creators of the cult you mention. Boyd's ideas, like CvC and others, are pretty much neutral and may have merit if placed in the proper context. Where they become dangerous is when a group of articulate (or simply loud) followers latch onto them and try to give them context and content that might not have been intended (or simply lacking) in the original idea. It's always worth remembering that the original OODA idea came from gun combat involving fighter aircraft. Boyd himself, from what I've seen of his presentations and unfinished ideas, later tried to stretch it into places that it really didn't fit, and his fellow travelers and later converts were even worse in extending the concept's "reach" into places it really didn't belong.

Bob's World
03-30-2009, 05:20 PM
I'm not so much wary of the ideas, but the followers and creators of the cult you mention. Boyd's ideas, like CvC and others, are pretty much neutral and may have merit if placed in the proper context. Where they become dangerous is when a group of articulate (or simply loud) followers latch onto them and try to give them context and content that might not have been intended (or simply lacking) in the original idea. It's always worth remembering that the original OODA idea came from gun combat involving fighter aircraft. Boyd himself, from what I've seen of his presentations and unfinished ideas, later tried to stretch it into places that it really didn't fit, and his fellow travelers and later converts were even worse in extending the concept's "reach" into places it really didn't belong.

As I read through this thread I got flashbacks to my high school lit class where we had to read and discuss Moby Dick; forced to sit and ascribe all kinds of unintended meanings to the characters and scenes in the book.

(Don't tell Mrs. Taylor, but I never did read over half of that book)

Although, if the white whale is really a symbol for bin Laden, and Rumsfeld is Ahab... nahhh

Hacksaw
03-30-2009, 07:35 PM
I thought I was pretty clear when I noted to Truefel that I doubted anyone in their squad was thinking about OODA as it maneuvered out of the kill zone and destroyed the enemy...

I do, however, see merit in junior leaders learning through STIX and other decision making drills/exercises to rapidly observe, orient, decide and assess - repeat... I'm not advocating, nor did I imply that the squad leader should have consciously went through a mental checklist to ensure he "checked" all the blocks...

mental construct does not nor was it intended to equal TTP/practical application.

Live well and row

Teufel
03-31-2009, 06:49 AM
I think that is a perfect example of OODA loop and also a great example of in which context (tactical decision making that leads to positional advantage) OODA loop makes sense as a tool, but then again I doubt you and your squad weren't thinking about OODA loop in the midst of the action...


I'll grant you that, but many things become intuitive after extensive training. I don't know how or if you can train someone to be a better decision maker with the OODA loop but I really think that the OODA loop is a valuable tool that can be used to describe how some successful tacticians make rapid tactical decisions. It really illustrates to a Marine or Soldier in very basic terms how important it is to weigh information vs time. The longer you take to orient and decide, the more information you will have but it is more likely that the enemy will make a decision before you do and force you to react to their action. Rush through observe and orient and risk making a rushed and disasterous decision because you don't have enough information.



I do, however, see merit in junior leaders learning through STIX and other decision making drills/exercises to rapidly observe, orient, decide and assess - repeat...


I liken this to the five paragraph order. We do it so much in training that we don't have to think about it when giving frag orders in the field; we have been trained to articulate our thoughts in such a way to follow the five paragraph format.


So, you did something for which the enemy was unprepared, and even if they had been prepared, they failed to recognise the change in conditions. That IS the definition of "Surprise." Do we need the OODA to describe the utility of Surprise?


I think it goes beyond surprise. In my opinion, the enemy was not surprised, but confused. They were able to locate our patrol but only after we had closed a significant amount of distance and gained a tremendous amount of momentum. If we applied this to the OODA loop, the enemy failed to reorient themselves to the changing conditions on the battlefield and became overfocused on a decision they made on old information. The surprise came later when they saw us manuvering on their flanks. I have seen this happen in several engagements. Sound tactical decisions made quickly inflict confusion and chaos upon the enemy which in turn generates momentum as the enemy attempts to react and counter these decisions.

William F. Owen
03-31-2009, 11:20 AM
I think it goes beyond surprise.
Well beyond surprise is Shock.


Sound tactical decisions made quickly inflict confusion and chaos upon the enemy...
...and that is shock. The wounding of the mind. An inability to make effective decisions leading to effective action. Sever shock is no decision = freezing.

I have always been an OODA sceptic. It does have some merit as a learning process, but I can't see it's application in combat. You (Teufel) are most likely a skilled tactical practitioner and would be without the OODA loop. Speed is only operationally and tactically relevant in relation to surprise.

Teufel
03-31-2009, 12:15 PM
Well beyond surprise is Shock.


...and that is shock. The wounding of the mind. An inability to make effective decisions leading to effective action. Sever shock is no decision = freezing.

I have always been an OODA sceptic. It does have some merit as a learning process, but I can't see it's application in combat.

I can agree with that. I think this really applies well to the current enemy as I have found that they really don't recover well if they are surprised. I don't know if you can train someone to incorporate the OODA to make quick decisions or if that just comes naturally with experience. I certainly wasn't thinking about Boyd when we were slugging it out, nor have I actively sought to train my mind to adopt his methods.

Bob's World
03-31-2009, 04:30 PM
I can agree with that. I think this really applies well to the current enemy as I have found that they really don't recover well if they are surprised. I don't know if you can train someone to incorporate the OODA to make quick decisions or if that just comes naturally with experience. I certainly wasn't thinking about Boyd when we were slugging it out, nor have I actively sought to train my mind to adopt his methods.

...was describe in a snappy way something that all humans are naturally coded to do from untold generations of evolution and survival. He didn't offer something new, he just offered a new description of something very old.

Kind of like discovering gravity. Important, but it was there all along.

Entropy
04-01-2009, 02:49 AM
I'm no expert on OODA, but it seems to me a simple way to think of it as a construct about gaining and maintaining the initiative.

Cavguy
04-01-2009, 03:01 AM
I'm not so much wary of the ideas, but the followers and creators of the cult you mention. Boyd's ideas, like CvC and others, are pretty much neutral and may have merit if placed in the proper context. Where they become dangerous is when a group of articulate (or simply loud) followers latch onto them and try to give them context and content that might not have been intended (or simply lacking) in the original idea.

This is why I am not a fan of the whole 4GW/Maneuver Warfare/Boyd Rulez clique.

There are valuable things within each context, but the some of the DNI crowd just is creepy to me, and their Boyd evangelism comes across as cult-worship.

Steve Blair
04-01-2009, 02:13 PM
This is why I am not a fan of the whole 4GW/Maneuver Warfare/Boyd Rulez clique.

There are valuable things within each context, but the some of the DNI crowd just is creepy to me, and their Boyd evangelism comes across as cult-worship.

Quite so. There are aspects of MW that I like, but on the whole I tend to find 4GW to be more of a marketing ploy than an actual theory. Boyd's historical analysis is also sketchy, and I've never been convinced that his theories really hold up outside of the context in which he originally conceived them (gun-based air to air combat). That doesn't mean that there isn't value in the stuff, but you need to be willing to accept what works and reject what doesn't without drinking a full glass of the Kool-Aid.

William F. Owen
04-01-2009, 05:30 PM
Boyd's historical analysis is also sketchy, and I've never been convinced that his theories really hold up outside of the context in which he originally conceived them (gun-based air to air combat).

Boyd's use of military history is THE main problem with his work and insights, all of which makes sense if you have HIS view of military history and human behaviour.

OODA is at best an idealised process to describe what learning should/could be. I am not convinced that this is what Boyd intended it to describe.

TSgalpin
04-22-2009, 10:21 PM
OODA is at best an idealised process to describe what learning should/could be. I am not convinced that this is what Boyd intended it to describe.

Very astute. Based on my own research, I can tell you that Boyd's work is not well understood or well used in defense circles. It actually is typically better understood (if less often referenced) in business.

To understand Boyd and the OODA loop, you need to be familiar with Boyd's body of work. OODA is not like METT-TC or C4ISR as a methodical doctrine acronym to be memorized.

30 second Boyd was a legendary cold war era fighter pilot. After that he was the scientific developer of energy maneuverability theory - what is now the guiding aeronautical engineering equation of tactical fighter design.

After becoming s scientist in his own right responsible for fundamentally changing aeronautical engineering; then he started to come up with stuff like the OODA loop.

OODA is not a doctrine for how you should think.

OODA is a psychological model (represented by a rather nice process flow diagram on wikipedia) that shows an opponents decision making process in a manner that you can exploit it. It is an equation for manipulating a situation no different than game theory manipulates economics or engineers use physics to alter machine performance.

OODA is a way to exploit and manipulate your opponents mind. What he thinks, and how long he needs to think.

Example - Poker. By exhibiting certain behaviors, I can influence other players at the table to make assumptions about my hand. A Bluff in poker is the classic example of using an opponent's observation to manipulate his decision making.

Now many examples have been shown where speed of maneuver does not necessarily create an advantage. Making one's own OODA loop faster is the lowest common denominator of applying an OODA loop. It is popular because it's easy. Not because it's the best application of OODA.

Now By the way - Chess has little to do with OODA. In a friendly match between amateur players it's possible to use OODA just like you would in a Poker game, commercial negotiation, or establishing enfilade. But Chess has a very limited number of moves, a small enough number of tactics and scenarios that a chess master has them all memorized. Chess matches are decided by who has the best memory, and in timed matches who has the fastest pattern recognition. That subject has been highly researched by psychology and neurology. Trying to manipulate the OODA cycle of a chess master is about as easy as manipulating your opponents OODA cycle in tic tac toe. I'm sure it's possible, but against a good player, it's exceedingly difficult and probably involves distraction off the game board. (Seriously, when was the last time you won a game of tic tac toe? Can you trick the other player into losing?)

OODA is just a psychological model that theoretically explains and predicts the effect of properly executed surprise, bluff, and misdirection.

Have you ever gotten information overload that caused you to panic because you couldn't keep up? It happens to quarterbacks in the NFL, and CEO's in board meetings. The OODA loop is a way of modeling the psychology that allows you it intentionally induce panic in your target, rather than waiting for luck to favor you. Shock and Awe is an application of OODA psychology to induce paralyzing emotions in an opponent.

But like any equation used in science or engineering, it's only useful if you understand how to apply the equation/theory and have enough tactical/technical ability to execute the application.

Which is why guys that do math for a living tend to make great utility of OODA methodology, and shooters don't get it. It's abstract theory, not a instructional acronym. The military is not known for it's ability to indoctrinate creative implementation of graduate level theory at a broad tactical level.

But You don't need F=MA to understand that steel on target kills. You don't need E=MC^2 to understand that a small nuclear device can destroy a city. And you don't need to know OODA process theory to appreciate that a good bluff, feint, or misdirection can be used to trick your enemy into doing what you want them to do. Good training doctrine can and should teach the craft without confusing riflemen with sophisticated theory. If this exposition made sense to you; please find away to pass on the technology of psychological manipulation of the enemy without misrepresenting it with four easily mistaken words to a culture obsessed with acronyms.

When John Boyd said "get inside an enemy's decisions cycle" he meant to change the amount of time it takes your enemy to react, to decide what to do. Boyd would feed his opponents information at a rate that would dictate how long it would take his opponent to react. And give the enemy information that would make him react predictably. Just like Musashi suggesting to appear slow, weak and tired; than attacking fast and hard. It's about manipulating your opponent's mind and response.

Read Boyd's personal history. His political strategies for promoting EM theory and the light weight fighter program. Boyd constantly manipulated his political opponents to achieve his goals. And succeed as a colonel advancing his agendas in the Pentagon by out maneuvering dozens of generals. Boyd's genius in OODA was to codify formal psychological theory into a form that is relevant to general strategic and tactical application.

So you guys are good - tell me what I missed, tell me what I got wrong.

Thanks for the forum.

William F. Owen
04-23-2009, 06:44 AM
Very astute. Based on my own research, I can tell you that Boyd's work is not well understood or well used in defense circles. It actually is typically better understood (if less often referenced) in business.

Thanks for the compliment. I would agree Boyd's work is poorly understood, but I am extremely skeptical about how useful it was in the first place, other than his work for the USAF.

As a military thinker and theorist, I think you can safely ignore Boyd and come to no harm. If you want to know what's wrong with modern military thought, then his name comes up pretty quickly.


OODA is a psychological model (represented by a rather nice process flow diagram on wikipedia) that shows an opponents decision making process in a manner that you can exploit it.

So it shows you how your enemy thinks? I submit that this is a fallacy. It shows you how you think you think, and not how you actually do. There is a vast body of simulation and C2 staff evidence to show that commanders rarely based their decisions on what they know or can observe.


Example - Poker. By exhibiting certain behaviors, I can influence other players at the table to make assumptions about my hand. A Bluff in poker is the classic example of using an opponent's observation to manipulate his decision making.
So OODA can be used to describe "Deception" and "Distraction." - both of which are methods of gaining "surprise." - How is this useful? A more skilled player may well detect your "bluffing." In real world operations the feedback needed to sustain that rationale is almost always totally absent, until you are committed.


But Chess has a very limited number of moves, a small enough number of tactics and scenarios that a chess master has them all memorized. Chess matches are decided by who has the best memory, and in timed matches who has the fastest pattern recognition.

OK, so why is Chess NOT a competition of OODA loops? Because the options are limited? Isn't pattern recognition somehow important? - eg Understanding?

I'm not sure I am THE Boyd sceptic here, but I'm in the top-5. If you read through my posts here, on other threads, I think you'll see why I am no fan of Boyd. Nothing personal against they guys, except I want to run a big red pen through a lot of his slides.

William F. Owen
04-23-2009, 07:06 AM
On a more positive note, something I recently discussed with Fanz Osigna and Chet Richards is that OODA does have a good use for formulating the procedures and processes associated with operational learning. This is currently being done by IDF, and in a slightly different way the UK as well - though I am more familiar with the IDF process...

That is how to take those things troops and commanders learn from on operations and ensure that they become best practice for all in theatre. This goes someway to ensuring that the enemy is hopefully learning slower than you are, but that has little to do with speed and everything to do with actually doing it in an audit-able, methodical and systematic way.

Hacksaw
04-23-2009, 04:26 PM
and I thought we had little in common!!!!:D

slapout9
04-23-2009, 04:35 PM
Wilf, you all ready understand OODA and so do most other Army folks, except we call it maintaining the initiative. If you maintain the initiative you are inside his OODA loop because he is always reacting to you. I don't know why the OODA people want to make it so mysterious.:wry:

Fuchs
08-07-2010, 06:12 PM
http://tachesdhuile.blogspot.com/2010/08/man-air-force-loves-them-some-boyd.html