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Tom Odom
06-05-2008, 05:26 PM
CNN is reporting that the Sec Def has dismssed both the Sec AF and the Chief of Staff of the AF for the nuke incident last year when weapons were loaded and flown to Louisiana by mistake.

More as it comes out

Tom

Cavguy
06-05-2008, 06:19 PM
From "Danger Room" (http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/06/breaking-air-fo.html)




The Air Force's top civilian and uniformed leaders are being booted out of the Pentagon. Chief of Staff Gen. T. Michael "Buzz" Moseley has resigned, according to Inside Defense and Air Force Times. Secretary Michael W. Wynne is next.

The move isn't exactly a shocker. The Air Force has come under fire for everything from mishandling nukes to misleading ad campaigns to missing out on the importance of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. For months, the Air Force's leadership has been on the brink of open conflict with Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England. In the halls of the Air Force's chiefs, the talk has been largely about the threats posed by China and a resurgent Russia. Gates wanted the service to actually focus on the wars at hand, in Iraq and Afghanistan. "For much of the past year I’ve been trying to concentrate the minds and energies of the defense establishment on the current needs and current conflicts," he told the Heritage Foundation. "In short, to ensure that all parts of the Defense Department are, in fact, at war."

Last fall, the Pentagon's civilian chiefs shot down an Air Force move to take over almost all of the military's big unmanned aircraft. "There has to be a better way to do this," Moseley complained at the time. Things only got more tense when Gates said that the future of conflict is in small, "asymmetric" wars -- wars in which the Air Force takes a back seat to ground forces. Then Gates noted that the Air Force's most treasured piece of gear, the F-22 stealth fighter, basically has no role in the war on terror. And when a top Air Force general said the service was planning on buying twice as many of the jets -- despite orders from Gates and the rest of the civilian leadership -- he was rebuked for "borderline insubordination."

Relations between Gates and the Air Force chiefs soured further when the Defense Secretary called for more spy drones to be put into the skies above Iraq and Afghanistan. The Air Force complained that all those extra flight hours were turning the robo-plane's remote pilots into virtual "prisoners." Gates then publicly chastised the service during the drone build-up, comparing it to "pulling teeth."

The scrapes harmed the service's image in Congress, and with the public. And so the Air Force launched an $81 million marketing effort to demonstrate its relevance in today's conflicts. Outside analysts wondered whether such a push was in violation of American anti-propaganda laws -- especially after one of the spots was found be be "misleading."

But, according to Air Force Times, "the last straw appears to be a [damning] report on nuclear weapons handling... [that] critical report convinced Gates that changes must be made."

According to the report, "the service mistakenly shipped four ballistic missile detonators -- instead of helicopter batteries -- to Taiwan," Inside Defense reports. "The incident occurred three years ago, but was discovered in March."

Last fall, the Air Force's 5th Bomb Wing lost track of six nuclear warheads. Then, in mid-May, the service flunked a nuclear surety inspection, when security personnel couldn't even be bothered to stop playing video games on their cell phones. Now, it looks like Moseley and Wynne has some serious time to play with, themselves.

More to come...

Gates is such a breath of fresh air after Rumsfeld. He did something similar after Walter Reed. Good for him. We have little need for "nice guy" leaders - we need people who engender results.

Steve Blair
06-05-2008, 06:22 PM
I really hope whoever wins in November has the brains to ask Gates to stay on. Somehow I doubt they will, but one can always dream....

Tom Odom
06-05-2008, 06:31 PM
From MSNBC


Top two Air Force officials resigning (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24988491/)
NBC: Secretary refused to fire chief of staff so both are forced out

WASHINGTON - The nation's top two Air Force officials are resigning, and military sources told NBC News Thursday that they were being forced out.

At the White House, press secretary Dana Perino said President Bush knew about the resignations of Air Force Chief of Staff Michael Moseley and Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne, but that the White House “has not played any role” in the shake-up.

Moseley, a general, is the Air Force's top uniformed officer. Wynne is the top civilian official.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates last week told Wynne to fire Moseley but Wynne refused, sources told NBC. As a result, Gates took the unprecedented step of asking both men to resign.

Ken White
06-05-2008, 06:56 PM
much anxious stirring in the pachyderm herds tonight...

That ruins Bob Bateman's article on unfired Generals. Still none for tactical blunders or technical malfeasance but the clock maybe she's a-ticking (hat tip to Dr. Emilio Lizardo).

Fuchs
06-05-2008, 07:00 PM
It's likely more because of the AF lobbying for more F-22's after Gates said 'no' than about the safety regulations mishap.

Steve Blair
06-05-2008, 07:08 PM
It's likely more because of the AF lobbying for more F-22's after Gates said 'no' than about the safety regulations mishap.

No, I don't think so. It's a combination of things, and the F-22 is only a part of that. There were actually two nuke-related mishaps, and in the second case Gates didn't even trust the AF to look into it on its own.

Cavguy
06-05-2008, 07:39 PM
No, I don't think so. It's a combination of things, and the F-22 is only a part of that. There were actually two nuke-related mishaps, and in the second case Gates didn't even trust the AF to look into it on its own.

The unit from the first one failed its re-inspection miserably a few weeks ago - if the CEO can't accomplish simple leadership fixes, than Gates has a case for what he did, especially given the combination of other factors - UAV's, F-22's, etc.

Steve Blair
06-05-2008, 07:43 PM
He also gave them plenty of public notice that he felt the AF was moving down the wrong garden path. There was no noticeable correction of course...if anything they got more stubborn about what they were doing. Combine that with the Thunderbirds contract issue ($50 million or so of PR stuff done in a suspect manner) and some of the other things and you could really see the writing on the wall.

Stevely
06-05-2008, 07:59 PM
While I agree Fuchs there is a larger context here, and the two nuclear mishaps were the excuse to lower the boom on the USAF leadership for many more sins, I do not think they are merely pretexts but are also of a pattern with the other abuses that has set Gates and others in DOD against the USAF. The senior leadership of a service sets the tone for its organizational culture. So does it come as a surprise that in a service where the senior leadership habitually subverts and even defies the express will of its superiors in government to further their own agendas, that farther down the ranks you find officers becoming lax and unserious about their own duties and jobs?

selil
06-05-2008, 08:09 PM
as to Batemans article "whoops". as to the USAF... playing that blue boy political media blitz football may have backfired. I'm not putting much faith in this until I see the results down stream.

JJackson
06-05-2008, 08:29 PM
much anxious stirring in the pachyderm herds tonight...

That ruins Bob Bateman's article on unfired Generals. Still none for tactical blunders or technical malfeasance but the clock maybe she's a-ticking (hat tip to Dr. Emilio Lizardo).

Thanks for that I did not know what a pachyderm was so I had to look it up but it is such a brilliantly apt term I am sure I will find plenty of use for it (obviously with acknowledgements).

Norfolk
06-05-2008, 09:12 PM
I really hope whoever wins in November has the brains to ask Gates to stay on. Somehow I doubt they will, but one can always dream....

I'll second that!:cool:

There could be a few more stars falling out of Air Force sky over the next several months if the Boys in Blue don't get the message loud and clear this time. Then again, maybe they'll just try to wait Gates out, and defer their ambitions until the next Administration comes in.:(

But wouldn't there be a gratifyingly palpable sense of fear running through the AF service culture if Gates were retained by the next Administration?:D

stanleywinthrop
06-05-2008, 09:27 PM
I really hope whoever wins in November has the brains to ask Gates to stay on. Somehow I doubt they will, but one can always dream....

McCain might consider it, with all the praise he's been showering Gates and Patreaus with.

Stevely
06-05-2008, 09:39 PM
Then again, maybe they'll just try to wait Gates out, and defer their ambitions until the next Administration comes in.:(


That seems the most likely COA.

Entropy
06-06-2008, 02:09 AM
People are way overplaying the acquisition angle. This firing was all about loss of confidence related to nukes - both the B-52 transport and the inadvertent selling of nuclear -related stuff to Taiwan.

Culpeper
06-06-2008, 04:29 AM
He also gave them plenty of public notice that he felt the AF was moving down the wrong garden path. There was no noticeable correction of course...if anything they got more stubborn about what they were doing. Combine that with the Thunderbirds contract issue ($50 million or so of PR stuff done in a suspect manner) and some of the other things and you could really see the writing on the wall.

Well stated, and I wish I had posted exactly that. Without trying to bash the Air Force I have to state that not much has changed in the company language of the organization in the last thirty or more years. This is a good start with disciplinary action on the higher echelon. There very well may be a lot of USAF Technical Sergeants and Lt. Colonels that would concur with what happened.

wm
06-06-2008, 11:39 AM
People are way overplaying the acquisition angle. This firing was all about loss of confidence related to nukes - both the B-52 transport and the inadvertent selling of nuclear -related stuff to Taiwan.

Defense Link posting (http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4236) of Secretary Gates' announcement supports this point rather clearly.

The more important point is who will be the new CSAF and SAF. I've heard that Gen Schwartz, the TRANSCOM Cdr, may have an inside track as CSAF. Anyone have any insight as to who is the likely new SAF?

Tom Odom
06-06-2008, 01:19 PM
Defense Link posting (http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4236) of Secretary Gates' announcement supports this point rather clearly.

The more important point is who will be the new CSAF and SAF. I've heard that Gen Schwartz, the TRANSCOM Cdr, may have an inside track as CSAF. Anyone have any insight as to who is the likely new SAF?

On the first point true--but it did happen against a larger setting. When I first started looking for information I googled SecDef Fires AF Secretary and Chief of Staff. Pages came up on the earlier events--including the nukes as I stated when I started this thread--and Gates' frustration with the AF over war support and rigidity in its approach to life.I would say this was a very large proverbial straw that broke the SecDef's patience.

On the second point that is a very large question. Gates is trying to affect AF culture. Nominating a airlift guy would be a very large signal. It is one way that Gates could significantly limit the AF senior leaders abilities to "wait him out" as others have correctly suggested.

Tom

Hacksaw
06-06-2008, 01:33 PM
Wow, we can only hope... I suppose the equivalent would be a placing a QM or Corps of Engineer as the CSA. If it comes to pass, it will be real interesting to see how the rank and file react. I suppose the chances are that it would be very professional etc etc. But the possibility remains for near open mutiny (at least behind closed doors).

Hell, if Chenney named Gates as either his running mate or presumptive Sec Def it might swing my vote.

There is definitely a bad moon arising in the USAF... about time

wm
06-06-2008, 01:41 PM
Wow, we can only hope... I suppose the equivalent would be a placing a QM or Corps of Engineer as the CSA. If it comes to pass, it will be real interesting to see how the rank and file react. I suppose the chances are that it would be very professional etc etc. But the possibility remains for near open mutiny (at least behind closed doors).


Schwartz is not just a transporter. He also has Special Ops and NORAD experience. Here's the link (http://www.transcom.mil/bios/schwartz.pdf)to his official bio.

Entropy
06-06-2008, 01:45 PM
The guy I've heard that is the likely pick is the current ACC commander, Gen. Corely (http://www.af.mil/bios/bio.asp?bioID=5080), another fighter guy.

I also agree to an extent with Tom about the "larger setting." I think they would have been fired regardless, but all the other stuff just made it that much easier.

Tom Odom
06-06-2008, 01:45 PM
Schwartz is not just a transporter. He also has Special Ops and NORAD experience. Here's the link (http://www.transcom.mil/bios/schwartz.pdf)to his official bio.

even better

Great personal friend of mine is an AF SOF one or two star

Steve Blair
06-06-2008, 02:01 PM
It's quite clear to me from that transcript that Gates is going after some baseline AF cultural issues. If you look at some of the things that have been going on in the AF in a number of areas (not just the nuclear programs), the drift has been noticeable for years. There was also a great deal of internal downplaying of the Minot incident, and the Taiwan shipment didn't make much of a ripple that we could see down here. Once you combine all that with Mosley's ties to the Thunderbirds fiasco and a recent letter in either AF Times or AF Magazine (don't remember which) that basically suggested that generals were above the law, I'm not surprised in the least that Gates acted. Wynn and Mosley were products of a particular culture...one that does not take criticism well and really isn't wired to look at itself in a critical way. That's been shown throughout the years. Hopefully the AF as a corporate whole will learn something from this other than "they're all out to get us."

That said, I know there's been a positive reaction in our little group regarding this removal. Not sure how it's playing out elsewhere, though.

Steve Blair
06-06-2008, 02:04 PM
The guy I've heard that is the likely pick is the current ACC commander, Gen. Corely (http://www.af.mil/bios/bio.asp?bioID=5080), another fighter guy.

I also agree to an extent with Tom about the "larger setting." I think they would have been fired regardless, but all the other stuff just made it that much easier.

I hope not. I'll keep my ear to the ground here. Honestly the last thing they need is another fighter pilot running the show. Schwartz's bio does look good...a nice balance of things and hopefully some new perspectives.

wm
06-06-2008, 02:18 PM
The guy I've heard that is the likely pick is the current ACC commander, Gen. Corely (http://www.af.mil/bios/bio.asp?bioID=5080), another fighter guy.

I also agree to an extent with Tom about the "larger setting." I think they would have been fired regardless, but all the other stuff just made it that much easier.


I understand the ACC CDR is the choice of AF leadership while the TRANSCOM CDRr is the choice of many of the non-AF denizens of the 5 sided building. Seein's how the SecAF is also gone (and there is no incumbent Under Secretary either IIRC), I'm not sure who does the nominating of the CSAF's replacement. Given the "larger setting" situation, I also wonder how much weight the remaining AF leadership's druthers has when it comes to nominating a successor.

Cliff
06-06-2008, 04:26 PM
It's quite clear to me from that transcript that Gates is going after some baseline AF cultural issues.

Agree.



Once you combine all that with Mosley's ties to the Thunderbirds fiasco and a recent letter in either AF Times or AF Magazine (don't remember which) that basically suggested that generals were above the law, I'm not surprised in the least that Gates acted.


I have heard that the Thunderbirds deal was a bigger part of this than many have implied.




Wynn and Mosley were products of a particular culture...one that does not take criticism well and really isn't wired to look at itself in a critical way. That's been shown throughout the years. Hopefully the AF as a corporate whole will learn something from this other than "they're all out to get us."


I can't speak for what you think the culture of the AF is, and I have no idea where you are getting your information. I can tell you that at the basic frontline trigger-puller level (albeit a sample made solely of the 6 bases I interact with regularly) the feeling is not "they are all out to get us." The feeling is "they are all risking us losing a lot of people in any near to medium-term conflict by ignoring the reality of modern air combat". This is not something the generals have told us - this is what we learn each day trying to train against an increasingly robust threat. In spite of that, every guy I know is still raring to go out there and get the job done - even though we know that we are losing our edge day by day and there's not much we can do about it. The hope is simply that we don't let a lot of Army, Navy, or Marine folks get killed because we can't get the job done anymore. Every time enemies have approached technical parity with the USAF it has been training that has made the difference... only now the training part is slipping even as the tech part continues to slide.

You can argue how likely it is that we will face this type of conflict. But if you look solely at only one adversary you are missing the boat - focusing only on one country or one scenario can lead to making poor choices. Better to look at how to deal with a range of scenarios and be prepared to deal with them. How many folks thought we would end up fighting Iraq in 1990? How many folks thought we'd end up at war with Afghanistan? We have an extremely poor history of predicting the next fight, and so I believe it makes pretty good sense to have at least a small hedge against the worst. OBTW, it doesn't take a peer competitor to combine tactical SSMs with WMD, mix in some 4th gen fighters and EA, and then add a liberal dose of double digit SAM IADs... you do that, as many folks are attempting to do, and you have a potentially catastrophic threat without requiring a peer-level competitor. Airpower has been one of the largest factors in our contuining ability to overmatch conventional opponents. I would argue that no one in the US military has a serious understanding of the effects the loss of control of the air would have on every service... the worst effects would not be on the USAF. The support the USAF and USN provide from the air is often overlooked, but is critical to every service's operations.

I completely disagree with the not looking at yourself in a critical way. Just because a lot of the "looking" occurs on a classified and therefore not public level doesn't mean it isn't occuring... anyone who thinks otherwise is naive at best. You could make comparisons about many Army generals not looking at their early OIF performance critically vs. what the lower level folks were doing... does the fact that the senior leaders porked it mean that the culture of the rank and file is messed up? Is the culture of a military service defined solely by the top couple leaders? I would argue that it is not, at least in the Air Force. Clearly some issues have not been addressed... but I don't think that's due to AF wide culture. Perhaps the one cultural element that may be affected by this is the willingness to fire people... that seems to be a problem throughout DoD. Most folks I have talked to understand and agree with what has happened - the commanders are responsible for their own as well as their people's actions.

There's been a lot of problems that need solving but it is tough to be all things to all people when you can't fly very much, your aircraft are falling apart (literally!), and all of your support folks have been cut in the name of reducing the budget. No excuses - the nuclear mission needs to be done right, as do all the missions. But it is hard to expect the same level of intensity as when Secretary Gates was in SAC when those same forces are expected to make their own TDY orders, be their own base personnel center, be their own finance office, do every conventional mission known to man, and still spend the same amount of time on the nukes, all with jets that have some of the highest MX time per flying hour in the history of the AF...

If you don't agree with funding the F-22, fine. Then at least fund the flying hours and upgrades to the jets we do keep to give guys a fighting chance, at least until those jets fall apart. Or admit that you don't care if we lose control of the air and accept that we will assume a level of risk comparable to that we assumed at the start of WWII. You can't have your cake (not fund AF recapitalization like F-22 and C-17) and then complain when your BCT gets SSMed or bombed by Flankers, you have no CAS 'cause the A-10s got shot by SAMS, and you can't get resupplied because there's not enough airlift and the boats were sunk by ASMs.

Again, I am not trying to make excuses. There are serious problems that need solving. These problems cannot be solved without good leadership, good followership, and more money. The first two hopefully we will get, the third isn't going to happen based on the amount being spent in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the end the result is good people trying to do the best they can. Let's hope it doesn't come back to bite us and get a lot of good people killed.

Sorry for the long post. I'd like to hear what anyone else who has regular contact with AF combat units thinks about the current culture in the AF.

V/R,

Cliff

Steve Blair
06-06-2008, 04:56 PM
Cliff,

The main context here (and I have this based on both historical experience and contact with a number of active duty AF folks) is NOT at the trigger-puller level. It's what goes on at higher levels (mainly headquarters level). That is where the culture is cultivated and preserved. If you track back through, you'll notice that I have no quarrel with the front line AF...it's when you hit the cultural level (say senior O-6 and up) where the major policy decisions are made that the disconnect begins. And that is where the long term management culture is created and preserved. To borrow your term...to believe anything else is naive.

It's interesting to me how this always spins back onto "you're attacking the AF" as a whole as opposed to an examination of what the miscues and malfunctions might have been that led to this removal. Going back as far as the B-36 (and farther in some respects), senior AF leadership has often been resistant to critical thinking and examination. Does this mean that the entire AF is? No. But when you consider that the majority of major policy decisions are made by a fairly limited group of people that culture has a great impact on the service and how it's perceived. And they have also done a masterful job of creating a circle the wagons and shoot the messenger defense system.

In short, if you think I'm attacking the rank and file AF, you're dead wrong. Hopefully the younger generation of officers will stick with it long enough to fix the problems.

Sargent
06-06-2008, 05:24 PM
I would argue that no one in the US military has a serious understanding of the effects the loss of control of the air would have on every service...

It would be like every war in history in which dominance had to be established on the field of battle rather than in garrison training. In most recent memory, it would be like WWII, where air superiority did not exist for the Allies, at least not in the beginning of the war.

The notion that superiority in one aspect of combat can exist and can be perpetuated ad infinitum is what is new. With respect to air power, it can likely be traced to the fact that since WWII the US has not had to face an opponent that had a creditable air capability.

On the other hand, one could look at the post-VN Army situation in Europe as an example of having to prepare for war as the inferior force. Ask any BNCO assigned to EUCOM in the 80s what it was like to wargame the Fulda Gap, and they'll tell you of the dismal prospects they faced in the event of a war there. Or ask an arty guy how he feels about the prospect of war against North Korea.

As we face a world where a) resources applied to the military are going to be increasingly restrained, and b) the picture of future war is increasingly murky, the Air Force argument that it must always maintain superiority through the application of unconstrained resources just can't work. To the extent that the firings of CSAF and SAF were related to an unchanged/ing attitude (as expressed by the request for more money for F-22s) as regards the USAF role in war reflects this fact.

There is going to have to be cultural adaptation in USAF to the fact that they will have to make more out of less, and that any future war will be a fight.

Regards,
Jill

Steve Blair
06-06-2008, 07:08 PM
From AF Times regarding Wynn's successor:

Gates is likely to recommend Michael B. Donley, the Pentagon’s director of administration and management to succeed Wynne, a senior defense official said Friday.

Donley was acting secretary of the Air Force for seven months in 1993 and served as the service’s top financial officer from 1989 to 1993.

Air Force Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Duncan McNabb will likely become acting chief of staff.

Full article here (http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2008/06/airforce_moseleywynne_060508w/).

Cliff
06-08-2008, 03:26 AM
It would be like every war in history in which dominance had to be established on the field of battle rather than in garrison training. In most recent memory, it would be like WWII, where air superiority did not exist for the Allies, at least not in the beginning of the war.

The notion that superiority in one aspect of combat can exist and can be perpetuated ad infinitum is what is new. With respect to air power, it can likely be traced to the fact that since WWII the US has not had to face an opponent that had a creditable air capability.

On the other hand, one could look at the post-VN Army situation in Europe as an example of having to prepare for war as the inferior force. Ask any BNCO assigned to EUCOM in the 80s what it was like to wargame the Fulda Gap, and they'll tell you of the dismal prospects they faced in the event of a war there. Or ask an arty guy how he feels about the prospect of war against North Korea.

As we face a world where a) resources applied to the military are going to be increasingly restrained, and b) the picture of future war is increasingly murky, the Air Force argument that it must always maintain superiority through the application of unconstrained resources just can't work. To the extent that the firings of CSAF and SAF were related to an unchanged/ing attitude (as expressed by the request for more money for F-22s) as regards the USAF role in war reflects this fact.

There is going to have to be cultural adaptation in USAF to the fact that they will have to make more out of less, and that any future war will be a fight.

Regards,
Jill

My point isn't that we neccessarily have to have Air Superiority.... it's that the entire US Military has come to depend on it. From JIT supply by air, to the lack of a robust anti-air breathing ADA, to the Navy's reduced focus on air to air and reliance on Aegis for fleet air defence... even the decision to switch to the EMEDs concept of air-evacing casualties vs. large theater hospitals... the whole US military has adapted to operating in an environment of air superiority. The substitution of air for artillery in many cases is another example.

The arguement for F-22s isn't for unconstrained resources, but for the resources to execute the National Security and National Military Strategy with an acceptable (read medium) level of risk. It's the CSAF and SECAF's job to state these requirements. If they're told to shut up and color, they either need to salute smartly or resign. If you believe the F-22 issue is one of the root causes, then it seems like the resignations are the right thing to do.

The USAF is definitely already doing more with less... but that doesn't mean you shouldn't state the risks of executing the strategy with the current force structure. As I've said before, doing more with less equipment is one thing, doing more with less equipment WITHOUT enough training doesn't work. I think the lack of adequate training ability is more of a problem than the lack of F-22s...

Finally, with the USMC and USA focusing on OIF and OEF, it makes sense for the USN and USAF to focus on the higher end of conflict. We have done a crummy job of prediciting what future conflict will look like... so we need to preserve our capabilities at all levels, instead of focusing solely on the current threat and ignoring the medium and long term ones. Otherwise we end up in the same situation we were in at the start of WWII, Korea, and Vietnam... do we have the strategic depth, time, and ability to absorb the losses that would result? Curious to hear what folks here think.

V/R,

Cliff

Cliff
06-08-2008, 03:48 AM
Cliff,

The main context here (and I have this based on both historical experience and contact with a number of active duty AF folks) is NOT at the trigger-puller level. It's what goes on at higher levels (mainly headquarters level). That is where the culture is cultivated and preserved. If you track back through, you'll notice that I have no quarrel with the front line AF...it's when you hit the cultural level (say senior O-6 and up) where the major policy decisions are made that the disconnect begins. And that is where the long term management culture is created and preserved. To borrow your term...to believe anything else is naive.


I guess in my mind the culture isn't from the higher ups... most of the operational AF deals mostly with folks at the local level... HHQ is mostly transparent to us. Day to day ops in peacetime are not centrally controlled... and even in combat, your interaction with the CAOC is somewhat remote. It is the LtCol level Commanders and DOs, and perhaps O-6 Ops Group commanders that set the culture... the HQ is not as relevant in my opinion, because they aren't involved in the actual execution of warfare on a day to day basis. The independent spirit of the airman is still around. Again, just my opinion...



It's interesting to me how this always spins back onto "you're attacking the AF" as a whole as opposed to an examination of what the miscues and malfunctions might have been that led to this removal. Going back as far as the B-36 (and farther in some respects), senior AF leadership has often been resistant to critical thinking and examination. Does this mean that the entire AF is? No. But when you consider that the majority of major policy decisions are made by a fairly limited group of people that culture has a great impact on the service and how it's perceived. And they have also done a masterful job of creating a circle the wagons and shoot the messenger defense system.


I agree that the AF in the times of SAC was very hide-bound. The shakeup post Desert-Storm is a good example of the fact that the AF does adapt. Not saying it's perfect, but I guess I think there is more debrief-style critical thinking going on that is visible. That's the whole beauty of the USAF Weapons School idea - a cadre of folks who are young tactical leaders. These folks can (and are supposed to) tell the commanders what tactically/operationally is wrong and how to fix it. Even the generals listen to these folks - and major recent changes have been due to the weapons officers standing up and saying "this needs to change". Not a perfect system, but I think it gets less credit than it should.



In short, if you think I'm attacking the rank and file AF, you're dead wrong. Hopefully the younger generation of officers will stick with it long enough to fix the problems.

I don't think you're attacking anyone. I am just offering my perspective (albeit from the tactical/operational level) on the culture of the warfighters in the AF. I think it differs from what you're seeing - hopefully a good thing!

V/R,

Cliff

Ken White
06-08-2008, 04:16 AM
of the F-22 (more than DoD says but less than the AF wants) and the F35 -- as well as more C17s and C27Js. So I can dispense with going into all that but with regard to these items...
...Finally, with the USMC and USA focusing on OIF and OEF, it makes sense for the USN and USAF to focus on the higher end of conflict. We have done a crummy job of predicting what future conflict will look like.In reverse order, not so. Not at all -- some in the system have most always predicted what would come and pretty accurately. The problem is and has been that the system is too bureaucratic to respond to the input and that senior people do not want to hear the world may be different than their preferences. That, regrettably, seems to still be the case. As to AF and Navy focus, I though that's what they were doing to the extent possible...
...so we need to preserve our capabilities at all levels, instead of focusing solely on the current threat and ignoring the medium and long term ones...Agree.
... Otherwise we end up in the same situation we were in at the start of WWII, Korea, and Vietnam...Three very different situations and not at all comparable to today. ForWW II, we had started building up in November, 1940, as rapidly as Roosevelt could convince Congress to act. Major aircraft, ship and army equipment programs were just starting to produce millions of tons and the services were slimming down and getting ready. At the time of Korea, we were sound asleep, period. For Viet Nam, most of the stateside Army was prepped, ready and trained for COIN -- problem was the Generals were not. None of those relate to today
... do we have the strategic depth, time, and ability to absorb the losses that would result? Curious to hear what folks here think.Can't answer that because you didn't tell me what it is that will cause those losses?

If, just guessing, your concern is the potential loss of air dominance, I'd like to know why you think that may be a problem; I know what you said above and I agree that training has been allowed to slide but I doubt it's gone down that much. The F22 and F35 are in the pipeline so the issue is not no new and capable aircraft, it is simply that they are so expensive that in a time of peace (which is what everyone outside of some service guys in Afghanistan and Iraq and a few other places is experiencing now) we can't buy as many as some would like. Given a threat, the money tap gets turned on and production ramps up.

So I'm uncertain what causes your doomsday scenario...

Ron Humphrey
06-08-2008, 05:18 AM
I had a question about something. I realize we would and should want to have the undeniable advantage in any force so with the AF thats makes sense too. Difference I have a question about is other countries perceptions of our air power.

Is it perhaps likely that some of the overt distrust when working with us of some countries may be not so much that they don't trust us, but aren't super comfortable with the fact that we might always choice to take an "easy out" and just bomb the living crap out of something and no one could do anything about it.

If I put myself in the mindset of any number of leaders with whom we may be trying to work I start to get why it's so hard for other large countries not to do anything they can to catch up. They may not necessarily expect parity but maybe they would feel at least a little less angst if they at least think they might be able to deter the thinking here. by this I mean One will usually think a lot harder before doing something if you know up front its really gonna cost you to do it. Is this something we should keep in mind when dealing with them.

???

Umar Al-Mokhtār
06-08-2008, 08:13 PM
is Mike Donely, currently OSD's Director, Administration & Management. He was the Acting SecAF for about four months under Bush I just prior to Clinton taking office.

For CSAF a real shake-up would be to reach a bit deeper into the 4-stars, I'd put Kevin Chilton in the slot. He's an astronaut (three Shuttle missions), headed up USAF's SPACECOM and is presently heading up STRATCOM. His last tour in the Puzzle Palace was as special assistant to the Vice CSAF, so he has the creds. So he's neither ACC nor AMC. He's a good guy too.

Culpeper
06-09-2008, 03:13 AM
It's quite clear to me from that transcript that Gates is going after some baseline AF cultural issues...Wynn and Mosley were products of a particular culture...one that does not take criticism well and really isn't wired to look at itself in a critical way. That's been shown throughout the years. Hopefully the AF as a corporate whole will learn something from this other than "they're all out to get us."



You really have a good understanding and knowledge beyond my own, which I find educating and refreshing. The AF itself is guilty of chewing up its ranks at the cost of careers and loss of talent. Inside, it has been for a very long time, exactly what you state, "they're all out to get us", but coming from the lower and mid ranks of the USAF itself as that statement relates to the higher ranks filled with shameful opportunists for a lack of better description. Again, I'm not bashing the USAF. There are a great deal of good people in the USAF. But The Force is brutal on its own people with the power of pen and paper alone. And like you intimated, I hope this is an eye opener for the corporate model types controlling thought, perception, emotion, will, memory, and imagination of those that do the work with enthusiasm and sacrifice in the face of internal asperity. I see administrative action at the top levels as a moral booster within the USAF and a long time in coming about. The mantra at the higher levels is as if the War Department still exists where careers were either made or broken. The War Department ended the same year the USAF was created.

Cliff
06-09-2008, 01:25 PM
...In reverse order, not so. Not at all -- some in the system have most always predicted what would come and pretty accurately. The problem is and has been that the system is too bureaucratic to respond to the input and that senior people do not want to hear the world may be different than their preferences. That, regrettably, seems to still be the case.

I agree, I guess my point is that the entire system does poorly at observing the indicators and being prepared for the next war. IE, doctrine, training, and equipment as well as strategy have often been aimed the wrong direction at the start of a conflict.



Three very different situations and not at all comparable to today. ForWW II, we had started building up in November, 1940, as rapidly as Roosevelt could convince Congress to act. Major aircraft, ship and army equipment programs were just starting to produce millions of tons and the services were slimming down and getting ready. At the time of Korea, we were sound asleep, period. For Viet Nam, most of the stateside Army was prepped, ready and trained for COIN -- problem was the Generals were not. None of those relate to today


I am talking about the fact that we were not ready overall when hostilities kicked off... agree that in WWII we were attempting to get there, but bottom line we started with a sub-standard Army and AAF, and probably Navy as well. Doesn't really matter in what respect you're unprepared - you're unprepared. If we fail to equip, train, or develop doctrine/TTPs/strategies to cover a myriad of scenarios realistically, we may be caught flat-footed... focusing only on the current war in the above at the expense of all else is wrong, unless it is going to cost you the war - which it isn't (funding training and equipment for medium risk across the full spectrum of options I mean).



Can't answer that because you didn't tell me what it is that will cause those losses?

If, just guessing, your concern is the potential loss of air dominance, I'd like to know why you think that may be a problem; I know what you said above and I agree that training has been allowed to slide but I doubt it's gone down that much. The F22 and F35 are in the pipeline so the issue is not no new and capable aircraft, it is simply that they are so expensive that in a time of peace (which is what everyone outside of some service guys in Afghanistan and Iraq and a few other places is experiencing now) we can't buy as many as some would like. Given a threat, the money tap gets turned on and production ramps up.

So I'm uncertain what causes your doomsday scenario...

SAMs are almost a bigger threat than anything else.... but add in 4th gen ftrs, jamming, subs, infowar/cyberwar, a savvy use of our media, WMD, etc.... even a 3rd rate power could threaten our interests and kill a lot of our folks. Kind of hard to eliminate that terrorist or rogue nation WMD stash when all your SOF carrying 130s get zapped by SA-20s or 10s.... OBTW weaponizing WMD for carriage by aircraft is a lot easier than by SSM... How would a stryker BCT do vs. a serious Su-30/PGM air attack? These are the kinds of things that people forget about, because we have not been challenged in the air for a long time... the morale effect alone of a sudden loss of air dominance would count for a lot.

Not saying we aren't going to buy F-35/F-22, just saying to make F-35 effective you need F-22, and to execute the Natl Military Strat with less than medium risk you need a certain number... there's only so many places one airplane with 8 missiles can be at any given time, no matter how awesome it is! I think the request for approx. 220 F-22s is pretty reasonable considering the stated requirement is 389 to cover the NMS.... I'm not saying we don't fund the Army and USMC expansion fully and focus on the current fight. I am saying that in time of war the nation can afford to fully fund the fight while hedging just a little (IE at the medium risk level) against the next... and it's not like closing down the F-22 line is going to help the economy over keeping it open another year or so and buying the cheapest Raptors ever... brand new 2008 Raptor costs $108 million (fas.org).... brand new 2008 F-15K (F-15 for the ROK) costs $110 million... (aerospace news daily)... how does it make sense to have to buy new legacy jets again?

V/R,

Cliff

Jim Rodgers
06-09-2008, 03:55 PM
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080609/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/air_force_shake_up

GEN Schwartz

Ken White
06-09-2008, 04:11 PM
I am talking about the fact that we were not ready overall when hostilities kicked off... agree that in WWII we were attempting to get there, but bottom line we started with a sub-standard Army and AAF, and probably Navy as well. Doesn't really matter in what respect you're unprepared - you're unprepared.Endemic problem in all democracies and it will not go away. I made up my mind many years ago that it was part of the cost of the relatively decent life style we have and thus, it should be tolerated. I also elected to keep wearing a war suit and thus accepted the fact that I could've been a sacrificial offering on the altar of unreadiness; that, too goes with the territory. YMMV.
If we fail to equip, train, or develop doctrine/TTPs/strategies to cover a myriad of scenarios realistically, we may be caught flat-footed... focusing only on the current war in the above at the expense of all else is wrong, unless it is going to cost you the war - which it isn't (funding training and equipment for medium risk across the full spectrum of options I mean).I don't think we're doing that though I acknowledge each community sees itself as being picked on... :wry:
... These are the kinds of things that people forget about, because we have not been challenged in the air for a long time... the morale effect alone of a sudden loss of air dominance would count for a lot.I don't think you're correct in that assumption. My sensing is that no one has forgotten about it -- they just don't emphasize it the extent the common wisdom in the USAF does. That ought to be okay; you guys are supposed to worry about it and to a greater extent then non-flying types. You are doing that and that's good --but I think you do others a disservice when you suggest that no one else cares.
Not saying we aren't going to buy F-35/F-22, just saying to make F-35 effective you need F-22...Arguable, circumstances dependent.
and to execute the Natl Military Strat with less than medium risk you need a certain number... there's only so many places one airplane with 8 missiles can be at any given time, no matter how awesome it is!Been my observation over a good many years that mixing numbers and warfare can lead to false conclusions. Also been my observation over the same period that the "Natl Military Strat" is a bunch of foolishness and is rarely (a) on target or (b) fulfilled. It really ends up being a wish list and not a whole lot more.
...I am saying that in time of war the nation can afford to fully fund the fight while hedging just a little (IE at the medium risk level) against the next... and it's not like closing down the F-22 line is going to help the economy over keeping it open another year or so and buying the cheapest Raptors ever... brand new 2008 Raptor costs $108 million (fas.org).... brand new 2008 F-15K (F-15 for the ROK) costs $110 million... (aerospace news daily)... how does it make sense to have to buy new legacy jets again?I think the F-22 figures are flyaway costs and do not include support and ancillaries which the F-15K costs do seem to include. Risk levels are in the eye of beholders and tend to be skewed. The AF naturally is worried about the air picture; the Army worries about it too but to nearly the same exten, they're worried about the ground issues; the Navy does water -- poor old DoD has got to look at the total spectrum and balance competing priorities. In any event, the F-22 line hasn't closed down yet, neither has the C-117 line. I haven't seen anyone seriously suggesting legacy jets -- except Boeing :rolleyes:...

We'll see what happens.

wm
06-09-2008, 04:25 PM
Kind of hard to eliminate that terrorist or rogue nation WMD stash when all your SOF carrying 130s get zapped by SA-20s or 10s.... OBTW weaponizing WMD for carriage by aircraft is a lot easier than by SSM... How would a stryker BCT do vs. a serious Su-30/PGM air attack? These are the kinds of things that people forget about, because we have not been challenged in the air for a long time... the morale effect alone of a sudden loss of air dominance would count for a lot.


Concur. I heartily recommend a read of the Rommel Papers--Rommel's comments about Allied air superiority at Alamein and the subsequent Axis retreat across Libya as well during actions in Tunisia and the Normandy landings is very instructive. Other anecdotal German commentary about fighting in the West and having to deal with the "damned Jabos" (the German name for Allied fighter-bomber CAS aircraft) is further support for Cliff's point.

Stevely
06-09-2008, 05:53 PM
Concur. I heartily recommend a read of the Rommel Papers--Rommel's comments about Allied air superiority at Alamein and the subsequent Axis retreat across Libya as well during actions in Tunisia and the Normandy landings is very instructive. Other anecdotal German commentary about fighting in the West and having to deal with the "damned Jabos" (the German name for Allied fighter-bomber CAS aircraft) is further support for Cliff's point.

I think these fears are starting to get out of hand. Air Force proponents aren't doing the cause any service when they start suggesting they are on the brink of losing any control of the air whatsoever, and US forces in the next war will face what the Germans faced in WW2. I think this is pretty damn far from what the enemy is capable of achieving, regardless of which potential enemy we're talking about. Let's keep it real, ok?

OTOH, if the challenge to American air supremacy is as strong as some would have us believe, the bad guys seem to be doing it for a lot, lot cheaper than the USAF and its contractors are charging the taxpayer to keep its edge. The Air Force is running the red queen's race. Maybe we ought to start buying from their vendors instead of Boeing/ LockMart?

Ken White
06-09-2008, 06:49 PM
Agree on all counts. We are nowhere near a crisis and to make it seem so is likely to be seen as caterwauling "canis lupus."

Best I can do with impenetrable terminology this time of day... :D

Sargent
06-09-2008, 07:01 PM
I am talking about the fact that we were not ready overall when hostilities kicked off... agree that in WWII we were attempting to get there, but bottom line we started with a sub-standard Army and AAF, and probably Navy as well. Doesn't really matter in what respect you're unprepared - you're unprepared.

Yes, you are unprepared. However, you are also not beholden to an extant structure of personnel, weapons, tactics, and doctrines -- in sum, you don't try to make the war fit what you have to iffy results, but you build what you need to the exact specifications required. I would much rather start off unprepared but able to build to suit rather than the other way around. It is what makes me take the maverick position of thinking that the American penchant for massive post-war demobilization is not the bad thing people assume it to be -- of thinking that it's actually a rather good thing.

I know, miliary heresy, but as a civilian that's my perogative.

Cheers,
Jill

Ken White
06-09-2008, 07:34 PM
heretical, possibly -- but that's not a bad thing. Not at all.

Cliff
06-09-2008, 10:20 PM
I think these fears are starting to get out of hand. Air Force proponents aren't doing the cause any service when they start suggesting they are on the brink of losing any control of the air whatsoever, and US forces in the next war will face what the Germans faced in WW2. I think this is pretty damn far from what the enemy is capable of achieving, regardless of which potential enemy we're talking about. Let's keep it real, ok?

OTOH, if the challenge to American air supremacy is as strong as some would have us believe, the bad guys seem to be doing it for a lot, lot cheaper than the USAF and its contractors are charging the taxpayer to keep its edge. The Air Force is running the red queen's race. Maybe we ought to start buying from their vendors instead of Boeing/ LockMart?

The problem isn't right now neccessarily... but the medium-term (10-15 years) future. Once you close down the F-22 line, you can't just restart it on a whim... it is not like a sheet metal WW-II fighter where a car factory can quickly turn from cars to planes. The technology to produce it is different.

I'm not saying the sky is falling now, I am saying we are on a slippery slope in that direction. And the enemy isn't neccessarily going for air supremacy... just a localized version of it. If we had the SAMs the enemy has, we could do what they may do - and just deny everyone the ability to fly on a general basis, only using our own air locally. My point is that the entire US military depends on Air Superiority throughout the AOR. Take away air superiority/freedom of action in the air and OEF and OIF go way differently - that is my point.

In short, not saying we're hurting now, but we need to invest - things like the F-15C breaking in half are going to start happening a lot more based on the age of our jets.

V/R,

Cliff

Norfolk
06-09-2008, 11:14 PM
The problem isn't right now neccessarily... but the medium-term (10-15 years) future. Once you close down the F-22 line, you can't just restart it on a whim... it is not like a sheet metal WW-II fighter where a car factory can quickly turn from cars to planes. The technology to produce it is different.

I'm not saying the sky is falling now, I am saying we are on a slippery slope in that direction. And the enemy isn't neccessarily going for air supremacy... just a localized version of it. If we had the SAMs the enemy has, we could do what they may do - and just deny everyone the ability to fly on a general basis, only using our own air locally. My point is that the entire US military depends on Air Superiority throughout the AOR. Take away air superiority/freedom of action in the air and OEF and OIF go way differently - that is my point.

In short, not saying we're hurting now, but we need to invest - things like the F-15C breaking in half are going to start happening a lot more based on the age of our jets.

V/R,

Cliff

Cliff's very right on this point, and although it might seem unlikely that the US would allow its fighter production capability to go cold, stranger things have happened. It took a year and a half to build an F-15 from start to finish, long-lead items and all, at a peacetime production rate. Even if that could have been reduced by 2/3 rds in wartime, that's still six months waiting for a new aircraft. It seems unlikely that an F-22 or even an F-35 could be built much quicker, let alone at a rate that would suffice to replace losses in a major shooting war. True, there may be no "peer competitor" at the moment, but the AF's fleet is elderly, and will no longer be with us for much longer in many cases. Personally, I have growing misgivings about the F-35, and the high-lo mix concept that began with the F-15/F-16 pairing back in the 70's in order to reduce costs may offer rather less benefit given issues surrounding the F-35's anticipated capabilities (or rather, indications that such capabilities as are to be afforded by the F-35 may turn out to be substantially less than expected). And I will echo wm's warning about the potential consequences of losing control of the air; an obvious point perhaps, but given that U.S. Forces (and National Policy) are thoroughly accustomed to the possession of Air Superiority, and thus are in some ways under-prepared for the converse, even flirting with the potential of substantially weakening it is probably imprudent.

But the Air Force also needs to bear in mind that not a single new MBT has been manufactured for either the Army or the Marines since 1992, and the Navy is increasingly struggling with aging ships and boats, as well as aging aircraft of its own - not to mention that its mine warfare fleet is being reduced to a pittance, and this in a Navy that is supposed to be focussing on Littoral Warfare. And it has no fixed-wing ASW capability on board its carriers. What resources that are available really are going to have to be shared in order to avoid being caught flat-footed in some critical area in the future. Of course, this is not the way things are done...:wry:

Sargent
06-10-2008, 12:33 AM
Once you close down the F-22 line, you can't just restart it on a whim... it is not like a sheet metal WW-II fighter where a car factory can quickly turn from cars to planes. The technology to produce it is different.

Why assume that in the event of a war we would go back to the F-22? I don't argue with your point that restarting that production line would be difficult and time consuming -- rather, I doubt we'd bother to go back to it all.

The problem with building weapons systems in peace time is that they must take into account many contingencies and have a multitude of capabilities. However, once a war has emerged, the need to have is defined and the required capabilities are narrowed. Thus, I would argue that the aircraft that would be built would be far simpler than what we are building now. I agree that they would not be as simple as WWII aircraft, but likely as relatively simple, given the advancements in production capabilities.

There is a logic to my heresy.

Cheers,
Jill

Ken White
06-10-2008, 12:45 AM
10 to 20 year procurement cycle is a permanent fixture. It is not. That length of time results from Congressional ambivalence and on again-off again funding, new administrations with different priorities, low volume peacetime production runs and several other impactors. Given a significant threat, that'll go. The F35, for instance, will almost certainly be produced in two variants, a US only and an all others. I'd bet big money that the 'all others' variant can be rapidly ramped up and produced in plants aside from Fort Worth. It might take a year to hit full volume but I suspect multiples per day would be rolling off the line.

Bombardier could make some... ;)

Huh? How do you get that year? Why, from today's all volunteer force -- just like we did in 1917, 1942, 1950, 1965 and will again. That's why that force exists, to buy that year. We all stuck up our hands and agreed to do that...

wm
06-10-2008, 12:07 PM
Huh? How do you get that year? Why, from today's all volunteer force -- just like we did in 1917, 1942, 1950, 1965 and will again. That's why that force exists, to buy that year. We all stuck up our hands and agreed to do that...
Ken,
I'd like to hope that our volunteer forces will give us that year in a future major conflict. However, 2 potentially significant differences from the two wars in your list that may have been life threatening to the US as a nation (the 2 World Wars--Korea and VN were neither direct or indirect threats to the continued existence of the American way of life) make me worry.

1.) Today's technology no longer allows the US to rely on the defenses to its national industrial base provided by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. US industrial infrastructure could be immediately at risk for attack in a future major conflict. Rebuilding destroyed factories is quite a bit harder than retooling them I believe.
2.) The US all volunteer force is currently the only thing protecting the nation. In both of those earlier "big" wars, the US had at least one ally who was already fully mobilized to stand as a shield while the US took the necessary time to bring its military up to speed. In the case of WWI, those allies were the folks who provided the final training that enabled US forces to succeed on a modern battlefield, not in some low level skirmishes against poorly trained and equipped irregulars or third rate national armies. Today, we would most likely need our combat veterans to do the fighting and would not have an adequate battle-experienced cadre available to train up the additional forces being mobilized. Our newly raised forces would probably have to learn most of their lessons the hard way, as we did in North Africa (at Kassserine Pass among others), Buna, and Guadalcanal--the difference being that we would not have another country's army to cover us while we recover from our mistakes.

J Wolfsberger
06-10-2008, 12:46 PM
Why assume that in the event of a war we would go back to the F-22? I don't argue with your point that restarting that production line would be difficult and time consuming -- rather, I doubt we'd bother to go back to it all.

The problem with building weapons systems in peace time is that they must take into account many contingencies and have a multitude of capabilities. However, once a war has emerged, the need to have is defined and the required capabilities are narrowed. Thus, I would argue that the aircraft that would be built would be far simpler than what we are building now. I agree that they would not be as simple as WWII aircraft, but likely as relatively simple, given the advancements in production capabilities.

There is a logic to my heresy.

Cheers,
Jill

I think you're overlooking the time to design. That involves years of system analysis, design and terst. The worst aspect of the problem is staffing up to do the work. Engineers who have spent a career in the civilian sector often have difficulty addressing the completely different set of needs and considerations for defense systems. Engineers who have "escaped" the defense sector usually refuse to return. The conflict would likely be over by the time the new aircraft emerged.

On the other hand, if we'd started in 2001 on an aircraft to support COIN ... we'd have found a way to put the A-10 back in production. :D

Tom Odom
06-10-2008, 01:19 PM
On the other hand, if we'd started in 2001 on an aircraft to support COIN ... we'd have found a way to put the A-10 back in production.

But it would be made of composites and would cost 10X as much...kind of a reverse multiplication table engineering...:wry:

I caught a bit of a military channel program on P47s last night--the true macho fighter of WWII. Just an incredible A/C, heavy, durable, powerful, and at wars end long range. Just not as sexy as a Mustang...

I wonder who would have won then had we followed today's practices...

Ken White
06-10-2008, 02:55 PM
Ken,
I'd like to hope that our volunteer forces will give us that year in a future major conflict. However, 2 potentially significant differences from the two wars in your list that may have been life threatening to the US as a nation (the 2 World Wars--Korea and VN were neither direct or indirect threats to the continued existence of the American way of life) make me worry.I'd argue that none of the wars I listed including the two world wars were life threatening to the US but that's another thread. :D
1.) Today's technology no longer allows the US to rely on the defenses to its national industrial base provided by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. US industrial infrastructure could be immediately at risk for attack in a future major conflict. Rebuilding destroyed factories is quite a bit harder than retooling them I believe.It is, of course. However the sheer number and dispersion of them (factories) in a nation this size makes that a somewhat daunting prospect for any potential adversary.

2.) The US all volunteer force is currently the only thing protecting the nation. ... not in some low level skirmishes against poorly trained and equipped irregulars or third rate national armies. ...the difference being that we would not have another country's army to cover us while we recover from our mistakes. (Emphasis added / kw)I think you sell this Army short. The part in bold denigrates a lot of folks who may be smarter than some seem to think. I also suggest that adequate warning of a potential major adversary, even given the sad state of the IC today, is very highly probable -- enough so that I'm comfortable with it. YMMV

Uh, wm, you aren't going all Euro-centric and north German Plain or Fulda Gap on me are you??? :D

J Wolfsberger
06-10-2008, 03:39 PM
But it would be made of composites and would cost 10X as much...kind of a reverse multiplication table engineering...:wry:

I caught a bit of a military channel program on P47s last night--the true macho fighter of WWII. Just an incredible A/C, heavy, durable, powerful, and at wars end long range. Just not as sexy as a Mustang...

I wonder who would have won then had we followed today's practices...

With modern design tools, techniques and technologies, we can design aircraft with capabilities that were impossible in the WW II era. As an example, the big trade off for fighters is manueverability vs. stability. Todays fighters are inherently unstable, but have maneuverability unheard in the past.

With respect to the Mustang, "The prototype NA-73X [which became the P-51] was rolled out just 117 days after the order was placed, and first flew on 26 October 1940, just 178 days after the order had been placed..." The A10 was 5 years from RFP to production.

Still, I understand the point, and I agree we could probably shorten the design cycle. I wonder how quickly we could do it if our backs were to the wall.

wm
06-10-2008, 04:22 PM
I'd like to hope that our volunteer forces will give us that year in a future major conflict. However, 2 potentially significant differences from the two wars in your list that may have been life threatening to the US as a nation (the 2 World Wars--Korea and VN were neither direct or indirect threats to the continued existence of the American way of life) make me worry.
I'd argue that none of the wars I listed including the two world wars were life threatening to the US but that's another thread.
Concur--remember my original post only said may have been life threatening to the US.

However the sheer number and dispersion of them (factories) in a nation this size makes that a somewhat daunting prospect for any potential adversary.
Not too much dispersion these days vis-a-vis critical defense industry factories--for example, Lima, Ohio is the only tank factory in the US. Two big strikes--at, for example, Galveston, TX and Linden NJ--would have significant inpact on US mid/down stream petroleum industry. Or imagine the impact of a large ADM detonation in the vicinity of Hampton or beautiful downtown Norfolk, VA.



2.) The US all volunteer force is currently the only thing protecting the nation. ... not in some low level skirmishes against poorly trained and equipped irregulars or third rate national armies. ...the difference being that we would not have another country's army to cover us while we recover from our mistakes. (Emphasis added / kw)

I think you sell this Army short. The part in bold denigrates a lot of folks who may be smarter than some seem to think. I also suggest that adequate warning of a potential major adversary, even given the sad state of the IC today, is very highly probable -- enough so that I'm comfortable with it. YMMV
Ken you quoted me out of context (are you looking for a job at the NYT? :D) I was comparing the quality of our past and potential opponents, not the capabilities of our own forces. Having been part of the IC's I & W (indications and warning) world, I am not quite as comfortable as you are about IC forecasting. I am even less comfortable with the decisionmakers' ability to draw the right conclusions and act based on what the IC may tell them.

Uh, wm, you aren't going all Euro-centric and north German Plain or Fulda Gap on me are you???
Far from it. I never expected that war to occur after about 1978 anyway. I'm more worried about some mid rate power thinking it can pull off a Pearl Harbor-like event on US infrastructure in order to buy itself enough time to to do some local conquests and then be able to consolidate on its objective while the US tries to rebuild its shattered infrastructure. The attacking power would expect its consolidation would be strong enough to deter the US (and others) from interceding to restore the status quo ante. Imagine how things might have turned out in the Mid-East had Saddam tried such a tactic as or before he rolled over the border into Kuwait.

Ken White
06-10-2008, 05:17 PM
...Not too much dispersion these days vis-a-vis critical defense industry factories--for example, Lima, Ohio is the only tank factory in the US. Two big strikes--at, for example, Galveston, TX and Linden NJ--would have significant inpact on US mid/down stream petroleum industry. Or imagine the impact of a large ADM detonation in the vicinity of Hampton or beautiful downtown Norfolk, VA.Yes and no. Agree on the lack of dispersion but also suggest that the lack of stupid Congressional restraints and the elimination of a lot of the regulatory burden would enable some amazing speed in reconstruction. Not to mention that a surprising number of plants exist in 'other' industries that are capable of conversion to war production. Biggest problem would be the skills of workers and that's not insurmountable. Not trying to suggest that it would be easy, just that it can be done.

Ken you quoted me out of context (are you looking for a job at the NYT? :D) I was comparing the quality of our past and potential opponents, not the capabilities of our own forces.If I did, my apologies. Seemed to me you were saying that COIN skills (I'm really starting to dislike that phrase. It's a bad misnomer) didn't equate to major conflict skills -- which is in a limited sense true but far from being totally correct or insurmountable.
Having been part of the IC's I & W (indications and warning) world, I am not quite as comfortable as you are about IC forecasting.I didn't mean to imply that I was comfortable with it; I think the IC has some major malfunctions right now; some self induced and some legislatively imposed by the 535 person debacle that is our Congress. Fortunately, there are enough good people about that the shortfalls can be supplemented by folks outside the IC.
I am even less comfortable with the decisionmakers' ability to draw the right conclusions and act based on what the IC may tell them.Touché.
Far from it. I never expected that war to occur after about 1978 anyway. I'm more worried about some mid rate power thinking it can pull off a Pearl Harbor-like event on US infrastructure in order to buy itself enough time to to do some local conquests and then be able to consolidate on its objective while the US tries to rebuild its shattered infrastructure. The attacking power would expect its consolidation would be strong enough to deter the US (and others) from interceding to restore the status quo ante. Imagine how things might have turned out in the Mid-East had Saddam tried such a tactic as or before he rolled over the border into Kuwait.All things are possible. Some are more probable than others. Some are more difficult to do than to talk about. Effects also are difficult to judge in advance.

Been my observation that many over the years have made the usually fatal mistake of misjudging what can be done to the US and / or what the US can or will do. I do not expect that to change in the near term.

wm
06-10-2008, 05:44 PM
:D
Touché.


Been my observation that many over the years have made the usually fatal mistake of misjudging what can be done to the US and / or what the US can or will do. I do not expect that to change in the near term.

I think that the first lesson that was beaten into my head about foreign (and not-so-foreign) relations, is that most actions are taken based on perceptions, rather on a good understanding, of reality. So, I agree we need to be on our guard as to the misjudgements that might dispose other national/quasi-national/nation-state-wannabe actors to do something that would probably be really stupid for a lot of folks around the globe in the long term. The more America can do to dissuade others from acting on their perceptions of reality, the better for all concerned.

Seems to me that Americans tend to be pretty stubborn when it comes to making sure that what they think is right comes to pass. The good news is, the judgement of history has shown more often than not that Americans end up being correct about what is the right end result. :) Too bad we have to fumble around for so long figuring out the right way to achieve it. :(

Ski
06-10-2008, 05:44 PM
Steve's exactly right - too much crying wolf is going to get the USAF argument shot down before it gains any traction.

The Air Force has continually - since the inception as a seperate service - received more funds on an annual basis within the base budget than any other service. They have not lacked for anything. It is the Air Force's fault, and perhaps we can add some Congressional flavor into the mix, that they have continually designed and manufactured aircraft that are more expensive and complex.

The F-16 is the only aircraft in the history of the USAF to cost LESS than it's predecessor. The capability still exists to make a fine aircraft without all the bells and whistles that is cheap to design, manufacture and sustain.

As Norfolk states, the Army has undergone incremental change to the Abrams and Bradleys since they were introduced in the 1980's. They were designed that way BTW. The only really new vehicle has been the Strykers. The Marines are even worse off (and a lot of that is their own fault by putting all their eggs in the AAAV program basket) because they rely on the Army for a lot of their weaponry.

I don't disagree about the necessity of the USAF to provide air dominance. The USN and USMC help out here as well. The USAF just doesn't spend it's money wisely from what I can see. I think the C-17's are close to $150M a plane, I've seen numbers as high as $200M a plane for the F-22, and the F-35 is rising by the day (it will be closer to $100M a copy than the $35M a copy that is being claimed). Meanwhile, flight hours are down in training...why do training funds always go by the wayside when it is clear throughout history that the better trained pilot/unit will beat one that is better equipped but less trained? And if we really do get into a drag down knock out fight with the Chinese, there are far worse things to worry about than aircraft. That is really the only possible peer competitor on the horizon, and the PLAF hasn't been in combat since the late 1970's. Are we really that afraid of that potential boogeyman? Geez...

Van
06-10-2008, 06:26 PM
Army has undergone incremental change to the Abrams and Bradleys since they were introduced in the 1980's. They were designed that way BTW. The only really new vehicle has been the Strykers.

To be fair, the enabling technologies of ground forces have not changed as much as the enabling technologies of air power in the same period. Comms and sensors are shifting this dynamic a bit, as new tools become availible to ground forces, but protection and lethality mechanisms have gone through any huge changes in a while.

Back on thread, Gates pick for CSAF comes out of the special ops world. This bodes well for the AF role in Small Wars (and not so well for the fighter community, and we'll just have to live with that :cool:)

Fuchs
06-10-2008, 06:32 PM
Isn't it funny?

In late '99 till at least late '02, the Army feared to be(come) "irrelevant".

Now it's the AF's turn (at least in regard to Iraq and to stealth planes).

Ski
06-10-2008, 07:58 PM
Van - I just don't buy it. The sensors and comms systems are parts of the integrated aircraft - they should not be the major cost drivers. If they are, that is a major problem.

I have no experience with aircraft design but my understanding is that the major cost drivers are the airframes themselves (especially with the various lightweight materials), the stealth technologies, and the engines. I stand to be corrected...

J Wolfsberger
06-10-2008, 08:27 PM
Van - I just don't buy it. The sensors and comms systems are parts of the integrated aircraft - they should not be the major cost drivers. If they are, that is a major problem.

... my understanding is that the major cost drivers are the airframes themselves (especially with the various lightweight materials), the stealth technologies, and the engines. I stand to be corrected...

The avionics - radars, optics, comm, signal processing, flight management, etc. - really are a cost driver. For example, todays fighters are inherently unstable, which means they obtain stability in flight by constantly monitoring conditions and adjusting the control surfaces to achieve "stable" flight. That requires not only a lot of instrumentation, but processing power; on the F-16, three militarized computers that "vote" on the correction, at a cost in the neighborhood of $100K each. The phased array radar in the nose of the AC could easily add upwards of $2M.

I wouldn't be surprised if the avionics was 30% or more of per unit cost.

However, a lot of the avionics can be upgraded.

Ski
06-10-2008, 09:06 PM
So there could be incremental upgrades to existing designs...correct?

Van
06-10-2008, 09:07 PM
Ski,
I was refering to the impact of emerging comm and sensors on ground forces.

The AF was getting a handle on planes when jets showed up. Jets are under control when space technology gets busy. etc. Until the current round with the various, competing technological advances like UAVs and some of the propulsion systems on the horizon. And they've had about 3-5 years between major technology.

The Army has had much more gradual change until the emerging comm systems started getting practical for us in the past few years. I'm not convinced we're really appreciating the potential or the impact yet.

But J Wolf is right, avionics in its various forms is a serious wedge of an aircraft's cost. In the case of the initial purchase of the Coast Guard HH-65 Dolphin, a French airframe, the avionics package was extremely robust, to help ensure the "buy 51% American" requirement was met, and was something like 25% of the total price.

Ski
06-10-2008, 09:11 PM
Ok- yeah, you are correct. The sensor and digital revolution has made quite a difference. Agree 100%

Thanks for the update on the avionics piece. Something just seems a little out of whack when the CPU's for actually flying the aircraft cost so much...

Entropy
06-10-2008, 10:39 PM
There was also a great deal of internal downplaying of the Minot incident, and the Taiwan shipment didn't make much of a ripple that we could see down here. Once you combine all that with Mosley's ties to the Thunderbirds fiasco and a recent letter in either AF Times or AF Magazine (don't remember which) that basically suggested that generals were above the law, I'm not surprised in the least that Gates acted. Wynn and Mosley were products of a particular culture...one that does not take criticism well and really isn't wired to look at itself in a critical way. That's been shown throughout the years. Hopefully the AF as a corporate whole will learn something from this other than "they're all out to get us."

While I agree that Gates is partially going after cultural issues with these latest leadership changes, these issues exist in all the services. Furthermore, I might suggest that none of the services take criticism particularly well. Rather than singling out the Air Force, I think an argument can be made that the entirety of DoD isn't "wired to look at itself in a critical way." It may be true the AF is worse in this regard, but I would like to see some evidence the AF is worse than any other service.

And, like it or not, there is a basis for the Air Force believing that "they're all out to get us." There are the many articles and commentaries that have made the rounds for decades that advocate the disbanding of the Air Force or at least consider it a serious option to consider. One can hardly visit anyplace that discusses AF issues without this desire being raised by someone. The comments in an AM post from today (http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com/2008/06/may-schwartz-be-with-you.html) is but one example of thousands.

Then there are Gate's comments which are almost always mis-reported and interpreted as being critical of the AF and not the other services. Probably the worst was Gate's comments about a month ago in Colorado Springs which are discussed in another AM thread (http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com/2008/05/thats-why-abu-muqawama-loves-you-bobby.html) (see the comments). When Gate's says something about the services not doing enough for the current war, it's the F-22 that is inevitably highlighted as "proof" of the AF's malfeasance, yet the billions spent by the other services (including the Army) on capabilities with no utility in Iraq and Afghanistan go completely unmentioned. By the same token the need for an air superiority fighter is endlessly questioned while other capabilities that are arguably less important go unmentioned. If you want to see defensiveness, try suggesting to the Marines that amphibious warfare is perhaps not as important as they might think.

Add in the fact that many making these arguments are clearly advocates for the Army and their arguments are parochial in intent and I think the AF has some justification for being defensive.

All this isn't to excuse the AF in any way. I've said many times before in this forum and others that the AF has serious problems that need addressing, but its extremely frustrating when so much criticism directed against the AF is just plain wrong and based on what appears to be parochial hatred of the service. These invalid criticisms do not go unheard by AF leadership and they certainly do affect how the leadership acts and reacts.

In closing and rereading this post, I want to make clear this post is venting a general frustration and is not directed at you in particular. Your post just happened to be the springboard.

Entropy
06-10-2008, 10:45 PM
The F35, for instance, will almost certainly be produced in two variants, a US only and an all others. I'd bet big money that the 'all others' variant can be rapidly ramped up and produced in plants aside from Fort Worth. It might take a year to hit full volume but I suspect multiples per day would be rolling off the line.

Bombardier could make some... ;)


Actually, there are a lot of variants. It's a USAF, USN, USMC and coalition aircraft that is designed to be modular enough to satisfy all those requirements.

Regardless, if we are still fighting an air war a year after the initiation of hostilities then we've probably already lost. Air supremacy will be decided relatively quickly.

George Raihala
06-10-2008, 10:50 PM
Software takes a looong time to code, test, fix, and retest.

Take, for example, something relatively simple like putting Link-16 into the B-1 (something I have direct experience with). The software effort alone for that will take the better part of 3 years, long after the hardware is ready. And that's for one application. Aircraft like the F-22 and F-35 are completely software-driven aircraft, from the radar to the displays to the flight control system. We are talking millions of lines of code for a new aircraft. That all takes time. If you are designing a new airframe, you are then talking about new flight control laws, envelope expansion, etc, etc...that can take years to test. The notion that we can afford to wait until we are in a shooting war to develop new aircraft is simply not practical in any sense.

I would also disagree with some on this board that have suggested we go with simpler aircraft. Our enemies surely aren't. The latest versions of the SU-27 have very sophisticated avionics, radar missiles, and thrust vectoring. Simple aircraft with unsophisticated sensors simply have no chance against a modern fighter aircraft, especially in the BVR arena. The F-22 is defeating F-15s in simulated air combat virtually every time...even a well trained pilot in a 4th-gen machine doesn't have a whole lot of options against a less well trained pilot in a 5th-gen jet.

And the simple fact also remains...our fighters (and every other type) are old...coming apart in mid-air, actually. The design factor for the F-15 was 9g, and the St Louis-based ANG jet that came apart broke after a 7g turn. No matter how much we upgrade our Eagles, we are still talking about 25 year old airframes. Older jets also cost more to maintain, and that cost increases every year, which in turn means less money to buy new aircraft.

One could argue that we won't fight an opponent with 5th-gen jets, which is a possibility. Maybe we won't. Its probably in the unlikely category, even. But, do we really want to take that bet?

Entropy
06-10-2008, 10:57 PM
So there could be incremental upgrades to existing designs...correct?

Yes and there have been. Both the F-15 and F-16 have had many upgrades which are designated by letters and then blocks. So a first-generation F-16 is an F-16A. The F-16C is the most common variant, but even that is divided into "blocks." A "block IV" aircraft, for example, is more advanced than a "block I" aircraft.

We could certainly keep upgrading F-16's/F-15's, but you run up against two limitations. First is airframe life. Second is the limitation of the basic design which sets a ceiling for the performance of the aircraft no matter how many bells and whistles you add on.

But as I've said before, the F-22 argument is now moot. Congress has already committed to funding the full buy of 187 aircraft and 2/3 of them are finished or under construction. Congress has also set aside money to either close the production line in 2011 or buy more aircraft and is leaving it to the next DoD to decide.

Entropy
06-10-2008, 11:14 PM
I don't disagree about the necessity of the USAF to provide air dominance. The USN and USMC help out here as well. The USAF just doesn't spend it's money wisely from what I can see. I think the C-17's are close to $150M a plane, I've seen numbers as high as $200M a plane for the F-22, and the F-35 is rising by the day (it will be closer to $100M a copy than the $35M a copy that is being claimed). Meanwhile, flight hours are down in training...why do training funds always go by the wayside when it is clear throughout history that the better trained pilot/unit will beat one that is better equipped but less trained? And if we really do get into a drag down knock out fight with the Chinese, there are far worse things to worry about than aircraft. That is really the only possible peer competitor on the horizon, and the PLAF hasn't been in combat since the late 1970's. Are we really that afraid of that potential boogeyman? Geez...

C-17's are more like $220 million last time I checked. This may have come down. F-22 flyaway cost is variable, but the final aircraft in the 187 buy are going to cost about $135m IIRC.

Training is not down because of procurement costs. Training is down because O&M money is being spent on operations. Air-to-air is not in demand so that is where the money gets cut. The fighter guys don't like that, but no one is happy when they don't get the training they think they need.

As for the PLAAF and others, you have too look long term. The F-22 is going to be our main A2A fighter for forty years or more. The AF understands that it's going to have to live with this aircraft for a long time. Yes, it's overkill for today's threats but the gap is already closing and will be much diminished in ten years. A big reason the AF wants more than the planned 187 aircraft is because it's doesn't think that 187 airframes are gonna last that long given the inevitability of accidents and losses in future conflicts.

Sargent
06-10-2008, 11:14 PM
I think you're overlooking the time to design. That involves years of system analysis, design and terst. The worst aspect of the problem is staffing up to do the work. Engineers who have spent a career in the civilian sector often have difficulty addressing the completely different set of needs and considerations for defense systems. Engineers who have "escaped" the defense sector usually refuse to return. The conflict would likely be over by the time the new aircraft emerged.

I don't expect that our folks are sitting around twiddling their thumbs during this time period.

With advances in computer modelling, etc., much could be done to have virtual prototypes of weapon systems ready to be pulled "off the shelf" when necessary. I suppose the most apt metaphor for what I envision are the set of strategic plans created for a variety of different conflict contingencies during the 30s. I'd include plans for factories/means of production as well.

Being resource constrained is often a great source of inspiration. Some good ideas have been developed without spending a lot of cash -- during the interwar lean years, Evans Carlson travelled to China to observe the early phase of the Sino-Japanese War and departed with the germ of a new warfighting model that later played a role in the Marine Corps' Pacific campaign (Raiders).



On the other hand, if we'd started in 2001 on an aircraft to support COIN ... we'd have found a way to put the A-10 back in production. :D

Don't be a tease!

Cheers,
Jill

slapout9
06-11-2008, 12:00 AM
Switch to Missiles like the Army said in the 1950's they are cheaper,better and safer.

Ken White
06-11-2008, 01:17 AM
.................

Ken White
06-11-2008, 01:35 AM
Actually, there are a lot of variants. It's a USAF, USN, USMC and coalition aircraft that is designed to be modular enough to satisfy all those requirements.Who knew. Why wasn't I informed of thi...

Whoops, sorry. Sarcasm is unbecoming; it's always brought on by condescending tutorials for the uninitiated. I may be old but I ain't uninitiated. ;)

Yep, multiple variants of the US types A, B and C. Then there's the British B (or will it be a C? TBD). The Canadians are talking a C instead of an A, bigger wings and rudder plus stronger gear are handy on ice and snow. Then the Euro variants and the Stryne mods -- they're also talking some Bs. Then the Israeli mod (also mumbling about Bs). Plus Singapore and of course, LM will push for India. But I digress...

I meant the stealth cape and the avionics fit for multiple variants -- multiple as in probably a dozen or more. Further you get from the US, less complex the bird will be.
Regardless, if we are still fighting an air war a year after the initiation of hostilities then we've probably already lost. Air supremacy will be decided relatively quickly.Totally arguable and not that likely. Depends on the opponent and location, location, location. Among several other things.

Why, it could be a Squid/ Marine, three or four CVW versus them air battle including SM3s and over before the Air Exped Wings even get there... :D

Entropy
06-11-2008, 02:01 AM
Ken,

Didn't mean to impugn your intelligence, which is, in all seriousness, impressive (no sarcasm there). I see the F-35 referred to as an Air Force-only weapons system often enough I let assumption get the best of me. My apologies.

As for an air war, I think we'll have to agree to disagree. You're totally correct that much depends on the specifics of the conflict, but I can envision no likely scenarios where air supremacy by one side or the other would still be in doubt after a year. I admit this may be lack of imagination on my part.

As for the squids/marine's, I agree with you there. I began life as a squid, after all, and it is still the service I love the most. A major problem for the Air Force in any conflict, as I'm sure you know, is basing - no bases, minimal Air Force participation.

Sargent
06-11-2008, 02:20 AM
As for an air war, I think we'll have to agree to disagree. You're totally correct that much depends on the specifics of the conflict, but I can envision no likely scenarios where air supremacy by one side or the other would still be in doubt after a year. I admit this may be lack of imagination on my part.

My air power knowledge is a bit rusty these days, but even if we lose the offensive game in the air, there is always the defensive game (surface to airm eg), which has a far lower cost of doing business, both in dollars and development time. If you look at the American air conops (and assume that a future high end competitor would follow our lead generally) there are so many targets it'd be like shooting ducks in a barrel. For fun, go back and look at the air war info that Cordesman put together at the start of OEF. Then plot all of the air asset tracks on a map -- warning, it'll make your head spin. The only problem would be trying to decide which target to start with. Honestly, if I weren't able to get a job teaching when this damned dissertation is done, I'd love it if someone would pay me to sit around and dream up ways to degrade high end air capabilities -- I cannot imagine how I could have more fun if I couldn't have a classroom for a captive audience.

Furthermore, why assume that the air war is the sine qua non of a future conflict? It is entirely possible that a party to a conflict could be the loser on that plain and still prevail in the conflict overall.

Finally, in the end, if we accept that air power isn't the ultimate arbiter of the conflict (which I really think it isn't -- otherwise, what the hell are we still doing fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan), then all that needs to be achieved is the ability to continue contending in the air while the rest of the war is fought.

And I second Ski's assertion that the technology is second to the quality of the pilots. (That goes for land and sea power as well.) Really good people will win a war every time, hands down.

Regards,
Jill

Ken White
06-11-2008, 02:53 AM
...I see the F-35 referred to as an Air Force-only weapons system often enough I let assumption get the best of me. My apologies.and did it tongue in cheek...
As for an air war, I think we'll have to agree to disagree. You're totally correct that much depends on the specifics of the conflict, but I can envision no likely scenarios where air supremacy by one side or the other would still be in doubt after a year. I admit this may be lack of imagination on my part.We can disagree. See Jill below. You might consider numbers available to opponents vs. quality avaliable. The SU-30 is a tough bird; it's locally assembled elsewhere clones not so much. Fair amount of the latter, not too many of the real deal. As I said, very arguable but not here or now
As for the squids/marine's, I agree with you there. I began life as a squid, after all, and it is still the service I love the most. A major problem for the Air Force in any conflict, as I'm sure you know, is basing - no bases, minimal Air Force participation.True. I suspect others know that as well... :D

Stevely
06-11-2008, 04:29 AM
And I second Ski's assertion that the technology is second to the quality of the pilots. (That goes for land and sea power as well.) Really good people will win a war every time, hands down.

Regards,
Jill

And on that note, it is telling that the Air Force is cutting 40,000 or so personnel, mostly to pay for F-22. And that buys less than 200 jets. At that rate, it can't be long until we reach the point where questions of keeping ahead of red air and ADA are academic because the service will have long since priced itself out of the war business.

I know we are drifting from the topic of the (overdue) firings of certain USAF senior leaders, but the cost of doing war business is a huge problem for the country and it is most problematic in the USAF and does feed into the leadership problems.

More later - day trips to DC are exhausting.


EDIT: wm - copy all, I was aiming more at the arguments as advanced by USAF leadership more than you specifically... sorry for the confusion. Just used your post as a launch pad.

Entropy
06-11-2008, 05:53 AM
My air power knowledge is a bit rusty these days, but even if we lose the offensive game in the air, there is always the defensive game (surface to airm eg), which has a far lower cost of doing business, both in dollars and development time.

That is, indeed, the route most potential adversaries have gone. Buying and operating a ground-based air defense is much less costly in terms of acquisition, operation, maintenance and training, so for most nations, which are more focused on regional adversaries, it is the way to go. On the other hand, both the US Navy and Air Force spend a lot of time and effort analyzing all these systems, discovering their weaknesses and exploiting them.


If you look at the American air conops (and assume that a future high end competitor would follow our lead generally) there are so many targets it'd be like shooting ducks in a barrel. For fun, go back and look at the air war info that Cordesman put together at the start of OEF. Then plot all of the air asset tracks on a map -- warning, it'll make your head spin. The only problem would be trying to decide which target to start with.

I'm not sure what you're referring to here - do you have any links?


Furthermore, why assume that the air war is the sine qua non of a future conflict? It is entirely possible that a party to a conflict could be the loser on that plain and still prevail in the conflict overall.

Naturally - my only point was that in most any conflict where there is a battle for air supremacy, the issue of who will have the advantage will be decided relatively quickly. There simply are not enough air assets on either side - particularly aircraft - to sustain an air campaign for very long in the face of losses.


Finally, in the end, if we accept that air power isn't the ultimate arbiter of the conflict (which I really think it isn't -- otherwise, what the hell are we still doing fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan), then all that needs to be achieved is the ability to continue contending in the air while the rest of the war is fought.

I guess it depends on what you mean by "contending" in the air.


And I second Ski's assertion that the technology is second to the quality of the pilots. (That goes for land and sea power as well.) Really good people will win a war every time, hands down.

That is certainly true up to a point, but technology imposes limits that skill eventually cannot overcome.


And on that note, it is telling that the Air Force is cutting 40,000 or so personnel, mostly to pay for F-22. And that buys less than 200 jets. At that rate, it can't be long until we reach the point where questions of keeping ahead of red air and ADA are academic because the service will have long since priced itself out of the war business.

Some of those cuts were because the Air Force was allowed to remain over its authorized end strength for a few years after 9/11. Then in 2003, a series of end-strength reductions through FY2009 were planned to help pay for recapitalization. Unfortunately, that plan did not anticipate changing requirements as a result of Iraq and so is OBE. Equally unfortunate is that OSD intends to stick with that plan. A decent review of the issue can be found here. (http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2008/May%202008/0508issbf.aspx)

Entropy
06-11-2008, 06:06 AM
Belay my last...Just read that Gates is suspending further drawdowns in AF personnel and he fully explains the reasoning behind the firings (http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2008/06/airforce_drawdown_ends_060908w/) and why Schwarz and Donely were chosen.

Ski
06-11-2008, 12:29 PM
How many total SU-27's exist in the world today? I think the number is less than 100. Has the aircraft seen combat? I don't think so. Do the countries procuring this aircraft have trained and combat experienced pilots? Doubtful. Are the countries procuring this aircraft threats to the US? Doubtful for the short term.

Listen, all services need to take a real hard and honest look at all of their major procurement projects. The FCS is a wishing well. The bottom line is our stuff takes way too long to design, build and is wicked expensive to maintain. Martin Van Creveld stated that aircraft today in the West are almost custom design pieces due to the complexity of the systems. Modern state based warfare is very expensive for a slew of different reasons - I think we are on the very edge of pricing ourselves out of business. The ROI on a $12B month war for us vs a less than $10M a month war for AQ is telling enough. Now that we have a weak dollar, bad housing market, energy troubles, etc...the ball is going to stop rolling towards DoD. People in our country are starting to have trouble making ends meet - I know people who spend over $600 a month in gasoline in the DC area - they were forced to buy 40 miles out because they couldn't afford living in the Beltway. And DC is an affleunt area. It's worse once you get out into "real America."

Good to see that Gates has come out and publically stated why the axe fell. He is such a breath of fresh air - the first decent SECDEF in 20 years.

Sargent
06-11-2008, 04:19 PM
Ski wrote: Listen, all services need to take a real hard and honest look at all of their major procurement projects. The FCS is a wishing well. The bottom line is our stuff takes way too long to design, build and is wicked expensive to maintain. Martin Van Creveld stated that aircraft today in the West are almost custom design pieces due to the complexity of the systems. Modern state based warfare is very expensive for a slew of different reasons - I think we are on the very edge of pricing ourselves out of business. The ROI on a $12B month war for us vs a less than $10M a month war for AQ is telling enough. Now that we have a weak dollar, bad housing market, energy troubles, etc...the ball is going to stop rolling towards DoD. People in our country are starting to have trouble making ends meet - I know people who spend over $600 a month in gasoline in the DC area - they were forced to buy 40 miles out because they couldn't afford living in the Beltway. And DC is an affleunt area. It's worse once you get out into "real America."

I wonder whether the aviation community's love of aircraft on technological steroids (and hence exceedingly expensive) has something to do with the fact that it's officers who fly. That is, if enlisted personnel were the aviators would there be a different philosophy on the development of aircraft?

My gut says that while aviation remains a sort of knightly endeavor it will continue to be cost-intensive on a per aircraft basis. If it were to become the province of the masses, as it were, this would change.

The only question is, would this be better?

Regards,
Jill

George Raihala
06-11-2008, 04:24 PM
China alone has over 300, including modern versions known as the SU-30MKK. India has 40 SU-30s and licenses to make 140 more. There are 449 SU-27s in service in Russia. Lots of other folks, like Vietnam and Venezuala have them or have them on order.

The SU-27 has seen very limited combat by the Eritrean AF.

The list of countries procuring the Flanker is a long one, many of whom could be potential adversaries, although the liklihood of fighting any of them is arguable. Some of them, such as India, field very well trained pilots indeed. Others probably are very clueless on modern tactics and wouldn't use the aircraft near its capabilities at all.

I do agree, that the timeline for designing and procuring takes far too long. The whole acquisition system, starting with the POM, needs to be completely rethought.

Van
06-11-2008, 05:19 PM
My gut says that while aviation remains a sort of knightly endeavor ...
But then the AF NCO corps would loose their bragging rights about how they're the smartest as they let their officers do the dirty work :)

Ski
06-11-2008, 05:21 PM
George

Even so, is the rationale/fear factor really that amplified since the countries you list don't have combat experienced pilots? Or for that matter, experienced pilots?

And as I said before, if we get into a fight with India, China, Russia - we all have much worse worries than whether or not the F-22 or the F-25 are viable matches...

George Raihala
06-11-2008, 11:49 PM
George

Even so, is the rationale/fear factor really that amplified since the countries you list don't have combat experienced pilots? Or for that matter, experienced pilots?

And as I said before, if we get into a fight with India, China, Russia - we all have much worse worries than whether or not the F-22 or the F-25 are viable matches...

Like I said before, though, its not like we are replacing relatively young airframes...we are replacing fighters that are literally coming apart at the seams. What is the alternative to the F-22 and F-35? Continuing to fly F-15s until they are 50 years old?

And I guess I don't get the rationale that if we get into a fight with China or the others we'll have "much worse worries", as if that means we don't have to pay attention to winning the air superiority battle. Is it better somehow to make it even worse by ceding control of the the air as well?

Tacitus
06-12-2008, 12:36 AM
And I guess I don't get the rationale that if we get into a fight with China or the others we'll have "much worse worries", as if that means we don't have to pay attention to winning the air superiority battle. Is it better somehow to make it even worse by ceding control of the the air as well?

Fascinating thread.

I'll let Ski answer for himself what our much worries might be besides whether we have air superiority in a war with China, but before it deteriorates to that point, I'd expect:
1. China to have presumably dumped their holding of US currency reserves on the markets. That's about $1.756 trillion.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_exchange_reserves
Confederate money, for its novelty value, may be worth more than the $US dollar at that point.

2. Oil finished trading today at $136 or so. Ready for $1,000 per barrell-- who knows if it would even be trading at that stage.

This list could go on. Would such economic catastrophes induce saner heads to come to some kind of negotiated solution?

I only bring this up because others are citing the economic costs of this equipment. The economic costs in a runup with a war with China would give some a crash course in basic international economics. A diplomatic compromise might look alot better when confronted with this.

George Raihala
06-12-2008, 01:00 AM
Fascinating thread.

I'll let Ski answer for himself what our much worries might be besides whether we have air superiority in a war with China, but before it deteriorates to that point, I'd expect:
1. China to have presumably dumped their holding of US currency reserves on the markets. That's about $1.756 trillion.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_exchange_reserves
Confederate money, for its novelty value, may be worth more than the $US dollar at that point.

2. Oil finished trading today at $136 or so. Ready for $1,000 per barrell-- who knows if it would even be trading at that stage.

This list could go on. Would such economic catastrophes induce saner heads to come to some kind of negotiated solution?

I only bring this up because others are citing the economic costs of this equipment. The economic costs in a runup with a war with China would give some a crash course in basic international economics. A diplomatic compromise might look alot better when confronted with this.

Yep, that would all suck. Agree 100%. Not to mention the fact that we would be fighting another nuclear power, which may be an even bigger worry. Does having those worries mean that we disregard everything else?

And I still haven't heard a convincing argument for why we should not be replacing 30 year old airframes that are nearing the end of their useful life. The very newest F-15C is 23 years old...the last ones for the USAF came off the assembly line in 1985. How many people on this forum drive a car that old?

Fuchs
06-12-2008, 01:50 AM
And I still haven't heard a convincing argument for why we should not be replacing 30 year old airframes that are nearing the end of their useful life. The very newest F-15C is 23 years old...the last ones for the USAF came off the assembly line in 1985. How many people on this forum drive a car that old?

Wrong question.

Try these questions:

A)
Did the #### hit the fan in your economy because of a long-time structural disaster (not enough industrial production to sustain the consumption level) of your economy?

B)
How many countries have a significant air power with a younger aircraft fleet?

C1)
Did another service of your military procure hundreds of brand new fighter-bombers recently?
C2)
Isn't that more fighting power than the second strongest air power can muster?
C3)
Didn't even the USAF recently get almost 200 brand new fighters granted?
C4)
Isn't that more air combat power than the second strongest air power can muster? AGAIN?

D)
Can your old combat planes be upgraded for a service life extension as it's common in allied air forces?

Ski
06-12-2008, 11:31 AM
Tacitus brings up a few of the salient points about a war with China. Here are a few more:

1. Have you seen how much is produced in China and is exported to the US today? Turning that spigot off might - my guess is probably - shut down the American economy almost overnight.
2. There are millions of Chinese in the US, and more than a few spies have been caught over the last decade or so...wanna bet there are a few sleeper cells here?
3. Forgetting about the nuclear weapons, what exactly would we fight over? Taiwan can be defended from Taiwan, and if Taiwan fell, it would be a loss, but it wouldn't be the end of the world. Is Taiwan worth the world's economic situation going #### up for a significant period of time? Probably not...and I think those who make the decisions know that.

The USAF has been gambling that quantity is not as important as quality. You reap what you sow.The USAF has had NO concept (and to be fair it's every service) of how to produce cheap, reliable and most importantly, effective weapons that can be manufactured, replaced and sustained easily.

Again - the USAF made it's own bed by creating airframe requirements that were overly complex, expensive and technologically over the top. The money is running out, number one, and number two, they had ample opportunity to continue the legacy of the F-16 and completely ignored it. So forgive me if I don't shed any crocodile tears about how old the USAF aircraft are today. The tanker example is another shining moment of self-immolation by the USAF.

Sargent
06-12-2008, 03:14 PM
Tacitus wrote: 2. Oil finished trading today at $136 or so. Ready for $1,000 per barrell-- who knows if it would even be trading at that stage.

Ski wrote: 1. Have you seen how much is produced in China and is exported to the US today? Turning that spigot off might - my guess is probably - shut down the American economy almost overnight.

The assumptions in both of these assertions only looks at the effect on the US.

China's economy is at a vulnerable point, and both of these situations would likely harm it more than the US.

Turn off the spigot on China's exports, and what happens to China? Where will they get the funds to continue further development? Who is going to buy this volume of cheap goods? If we ditch China's imports, we could always commission Mexico to pick up the slack -- hell, it might help with immigration issues, killing two birds with one stone. You'd also reduce the energy footprint of our imports -- less is used to move goods from Mexico than from China. And if Mexico isn't big enough, there are a whole lot more countries to our south who'd be willing to jump in to help out. Might be a boon to hemispheric relations.

As for oil at $1000 a barrel, again, look at where China is in its economic development. How will they continue to feed the growing consumer demands? There is much more likely to be problems trying to cope with that than here in the US. The Chinese economy is not nearly so flexible or adaptable to shift away from petroleum in its manufacturing systems and products -- think about all that plastic, folks.

But I do agree with Ski's assessment regarding our own military hardware production values. And it's not just our aircraft -- everything we do is based on fuel gluttony, from the generators running non-stop to maintain the ice cream and air conditioning to the vehicles and aircraft.

Perhaps these USAF shakeups ought to serve as a warning of the watershed approaching in how we do business.

Regards,
Jill

Stevely
06-12-2008, 04:04 PM
The assumptions in both of these assertions only looks at the effect on the US.

China's economy is at a vulnerable point, and both of these situations would likely harm it more than the US.

Turn off the spigot on China's exports, and what happens to China? Where will they get the funds to continue further development? Who is going to buy this volume of cheap goods? If we ditch China's imports, we could always commission Mexico to pick up the slack -- hell, it might help with immigration issues, killing two birds with one stone.

I submit the Chinese have a much higher threshold of economic pain than we do. We'd cry uncle long before they would.

I don't think it's realistic to assume that we could walk away from China and find an easy surrogate elsewhere for cheap production. Where would the capital come from to gear Mexico up to be a major producer to make up for the loss of Chinese imports? Or more to the point, who would we have to go to hat in hand to ask for a loan to do this? And assuming we had the money, how long would that take? Et cetera, et cetera. I understand China has its share of problems, I just think people underestimate how strong their position is economically vis a vis us.

There has been a massive, almost unprecedented transfer of capital, know-how and manufacturing capability from this country (and others) to China that has been decades in the making. It can't be undone easily or overnight, if at all.

Another thing to keep in mind is that the threat we make to China that they will have nowhere to sell their junk if we won't let them do it here, is rapidly diminishing (questionable in the first place that we could summon the national will to step back from the crack pipe...), thanks to other parts of the world rapidly becoming major consumers of their goods, above all China's internal market itself.

Their hand is simply much stronger than ours, in my opinion, and it gets better all the time. It's one of those things that someone should have done something about, but it's much too late.

Ken White
06-12-2008, 04:39 PM
I submit the Chinese have a much higher threshold of economic pain than we do. We'd cry uncle long before they would...Their hand is simply much stronger than ours, in my opinion, and it gets better all the time. It's one of those things that someone should have done something about, but it's much too late.in my case, on three points:

The Chinese probably do have a higher threshold then do we; the Chinese government, OTOH almost certainly does not.

Their hand may -- just may -- get stronger than ours, economically speaking but I don't think it's their yet. I think you misunderestimate American resiliency.

It's never too late; being late makes it difficult on occasion but rarely precludes a correction -- if, in fact one is required. Which I question...

Stevely
06-12-2008, 06:51 PM
in my case, on three points:

The Chinese probably do have a higher threshold then do we; the Chinese government, OTOH almost certainly does not.

Their hand may -- just may -- get stronger than ours, economically speaking but I don't think it's their yet. I think you misunderestimate American resiliency.

It's never too late; being late makes it difficult on occasion but rarely precludes a correction -- if, in fact one is required. Which I question...

Ken,

I hope I am misunderestimating ( ;) ) our resiliency! It's one of those things I would rather not be right about.

Ken White
06-12-2008, 07:38 PM
- Discounts at Waffle House.

- Ability to substitute 'their' for 'there.'

- Having witnessed American resiliency put to the test in circumstances far worse than those that pertain today.

- Ability to use Bush's 'misunderestimate' in lieu of the more correct but lengthier 'fail to properly appreciate the depth of.'

- Being able to pontificate knowing full well one is not infallible... :D

Stevely
06-13-2008, 04:35 PM
Ken -

There are even more good deals to being old than I previously suspected... me, I was mostly just looking forward to mocking the youth like Statler and Waldorf and asking grand kids to pull my finger. :)

http://img308.imageshack.us/img308/9311/jmh508b4nw.jpg

Ken White
06-13-2008, 04:44 PM
embarrassment to your kids, they say.

I have exceeded all expectations. :D

Cliff
06-14-2008, 05:15 AM
The USAF has been gambling that quantity is not as important as quality. You reap what you sow.The USAF has had NO concept (and to be fair it's every service) of how to produce cheap, reliable and most importantly, effective weapons that can be manufactured, replaced and sustained easily.

Again - the USAF made it's own bed by creating airframe requirements that were overly complex, expensive and technologically over the top. The money is running out, number one, and number two, they had ample opportunity to continue the legacy of the F-16 and completely ignored it. So forgive me if I don't shed any crocodile tears about how old the USAF aircraft are today. The tanker example is another shining moment of self-immolation by the USAF.

Ski-

Unfortunately, a cheap/reliable airplane will get shot down by the cheap/reliable SA-20s that the Chinese have, or their (not so cheap, but still somewhat reliable) Flankers.

The USAF didn't create the requirements - the threat does. The USAF didn't get to decide what potential adversary countries bought for their forces. How would you suggest we counter these threats?

I'm not sure what "legacy" you are talking about. The F-35 is supposed to take over the F-16 legacy - hence use by all our allies and a focus on air to ground. The original F-16 was a day, VFR only fighter - designed to take off, fly a short distance, dogfight with MiGs over the Fulda Gap (with only 2 heat-seaking missiles and a very weak radar), and land. It would be nearly worthless against a threat like the Chinese possess or the Venezualans would like to possess. Modern F-16s are closer to the F-22 in terms of avionics, but they still don't have the stealth and supercruise to be able to survive double-digit SAMs. They also have been extensively upgraded to carry air to ground weapons and newer missiles - it is a completely different plane. This is part of why F-16 wings are cracking and falling apart - the aircraft wasn't originally designed to do what it is doing now.

BTW, maintainability is one of the primary design features of all new aircraft. Considering the complexity of the aircraft we are flying now, the fact that young 18 year olds with high school diplomas and a few months training can maintain them says a lot about how sustainable they are. The limitation now is that there's only so much you can do to maintain an old airplane - eventually the basic components fail. We are spending millions to keep our old aircraft serviceable, and the costs are only going to go up - all to keep older aircraft in service. It'd be like taking your 1983 muscle car, and racing it every day of the week for 20 years, then expecting it to be able to beat the newest 2008 Dodge Viper with no issues... there's only so much you can do.

I'm not saying there's not issues with aircraft procurement - but at the same time, with how few defense contractors are left, how few aircraft we are buying, and the threat driven requirements, how do you make it better? I don't see it happening anytime soon.

V/R,

Cliff

SWJED
06-14-2008, 01:33 PM
How the Air Force Fell So Far (http://lexingtoninstitute.org/1274.shtml) by Loren B. Thompson, Lexington Institute.


The forced resignation of the Air Force's top civilian and uniform leaders last week is the latest chapter in a chronicle of decline that has been unfolding for decades. The political influence of U.S. air power has gradually ebbed away since the cold war ended, and the resulting vacuum has been filled by representatives from other services, most notably the Navy. Air Force officers today are largely excluded from the uppermost tier of the joint command structure, and have grown accustomed to being out of step with the priorities of senior political appointees running the Pentagon. Some proponents of air power offer conspiracy theories to explain why the Air Force has fallen to the lowest point in its sixty-year history. But an honest appraisal of what happened suggests that the service's wounds are mostly self-inflicted.

Perhaps the greatest defect of Air Force leaders in recent times has been their failure to adapt to the changing demands of a transformed global security environment. The Air Force won its independence from the Army and became first among equals in joint military counsels by offering a theory of strategic bombing that seemed uniquely responsive to the geopolitical rivalries of the industrial age. The promise of air power at its inception was that it could hit the "vital centers" of enemy power, and thus bring speedy victory that avoided the static trench warfare of World War One. A generation later, nuclear weapons made air power even more potent -- not so much as an agent of victory, but as a tool of deterrence. However, U.S. defeat in Vietnam signaled that the source of danger was shifting to elusive, unconventional aggressors, and the Air Force failed to change as fast as the threat did...

Entropy
06-14-2008, 04:44 PM
The money quote from the article above (at least for me):


A final defect has been the Air Force's inability to communicate with outsiders in a way that makes its capabilities and needs compelling. This is a problem for all the services, but the Navy and Marine Corps have worked much harder to improve their outreach abilities. Because the Air Force has lost the capacity to speak clearly, few Americans are aware of what it is doing in the global war on terror; fewer still realize it may be more relevant to future conflicts than the other services.

Ken White
06-14-2008, 05:02 PM
Perhaps the greatest defect of Air Force leaders in recent times has been their failure to adapt to the changing demands of a transformed global security environment. The Air Force won its independence from the Army and became first among equals in joint military counsels by offering a theory of strategic bombing that seemed uniquely responsive to the geopolitical rivalries of the industrial age. The promise of air power at its inception was that it could hit the "vital centers" of enemy power, and thus bring speedy victory that avoided the static trench warfare of World War One. A generation later, nuclear weapons made air power even more potent -- not so much as an agent of victory, but as a tool of deterrence. However, U.S. defeat in Vietnam signaled that the source of danger was shifting to elusive, unconventional aggressors, and the Air Force failed to change as fast as the threat did...Proving that priorities differ from person to person, I guess...

Entropy
06-14-2008, 05:34 PM
The reason that quote isn't as important to me is that I don't agree with it or the premises behind it. The last sentence in the portion you quoted is particularly enlightening in that regard.

Ken White
06-14-2008, 06:18 PM
arrive at differing conclusions. We can agreeably disagree on that, particularly on the enlightenment offered by that sentence which, to this observer, is regrettably correct in some respects if not all.

Interestingly, I agree with the accuracy of your quote -- but suggest that if mine were not partially correct, then yours wouldn't exist... ;)

Entropy
06-14-2008, 09:46 PM
First, I completely agree that reasonable people can come to different conclusions based on the same data. As a member of the so-called "intelligence" profession, differing conclusions come with the territory.

That said, here's my take on that paragraph:


Perhaps the greatest defect of Air Force leaders in recent times has been their failure to adapt to the changing demands of a transformed global security environment.

Where is the evidence? And what's "recent" - especially since the example given is Vietnam. As I've mentioned elsewhere, the AF reorganized in 1992 and got rid of Strategic Air Command which was the AF's most important arm during the cold war. Given the decline in nuclear security and accountability that led to these firings (which I think were necessary, btw), one might argue that the AF changed too much in that case. I personally think the AF has been more adaptable in recent times than the other services - or at least the Navy, which is where I have direct experience. When I first joined the AF after the Navy, it was frankly refreshing to be in a service relatively free of cultural baggage and what some of us Navy guys jokingly called "tradition before innovation."

Regardless, my sense is that the entire nation is still grappling with the "transformed global security environment" and what that means with respect to US interests and military doctrine and capabilities. The author doesn't give us her definition, so it's impossible to ultimately tell if her criticism is valid in a specific context.


However, U.S. defeat in Vietnam signaled that the source of danger was shifting to elusive, unconventional aggressors, and the Air Force failed to change as fast as the threat did.

I would agree with you that the sentence is basically correct, but it is deceptive by what it leaves out. Why not replace Air Force in that sentence with any of the other services or the DoD as whole? It hardly seems fair to lay blame for failure to adapt to threats posed by "elusive, unconventional aggressors" when those threats are largely ground-based and the Army didn't seem too interested in addressing them either until OEF/OIF. The AF has been pretty consistent in adapting to threats in its domain, IMO.

Finally, while it's probably beyond the scope of the article, there's no suggestion as to what the AF should have done better, much less whether it would have been possible to convince OSD and Congress to sign on to changes the AF should have taken. Nor is it clear if the AF is currently on the right track, though the author's use of the past tense might indicate that it is.

The bit about the location of the Air Force Academy and service school is particularly obtuse - one wonders if she makes the same argument with regard to Leavenworth?

I do agree with this paragraph, however, which is a very close second to the one I identified above:


One symptom of this cultural insularity is a widespread political obtuseness within the Air Force that leads it to misjudge what power brokers outside the service want or will support. For example, during the Bush years the service has expended considerable political capital in resisting the efforts of civilian leaders to buy more B-2 bombers, increase spending on space systems, and accelerate the development of unmanned surveillance aircraft. If it had simply said "yes" in each case and conserved its capital for the really hard fights like keeping the F-22 fighter in production, the Air Force today would have a bigger budget, better capabilities, and more goodwill among senior policymakers. By refusing to deal with the political system on its own terms, the Air Force has handed other services with superior political skills control of the entire joint command structure.

Ken White
06-14-2008, 10:10 PM
Where is the evidence?Here's one (LINK) (http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F03E1DD1431F934A15756C0A9659C8B 63)I can find more pertaining to everything from the YC14 and 15 to Bombers. Point is the senior leadership of the USAF has been excessively air to air fighter centric since Viet Nam.
And what's "recent" - especially since the example given is Vietnam.Since 1975; since 1989 when the USSR dribbled into a puddle, since 1991 when the future of air to air for some time was illustrated plainly; since 2001? Take your pick. As you may recall, I've defended the AF in several of these threads. I will on this one as well; I just found it interesting that seemingly, the PR aspect -- which I admit is important -- took precedence over the practical, do the job aspect -- which would seem to me to be more important.
As I've mentioned elsewhere, the AF reorganized in 1992 and got rid of Strategic Air Command which was the AF's most important arm during the cold war. Given the decline in nuclear security and accountability that led to these firings (which I think were necessary, btw), one might argue that the AF changed too much in that case.I would agree. SAC worked and should not have been trifled with, I suggest that what occurred was an effort to appear in tune with the times that was ill thought out.
I personally think the AF has been more adaptable in recent times than the other servicesI'd say it's been about on par with the others -- none of whom, not even the rather flexible USMC have exactly covered themselves with glory in that respect. All the services practice "tradition before innovation."
Regardless, my sense is that the entire nation is still grappling with the "transformed global security environment" and what that means with respect to US interests and military doctrine and capabilities.True.
The AF has been pretty consistent in adapting to threats in its domain, IMO.I agree but offer the caveat; with quite selective priorities which have not done them any favors. That, I think is the rub.

In any event, wasn't picking on you or the USAF; just thought the selection of a "money quote" was interesting, not wrong. :cool:

Cliff
06-17-2008, 09:49 AM
Here's one (LINK) (http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F03E1DD1431F934A15756C0A9659C8B 63)I can find more pertaining to everything from the YC14 and 15 to Bombers.

Shortly after this the A-10C precision engagement program upgrade was funded by the USAF.... I haven't seen the memo in question, so I can't comment on that, but I am pretty sure the A-10 wasn't ever in much danger.



Point is the senior leadership of the USAF has been excessively air to air fighter centric since Viet Nam.Since 1975;

So we should have ignored the less than 2-1 kill ratio in Vietnam? Ignore the threat of SAMs to bombers?



since 1989 when the USSR dribbled into a puddle, since 1991 when the future of air to air for some time was illustrated plainly; since 2001?


The future of air to air was illustrated since 2001? How? Who did we fight since 2001 that had advanced jammers and 4th gen fighters with active missiles? What about the future of Surface to Air Missiles? This wasn't illustrated in any of the above because none of the adversaries had the SAMs other folks have now... The F-22 is a response to SAMs almost more than it is to Flankers. If we were only talking about the Air to Air threat, we would be able to upgrade F-15Cs and at least have parity with the Su-30...



Take your pick. As you may recall, I've defended the AF in several of these threads. I will on this one as well; I just found it interesting that seemingly, the PR aspect -- which I admit is important -- took precedence over the practical, do the job aspect -- which would seem to me to be more important.I would agree. SAC worked and should not have been trifled with, I suggest that what occurred was an effort to appear in tune with the times that was ill thought out.I'd say it's been about on par with the others -- none of whom, not even the rather flexible USMC have exactly covered themselves with glory in that respect. All the services practice "tradition before innovation."True.I agree but offer the caveat; with quite selective priorities which have not done them any favors. That, I think is the rub.


The ditching of SAC was, in fact, a significant innovation. It is interesting that you argue against the USAF due to the focus on air to air but like the fact that we shackled our entire bomber force to a single nuclear mission.... While perhaps SAC should have been retained, having all the USAF's bombers focus solely on the SIOP and not train to conventional missions is exactly the lack of innovation you are unhappy with. The idea of getting rid of SAC was that we should focus on the effects weapons create rather than the command that owns them or the type of aircraft in question.

This is the same reason the USAF has a requirement for a certain number of Raptors... we need to preserve a broad spectrum of capabilities to be able to deal with a range of future threats, rather than focusing solely on one narrow scenario.

I agree that the USAF could show more flexibility, and hasn't always done the best PR. I fail to see how the PR aspect took precedence over doing the job... that isn't happening at the warfighter level. From my perspective (and that of many USAF folks) we know we're sacrficing training hours, maintenance, and equipment (as well as a lot of folks) to support our brothers and sisters from all services in the AOR... and most folks aren't thrilled, but they understand why things are this way.

Ken White
06-17-2008, 02:54 PM
Shortly after this the A-10C precision engagement program upgrade was funded by the USAF.... I haven't seen the memo in question, so I can't comment on that, but I am pretty sure the A-10 wasn't ever in much danger.Only because Dave Deptula didn't get his way. The upgrades to the A-10 were partly reaction as a result of the outcry over the article I linked. The point is that many in the USAF would like to get rid of the CAS mission -- but not at the expense of the Army getting it.

I'm not going to quibble about the SAM vs air to air issues; you have valid points and we'd degenerate even further we have into semantic nit noiding.
The ditching of SAC was, in fact, a significant innovation. ... The idea of getting rid of SAC was that we should focus on the effects weapons create rather than the command that owns them or the type of aircraft in question.Ah, effects based... yes. Shock and awe. :wry:

SAC worked; missions can be changed; the fact that the USAF did NOT change SAC's mission in the 70s is due to the fighter and bomber mafias staying out of each others sandbox -- until it was forced on 'em. My point was simply an aside that you took a fairly well functioning command and tossed it instead of just changing it's mission. No big thing, really
This is the same reason the USAF has a requirement for a certain number of Raptors... we need to preserve a broad spectrum of capabilities to be able to deal with a range of future threats, rather than focusing solely on one narrow scenario.Let me remind you -- again -- that I'm an F-22 and F-35 supporter; so you don't need to sell the bird; as for numbers, that need changes on an almost daily basis; unfortunately, the budgeting and production processes aren't that flexible and a decision on a number that is a meld of available dollars and mission needs will be reached. That's life.
...and most folks aren't thrilled, but they understand why things are this way.Nor, I suspect are most of the folks in the AORs all that thrilled...

This too will pass... :D

And we better quit before we both get silly. I've defended the USAF here and elsewhere for a long time. I've benefited from the air superiority that the USAF and the Navy and Marines have provided for me. I see the need for new airframes. I've said all that. I also see you guys in blue are hyper defensive and don't take even constructive criticism well ;)

We're all on the same side. Honest

Entropy
06-17-2008, 05:02 PM
Ken, will you please quit bashing the Air Force?!! Some of us are sick and tired of it! :D

Ken White
06-17-2008, 05:37 PM
and do not care which one gets the nod as long as it works.

Plus I want the Illinois, Kansas and Washington Congressional delegations plus that twit Murtha to shut up on the Tanker deal.

Oh. AFSOC needs C-27s, too -- and AC-27s.

In return for that, I respectfully request the right to make mildly smart ass comments about the ABU. :D

Entropy
06-17-2008, 06:02 PM
In return for that, I respectfully request the right to make mildly smart ass comments about the ABU. :D

Don't get me started on that! I'm still wearing good old BDU's but they are wearing out fast. Oh, and they're changing our class A's...again.

LawVol
06-17-2008, 10:34 PM
In return for that, I respectfully request the right to make mildly smart ass comments about the ABU. :D

You have to lay off the ABUs. It's par for the course. Just like the F-22, it's the newest technology, it's more expensive, and many think we don't need it.:eek:

Entropy
09-17-2008, 06:21 PM
Ah, what a difference a new CSAF makes! The new CSAF, Gen. Schwartz, addressed the Air Force Association last night. There was a LOT of meat in the speech and I'm very happy with his vision for fixing problems in the service.

The entire transcript can be found here (http://www.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-080916-083.pdf) in a very annoying bullet-point format. WTF? The content is golden though.

I will comment more later and provide some links when I get a bit of time.