PDA

View Full Version : Ill Informed Blog Post at AM on Advisors



Tom Odom
06-06-2008, 02:56 PM
I guess I expect more from AM. This one does not cut it. The reasons for the shift to Polk deal with the congruence in training objectives at the JRTC.



Polking the Advisor Mission in the Eye (http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com/2008/06/polking-advisor-mission-in-eye_05.html)
This is the third in a four part series on training advisors.

Six years into the Long War, efforts to train advisors remain mediocre. But they are improving. Fort Riley Training Mission commander Colonel Jeff Ingram deserves special plaudits for taking a thankless mission after having the combat forces gutted from his brigade and attempting to foster effective, survivable combat advisor teams.

As an advisor-in-training in October 2006, the training we received was the worst I had received in the Army to date. The training schedule seemed to be an hour ahead of our current location, and often an hour behind. The idea that operating in Afghanistan might be different than Iraq had perhaps crossed the trainers' minds, but the solutions was simply to train as though we would go to Iraq and finish by saying, "Well, this should help for Afghanistan as well." If I had ten dollars for every time an instructor said, "So, where are you guys headed in Iraq? Oh, you're going to Afghanistan. Well, its about the same thing," I could have foregone combat pay.

A really ignorant comment read:


The main reason is that Polk is looking for a mission in life vs the somewhat low number of personnel going through the JRTC---why not go to Irwin which is in fact in the desert- replicates both Afghanistan and Iraq has a 1200 role number of Iraqi/American, has a replicated IA/IP, a very active OPFOR, and a scenario built to replicate Diyala Province down to the governance piece, has HTTs, PRTs, NGOs,-has a BCT every month going through and is being strongly supported by the SOF community.

It is dumbfounding how ignorant some folks are. JRTC has trained the majority of units in both theaters for the past 5 years. Most of what goes on at Irwin replicates the JRTC.

Tom

Cavguy
06-06-2008, 03:10 PM
It is dumbfounding how ignorant some folks are. JRTC has trained the majority of units in both theaters for the past 5 years. Most of what goes on at Irwin replicates the JRTC.

Tom

The one positive part of that Blog is that they do take criticism - I would send a post there.

I think Kip's overall beef is the short shift SFA is going to get in the future - with proponency to SOCOM and only an O-6 billet at Polk responsible for training it. Some validity to that.

Will be interesting to see whether the Army assigns its proponency to the SF or makes it a GPF/TRADOC responsibility. If it goes to SF, it will never be heard from again in the GPF.

Tom Odom
06-06-2008, 03:22 PM
I think Kip's overall beef is the short shift SFA is going to get in the future - with proponency to SOCOM and only an O-6 billet at Polk responsible for training it. Some validity to that.

Partly true as an 0-6 will command. But a GO has the training center and the SFA will fall under him. That is the same set up for the Ops Group and it has worked quite well.

Personally I would rather see an active and civilian component approach to the mission. Why? Because when an Army unit stands up with a civilian component (DAC not contractor) that is a statement of probable longevity.
That also addresses some of the issues regarding moving to Louisiana.

I agree with your point that giving SFA in total to the SF community will essentially remove it from the lexicon of the conventional force. I have long argued that the happy bridge between the two needs to be at the MiTT training with SF providing a significant core of instructors. Perhaps that will emerge here once this gets started given our SOF role.

Tom

Cavguy
06-06-2008, 03:27 PM
Partly true as an 0-6 will command. But a GO has the training center and the SFA will fall under him. That is the same set up for the Ops Group and it has worked quite well.

Personally I would rather see an active and civilian component approach to the mission. Why? Because when an Army unit stands up with a civilian component (DAC not contractor) that is a statement of probable longevity.
That also addresses some of the issues regarding moving to Louisiana.

I agree with your point that giving SFA in total to the SF community will essentially remove it from the lexicon of the conventional force. I have long argued that the happy bridge between the two needs to be at the MiTT training with SF providing a significant core of instructors. Perhaps that will emerge here once this gets started given our SOF role.

Tom

Tom,

No real disagreement. But even a 1-star being the highest advocate for SFA training seems low to me given it's agreed upon import.

My earlier on SF wasn't meant to slight them - they're true pros at what they do, but so far I have seen little desire from SF to "outreach/integrate" with the evil "big army". So if they get TAA/SFA proponency in the Army, it will lose focus. Just as COIN will if the Army does the same to it.

I'm truly hoping for different, but expecting the worst.

Niel

Tom Odom
06-06-2008, 03:38 PM
Tom,

No real disagreement. But even a 1-star being the highest advocate for SFA training seems low to me given it's agreed upon import.

My earlier on SF wasn't meant to slight them - they're true pros at what they do, but so far I have seen little desire from SF to "outreach/integrate" with the evil "big army". So if they get TAA/SFA proponency in the Army, it will lose focus. Just as COIN will if the Army does the same to it.

I'm truly hoping for different, but expecting the worst.

Niel

I saw no slight on SF; the real issue is what happens with CF if that were to happen. From my perch we would be right back where we were just 5 years ago with everyone happily saying "well that's an SF mission we don't need to worry 'bout that," until another need slapped us in the face.

You are dead right when you say the same thing would happen to COIN if the Army did the same with it.

Tom

Old Eagle
06-06-2008, 04:05 PM
I second CG's rec that you post straight to AM blog. You know the issues. For all we know, "Kip" may be gathering intell from thousands of miles away. He certainly did not research the background leading to the DP to move TT/PRT to Polk.

One of the really remarkable aspects of SWJ is the quality of the posts. We also do a decent job of self-policing the responses. So many of the other sites where I do research just don't have that kind of discipline.

Randy Brown
06-06-2008, 07:32 PM
I'd hate for some of the ground-truth detail of Kip's observations to be lost in the "Why Polk?" speculations/arguments posted both here (SWJ) and there (AM). Particularly juicy stuff such as:

As an advisor-in-training in October 2006, the training we received was the worst I had received in the Army to date. The training schedule seemed to be an hour ahead of our current location, and often an hour behind. The idea that operating in Afghanistan might be different than Iraq had perhaps crossed the trainers' minds, but the solutions was simply to train as though we would go to Iraq and finish by saying, "Well, this should help for Afghanistan as well." If I had ten dollars for every time an instructor said, "So, where are you guys headed in Iraq? Oh, you're going to Afghanistan. Well, its about the same thing," I could have foregone combat pay.

Hate to say it, but I've come across numerous such opinions regarding ETT advisor training--near word-for-word, even--from 2006 to present.

Too many people in the Army can't even spell "ETT." You find yourself clarifying by saying things like, "They're like 'MiTTs,' but in Afghanistan."

Basically, Joe Advisor-to-be doesn't care if he trains at Fort Riley or Fort Polk or Fort-Hole-in-the-Wall, but he and his buddies and his family DO care about getting him the best, mission-focused training and preparation possible. Personally, I'm not convinced that Fort Polk is the answer. At the very least, moving training sites seems to inherently carry some risk of diminishing the existing quality of training in the short-term. I'm hopeful in the long-term, of course--I just wish we'd cracked the code on how/where to train these guys years ago.

In the meantime, it sucks to be the guys who are going through the last days of Riley or the first days at Polk. Particularly if you're deploying to Afghanistan. Somethings going to be lost in the shuffle, and it's most likely you.

Tom Odom
06-06-2008, 08:07 PM
Basically, Joe Advisor-to-be doesn't care if he trains at Fort Riley or Fort Polk or Fort-Hole-in-the-Wall, but he and his buddies and his family DO care about getting him the best, mission-focused training and preparation possible. Personally, I'm not convinced that Fort Polk is the answer. At the very least, moving training sites seems to inherently carry some risk of diminishing the existing quality of training in the short-term. I'm hopeful in the long-term, of course--I just wish we'd cracked the code on how/where to train these guys years ago.

Randy,

A number of us on here are more than passingly familiar with the growing pains of the advisor effort. I agree that where the training takes place is not germane; whet counts is how the training is given and the quality of the content. My former NCO just went through said training and has some pretty blunt things to say about his ETT training for OEF went. He will also tell you it was not from a want of trying by the trainers--most of whom were not advisor veterans.

But in the article in question, the thesis that Polk will not be able to do a good job ignores the reality that the JRTC has been doing MREs for 5 years now and made a concerted effort to build MiTTs, PRTs, and other similiar complicating and bedeviing play into those rotations. The decision to move the MiTT effort here was well debated and studied. The drive to move the effort here was to stengthen the connections between MiTT and MREs. As you say you are not convinced Polk is the answer, exactly where do you think that answer might lie?


Tom

Ken White
06-06-2008, 08:37 PM
Joint Readiness Training Center? Don't SOF units also cycle through there?

Makes sense to me...

Sargent
06-06-2008, 08:51 PM
I can imagine what the differences in operational considerations would be between a deployment to OEF and OIF. However, beyond that I'm curious how the training-mission (MTT, PTT, etc.) specific training would differ.

Cheers,
Jill

Cavguy
06-06-2008, 09:14 PM
But in the article in question, the thesis that Polk will not be able to do a good job ignores the reality that the JRTC has been doing MREs for 5 years now and made a concerted effort to build MiTTs, PRTs, and other similiar complicating and bedeviing play into those rotations. The decision to move the MiTT effort here was well debated and studied. The drive to move the effort here was to stengthen the connections between MiTT and MREs. As you say you are not convinced Polk is the answer, exactly where do you think that answer might lie?


Tom,
Good points as always. In the long term it makes more sense than Riley for that particular mission (especially if NTC converts back to being primarily a maneuver center in the years to come) given its MRX integration. I know there is talk as well of moving the PRT training there as well (from Ft. Bragg). Integrations with MRX units rotating in the box would help reduce some of the friction that occurs in theater between TT's and their partner US units.

Kip does have a good point that the move will incur some short term pain as the new instructors (unless the current ones PCS to Polk) get used to a) their roles, and b) Ft. Polk. I imagine a significant amount of wheel reinvention (could be good in some cases) will go on.

Kip also highlighted what I think is an enduring excellent point. Like everyone else here, I have known many people who have cycled through Riley for training. The comments, especially from those who went 1-2 years ago, are uniformly negative, often scathing. They have moderated somewhat, but still remain critical from my peer groups. Most are along Randy's line - the instructors did the best they could, but had never been advisors and just didn't meet what the Army should be providing those going on this demanding mission.

One can look at the army's failure to provide such instructors as a measure of how much the Army values the TT mission in fact as opposed to rhetoric.

Randy Brown
06-06-2008, 09:19 PM
... the thesis that Polk will not be able to do a good job ignores the reality that the JRTC has been doing MREs for 5 years now and made a concerted effort to build MiTTs, PRTs, and other similiar complicating and bedeviing play into those rotations. The decision to move the MiTT effort here was well debated and studied. The drive to move the effort here was to stengthen the connections between MiTT and MREs. As you say you are not convinced Polk is the answer, exactly where do you think that answer might lie?

Tom:

Thanks for your kind reply. Please don't get me wrong--I'm in no way singling out Polk for criticism. My point about training suffering immediately before, during, and after a hand-off would apply regardless of the installations involved. And, admittedly, that's a concern that's decidedly short-term.

We're already feeling some of the effects, for example, as we hear from attendees that instructors at Riley are not being replaced, as that installation draws down its advisor-training role. That (fact? rumor? does it matter?) naturally causes concerns from those who are still scheduled to go through Riley, and not Polk.

As a potential customer, so to speak, I personally like all the resources and capabilities that you and others have described as being available at JRTC. In fact, it sounds like a Tactical Disneyland. So I'm hoping that Polk does prove to be the long-term fix.

Given the realities of the OEF mission, however, I'm specifically looking forward to seeing if/how Fort Polk manages to create Afghantomorrowland (maybe EPCOT Center would've been a better analogy?) as well as Iraqadventureland. Although outside of my personal experience, it seems to me that some of the dynamics present in the former are not necessarily present in the latter.

I guess the larger question--one with which we're wrestling daily as we send more guys into the pipeline--is: How do you create a training scheme and environment that adequately prepares citizen-soldiers to mentor ANA/ANP/other counterparts while working in a combined, joint, and AC vs. RC operation (in other words, whose branch, country and/or task force is in charge?). And, while they'll train as teams, they'll mostly be deployed as individuals once they hit country, often in functional areas completely disassociated with their military/civilian expertise.

One former ETT member described the best-possible training as: Put everyone's job description in a hat, and draw for mentor assignments randomly, regardless of rank or MOS. Now, go mentor that person, who doesn't necessarily speak English, in an area that's 60 percent likely to be controlled/administered by a NATO ally.

Sorry if all this sounds defeatist or negative. Rather, my objective is just the opposite: The guys who have gone before want to make it better for the guys who are about to go. Any insights you or others might offer on how Polk can meet their needs would be appreciated; and, to flip that question around, any insights you might offer on how soldiers can show up to Polk better prepared for ETT training would also be appreciated.

Thanks for your attention ...

Ken White
06-06-2008, 09:39 PM
...One can look at the army's failure to provide such instructors as a measure of how much the Army values the TT mission in fact as opposed to rhetoric.They and the institutional culture...

The TT mission and those selected for it. I guess there are missions and then there are 'missions.' Sad.

Hmm. Maybe Gates could...

Tom Odom
06-07-2008, 01:05 PM
Tom:

Given the realities of the OEF mission, however, I'm specifically looking forward to seeing if/how Fort Polk manages to create Afghantomorrowland (maybe EPCOT Center would've been a better analogy?) as well as Iraqadventureland. Although outside of my personal experience, it seems to me that some of the dynamics present in the former are not necessarily present in the latter.

I guess the larger question--one with which we're wrestling daily as we send more guys into the pipeline--is: How do you create a training scheme and environment that adequately prepares citizen-soldiers to mentor ANA/ANP/other counterparts while working in a combined, joint, and AC vs. RC operation (in other words, whose branch, country and/or task force is in charge?). And, while they'll train as teams, they'll mostly be deployed as individuals once they hit country, often in functional areas completely disassociated with their military/civilian expertise.

One former ETT member described the best-possible training as: Put everyone's job description in a hat, and draw for mentor assignments randomly, regardless of rank or MOS. Now, go mentor that person, who doesn't necessarily speak English, in an area that's 60 percent likely to be controlled/administered by a NATO ally.

Sorry if all this sounds defeatist or negative. Rather, my objective is just the opposite: The guys who have gone before want to make it better for the guys who are about to go. Any insights you or others might offer on how Polk can meet their needs would be appreciated; and, to flip that question around, any insights you might offer on how soldiers can show up to Polk better prepared for ETT training would also be appreciated.

Thanks for your attention ...

Great post and excellent questions. Old Eagle, Rob Thornton, and others on here with have pondered these for a few years now. I put together the CALL Newsletter on this subject and it was a moving target because even as we worked it Riley's training evolved for the better thanks to guys like John Nagl.

There are some fundamental issues, however, that remain relevant and to a large degree unanswered:

a. What is the future of SFA and advisory capacity? Yes we are moving the training to Fort Polk and I see that as a good thing. But is a "for the duration" only effort? What does that mean if we are truly in a long war?

b. What are we training? Military basic skills or advisor skills? A purely military (as in uniformed) effort is a partial answer that works OK if you are concentrating on the former, especially if your trainers are conventional military, few of whom have advisor experience. But it is not sufficient for training advisors; they need to start as a ready for war Soldiers and then go through training. It cannot be a mobilization station or extended EIB camp with advisor tacked on. You need military who have done the mission in different locales and different cultures and you need civilians with skills that come from previous military experiences as well as those who practice the skills of an HTT. A great friend of mine who just got promoted and is going back to the line to take an infantry brigade to war is always saying, "it's all about people." He is correct; what he says has even greater meaning in regard to advisors. Advisory duty is all people, meaning you have to deal with people effectively when your cultures are in conflict.

c, How long are we going to train advisors? I will tell you that 60 days is NOT enough time even if their soldier skills are up to speed. Six months would be better for novice advsors. Should we do second tier training for experienced advisors? I believe we should especially if we can do that as a parallel and connected effort with novice training. I hammer the point to people that I cannot teach/train experience. I can teach and train you on skills; you have to use them in a meaningful way to develop relevant experience. Recycling advisors as advanced students who serve as trainers would take a step in toward sustaining experience in the advisor force. If we cannot have a standing advisory corps we have to do something to retain hard won experience. Maybe we need a warrant program for advisors?

Anyway gotta scoot to Houston so I will chat with you folks later..

Best

Tom

patmc
06-07-2008, 02:30 PM
At a Change of Command ceremony yesterday, I ran into my old 1SG when I was an XO, and he is on mid-tour leave from MiTT in Balad. He said he is lucky that he's attached to a good IA unit, that are not hesitant to go out and get the bad guys. He also said they've cleaned up the Balad area. As a former convoy commander, going through the Balad Market area on MSR Tampa was never a pleasant experience, so clearly the IA and US are working well together. His complaints, though, were with the MiTT training. He wondered why he was doing BRM and licensing for a humvee? He is a MSG, he has driven a truck, and zeroed a rifle before. He enjoyed the culture and language classes, but felt the basic Soldier tasks were a waste of time considering the experience level on the team. He wanted more advisor/culture, not check the box training. Anecdote from another friend on MTT, during live fire, their "instructor" advised them to carry a drop weapon in case wrong person was shot. They reported him and he was removed, but that was the instruction they were receiving.



b. What are we training? Military basic skills or advisor skills? A purely military (as in uniformed) effort is a partial answer that works OK if you are concentrating on the former, especially if your trainers are conventional military, few of whom have advisor experience. But it is not sufficient for training advisors; they need to start as a ready for war Soldiers and then go through training. It cannot be a mobilization station or extended EIB camp with advisor tacked on. You need military who have done the mission in different locales and different cultures and you need civilians with skills that come from previous military experiences as well as those who practice the skills of an HTT.

The Army is having a hard enough time filling these teams for 60 days + 12 months, and out. To resource 6 months of training for each advisor, Combat Advisor needs to become a branch or functional area (with that new tab?). Wait, there already is a branch that does FID. Those who want to advise, have already submitted packets and went to selection. Further, many captains do not want to go on these teams because they take you out of the command loop for a year and a half. Could the Army only put key developed (formerly branch qualified) captains in these slots? Good luck finding them, they're already being used elsewhere. Senior NCO's I know on teams look at it like a Korea tour (pretty routine with senior Bragg SGT's), but they mostly wonder what they know about advising and hated the training. Random 13 series NCO's are serving as Fire Support Advisor, even though they have spent their years behind the cannon or MLRS, not calling for fire.

The Army has to "reward" current members with a "say" in their next assignment. If you locked people in at Fort Polk, as an Advisor lifecycle, with 6 months training, 12 months deploy, 18 months trainer, you would take these officers and senior NCO's out of the force for 3 years at a time, and leave them stuck in Polk. How many people would volunteer for that? Also, aside from SOF community and previous MiTT members, where can we find qualified instructors in sufficient numbers? There's already a numbers problem.



c, How long are we going to train advisors? I will tell you that 60 days is NOT enough time even if their soldier skills are up to speed. Six months would be better for novice advsors. Should we do second tier training for experienced advisors? I believe we should especially if we can do that as a parallel and connected effort with novice training. I hammer the point to people that I cannot teach/train experience. I can teach and train you on skills; you have to use them in a meaningful way to develop relevant experience. Recycling advisors as advanced students who serve as trainers would take a step in toward sustaining experience in the advisor force. If we cannot have a standing advisory corps we have to do something to retain hard won experience. Maybe we need a warrant program for advisors?

This is a key mission, but the Army is not resourcing or managing it as such. Training, personnel management, promotions, schools, etc, need to change to reflect the MTT mission. Right now, the Army seems to be paying lip service. If this is going to become a core function of the Army, realize that many people do not want to do it, and the makeup of the Army may change. Effects of GWOT are already hurting Field Artillery branch (all but 2 1LTP in my battalion submitted a packet to change branches). Moving MiTT to Polk, to tie it in with the JRTC resources, is a good plan if all the support (pax, $, training) it needs will actually move with it. If it is just being moved to free up a brigade from 1 ID, then it is essentially doing the same thing over again, "Hey, JRTC, do this now." (Earlier, "Hey, 1st ID, do this now.")


Late night in Fayetteville, so if this is slightly disjointed or rambling, I apologize. Good discussion despite my efforts.

Tom Odom
06-08-2008, 02:09 PM
Late night in Fayetteville, so if this is slightly disjointed or rambling, I apologize. Good discussion despite my efforts.

All good points and all tied to the very first question I posted:


a. What is the future of SFA and advisory capacity?

All things flow from that issue. Much of what you describe is US Army culture driven based on a decades-old mindset that dictates how one gets ahead. For instance:


If you locked people in at Fort Polk, as an Advisor lifecycle, with 6 months training, 12 months deploy, 18 months trainer, you would take these officers and senior NCO's out of the force for 3 years at a time, and leave them stuck in Polk. How many people would volunteer for that?

We already lock folks at Fort Polk on a 3 year cycle as OCs. IF advisor success is the key to a strategy of drawdown and turnover, asking for volunteers is not the answer. Your 3 year cycle would be a good way to do it.

The idea that MiTT tours are Korea tours is the same thinking that dogged efforts early on in Iraq; the belief this is not what real soldiers do is at this stage like praising the Maginot Line in 1939. The Army has to put up some of its best and brightest and then reward them for what they are doing. The answer to the issue of captains missing command cycle opportunities is to give priority for command to those who have MiTT tour under their belt as well as using MiTT duties as a discriminator on selection to battalion command. That too goes back to the original question.

Tom

patmc
06-08-2008, 07:39 PM
I agree with you, but O/C, AC/RC, etc are suppossed to be post-command (key developed aka branch qualified) jobs. Instead, some junior captains are now moving into these slots, and upon completion, being moved to MiTT or deployment bc of dwell time, not to command slots. BZ MAJ and Functional Area boards are dropping to around 7 years for the first look now, very scary yes, but if you put a junior captain into a 3 year advisor tour, he's not getting picked up, or not getting a command. "Commanding late," which my battery cdr did and recommends bc it better prepares you (which I agree with already as a learning junior cpt), can end up hurting you. Promotions shouldn't be your motivation, but they do impact morale.

My first BN CDR followed the old FA career plan: FSO > PL > XO > ICCC > BN FSO > staff >2x BTRY CDR > JRTC O/C > CGSC > S3 > special staff job > bn command. My current commander did basically the same, minus the OC duty. Its too soon to see what the new path will be, but on paper, it seems to be command if lucky, then whatever job you're given. Not very encouraging.

I'm MI now, which no longer "requires" command, but nobody honestly believes that command is not still the best job. Transformation and GWOT realities have already shrunk MI commands, and the Army is basically saying, "yeah, it sucks, but come on." With near 100% promotions, nobody really needs any job now, but serving on staff with no light at the end of the tunnel, may be too much. May be one of the reasons MI was top tier for the captains bonus.


All things flow from that issue. Much of what you describe is US Army culture driven based on a decades-old mindset that dictates how one gets ahead. For instance:

We already lock folks at Fort Polk on a 3 year cycle as OCs. IF advisor success is the key to a strategy of drawdown and turnover, asking for volunteers is not the answer. Your 3 year cycle would be a good way to do it.

The idea that MiTT tours are Korea tours is the same thinking that dogged efforts early on in Iraq; the belief this is not what real soldiers do is at this stage like praising the Maginot Line in 1939. The Army has to put up some of its best and brightest and then reward them for what they are doing. The answer to the issue of captains missing command cycle opportunities is to give priority for command to those who have MiTT tour under their belt as well as using MiTT duties as a discriminator on selection to battalion command. That too goes back to the original question.

Tom

Tom Odom
06-08-2008, 08:37 PM
Pat,

Again you are bringing important issues up but they do not get at the heart of the matter. This thread was and is focused on the issue of MiTT training and how to improve that training.

If we first answer that A. MiTTs and advisory effort is critical and will be a long term effort--lets use 20 years as a start--then we need to improve that training. We cannot do that with a 60 day summer camp approach regardless of where we put it. That means a fundamental change in career culture, one that I have yet to see. Ken loves to say come the revolution first blow up personnel command. This would be a good thing to light a match about.

My point is quite simple: we are still talking the talk rather than walking the issue forward.

Tom

Ken White
06-08-2008, 08:42 PM
like nukes.........

Rob Thornton
06-08-2008, 10:37 PM
Tom
Good points. I think what needs to be got at is that this and many issues like it are beyond ascribing a temporary value to in terms we are generally comfortable with.

There are some advisory skill sets in high current demand such as those at the ministerial level which take years to grow. These institutional level advisors are key in achieving sustainable capacity, but there is a significant gap in the USG's ability to provide them. In addition to the personal attributes and skills of our 03-06s advising at the tactical echelon in foreign environments, these ministerial level advisors have to have technical skills we might normally attribute to a policy guy or gal working as Assistant Deputy in OSD, or those of an ambassador or senior FSO, etc. Its not so they can come in and impose a template, but so they can have a fundamental understanding of how institutions work and the purposes they serve. From there they can advise and bring assistance to help their foreign counterparts grow their own institutions in a manner that fits their environment and supports their political goals. This is not where we should draft pick up teams of 05s and 06s. If we decide to develop those skills to support 3000.05 then we start now by assigning the right people to assignments where they can get that experience and learn those skills.

We often articulate the components of our defense institutions in DOTMLPF terms. We like to cherry pick from the DOTMLPF tree for the ones that seem easiest and offer the least amount of risk. We like to do it in an ad-hoc fashion for the same reasons. Unfortunately this is the least effective, and I'd argue at a certain point the least efficient. This method of change may even be the one which holds the greater risk as the parts become incongruent and confusing as some evolve and some remain unchanged - but its what we do.

We could be discussing any aspect of DOTMLPF, but we also need to consider the broader USG, and even the US Codes and authorization that allow us to be flexible for long term efforts that change over time through interaction. 1206 and 1207 are examples of authorizations that need to be followed up on and considered in light of what we are trying to accomplish. Without some of the external DoD changes, we'll wind up with capabilities that are hard to employ because of shortfalls and self imposed constraints.

Best, Rob

Tom Odom
06-09-2008, 01:07 PM
Tom
Good points. I think what needs to be got at is that this and many issues like it are beyond ascribing a temporary value to in terms we are generally comfortable with. ...

We could be discussing any aspect of DOTMLPF, but we also need to consider the broader USG, and even the US Codes and authorization that allow us to be flexible for long term efforts that change over time through interaction. 1206 and 1207 are examples of authorizations that need to be followed up on and considered in light of what we are trying to accomplish. Without some of the external DoD changes, we'll wind up with capabilities that are hard to employ because of shortfalls and self imposed constraints.

Best, Rob

Agree with all and going back to what prompted this thread in the first place--fixation on movement to Polk as a source of problems--is classic angels on a pinhead analysis. The issue is much larger than do we stay at Riley or do we go to Polk. It is a fundamental question of strategy and the objective of that strategy and the means to achieve it. Right now and for the foreseeable future 2 brigade equivalents of trained and competent advisors are in my estimation much more important than 2 BCTs. That reality is so apparent and so distasteful to many who had rather have the 2 BCTs.

Best

Tom

Hacksaw
06-09-2008, 01:59 PM
I had the fortune (misfortune) to be a part of the initial planning for consolidating MiTT training at Riley (previously it was scattered and REALLY bad:mad:). A few thoughts and background on the common points/questions running through this thread:

1. Advisor vs Soldier Skills... Lots of factors, but two are most significant... Army G1 convinced G3 and FORSCOM that PERSTEMPO would only allow for a 60 day training window. I am not casting aspersions... people of this particular rank and skill set are in very short supply and demand is high, we can quibble over whether we ought to train to time or standard but that is part of the calculation. Second, there is a list a mile long of MNF-I, MNC-I, CFC-A, and FORSCOM pre-deployment training that is mandated. If you want a mix for dissatisfaction... mix 60 days + basic soldier skills + experienced soldiers = training dissatisfaction. In fact, what I've heard anecdotally is that 60 days is too much (of course this is based on concurrent training content).

2. Sorry Tom, but I don't think the decision to move the MiTT training to Polk was not as rigorously examined as you are under the impression. More of a knee jerk if you asked my impression. A lot of conjecture is mostly what I have to back that up, so it doesn't merit mention in this forum... but I will say this. The decision to move the training was made before the decision as to whether it was a "relatively" permanent requirement and who ought to be the Army proponent. The synergy of combining the training was pretty much debunked by the responsible TRADOC organization, and if TRADOC were to be named Army lead (makes sense) then I don't think it would have moved it to Polk. Better options such as Knox. No this was a FORSCOM initiative that was pushed very rigorously to make training space for BCTs that will be fielded in the next few years, and my darker angels say to try and force big Army to move the mission to TRADOC.

3. The lack of qualified instructors is an institutional failure. That mechanism was supposed to be in place, but it appears no one wants to tell a returning advisor... "sorry, I know you should go to ILE (or CCC or wherever) but the Army needs you to do this mission for 12-18 months." I understand the desire to give folks who have done a tough mission well, a break, but if you serve long enough we all have taken one for the good of the service.

So in the end... the move to Polk might have some political overtones and was most likely not that well considered or sequenced with other linked decisions, but it was not empire building by the folks at Polk.

MiTT/ETT Training is what it is because we have convinced ourselves that PERSTEMPO will only allow 60 days training; that we can't trust parent units to maintain individual soldier skills; and the personel system seems unwilling to deliver bad news

and....

Security Force Assistance has a new Joint Proponent SOCOM. Good news... DoD actually named a proponent :o... Bad News... Indicates a leaning towards pidgeon holing the capability in SOF and oh by the waywhat does a proponent do???? DOTMLPF requirements determination and capabilities development. Is SOCOM really suitted institutionally and culturally to do capability development for GPF????:mad: Argghh, me thinks not. Sorry Old Eagle, Rob, and Tom... I think the wind direction wrt SFA is blowing us away from port.

Live well and row

Tom Odom
06-09-2008, 02:19 PM
Argghh, me thinks not. Sorry Old Eagle, Rob, and Tom... I think the wind direction wrt SFA is blowing us away from port.

No need to be sorry. You are only confirming what I just said: that the real discussion should not be on where the training is but its objectives and all things that flow from those objectives.

I am aware of the desires for the additional BCTs but I also was aware of leadership efforts to leverage bringing the TT program here. It was not a pure FORSCOM decision. I would not call it a knee jerk as it was hotly debated.

But again that is beside the point. Until we make a decision to commit to it we will continue to have much disgruntlement down range and issues that flow from that friction. Overall I am fearful you are correct on the wind direction.

Tom

Rob Thornton
06-09-2008, 03:06 PM
I am aware of the desires for the additional BCTs but I also was aware of leadership efforts to leverage bringing the TT program here. It was not a pure FORSCOM decision. I would not call it a knee jerk as it was hotly debated.

I saw most of the DP briefs that came out of the work group on where it would rest and why. They were of course .ppt deep and without the value of context from participating. However, Tom makes a great observation above. Moving the mission outside of a purely FORSCOM locale to a shared TRADOC and FORSCOM venue has some real value

- it puts us in a better position to close the instituional loop
- it puts it a location where Advisro training can be integrated with units conducting their pre deployment MREs- perhaps even allowing som initial coordination that might better acheive unity of effort. It would also expose commanders and TTs to some of the frictions each other encounter before they head out the door. Everything from sustainment, to QRF.
- if done right (and I have every reason to beleive the JRTC folks will do just that) it will help get after expectations management.
- in terms of resources it places far more then we'll see at any purely FORSCOM post - no matter how good home station is I've never seen the avialabity of resources or quality of training you find at a CTC.
-it may have changed, but my experience at JRTC was more focused on people then my experience at NTC - so while the physical terrain may favor NTC, the human terrain I think favors JRTC
- In late 03 and early 04 I did NTC and JRTC almost back to back with 1/25th. JRTC provided a more rich experience in a number of relevant ways. NTC had its pluses as well, but looking back I favor the JRTC. While JRTC may have lots of scrub pine and forests, consider what the effects are on command. low visibility, poor comms, cover and concealment for ambushes etc. offer similiar challenges to those of built up areas in terms of fog and friction.
-we say it'll be hard to get quality folks to move down there, but let me ask what is one of the most sought after jobs for post company command? Its an OC at the CTCs. Where do most of your foot and motorized IN, as well as a growing number of other combat arms officers and SNCOs? JRTC. The question is not the location its relevancy. Make serving as an advisor instructor as valuable as an OC and they will go.

Best, Rob

Hacksaw
06-09-2008, 05:47 PM
Rob, I hesitate to respond only because I know I lack the interest and time to engage in this topic with any greater detail, but some of the points you make are echoes of those ppt slides and are somewhat debatable. So in the interest of the rigorous debate that this forum encourages...


I saw most of the DP briefs that came out of the work group on where it would rest and why. They were of course .ppt deep and without the value of context from participating. However, Tom makes a great observation above. Moving the mission outside of a purely FORSCOM locale to a shared TRADOC and FORSCOM venue has some real value

- it puts us in a better position to close the instituional loop
Not so much... don't see how the move to Polk in any way enhances institutional support and development of advisor capability. Mission still belongs to FORSCOM and TRADOC remains in supporting train-the-trainer role for new cadre (upon request)
- it puts it a location where Advisro training can be integrated with units conducting their pre deployment MREs- perhaps even allowing som initial coordination that might better acheive unity of effort. It would also expose commanders and TTs to some of the frictions each other encounter before they head out the door. Everything from sustainment, to QRF.
This has some temporal value, in that a team (a small proportion of the total) get to "play" in the box with a BCT. That said the MiTT will know virtually nothing about what a MiTT really does -- hence BCT might learn wrong lessons. Value for MiTTs marginal same can be said for BCTs. Not to mention what about when IZ and AFG spool down, over the long term these are two separate activities competing for the same training space. Does Polk have the most to spare in the long run???
- if done right (and I have every reason to beleive the JRTC folks will do just that) it will help get after expectations management.
Just not sure, who's expectations? BCTs, MiTT members, DA Staff, press?? Why do we assume that Polk will somehow attract a qualified cadre?
- in terms of resources it places far more then we'll see at any purely FORSCOM post - no matter how good home station is I've never seen the avialabity of resources or quality of training you find at a CTC.
OK, but... what is it that we think is missing from the MiTT training today? My impression is that the shortcomings are more in line with language, culture, negotiatio/influence, nuts and bolts of how to teach and influence as opposed to a good training environment
-it may have changed, but my experience at JRTC was more focused on people then my experience at NTC - so while the physical terrain may favor NTC, the human terrain I think favors JRTC
Here we agree, at least partially... the shortfalls in advisor training have little to do with climatology or terrain... and everything to do with mindset and development of the skills mentioned above. Heck we can acclimate a team in theater. Knox is looking better:D
- In late 03 and early 04 I did NTC and JRTC almost back to back with 1/25th. JRTC provided a more rich experience in a number of relevant ways. NTC had its pluses as well, but looking back I favor the JRTC. While JRTC may have lots of scrub pine and forests, consider what the effects are on command. low visibility, poor comms, cover and concealment for ambushes etc. offer similiar challenges to those of built up areas in terms of fog and friction.
Again the shortfall isn't experience in a CTC rotation. OK JRTC gives better MRE :p just not pertinent to the topic
-we say it'll be hard to get quality folks to move down there, but let me ask what is one of the most sought after jobs for post company command? Its an OC at the CTCs. Where do most of your foot and motorized IN, as well as a growing number of other combat arms officers and SNCOs? JRTC. The question is not the location its relevancy. Make serving as an advisor instructor as valuable as an OC and they will go.
Agreed, but here is a caveat... this issue was identified early in the process by senior personnel. The question was whether to give key developmental credit to MiTT participation. The worry was whether it would be more of a deterent to the best volunteering since it would limit chances to get S3 XO time. Hence decision made to give credit but not consider KD for assignment purposes. Mixed message... Answer might be Advisor OC gets big ups in board deliberations, but Soldiers won't believe until they see the trends in board results (4 year lag). Only viable means to remedy in the interim is for assignment officers to play the bad guy in the near-term


Best, Rob

OK let the idea assassination begin....

However, all those reasons you sited Rob were the ones used in the senior deliberations and I just don't think they hold water.:(

Live well and row

Rob Thornton
06-09-2008, 07:52 PM
Hey Hacksaw,

I did forget to add one other. My understanding was that FT Polk stepped up to the plate. While it could be argued that something new or a new twist on something special would have scratched the itch 'mo better' - other's involved may either have not wanted to force the issue, or would not have given it the attention it deserves. I'll attempt to stay with our format here:D


Not so much... don't see how the move to Polk in any way enhances institutional support and development of advisor capability. Mission still belongs to FORSCOM and TRADOC remains in supporting train-the-trainer role for new cadre (upon request)

My guess is that even though FORSCOM is in the lead in terms of resourcing advisors, the training will be taken under the wing of TRADOC. Fort Polk is not in the business of letting units fail, and as a command they can focus on training requirements where FORSCOM's focus is on meeting numbers. There is a different in philosophy in the 2 commands. I beleive that what is written on paper will be subsumed by the creative folks down there. There will undoubtedly be some hiccups, but I think Polk will resolve them quicker based on their history of doing so.

I think one of the great things about how JRTC is laid out in terms of closing the loop is the frequency and levels it touches by virtue of the cycles of rotation. Many have done advisory duty now and they are often resident inside these BCTs. Many never get asked detailed questions and so we never get the full value of their experience. If I go out and collect on SFA related stuff I have a good frame of ref. from whch to ask my questions, when other collection efforts go out they foucs on what is important to them. They may ask the questions I send with them, but they lack the background or desire to explore the responses to get at what really matters. If you give the mission to somebody with the resources so you marry up responsibility and capability we'll get more complete feeds back into DOTMLPF.


This has some temporal value, in that a team (a small proportion of the total) get to "play" in the box with a BCT. That said the MiTT will know virtually nothing about what a MiTT really does -- hence BCT might learn wrong lessons. Value for MiTTs marginal same can be said for BCTs. Not to mention what about when IZ and AFG spool down, over the long term these are two separate activities competing for the same training space. Does Polk have the most to spare in the long run???

I'll let Tom answer the 2nd Point, but you could make the same point in a different manner with regard to any FORSCOM post. The key is instituionalization wherever it goes. I think the value to the BCT and the TT depends on how the leadership understands its mission. It may also depend on how much the BCT itself is providing in terms of TTs out of hide. No easy answers, still comes down to leadership.


Just not sure, who's expectations? BCTs, MiTT members, DA Staff, press?? Why do we assume that Polk will somehow attract a qualified cadre?
Could they do worse then the numbers we've seen so far? That is not a slap at Riley - it gets after the braoder problem of how we show value to the mission and the individual. If the assignment as TT instructor is rated as high as CTC OC, and if the post invests in making it attractive to families (like Fort Leavenworth) then word will get out.


OK, but... what is it that we think is missing from the MiTT training today? My impression is that the shortcomings are more in line with language, culture, negotiatio/influence, nuts and bolts of how to teach and influence as opposed to a good training environment

It still comes down to resources for training. These resources are mostly people focused. In this case the justification to hire more qualified people, spend more money on education, do more practical applications, etc. while including that these personnel and facilities issues are dual use since its at the CTC. It would probably be unwise to assume that existing facilities and numbers of training personnel that make up the JRTC training infrastructure are adequate - I'd be willing to bet that JRTC has already done a detailed assessment that tells the Big A "here is what it will cost to do this right" - the question is will a combination of green, purple and inter-agency monies foot the bill for what right looks like, and how do we show sustained value to that customer base?


Here we agree, at least partially... the shortfalls in advisor training have little to do with climatology or terrain... and everything to do with mindset and development of the skills mentioned above. Heck we can acclimate a team in theater. Knox is looking better

While Knox might fit my own long(er) range plans:D I'd not step foot in the place for the next 5 - 7 years as the dust settles from the HRC move. That place will be a booming little Alexandria without a supporting road network:D - however it is close to Bardstown and good bourbon.


Again the shortfall isn't experience in a CTC rotation. OK JRTC gives better MRE just not pertinent to the topic

I differ. I think it is pertinent. The systems they've established to suppor the MRE can be applied to prepping advisors. Even BCTP is down range right now collecting on BTT experiences in the field to help an upcoming DIV with a CPX that focuses the DIV HQs on how better to support existing missions and conditions. Its hard for any FORSCOM post or unit to acheive that kind of scale or flexibility - they are not well resourced with the personnel to do so and meet their other requirements. VTCs can only get you so far.


Agreed, but here is a caveat... this issue was identified early in the process by senior personnel. The question was whether to give key developmental credit to MiTT participation. The worry was whether it would be more of a deterent to the best volunteering since it would limit chances to get S3 XO time. Hence decision made to give credit but not consider KD for assignment purposes. Mixed message... Answer might be Advisor OC gets big ups in board deliberations, but Soldiers won't believe until they see the trends in board results (4 year lag). Only viable means to remedy in the interim is for assignment officers to play the bad guy in the near-term
I think you have got the crux of it - to show real value our actions must reflect it.

Ultmately the perfect answer may just not be feasible, but I still beleive JRTC is a step in a better direction. SFA may be further from the port we thought it should go, but does not mean its not headed for the right one. Our understanding of what is both right and possible may make the destination different then we'd anticipated. What would be great is if we could figure out how to help Polk become better prepared to do what needs to be done not only for the Army, but for the broader Joint and Inter-Agency community who need a home for our advisory efforts.

Best, Rob

John Nagl
06-10-2008, 02:30 AM
A fascinating discussion of the Security Forces Assistance Mission, to which I'd like to contribute a few facts and opinions.

First, and most important, is the question of whether this is an enduring mission. The Secretary of Defense certainly thought it was at the AUSA Conference last October: "Arguably, the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries." He also doesn't (or at least didn't, back on October 10th), think that we have it quite right yet: "How the Army should be organized and prepared for this advisory role remains an open question, and will require innovative and forward thinking.”

Second is the nature and quality of the training for MTT teams here at Fort Riley. This is improving, due in no small part to the fact that the number of former advisors assigned to do the training continues to increase; my battalion of 96 now has 13 former advisors assigned, many in the critically important field grade/company commander/first sergeant roles. Not where we need to be, yet, but moving in the right direction. Similarly, the nascent doctrine for GPF engaging in SFA, now being written by the Air Land Sea folks, is also an important institutional adaptation to the wars we're fighting.

Some good news. However, advisors continue to wonder how the mission they're executing--the enabler of our exit strategy in two wars--will be rewarded by the Army. There are moves in the direction of an advisor Additional Skill Identifer, which would obviously be helpful in tracking this skill set for the Long War, and toward granting KD credit for those who successfully lead TT teams--but there are more incentives that could be offered to increase the desire of our best and brightest to volunteer for this mission, in my eyes at least the most important we're doing as an Army.

As for where we conduct SFA training, that is perhaps less important than any of the other elements of DOTMLPF. Most important is that the Army embrace the necessity to view the combat advisory mission holistically, from Doctrine through Facilities, and within the context of a broader DoD and USG advisory perspective. "Innovative and forward thinking" on this critical mission remains necessary--as does execution of decisions on DOTMLPF.

Tom Odom
06-10-2008, 11:48 AM
As for where we conduct SFA training, that is perhaps less important than any of the other elements of DOTMLPF. Most important is that the Army embrace the necessity to view the combat advisory mission holistically, from Doctrine through Facilities, and within the context of a broader DoD and USG advisory perspective. "Innovative and forward thinking" on this critical mission remains necessary--as does execution of decisions on DOTMLPF.

Thanks, John! Agree 110%.

I am aware of what the SecDef said--we need to keep pushing to make that happen. Then again, this SecDef is not into idle pronouncements :eek:


Some good news. However, advisors continue to wonder how the mission they're executing--the enabler of our exit strategy in two wars--will be rewarded by the Army. There are moves in the direction of an advisor Additional Skill Identifer, which would obviously be helpful in tracking this skill set for the Long War, and toward granting KD credit for those who successfully lead TT teams--but there are more incentives that could be offered to increase the desire of our best and brightest to volunteer for this mission, in my eyes at least the most important we're doing as an Army.

That is indeed good news and yes I too believe more incentives are necessary.

Keep posting!

Tom

Old Eagle
06-10-2008, 12:23 PM
John,

You're absolutely right about the DOTLM-PF solution requirements. I think that folks have focused on the T piece because that's where the tactical gains can be made. The other pieces require longer term solutions. I get the feeling that in Big Army, the thought was to have you & Jeff make this "problem" go away.

Now, the real challenge will be to make as many advances as possible in the other areas -- SFA doctrine, organization?, leader development, and as you stress, personnel.

Ken White
06-10-2008, 02:41 PM
for openers.

marct
06-10-2008, 03:54 PM
Hi John,


First, and most important, is the question of whether this is an enduring mission. The Secretary of Defense certainly thought it was at the AUSA Conference last October: "Arguably, the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries." He also doesn't (or at least didn't, back on October 10th), think that we have it quite right yet: "How the Army should be organized and prepared for this advisory role remains an open question, and will require innovative and forward thinking.”

I have to agree that this is, in many ways, the crucial question from which everything else flows. One of the key things that has bothered me about the entire DOTLM-PF effort is that it has been applied, in many cases, in a "one size fits all" model (OSFA), although that has been changing.

Part of the reason why I think this is the crucial question does not have to do with training per se but, rather, with motivations and underlying assumptions of the OSFA model. I think Dave Kilcullen captured this nicely in his Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/08/anatomy-of-a-tribal-revolt/) blog essay when he said


The other implication is that, to be perfectly honest, the pattern we are seeing runs somewhat counter to what we expected in the “surge”, and therefore lies well outside the “benchmarks”. The original concept was that we (the Coalition and the Iraqi government) would create security, which would in turn create space for a “grand bargain” at the national level. Instead, we are seeing the exact opposite: a series of local political deals has displaced extremists, resulting in a major improvement in security at the local level, and the national government is jumping on board with the program. Instead of coalition-led top-down reconciliation, this is Iraqi-led, bottom-up, based on civil society rather than national politics. And oddly enough, it seems to be working so far.

To my mind, this brings up a couple of key questions relating to the entire advising effort:

What, exactly, are "they" being advised about, and
Who should be advising whom?These, IMO, get to some really core questions about curriculum, expectations, etc. For example, it strikes me that one of the core skills an advisor needs is the ability to critically determine the organizational culture of a HN force. Rob has talked about this in a number of threads (hat tip especially to the stuff about NCOs and charismatic leadership of officers ;)).

The "Who should be advising whom" question is, in some ways, even more important, especially if the rhetoric surrounding the relationship talks about "partners", etc. At the simple level, would you go to a friends house and criticize his interior decorating, cooking arrangements, food, how his kds act, etc.? I doubt it (I hope not, 'cause if you would, I'm not inviting YU over for dinner :eek:!). Why should the same thing be done in a military setting? This simplest way to avoid this is to have your advisors trained, in part, by their hosts on how to act, what to expect, etc., as part of their training program.

Old Eagle
06-10-2008, 04:24 PM
1. The mission is enduring for a whole host of reasons that we can discuss later.

2. You assume that the only method of providing advice and other assistance is quasi adversarial. I would LOVE to have Rachel Ray over to show me how to enhance my culinary skills, especially if she brought an industrial strength kitchen to work in.:)

marct
06-10-2008, 05:03 PM
Hi Old Eagle,


1. The mission is enduring for a whole host of reasons that we can discuss later.

I agree, and it would make a good thread.


2. You assume that the only method of providing advice and other assistance is quasi adversarial. I would LOVE to have Rachel Ray over to show me how to enhance my culinary skills, especially if she brought an industrial strength kitchen to work in.:)

Hmm, I wouldn't say that my assumption was that it is "quasi-adversarial". I would characterize my assumption more along the lines of it being assumed that the US has the "answers" - ask your example shows ;). That being said, however, I think that is a problematic assumption - "ethnocentric" to use the verbiage of others.

Part of it goes back to the reasons behind the mission. What is the goal and how is this going to be understood by various partners, both traditional (e.g. the UK, Oz, Canada, etc.) and non-traditional (e.g. Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.). I would suggest that mission clarity is crucial and, if the goal is to develop global partners to deter terrorist activity globally, then the implications of that need to be taken seriously, to whit, that US forces have as much top learn as HN forces, although ot necessarily in the same areas. If the goal, on the other hand, is to protect US interest globally and, especially, US corporate interests (e.g. cheap oil, favourable access to raw materials, etc.), then you are going to have a real problem (BTW, this is at the root of the accusations concerning the US building an "Empire").

Ken White
06-10-2008, 05:37 PM
...Hmm, I wouldn't say that my assumption was that it is "quasi-adversarial". I would characterize my assumption more along the lines of it being assumed that the US has the "answers" - ask your example shows ;). That being said, however, I think that is a problematic assumption - "ethnocentric" to use the verbiage of others.Having been an Advisor in one ME and one Asian nation; I regrettably have to agree with that. We have a bad tendency to want others to do it our way. Egos...

We really, really need to work on that aspect.
Part of it goes back to the reasons behind the mission. What is the goal and how is this going to be understood by various partners, both traditional (e.g. the UK, Oz, Canada, etc.) and non-traditional (e.g. Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.). I would suggest that mission clarity is crucial and, if the goal is to develop global partners to deter terrorist activity globally, then the implications of that need to be taken seriously, to whit, that US forces have as much top learn as HN forces, although ot necessarily in the same areas. If the goal, on the other hand, is to protect US interest globally and, especially, US corporate interests (e.g. cheap oil, favourable access to raw materials, etc.), then you are going to have a real problem (BTW, this is at the root of the accusations concerning the US building an "Empire").Addressing the last first; true. We may well be acting primarily in our own interest but we have generally done a very poor job of elocuting the benefits to the broader world (particularly abysmally w/r to Iraq).

On the to me more important point, anecdotal evidence follows:

Two Viet Namese Company Commanders. Both had been to the USAIS Infantry Advance course. One liked Americans, the other did not and would reject much 'advice' on principle. Of the two, the latter was the better Commander and we learned more, tactically, from him than he did from us. The former tried to do what we 'advised' and couldn't adapt it to his METT-TC problems so he continually erred. "Be reasonable, do it my way" is not a good approach to advising. It does not have to be our way to work.

ME Bde Commander schedule an attack in an exercise. Due to the ensuing three hour argument over who was going to lead the attack instigated by the Bde senior US advisor; they blew LD time and the attack because at US insistence, the wrong route and unit were chosen. That debacle ruined US cred for a bunch of people.

Lastly, watching 8th ROK Div crossing a floating bridge across the Imjin to relieve 1st ROK in the DMZ, our ROK LnO, A Major who'd served in Viet Nam with the Capital Division asked me what I thought of the ROK Army. Said I thought they were very good (and I did). He said "Well, everything we do, you teach us to do. Why don't you do what you teach us?"

I had no answer for that...

Short version of all that -- Marc's correct and we have GOT to learn to tune our egos, our demands and our expectations to successfully advise others.

Hacksaw
06-10-2008, 06:53 PM
I have avoided rejoining this thread because at some point it seems we evolve/devolve into an arcane discussion of semantics or we talk past each other.

I did, however, want to reframe the question of what we should be training/teaching our advisors, and the implications of some of the choices that have been made.

I will briefly recap some of considerations/constraints associated with the current advisor training mission (John Nagl correct me where I err).

1. MiTT TNG MSN @ Riley has approx 2 months to assemble, form, equip, and train each advisor team. This is not much time regardless the focus of the POI. (Note: Why only 60 days is explained earlier in the thread, but just accept it as a constraint for this discussion.)

2. Multiple sources (Theater and FORSCOM) provide authoritative guidance regarding directed/mandatory pre-deployment training requirements. Many tasks are basic Soldier skills. This is not inherently a bad thing since many MiTT members arrive at a low training level (the imbalance in training levels of incoming Soldiers creates risk and is being mitigated by including these tasks in each individuals pre-deployment training). Boring and redundant for some, critical for others

3. This leaves very little time to conduct "higher order" advisor training such as coordinating for joint fires and other US/Coalition capabilities, as well as, improving language, culture, and negotiation/influence skills. Couple this with the fact that not everyone is predisposed (personality and biases) to performing the advisor mission. At one point there was supposed to be an exercise early in the program to aid in identifying the ill-suited. I'm really curious as to the how many (on average) are identified and removed from the mission based on unwillingness/inability to adapt to advisor role.

4. John notes in an earlier post that his unit manning up to 13 MiTT alums out of 96 (an improvement but a far smaller % than was envisioned when FT Riley backbriefed its concept to FORSCOM in 2006).

So what is the crux of this issue....

Is it whether the mission is enduring?? The is an important question for the future, but in the short run I think we can surmise that actions to date indicate that MiTT is considered an economy of force mission (actions/resources speak louder than words).
Sidebar: I certainly concur that the IW/COIN operational theme is the most likely ground force environment we can expect for the next 20 years and that SFA is a proactive tool in that environment, but I remain skeptical that we are heading in that direction when the most compelling evidence is based on an outgoing SecDef's public comments as opposed to program decisions. Moving MiTT training to FT Polk is not an indication of an enduring mission, its just a recognition that FT Riley was going to get crowded and a new location was needed to support other programatic decisions.

Moving the mission to FT Polk to "leverage" "gain synergy" yada yada yada isn't significant either. If the training variable don't change, the outcomes are unlikely to improve.

I propose the real issue involves the training variable/equation...

60 training days +
extensive mandated pre-deployment training tasks +
shortage of experienced/qualified cadre =
advisor force that is less than it could be if resource allocation reflected rhetoric regarding priorities.

Then again... All the news I read reflects a significant improvement in IA and IP performance and proclamations of tne "near" strategic defeat of AQ in Iraq. Maybe what we are doing right now is perfectly adequate... if not perfect.

By the way the answer is.... four (Rodney Dangerfield in Back to School)

Live well and row

Sargent
06-10-2008, 08:04 PM
Can anyone tell me to what extent the efforts of the two services in MTT training and execution are being coordinated, if at all? I'd be very curious to see a line by line comparison of how the Army and the Marine Corps are pursuing this mission, both in training and execution.

Would guidance from the Army leadership similar to that of the CMC from November of last year help the TT effort? "THE WAR ON TERRORISM HAS SEEN THE GROWTH OF BILLETS TRADITIONALLY NOT FILLED BY MARINE OFFICERS (STAFF NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS FOR ENLISTED BOARDS). OFFICERS (SNCOS) ASSIGNED TO NATION BUILDING AND CRISIS OPERATIONS BILLETS ARE CRITICAL TO THE SUCCESS OF OUR COUNTRY'S POLICIES. THE BOARD SHOULD BE ESPECIALLY DILIGENT IN WEIGHING THE QUALIFICATIONS OF OFFICERS (SNCOS) SERVING IN TRANSITION TEAMS (TT).... SERVICE IN THESE CRITICAL BILLETS SHOULD WEIGH EQUAL TO TRADITIONAL MARINE CORPS OFFICER (SNCO) BILLETS IN THE OPERATIONAL FORCES SUPPORTING THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM DURING BOARD DELIBERATIONS."

http://www.marines.mil/news/messages/Pages/2007/MESSAGES149.aspx

As to the experience piece, when given a choice of deployments my husband chose a second MTT leadership tour to a staff job on a FOB. When they found out, about half of the guys who were with him last year volunteered to go back with him (all of those who were in Camp Pendleton and available to deploy), creating a core of experience that makes up half of the team. He was also able to select the personnel to make up the rest of the team. As for their training, the ATG (Advisory Training Group) gave him a tremendous amount of leeway to set up the team's preparation for the deployment and he ended up adding a few pieces that the set training did not include. He also was able to travel to their AOR ahead of time to check out the lay of the land (something he recommends highly) -- from this he found out that they would be working in a very different setting from the previous deployment, dealing with a piece of geography much larger than the several square mile piece of property they worked in Fallujah last year. Because of that, he modified the 29 Palms training piece, to include training that took advantage of that base's vast terrain to mimic what they'd be dealing with on this deployment. In the end, they were the first team that prevented the insurgent attack on the school opening that is one of the capstones in the pre-deployment training. I believe the ATG is watching this deployment to see what difference experience makes in the mission.

I brought up this thread to my husband -- below is his take on the issues:

"...but in the end the two main issues are improving MTT/ETT training overall, and improving the 'advisor corps' of at least the assignment and selection of personnel to be on the teams.

"As for the training I think they hit on a key issue and that is experienced instructors. The services need to put particular effort into getting former advisors to be instructors. The advisor experience is unique, and there is almost no way to write it all down, or put it into a training plan. Not to mention instructor credibility. This last round of training (in 29 Palms) about half the instructors were former advisors. They had the credibility, knowledge and experience to make them effective instructors. The other half of the trainers always started out classes saying "well I haven't been an advisor, but I can still teach you x". Perhaps true, but that immediately made people pay less attention. Just the stories and nuances of the previous advisors provided a good deal of training, and I think that is key.

"As for personnel assignment I am a big fan of making the advisor mission a standard length (3year) tour. Make advising their only mission, not the mission they have to perform while ripped away from some other billet. Three years gives you two training/deployment cycles (train 6 months, deploy 12). Plus you can use the people who are in their second 6 month training period to instruct the brand new guys. I agree that if the advisor mission is so key to success and is a long term mission then we need to treat it as such. Yes it may change the standard career paths, but who really has a standard career path now-a-days anyway. If the mission is important anyway then you need to change the institutional attitude that it is a sidetrack, and that is hard to do when most teams are put together ad hoc, and on a TAD basis. The Marine Corps is trying to eventually move to the standard advisor tour. They are standing up MCTAG (Marine Corps Tactical Advisor Group) or whatever they are calling it now, as a command and will send people there just like any other unit. Actually I think they will start running all advisor work through there next year. Given the current conflict, and the strong possibility that future conflicts may be somewhat similar, it only makes sense to institutionalize what has been called a critical factor in this fight."

He also mentioned that he'd definitely want to spend what's left of his time at Pendleton after he gets back as an instructor for the ATG.

Ken White
06-10-2008, 08:56 PM
...2. Multiple sources (Theater and FORSCOM) provide authoritative guidance regarding directed/mandatory pre-deployment training requirements. ...

... (an improvement but a far smaller % than was envisioned when FT Riley backbriefed its concept to FORSCOM in 2006).

Why is FORSCOM involved?

This from one with long (over 10 years) and intimate (too intimate) experience with that Hq...
By the way the answer is.... four (Rodney Dangerfield in Back to School)Heh. I did know that... :D

Old Eagle
06-11-2008, 01:25 PM
Ken --

FORSCOM, as the Army's force generation HQ, has the mission to provide trained and ready forces to the warfighting commands, so they write the standards.

Jill --

The Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance coordinates among all the various advisor training activities. In fact, they are developing an interactive webtool on their website that allows trainers at all sites to access curricula and classes from other training centers. Doesn't solve all the problems, but it's a major step in the right direction.

Ken White
06-11-2008, 05:00 PM
Ken --
FORSCOM, as the Army's force generation HQ, has the mission to provide trained and ready forces to the warfighting commands, so they write the standards..I'm aware of their mission and having participated directly for a lot of long hours in that force generation effort during Desert Shield and Storm know that then the gaining GCC provided the tasks and standards; FORSCOM merely executed. I know things change but one expects the changes to be progress, not regression.

I understand FORSCOM involvement on location selection (though I question whether today with ACSIM there should be such a thing as a 'FORSCOM' or 'TRADOC' post...) and operational entity (as Riley/1 ID vs. JRTC) but other than as executor for templating TRADOC doctrine over CentCom requirements at unit level seems to me that their imposing standards is merely job justification???

An added question. Even accepting FORSCOM standard setting for units, am I to understand that the Advisory Teams are considered FORSCOM elements until they chop over to CentCom? The Teams were the focus of my question, while I think the setting of standards is a bit much, I can understand some FORSCOM involvement with units in the generation and deployment process. I'm unsure what their relationship with the Teams happens to be.

Sorry to be a pain, just trying to get a feel for what's happening.

Ski
06-11-2008, 05:46 PM
Since Riley is a FORSCOM post and 1/1 is a FORSCOM unit, FORSCOM gets to write the task list.

The tast list was just revised two weeks ago at a conference...it is going to be MUCH shorter from what I have heard. There was a roughly 65% growth in training tasks from OIF II to OIF whatever it is today (8-10?) and a lot of people were getting pissed off - the list kept growing and it almost never shortened. A lot of tasks were part of normal METL training anyway, so those were eliminated.

Ken White
06-11-2008, 07:12 PM
Since Riley is a FORSCOM post and 1/1 is a FORSCOM unit, FORSCOM gets to write the task list.That tells me what is happening as did Hacksaw (so I knew that); my question was why is it happening. The fact that the 1st ID, a nominal FORSCOM organization is doing the training is not remotely germane to the development of the task list for elements bound for a theater, those are a GCC call and FORSCOM has no business complicating the issue by adding their thoughts (and CYA concerns). Doctrinally, FORSCOM just has no business sticking their nose into it (nor much reason for existing IMO and based on long experience with them -- but that's another thread)
The tast list was just revised two weeks ago at a conference...it is going to be MUCH shorter from what I have heard. There was a roughly 65% growth in training tasks from OIF II to OIF whatever it is today (8-10?) and a lot of people were getting pissed off - the list kept growing and it almost never shortened. A lot of tasks were part of normal METL training anyway, so those were eliminated.Bureaucracy in action. My sympathy to all involved -- and that's not a snark, it's a serious dose of real sympathy...

Edited to add: Since 1/1 is doing the training, they have every right to tamper with the task list but FORSCOM should have auth dir coord w/CentCom for that adjustment. Oh, wait...

Ski
06-11-2008, 09:03 PM
Ken

FORSCOM became the force provider for ALL Army units a few years ago, and that's why they are so involved in the process. Doesn't matter what kind of unit - outside of the SOF community.

That task list is not just FORSOM, it also eminates from CENTCOM, ARCENT/3rdArmy, HQDA and TRADOC. All of that kluged together has made for an exceptionally painful DMETL.

The best quote of the conference was from an 06 from HQDA :"Are we really this ####ing stupid?" Uh, yes, we are.

Ken White
06-11-2008, 10:05 PM
Thanks for the expansion. Er, that is thank you :cool:. The apparent facts of the expansion don't fill me with glee...:mad:
Ken

FORSCOM became the force provider for ALL Army units a few years ago, and that's why they are so involved in the process. Doesn't matter what kind of unit - outside of the SOF community.They've always been the big Daddy for everyone that wasn't totally stovepiped -- that's not new. What apparently is new is that a 4-button Hq is getting down in the weeds; even under the weeds for either justification, covering or meddling purposes Whatever happened to delegating authority? Trusting subordinates? Deconfliction of tangled responsibilities?

All of Which leads to your very apt quote:
The best quote of the conference was from an 06 from HQDA :"Are we really this ####ing stupid?" Uh, yes, we are.Sigh, again. This is all a plot to make my gray hair go away so I look like Tom and Steve...:eek:

wm
06-12-2008, 12:38 AM
Thanks for the expansion. Er, that is thank you :cool:. The apparent facts of the expansion don't fill me with glee...:mad:They've always been the big Daddy for everyone that wasn't totally stovepiped -- that's not new. What apparently is new is that a 4-button Hq is getting down in the weeds; even under the weeds for either justification, covering or meddling purposes Whatever happened to delegating authority? Trusting subordinates? Deconfliction of tangled responsibilities?

All of Which leads to your very apt quote:Sigh, again. This is all a plot to make my gray hair go away so I look like Tom and Steve...:eek:

My ages past experience with Farcecom was always that their 4 button needed to meddle in what were more properly the affairs of division and bde commanders. But that was back in the days when Fort McPherson held sway over the CONUS portions of REFORGER and chopped on every OPLAN/CONPLAN TPFDDL.

Ken White
06-12-2008, 01:15 AM
Reforger TPFDs were always a political monster for a lot of reasons. However, it wasn't the 4-buttons (well, not most of them anyway; Palastra was a busy guy...) that were the meddlers -- it was the huge number of civilians on the staff, a number of whom saw Job Security as their primary mission. Obviously that's gotten worse. So much for cutting Hq size...

Ski
06-12-2008, 11:38 AM
The biggest problem with FORSCOM is that they continually look to overextend their authority - my MACOM has gotten into serious knock down drag out JAG infested fights over some issues. Add in what Ken has said - they have a Corps worth of retired 05's who are more concerned about doing business the way it's all been instead of letting the young guys run the show. It's awfully painful doing business with them because all these retired 05's think they have more collective knowledge on war than Alexander the Great, Napolean and Genghis Khan. The GS 14-15 positions down there should be nuked from orbit, just to be sure.

FORSCOM also delegates to 1st Army a lot...and that is the textbook example of a command that has become a wasteland of personnel...some of the people there...I have to stop.

Cavguy
06-13-2008, 06:45 PM
Back on topic - Kip has posted his fourth and most critical essay of our advisor efforts (http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com/2008/06/flunking-advisor-training-mission.html):


This is the last of a four-part series on the Army's advisor training efforts.

Are you deaf? Limp? Ancient (mostly our National Guard brethren)?

After climbing a flight of stairs, do you most resemble a hyperventilating pumpkin?

Can't fire your weapon? Can't learn a language? Think that Blue Force Tracker is a Ticketmaster promotion for the Blue Man Group?

Fired from your last company command for drunk driving?

Believe that preaching Christ to your Muslim counterparts is the surest way to salvation?

Great, because the US Army has a job for you that you literally can't fail--training at the Fort Riley Training Mission to be an advisor.

You can fail Airborne school. You can fail Ranger school. You can fail Sapper school. But the Army's number one mission--our efforts to develop security forces capable of providing security and stability to the populations of Iraq and Afghanistan--no matter what you do, no matter how terrible you are going to be as an advisor, you simply can't fail the training.

I think the veiled insults (and I don't think he is characterizing all advisors this way - only that we aren't rigorous in our selection process) detract from some valid points in the whole series:

We have stated that the advisor effort is a priority. Our actions as an Army have not matched our words.

- The training mission is not manned by sufficent numbers of qualified personnel. LTC Nagl stated earlier that 13 of 96 trainers in his BN have previous advisor experience. That's about 15%. We can't do better than that after thousands have completed MiTT duty?
- There has been little if any vetting of who is assigned as an advisor. Having a pulse and are deployable are about the only two standards. We send USAF and USN personnel to advise Iraqi infantry.
- There has been no credible effort (other than board instructions) to reward advisorary duty. While it won't HURT you to be an advisor, there is no incentive to be one. Not making the assignment KD for officers reinforces the perception of advisor duty as something that isn't for the up and coming.
- The assignment of SFA back into the SOCOM arena (vice JFCOM) and the rejection of TMAAG convey that the Army does not see advisory capacity as a core function, but an ancillary function to be performed by BCT's and generating force augmentees sent to advisor training at Polk when needed.

I think Kip is somewhat off-base in his worries about Polk - families will move where they are assigned. JRTC has no shortage of qualified, high-speed OC's, despite its location. I also believe it will be relatively simple to adapt JRTC to advisor training. I do agree there will be a flash to bang delay for facility usage - but remember - 2ACR was there until a few years ago - no unit has replaced them yet (as I understand). So there is excess capacity.

Like many things, the rhetoric regarding advisor efforts says one things, our actions have conveyed the exact opposite regarding the mission. Kip does have a point - if this is our main effort, it certainly isn't weighted as such, so let's stop pretending it is.

Tom Odom
06-13-2008, 07:00 PM
Like many things, the rhetoric regarding advisor efforts says one things, our actions have conveyed the exact opposite regarding the mission. Kip does have a point - if this is our main effort, it certainly isn't weighted as such, so let's stop pretending it is.

No disagreement there whatsoever. Goes back to question 1: the SecDef says it is a priority but the services are not making it so.

Dr. Kalev "Gunner" Sepp quite rightly point out that a mark of success in his COIN Best Practices article was putting quality folks in the program. I think we do for the most part but we then add the fillers. The fillers are like the proverbial bad apples. They taint the effort.

Again I agree, Hacksaw essentially said the same thing as did John Nagl. My last NCO Tony Hoh tells me the same thing.

This all goes back to the basic questions of what war we care about and what is next. I will say that whatever happens to the Advisory Effort so will happen to the effort to keep COIN capabilities in the kitbag for later use.

See:


The Challenge of Adaptation: The US Army in the Aftermath of Conflict, 1953-2000. (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=49708#post49708)

"Within the institutional Army, there were clear trends away from “subtheater” operations in the 1970s. Army Special Forces were reduced from 13,000 men in 1971 to 3,000 men in 1974. Counterinsurgency was also waning as part of the Army’s curriculum in the 1970s. At CGSC there were still forty hours of instruction on counterinsurgency as late as 1977, but this fell to eight hours two years later. The War College had dropped internal defense and development to two weeks instruction by 1972, and further reductions scaled even this limited instruction back to a mere two days by 1975. All this helps explain why little seems to have come of Laird’s suggestion for reorganizing part of the force for “sub-theater” operations."

Rob Thornton
06-13-2008, 09:10 PM
Hi Neil,


- The assignment of SFA back into the SOCOM arena (vice JFCOM) and the rejection of TMAAG convey that the Army does not see advisory capacity as a core function, but an ancillary function to be performed by BCT's and generating force augmentees sent to advisor training at Polk when needed.

I don’t think the requirement for a TMAAG like function has gone away -the experiments and exercises still show the need based on the limitations of approaches like "train and equip" to meet our FP objectives.

Our increasingly better (yet admittedly sometimes painful and geologically slow) understanding of SFA recognizes that to assist a partner in achieving sustainable security, both reform and development may be required across the depth and breadth of the security sector. This includes those partner systems which it directly or indirectly interacts with such as its economy or political systems.

The purposes to which SFA may be applied go beyond building the internal defense of a legitimate authority for the purpose of internal stability; they may apply to building exportable capacity in support of some regional objective. Its not just about states either, but organizations invested with authorities. It not just about DoD, but anyone assisting security forces in support of our FP.

This gets to the issue of what the BCT (or like structure) can realistically achieve. Even if we invest a broader range of capabilities and capacities within a BCT structure there will still be limitations on what it can achieve. Every organization has limits and once it exceeds those, its functions are less effective.

If during MA we get a BCT pregnant with the required amount and combination of BTTs, NPTTs, MiTTs, PTTs and an e PRT along with the supporting organizational infrastructure it will probably do pretty well at achieving tactical and operational objectives. This to some degree would be codifying what is working best right now in many cases. I think it would assist in synchronizing resources, rotations and train ups so that everybody has more of a shared vision and gets to better support and focus during the mission. You stand to get Unity of Command and better Unity of Effort. There are still warts on it, but I think it is “less” ad-hoc then what we started off doing, and provides the Army more flexibility in meeting the various demands by the GCCs. It is still a combination of individual augmentees and BCTs, but it is earlier on and builds a relationship between the TTs and BCT in CONUS as opposed to on the ground throughout the deployment.

There is also the issue of how the Army assigns value – if the BCT is the Army’s defining organization and it assigns and supports a BCT for the express purpose of assisting security forces, then has it then placed value on that mission? Another way to approach it might be to say that BCTs are no longer going to be the premier organization, something new is and its functions will be X, Y and Z. What would that mean and what are the potential risks? Still another way would be to institute a parallel organization(s) of sufficient scale to meet the growing demand requirements and man it with people who have the correct attributes, traits and skills to be advisors – but many of whom are also the people we most value as leaders for companies, BNs, BCTs and DIVs, or other positions we’ve identified as being key to our own sustainability. It is also worth considering that not all of our SFA activities may be in the area of advising on counter-insurgency, we need full spectrum advisors for a number of reasons – ex. where will an advisor advising a FSF on employment of his artillery BN learn his technical specialties? Are there other threats out there that our partners believe they will have to confront outside of domestic security issues? Anyway, it is worth thinking about.

What ever we do with regard to tactical level advising, it does not necessarily absolve us from the need of something like a TMAAG function which could coordinate and synchronize activities of “SFA focused” BCTs. Such an organization could also be used as the foundation to address requirements such as ministerial level advising. In that regard I think a TMAAG like organization could look allot like a 2 star CJIATF. This may not need to be a permanent organization, but it could be. By its nature such a CJIATF would probably a significant number of senior guys because experience and credibility usually happen over time. An O4 who tries to advise a cabinet minister is probably out of his depth – he just has not had the experiences of say a GO or senior GS or FS type. To do this more right, such an organization would need to first understand the requirements of the environment and then put together the right combination of talent and regional expertise. It might be a combination of USG core personnel and others – be they MNPs, MNCs, IOs, NGOs, contractors etc. We have stood up a broad range of JTFs based on the mission, recognizing the need for this type of SFA CJIAJTF would in itself be an institutionalizing measure.

Much like the discussion surrounding facilities, this one is centered around organizations. Perfect may not be an option, better might be though. Perfect often means only doing one thing really well – there is balance to be had in there somewhere between doing only one thing really well, and doing too many things not good enough.

With regards to the Joint proponent – I know we’ve gone down that road on other threads, but there would be issues with JFCOM as the proponent as well. That is not a lick against them, they do some great things, but when the decision left the DAWG and went to the tank I’ll bet there was probably an opportunity to contest it and some reasons not to. At this point it may be more useful to help it work better within the left and right limits that have been laid out – and figure out if there are ways to expand those limits some that are suitable, feasible and acceptable given the other things we have to do.

We still have not crossed the ground on service proponents, and what the requirements for the Navy and USAF might be outside of Iraq and Afghanistan. Nor have we really discussed the funding streams that allow us to organize, train, equip, rebuild and advise - that is a big deal because while 1206 and 1207 have provided allot of flexibility in OIF and OEF, they are not code but renewable paragraphs in the Defense Authroization Act designed to support OIF and OEF. In other words you could have a really cool tool set to go out and do SFA, but without the authorities to do those activities you might never get them out of the box - accept in an adhoc fashion.

Best, Rob

Stevely
06-14-2008, 04:51 AM
Back on topic - Kip has posted his I do agree there will be a flash to bang delay for facility usage - but remember - 2ACR was there until a few years ago - no unit has replaced them yet (as I understand). So there is excess capacity.


Didn't a brigade of 10th MTN move down there?

Tom Odom
06-14-2008, 01:34 PM
Didn't a brigade of 10th MTN move down there?


Yeah about 5 years ago and went to OEF in piecemeal and is now deployed to OIF

1st MEB is here as well and they just started deploying.

There was a full division --a heavy one--for close to 20 years. Capacity is a red herring issue, especially when you are talking MiTT training.

Tom

Marauder Doc
01-07-2009, 07:47 AM
I gotta ask, just to throw it out there, Advisory Branch? Is there any other way to cement a capability in the long term, other than to develop an officer corps that will advocate on its behalf?

William F. Owen
01-07-2009, 12:51 PM
I gotta ask, just to throw it out there, Advisory Branch? Is there any other way to cement a capability in the long term, other than to develop an officer corps that will advocate on its behalf?

I can't speak as to how the US Forces as a whole view this, but from a UK informed perspective, why do you need it?

The capability is theatre and operation specific. The UK forms British Army Advisory and Training Teams (BAATTs) as and when required. Works well with a long track record of historic success. Not perfect, but certainly fit for purpose. Every Army Officer and NCO is a de-facto instructor. Their job is to train their units.

Now for those that go "oh but what about culture," what about it? Many cultures have things in their make-up that bar them from "best practice." These are generally well known, pretty well understood and not a mystery to get past.

Moreover, to my mind you have an Advisory Corps. It's called Special Forces, and they should be the repository of things that go beyond the conventional understanding of the military instrument. That's why they are Special.

120mm
01-07-2009, 11:19 PM
I gotta ask, just to throw it out there, Advisory Branch? Is there any other way to cement a capability in the long term, other than to develop an officer corps that will advocate on its behalf?

CA and MI have shown why this is a bad idea, I think.

Advisor branch will become cliquish and exclusive and some of the most talented officers will be excluded from the mission, because they don't belong to the "club".

The best CA and MI guys I've ever met didn't wear the brass on their collars, and can't really hold the billet officially because they aren't "branch" qualified.

reed11b
01-07-2009, 11:30 PM
How about eliminating branches. I would in a heart beat. They serve little useful purpose and divert useful combined arms discussion.
Reed

patmc
01-08-2009, 01:23 AM
Moreover, to my mind you have an Advisory Corps. It's called Special Forces, and they should be the repository of things that go beyond the conventional understanding of the military instrument. That's why they are Special.

This is true on paper, but in practice, MiTTs are still providing a bulk of the advising. My class will be receiving assignments in the next couple weeks, and results from last 2 classes indicate that, for MI at least, most of the Military Age Males will be advisors. The majority are not volunteering for this assignment, but its the number one need.

Agree or disagree with LTC Nagl, but the Army is not formalizing MiTTs, and still running the advisor mission ad hoc. The new training site at Polk is an attempt to make the mission seem more permanent, even though CSA has stated he believed MiTTs should be a BCT mission. MAJs receive KD credit, but are told they still need to be an S3 or XO. CPTs receive KD credit, but are told, you still need to command, if you can get it (bc since you are KD, go be an OC).

There are not enough SF teams to meet all the places they are needed. Adding the extra BNs will still not meet the need while we are in OIF and OEF. The peace dividend may give us a break, but if someone knows when that will be, please let me know. (January 20th, maybe?)

Cavguy
01-09-2009, 05:54 AM
Just to clear misconceptions -

I will reiterate that Nagl's proposal is not for an Advisor Corps like CA, FAO, etc., but three BCT's designed and manned specifically to advise. Soldiers would rotate in/out of these units in lifecycles - train, deploy, reset, just like regular BCT's. Advisors would get support structure, FRG's, team building prior to deployment (not the 60 days now), etc.

I told him in a phone conversation a few weeks ago the worst thing he did to his case is call it a "Corps" because everyone assumes it's a branch/functional area rather than an assignment.

So a "for example", Armor Officer MAJ Smith following ILE gets assigned to an advisor unit, takes a team, trains for ~ 1 year, deploys for a period of time (~ 1 year) advising a foreign force, and returns to home station. He then moves on to other assignments.

Key to his plan is incentives - it would have to be rewarded as a job like O/C duty used to be.

The army instead is essentially going to do a bastardized version of this - certain H/I/S BCTs will be told they are going to morph into advisors for a deployment, and then deploy to Polk for training, and then to theater. They will be augmented from the generating (read TRADOC) force.

At least that's the plan.

Old Eagle
01-09-2009, 12:55 PM
Advisors need to bring subject matter expertise to the fight. Just because we haven't been able to get perfect match-ups for every MiTT position does not change the principle.

Those experts can then be developed as advisors (or returned to other duties).

As MG(Ret) Geoff Lambert so suscinctly put it, nobody wants a guy whose only expertise is giving advice.

Ken White
01-09-2009, 05:06 PM
Advisors need to bring subject matter expertise to the fight.... Those experts can then be developed as advisors (or returned to other duties)...nobody wants a guy whose only expertise is giving advice.A structured cyclic program as envisioned by Nagl would eat up three Bdes worth of Officers and senior NCOs for every 'Advisor Bn' it fields.

I served as an advisor to two different foreign Armies and know dozens of Officers and NCOs who've done the same thing plus some with another Army or two under their belt. Most of us did that fairly successfully without any preparatory effort to speak of, certainly those that did got a minimal effort.

After the Nagl proposal was publicized, I asked a number of them for their opinion -- not one agreed, nor did or do I. Advising is not easy but it isn't all that hard, either and ones effectiveness as an advisor is directly related to his currency and subject matter knowledges and abilities. Dedicated advisors even on a quasi-rotational basis are a terribly bad idea.

The Marines have figured that out...

Old Eagle
01-09-2009, 05:12 PM
Gotta disagree with the "so easy a caveman could do it" position. There are a host of reasons why perfectly good officers and NCOs fail miserably when trying to advise others. Some of it has to do with the degree of sophistication required to shift from being a doer and a trainer to being an advisor, and some of it has to do with inter-cultural stuff.

Ken White
01-09-2009, 06:08 PM
Gotta disagree with the "so easy a caveman could do it" position.But I don't think that's what I said...

I thought I said ""Advising is not easy but it isn't all that hard, either and ones effectiveness as an advisor is directly related to his currency and subject matter knowledges and abilities.""(emphasis added)
There are a host of reasons why perfectly good officers and NCOs fail miserably when trying to advise others. Some of it has to do with the degree of sophistication required to shift from being a doer and a trainer to being an advisor, and some of it has to do with inter-cultural stuff.True, no question -- and language...

Plus a lot of it -- failure to do well -- and perhaps even most of it has to do with the attitude and the ego of the Adviser in question but it would be extremely difficult if not impossible to screen for that. Not least because different cultures affect people in odd ways. For example, I did not like one culture I worked with and did like the other while a friend who had experience in the same two nations reversed that.

Old Eagle
01-09-2009, 08:06 PM
We're clearly on the same sheet. The "cavemen" postulators are the ones who come down on the far opposite end of the Nagl corps. The truth is somewhere in the amorphous middle.

Ken White
01-09-2009, 08:34 PM
We're clearly on the same sheet. The "cavemen" postulators are the ones who come down on the far opposite end of the Nagl corps. The truth is somewhere in the amorphous middle.Yea verily on that middle.

And my silly kids say I'm too quick to bridle at stuff...:cool:

jkm_101_fso
01-09-2009, 09:01 PM
Gotta disagree with the "so easy a caveman could do it" position. There are a host of reasons why perfectly good officers and NCOs fail miserably when trying to advise others.

The most prevalent defect I saw in those officers and NCOs who were poor advisors was their complete lack of maturity.

I define maturity as the willingness to understand your role, mission and constraints as an advisor.

When I heard NCOs or Officers say: "These Iraqis are all F***** up", it was usually indicative of their performance as an advisor.

Granted, some of those that failed as advisors maybe (or have been) great Platoon sergeants, company commanders and staff guys.


Some of it has to do with the degree of sophistication required to shift from being a doer and a trainer to being an advisor, and some of it has to do with inter-cultural stuff.

I personally didn't believe the transistion from "doer to advisor" was that difficult...and I'm an average performer. There were guys on my team and others that were (are) much better officers than me. It was difficult for them because they made it hard for themselves; specifically, their crappy attitude from start to finish. Not sure if it was because they didn't want to be on a MiTT or because they didn't like Iraqis. It doesn't matter; they did a disservice to the mission, other team members and the IA.

To be a successful advisor, a guy has to WANT to do well; put his personal feelings or grudges aside and execute.

By execute, I mean sincerely and wholeheartedly put their best effort into making their foreign counterpart the best performer he can be. This can only be done with patience, time and consistency. Particularly with Iraqis, they know when someone doesn't sincerely want to help them, and it will effect the relationship and his performance.

EDIT:
One Caveat: It is crucial that the MiTT team chief is the most mature (see definition). His attitude will have a lot to do with the team's (and thus foreign unit) performance.