Defining Success in Counterinsurgency

[SteveMetz]

I've been doing some research on the Chechen conflict as preparation for a paper on high value targeting and counterinsurgency that I'm presenting to the RAND Insurgency Board next month. I noted that by 2007, a combination of offensive actions and political reform/reconstruction had so beaten the movement down that it was basically a combination of terrorism and banditry.

It struck me how common that pattern is. U.S. (and U.K.) doctrine and strategy posit "peace"--the absence or near-absence of organized violence--as the end state in counterinsurgency. Is this feasible? Should we instead have doctrine and strategy that posits an end state where the insurgency cannot seize power or exercise total control over significant parts of the country, but where terrorism and banditry are still relatively common? I know that's not desirable, but is it the most realistic definition of success?

[John T. Fishel]

Hey Steve--

Good point/post. Back in 86 - 87 we (Max, me, and others in SWORD) were trying to define what COIN success in El Salvador would look like. None of us thought that it would end with a peace accord that gave the government nearly everything it wanted. :cool: So, we thought that success would probably be when the threat was down to the level of a police problem. That is, it would be essentially banditry that would not require the army to address. At most, the AF would have to provide some helicopter mobility and the navy would need to exercise its coast guard function.

Cheers

JohnT

[Tom Odom]

Interesting question, Steve. I can say that in our portrayal of ops in a campaign frame here at JRTC we are not looking for peace as in absence of conflict. Sometime, my friend, I want you to get down here for an MRE. I believe you would find it quite interesting, especially if you could come and stay for a couple of weeks.

I would also add that when I wrote a campaign plan for the Great Lakes area of Africa in 1995, I used reduced conflict/reduced killing as the desired endstate. To have posited "peace in our times" as an endstate then would have been absurd. DATTs normally don't write campaign plans but we needed one to frame our efforts as a country team. USEUCOM picked it up and used it. It also stimulated State to name a regional coordinator--Ambassador Dick Bogosian--for the Great Lakes.

Best

Tom

[Surferbeetle]

It struck me how common that pattern is. U.S. (and U.K.) doctrine and strategy posit "peace"--the absence or near-absence of organized violence--as the end state in counterinsurgency. Is this feasible? Should we instead have doctrine and strategy that posits an end state where the insurgency cannot seize power or exercise total control over significant parts of the country, but where terrorism and banditry are still relatively common? I know that's not desirable, but is it the most realistic definition of success?

Steve,

The USAID website (http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/conflict/) on Conflict Management has some interesting references that speak to acceptable equilibrium points in areas experiencing some level of conflict.


A peaceful, stable world is a key foreign policy priority for the United States. Yet violent conflict and instability are widespread in the developing world, affecting almost 60 percent of the countries in which USAID operates.

Many of the most important causes of violence, extremism and instability – such as stagnant or deteriorating economies, weak or illegitimate political institutions, or competition over natural resources – are the central concerns of aid. Development assistance must take this into account. Therefore, the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (DCHA/CMM) was created to change the way aid is planned and implemented.

This month's Atlantic also has a pretty interesting article about tipping points/equilibrium points in US communities by Hanna Rosen titled 'American Murder Mystery' (http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200807/memphis-crime).


Falling crime rates have been one of the great American success stories of the past 15 years. New York and Los Angeles, once the twin capitals of violent crime, have calmed down significantly, as have most other big cities. Criminologists still debate why: the crack war petered out, new policing tactics worked, the economy improved for a long spell. Whatever the alchemy, crime in New York, for instance, is now so low that local prison guards are worried about unemployment.

Lately, though, a new and unexpected pattern has emerged, taking criminologists by surprise. While crime rates in large cities stayed flat, homicide rates in many midsize cities (with populations of between 500,000 and 1 million) began increasing, sometimes by as much as 20percent a year.

I am thinking about models which describe 'violence', for want of a better word, and are able to address the many faceted things we see in '4GW' conflicts; relevant metrics and methodologies used to predict incidents that can also be used train folks who work in this arena are of particular interest. I very much appreciated the list of references you once posted to this board and if you have a list on this topic that you would be willing to share I would appreciate it.

Does your bike use a kevlar chain? I have an old r850r that I still love to ride around on...german engineering makes for an enjoyable ride. :) Their new superbike looks to be pretty interesting but the k1200rs (practical, comfortable, and wicked fast) that I test rode a few years back still haunts me, one of these days I will have to do something about that.

Regards,

Steve

[SteveMetz]

Does your bike use a kevlar chain? I have an old r850r that I still love to ride around on...german engineering makes for an enjoyable ride. :) Their new superbike looks to be pretty interesting but the k1200rs (practical, comfortable, and wicked fast) that I test rode a few years back still haunts me, one of these days I will have to do something about that.

Regards,

Steve

It's a belt--not sure if that's the same thing.

The K1200R is really hot. I looked at one but learning to ride at age 51 on a 167 HP bike would have been double dumb instead of just single dumb. I have one buddy that keeps telling me I'm idiot for getting what I did--that I need to learn on a used 350cc Suzuki.

Had to take it to the dealer for something they missed in the initial inspection yesterday. My first ride in traffic on major roads. Went very well. Still ragged on the starts and shifts and my hands get tired very quickly, but coming along. And successfully keeping it rubber side down.

[William F. Owen]

It struck me how common that pattern is. U.S. (and U.K.) doctrine and strategy posit "peace"--the absence or near-absence of organized violence--as the end state in counterinsurgency. Is this feasible? Should we instead have doctrine and strategy that posits an end state where the insurgency cannot seize power or exercise total control over significant parts of the country, but where terrorism and banditry are still relatively common? I know that's not desirable, but is it the most realistic definition of success?

This is exactly the end-state that the British Empire adhered to for over 200 years, and was applied in Northern Ireland, and everywhere else. Almost all of the Empire had problems with bandits, and frightful people.

Kilcullen also noted this in one of his papers. I think Paget talks about it explicitly, though I am currently away from my library so I can't check.

I do note that FM3-24 has something to say about controlling the level of violence on Page 33. (Page 1 Chap 2)

The "acceptable level of violence" (explicit in UK NI Doctrine) form also adheres to the classic concept of military defeat - Delbruck Destruction and Exhaustion? -. The Insurgent capability to create useful change is so undermined that it becomes demonstrably useless, and thus erodes their will to continue. - though non-military means may also have eroded his support.

Additionally, one of the few useful distinctions I can make between fighting insurgents and fighting formations is that mechanisms of military defeat are, in a few key areas, distinctly different, so this would suggest that Steve may be on exactly the right track.

I would further suggest that looking at Colombia from this perspective would be very interesting for obvious reasons.


So, we thought that success would probably be when the threat was down to the level of a police problem. That is, it would be essentially banditry that would not require the army to address. At most, the AF would have to provide some helicopter mobility and the navy would need to exercise its coast guard function.

John! You should have been a Colonial Policeman! Incisive and useful.

[Fuchs]

Should we instead have doctrine and strategy that posits an end state where the insurgency cannot seize power or exercise total control over significant parts of the country, but where terrorism and banditry are still relatively common? I know that's not desirable, but is it the most realistic definition of success?

That may be reasonable as a definition for mission success, but it is lacking as definition for political success.

The politicians bear the responsibility for waging war, and I personally cannot accept any war as success that does not improve the situation in comparison to not waging war at least for the own country.
In other words: Political success depends not only on what's being achieved, but also at what costs it was achieved.

[MattC86]

That may be reasonable as a definition for mission success, but it is lacking as definition for political success.

The politicians bear the responsibility for waging war, and I personally cannot accept any war as success that does not improve the situation in comparison to not waging war at least for the own country.
In other words: Political success depends not only on what's being achieved, but also at what costs it was achieved.

True - and all the more relevant given the unrealistic expectations this war (wars?) has/have been waged under. The domestic public as a whole was not prepared for a drawn-out conflict with an uncertain outcome. That makes an ambiguous "victory" in this COIN effort domestically tough to swallow, and consequently tough to drum up support for, particularly as sentiments that "all that money could be better spent elsewhere" mount.

Combine that with a media-driven political fight over each report of a car bomb, kidnapping, or killing ("guess the surge didn't work after all"), and such an ambiguous end-state does not strike me as particularly appealing to the general public.

Regards,

Matt

[Granite_State]

True - and all the more relevant given the unrealistic expectations this war (wars?) has/have been waged under. The domestic public as a whole was not prepared for a drawn-out conflict with an uncertain outcome. That makes an ambiguous "victory" in this COIN effort domestically tough to swallow, and consequently tough to drum up support for, particularly as sentiments that "all that money could be better spent elsewhere" mount.

Combine that with a media-driven political fight over each report of a car bomb, kidnapping, or killing ("guess the surge didn't work after all"), and such an ambiguous end-state does not strike me as particularly appealing to the general public.

Regards,

Matt

I see what you're saying, but ambiguous or not, that end-state could result in virtually all U.S. combat troops coming home. Hard to see that and a functioning Iraq or Afghanistan not being perceived as a victory, even if partial.

[Fuchs]

"Pyrrhic".
You forgot "Pyrrhic" next to "victory".

[Ken White]

"Pyrrhic".
You forgot "Pyrrhic" next to "victory".that there's no such thing as victory in an insurgency, all one can do is achieve an acceptable outcome -- and that's pretty well going to happen.

[MikeF]

"We're not after the Holy Grail on Iraq, we're not after Jeffersonian democracy…There's not a desire for what people might see as perfection, adequate is good enough, if you will."
- General David Patraeas, Testimony to Congress, April 2008

“Success will be when Al Qaeda has no safe havens in Iraq and Iraqis can protect themselves. Success will be when Iraq is a nation that can support itself economically. Success will be when Iraq is a democracy that governs itself effectively and responds to the will of its people. Success will be when Iraq is a strong and capable ally in the war on terrror.
-President Bush, Fort Bragg, NC, 21MAY08

The tone is definitely a shifting- from optimistism to pragmatism.

[John T. Fishel]

stand up the new Panama National Police in 1990. Does that count?:D

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

The tone is definitely a shifting- from optimism to pragmatism.Just the usual and to be expected case of reality intruding on political exuberance and hyperbole. Politicians, mostly, don't understand the limits or war and tend to use big glowing words and too simplistic ones like 'victory,' 'win' and 'lose' to dazzle or sway the great unwashed. It's stupid and ignorant...

They shouldn't do it but they're politicians after all. Can't expect too much.

[MattC86]

Just the usual and to be expected case of reality intruding on political exuberance and hyperbole. Politicians, mostly, don't understand the limits or war and tend to use big glowing words and too simplistic ones like 'victory,' 'win' and 'lose' to dazzle or sway the great unwashed. It's stupid and ignorant...

They shouldn't do it but they're politicians after all. Can't expect too much.

I feel it's more than just idiot politicians. It's ingrained American identity. We don't act in our self-interest, we change the world in great moralist crusades, as is our mission. So much of what we've done since 9/11, though it cries out for a realist response, has taken this idealist overtone.

I think it's easy to laugh at how stupid that all sounds, but I believe it truly does underwrite so many of our perceptions. That precludes a domestic public from accepting an "acceptable level" of banditry and terrorist violence - particularly when one side (my side) is determined to subjugate achieving foreign policy goals to taking potshots at a disliked president. . .

As Wilf pointed out, the British Empire was essentially built on an ambiguous level of control and peace in its territories. The British public accepted this as the expected order of things - Americans do not, and it's not just our current neurotic and highly-politicized culture, either. There was more than enough domestic discontent with the American version of "imperial policing" efforts in the Caribbean, the Philippines, and the like.

So what's the solution?

Regards,

Matt

[MattC86]

I see what you're saying, but ambiguous or not, that end-state could result in virtually all U.S. combat troops coming home. Hard to see that and a functioning Iraq or Afghanistan not being perceived as a victory, even if partial.

Right - that will ease some, but not all, of the discontent. The fact that neither state will be a totally successful, peaceful, and prosperous free democracy (at least in our idealized sense) means that people will still view it as a failure, even if the major American commitment is over.

This also means that the public as a whole is probably never going to view what we did in Iraq (potentially Afghanistan) as a success, and thus a complication for dealing with further instabilities and the like.

Regards,

Matt

[Ken White]

I feel it's more than just idiot politicians. It's ingrained American identity...So what's the solution?Still, you asked...;)

- Fix our education system to eliminate the froth and feel good self esteem foolishness, educate and train people who have no business going to college for other employment and instill a knowledge of the wider world, our governmental system and at least one foreign language. That MUST include the inner city and poor rural schools.

- Scale back so-called 'entitlements to a realistic and affordable level to assist in eliminating the culture of dependency that has grown in the US over the alst 70 years.

- Force the US media to return to journalism instead of celebritology and educate the ignorant on how their government works.

- Mandate English as the official language; commercial use of others is fine but all tests and governmental signs, anything remotely official, should be in English.

- Retool the Executive branch to get rid of all the foxes watching henhouses. The FAA, for example, cannot promote air travel, foster a secure operating environment, manage the airways and insure flight safety -- those things are conflicts of interest and the US government is rife with them.

- Restore some luster to the State Department and get the GCCs out of the pro-consul bit.

- Repeal all the idiotic incumbent protection laws like the FEC establishment and McCain-Feingold.

- Reform our dysfunctional budget process and force Congress to stop micromanaging, interfering and reacting whimsically to enforce what they (not the 'American people') want or think right but to do what is best for the nation -- starting with fewer special interest protection laws.

You asked. All that in the too hard box? Probably.

So what's realistically to be done? Vote out all incumbents at all levels and keep doing that until the idiots get the message. It'll take about 15 years for that for it to sink in but until we start electing competent people who are not professional pols, it'll continue to get worse instead of better.

[Ken White]

Right - that will ease some, but not all, of the discontent. The fact that neither state will be a totally successful, peaceful, and prosperous free democracy (at least in our idealized sense) means that people will still view it as a failure, even if the major American commitment is over. That 'idealized sense' is due to politicians saying dumb things, they build expectations that are totally unrealistic (and not just in Iraq). Fortunately, most Americans are smarter than their politicians.

This also means that the public as a whole is probably never going to view what we did in Iraq (potentially Afghanistan) as a success, and thus a complication for dealing with further instabilities and the like.I suspect that will be only partly true -- and the division will be on political / ideological grounds.

[MikeF]

Every generation needs a new revolution.

-Thomas Jefferson.

[Bill Moore]

the absence or near-absence of organized violence--as the end state in counterinsurgency. Is this feasible? Should we instead have doctrine and strategy that posits an end state where the insurgency cannot seize power or exercise total control over significant parts of the country, but where terrorism and banditry are still relatively common? I know that's not desirable, but is it the most realistic definition of success? SteveMetz

I don’t agree with this for several reasons, but will focus on one. Insurgencies can ebb and flow, so if an insurgency is beat down to the level where the police can control it, that doesn’t mean it will stay down (we have this numerous times in regions of Iraq and Afghanistan). If the insurgency isn’t defeated (this term does need further definition), it can re-strengthen to a level where they can overcome the police, and then it boils into a national emergency again (for the inflicted country).

If you look at it from the U.S. perspective, then perhaps sending in combat forces to beat down an insurgency to the level that the HN can hold its own is an acceptable course of action (clear end state for the military). However, the conflict is hardly over for the HN, and if it is in our national interest for the existing HN government to remain in control, then the USG may still desire to be involved in the conflict at various levels (USAID, economic development, information support, and perhaps even military advisers for their security forces).

From the HN perspective, I can’t see anything less than defeat of the insurgents being acceptable. Defeating an insurgency can be more complex than defeating a conventional military force, and it will involve all elements of national power down to the village level to defeat their foot soldiers and their ideology, and to establish or re-establish government legitimacy over the entire population (this may be the strategic endstate).


The USAID website on Conflict Management has some interesting references that speak to acceptable equilibrium points in areas experiencing some level of conflict. Surferbeetle

I’m over simplifying, but this is a politically correct version of waging war/peace. This means we (whoever we may be) go into a conflict without the intent of defeating the enemy, but simply to achieve an acceptable middle area. This can be the cruelest form of war, a low level conflict that carries on forever preventing social and economic development. Why not let one side prevail? This may appear to be cruel and indifferent, but I think war is a form of social/political evolution. If there is compelling need for a group of people to evolve and there is no other recourse (political or other peaceful method of change) to facilitate that evolution, man will result to conflict. Simply getting to a so called equilibrium point will not solve the underlying issues, and it may freeze frame a region into a permanent state of conflict.

If we're going to commit forces, then let's do it to win. Insurgenices can be defeated, as written elsewhere throughout this council it is the HN that defeats the insurgency, and if our help is needed, then we assist them. Our actions are not decisive, they are enabling.

[Surferbeetle]

This may appear to be cruel and indifferent, but I think war is a form of social/political evolution. If there is compelling need for a group of people to evolve and there is no other recourse (political or other peaceful method of change) to facilitate that evolution, man will result to conflict. Simply getting to a so called equilibrium point will not solve the underlying issues, and it may freeze frame a region into a permanent state of conflict.

If we're going to commit forces, then let's do it to win. Insurgenices can be defeated, as written elsewhere throughout this council it is the HN that defeats the insurgency, and if our help is needed, then we assist them. Our actions are not decisive, they are enabling.

Bill,

Darwin is an interesting guy who managed to uncover a fundamental truth. I am of the opinion that civilization is an extremely thin veneer and we forget this at our peril. Nature, be it at the chemical, microbial, plant, or animal level (this includes us) is all about equilibriums (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gibbs_free_energy). There is no static decisive point for a species other than extinction.

Examining Iraq it appears that the in-country factions (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_of_Iraq_from_2006) are waiting for our election results to reveal the future orientation of America's foreign policy while scheming about how to maximize any resulting opportunities. There was alot of anger in that country when I was there, and alot of blood (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qisas) has flowed since then. Somebody will have to continue to cut deals (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diplomacy) so that stability efforts can take hold. We just need to keep in mind that it's not Kansas nor will it ever be. I have always been a fan of the school of 'walk softly but carry a big stick (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theodore_Roosevelt)' and feel that some of these lessons are a viable solution to our troubles.

Chechnya (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chechnia) may indeed be an applicable model for a future Iraq. Even the Russians (not such big fans of the whole PC thing) have not been able to stamp out conflict and bring complete stability to that country. The British Empire (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_empire), (PC-capable as required) even with their vaunted Colonial Service (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colonial_Service) had on-going issues in several of their colonies (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_empire#End_of_British_Raj). The Romans (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Roman_wars) did well using non PC techniques but I submit that they were stuck with equilibrium points (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marcomannic_Wars) just like we are.

This weekend I am going to draft up a note for Rob Thorton on his stability thread about public private partnerships vs. the limited/non-existent rule of law environment and would appreciate your insights if you get a chance. I am going to try to cover north america, latin america, and europe vs. iraq....this will probably require a couple of beers to build up some steam however.

Regards,

Steve

[SteveMetz]

Bill,

Darwin is an interesting guy who managed to uncover a fundamental truth. I am of the opinion that civilization is an extremely thin veneer and we forget this at our peril. Nature, be it at the chemical, microbial, plant, or animal level (this includes us) is all about equilibriums (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gibbs_free_energy). There is no static decisive point for a species other than extinction.

Examining Iraq it appears that the in-country factions (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_of_Iraq_from_2006) are waiting for our election results to reveal the future orientation of America's foreign policy while scheming about how to maximize any resulting opportunities. There was alot of anger in that country when I was there, and alot of blood (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qisas) has flowed since then. Somebody will have to continue to cut deals (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diplomacy) so that stability efforts can take hold. We just need to keep in mind that it's not Kansas nor will it ever be. I have always been a fan of the school of 'walk softly but carry a big stick (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theodore_Roosevelt)' and feel that some of these lessons are a viable solution to our troubles.

Chechnya (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chechnia) may indeed be an applicable model for a future Iraq. Even the Russians (not such big fans of the whole PC thing) have not been able to stamp out conflict and bring complete stability to that country. The British Empire (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_empire), (PC-capable as required) even with their vaunted Colonial Service (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colonial_Service) had on-going issues in several of their colonies (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_empire#End_of_British_Raj). The Romans (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Roman_wars) did well using non PC techniques but I submit that they were stuck with equilibrium points (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marcomannic_Wars) just like we are.

This weekend I am going to draft up a note for Rob Thorton on his stability thread about public private partnerships vs. the limited/non-existent rule of law environment and would appreciate your insights if you get a chance. I am going to try to cover north america, latin america, and europe vs. iraq....this will probably require a couple of beers to build up some steam however.

Regards,

Steve

What amazed me as I did my Chechnya research was that when the Russians shifted to a combination of mailed fist and hearts and minds approach, and "Chechnyization," it worked pretty well. They shattered the resistance as a true political threat, and drove it to pure terrorism and banditry. Chechnya is not doing too badly today (although the conflict has spread to neighboring states).

[Bill Moore]

I am of the opinion that civilization is an extremely thin veneer and we forget this at our peril. Nature, be it at the chemical, microbial, plant, or animal level (this includes us) is all about equilibriums. There is no static decisive point for a species other than extinction. Surferbeetle

I think this is a great point, it takes very little to disrupt the current politcal/social balance, but that doesn't mean an insurgency can't be defeated. If the insurgency is the disrupter, it must be defeated to return to an acceptable equalibrium. We may be talking past one another with vague concepts, such as "defeat" when talking about insurgencies. You defeat an insurgency using several lines of effort, and one of those LOEs is removing their cause(s) to continue fighting, thus making deals with the insurgents can be a LOE in order to establish or re-establish an equalibrium point. The idea that we never negotiate with the enemy is usually seriously flawed, but we do want to negotiate from a superior position. There are no book answers, it always depends on the nature of the insurgency.

Where we frequently get it wrong is:

1. The USG attempts to define success criteria, which leads to the USG taking the lead role in a counterinsurgency, instead of a supporting role. Who ultimately defeats the insurgents, the USG or the HN?

2. We attempt to transpose Western values upon non-Western societies, which in itself results in non-equalibrium.

3. We frequently fail to understand the nature of the conflict we're embarking upon before embark. Iraq for example, in my opinion, should not be viewed as the COIN model we base our doctrine on. As I have argued before, we need to develop a doctrine for occupation/regime change for situations like Iraq and Afghanistan, and possible future scenarios.

When I first wrote about it I called it regime/occupation doctrine, but my boss more accurately called it revolutionary war. Think about it:

a. We invaded a country and overthrew their government.
b. We just didn't replace the leader, we imposed a foreign form of government upon them in the midst of the fight.
c. We provided the bulk of the fighting forces, and still provide a significant portion of the fighting forces, thus we are in fact foreign revolutionaries, we are engaged in revolutionary warfare.
d. Counterinsurgency doctrine is wholly inadequate for this type of warfare. Equalibrium is a long ways off, since we significantly disrupted the social-politicalsphere. Something close to the former equalibrium may return if we see a military coup in Iraq and the re-establishment of martial government.

In a more traditional COIN scenario where we are in a supporting role, I agree that equalibrium may be the U.S. exit point, then the HN carries on with the transformation needed to decisively defeat/end the insurgency. In Iraq what does equalibrium look like?

We must take into account that our interests don't necessarily dovetail with the nation's interests we are supporting. We need to clarify the interests of both nations before we embark (of course you couldn't do that with Iraq, because the follow on government didn't exist yet, another argument for revolutionary warfare doctrine), and attempt to define our exit point before we enter, so military planners inconjunction with other key interagency players can work towards an endstate. This is challenging enough, but not near as challenging as what we're doing in Iraq.

[William F. Owen]

d. Counterinsurgency doctrine is wholly inadequate for this type of warfare.

I'm intrigued by this! Isn't Counterinsurgency Doctrine merely the body of teaching that informs the countering of an insurgency?

If the doctrine is inadequate what don't understand about the problem?

[Bill Moore]

I'm intrigued by this! Isn't Counterinsurgency Doctrine merely the body of teaching that informs the countering of an insurgency?

If the doctrine is inadequate what don't understand about the problem?


Technically you're correct, we are now dealing with an insurgency against the occupation and the Iraqi government (the form of government we created). We're also dealing ethnic conflict and a terrorist threat that is separate from the insurgents and civil conflict combatants (though the terrorists attempt to exploit both), but the insurgents and civil conflict combatants also use terrorism as a tactic. But we'll move beyond that and address the specific question at hand.

The doctrine doesn't adequately address standing up a government from scratch, but assuming that exists somewhere, does it address how to implement revolutionary change? If we think we may have to completely transform a country's political and social system in the future, we should have a doctrinal basis of sorts to work from. The situation we have Iraq today is of our own making. The COIN doctrine only captures the current fight, it doesn't address the transition between combat operations and establishing a new government. Assuming we could have done this better, we would have fewer problems today. Instead it appeared to be an afterthought. If we were going to overthrow another country today, have we captured the lessons on how to establish a new government?

[Surferbeetle]

The doctrine doesn't adequately address standing up a government from scratch, but assuming that exists somewhere, does it address how to implement revolutionary change?

Bill,

I mentioned this RAND reference on Nation Building (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG557/) over on Rob Thorton's thread on stability (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5548). The monograph is certainly a start, however 'standing up a government' is a massive topic spread out over many disciplines and just one reference cannot begin to do justice to the complexity involved.


Since the end of the Cold War, the United States, NATO, the United Nations, and a range of other states and nongovernmental organizations have become increasingly involved in nation-building operations. Nation-building involves the use of armed force as part of a broader effort to promote political and economic reforms, with the objective of transforming a society emerging from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbors. This guidebook is a practical “how-to” manual on the conduct of effective nation-building. It is organized around the constituent elements that make up any nation-building mission: military, police, rule of law, humanitarian relief, governance, economic stabilization, democratization, and development. The chapters describe how each of these components should be organized and employed, how much of each is likely to be needed, and the likely cost. The lessons are drawn principally from 16 U.S.- and UN-led nation-building operations since World War II and from a forthcoming study on European-led missions. In short, this guidebook presents a comprehensive history of best practices in nation-building and serves as an indispensable reference for the preplanning of future interventions and for contingency planning on the ground.


If we think we may have to completely transform a country's political and social system in the future, we should have a doctrinal basis of sorts to work from.

By living outside of the US periodically during the 60's, 70's, and early 90's I have noted a gradual homogenization of fashion cultures around the world ('sneaker' casual followed by the current hip-hop trend in particular). The 'Culture (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Culture)' of a society is so multi-faceted however, that I question any one nation's ability to 'completely transform' an indigenous political and social system no matter what the means used. To use a surfing/boogie-boarding/sponger analogy, fighting the wave is not going to get you where you want to go, instead you need to accept what the wave is, and use the power of the wave in order to achieve your goals.

Regards,

Steve

[jcustis]

Ambassador Dick Bogosian

Interesting guy Tom...Was he the one who eventually assigned the head USLO role in Mogadishu? If so, he signed off on a letter of apreciation for me and the rest of my platoon mates.

As for the issue of level of banditry and terrorism, I would have to say that if you can start to bring things down to that point, it does make it easier to mobilize the population behind your efforts.

For some reason, it seems that we have had the most success when the terrorist and the criminal is villified, versus the "insurgent". The latter term invokes differences of opinion here at the SWC, and that carries over to the theater. I think the terrorist is a easier fruit to crush.

[Tom Odom]

I don't know if Dick was in Mog, He may have been. I last saw him in DC when Ambassador Dave Rawson and I spoke on a 10 anniversary panel at USIP in 2004. Dick is one of the good guys


Tom

[Bill Moore]

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5602

Jedburgh posted this link to an excellent article that I think seriously challenges some of arguments made in the RAND study on Nation Building posted by Surferbeetle.

Both articles leave considerable wiggle room (gray space), but in general the RAND study states that some level of democratization and economic development are essential, and that our numerous failures in the past at nation building were largely due to insufficient input (i.e. dollars and Joes).

On the other hand Dr. Birtle argues the following:


There is a tendency on the part of many Americans, for example, to believe that economic capitalism and political democracy are sure remedies for resolving internal conflicts.

This tendency is highlited in the RAND study on nation building. Dr. Birtle continues with:


The rhetoric proved naïve. Eco*nomics and materialism were not as deterministic as many had thought, and even Rostow eventually admitted that “as for the linkage between economic development and the emergence of stable political democracies, we may, in retrospect, have been a bit too hopeful.”

Unrealistic expectations about the power of mate*rial changes have been matched on the political front. As historian Daniel Boorstin warned in 1953, “If we rely on the ‘philosophy of American democ*racy’ as a weapon in the world-wide struggle, we are relying on a weapon which may prove to be a dud.”


Counterinsurgency and nation building theorists have all too often ignored this reality and have fallen into the culturally insensitive trap of trying to radically transform foreign societies.

Allowing for some wiggle room, I'm finding myself in Dr. Birtle's camp based on experience, and this is coming from a reformed neo-conservative (the Reagan years). Just like any other former addict, when I hear lofty ideas floated about I tend to get excited and want to embrace them, but then I have to remind myself that, "no, no, no, I don't smoke it no more, I'm tired of waking up on the floor."

[Jedburgh]

This paper is one of a group that were given in the Special Warfare and Incipient Insurgency Working Groups at the XVIII MORS, which was held at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center, Ft Bragg, N.C., on 19-21 October 1966:

Guidelines for Measuring Success in Counterinsurgency (http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=AD643236&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)


This study represents an attempt to establish valid guidelines for measuring the progress of the war in South Vietnam as well as in similar situations of insurgency and revolutionary warfare that may arise elsewhere in the future. As far as it is known, this is the first, and it is believed a successful, attempt to spell out a series of steps by which reasoned concusions may be drawn regarding this special kind of situation. Although the war in Vietnam has been used as the primary source of inputs for this study (and many references will be case specific to Vietnam), the level. of generalization extends far beyond the borders of Vietnam. The individual evaluations necessary to apply the guidelines to a specific case will vary widely according to the cultural setting. But the guidelines themselves are generic to insurgency and revolutionary warfare and should be of considerable aid to those faced with the daily task of knowing whether we are winning or losing, and by how much.

[Tukhachevskii]

What amazed me as I did my Chechnya research was that when the Russians shifted to a combination of mailed fist and hearts and minds approach, and "Chechnyization," it worked pretty well. They shattered the resistance as a true political threat, and drove it to pure terrorism and banditry. Chechnya is not doing too badly today (although the conflict has spread to neighboring states).

Yet, lets not forget that the Chechens themselves were partly if not wholly responsible for the fracturing of the insurgency which in Chenya II the Russians actually exacerbated rather than instigated. The original demand of the Chechen sepratists/freedom fighters was

The original Chechen independence movement was in many ways high-jacked by Islamic radicals (although Dudayev was also partly to blame for appealing to Islamist forces to protect the republic). The tension between the ―moderate (sufi) nationalists and ―Wahhabi factions was initially submerged during the First Chechen War when all parties concentrated on repelling the counter-productive and brutal response of the Russian armed forces. However, with the steady erosion via assassination of the government‘s higher echelons- Dudayev 1996, Yandarbiyev in 2004, Maskhadov in 2005, Basaev and Sadulaev in 2006, etc – and the increasing difficulty of controlling an array of jamaats or armed groups, many of whom have differing agendas, tensions have come to the surface with the reported split between Prime Minister, now Emir, Doku Umarov and his former Prime Minister Akhmed Zakaev.

Zakayev steadily distanced himself from Umarov whom he considered to be dangerously influenced by radical ―Wahhabi‖ factions and resigned upon Umarov‘s declaration of a Caucasus Emirate in 2007. Of the rebel forces in Chechnya only Isa Munayev and Sultan Arsayev have publicly sided with Zakayev. Some of the remaining government-in-exile has thrown its weight behind Umarov, who has declared Zakayev a traitor for his attempts to reach out to the pro-Russian Chechen government, while others declared that Umarov‘s declaration was in violation of the Chechen Constitution of March 1992 and that, as a result, Umarov was no longer President. Zakayev and the moderates have long sought a negotiated settlement of the Chechen problem based upon a desire to see Moscow adhere to the defunct Soviet Constitution of 1990 elements of which were retained in the Russian Federal Constitution, a text, moreover, whose wording regarding the precise meaning of ―sovereignty‖ is disputed by both sides. According to the law passed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 26th April 1990 all Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSR), of which the Chechen—Ingush ASSR was one, were upgraded to union republics giving them the theoretical right to secede from the Union.

As for Chechnya being peaceful that's only because Russia decided to install Ramzan Kadyrov and his "gang" in power. They have continued to fight Yamadaev's units (who were then sent to Georgia to get them out of Kadyrov's hair). Also, Sulim Yamadaev was recently assassinated in Dubai on, IMO, Kadyrov's orders. Essentially what we have in Chechnya is a complicated morass of nationalist/separtist forces, clan "violence entrepeneurs" (to use Vadim Volkovs phrase) and now marginalised but still influential Wahhabis (for lack of a better term) who are all engaged in a complicated game of balancing, bandwagoning and exploting the Russian presence for their own goals while, above all this, Russia tries to play each force off without appearing to be the puppet master (a role at whch, IMO, they have never really succeded). Subtly is to Russia what hout cusine is to McDonalds.